Calls to Curb the Crown’s Writ Put Thailand on Edge
Calls to Curb the Crown’s Writ Put Thailand on Edge
Briefing 113 / Asia

泰国南部僵局

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概况

在泰国主要的穆斯林地区——南部马来族地区发生的致命冲突如今陷入僵局。虽然军事行动可能减弱暴力冲突,但总理阿披实·维乍集瓦所领导的政府至今几乎并未做出努力以解决引发这场暴乱的政治积怨。暴乱分子提出单方面有限中止敌对行动,但目前还未得到政府有意义的回应。赋予安全保卫部队广泛权力的严厉法律仍然有效,然而对于以前恶劣的虐囚案件却仍未做出任何判决,对嫌疑犯的折磨也在继续。由于2010年初发生在曼谷的血腥反政府抗议活动困扰着整个国家,这场长达六年的暴乱的死亡人数一直在攀升。南部腹地的冲突仍是泰国政治中村在的问题并尚未得到解决。泰国政府需要从根本上转变方法,承认已经无法同化马来穆斯林,他们独特的民族—宗教身份必须得到认同。与暴乱分子的对话和对治理结构的改革目前仍是全面政治解决中缺失的两大要素。

南部腹地的暴力等级在过去三年间已大为稳定。大约30000人的部队被部署在暴乱地区,马来穆斯林暴乱分子持续袭击安全保卫部队、政府教师,以及被视为政府支持者的佛教徒和穆斯林。自2008年暴力等级骤降以来,根据2010年前10个月的记录,目前的暴力水平一直维持在大约每年1000起袭击,368人死亡的等级上。但仅靠军事行动是无法结束暴力的。

阿披实政府意识到政治解决对于结束冲突必不可少,但是其言行却并不一致。政府没有解除自2005年以来在三个南部省份施行的国家紧急状态。更糟的是,严厉的法律还被扩展至其他省份以控制反政府抗议者。对于两个暴乱组织单方面提出的于年中有限中止敌对活动的建议,政府冷淡的接受态度已令其失去了通往和平对话的机会。虽然与以前的政府相比,现任政府允许公开讨论行政改革的空间已经大了很多,但现任政府并没有认真试图探索在同一泰国原则下可能实行的改革模式。

政府正计划通过在内部安全法下实施一项准特赦作为新一轮“政治攻势”,希望其能诱使武装分子投降并削弱暴乱行为。该条款允许当局通过法院许可撤销针对武装嫌疑分子的刑事起诉,为此,嫌疑人将必须参加最多可达六个月的“培训”(反向教化的委婉说法)。此项政策能否成功还有待观察。但人权组织对此持怀疑态度,担心嫌疑人会被迫承认他们未曾犯下的罪行,并将培训称为“行政拘留”。然而,只要更广泛的社会政治积怨不得到解决,准特赦本身不太可能成为一项可持续的解决措施。

对被拘禁者的人身虐待和折磨仍在继续,而对过去的虐囚事件给予法律制裁的要求也仍没有得到回应。警方撤销了对一名涉嫌2009年Al-Furqan清真寺袭击事件的前突击队员的指控。这证明了免责的观念和暴乱分子对于不公正规则的叙述,也帮助反政府派别招募那些愿意拿起武器反对佛教泰国的人员。

在曼谷恢复政治稳定之前,暴乱将仍处于政府议事日程的外围。但政府需要做更好的准备以回应暴乱分子未来的姿态,并为谈判解决冲突奠定政治基础。在其他的独立主义冲突中,谈判已被证明是结束暴力的有效方法,并且不一定导致独立——这正是曼谷长期以来的担忧。作为减少派遣部队的努力的一部分,政府应计划增加警官和民防志愿者的数量,并提高他们的安全保卫能力。

由于军事胜利的可能性甚小,暴乱分子也必须考虑新的政治策略。暴乱分子的代表必须提出全面的政治解决方案。在超越暴力抗议的层面上,他们应该准备好,在对话机会出现时能够提出实质性的要求。

本简报来源于2010年2月和10月所做的实地调研——包括在南方腹地所进行的采访,本简报是对阿披实任期的第二年对泰国南部暴乱局势的更新分析。

曼谷/布鲁塞尔, 2010年11月3日

Overview

The deadly conflict in Thailand’s predominantly Malay Muslim South is at a stalemate. Although military operations might have contributed to the reduction in violence, the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has made little effort to tackle the political grievances that drive the insurgency. A limited unilateral suspension of hostilities offered by rebels has met no significant response. Draconian laws that grant security forces sweeping powers remain imposed while justice for serious cases of past abuse remains unaddressed and torture of suspects continues. As bloody anti-government protests in Bangkok distracted the nation in early 2010, the death toll in the six-year-long insurgency steadily climbed. The conflict in the Deep South remains on the margins of Thai politics and unresolved. A paradigm shift is needed to acknowledge that assimilation of Malay Muslims has failed and that recognition of their distinct ethno-religious identity is essential. Dialogue with insurgents and reform of governance structures remain two missing components of a comprehensive political solution.

The level of violence in the Deep South has largely been steady for the past three years. Some 30,000 troops are deployed in the insurgency-hit region where Malay Muslim insurgents have continued to attack security forces, government teachers, Buddhists and Muslims perceived to side with the government. Since a significant drop in 2008, the tempo of violence has been around 1,000 attacks per year with 368 deaths recorded in the first ten months of 2010. Military operations alone are unable to end the violence.

While the Abhisit government has recognised that political solutions are necessary to end the conflict, words have not been matched by actions. It has failed to lift the state of emergency in the three southernmost provinces imposed since 2005. Worse still, the draconian law has been extended to control anti-government protestors in other provinces. The government has dismissed a chance to move towards peace dialogues by giving a lukewarm reception to a mid-year limited suspension of hostilities declared unilaterally by two insurgent groups. Although there has been greater space for public discussion on administrative reform than under previous governments, no serious attempt has been made to explore possible models within the principle of a unitary Thai state.

The government is planning to launch a new “political offensive” by implementing a quasi-amnesty policy under the Internal Security Act, hoping it will entice militants to surrender and weaken the movement. The provision allows the authorities, with the consent of a court, to drop criminal charges against suspected militants who, in turn, will be required to undergo up to six months of “training”, a euphemism for reverse indoctrination. It remains to be seen whether the policy will succeed. Human rights advocates are sceptical, fearing suspects could be forced to confess to crimes that they did not commit and calling the training “administrative detention”. Nevertheless, the quasi-amnesty measure alone is unlikely to be a lasting solution as long as larger socio-political grievances remain unaddressed.

Physical abuse and torture of detainees continue, while demands for justice for past abuses remain unanswered. Police dropped charges against a former ranger alleged to be involved in the 2009 Al-Furqan mosque attack. This reinforces perceptions of impunity and the insurgency’s narrative of the unjust rule, while aiding recruitment of those willing to take up arms against the Buddhist Thai state.

Until political stability in Bangkok is restored, the insurgency will remain at the periphery of the government agenda. But the government needs to be better prepared to respond to future gestures by the insurgents and lay the political groundwork for a negotiated settlement. In other separatist conflicts, negotiations have proven an effective means to end violence and do not necessarily lead to secession, as Bangkok has long feared. As part of an effort to scale down the presence of troops, the government should plan to increase the numbers of police officers and civilian defence volunteers as well as enhance their capacity to provide security.

With no military victory in sight for either side, the rebels must also consider new political strategies. Their representatives must propose comprehensive political solutions. Beyond protesting through violence, they should get ready to make concrete demands at a time when an opportunity for talks arises.

Based on research carried out between February and October 2010, including interviews in the Deep South, this briefing provides an update of analysis of the southern insurgency in the second year of the Abhisit administration.

Bangkok/Brussels, 3 November 2010

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