Arrow Left Arrow Right Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Twitter Video Camera Youtube
A Huthi Missile, a Saudi Purge and a Lebanese Resignation Shake the Middle East
A Huthi Missile, a Saudi Purge and a Lebanese Resignation Shake the Middle East
Houthi fighters walk at the site of an air strike on a parade square in Sanaa, Yemen on November 5, 2017. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah

A Huthi Missile, a Saudi Purge and a Lebanese Resignation Shake the Middle East

Volatility is rising across the Middle East as local, regional and international conflicts increasingly intertwine and amplify each other. Four Crisis Group analysts give a 360-degree view of the new risks of overlapping conflicts that involve Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon and Israel.

On 4 November 2017, Huthi/Saleh forces in Yemen fired a Burkan 2-H long-range ballistic missile at the Saudi capital, Riyadh. It was intercepted and destroyed before reaching its target. The attack occurred during a profound political shakeup in Saudi Arabia, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is seeking to consolidate power, and amid dramatic Saudi political manoeuvrings in the region which led to the resignation of Lebanon’s prime minister, Saad Hariri. Adding to the volatility, Israel has been making veiled – and not so veiled – threats about its intent to prevent Hizbollah from developing an indigenous capacity to build sophisticated precision missiles.

The Yemen War Is a Trigger Point for Wider Conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran – By April Longley Alley

The Potential Cost to Iran of Its Expanding Rivalry with Saudi Arabia – By Ali Vaez

Saudi Arabia’s Counter-productive Show of Strength in Lebanon – By Heiko Wimmen

Israel Faces New Risks in Enforcing Its Red Lines against Hizbollah – By Ofer Zalzberg

 

The Yemen War Is a Trigger Point for Wider Conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran

By April Longley Alley, Project Director, Arabian Peninsula

Although the Huthi/Saleh alliance has fired dozens of rockets into Saudi territory this year, this missile launch is the farthest on record and the closest they have come to hitting a major population centre. The fact that they have the capability to strike Riyadh raises the political stakes as well as the cost of war for Saudi Arabia. It also means that other Gulf cities may soon be in target range; on 8 November, the Huthis threatened further attacks on Saudi and Emirati ports and airports. Given growing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the U.S. administration’s eagerness to push back against Tehran, missile strikes by the Huthis in Gulf countries or in the Red Sea arguably are the single most dangerous trigger points for widening the conflict beyond Yemen to a regional confrontation.

Crisis Group on the Ground This section is contributed by April Longley Alley, Project Director, Arabian Peninsula CRISISGROUP/Julie David de Lossy

Yet lost amid the regional dynamics is the Yemeni political context. The Huthi/Saleh alliance didn’t fire the missile as part of the Iranian-Saudi conflict; rather, they did so for domestic reasons. They view their missile program, rightly or wrongly, as the best way to retaliate against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, which have devastated parts of north Yemen over the past two and a half years, and also as the best bargaining chip in future negotiations. Tellingly, the missile attack came on the heels of two Saudi airstrikes in the Huthis’ home governorate of Saada, which reportedly killed 38 people, eight of them children.

Intra-Huthi dynamics also could be at play. The strike came at a time of behind-the-scenes efforts to restart stalled negotiations to end the war, and thus may have been an indication that the Huthi bloc’s harder-line military wing may be out of step with its political negotiators and is acting to pre-empt talks. In this context, the most effective way to minimise the risk of future missile attacks would be to reduce coalition airstrikes, especially those with the potential to result in civilian casualties, and quickly revive meaningful negotiations so that would-be Huthi dealmakers acquire leverage over hardliners deeply sceptical of a political compromise. Since the missile launch, however, the coalition has done precisely the opposite.

Driven by local factors, the strike nonetheless risks having dangerous regional and even international ramifications. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. directly linked the strikes to both Iran and Hizbollah, on the plausible basis that the Huthis’ mastery of missile technology benefited strongly from their assistance. A Saudi-led coalition spokesman went so far as to warn that the latest attack on Riyadh could be considered “an act of war”, with fingers clearly pointed to Tehran and Beirut.

Driven by local factors, the strike nonetheless risks having dangerous regional and even international ramifications.

Should the Saudis choose to retaliate, they would have only limited options inside Yemen, and these would come with significant risks. They could tighten the noose on Huthi/Saleh-controlled territories through an enlarged and more tightly enforced blockade. They already are doing this. On 6 November, they announced the temporary closure of all of Yemen’s land, air and seaports, ostensibly to prevent the flow of weapons from Iran to the Huthis.

But this approach is fraught with problems. First, whatever weapons are being smuggled into Yemen are unlikely to be passing through the main entry points currently closed off, namely the Huthi-controlled port of Hodeida as well as the Saudi-led coalition-controlled ports of Aden and Mukalla and airports in Aden and Saiyoun (Hadramout). More probably, they are entering Yemen through smaller ports along the Red Sea and Arabian Sea coasts, or through land crossings via Oman – vast areas that are nearly impossible for the coalition to seal.

Second, the Saudis are shooting themselves in the foot by closing off access to areas nominally under the Hadi government’s control in the south. They are punishing the people with whom they are politically aligned and whose support they need to maintain.

Yemen represents the most severe hunger crisis in the world, with an estimated seventeen million people who are food-insecure.

Third and most important are the humanitarian consequences. Supplies to Huthi/Saleh-controlled areas already have been sharply reduced due to coalition restrictions. As imports from Hodeida have declined, the Saudi border crossing of al-Wadi’a and Aden port have picked up the slack. If these vital access points are closed down, civilians will suffer the most, and Huthi/Saleh fighters will be the last and least affected. Already, Yemen represents the most severe hunger crisis in the world, with an estimated seventeen million people who are food-insecure. The coalition’s promise that the embargo will not affect humanitarian assistance is nice rhetoric but of virtually no practical impact. Aid cannot possibly address the food needs of all 27-28 million Yemenis. Sanaa is experiencing severe fuel shortages as a result of the announced closures, and these will further reduce the volume of food reaching markets. They will also affect the water supply, as water must be pumped from deep underground.

So far, the economic strangulation of the north has empowered the Huthi military wing, which has privileged control over and access to limited resources flowing into their areas. There is little reason to believe that more of the same will produce a different outcome.

Military options also are limited. By this point, the coalition has exhausted legitimate military targets from the air. Immediately after the missile strike, coalition bombers unleashed a barrage of airstrikes on Sanaa, repeatedly hitting military targets previously struck, and adding new but largely symbolic ones, such as the city’s parade ground. The coalition could expand its target list to include civilian infrastructure, government buildings and the homes of Huthi/Saleh leaders, as it has done in the past. But this would bring international scrutiny and condemnation as a result of inevitable civilian casualties, while also feeding the deep and growing resentment toward Saudi Arabia in the north.

The coalition also could put more troops on the ground to try to capture territory in north Yemen. One problem it would face is where to find such troops. Saudi-trained and supplied Yemeni forces consistently have failed to register military successes. Saudi Arabia has not been willing to put its own troops on the ground and is probably less likely to do so now, given developments inside the country. In contrast, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has committed troops in southern Yemen and has proven quite capable, but it remains unclear how much further they can or will go, given that a fight in the Huthi/Saleh northern heartland doubtless would result in significant casualties.

The U.S. conceivably could step in to help the coalition capture Hodeida and other areas. While this may produce gains, it likely would rally additional northern fighters to the fronts, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. The battle would become increasingly prolonged if it subsequently moved into the highlands.

In short, what can be done from the air in Yemen has already been done. What territory could be taken in the south with the strong backing of local populations has already been taken. Additional gains on the ground would be costly for all sides involved. Given that they are fighting on their home turf, Huthi/Saleh fighters almost certainly have a higher tolerance for escalation than their adversaries.

What is more, the attack on Riyadh temporarily brought the Huthis and Saleh’s forces closer together. Their cooperation had been fraying and their incipient divisions had opened up a small window for negotiations, as Crisis Group argued in a recent briefing. Yet today, both view the missile launch as a resounding success. Absent the resumption of political talks, the prospects for which have suffered a clear setback, we should expect more missiles headed toward Riyadh, and sooner or later a Saudi/U.S. response, whose target could be Yemen, Iran or Hizbollah. By all accounts, the current trajectory bodes poorly for a return to stability in Yemen, and may presage an ominous escalation in the region.

 

The Potential Cost to Iran of Its Expanding Rivalry with Saudi Arabia

By Ali Vaez, Project Director, Iran

U.S. as well as Saudi officials have claimed that Tehran plays a substantial role in arming the Yemeni movement, particularly through the provision of missile parts and training. While there is evidence of Iranian weapons supplies to the Huthis, including the transfer of drone technology, as well as of Iranian advisory and training support to the Huthis, notably via Hizbollah, the same cannot be said regarding any ongoing provision of significant amounts of military hardware.

Crisis Group on the Ground This section is contributed by Ali Vaez, Project Director, Iran CRISISGROUP/Julie David de Lossy

Likewise, although Iran sees real benefit in a Saudi Arabia caught in the Yemeni quagmire at very low cost to Tehran, it is unclear whether Iran exerts the kind of influence over the Huthis that would enable it to order or prevent such an attack. Indeed, the Huthis are known to have ignored Iran’s advice on consequential decisions in the past, for example when they entered Sanaa and subsequently moved south to Aden. In other words, Iran ultimately might pay a price for actions by an allied group it does not control.

Against this backdrop, Iran’s ties with the Huthis are a subject of debate among Tehran policymakers. One view, prevalent in the military and security establishment, appears to consider the Huthis a natural, potentially long-term ally, and accordingly argues for strengthening the group in order to keep Saudi Arabia off-balance. The second is the perspective of the elected government of President Hassan Rouhani, which sees Iran’s ties with the Huthis as useful, but only as long as the group’s actions do not harm Iran’s strategic interests.

Iran ultimately might pay a price for actions by an allied group it does not control.

For now, some in Tehran seem to be sensing the risks. The hard-line Kayhan newspaper explicitly welcomed the missile strike on Riyadh as an apt retaliation for the devastation the Saudis have inflicted on Yemen, and speculated that Dubai could be the Huthis’ next target. In response, the country’s Supreme National Security Council suspended the powerful outlet for two days for undermining national security. This was virtually unprecedented, given Kayhan’s position on the political spectrum, and reflects sensitivity at the highest levels against handing Iran’s foes a good pretext to retaliate. Even generally hard-line politicians say they see Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel colluding to heat up the region’s conflicts, including by destabilising Lebanon, in order to push the U.S. and Iran into a military confrontation.

This development also should be seen in the broader context of Iran’s rivalry with the U.S. and its regional allies. Friction between them is rising in eastern Syria as both sides rush to seize territory from a rapidly diminishing Islamic State (ISIS). This also comes at a time when the Trump administration has launched a broad campaign to demonise Iran as the source of all the region’s troubles and as acting in collusion with al-Qaeda, while refusing to certify Iran’s compliance with the 2015 nuclear agreement, thereby casting doubt on the accord’s sustainability. All of this has heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran, and none of which has been accompanied – let alone mollified – by diplomatic engagement between the two countries.

In the eyes of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, not responding to U.S. aggression only would invite more of it.

If the U.S. were to take military action against Iranian facilities in reaction to the Huthi missile strike, Iran’s response likely would depend on circumstances. If the strike originated from the territory of a regional country, Iran arguably could directly retaliate against it. Conversely, if the strike originated from a U.S. warship, a direct response would be far less probable given U.S. escalation dominance. In either case, the more plausible reaction would be indirect and asymmetric, using Iran’s proxies or partners to target U.S. forces in Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan. Iran’s leaders likely know that they could lose control of such a dynamic and they do not seem hungry for a direct military confrontation. Still, in the eyes of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, not responding to U.S. aggression only would invite more of it.

 

Saudi Arabia’s Counter-productive Show of Strength in Lebanon

By Heiko Wimmen, Project Director, Iraq/Syria/Lebanon

That Prime Minister Hariri announced his resignation from Riyadh clearly made him look like he was acting on Saudi orders. That impression was reinforced by what had happened both prior to and after that event. Immediately preceding the announcement, strongly worded anti-Hizbollah statements had come from prominent Saudi officials, including Minister of State for Gulf Affairs Thamer Sabhan. Later, none of Hariri’s advisors in Lebanon could fully explain what happened, where he was going, and whether he was free to return. Under the circumstances, most Lebanese political leaders assumed Hariri was being held against his will. If Riyadh wanted to show the world that it was in charge of Hariri’s fate, it succeeded.

Crisis Group on the Ground This section is contributed by Heiko Wimmen, Project Director, Iraq/Syria/Lebanon CRISISGROUP/Julie David de Lossy

The question is why Riyadh made this decision now. Saudi Arabia implicitly blessed the deal Hariri struck with Hizbollah and that allowed him to gain the premiership nearly a year ago. That the Saudi leadership ever could have seriously entertained the notion that Hariri could “rein in” Hizbollah appears fanciful if one takes even a cursory look at the group’s relationship to previous Lebanese governments since 2005, which it either dominated, defied or toppled at will.

Nor is it plausible to assume that Hariri’s resignation would compel Hizbollah to change its ways. With the party and its allies effectively monopolising the vote of the Shiite community – roughly a third of the Lebanese population – no government can be formed without its consent. The most likely near-term scenario is therefore that Lebanon once again will be stuck without a functional government, a situation that arguably serves Hizbollah more than harms it. Indeed, rather than being portrayed as the source of the problem, Hizbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, now can cast his party as a proponent of “safety and stability for Lebanon” – as he did in a televised speech the day after Hariri’s announcement – whose partner walked out on him at the behest of a foreign power. Finally, being out of government does nothing to restrain Hizbollah’s regional activities.

The most likely near-term scenario is therefore that Lebanon once again will be stuck without a functional government

That leaves other possible motives for Riyadh to have made its move now. With the U.S. adopting a harder line against Iran and slapping new sanctions on Hizbollah, Saudi Arabia may have sensed an opportunity to reinforce that trend in order to isolate and pressure its regional rival. Hariri’s resignation as prime minister on the grounds of excessive Iranian and Hizbollah meddling furthers that goal by bolstering the case that those two actors need to be restrained and that coexistence with either one is impossible. It also paves the way for possible punitive action against Lebanon and the Shiite movement, again with the goal of weakening both it and its Iranian ally.

For now, Hariri’s resignation on its own is unlikely to have a major impact on the political situation in Lebanon. It will not destabilise the country in the near future, and he could theoretically remain in a caretaker position until elections in 2018. Likewise, while regional pressure on Hizbollah could rise, no domestic actor is in a position to mount a credible military challenge to the Shiite movement. And the manner of Hariri’s departure is unlikely to galvanise an already weakened Sunni community to mobilise on his behalf.

The most immediate cause for worry is of an economic nature. With the Qatari precedent in mind, and in light of Saudi statements casting the Lebanese government as an enemy, Lebanese officials and members of the business community are bracing for Riyadh’s and its Gulf allies’ potential punitive measures. Already, several Gulf countries have ordered their citizens to depart Lebanon. Should they either cut off imports from the country or, worse, expel some of the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese living in the Gulf – thereby affecting billions of dollars in remittances – the impact on an already fragile economy could be dramatic. What Qatar could cushion thanks to its vast wealth and reserves, Lebanon would have a far harder time to survive. Saudi Arabia’s Western allies in particular ought to urge it to refrain from such a devastating step.

What Qatar could cushion thanks to its vast wealth and reserves, Lebanon would have a far harder time to survive.

The other question on Lebanese minds has less to do with Saudi Arabia or their own domestic actors than with Israel. It remains the only force that could seriously degrade Hizbollah’s military capability, which would have a devastating effect on the rest of the country. Israeli officials have drawn an implicit red line regarding the transfer of production facilities for the domestic manufacturing of precision-guided missiles. A serious build-up of Hizbollah and other pro-Iranian forces on Syria’s border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights also could become a casus belli. Hariri’s resignation and Saudi Arabia’s assertion that Lebanon is now in the hands of a terrorist entity arguably facilitates an Israeli assault. But the Shiite movement and many others in Lebanon seek reassurance in what they call the “balance of terror”: the prospect that an Israeli attack could provoke Hizbollah to rely on its massive stock of short-to-mid-range missiles to strike Israeli civilian areas.

Lebanon in the Crosshairs

Crisis Group's Project Director for Lebanon, Syria and Iraq Heiko Wimmen explains from Beirut what might have driven the Lebanese Prime Minister to resign and the effects that the Saudi confrontation with Iran might have on Lebanon's stability. CRISIS GROUP/JGL

 

Israel Faces New Risks in Enforcing Its Red Lines against Hizbollah

By Ofer Zalzberg, Senior Analyst, Israel/Palestine

Israel is concerned about Hizbollah’s growing strength in both Lebanon and Syria because of the severity of damage their next war would cause on the Israeli home-front – damage so severe that the prospect of such a war could curb to a degree Israel’s freedom of manoeuvre for fear of triggering one.

Crisis Group on the Ground This section is contributed by Ofer Zalzberg, Senior Analyst, Israel/Palestine CRISISGROUP/Julie David de Lossy

In particular, Israeli officials say they will do their best diplomatically and militarily to prevent Hizbollah from setting up offensive infrastructure in south-west Syria because its defence establishment assesses that Israel’s deterrence doctrine would likely fail to effectively prevent its use should that occur. If Hizbollah were to move into the area, it could fire across the border at Israeli civilians while Israel would be limited to targeting Hizbollah fighters in retaliation; these, as Israeli sees it, can easily be replaced. (By contrast, in Lebanon, Israel’s ability to harm civil infrastructure has restrained Hizbollah). Indeed, Israel’s only way to exact a real cost from Hizbollah in Syria in such a scenario would be by attacking targets in Beirut, Damascus or Tehran. This easily could provoke a broader conflagration that Israel might well rather avoid.

Israel is concerned about Hizbollah’s growing strength in both Lebanon and Syria because of the severity of damage their next war would cause on the Israeli home-front.

Moreover, Israel specifically marked provision of high-precision long-range missiles to Hizbollah as a red line, and has attacked dozens of convoys crossing Syria to enforce it. These actions have not stemmed the tide of long- and short-range missiles and rockets, of which Hizbollah now reportedly has over 130,000 in its arsenal, as compared to roughly 15,000 in 2006, prior to their last war. But they did limit the number of high-precision long-range missiles that came through Syria, the kind that can deliver a 400kg warhead on a tall residential building in downtown Tel Aviv and generally threaten Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion airport and Israel’s strategic maritime gas rigs.

Reports since July have suggested that Hizbollah is trying to establish underground long-range missile factories in Lebanon with Iranian support. Israel relayed messages to the U.S. and others that it would take military action to prevent this, a warning that, according to Israeli officials, induced Hizbollah to freeze construction. The dominant official view in Israel is that it can afford to take out any such facility should construction resume, because any Hizbollah retaliation to such a targeted strike likely would itself be narrowly focused and thus fall short of triggering a full-fledged war.

The Israeli establishment also expects Russia to restrain Hizbollah, just as it has restrained President Bashar Assad when Israeli strikes took out Syrian military targets over the past few months. They believe Iran is similarly not keen to see Hizbollah’s military arsenal destroyed over this: it has armed Hizbollah, in part, as a second-strike capacity to deter Israel from striking Iran itself, a threat Tehran obviously would want to maintain. Hizbollah itself has more pressing priorities as its fighters continue to fight in Syria. In short, Israel views a limited Hizbollah counter-attack as the more likely reaction and a risk that would be worth taking to prevent Hizbollah from acquiring the indigenous ability to produce high-precision long-range missiles. In turn, Israeli plans assume a purposefully limited reaction to any such Hizbollah retaliation.

A large-scale military confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah is an unlikely direct or immediate result of Hariri’s resignation

This situation imposes certain limits on Israel. As noted, its army leadership knows it needs to restrict its military objectives in order to reduce chances of all-out war. It also will need a compelling legitimising narrative to secure broad international backing – possibly coupled, unfamiliarly, with explicit regional support given the recent upswing of Iran-Saudi tensions – and domestic public support in the event that a strike and counter-strike scenario leads to full-scale war.

A large-scale military confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah is an unlikely direct or immediate result of Hariri’s resignation if only because – as far as Israeli officialdom is concerned – not much has changed. It has long argued that Hizbollah effectively controls Lebanon. Yet, his stepping down provides grist for the public relations mill, since it reveals to the world Israel’s contention about the power balance in Lebanon. Netanyahu seems keen to use this in order to further mobilise international pressures against Hizbollah.

Contributors

Project Director, Gulf and Arabian Peninsula
Project Director, Iran
AliVaez
Project Director, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon
heiko_wimmen
Senior Analyst, Israel/Palestine
OferZalzberg
Supporters of Yemen's former president Ali Abdullah Saleh attend the 35th anniversary celebration of his General People's Congress party (GPC) in Sanaa, Yemen, on 24 August 2017. DPA/Hani Al-Ansi

Discord in Yemen’s North Could Be a Chance for Peace

Since August, a public rift has surfaced between the two main partners on the northern front of Yemen’s war – the forces loyal to the Huthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh. Rather than fostering its rivals’ discord, key powerbroker Saudi Arabia should seize this rare chance to resolve the two-and-a-half year war by championing a new regional initiative.

  • Share
  • Save
  • Print
  • Download PDF Full Report

I. Overview

A public rift between Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress party (GPC) and the Huthis (aka Ansar Allah) may change the course of Yemen’s two-and-a-half-year war. Despite significant ideological and political differences, the two have been allied against the Saudi Arabia-led military intervention in support of the Yemeni government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Yet tensions between them rose to an all-time high following a GPC rally in Sanaa on 24 August to celebrate the party’s 35th anniversary and to demonstrate its political strength. This rift could expand and prolong Yemen’s regionalised civil war, further shattering the country and threatening regional security – or it could be seized upon as an opportunity to advance peace. This will require Saudi Arabia and its international backers, including the U.S. and the UK, to act quickly to capitalise on a division they have encouraged by supporting an immediate ceasefire and an inclusive political settlement.

After a period of rapid advances, the Huthi/Saleh alliance lost territory in the south in July and August 2015. They since fought the opposing side to a stalemate, maintaining control over the northern Zaydi (version of Shia Islam) highlands, which includes the country’s capital, Sanaa, and the majority of Yemen’s population. This has produced a tense status quo, from which several parties in the conflict benefit, but which has produced immense suffering among the Yemeni people as well as additional instability in a region that has no shortage. For Saudi Arabia in particular, the fighting has created a growing security threat, with Huthi/Saleh forces firing rockets deep into Saudi territory and threatening to target Riyadh’s closest regional ally, Abu Dhabi. It is a financially costly war and a diplomatic headache, as Riyadh has borne considerable criticism for the devastating humanitarian consequences, including near famine conditions and widespread cholera.

To take advantage of heightened Huthi/Saleh tensions, Riyadh should champion a political process, agree to suspend military operations, and forgo the temptation to simply wait for its adversaries to turn their guns on each other. Indeed, direct Huthi/Saleh confrontation is unlikely and, even if it were to occur, the result would be even less likely to redound to Riyadh’s benefit: the Huthis could defeat the GPC or the civil war could spread to the highlands, further facilitating both Iranian intervention and al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expansion. If by contrast the Saudis – in partnership with regional states like Oman and with support from the UN Security Council and the UN special envoy – sponsor a realistic peace initiative, the onus would shift to the Huthis and GPC to accept it, lest they provoke even greater suffering and possibly destabilise areas under their control. Saleh’s GPC almost certainly would entertain the offer, placing Huthi hardliners in an awkward position if they were to reject it, changing the political dynamic and possibly paving the way for a settlement. The stakes have never been higher. With Huthi forces threatening to target Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and the Trump Administration eager to push back against Iran in the region, there is a serious risk of wider escalation. This could include direct U.S. confrontation with Iran, which Washington and its allies blame for providing the Huthis with the requisite missile technology. Too many opportunities have come and gone to end the Yemen war. Neither Yemenis nor their neighbours can afford to lose this one.

II. GPC-Huthi Relations

A. Historical Context and Contemporary Challenges

Tension between the Huthis and Saleh’s GPC is nothing new. Between 2004 and 2010, then-President Saleh fought six wars with the Huthis, killing their leader, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Huthi, in 2004 and laying waste to much of their home governorate, Saada. Common enemies brought the two sides together in 2014 as they sought to shift the balance of power in Yemen’s north against the Sunni Islamist party, Islah, and Hadi, who had alienated both groups during the country’s transition period (in which Saleh transferred power to Hadi through a political agreement known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative).

Their cooperation, initially tacit, may well have faded if not for the Saudi military intervention, which began in March 2015, to reinstate Hadi and reverse Huthi/Saleh military advances. The campaign bound them together against what in Yemen’s northern highlands is commonly perceived as a national, existential struggle against Saudi Arabia – rather than as a Yemeni civil war, which is how the national conflict is viewed elsewhere in the country.

Beneath the surface, however, differences festered. The GPC views itself as a party of the political centre, an umbrella organisation encompassing a range of political perspectives and confessional groups, with appeal throughout the country. It sees the Huthis in much the same way it views Islah, an intolerant religion-based political organisation with ties to foreign actors – in the Huthis’ case, Iran, in Islah’s case, Qatar and chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere in the region.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, group of eight GPC supporters, Sanaa, Yemen, April 2017.Hide Footnote Like many Yemenis, they suspect the Huthis of plotting to bring back the rule of Zaydi Imams, who ruled northern Yemen for a millennium before the 1962 republican revolution ousted them. In this view, the Huthis are a throwback to Yemen’s oppressive, discriminatory past, an anathema to a modern state and institutions, let alone an inclusive democracy.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, GPC members, Sanaa, November 2014; GPC member, Sanaa, February 2015; GPC member, September 2015; GPC members, Sanaa, April 2017.Hide Footnote

Similarly, the Huthis have fundamental problems with Saleh and the GPC. They view him and his close supporters as dangerous and unreliable allies. From their perspective, Saleh’s GPC is responsible for a corrupt past in which the government failed to develop the country, marginalised them politically, facilitated the spread of Salafi/Wahhabi doctrine (their ideological adversary) and destroyed their territory.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Huthi supporters, Sanaa, February 2015.Hide Footnote Huthis are hostile to the U.S., viewing its Middle East policy as part of an improbable Israel/Saudi/Wahhabi plot to sow discord among Muslims, and as such are deeply suspicious of Saleh’s past support for and cooperation with the U.S. and its counter-terrorism activities.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Huthi leader, Sanaa, Yemen, April 2017.Hide Footnote Some Huthis want eventually to hold Saleh and other GPC leaders accountable for past crimes, including killing Hussein al-Huthi. As the GPC doubts Huthi commitment to democracy, the Huthis doubt the GPC’s commitment to real power sharing.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Huthi supporter, Sanaa, Yemen 2017, who said: “Saleh wants to return to power as it was before 2011 [when the GPC ruled alone], but this time through his son [Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh]. Saleh only wants cooperation with Ansar Allah now so that he can gain a bigger share in power to make this possible in the future. The GPC is not committed to long-term power sharing”.Hide Footnote

As the General People's Congress party (GPC) doubts Huthi commitment to democracy, the Huthis doubt the GPC’s commitment to real power sharing.

These mutual suspicions have left both groups ill at ease. Ever since October 2016, when they formed a “national salvation government” with the Huthis, GPC leaders have complained that the Huthis have not honoured their commitment to disband the “revolutionary committee”, which the Huthis had established in February 2015 after they toppled the Hadi government. Still active, the committee oversees government functioning and forms a kind of shadow government with final say in decision-making, in effect undermining weak state institutions.[fn]GPC politicians gave numerous examples of the revolutionary committee interfering in decision-making and refusing to vacate ministries under GPC authority, such as the higher education, religious endowments and health ministries. Crisis Group interviews, group of GPC members, Sanaa, Yemen, April 2017.Hide Footnote Their frustration with Huthi interference has been exacerbated by the Huthis’ relative inexperience in the governance realm – not only do they as a movement lack know-how, but in many cases have appointed young loyalists who interfere in the decision-making of long-serving bureaucrats.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote

In an ironic reversal of their traditional roles, GPC members today accuse the Huthis of corruption, disregard for the country’s laws, for example regarding detentions, and failure to treat them as an equal partner in government. In particular, the GPC resents Huthi control of the limited resources flowing into the north in the form of customs, taxes and telecommunications fees.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Saleh supporter, GPC member, GPC bureaucrat, Sanaa, Yemen, 2017.Hide Footnote After dividing ministerial portfolios, the two sides fought over the appointment of ministerial deputies. Arguably most importantly, they disagree on the leadership and future of the Republican Guards, the most qualified military unit in the army before the 2011 Arab Spring, which was led by Saleh’s son Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh and was largely loyal to him. Today it is a shadow of its former self, disbanded under Hadi in 2012 and later partially reconstituted during the current war.[fn]On 19 December 2012, President Hadi issued a decree disbanding the Republican Guards, announcing that its units would be integrated into the regional command structure. For an overview of changes to the military-security apparatus during the transition period, see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°139, Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?, 4 April 2013.Hide Footnote The GPC would like to strengthen and lead it; the Huthis are blocking them.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, group of GPC supporters, Sanaa, Yemen 2017.Hide Footnote

The Huthis accuse the GPC of stoking public resentment against them instead of focusing on the fight against the Saudi-led coalition. Bearing the brunt of casualties, they view GPC politicking as an affront to their sacrifices.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, two Huthi supporters, September 2017.Hide Footnote Regarding the civil service, they say, Saleh’s party continues to dominate decisions on retirement and recruitment, encumbering their ability to implement the law, which requires, for example, pensioning off individuals above a certain age. The Huthis also are quick to point out that integrating their members into all parts of the state is one of the agreements reached by the 2014 National Dialogue Conference, the centrepiece of the country’s UN-sponsored transition.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Huthi representative, August 2017.Hide Footnote Arguably most importantly, the Huthis suspect the GPC of trying to strike deals with their mutual enemies, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, to end the war to its advantage. Some Huthi supporters, for example, were convinced that the massive GPC rally in Sanaa on 24 August was a plot by Saleh to oust the Huthis from power and push them from Sanaa, with the help of the UAE.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, three Huthi supporters, September 2017.Hide Footnote

Under attack by the Saudi-led military campaign, both political leaderships continue to argue that what unites them [...] is more significant than what drives them apart.

Until August 2017, the leadership of both groups successfully contained their many differences. Under attack by the Saudi-led military campaign, both political leaderships continue to argue that what unites them – especially defence of the parts of Yemen they each control – is more significant than what drives them apart.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, two GPC leaders and a Huthi representative, Sanaa, Yemen 2017; GPC leader and Huthi representative, September 2017.Hide Footnote But the groups’ respective rank-and-file, and certainly their hardliners, do not uniformly agree.

Many GPC cadres, in Yemen and elsewhere, do not see value in the relationship.[fn]Crisis Group interview, GPC leader, Sanaa, Yemen, April 2017, who said: “At the top the relationship is very strong. But at the middle levels, and especially over the issue of government jobs, there is a lot of tension”.Hide Footnote They are blunt in their hostility to its continuance and even support going on the offensive against the Huthis, should an opportunity arise to shift the balance of power. A GPC supporter expressed a perspective common among the rank-and-file in Sanaa:[fn]Crisis Group interview, GPC member, Sanaa, Yemen, April 2017.Hide Footnote

Now the Huthis control the army and the resources of the north. Everything is going to them because of the war. The GPC would be ready to fight the Huthis, but they cannot open a second front. The Huthis are doing many things that harm the Yemeni people. They are completely destroying the army. But if the GPC turned on the Huthis now, the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Islah would fight the GPC from the other direction.

The Huthi movement at all levels evinces internal differences about the necessity and desirability of cooperation with the GPC. The political side of the movement, represented by figures such as Saleh Somad, head of the supreme political council (a ten-person organisation formed by the GPC and Huthis in August 2016 and split equally between them that serves as a presidential council) appears to value the partnership and works pragmatically to maintain it by mediating conflict between the two sides.[fn]That said, even politicians on the Huthi side who are supportive of continuing the alliance view themselves as the stronger partner in the relationship. According to a Huthi politician: “It is not in the interest of either party to break the partnership and relationship, but this is especially true of the GPC, which has made many gains by aligning with Ansar Allah against the aggression [the Saudi military intervention] and would lose these completely if they stopped the relationship with Ansar Allah”. Crisis Group interview, September 2017.Hide Footnote Hardliners in the revolutionary council and the military-security apparatus, including Mohammed al-Huthi, head of the revolutionary council, are seemingly less keen on cooperation and aggressively attack the GPC in public. One Huthi supporter summed up scepticism of the partnership:[fn]Crisis Group interview, Huthi supporter, September 2017.Hide Footnote

Partnership with the GPC is not important for the war because Ansar Allah is controlling all of the fronts and Saleh is not really contributing to the fight. The alliance is only really in the area of government and there, the GPC needs the alliance more than Ansar Allah. Without it, the GPC would lose all power and influence. Many in Ansar Allah think that the partnership with the GPC has damaged its reputation in the north as the GPC has conducted a smear campaign, accusing it of corruption even as the GPC obstructs proper running of the government. A break-up of the alliance could be better for Ansar Allah.

Though the security situation and resulting territorial fragmentation make it hard to judge, the prevailing wisdom among a range of interlocutors in Sanaa, including GPC members, independents and analysts, is that a group of Huthi sceptics and hardliners have the upper hand, a situation that bodes poorly for the future of cooperation.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, GPC leaders, tribal sheikh from the Hashid confederation, Yemeni political analyst, August 2017; two tribal sheikhs from the Bakil confederation, Yemeni government supporter, tribal sheikh fighting with Yemeni government side, Huthi supporter, September 2017.Hide Footnote

B. 24 August and its Aftermath

The GPC-Huthi coalition has been deeply strained, possibly irreparably damaged, by events surrounding the GPC’s 24 August political rally. In the lead-up to the gathering, the groups engaged in a vicious war of words. Saleh gave a bombastic speech calling the Huthi popular committees a “militia” and warning them not to interfere in the GPC’s celebration or to cause chaos in Sanaa. The Huthis accused Saleh of “backstabbing”, lacking commitment to the war and trying to secure a deal with the Saudi-led coalition to remove them from power.[fn]Saleh warns Huthis against causing chaos in Sanaa”, al-Masdar, 20 August 2017, “Yemen’s Saleh rallies followers in Sanaa amid Houthi rift”, Reuters, 24 August 2017.Hide Footnote

While the rally went forward without incident, the following day a prominent GPC politician, Khaled al-Radi, and three Huthi-aligned security personnel were killed in a gun battle at a Huthi-controlled checkpoint. The next day saw further clashes near one of Saleh’s son’s homes in south Sanaa; a large contingent of Huthi security forces deployed in the area. Since then the two sides have agreed to de-escalation measures, but tensions remain high. The Huthis have increased their security presence, which risks minor disagreements escalating into clashes.

With the rally, Saleh sought to send a message to the Huthis and the international community that he and his party are politically strong, key to any settlement, and ought not be treated as junior partners in negotiations, which has been the case in both UN-led and informal negotiations. His supporters suggest that the rally’s timing was based on his calculation that his political support and popular frustration with the Huthis are at relative highs.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, two prominent GPC members, Cairo, Egypt, 2017.Hide Footnote

The events of 24 August were a culmination of what could be considered a GPC revival.

The events of 24 August were a culmination of what could be considered a GPC revival. After surviving attempts by Saudi Arabia to divide it and pull its leadership to Hadi’s side, Saleh’s camp has emerged stronger, at least for now. GPC members inside Yemen describe a new conviction that the GPC is the only party capable of protecting the country from the ravages of sectarianism and preserving its republican system from religious groups like the Huthis or Islah.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, group of eight senior and mid-level GPC leaders, Sanaa, Yemen, 2017.Hide Footnote But this awakening is as much an indicator of weakness as strength. It is driven in part by the fear that if the war continues, religious actors and militias will gain greater strength, while the GPC and political parties will lose influence and relevance.

Rally participation was not limited to the GPC. Many other people attended or supported it on social media, including those aligned with the Hadi government and even Islah.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, journalist aligned with the Yemeni government, Islah members, Yemeni Socialist party member, tribal sheikh not aligned with ether Huthi/Saleh or Yemeni government, Cairo, Egypt, August 2017; member of the Yemeni government, tribal sheikh supporting Yemeni government, September 2017.Hide Footnote For them, the gathering was a chance to demonstrate their opposition to the Huthis (not their support for Saleh) and, for some, to encourage the brewing fight between the two to knock both down to size.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote

Though the rally’s size – a least tens of thousands, with local reports saying around 300,000 – and eclectic backing might indicate that the GPC’s political fortunes have eclipsed the Huthis’, the military balance is still clearly in the latter’s favour.[fn]“Tens of thousands rally in support of Yemen’s former president amid growing rifts”, Washington Post, 24 August 2017.Hide Footnote The Huthis allowed the GPC rally, but the same day organised their own smaller demonstrations at the city’s entrances and imposed a heavy security presence in Sanaa. After the rally, loyal forces further increased their presence around the city, especially in neighbourhoods dominated by Saleh sympathisers. They too had a message: their dedicated supporters and fighters were ready to confront any challenge to their authority. The Huthis then held their own massive public rally, to celebrate what they call the 21 September Revolution, the anniversary of their entering in Sanaa (in 2014), demonstrating that they too can rally significant support, albeit not as politically diverse.

Those who hoped that Saleh would pursue a more confrontational course in the wake of the rally have been disappointed. Instead of backing out of the coalition government or fighting to regain control of the capital, Saleh ultimately adopted a more conciliatory tone. At the GPC rally, he gave a short speech praising the GPC and called more fighters to the war fronts, but since then he has called for calm and reaffirmed his commitment to the alliance. According to a prominent Yemeni politician who has remained neutral during the war, “GPC supporters and anti-Huthi groups alike experienced a moment of collective depression when Saleh failed to act. Most attribute his inaction to weakness in the face of the Huthis’ superior military strength”.[fn]Crisis Group interview, September 2017.Hide Footnote Indeed GPC, Huthi and Hadi government supporters interpret his actions as a sign of weakness and evidence that the GPC cannot challenge the Huthis in the context of war.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, three Hadi government supporters, tribal sheikh, Huthi supporter, Huthi leader, political independent, two GPC members, September 2017.Hide Footnote It is unclear whether Saleh changed his course of action in light of Huthi pressure or whether he knew all along that he could not risk opening a second front with them. In any case, he is walking a fine line, straining but not breaking the relationship, and in doing so raising yet more questions about the future of the coalition with Ansar Allah and the course of the war writ large.

III. A Way Forward

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the Yemeni government and their backers, including the U.S. and UK, have long encouraged a break in the Huthi/Saleh alliance either to enable a popular uprising in the north or improve the Yemeni government’s (and by extension Saudi Arabia’s) bargaining position. Post-August 2017, U.S. and UK officials say they increasingly recognise the dangers of such a split, while their allies in the region appear determined to pursue it.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, U.S. and UK officials, September 2017.Hide Footnote Putting aside how likely they are to succeed, they should be careful what they wish for. If the two allies turn on each other, the more likely result is the prolongation of the civil war and the complication of peace efforts.

A. Danger Ahead?

It is hard to predict the course of a putative Huthi-Saleh fight. In a worst-case scenario for Saudi Arabia, the Huthis would win a military confrontation and consolidate political and military control of the north. Already the Huthis dominate the military-security apparatus in Sanaa and over the course of the war they have gained the upper hand over Saleh, though the extent of their advantage is widely debated among Yemenis.[fn]The senior commanders of the military are Huthis, including the defence minister, the chief of staff and the deputy chief of staff. All military personnel go through Huthi religious training, but it is unclear how this has affected their loyalties. Crisis Group interview, Huthi supporter, Sanaa, April 2017. In what appears to be an indication of their relative strength, the Huthis have been responsible for negotiating security issues like withdrawals of militias and disarmament in the context of UN talks. According to a Huthi representative: “The GPC does not negotiate a security plan for Sanaa because it is not their file. It is not their responsibility. It is Ansar Allah’s responsibility”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, April 2017. Huthi supporters and many of their critics say that Saleh has weak support in the military and virtually no influence over security decisions in Sanaa. Crisis Group interviews, Huthi supporter, Huthi leader, Sanaa, April 2017; Yemeni analyst, Huthi tribal supporter, sheikh from Bakil, sheikh from Marib, Islah member, Hadi government representative, August and September 2017. That said, some say Saleh maintains significant influence beneath the surface. A GPC leader says that “Saleh is smart. He sent most of the Republican Guard members home when the war started and they will come back to the fight if called by Saleh. It is true that some Republican Guards are fighting at the war fronts, but not all of them. Many refuse to fight under Huthi command”. Crisis Group interview, Sanaa, April 2017.Hide Footnote That said, the Huthis have miscalculated in the past. In Aden, for example, they were confident that the population would support them against what they viewed as the al-Qaeda threat there. But ultimately they were perceived as invaders and pushed out by local forces, with the help of the UAE, in July 2015. In Sanaa too, they may overestimate their strength. Certainly Saleh and his party are politically popular; over 33 years of Saleh’s rule they built strong networks inside the military-security apparatus. Today it is not clear how many of these GPC loyalists are keeping their distance but would answer the call if violence erupted with the Huthis.

There is also the issue of the tribes. In Yemen, they are a critical component of hard power. Here again, the relative power balance is not clear. Saleh enjoys influence and support, both personally and because the Huthis have insulted and bullied many sheikhs, some of whom are eager to take revenge when the time is ready.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, pro-Saleh sheikh, August 2017. According to a prominent GPC member, “90 per cent of the seven tribes that surround Sanaa are pro-Saleh. Only 10 per cent are aligned with the Huthis. This was not the case before the war. But over time, the Huthis’ mistakes and mistreatment of sheikhs increased Saleh’s popularity. The seven tribes surrounding Sanaa are critical to the balance of power in Sanaa. Most of the Republican Guards come from these areas”. Crisis Group interview, August 2017.Hide Footnote But the Huthis also have cultivated their own tribal networks, which often are a product of frustration with Saleh and his former allies like the al-Ahmar of the Hashid confederation.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, prominent tribal sheikh, Huthi tribal supporter, Huthi supporter, September 2017.Hide Footnote

The uncertainty about the two sides’ relative strength suggests that the consequences of a fight between them would be disastrous for Yemen and likely for Saudi Arabia as well. The Huthis and Saleh would lose ground as they pull their fighters from the war fronts, but their losses would not necessarily translate into sustainable gains for the Hadi government. Two years since the UAE and aligned southern fighters pushed the Huthis and Saleh’s forces out of southern territories, the Hadi government has been unable to successfully control, let alone govern, these areas. Instead, infighting between Hadi’s forces and southern separatists in the government’s temporary capital of Aden has divided the coalition, with Saudi Arabia backing Hadi and the UAE closely aligned with his competitors. Southern territories also are plagued by al-Qaeda’s expansion.[fn]Crisis Group Middle East Report N°174, Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base, 2 February 2017.Hide Footnote Despite hardships in Huthi/Saleh controlled areas, residents express relief that they are not living in the south’s “liberated areas”, a term they use to suggest chaos.[fn]Over two dozen Crisis Group interviews and conversations with residents of Sanaa, Yemen, April 2017.Hide Footnote

In the north, the prospect of the government profiting from an internecine Huthi-Saleh fight is even weaker. Given widespread resentment toward Hadi and Saudi Arabia in the Zaydi highlands in particular, it is virtually impossible to see his government as an alternative to the Huthis or Saleh’s GPC. The likely result of a clash would be the north’s fragmentation, leading to the same civil strife and sectarianism that has racked areas like Taiz. Islah, which has popular support in the north, could join forces on some fronts with the GPC against the Huthis. The GPC itself could fracture, with some continuing to ally with the Huthis while others join their enemies, including Islah and tribal forces aligned with the government in Marib. Almost certainly the conflict would be a magnet for Yemen’s al-Qaeda branch, which has forged alliances against the Huthis with local fighters in other parts of the country;[fn]Crisis Group Report, Yemen’s al-Qaeda, op. cit.Hide Footnote given the collapse of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Yemen could provide an attractive destination for these fighters to relocate.

The weaker Yemen’s north, the more likely chaos is to spread to Saudi Arabia.

These dynamics could shred the north’s social fabric, which hitherto has been strained but not as severely as the south’s, and accelerate the country’s humanitarian disaster, already one of the worst globally.[fn]Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N°52, Instruments of Pain (I): Conflict and Famine in Yemen, 13 April 2017.Hide Footnote The weaker Yemen’s north, the more likely chaos is to spread to Saudi Arabia. Iran would find ample opportunity to keep the Saudis bogged down. Perhaps most dangerously for Riyadh, it will become increasingly difficult to engineer a way out: as intra-group fragmentation grows, there will be no clear address for negotiation.

That said, the most likely scenario is a continuation of the troubled Huthi/Saleh partnership. The danger of a split is obvious to both political leaderships.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, GPC politician, August 2017; Huthi politician, September 2017.Hide Footnote Any military escalation by the Saudi-led coalition likely would reinforce this sense, and push them to paper over their differences. Yet the continuation of the Huthi/Saleh alliance does not bode any better for Saudi Arabia and Hadi. If the two stay together and the war continues, the Huthis likely will tighten their control of the north. Already, they have announced a new round of changes in the government, which they say are meant to weed out corruption but which are being made at the GPC’s expense; they also have tightened restrictions on the press and some in the movement are calling for a state of emergency, which the GPC fears will facilitate an even greater crackdown. If the Huthis consolidate power, the north’s precarious political balance will be lost and their relatively hard-line position will complicate negotiations. Their propensity to form shadow state institutions and supervisory bodies through the revolutionary committee also would further hollow out already weak state institutions.

B. A Way Out

Saudi Arabia and its partners have long sought to pry the GPC away from the Huthis. However, now that divisions have become more apparent, Riyadh should forgo the temptation to push for military advantage or wait for its adversaries to fight each other, scenarios that, as explained above, almost certainly will not give them a decisive advantage. Instead, along with regional partners including Oman, and with the encouragement of the Security Council and UN special envoy, it should champion a political solution. The timing is ripe but the opportunity easily could slip away. There is widespread frustration with the Huthis in the north and a desire, including within the GPC and some parts of the Huthi movement, to find an exit to the war. If Riyadh, through a regional initiative, supported a realistic compromise to end the fighting – outside the narrow requirements of UN Security Resolution 2216,[fn]Passed on 14 April 2015, UN Security Council Resolution 2216 unequivocally took the Yemen government’s side in the civil war. The resolution demanded the Huthis withdraw from territories, surrender weapons to the state and cease all activities that are the government’s prerogative. It also levied a travel ban and asset freeze on the Huthi leader, Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi and on Saleh’s son, Ahmed Ali, and established an inspection mechanism to prevent the Huthis from rearming.Hide Footnote which are perceived as tantamount to surrender by GPC and Huthi constituencies alike – both would be hard-pressed to reject it in the face of public pressure.

A new Saudi-backed regional initiative also would allow the GPC, by reacting positively, to seize the political momentum. That in turn would give leverage to those Huthi political leaders who say that they would support a political deal, as they did in October 2016 when former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry proposed one, before the Hadi government rejected it.[fn]The Huthi negotiating team grudgingly accepted the roadmap proposed by Secretary Kerry as the basis for negotiations. The roadmap itself was based on UN talks in Kuwait, which collapsed in August 2017, but unlike what was on the table in Kuwait, for the first time combined political compromises (the Huthis’ priority) and security compromises (the priority of the Hadi government and Saudi Arabia) in a single agreement. Doubts existed as to whether the Huthis would live up to a deal if it were accepted, but their commitment remained untested, as the Hadi government rejected the proposal.Hide Footnote Would-be Huthi dealmakers need ammunition against hardliners, especially those in the military-security apparatus who are deeply sceptical of compromise and derive benefits from continuing the war.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Huthi supporter, September 2017. He said: “Extremists within the movement have more power in the military security apparatus and they do not want to give up the fight. But there is a group in Ansar Allah that wants a political solution and they will raise their hand in favour of one if a realistic offer is on the table. A peace agreement that secures all sides, not one that asks for the surrender of the Huthis, will give more power to moderates in the movement. Now they are at a dangerous moment when the military side may take over completely and the moderate voices will be lost”.Hide Footnote

Saudi Arabia is the best positioned to take advantage of the political moment. Everyone, including the GPC and the Huthis, their hesitations about Saudi intentions notwithstanding, know that it is the real powerbroker, in no small part because of its role in supporting the opposing side of the war and its superior capacity to fund reconstruction. Yet at present, Riyadh refuses to acknowledge its role in the conflict, instead insisting that it is an intra-Yemeni one that must be resolved between Yemenis. In part, the contention is correct. No agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Huthi/Saleh side will resolve intra-Yemeni disputes, particularly regarding the issue of decentralisation and the federal structure, which triggered the violence and civil war in the first place. That said, the Saudi-led military intervention has further highlighted a regional dimension to the fight. For the GPC and the Huthis, the war is now first and foremost against Saudi Arabia and only secondarily against domestic enemies. Both of Riyadh’s adversaries are largely dismissive of the Hadi government, which they rightly insist has limited influence on the ground. Instead, they seek negotiations to end the war with Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE, who – in addition to launching airstrikes – are the war’s main financiers in general and of anti-Huthi/Saleh fighters in particular, who comprise a mixture of Islah, tribes, Salafi groups and southern separatists. If a compromise to end the regionalised part of the war were able to gain traction, Saudi Arabia should have the leverage to bring its Yemeni allies along.

Given that UN negotiations to end the conflict have been stalled since the collapse of talks in Kuwait in August 2016, new thinking is needed. If Saudi Arabia is not willing to take a seat at the table, at a minimum it should advance a political initiative and, in cooperation with regional states and with UN support, provide the table around which Yemenis can hammer out the details. In that scenario, Riyadh optimally would co-sponsor a political initiative and dialogue with other GCC or Arab states – including Oman, which has ties to the Huthis, and possibly Kuwait, which previously has hosted UN talks.

A chief benefit of a regionally-sponsored initiative is its potential to break the diplomatic stalemate.

A chief benefit of a regionally-sponsored initiative is its potential to break the diplomatic stalemate following three unsuccessful rounds of UN negotiations and an ensuing deficit of trust by all combatants, but especially the Huthi/Saleh bloc, in the UN process and the special envoy. It would also send a clear message to all Yemeni belligerents that Saudi Arabia, the pivotal regional powerbroker, is fully supportive of a settlement, something that Yemeni stakeholders from across the political spectrum say is currently lacking.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Islah supporters, GPC-aligned sheikh, southern separatist leaders, Hadi government representative, GPC members, political independent, non-aligned tribal sheikh, Yemeni analyst, Cairo, July and August 2017; three Huthi representatives, Huthi supporter, Hadi government representative, sheikhs aligned with the Hadi government, September 2017.Hide Footnote

To be successful, a regional initiative and subsequent talks should break out of the constraints imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which has impeded UN negotiations because of its one-sided and unrealistic nature. The resolution demands, in effect, the surrender of the Huthi/Saleh side and establishes a negotiating framework – the Huthis and Saleh on one side, the Hadi government on the other – that does not reflect the range of Yemeni belligerents on the ground. More inclusive, regionally-sponsored talks could comprise all relevant combatants, including Saleh’s GPC, the Huthis, the Hadi government, tribal representatives, Islah, Salafi groups and representatives of the Hiraak, south Yemen’s separatist movement. With wider terms of reference, more issues could be addressed, including for instance Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s security concerns about Iranian influence in Yemen, as well as border and maritime security. Such talks also could have the flexibility to address the role of controversial Yemeni leaders like Saleh, Hadi, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (Saleh’s former partner who defected in 2011 to join the Arab Spring and is now Hadi’s vice president) and others who are central to the current conflict and whose removal from politics may be needed for the country to move forward. For any of this to work, back-channel bilateral discussion between Saudi Arabia and Saleh on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the Huthis on the other, will be needed to lay the conceptual foundations for an agreement to end hostilities.

Most likely, a successful regional initiative would contain the following elements, which would need further specification in the context of talks:

  • Comprehensive ceasefire, lifting of all blockades and opening of international airports, with security guarantees and monitoring to ensure that Yemeni belligerents, including the Huthi/Saleh side, do not use a ceasefire to rearm;
     
  • Return of Huthi/Saleh fighters to Yemeni territory and withdrawal of all of these fighters from the Saudi-Yemeni border;
     
  • Commitment of all Yemeni groups to cut military ties with Iran and to combat al-Qaeda;
     
  • Commitment by Saudi Arabia and other regional states to help in post-war reconstruction;
     
  • Agreement on a new executive leadership, including an interim president, vice president and prime minister, and an inclusive coalition government for a limited period of time until elections, as well as agreement on the government’s responsibilities, which must include a clear plan for implementing and overseeing the withdrawal of all militias from cities and the handover of heavy weapons to the state, most likely through an inclusive military-security council;
     
  • Commitment of all Yemeni parties to the consensus outcomes of the country’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), including the principle of decentralisation, and completing the remaining tasks of the transition period, including a constitutional referendum and elections;
     
  • Agreement to implement decentralisation measures during the transition period, giving governorates significant financial and security authorities, with a special status for the south;
     
  • Develop a mechanism to revisit the main outstanding issues of the NDC: the number of federal regions, the status of south Yemen and the issue of national reconciliation.
     

The UN has an important role to play. Regionally sponsored talks over the details of the elements listed above should be supported by UN Security Council members and by the UN envoy to encourage participation and ensure that agreements have international backing. Yemenis also will need technical and political assistance from the UN to implement an agreement for ending the war and to resolve political issues, like state structure, that will likely require further negotiation. Finally, the UN could serve a vital role in ensuring that women, youth, civil society activists and a full range of political parties have a seat at the decision-making table and the influence to affect what happens during the transition phase, something they enjoyed during the NDC but which was quickly eroded by war.

Under the long shadow of Resolution 2216 and after three rounds of failed UN talks, there is little chance that the UN envoy, working under the established framework, would be able to produce an agreement. In these circumstances and with the war poised to metastasise in Yemen’s north or even spill outside its borders, the best chance for an exit resides with regional actors and Yemenis themselves, with the international community actively encouraging and supporting their efforts from behind.

Brussels, 11 October 2017