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Oil Zone Fighting Threatens Libya with Economic Collapse
Oil Zone Fighting Threatens Libya with Economic Collapse
Burned equipment, including a charred and flattened crude oil tank in the background, is seen at the Ras Lanuf crude oil tank farm near Ras Lanuf, Libya, 17 October 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Claudia Gazzini

Oil Zone Fighting Threatens Libya with Economic Collapse

New clashes over Libya’s oilfields could wreck the fragile remains of the country’s economy. Beyond security help, international actors must support compromises on state financing between the opposing factions and help pull Libya back from the brink.

Libyans have seen rare glimmers of hope in recent months, with an uptick in oil exports and recent reverses inflicted on the jihadists of the Islamic State. But new fighting over the country’s oil crescent has upset precarious balances and threatens the country with a dangerous economic meltdown.

The new trouble began on 7 December, when a coalition of militias began an offensive to take control of the oil export facilities of the Gulf of Sirte, an area known as the “oil crescent” that is one of Libya’s main economic lifelines. The attacking forces moved from Jufra, south of Sirte, and advanced to Ben Jawwad, some 30 km west of Libya’s largest oil export terminal. Forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar, which control the area, responded with airstrikes and pushed the assault force back to Jufra.

The rump government in Tripoli, the Presidency Council headed by Prime Minister Faez Serraj and backed by the UN and several Western powers, has distanced itself from this operation and stated it played no role in mobilising this force. Crisis Group warned in September and November that such an attack would be perilous.

Yet many Libyans, including members of units who launched the assault, claim the operation was carried out under the leadership of al-Mahdi al-Barghathi, the defence minister in Serraj’s government. Tripoli-based officials have been sounding the alarm for months about preparations for such an assault, alleging that Barghathi was providing legal cover and funds for the operation, and also coordinating the recruitment of men and provision of weapons.

The aim of the offensive was clearly to strike a blow against Haftar-led forces, whose control of the oil crescent is ill-tolerated by various Tripoli-based groups, including some members of the Presidency Council. Haftar took over the oil crescent in September. Since then he has greatly increased his negotiating position, having already established his Libyan National Army (LNA) as the dominant politico-military force in eastern Libya and seizing control of much of Benghazi over the course of 2016. For those attacking, regaining the oil crescent would not only mean controlling the oil terminals there, but also opening strategic supply roads to Benghazi, where forces allied with the Council against Haftar have suffered successive defeats since the beginning of the year.

But Haftar’s takeover of the oil fields has also allowed a 50 per cent rise in Libya’s oil exports at a time where Libya’s foreign cash reserves are growing dangerously depleted. And the new fighting comes just as Libyans had welcomed the liberation of Sirte from the Islamic State, with the last few blocks of the coastal city under the jihadist group’s control seized on 5 December.

Politically, the 7 December operation reveals further fragmentation in the coalition that is backing the Presidency Council and will likely make it more difficult to reach a negotiated solution to the Libyan conflict. In particular, Barghathi’s apparent role in the offensive is divisive. Several members of the Presidency Council, as well as the main military force in the west from the city of Misrata, had opposed such an escalation. It also raises the question of whether an already weak Presidency Council, facing increasing challenges in its own camp, has lost control of its defence ministry. And it affords its opponents in the east the opportunity to discredit it further. On 8 December, the day after the offensive on the oil terminals, Haftar-aligned forces retaliated by attacking Brak air force base, south of Sirte, inching closer to a confrontation with the Presidency Council-aligned Misrata forces now controlling Sirte.

The Attack on the Oil Crescent

Crisis Group on the Ground Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for Libya, Claudia Gazzini, walks through destroyed crude oil storage tanks in the Sidra tank farm, near Ras Lanuf, Libya, 16 October 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Claudia Gazzini

The 7 December offensive was carried out by a self-proclaimed “Operations Room for the Liberation of the Oil Fields and Ports”.

According to sources familiar with the operation, a surprisingly small force of some 600-800 men drawn mostly from former members of the Shura Council of the Benghazi Revolutionaries, an anti-Haftar military coalition, and another military grouping called the Benghazi Defence Brigade. Both are Islamist-dominated militias driven out of the eastern city earlier this year. It also includes men loyal to Ibrahim Jadran, the former commander of the Petroleum Facilities Guard in the area, who controlled it prior to Haftar’s takeover in September. Close associates of Barghathi were also actively involved in the operation: one is Idris Musa Bughuetin, the Operations Room’s commander; another is Osama al-Obidi, a colonel who was captured by the LNA on 7 December and transferred to its headquarters in Merj.

Barghathi has told the Presidency Council that he did not order that attack. Yet there is strong evidence to the contrary. According to defence ministry sources, for the past three months Barghathi has been coordinating with Qatar-based Islamist politician Ismail Sallabi, who is also from Benghazi, and members of the Benghazi Defence Brigades in Tripoli in preparation for the offensive. They also allege that he has been tapping into the defence ministry’s budget (never earmarked for such an operation) while Sallabi obtained other funds from Qatar to recruit men. Sources in Misrata add that Barghathi and his aides have been purchasing weapons on the local arms market (a common practice even for officials in Libya, as an arms embargo prevents the legal purchase of weapons from abroad).

The credibility of the Presidency Council and its defence minister is at stake. If it is true that the Council had no knowledge of the offensive being planned, which is what it publicly stated in a 7 December communiqué, this attack underscores its weakness and inability to control what is happening on its own turf (since the offensive was planned and the force recruited in Tripoli). It is unlikely that the Council was fully in the dark, as preparations for the offensive were an open secret. Indeed, it may be that the Council, or some of its members, covertly backed the offensive to undermine Haftar and retake the crucial oil crescent. This would suggest political and military naivety, as such an assault was always unlikely to succeed without the support of Misratan armed groups, the most important in western Libya, and a way to counter Haftar’s air superiority.

“We Are Dying of Hunger”

Buildings destroyed in bouts of fighting line a road in Benghazi, 19 July 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Claudia Gazzini

The greatest repercussions, however, are economic. Since Haftar seized control of the oil crescent in September, he allowed oil exports from the terminals to resume and repairs to damaged facilities to be carried out. Revenues from these sales, made by the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation (NOC), are paid to the Central Bank of Libya. Both institutions, whose unity the international community has sought to defend since the conflict began, recognise and work with the Presidency Council. The Haftar-supporting eastern government tried to create its own branches of the NOC and Central Bank, but Haftar himself has so far worked through the Tripoli-based NOC chairman.

Now, even if the 7 December offensive stops, it has already broken the delicate equilibrium that allowed the NOC to both cooperate with Haftar forces in the oil crescent and also to collaborate with the Presidency Council. Haftar could well claim that the Council has allowed state funds to be used to finance the offensive, end cooperation with the NOC and perhaps once again block exports.

So far Haftar has made no such move. But his continued cooperation in oil exports appears to be conditional on the Central Bank of Libya not disbursing funds to the Presidency Council through ad hoc procedures, which is what the Council and its international backers are asking the Central Bank to do. At present, such ad hoc procedures are frozen by political disagreements between Libya’s rival political entities – which may be one reason the 7 December operation happened in the first place.

If Haftar does cut back exports, this would put huge new strain on Libya’s struggling economy. The loss in oil exports due to the ports’ closure (when they were controlled by Jadran) and blockades of critical oil and gas infrastructure elsewhere over the last three years have significantly reduced oil production. From a high of 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd) in the era of the late former leader Muammar Qadhafi, it remained under 400,000 bpd for much of 2016. Since Haftar took control of the fields, it has begun to recover, reaching 600,000 bpd in November. Together, low oil production, prices and exports have resulted in a fiscal deficit of 56 percent of GDP in 2015, expected to remain approximately the same for 2016.

At this rate, Libya could be bankrupt by the end of 2017

At this rate, Libya could be bankrupt by the end of 2017. Foreign currency reserves are estimated to now be below $40 billion, compared to $75 billion in March 2015, the last known public figure. Even if, in the NOC’s optimistic scenario, production returns to 1 million bpd at a price of $50 a barrel, the country will barely recover. It is already suffering a severe liquidity crisis, with commercial banks limiting cash withdrawals. Libyans have to queue for hours to withdraw a maximum of $300 per day; sometimes weeks can go by without any cash in the banks. The U.S. dollar is traded at four times its official rate on the black market and inflation is rising rapidly, as most food and consumer goods are imported.

Such is the public frustration that a woman recently climbed on top of a fountain in downtown Tripoli, stripped off her veil and shouted: “We are dying of hunger. Do you want us to sell our honour to feed our children?

Healing the Divide

Clouds dot the skyline over Merj, in Eastern Libya, 16 July 2016. CRISIS GROUP/Claudia Gazzini

Not enough attention has been given to healing the divide of Libya’s main economic institutions, which the Libyan Political Agreement signed in December 2015 has not ended. An improving relationship between the two rival governors of the Central Bank of Libya, Saddik ElKebir, based in Tripoli, and Ali al-Hibri, based in al-Bayda in the east, broke down in early June when Hibri authorised the distribution of Russian-minted banknotes. The Presidency Council has done little to address this, and in November, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and other international officials personally intervened to improve increasingly difficult relations between ElKebir and the Presidency Council. Likewise, Tripoli-based NOC chairman Mustafa Sanallah and his Benghazi-based counterpart Naji al-Mogrebi, who had agreed to work together this summer, have not communicated since October. Sanallah also has his own problems dealing with the Council.

In this chaotic political context, it is essential to stabilise the country’s economy and prevent further destruction of oil and gas installations. Even in the absence of an overarching political settlement there are important steps that can be taken.

First of all, the Presidency Council and its international backers must urgently prevent any further escalation in the Gulf of Sirte. One way to do so would be for the Presidency Council to launch an investigation into the 7 December offensive with the aim of determining who is responsible for organising the attempted assault on the oil terminals. Such steps might help quell tensions, reassert the authority of the Council and enable the consensus to get funds flowing to it again.

In this chaotic political context, it is essential to stabilise the country’s economy and prevent further destruction of oil and gas installations.

Secondly, with regard to economic considerations, the UN Security Council should reiterate its strict ban, outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2146, against selling oil outside legal channels. It should insist on the principle that military forces in control of oil and gas facilities allow the NOC unhindered access to, and operation of, such facilities. Adherence to this principle would reduce the growing nervousness of the Presidency Council about its dire financial situation and help avert the prospect of economic disaster in the coming year.

Thirdly, the UN and backers of the diplomatic process in Libya should consider the necessity, now more than ever, of a serious economic track that encourages the various factions, even if they take time to reach a political settlement, to take interim measures to address urgent economic challenges.

Militarily, Libya’s conflict has been, in regional terms, relatively low-intensity. Keeping it that way, consolidating the defeat of the Islamic State in Sirte and extremists elsewhere, and eventually resolving it will require addressing the political divides, a process that has proven deeply frustrating and has been faced with many setbacks in the last year. A way to revive hope for a political settlement should begin with addressing looming economic problems before they get more serious, and strike economic compromises that help solve immediate governance problems. In other words, amid the necessary focus on getting Libya’s security balances right, policymakers should not forget to address the country’s bottom line.

Contributors

Consulting Analyst, Libya
Former Project Director, North Africa
boumilo
Military engineers of the UN-recognised Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) sort ammunition and explosives for safe disposal in the Libyan capital Tripoli on 12 October 2020. Mahmud TURKIA / AFP

Fleshing Out the Libya Ceasefire Agreement

Though overdue, the 23 October Libya ceasefire deal is worthy of applause. With help from the UN and their foreign backers, the warring parties should now close the loopholes in the agreement’s text, lest rival interpretations derail movement toward peace.

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What’s new? On 23 October, negotiators from the warring sides in Libya signed a ceasefire deal in Geneva. The text lacks specificity, however, leaving the parties room to backtrack on their commitments.

Why does it matter? Should disputes erupt between the sides over how to interpret the accord, it could fall apart, leading to renewed combat. War raged around Tripoli between April 2019 and June 2020, but a lower-intensity conflict between various Libyan factions has been ongoing for nine years.

What should be done? The Libyan parties, as well as their respective outside backers, should hammer out the details of troop withdrawals and foreign fighter repatriation, so that there is no space for competing interpretations. The UN should assist in this endeavour.

I. Overview

It was long in coming, but the Libya ceasefire agreement, signed in Geneva on 23 October, is a welcome development, a move toward broader political talks and a way out of the war. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres put it, if honoured, the deal between representatives of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) could constitute “a fundamental step toward peace and stability”. But the agreement’s text leaves room for divergent interpretations, misunderstandings and/or intentional recasting of terms to serve either party’s interests – or those of foreign patrons. Preventing a destructive blame game and the agreement’s unravelling should be the top priority for stakeholders in the Libyan conflict.

That will take some doing. The military follow-up committees, comprising representatives from both sides and tasked with implementing the deal, should flesh out its details. They will need full backing from their respective governments, senior military commanders and foreign sponsors. The last group, especially Turkey, Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, should cooperate even if they fear that the agreement’s success might diminish their influence on the ground. All have more to gain from a functional, stable, unified Libya than from a Libya that remains divided and chaotic or backslides once again into war. The ceasefire arrangements will take time to carry out and will require strong UN Security Council backing, including the establishment of a monitoring mechanism. But immediate tangible progress in defining and implementing each side’s ceasefire commitments is also necessary, so as to create the right conditions for UN-backed political talks scheduled for November. 

II. The Agreement

The agreement resulted from dialogue that five military officers loyal to the GNA and five affiliated with Haftar (known as the 5+5 Joint Military Commission) initiated under UN mediation in February 2020. This negotiating track is one of three (the others are political and economic) that the UN has been convening since the January 2020 Berlin conference, which aimed at ending the Haftar-led campaign to take Tripoli.[fn]After months of protracted UN-mediated consultations among foreign stakeholders in the Libyan conflict, Germany convened the Berlin Conference on Libya on 19 January 2020. At its conclusion, the U.S., the EU, the UK, France, Russia, China, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Congo-Brazzaville, as well as the UN, Arab League and African Union, signed a 55-point declaration, which was subsequently endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution 2510 (12 February 2020), enshrining their countries’ support for a three-track UN mediation process. The military track tasked a 5+5 Joint Military Commission, composed of five military representatives from each side of the conflict, to reach agreement on ceasefire terms. Crisis Group Statement, “Libya: Turning the Berlin Conference’s Words into Action”, 22 January 2020.Hide Footnote For months, this track failed to produce results, even after Haftar’s forces withdrew from Tripoli’s environs in June. Emboldened by Haftar’s retreat and empowered by direct Turkish military support, pro-GNA forces launched an assault on Haftar-controlled central Libya, hoping to seize the oil facilities that Haftar had blockaded since January.[fn]Crisis Group Statement, “Averting an Egyptian Military Intervention in Libya”, 27 July 2020. Hide Footnote This offensive soon stalled: Egyptian threats of military intervention to stop it and the deployment of Russian military equipment, including fighter jets, to defend Haftar’s positions forced Ankara and Tripoli to reconsider, leading to a de facto halt in hostilities throughout Libya.

The 23 October agreement made official the informal nationwide ceasefire that both sides had been observing since August.

Two preliminary events set the stage for a formal ceasefire deal: a Russia-brokered agreement between a member of the Tripoli government and a member of the rival pro-Haftar government to end the oil facilities blockade, and a successful meeting of military officers from Libya’s warring sides hosted by Egypt in late September.[fn]On 28-29 September 2020, police and military officers from the GNA and LNA met in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Hurghada for talks facilitated by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). They agreed to a prisoner exchange, resumption of flights and reopening of land routes, and renewal of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission’s face-to-face talks. “Security and Military Direct Talks between Libyan Parties in Hurghada, Egypt Conclude with Important Recommendations”, press release, UNSMIL, 29 September 2020. On 20 September, a Tripoli-based member of the GNA’s Presidential Council, Ahmed Meitig, and the deputy finance minister of the east-based government allied with Haftar, Morajea Geith, met in Sochi, Russia, and inked an agreement to lift the blockade on the oil installations. The agreement remains highly contested; many Tripoli-based politicians continue to object to its terms, which include the establishment of a joint committee to oversee oil revenue disbursement. Nevertheless, oil production proceeded across the country throughout October.Hide Footnote The 23 October agreement made official the informal nationwide ceasefire that both sides had been observing since August. It commits the parties to stopping all hostilities with immediate effect.[fn]“A Complete and Sustainable Ceasefire Agreement in Libya”, 23 October 2020. The text circulated on Twitter, including in the tweet by Muhammad Bushaqma, journalist, @boshqma, 7:06am, 23 October 2020.Hide Footnote

The agreement outlines four crucial follow-up areas. The first focuses on relations between Libyan military factions and their foreign backers. The parties commit to the departure from Libya of all foreign fighters by 23 January 2021. The problem is that neither side officially acknowledges being supported by foreign fighters, which could lead to future backtracking. But based on conversations with people involved in the negotiations, Crisis Group understands that – on Tripoli’s side – Turkish-supplied anti-Damascus Syrian fighters and a handful of Sudanese and Chadian armed groups mainly based in southern Libya are to go home. On Haftar’s side, those who will leave are the estimated 2,000-3,000 Russian Wagner Group contractors, pro-Damascus Syrian fighters and a second collection of Chadians and Sudanese.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interviews, UN officials, Tripoli-based and Benghazi-based politicians, 24-26 October 2020. Hide Footnote

The agreement also states that all foreign military officers must leave the country immediately and freezes all training agreements with foreign states until the Libyan parties form a new unity government. Again, the text does not specify any foreign country or training agreement. It does not say whether this provision suspends only the training carried out by each faction’s foes (Turkey training GNA personnel, which the LNA opposes; Russia, Egypt and other Middle Eastern states training LNA personnel, of which the GNA does not approve), or whether less controversial programs carried out by European states, such as training of the coast guard loyal to the GNA, must also halt. Nor does it advise Libyans now training abroad as to what they should do. Also unclear is whether the prohibition includes counter-terrorism training. The agreement states only that the “ceasefire does not apply to UN-designated terrorist groups on all Libyan territories”, suggesting that both sides can continue attacking such groups.

The potential for backtracking is considerable, and some is already occurring.

The potential for backtracking is considerable, and some is already occurring. A day after the agreement became public, the Tripoli-based defence minister declared that the deal does not affect all its military cooperation and training agreements with Turkey, on the grounds that the GNA is Libya’s legitimate government, bound to a deal with another legitimate government in Ankara.[fn]On 25 October 2020, Defence Minister Salahedin Al Namroush posted on his Twitter account (@Namroush): “We affirm the strengthening of joint cooperation with the Turkish ally and the continuation of the training programs that have been received and will be received by affiliates in the training institutes of the Defence Ministry of the Government of National Accord, and the signing of the initial agreement (5 + 5) does not include the military cooperation agreement with the state of Turkey, an ally of the legitimate government”. On 27 November 2019, Prime Minister Faiez Serraj and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed a security cooperation memorandum of understanding, which the Turkish parliament subsequently ratified. This memorandum paved the way for Turkish military intervention in Libya, which Ankara’s legislators approved on 2 January 2020. Tripoli-based politicians and foreign officials claim that Serraj had agreed in private to freeze Turkey’s training program and was aware that the ceasefire agreement implied a suspension of the military cooperation agreement with Ankara, but as of the end of October he had yet to publicly weigh in on the matter. Crisis Group telephone interviews, Tripoli-based politicians, 23-27 October 2020. On Turkey’s intervention in Libya, see Crisis Group Europe Report N°257, Turkey Wades into Libya’s Troubled Waters, 30 April 2020. Hide Footnote Turkish authorities echoed this position, while the Tripoli government’s military operations room, Volcano of Anger, published a video of its recruits undergoing commando training in Turkey.[fn]See the tweet by the Burkan al-Ghadab media centre, @BurkanLY, 1:57pm, 24 October 2020. Hide Footnote Three days later, the pro-Tripoli interior minister signed an agreement with Qatar on counter-terrorism cooperation.[fn]“Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Security Cooperation between the Ministry of Interior of the Government of National Accord of the State of Libya and the Ministry of Interior of the State of Qatar” (original in Arabic), 26 October 2020. Copy on file with Crisis Group. Copies circulated on Libyan social media, including in a tweet by Libya al-Ahrar TV, @libyaalahrartv, 8:21am, 26 October 2020. Hide Footnote

A second follow-up area concerns the repositioning of Libyan military forces and joint patrolling. The text states in vague terms that the two coalitions agree to withdraw their forces from the front lines to home bases. “Forces from Benghazi must return to Benghazi, those from Tripoli to Tripoli, those from Misrata to Misrata”, said a GNA military delegate, expressing this side’s interpretation of the clause.[fn]Remarks of Brigadier General al-Faituri Gherbil, member of the GNA’s delegation at the ceasefire talks, to Libya al-Ahrar TV, 23 October 2020.Hide Footnote The lack of detail about the relocation of forces and their equipment is worrying, especially regarding Libya’s central region, where the latest military build-up has taken place. Some politicians on Haftar’s side claim that the two sides agreed to withdraw fighters from front lines in the desert between Sirte, Jufra and Misrata, but that Jufra and Qurdubiya, the two main airbases in the area, would remain under Haftar’s control on the grounds that fighters from these two locations are part of the LNA.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interviews, persons close to the LNA general command, Tripoli and Benghazi, 24 October 2020. Hide Footnote Whether the pro-GNA coalition shares this understanding remains unclear. Both sides, however, committed to carrying out joint police patrols along the front lines once military forces withdraw.

The lack of detail about the relocation of forces and their equipment is worrying, especially regarding Libya’s central region.

Thirdly, the agreement outlines steps aimed at demobilising armed groups. A joint subcommittee will review all armed groups, including those already integrated into the state security apparatus, to determine which ought to be dismantled and how. Military officers on both sides of Libya’s conflict oppose the armed groups that emerged after the Qadhafi regime fell in 2011. They consider professional security personnel to be the foundation of the state. The problem is that, especially in Tripoli, these armed groups continue to enjoy the patronage of political factions, including Islamists, who want a counterweight to Qadhafi-era security personnel as a safeguard against the return of a repressive military regime. In eastern Libya, Haftar has co-opted or crushed such local armed groups.

As it stands, most Libyan observers seem to perceive the agreement’s vaguely worded commitment to demobilise armed groups as a nod to the Haftar camp. Haftar, who claims to stand at the LNA’s helm, has repeatedly demanded that pro-Tripoli armed groups be dismantled. But Tripoli-based politicians consider the LNA itself to be little more than an amalgam of armed groups using the same brutal tactics that the Qadhafi regime employed. As a result, demobilisation faces two main potential obstacles: 1) whether Haftar-led commanders will agree to dissolve some of the armed groups that the LNA has integrated into its security forces, but which the GNA might want to see disbanded; and 2) whether the patrons of the Tripoli-based armed groups will likewise agree to the disbandment of irregular forces that have become part of the state security apparatus loyal to the GNA. The agreement does not specify if the demobilisation applies to both sides or solely to GNA security forces.

The two sides also agreed to reform the Petroleum Facilities Guards, which are in charge of protecting Libya’s oil facilities and are divided between pro-Haftar and pro-Tripoli units. This project remains in its infancy. While the guards are largely uncontroversial and necessary to guarantee security at the hydrocarbon hubs, an open question is whether the LNA will relinquish control of the oil installations that are under its authority. 

Fourthly, the agreement outlines important confidence-building measures, such as the reopening of central Libya’s roads and the resumption of flights between Benghazi and Tripoli. The two camps have already started rolling out these measures, which will benefit most Libyans, and this part of the accord is likely to proceed smoothly.

III. Domestic and International Reactions

The ceasefire announcement sent a wave of hope across Libya. Many in the pro-Haftar camp, including the LNA, applauded the deal, as did many in the pro-Tripoli coalition. Even a Misratan politician normally critical of foreign mediation paid homage to the agreement, calling it “the closest thing we have ever had to ending the war and putting an end to this misery we are in”.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, Misratan politician, 25 October 2020. Hide Footnote

But sceptics and critics abound, especially among Libya’s anti-Haftar factions. While praising the agreement, Tripoli’s defence minister homed in on the need for justice for war crimes, whether through Libyan or international judicial institutions.[fn]Remarks by Defence Minister Salahedin Al Namroush to Libya al-Ahrar TV, aired on 25 October 2020. Hide Footnote He was referring to pro-Tripoli factions’ demand that Haftar and his military be held accountable for actions during the siege of Tripoli. In a published statement, members of the Tripoli-based parliament also expressed doubt about whether Haftar would abide by the agreement, “especially with regard to removing mercenaries from the Wagner forces, the Janjaweed [Sudanese armed groups] and the Chadian opposition”.[fn]“Statement of the High Council of the State Regarding the Ceasefire Agreement”, 25 October 2020. Hide Footnote Muslim Brotherhood members and other Islamists likewise expressed displeasure over the agreement, saying it validates Haftar as a negotiating counterpart – something they have long rejected.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, Tripoli-based Islamist politician, 25 October 2020. Even non-Islamist Tripoli-based politicians who consider themselves “nationalists” but share the Islamists’ aversion to Haftar expressed similar views. Crisis Group telephone interviews, Tripoli-based politicians, 24-25 October 2020. Hide Footnote They had hoped to sideline him instead, betting that, without his leadership, the LNA would disintegrate over time. 

The U.S., France, Germany, Italy, the EU and the African Union all applauded the ceasefire agreement.

International reactions have been mostly positive. The U.S., France, Germany, Italy, the EU and the African Union all applauded the ceasefire agreement.[fn]Ceasefire in Libya”, press release, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, 26 October 2020; “France Welcomes Libya Ceasefire Agreement”, statement, French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs spokesperson, 26 October 2020; “Accordo per un cessate il fuoco permanente in Libia”, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 October 2020; “Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on the Announcement of a Ceasefire Agreement in Libya”, 25 October 2020; “Statement of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Signing of a Ceasefire in Libya”, 23 October 2020. UN Security Council members also issued a press statement welcoming the ceasefire agreement: “UN Security Council Press Statement on the Ceasefire in Libya, October 27, 2020”.Hide Footnote Russia issued a timid endorsement that suggested scepticism. Moscow’s interim Libya chargé d’affaires merely expressed “satisfaction” with the deal and said he hoped it would last.[fn]The comments of Russia’s chargé d’affaires were quoted in “Libya rivals sign ceasefire agreement: live news”, Al Jazeera, 23 October 2020. Hide Footnote The agreement’s greatest foreign sceptic was Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who declared: “The ceasefire agreement that has been signed is not a ceasefire at the highest level. Time will show how lasting it will be at lower levels”.[fn]President Erdoğan’s comments to the press were quoted at the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey website: “The Ceasefire Agreement Signed in Libya is Not a Ceasefire at the Highest Level”, 23 October 2020. Hide Footnote

IV. Implementing the Ceasefire Agreement

Despite its lack of specifics and other shortcomings, the spirit that this deal embodies is worth preserving. Now is the time to turn the agreement’s general principles into details and chart a roadmap with concrete actions that both sides need to take. The 5+5 Joint Military Commission that negotiated and signed the ceasefire agreement, its follow-up committees and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) need to rapidly agree on the deal’s practicalities. The parties should clarify how it defines foreign fighters, and whether its clause on training agreements includes those signed by the government in Tripoli with foreign governments. They should also flesh out the framework for the vetting of armed groups. Insofar as many foreign fighters operating in Libya, especially those from Sudan and Chad, belong to opposition armed groups in their respective countries, authorities there may well object to their return; the UN should help put in place a plan for their demobilisation so that they do not become guns for hire in other conflicts. 

Despite its lack of specifics and other shortcomings, the spirit that this deal embodies is worth preserving.

The two sides also need to be more explicit about the terms of withdrawal from the front lines and relocation. They need to decide the status of Jufra and Qurdabiya airbases and delineate areas for joint police patrols. Only then will it be possible to put in place an international ceasefire monitoring mechanism, the need for which all parties recognise. A solution that would satisfy both sides’ preference for a light footprint would be to place a monitoring team under the next UN special envoy’s authority. The special envoy could give the team political guidance and ensure that verification of violations, as well as of implementation of follow-up measures, supports the political process, while the head of the ceasefire monitoring team would shoulder the responsibility of reporting publicly on violations and implementation. Such a solution would get around the difficulties in clinching a UN Security Council resolution to create a Libya ceasefire mission from scratch (and the associated logistical and security-related hurdles). It would also guarantee continuity with UNSMIL personnel, who over the past few years have built trust with Libya’s military factions. 

The ceasefire agreement offers a rare moment of real hope for the long-suffering Libyan people. If Libyan factions fail to follow through on its implementation or their foreign backers obstruct the process, that hope will have proven tragically short-lived.

Rome/Brussels, 4 November 2020