In mid-August 2021, Taliban militants swept into Kabul, completing their takeover of Afghanistan and marking a new phase in what has been the world’s most lethal conflict in recent years. The U.S.-backed government in place since 2001 is gone, as are almost all U.S. and NATO troops. As the new dispensation takes shape, Crisis Group remains focused on promoting a deep understanding of events on the ground and helping the various stakeholders inside and outside the country comprehend their counterparts' motives and political constraints. We also aim to advance policies that improve security and promote inclusive governance.
In August 2021, as foreign troops departed, Taliban insurgents seized power in Kabul, bringing the country back under their rule. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Graeme Smith, drawing upon Crisis Group’s research across Afghanistan, assesses the regime’s record and its implications for international policy.
Tensions with Pakistan remained elevated amid cross-border attacks from militants; authorities sought to clamp down on IS-KP activity.
Authorities targeted IS-KP, implemented poppy eradication campaign. Taliban forces 7 July killed Zakir, senior Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) commander in Nangarhar province; 13 July Taliban raided IS-KP hideout in capital Kabul and arrested several suspects for allegedly planning attack during Ashura, day of commemoration held by Shia Muslims. Amid ongoing poppy eradication campaign, authorities 17-23 July arrested at least seven people during narcotic raids in Badakhshan province, leading to tensions with local communities.
Relations with Pakistan remained strained. UN 10 July released document labelling Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) “largest terrorist group” in Afghanistan. Report stated that group received increased support from Taliban authorities to conduct cross-border attacks against Pakistan. It blamed Taliban authorities for being “unable or unwilling” to curb TTP activities whose attacks have increased in recent years. Pakistan Foreign Ministry 17 July said it summoned senior Afghan diplomat in Islamabad after suicide bombing attack in Pakistan’s Bannu city killed eight soldiers two days before; Pakistan accused Afghanistan-based TTP’s Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group for violence, demanded Kabul to take “immediate, robust, and effective action” against attackers. Taliban authorities did not respond immediately. Pakistan 21 July reopened Chaman border crossing with Afghanistan after nine months of closure.
Iran deported over 2,000 Afghan migrants. Amid rising anti-Afghan sentiments, local residents 19 July in Iran’s Khur city torched homes of several Afghans following killing of Iranian man by alleged Afghan teenager; Iran same day sent back 2,212 migrants to Afghanistan.
In other important developments. Central Asian delegations and investors 3 July attended Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Trade Coordination Forum to explore business opportunities around Afghanistan. Taliban Emir 6 July made another round of changes to cabinet and replaced central bank governor, mines and petroleum minister. Authorities early July held series of meetings with Shia leaders to impose restrictions on Shia Ashura celebrations, including by restricting gatherings to places of worship, and prohibiting public displays such as flags.
The more isolated the Taliban becomes, the more they turn to China to replace the diplomatic weight the US previously provided.
Most regional capitals are not allowing the issue of non-recognition [of the Taliban] to hinder their relations with Kabul.
As Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban severed, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also gotten cold feet in their engagement [with the Taliban].
The flood of outrage from the West will strengthen the resolve of the Taliban leadership [in Afghanistan], which defines itself as a bulwark against the outside world.
Negotiations with the Afghan Taliban have failed to make their regime more politically inclusive or respectful of women’s rights. The diplomatic agenda should be more focused, with issues like security cooperation and economic stability insulated from a main track regarding international recognition of the Taliban.
This week on Hold Your Fire, Richard is joined by Crisis Group experts Jerome Drevon, Ibraheem Bahiss and Olga Oliker to discuss the ISIS-claimed attack on a music venue in a Moscow suburb, the global threat ISIS and its affiliates pose and what the strike might mean for Russia and the war in Ukraine.
In this online event, Crisis Group experts and external speakers discuss the ways governments around Afghanistan are engaging with the de facto authorities on pressing issues.
Even as many diplomats shun the Taliban regime, protesting its treatment of women and girls, emissaries of countries near Afghanistan have sought dealings with Kabul in areas like security and commerce. It is a worthwhile endeavour, and the West should not stand in the way.
Western sanctions on the Taliban regime for its restrictions on women’s rights are plunging Afghanistan into isolation, including from its neighbours. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2024, Crisis Group outlines ways the EU can support regional diplomacy and mitigate the country’s socio-economic crisis.
پاکستان پروسه برگرداندن به وطن را که میتواند میلیونها افغان را به کشور بحرانزده خود بازگرداندآغازکرده است. همانطور که ابراهیم باحث، کارشناس گروه بحران در این پرسش و پاسخ توضیح می دهد، علیرغم تلاش های اسلام آباد برای توجیه آن بر اساس دلایل امنیتی، این سیاست می تواند مشکلات بیشتری را برای منطقه به بار آورد.
Surviving the impact of climate change and adapting to harsher new environments are collective tasks that need the cooperation of all countries, even Afghanistan under the outcast Taliban regime.
On 13 September, Crisis Group Asia Program Director Pierre Prakash spoke at the Afghanistan Humanitarian Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) at Brussels.
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