Syria after the U.S. Strike: What Should Come Next
Syria after the U.S. Strike: What Should Come Next
What Comes After the Bloody Battle for Aleppo?
What Comes After the Bloody Battle for Aleppo?
A poison hazard danger sign is seen in the town of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib province, Syria, on 5 April 2017. ANADOLU AGENCY/Ogun Duru

Syria after the U.S. Strike: What Should Come Next

Poison gas and missile response have heightened tensions over the Syria conflict. Washington and Moscow should respond to the new risks by pursuing their stated common interest: sufficient de-escalation of the war's violence to establish a meaningful political track toward settlement.

Whether one believes they were the long-overdue response to the Syrian regime’s brutality, a one-off event that will not affect the conflict’s trajectory, a risky step that could prompt military escalation or all of the above, the 7 April U.S. missile strikes on Syria’s Shayrat air base in response to the regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons should be seized upon as an opportunity to jumpstart diplomatic efforts. The strikes have heightened tension between Moscow and Washington. Yet, this added volatility and the risks attached to it could and should prompt more serious pursuit by the two countries of their purportedly common interest: de-escalating violence sufficiently to establish a meaningful political track. This can be best achieved by deepening rather than breaking off U.S.-Russian cooperation.

The Trump administration framed its strikes, involving 59 Tomahawk missiles fired from two U.S. Navy destroyers in the Mediterranean, as a proportional response to what both the U.S. and such independent on-the-ground observers as the group Médecins sans Frontières concluded was a sarin attack near the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun on the Damascus-Aleppo highway on 4 April. It identified the target as the air base from which it said the aircraft that carried out the attack had taken off. It highlighted efforts to alert Moscow beforehand and avoid casualties among both Russian and Syrian personnel. And it noted that while the decision to punish the regime militarily for chemical attacks was new, its broader policy of prioritising the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and pinning the hoped-for departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on the results of a political process remains in place. In other words, the military action appeared intended to be narrow in scope, an attempt at limiting risk but offering correspondingly relatively modest rewards: deterrence of further chemical attacks.

In the U.S. and Europe, as well as in many Middle East countries, the Trump administration’s decision brought relief to those who had bemoaned President Obama’s reluctance to order more forceful U.S. military action to protect Syrian civilians from regime atrocities and, for some, even oust the regime. Others deemed it a risky gambit, taken impulsively and outside the framework of a forward-looking strategy, that would not change the fundamental course of the war and inadvertently could trigger an escalation, if not a direct military confrontation, with Russia or Iran. Some saw it as a bit of both: a welcome response that only would make sense – and avoid unintended consequences – if immediately accompanied by efforts to put Syria’s collapsed ceasefire and faltering political talks back on track.

Now that both sides have made their largely symbolic moves, the moment has arrived to return to diplomacy and de-escalate tensions.

The risks are indeed significant. If, for example, regime chemical attacks were to continue (perhaps employing chlorine instead of the much deadlier nerve agent sarin), the U.S. might find itself compelled to launch additional, more significant strikes and accept the increased risks, or forfeit whatever deterrent effect and credibility boost it had hoped to achieve. High-casualty regime attacks employing other weapons, such as barrel bombs, likewise may generate pressure on Washington to decide whether to expand its deterrence or be seen as signalling that atrocities that do not involve poison gas are tolerable. There also is the related challenge of managing U.S. allies in Syria and the broader region, whose expectations may now rise disproportionately to what the White House is willing to do in their support.

The biggest risk, direct escalation with the regime’s principal backers, Russia and Iran, can be expected to grow in the event of additional U.S. strikes. Iran’s militia network has the capacity to retaliate against U.S. interests throughout the region. Moscow presents an even bigger and more immediate concern: Russian and U.S. jets share the Syrian skies, and Russian personnel and equipment are integral components of the regime’s air-defence systems. This means not only that Moscow can severely constrain Washington’s capacity to carry out airstrikes crucial to its efforts against ISIS in eastern Syria, but also that an accident or miscommunication involving aircraft or ground personnel could set off an extremely dangerous escalatory spiral. Underlining this concern is the fact that Moscow has already announced its intentions to suspend participation in the de-confliction channel its forces and those of the U.S. use and beef up the regime’s air defences. It also has dispatched a frigate carrying cruise missiles to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Now that both sides have made their largely symbolic moves, the moment has arrived to return to diplomacy and de-escalate tensions, lest an opportunity be wasted and the situation spin out of control. Despite the brief display of U.S. military muscle, Russia remains in the driver’s seat in the Syrian conflict, given its assets on the ground and in the air, as well as its alliance with the regime, Iran, Hizbollah and associated militias. While Washington can hope to influence Moscow’s behaviour, Russia doubtless will take the lead in shaping the course of events.

During a visit to Moscow that coincided with the Khan Sheikhoun attack and the U.S. missile strike, Crisis Group encountered deep frustration about the presumed lack of U.S. appreciation for what Moscow considers to be its constructive effort to end the war and prevent the country’s dissolution. Despite the public bluster, Russia is also clearly weary of further escalation and a complete unravelling of its diplomatic efforts at effecting a ceasefire and jumpstarting political talks, and apprehensive about the soundness of its Syrian ally. Some Russian analysts also expressed concern about the damage Russia’s reputation might suffer from what they considered the regime’s graphic and blatant breach of an agreement on the regime’s chemical arsenal and chemical weapons use that Moscow itself initiated. (This is the 2013 U.S.-Russian agreement to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons program, and UN Security Council Resolution 2118 endorsing that agreement.)

Whatever wisdom one might assign to the latest U.S.-Russian tit-for-tat, it has potential to advance a better way forward. Rather than merely seeking to restore the pre-2013 status quo concerning non-use of chemical weapons, the U.S. and Russia should take steps jointly to prevent a direct confrontation and pursue what both have identified as an immediate interest: reducing violence between the regime and its non-jihadist opponents. This is essential to save lives but also could enable a shift of resources toward the fight against ISIS; obstruct efforts by Tahrir al-Sham (a jihadist coalition led by a former al-Qaeda affiliate previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra) to assert hegemony over the opposition’s non-jihadist factions; and, over time, pave the way for a credible political process.

The first step should be to define the terms of a viable ceasefire between the regime and non-jihadist opposition. Elements of truces attempted in 2016 and early 2017 could provide starting points. Trading U.S. counter-terror coordination with Moscow in exchange for an end to regime air attacks outside ISIS-held areas merits renewed discussion. Including Turkey, Iran and Jordan as co-guarantors alongside Moscow and Washington would be necessary to achieve a critical mass of leverage over the warring Syrian parties. Recognising spheres of influence held by the conflict’s many players is nobody’s idea of a perfect peace, but currently it offers the most realistic path to a sustained de-escalation that could create space for a political process addressing Syria’s governance and geopolitical dilemmas.

The U.S. and Russia should take steps jointly to prevent a direct confrontation and pursue what both have identified as an immediate interest: reducing violence between the regime and its non-jihadist opponents.

For a new ceasefire to succeed where others have failed, however, Russia, the U.S. and their regional partners will have to be more realistic in addressing the challenges posed by Tahrir al-Sham, which dominates much of the rebel-held north west and holds territory close to non-jihadist forces. Its exclusion from previous truces has increased its incentives to act as a spoiler and provided a loophole through which the regime and its allies have continued to pummel opposition-held areas (using its presence, real or fabricated, as a pretext). To have any chance of success, a ceasefire must include – at least for a defined period – areas in which Tahrir al-Sham is present but does not exert unilateral control. This would provide time, space and political capital for the U.S. and Turkey to work with rebel allies to address the Tahrir al-Sham problem before it strangles them.

Though they support opposing sides, Washington and Moscow appear more realistic about the need for eventual compromise than their respective Syrian and regional allies. Russia is pinched between an unreliable ally in the Assad regime, which, for all its brutality, is incapable of winning the war; an all too capable ally in Iran, able to defend its interests in Syria even when they diverge from Moscow’s; an adversary in Turkey which, nominal rapprochement notwithstanding, has little incentive at present to do Moscow favours; a formidable military power across the occupied Golan in Israel, which is sceptical of Russia’s intentions and ability to rein in Hizbollah and acts against it even in proximity to Russian forces; and an unpredictable rival in the Trump administration, which, for all its professed desire to avoid foreign entanglements, may find stoking crisis to its political benefit. Russia for the most part has successfully balanced among these competing forces, but it cannot do so forever. The chemical weapon attack and U.S. response are examples of destabilising events that are bound to increase and at some point slip out of Moscow’s control.

Ultimately, U.S. and Russian realism will be needed to seriously begin a process that could lead to an end of the conflict. What happened in Khan Sheikhoun points to the horrors ahead and of their dangerous regional and perhaps even wider international ramifications if the situation is left adrift. Whether the U.S. attack on 7 April was prudent or reckless is beside the point: what matters now is to turn it into an opportunity to initiate steps that reduce the violence in Syria, so that the unspeakable civilian suffering eases and a political process finally has a chance.

Residents escape Assad regime bombardment in Al Moyaser neighbourhood of Aleppo, Syria on 29 November, 2016. ANADOLU AGENCY/Jawad al Rifai

What Comes After the Bloody Battle for Aleppo?

Despite the Syrian regime’s brutally effective campaign to recapture Aleppo, it cannot celebrate victory yet. In this Q&A, Senior Syria Analyst Noah Bonsey talks about the factors likely to fuel greater violence, increased radicalisation and more massive displacement. 

What are the immediate implications of the regime’s victory in Aleppo?

Aleppo illustrates the bleak state of the Syrian war, more than five years into the conflict. The regime and its allies are defeating rebel groups by employing an expanded version of their long-favoured military approach: massive collective punishment, including siege tactics and relentless bombardment targeting civilians. With crucial support from Russian air power and Iran-backed foreign fighters, this set of tactics has enabled the regime to compensate, for now at least, for its eroding military and limited base of reliable Syrian fighters. 

This approach has enabled the regime to achieve significant military and political gains at minimal cost to itself. The human suffering it creates is truly unimaginable, in both scale and intensity, particularly among civilians in opposition areas—as the images emerging from Aleppo remind us. But the regime and its allies are at best unconcerned with civilian casualties, and at worst appear intent on increasing them. They have multiple objectives: to push local civilians to pressure the fighters in their midst toward surrender; to signal to Syrians elsewhere the price of continued resistance; and to displace pro-opposition populations that might pose challenges to regime governance in the future. Meanwhile, the regime and its allies see clearly that the opposition’s backers and broader “international community” are unwilling or unable to take action to raise the price for this scorched-earth approach--despite all the bloodshed, displacement, and radicalization it generates. Given those incentives—high rewards, with minimal costs to themselves--it is no wonder that the regime, Russia, Iran and allied proxies have repeatedly employed this brutal strategy. It has worked around Damascus and Homs, it has now worked in Aleppo, and they will presumably seek to employ it again—perhaps next in Idlib, or in Eastern Ghouta [outside Damascus]. What we are seeing in Aleppo is not only an unfathomable human disaster unto itself, but also a preview of what is likely to come.  

This approach has enabled the regime to achieve significant military and political gains at minimal cost to itself.

What particular importance does Aleppo have within the Syria conflict?

The eastern half of Aleppo was arguably the opposition’s most valuable strategic holding, given the city’s size, economic weight, and proximity to the Turkish border. As the conflict has evolved, Aleppo city and portions of the adjacent countryside were also the part of the north where non-jihadi factions remained the dominant local forces, even as Jabhat al-Nusra (now known as Fath al-Sham) asserted hegemony over much of neighbouring Idlib. Aleppo’s loss is a huge blow to the non-jihadi portion of the rebel spectrum, and thus to the opposition’s political ambitions in general. 

Regime strategy has long aimed to militarily cripple the non-jihadi opposition and render it politically irrelevant. Ever since 2014, Crisis Group has highlighted the importance of Aleppo, pointing out that the regime’s capture of the city would seriously jeopardize any remaining prospect for a negotiated end to the conflict and likely to strengthen jihadist groups. For any settlement to prove viable, you need a non-jihadi opposition that is sufficiently pragmatic to make a deal, and strong enough on the ground to implement it. The evisceration of non-jihadi factions in the north will increasingly play to the advantage of jihadists like Fath al-Sham. It will also offer new opportunities to the Islamic State (IS), which is widely despised by the rest of the rebellion but, as that rebellion loses momentum, may find openings to assert itself and even rebuild some credibility with the anti-regime base.

Where does the opposition go from here?

Aleppo reflects long-standing problems within the pro-opposition camp that weakened their ability to defend territory. Poor coordination and competing priorities among state backers have consistently undermined their Syrian allies. Recent months were no exception, with Saudi Arabia stuck in a quagmire in Yemen, Turkey caught in a trans-border struggle with Kurdish forces, and the U.S. focused on fighting IS while engaging in fruitless rounds of diplomacy with Moscow. 

That left the armed opposition more or less to their own devices in Aleppo, and they played a bad hand very poorly—succumbing to in-fighting at the worst possible moments, and undermining their own cause with indiscriminate shelling of regime-held western Aleppo. Rebels would have struggled to defend their territory in the city in any case, given the breadth and intensity of the pro-regime offensive, but it must be noted that the pro-opposition camp’s effort proved less than the sum of its parts. 

So what’s left for the opposition on the ground? They face a bleak map, where the most promising spot is northeast of Aleppo, where non-jihadi factions working directly with Turkish forces have recaptured from IS a large swath of territory along the border, and are now attempting to take the city of al-Bab, some 35 km east of Aleppo. Ankara charts the course for this joint effort, known as Euphrates Shield, which aims primarily to push IS from the Turkish border and block the Syria-based People’s Protection Units (YPG, Kurdish forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK) from connecting their territory east of the Euphrates river with the Afrin canton they control north of Aleppo. Participation in Euphrates Shield carries significant costs for the opposition: forces deployed there might otherwise have helped strengthen efforts to defend eastern Aleppo; and Ankara’s need to maintain Moscow’s goodwill, in order to prevent the interference of the Russian air force, constrained its ability to help rebels counter the pro-regime campaign there. Yet the benefits are also significant, as the operation’s gains have provided new space and relevance for non-jihadi opposition elements facing existential threats elsewhere in the north.

The northern province of Idlib has been much discussed as the next point of conflict in the north, can the opposition rally there? 

Efforts to evacuate civilians and fighters from Aleppo began today, after repeated delays, with convoys headed toward Idlib, the opposition’s remaining northwestern stronghold. The situation in Idlib is even more dynamic--and combustible. The pro-regime camp may seek to escalate there after Aleppo, applying similarly brutal tactics against cities and towns that remain crowded with civilians, including many displaced from elsewhere. Rebel control in the area is split primarily between Jabhat Fath al-Sham—a salafi-jihadist group that until recently maintained official links to al-Qaeda—and Ahrar al-Sham, a group incorporating a range of Islamists that has situated itself between Fath al-Sham and more mainstream factions on the rebel political and ideological spectrum. These are two of the rebellion’s strongest factions, and they will likely prove better situated to defend their ground than did their Aleppo counterparts. However, their unambiguously Islamist platforms and Fath al-Sham’s al-Qaeda ties may limit international outcry over the pro-regime camp’s attacks on areas under their control. This may be a moot point, given that international outcry has done little to restrain the regime and its allies elsewhere. Meanwhile, a long-standing ideological, political and personal rift between pragmatist and hardline camps within Ahrar al-Sham has recently deepened. A break between the two camps, should it occur, may prove healthy for the opposition in the medium to long term, but would likely further weaken their defensive capacity in the immediate future.

Does the opposition have any better hopes for a come-back in the south?

The opposition in southern Syria has won only mixed returns from compromise. Non-jihadi factions there continue to control significant swaths of territory, but an apparent understanding between Russia and Jordan, upon which rebels depend for supplies, has largely frozen that front for the time being, with occasional exceptions. This has offered some degree of respite for rebel-held areas there, but has also enabled the pro-regime camp to divert resources toward escalation against other opposition pockets—and in turn, by some accounts, lowered morale among southern rebels.

Elsewhere, armed opposition control is limited to isolated pockets—most notably the besieged Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta, controlled primarily by non-jihadist factions and still home to a large civilian population. Reasserting its authority throughout the capital region is a long-standing regime priority, and the regime’s success in Aleppo would appear to raise the likelihood of a similarly devastating campaign for what is left of rebel-held Ghouta. 

In theory, to avoid the human and potential political toll of massive pro-regime offensives targeting Eastern Ghouta or parts of Idlib, non-jihadi factions and their state backers might be best served by jointly pursuing something akin to the non-aggression arrangement that has largely prevailed in the south. Also in theory, such an understanding could hold appeal for Russia—which has at times appeared wary of the regime’s limited capacity to hold regained territory and whose air support is crucial to enabling further regime offensives. Moscow’s concerns were underlined with the recent recapture of Palmyra by IS, just nine months after a Russian-backed military campaign had succeeded in expelling the group. In practice, however, there is little apparent appetite for a non-aggression arrangement within the fractious pro-opposition camp. And it is hard to imagine Russia—let alone the regime and Iran—choosing to halt their march against rebels now when they enjoy such momentum. Even if the rebels suffers continued territorial losses, that will not spell the end of the regime’s armed opponents. It will leave those wishing to continue the fight with little choice but to shift to a longer-term strategy of asymmetric insurgency—a scenario which plays further to the advantage of salafi-jihadis, and would make it still harder for the rebellion to cobble together a coherent, credible, and practical political leadership. 

Is the regime on its way to proving that there is a military solution to this conflict after all?

The regime has gone a long way toward dismantling its mainstream opponents inside the country, armed and civilian,—a long standing regime goal that blocks any viable path to a negotiated political transition in the foreseeable future. But despite current momentum, it is not rolling toward a full military victory. Crucial weaknesses within the pro-regime camp remain. Central among them is the erosion of the Syrian military, and the limited base from which the regime can draw reliable, dedicated Syrian fighters. To gain additional territory while maintaining what it has, the regime has steadily grown ever more dependent on Shiite foreign fighters facilitated by Iran – Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan and Pakistani recruits drawn from refugee communities in Iran. They, along with intense Russian air power, have been key to enabling continued regime gains. But in the medium to long term, they do not provide sustainable means of holding—let alone stabilizing—territory in populated anti-regime strongholds amid a continuing insurgency. 

It is unlikely that, absent real compromise, it will be able to use such brutal tactics to win the war outright.

Indeed, even in the short term, holding ground is a serious challenge. The IS recapture of Palmyra earlier this month illustrates this well. With its foreign allies and most reliable Syrian fighters focused on other fronts—most notably Aleppo—regime forces charged with holding Palmyra proved no match for a surprise attack by IS, losing the city within three days despite Russian air support. That regime collapse could happen so quickly in Palmyra—a world-famous heritage site and strategically important location, whose recapture in March was heralded in a major Russian propaganda effort—provides ample indication of its manpower problem. If and when pro-regime forces continue to gain additional territory, the risks they run of over-extending themselves only grow. 

Part of the challenge for the regime’s backers, including Iran, is that they are pushing against the grain of Syria’s demographics—across the country, and in the northwest in particular. This is a notable difference between Syria and Iraq, where Iran’s assertion of hegemony is eased by alliances with political and military forces rooted in—and recruited from—the country’s Shiite majority. In theory, the regime and its allies could attempt to overcome this challenge by expanding and intensifying their existing depopulation efforts in parts of the country where anti-regime sentiment is perceived as especially broad and deep. That would erase whatever line remains between scorched-earth counter-insurgency and systematic sectarian cleansing. It would also generate civilian casualties, displacement, and radicalisation still worse than the horrors Syria has already witnessed. Sadly, given the lengths to which the pro-regime camp has gone thus far, and the lack of any foreseeable external military deterrent, it cannot be ruled out. 

What is the relative strength of IS now? Despite its recapture of Palmyra, is the group not under threat in the northern Syrian city of Raqqa?

The Islamic State’s military fortunes have ebbed and flowed, even in the last couple of weeks, but overall it seems to be losing ground. Yet even if there are further military successes against the group, that alone won’t solve the problem.

A lot of the Western conversation on Syria focuses on specific groups – IS, Fatah al Sham. But that is misleading, and extremely counterproductive. As we have seen in Iraq over the years, even driving a jihadist group beyond the apparent brink of defeat will prove only a short-term success if the underlying conditions on which it fed remain, or re-emerge. Eliminating groups’ leadership is also no guarantee that jihadists are defeated:  three leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq were killed, only to be replaced by the current leader of IS. Groups will evolve as they lose ground, some may disappear and others will introduce themselves; they are symptoms rather than causes of deeper problems in Syria, Iraq and beyond.  Chief among those problems is the massive radicalising force generated by the brutal military tactics used by all armed elements in the country–but which have been carried out most extensively and systematically by the Syrian regime and its allies.

When we look at the levels of violence Syrians have experienced, and those, mostly Sunni, communities that have been the worst affected, it is clear that seizing territory from IS or any jihadist group will not in and of itself sustainably address the problem. The goal must be to secure stability and credible governance within these areas—meaning that questions of how a given city will be administered post-IS, and by whom, are more important than the speed with which IS is driven from that area.

The Islamic State’s military fortunes have ebbed and flowed, even in the last couple of weeks, but overall it seems to be losing ground.

There is a real danger, then, that the U.S. is making a mistake by rushing to arrange a campaign to take Raqqa city led, in practice if not in rhetoric, by Kurdish YPG forces. First, due to Ankara’s intense objection to additional YPG gains—and amid continued violence between Turkey and the PKK/YPG on both sides of the Turkey-Syria border—the momentary benefit of driving IS from the city might pale in comparison to the costs of spiralling destabilisation throughout this arc of tension. Second, due to the YPG’s approach to governance—delegating minimal responsibility to local bodies while clearly retaining more meaningful authorities in the hands of Kurdish YPG cadres—it is difficult to imagine the organisation achieving credible, sustainable governance in an overwhelmingly Arab city of Raqqa’s size. 

How are things shaping up for Turkey and its allies in the battle to take al-Bab from IS?  

As I noted earlier, Turkey and its rebel allies began Euphrates Shield with two immediate objectives: 1) capture from IS the territory adjacent to the Turkish border, and 2) block the YPG from connecting its territory in northeastern Syria with the Afrin canton it controls north of Aleppo. Thus far, Turkey has already accomplished the first goal and is on the verge of achieving the second—if and when it takes al-Bab, it will have nearly completely blocked the YPG’s path to control a single, contiguous stretch of territory. Notably, controlling al-Bab would also provide Turkey and its rebel partners a foothold in a significant population centre just 35 km from Aleppo city, and less than 10 km from the nearest regime-held territory—which explains why Damascus has repeatedly signalled its objection to Euphrates Shield advancing on the city. Thus the battle for al-Bab is between Turkey-backed rebels and IS, but the ramifications are much broader.

If and when Turkey and its Euphrates Shield allies succeed in taking al-Bab, however, there is a real risk that further escalation may ensue. Connecting its Afrin and northeastern cantons is the YPG’s top priority in Syria, and its officials have hinted that the organisation is prepared to respond forcibly to Turkish attempts to block that. Meanwhile, the Turkish leadership has publicly suggested that Euphrates Shield may build on victory in al-Bab with a march east toward Menbij, a city subject to dispute since the YPG and its local allies captured it from IS in August, taking in the process an initial step toward connecting its cantons. Turkey was unhappy with this development, and understood from the U.S. at the time that the YPG was to withdraw from Menbij after seizing it and hand control to local authorities. That did not happen – the YPG has withdrawn some of its assets but kept others, and in any case there is no shared definition between Turkey, the YPG and the U.S. on where the YPG ends and local authorities begin. (The issue is complicated by the PKK/YPG tactic of creating officially autonomous local bodies that in practice remain under the organization’s authority.)The bottom line is that it would benefit all these parties—Turkey, the YPG and U.S.—to pro-actively define a mutually acceptable arrangement in Menbij. If Turkey attempts to resolve the matter with a military push in that direction, it may over-stretch its Euphrates Shield forces in the process—presenting opportunities for IS, the YPG or even nearby regime forces to exploit. Moreover, it could ignite an escalatory cycle between Turkey and the PKK/YPG spanning both sides of the border. The same could result from any YPG escalation against Turkish and allied forces in al-Bab or elsewhere. Indeed, at this point the YPG would be well advised to accept that connecting its cantons via military means is not a realistic objective, and that any attempt toward that end might backfire by inciting an expanded Turkish response.

Given all these dangerous dynamics, what are the prospects for de-escalating the violence in Syria?
A first step would be for all actors to be more realistic about what they can accomplish militarily. Repeatedly, over the course of this war, decision-makers on all sides have overestimated what they can achieve and sustain—that is, maximalist objectives have made them all prone to overshooting. This was true of the pro-opposition camp when it had momentum earlier in the conflict, and it’s true of the pro-regime camp now that it enjoys momentum. The regime has won the battle for Aleppo, but at a cost of immense destruction, international isolation, and horrendous civilian suffering. It is unlikely that, absent real compromise, it will be able to use such brutal tactics to win the war outright.  

One would hope that by being more realistic, the conflict’s protagonists could avoid mutually damaging fights; that principle applies not only to Menbij and al-Bab, but also to Idlib—the pro-regime camp is itself in danger of over-stretch. 

The recent flurry of Turkey-Russia diplomacy shows the potential for each to achieve better results—for themselves and their allies—via negotiating a non-aggression arrangement that would avert an all-out war for Idlib, or elsewhere. Agreement between Turkey and Russia is not sufficient, of course—as we saw yesterday in Aleppo, when Iran-backed militias appeared to thwart an evacuation deal facilitated by Ankara and Moscow.  But diplomacy between the two can provide a promising start. 

That said, the obstacles to such a deal are immense:  the regime and Iran have consistently preferred immediate military escalation to Russian negotiation efforts; Moscow itself appears content to press the pro-regime camp’s current military advantage; Fath al-Sham dominates much of Idlib, prefers that the rebels remain on the offensive, and would likely seek to thwart any non-aggression arrangement; and there are limits to Turkey’s will and capacity to pro-actively push its rebel allies on an issue that for Ankara pales in importance to the challenges presented by the PKK and YPG.

At this point, de-escalation seems like wishful thinking, but it is achievable if the major powers involved in this fight are willing to step back and recalibrate based on their longer-term interests. Going forward, the three most critical external actors are likely to be Russia, Turkey and Iran—especially now that the next U.S. administration seems inclined to limit its engagement on Syria. Crisis Group is planning to address these dynamics in a forthcoming report.

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