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Cameroon: Prevention is Better than Cure
Cameroon: Prevention is Better than Cure
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
CrisisWatch 2018 January Trends & February Alerts
CrisisWatch 2018 January Trends & February Alerts
Briefing 101 / Africa

Cameroon: Prevention is Better than Cure

Cameroon’s apparent stability belies the variety of internal and external pressures threatening the country’s future. Without social and political change, a weakened Cameroon could become another flashpoint in the region.

I. Overview

Cameroon’s apparent stability and recent government reforms can no longer hide its vulnerabilities. While the government of President Paul Biya has manipulated the electoral system to his advantage, options for effective political expression by the opposition are minimal, social discontent is widespread and new security threats are emerging. The combination of external pressures (Boko Haram and the Central African Republic crisis) and long lasting internal social and political deadlock is a destabilising mix. Yet, ironically, for the moment, it is the principal source of support for the current regime; for the majority of Cameroonians, a preference for the devil they know – rather than any intrinsic appeal of the ruling party – is what seems to ensure a semblance of stability. To reduce the risk of violent crisis ahead of the next election in 2018, the government and opposition should set up a framework for dialogue and agree on a package of meaningful political and institutional reforms.

The key question for both local and foreign observers of Cameroon is always the same: how will the transition to a post-Biya political landscape play itself out? After 32 years as president, 81-year-old Paul Biya, reelected in 2011 for seven more years at the helm, does not seem ready to leave office in 2018. In 2010, the International Crisis Group outlined the weaknesses of Cameroon’s non-violent status quo and the dangerous consequences of a growing rift between the regime and society at large. Since then, vulnerabilities have deepened.

Despite accepting demands by opposition and civil society for some institutional reforms (new electoral code, creation of the Senate), the governing Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) party still dominates the political scene. Amid claims of electoral fraud, the outcome of the 2011 and 2013 elections resulted in only a residual role in parliament, towns and cities for opposition parties, reinforcing the notion that a change of power through the ballot box was improbable under the current dispensation.

Despite the proliferation of media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society has lost the influence it had during the 1990s. Some local NGOs are under the sway of the regime while others are dependent on financial foreign assistance. Due to corruption, unemployment, and poverty, much of the NGO sector has turned into a market and consequently civil society’s influence on public policies is limited.

In addition, some pillars of the regime are cracking. Internal tensions are deepening in the CPDM while security forces are divided and under pressure. The expansion of attacks by Nigeria’s extremist Islamist group Boko Haram into northern Cameroon and the spillover of the Central African Republic crisis into eastern Cameroon are increasing the fragility of the security apparatus and may feed internal discontent.

The mix of external security challenges with political and social stagnation could prove potentially dangerous if there is an unmanaged transition. As shown by the 2011 and 2013 elections, neither the opposition nor civil society can serve as vehicles for social and political change in a context of a widening generation gap and massive youth unemployment. The bulk of the Cameroonian population is young (the average age is nineteen), often jobless, and views the ageing elite as the main cause of stagnation.

Crisis Group’s previous recommendations on the transparency of the electoral process, institutional reforms and the fight against corruption are still relevant and should form the thrust of an agreement on a post-Biya transition signed between the regime, opposition and civil society and guaranteed by an international witness (the African Union). This agreement should include:

  • creating a dialogue framework between the opposition and the ruling party to negotiate and agree on institutional reforms;
     
  • injecting new blood into the leadership structures of political parties through the implementation of age quotas;
     
  • President Biya’s promise not to contest the 2018 presidential election in exchange for a guarantee that no legal actions (excluding crimes under the Rome Statute) will be undertaken against him and that he can retain his assets;
     
  • organising primaries in all political parties, including the ruling party, before 2018;
     
  • changing the appointment mechanisms for the members of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Council and the electoral commission in order to improve their independence; and,

reducing discontent within the army by providing the same equipment, wage and financial benefits to the special and regular military units and rotating troops in the Far North.

Nairobi/Brussels, 4 September 2014

Commentary

CrisisWatch 2018 January Trends & February Alerts

The latest edition of Crisis Group's monthly conflict tracker highlights dangers of new conflict in Somaliland, Afghanistan and Syria. CrisisWatch also notes that February's winter Olympics on the Korean Peninsula represent a chance for peace against a great background risk of war.

January saw violence rise in Afghanistan, likely to continue in February as conflict parties compete to gain the upper hand ahead of spring offensives. Clashes look set to escalate in north-west Syria, with the regime ramping up its push against rebels and Turkey launching an assault on Kurdish-held Afrin. In Yemen, southern separatists fought government forces, their erstwhile allies, to take control of Aden city in the south. In West Africa, both Mali and Niger experienced a rise in jihadist violence, in Nigeria deadly attacks between herders and farmers spiralled, and Equatorial Guinea said it had thwarted an attempted coup. In the Horn of Africa, Somaliland troops clashed with neighbouring Puntland’s forces and both sides looked to be preparing for more hostilities. In Colombia, peace talks between the government and the National Liberation Army were suspended following a spate of guerrilla attacks. The Venezuelan government’s announcement of early elections sparked a crisis of confidence in talks with the opposition. Meanwhile, peace talks between North and South Korea provide an opportunity for de-escalation, however the threat of war on the peninsula is higher now than at any time in recent history.

With peace talks stalled, Afghanistan experienced a rise in deadly attacks by all armed actors, at a tempo and intensity that could persist as conflict parties try to gain the upper hand ahead of spring offensives. The Afghan National Security Forces claimed to have killed about 2,000 Taliban and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) fighters since late December, while attacks by the Taliban and the IS-KP have left scores dead. In one incident in Kabul claimed by the Taliban, a bomb in an ambulance killed more than 100. Recognising that Afghanistan risks facing escalating violence in 2018, Crisis Group has stressed that diplomatic channels should be preserved and a political settlement pursued.

In Syria’s north west, Turkey’s air and land offensive against Kurdish “People’s Protection Units” (YPG) in Afrin, and regime advances against rebels in Hama and Idlib provinces, marked a severe escalation and paved the way for worse fighting in February. As we warned, Turkey’s offensive among a hostile population and in difficult territory could easily become a prolonged fight against a gritty insurgency, further strain its alliance with the YPG’s main backer, the U.S., and provoke Kurdish attacks at home. A deal would serve both sides better. In Yemen’s port city of Aden, southern separatists – nominally allied with the government in its fight against Huthi rebels – routed government forces from much of the city; dozens died in the fighting.

Suspected jihadist gunmen and suicide bombers in Mali upped deadly attacks against the military and French Barkhane forces, especially in Ménaka region in the east. In neighbouring Niger, Boko Haram militants increased attacks against the army in the south east, killing at least ten soldiers. To confront these rural insurgencies in the Sahel, in tandem with military efforts, authorities and foreign partners should promote local mediation and peacebuilding initiatives and, where possible, try to engage militant leaders. Nigeria’s expanding conflict between herding and farming communities spiralled in January with at least 200 killed across five states. Also in West Africa, Equatorial Guinea said it had foiled a coup attempt; 39 mercenaries were arrested in southern Cameroon.

Tensions between Somaliland and Puntland state in Somalia turned violent when on 8 January Somaliland troops seized the town of Tukaraq in the disputed Sool region, pushing out Puntland forces. With fighters exchanging fire on 28 January and both sides reportedly mobilising more manpower, February could see further hostilities.

In Colombia, amid a climate of mistrust at the negotiating table and a general atmosphere of public scepticism and apathy, peace talks between the government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group were suspended on 29 January following a spate of guerrilla attacks. In Venezuela, the government’s announcement that it will hold early elections “before 30 April”, in defiance of ongoing talks with the opposition, sparked a crisis of confidence in the talks, greatly reducing the prospects of a viable agreement to resolve the political standoff.

In Kosovo, the murder of moderate Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic in Mitrovica on 16 January triggered shock and condemnation within Kosovo and by the U.S., EU and others in the international community, who called for all sides to remain calm, exercise restraint and avoid dangerous rhetoric.

North and South Korea conducted multiple rounds of peace talks in January and agreed to conduct several joint activities in the coming months. This came after Seoul responded positively to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s offer of immediate and unconditional talks with South Korea in his annual New Year’s address. As Crisis Group reports state, the thaw in relations offers an opportunity to dial down tensions and reduce the immediate risk of conflict through some form of de-escalatory deal between the U.S. and North Korea. Nevertheless, the threat of catastrophic war on the peninsula is higher now than at any time in recent history, and escalation could quickly resume after the Olympics.

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Contributors

Director of Research & Special Adviser on Gender
iarradon
Research Manager
BranczikAmelia
Senior Research Analyst
neddalby