Settling Cyprus

When he witnessed the deadly conflict unfolding between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1955, novelist Lawrence Durrell noted how unreal the bloodshed seemed against the background of the island's idyllic beauty. Between bouts of violence, he said, the land was "covered by the deceptive mask of a perfect spring, smothered in wild flowers and rejoicing in those long hours of perfect calm which persuaded all but the satraps that the nightmare had faded."

The killings and almost half a century have passed, but the self-deception remains. Cyprus's present tranquility now masks a new unraveling of the predictable, if awkward, status quo.

For three decades after Turkey's invasion in 1974, stalemate ruled. Turkish troops occupied the northern third of the island, guarding the Turkish Cypriot community, about 20% of the total population. Ankara would not pull out unless the Turkish Cypriots got a federated state in a new bizonal Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots wouldn't offer their Turkish neighbors more than minority rights in the Greek Cypriots' own unitary state. The standoff held back the Cypriots economically and hobbled Turkey's integration with the West. Yet the buffer zone is normally so quiet that U.N. peacekeepers there can afford to write nature studies about the flora and fauna that has multiplied in this overgrown no man's land.

Between 2002 and 2004, there was a heady moment of hope. The Turkish Cypriot side unilaterally opened border crossings, triggering a nostalgic rush of bicommunal visits. Turkey agreed to the U.N.-mediated Annan plan to withdraw its troops, backed by the U.S, the EU and, in a 2004 referendum, by 65% of the Turkish Cypriot voters. But this hope was extinguished when 76% of Greek Cypriots, urged on by President Tassos Papadopoulos, voted no.

Even though Mr. Papadopoulos broke a promise to back the plan, the EU then allowed the Greek Cypriot government to join the EU as the island's sole representative. Since then, the status quo has been falling apart. Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots are deteriorating and putting the island on course for indefinite partition. Official contacts have all but ceased, and bicommunal meetings have dried up.

Turkey refuses, against its best interests, to honor its EU obligation to open its seaports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic. A 259 million euro EU aid program to Turkish Cypriots is stumbling over Nicosia's refusal to acknowledge Turkish Cypriot institutions created after the 1974 invasion. Ill-will on both sides means intra-island trade is minimal. EU-sanctioned Turkish Cypriot exports through Greek Cypriot ports amounted to one shipment of aluminum scrap last year. In 2006, it totaled one shipment of Turkish Delight -- or "Cyprus Delight" in EU parlance.

And while until now the conflict had few implications for the outside world, there is now a big new loser: the European Union. The EU effectively imported the Cyprus problem into its inner councils, clouding its foreign, security and trade policy. Nicosia is the principal holdout against a European consensus to support an independent Kosovo, fearing that it would be a precedent for Turkish Cypriot secession. In 2006, Greek Cypriots wielded the swing vote on EU import tariffs on Chinese shoes. Nicosia backed the protectionists apparently because of their support in the Cyprus dispute. In 2005, Greek Cypriots held up EU talks with countries in the Caucasus for six months because of a single charter flight between Azerbaijan and the Turkish Cypriot airport in north Cyprus.

At every turn, Greek Cypriots have used their EU membership to punish Turkey, notably by trying to torpedo Ankara's accession talks. The Turks, in turn, have used their membership in NATO to retaliate by blocking Cypriot and EU cooperation with the group, even in Afghanistan. Turkey is also blocking Cypriot accession to the OECD and even the European Center for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts.

But it is not just the EU that needs to reverse the dynamics of partition in Cyprus. Turkey has to strike a deal that will ultimately ensure the withdrawal of its troops if it is to resume its stalled enlargement talks with the EU. For the Turkish Cypriots in the north, a comprehensive settlement is the only realistic way to get their full rights as EU citizens and save themselves from dependence on Turkey. It's also their best bet to rid themselves of criminal elements taking advantage of the territory's unrecognized status to launder money and smuggle illegal immigrants into the EU.

For the Greek Cypriots, a settlement is the only way to win the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, recover at least some territory on the other side of the border for former refugees, and discourage the influx of Turkish immigrants into the north which threatens the island's demographic balance.

The Greek part of Cyprus south of Nicosia boasts shiny office buildings and showy restaurants, but all is not well. A tourism sector aimed at cheap holidays for Britons is sagging. Cyprus's membership in the EU and the euro zone means that making money off a free-wheeling offshore banking system is no longer an option. Lying 70 kilometers from the Turkish coast and 4,650 kilometers from Brussels, Greek Cypriots need normalization with Turkey if their service industries are to become an East Mediterranean hub.

All the countries in its neighborhood, even Greece, are pursuing policies of detente and cooperation with Turkey, the region's biggest and most dynamic economy. Syria, once the standard-bearer for Greek Cypriots against Turkey in the Arab and Islamic worlds, reopened a ferry route to the Turkish Cypriot port of Famagusta in October.

Cooperation instead of conflict with Turkey would provide large benefits. Greek Cypriot hoteliers could, like the Greek island of Rhodes, be filling empty rooms with newly well-off Turkish tourists. Turkey's ban on Greek Cypriot vessels has helped push the Greek Cypriot merchant fleet from fourth down to 11th in the world. Ending a sense of being a gated community in the wrong neighborhood will persuade more well-qualified young Cypriots to stay home rather than seek opportunities elsewhere.

Greek Cypriots should realize that Turkish Cypriots are growing stronger in the world and will not give up and join a unitary Greek Cypriot state. Similarly, Turks should understand that the only way to persuade Greek Cypriots to settle will be through normalization and persuasion, not threats, as when Ankara hinted at a military escalation during a 2007 oil-prospecting dispute. When the Greek Cypriot presidential elections next month are out of the way, all sides should appeal to the U.N. to return to mediate a comprehensive settlement. This time, it may really be the last chance.