CrisisWatch

Tracking Conflict Worldwide

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CrisisWatch is our global conflict tracker, an early warning tool designed to help prevent deadly violence. It keeps decision-makers up-to-date with developments in over 70 conflicts and crises every month, identifying trends and alerting them to risks of escalation and opportunities to advance peace. In addition, CrisisWatch monitors over 50 situations (“standby monitoring”) to offer timely information if developments indicate a drift toward violence or instability. Entries dating back to 2003 provide easily searchable conflict histories.

Global Overview

Outlook for This Month April 2005

Conflict Risk Alerts

Resolution Opportunities

Trends for Last Month March 2005

Conflict in Focus

Nine conflict situations around the world deteriorated in March 2005, according to the new edition of CrisisWatch,* released today. In Pakistan dozens were killed in a dramatic escalation of Balochistan violence. Yemen saw some 65 die in fighting between security forces and followers of a radical Shia cleric who died leading a revolt last year. The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda increased attacks, with perhaps as many as 70 abducted and 80 killed. Lebanon suffered deadly bomb attacks amid its ongoing political crisis.

The death of Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov dealt a significant blow to hopes for a political solution to the conflict there. The situations in Azerbaijan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Somalia also deteriorated in March 2005. And tensions across the Taiwan Strait increased as China’s National People's Congress passed an "anti-secession law" authorising "non-peaceful means" to prevent Taiwan from moving towards greater independence.

The 1 April edition of CrisisWatch also notes four conflict situations that improved last month. Mass protests over rigged parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan toppled the government of President Askar Akayev, and this may usher in positive change on range of political, economic, and social fronts, though the situation remains highly unstable, with risk of further unrest.

In Burundi, a power-sharing constitution was accepted by 90% of voters in a referendum, opening the path to a series of elections in the ongoing transition to peace. Rwandan Hutu rebels based in eastern DR Congo renounced armed conflict and denounced the 1994 genocide, which if followed through will be a very positive development. Three key ministers in Guinea, including the widely disliked security minister, were removed, in a potential signal of easing of restrictions on the opposition and repression by security forces.

For April 2005, CrisisWatch identifies Kyrgyzstan, Nepal and Pakistan as Conflict Risk Alerts, or situations at particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict in the coming month. No new Conflict Resolution Opportunities were identified for April.

CrisisWatch Digests

Africa

Benin

Govt called for unity as Sahel states’ announced withdrawal from ECOWAS dealt blow to regional integration.

President Talon underlined ECOWAS significance, warned against sanctions. Talon 8 Feb lamented Jan-announced withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from West African regional bloc ECOWAS, stressing importance of body in maintaining wider stability; Talon also cautioned against harsh sanctions against three govts, arguing measures disproportionately harm local populations, and suggested withdrawal of sanctions may mean Jan decision to “separate peoples” will remain just “declaration” (see Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger). In same speech, Talon reiterated he will not run for third term and would respect parliament’s upcoming decision over changes proposed by ruling coalition members to Constitution and Electoral Code; reforms have sparked tensions, including over whether to hold 2026 presidential vote ahead of legislative elections.

Jihadist violence and security operations continued. After military late Jan conducted operations against al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants in Alibori and Atacora provinces, JNIM 22 Feb claimed it had killed four soldiers 17 Feb near border with Burkina Faso.

In another important development. UN Sec Gen spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric 29 Feb said Benin had pledged to contribute at least 1,500 personnel to Kenyan-led multilateral police mission to Haiti (see Haiti).

Burkina Faso

Violence reached levels unseen since jihadist insurgency started in 2015, with hundreds killed in one day as militants launched nine simultaneous attacks and govt forces and allies reportedly conducted large-scale massacres.

Violence reached levels unseen since 2015, leaving hundreds dead. Jihadist militants from al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province 25 Feb launched nine attacks across country, notably targeting places of worship. Raid on mosque in Natiaboani town, Gourma province (East region), left up to 100 dead, including civilians, soldiers and civilian auxiliaries (VDPs), and attack on catholic church in Essakane village, Oudalan province (Sahel region) killed at least fifteen people. Jihadist militants same day also targeted military, notably killing 51 soldiers in Tankoualou area, Komandjari province (East region). Suspected army and VDPs also 25 Feb allegedly attacked three villages in Yatenga province (North region), with provisional toll of around 170 people killed. Reports of attacks on two villages in Gayéri area of Komandjari province (East) late Feb also emerged, with unconfirmed death toll of 150.

Silencing of dissent continued. National council of lawyers 15 Feb led countrywide strike to demand release of lawyer and civil society activist Guy-Hervé Kam, who was arrested in Jan on undisclosed charges. Rights defender Daouda Diallo, former FM Ablassé Ouédraogo and civil society leader Issiaka Ouédraogo 18 Feb appeared in videos circulated on Internet in combat gear, confirming they have been forcibly enrolled as VDPs since their arrest in late 2023.

ECOWAS urged govt to reconsider decision to leave group. After Burkina Faso alongside Mali and Niger late Jan announced withdrawal from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), regional bloc 8 Feb called on trio to “prioritise dialogue and reconciliation”, and ECOWAS chairman, Nigerian President Tinubu, 24 Feb urged departing countries to “reconsider the decision”. Tinubu’s comments were made at extraordinary summit of ECOWAS heads of state, during which bloc lifted most sanctions imposed on Niger in 2023 (see Niger). Conciliatory approach has yet to bear fruit, however. Notably, Ouagadougou, Bamako and Niamey 15 Feb discussed framework to create three-state federation at Alliance of Sahel States ministerial summit, said decision to leave ECOWAS was irreversible.

Burundi

War of words with Rwanda continued as rebels reportedly supported by Kigali launched new attack; deployment of troops and militiamen to DR Congo (DRC) caused strains.

Tensions between Burundi and Rwanda continued to worsen amid rebel violence. Addressing diplomatic corps, President Ndayishimiye 3 Feb criticised what he termed Kigali’s “hypocrisy” in regional peace initiatives, citing unsuccessful negotiations for extradition from Rwanda of RED-Tabara rebel group leader. Meanwhile, govt 26 Feb reported RED-Tabara killed at least nine people including soldiers and civilians in Buringa village, Bubanza province previous day, and accused Rwanda of backing rebels; RED-Tabara claimed responsibility for attack, saying they had destroyed ruling party headquarters, and denied killing civilians.

Deployment of Burundian troops to DRC faced challenges. Reports emerged of soldiers and members of ruling party youth wing Imbonerakure refusing deployment to DRC due to concerns over payment and benefits. SOS Media Burundi 23 Feb reported 242 Burundian soldiers detained in Bururi, Rumonge, Ruyigi and Ngozi provinces for allegedly refusing to combat M23 rebels alongside Congolese army in eastern DRC.

Crackdown on opposition persisted, judiciary handed heavy sentence to journalist. Representatives of National Intelligence Service 8 Feb reportedly arrested National Congress for Freedom (CNL) opposition party member, Desire Bizimana, in Bubanza province, taking him to undisclosed location in capital Bujumbura. In blow to press freedom, Supreme Court 13 Feb upheld ten-year prison sentence against journalist Floriane Irangabiye for allegedly collaborating with armed groups.

Cameroon

With peace talks stalled, Anglophone separatist militants hardened stance against civilians who violate their “ghost town” orders and UN humanitarian agencies.

Anglophone conflict continued to take heavy toll on civilians. Separatist groups 10-12 Feb violently enforced lockdowns in various towns of Anglophone North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions to prevent smooth running of National Youth Day activities on 11 Feb. Notably, bomb attack in Nkambe city, Donga Mantung division (NW), 11 Feb killed one school child and injured at least 40 people. Govt forces 15-17 Feb attacked separatists in and around Mamfe city, Manyu division (SW), killing four. Separatist factions from late Jan also hardened stance toward internationally-backed humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC) unveiled plans to destroy World Bank-funded projects, while Interim Govt-Maryland group announced severing cooperation with several UN bodies, accusing them of thriving on status quo while making no effort to find political solution to conflict. Meanwhile, alliance between separatist groups in Ambazonia and Nigeria continued to raise tension: clashes between Nigerian Biafra separatists and Cameroonian soldiers reported 29 Jan and 4 Feb in Bakassi Peninsula.

Boko Haram conducted deadly attacks in Far North region. Suspected Boko Haram militants 5 Feb kidnapped fourteen herders of Fulani and Choa Arab ethnic groups in Limani town, Mayo-Sava division. Boko Haram militants 12-18 Feb attacked several neighbourhoods and villages in Kolofata, Limani (both Mayo-Sava) and Blangoua (Logone-et-Chari division) communes, stealing cattle, food, vehicles and kidnapping civilians. Govt forces 18 Feb repelled Boko Haram attacks on military bases in Limani and Amchide towns (both Mayo-Sava) on Nigerian border, with unknown number of casualties. Boko Haram roadside bomb explosion 27 Feb killed five elite forces soldiers in Gossi locality (Mayo-Tsanaga division).

AU endorsed Cameroonian candidate for UN General Assembly presidency. African Union 14 Feb endorsed former PM Philemon Yang as candidate for one-year presidency of 79th UN General Assembly; Yang’s UN posting could be used by Yaoundé to show govt rewards those who remain loyal and to closely monitor diplomatic moves ahead of 2025 elections.

Central African Republic

Russia doubled down on military support to Bangui amid struggle for influence with U.S.; rebel groups continued to stage attacks in hinterland.

Struggle for influence between U.S. and Russia continued. Recent announcement of U.S. private security company Bancroft’s operations in CAR gave new impetus to Russia’s military support to President Touadéra amid struggle for influence. Notably, Russian govt late Jan delivered seven fighter jets to CAR’s national security forces, and presidential adviser Pascal Bida Koyagbélé around 1 Feb confirmed opening of Russian military base in Berengo (Lobaye prefecture), where Russian paramilitary Wagner Group already operates training camp for CAR army; base could host up to 10,000 troops, increasing Russia’s capacity for sub-regional projection. Meanwhile, Russian propaganda campaign against U.S. intensified, supported by pro-Wagner Committee for Initiative, Control and Investigation of U.S.’s Actions in CAR. Notably, anti-U.S. caravan 26 Feb circulated in capital Bangui on tour that appears to have received significant financial support.

Despite army’s efforts to control hinterland, security situation remained precarious. In Ouham-Pendé prefecture (north west), govt forces 8 Feb attacked 3R fighters who were reportedly mediating in dispute between farmer and herder north west of Bocaranga city, killing two rebels and seizing vehicles and weapons. In retaliation, 3R fighters next day burnt dozen houses in same area and forced residents to flee, with no reported casualties. In Nana-Mambéré prefecture (also north west), 3R fighters 11 Feb kidnapped three miners and seized gold during raid on mining site near Baboua town. Fighters from Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé militia around 22 Feb engaged in several days of fighting near Zémio town, Haut-Mbomou prefecture (east), leading to several deaths and population displacement whose extent is not yet assessed. Meanwhile, President Touadéra 7 Feb inaugurated new Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) of national army, which was trained in Bangui by Rwandan bilateral troops; BIR’s commander, Captain Listher Lazaret, like majority of battalion’s soldiers, belongs to Touadéra’s Mbaka-Mandja ethnic group. BIR is reminiscent of notorious Escadron blindé autonome created by President André Kolingba in 1980s, which later became brigade of ethnic repression.

Chad

Gunfire erupted in capital N’Djamena, with security forces killing staunch opponent and cousin of transitional President Déby, Yaya Dillo, as major cracks emerged within ruling elite ahead of presidential election scheduled for May.

Security forces killed staunch opponent, exposing divisions within ruling elite. Transitional President Mahamad Déby’s uncle, Gen. Saleh Déby, 10 Feb left ruling party to join Socialist Party without Borders (PSF), led by Mahamat Déby’s cousin Yaya Dillo. Defection, together with expressions of dissent by other members of Zaghawa clan (which is Mahamat Déby’s father, former President Idriss Déby’s ethnic group), raised tensions within ruling elite. Secret intelligence 27 Feb reportedly arrested and injured senior PSF official Ahmed Torabi, accusing him of murder attempt against Supreme Court president. Victim’s relatives overnight 27-28 Feb allegedly tried to storm National State Security Agency in N’Djamena; after security forces intervened, govt said situation was “under control” and confirmed several fatalities. Security forces 28 Feb also surrounded PSF headquarters in N’Djamena, leading to heavy gunfire; authorities later said Yaya Dillo and twelve others had died in shootout, while Saleh Déby had been arrested. Situation next day remained tense in N’Djamena with security forces deployed in key locations and internet services cut off.

Presidential vote scheduled for May, opposition questioned legitimacy of electoral bodies. Election agency 27 Feb announced first round of presidential election will take place 6 May, followed by second round on 22 June; polls aim to end three-year transitional period and return country to constitutional rule; no date announced for legislative elections. Alliance of fourteen political parties, Consultative Group of Political Actors, 8 Feb questioned Constitutional Council and National Electoral Authority’s legitimacy after Gen. Déby late Jan appointed ruling party spokesman Jean-Bernard Padaré as Constitutional Council president and named several people affiliated to ruling party as members of these two bodies.

Social tensions ran high amid rising cost of living. Public sector workers 6 Feb threatened to go on strike over govt’s lack of commitment to their demands, including lifting of freeze on raises and advancements. Opposition and civil society coalition “Nous le people” 26 Feb launched ghost town operation in N’Djamena and other cities to protest rising cost of living.

Côte d’Ivoire

Govt articulated commitment to stability and fair elections, reaffirmed U.S. partnership.

Preparations for 2025 elections continued. President Ouattara 14 Feb emphasised measures would be put in place to maintain and strengthen cohesion ahead of 2025 presidential election. Both ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) and main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) sought to build election campaigns and gain popular support, including focussing on youth mobilisation; senior RHDP official Roger Adom 19 Feb attended meeting presenting new leader of party’s youth wing, saying “We are counting on you” in vote. After Senate President Kandia Camara 31 Jan announced 2024 revision of six legislative bills, including Electoral Code and Nationality bill, PDCI President Tidjane Thiam 21 Feb stressed need for electoral reform to create more representative democratic system.

U.S. and govt reaffirmed security cooperation. Interior and Security Minister Vagondo Diomandé and U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Civil Security, Democracy and Human Rights Uzra Zeya 2 Feb met in Abidjan city, discussing themes including justice sector reform, fight against corruption and terrorism; Zeya emphasised role of Côte d’Ivoire in maintaining regional stability, and importance of mutual cooperation in confronting security challenges.

In another important development. NGO Amnesty International 20 Feb called on authorities to enforce anti-corruption laws and protect human rights defenders, citing Ivorian perceptions of pervasive corruption.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Advance of M23 rebels on strategic town of Sake in North Kivu caused mass displacement amid major uptick in fighting involving sophisticated weapons.

Rebels surrounded strategic town of Sake, considered last barrier before Goma. In North Kivu’s Masisi territory, M23 early Feb engaged in fierce fighting with Congolese army and allied Wazalendo militiamen, supported by foreign security contractors and Southern African bloc (SADC) troops, around Sake town (25km north west of Goma), which came under attack 7 Feb. Fighting also reported in villages south of Sake, notably Shasha, Kirotshe and Bweremana, with reports of M23 and allied forces deploying armoured vehicles equipped with surface-to-air missiles. After brief lull, violence 25 Feb resumed on outskirts of Sake. Army and allies late Feb retained control of Sake, while rebels occupied surrounding hills and controlled access, except for road to Goma. NGO Médecins sans Frontières late Feb said fighting and shelling had triggered displacement of 180,000 civilians toward Goma and Minova town in South Kivu province since 7 Feb. Tensions with Kigali remained high, with Congolese military saying Rwandan drone attack 17 Feb targeted Goma International Airport.

Kinshasa continued to track down M23 allies. Amid concerns of broader opposition alignment with M23, Kinshasa intensified efforts to arrest individuals suspected of ties to former head of electoral commission Corneille Nangaa, who in Dec 2023 created pro-M23 politico-military group Congo River Alliance. Notably, military intelligence 13 Feb arrested three National Intelligence Agency officials and military governor’s spokesman in North Kivu for alleged complicity with M23.

Civilians continued to face other armed groups’ attacks notably in Ituri province. Suspected Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) militants around 5 Feb allegedly killed eighteen people in Mambasa territory, and 17-18 Feb killed at least thirteen people in Badibongo Siya groupement, Irumu territory. CODECO militia, which claims to defend interests of Lendu ethnic group and often targets people from rival Hema tribe, 14 Feb killed twelve people and 17 Feb killed another fifteen in Djugu territory.

In another important development. PM Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde 20 Feb resigned, prioritising his new mandate as MP in Kasenga constituency in compliance with legal requirement against dual-office holding.

Eritrea

Fresh reports of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia’s Tigray region surfaced, and President Isaias Afwerki held talks with Italian officials during extended stay.

Ethiopia-Eritrea relations remained strained. News agency Associated Press 2 Feb revealed memo prepared late Jan by Ethiopia Health Cluster – international, local organisations and UN agencies coordinating health responses for people affected by humanitarian emergencies – alleging that Eritrean troops have abducted farmers and stolen hundreds of livestock in Ethiopia’s Tigray region; Eritrea’s information minister Yemane Gebremeskel same day denied allegations. Meanwhile, performance during nationally televised celebration marking 34th anniversary of Massawa city’s capture from Ethiopia 10 Feb implicitly mocked Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed, in further sign of deteriorating relations with Addis after Abiy vowed to restore Ethiopia’s sea access; Eritrea viewed remarks as threat to its sovereignty.

In other important developments. After attending Italy-Africa summit late Jan in Italy’s capital Rome, President Isaias extended stay until 8 Feb, holding meetings with investors and Italian officials, including PM Meloni and Defence Minister Guido Crosetto; Information minister Yemane 3 Feb said discussions focused on strengthening economic cooperation and security in Red Sea region. Isaias 24-27 Feb visited Egyptian capital Cairo for talks on bilateral cooperation and regional security.

Ethiopia

Authorities extended state of emergency in Amhara region amid ongoing violence, insurgency continued in Oromia, and tensions between Tigray authorities and federal govt rose over peace process.

Federal govt extended state of emergency in Amhara. Clashes between federal forces and Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano persisted, prompting govt 2 Feb to extend state of emergency by four months. Human Rights Commission 5 Feb said federal forces late Jan killed at least 45 civilians in Merawi town, North Gondar; govt 6 Feb denied targeting civilians. Federal drone 19 Feb reportedly killed at least 30 near North Shewa’s Sasit town. Fano 24 Feb briefly took control of Merawi town, sparking heavy fighting. Fano forces 29 Feb reportedly entered regional capital Bahir Dar city.

Fighting in Oromia region persisted. Counterinsurgency operation against Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) that was launched late Jan continued, with federal forces 10 Feb claiming to have killed 70 OLA members in Oromia’s West Shewa zone; 20 Feb reportedly killed around 50 fighters, including four leaders, in North Shewa zone. Meanwhile, security forces 22 Feb arrested French journalist for allegedly conspiring with OLA and Fano to incite unrest in capital Addis Ababa, released him 29 Feb.

Tigray leaders met with PM Abiy amid rising tensions over peace process. Tigray leaders 9 Feb met with PM Abiy to discuss peace process and humanitarian crisis. Key sticking points of peace process, including lack of progress on disputed territories, Tigray People’s Liberation Front party’s unregistered status and delayed demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration process, have heightened federal-Tigray tensions and cast doubts on holding local elections as per agreement. Interim Tigray President Getachew Reda 10 Feb acknowledged lingering mistrust between Addis and his administration. Tigray administration 29 Feb said it would only engage with federal govt on peace process through African Union.

Relations with Somalia remained tense. Somali President Mohamud 17 Feb again condemned 1 Jan Ethiopia-Somaliland deal, which grants Addis access to Somaliland coastline and potentially paves way for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence; Mohamud accused Ethiopia of attempting to annex Somali territory and alleged Ethiopian security forces blocked his entry to African Union summit in Addis Ababa, which Ethiopia denied.

Guinea

Tensions peaked as junta dissolved govt amid internal power struggles and trade unions launched nationwide general strike that paralysed country.

Junta dissolved govt and restricted movement of sacked ministers. Presidency’s Secretary General Amara Camara 19 Feb announced dissolution of govt, granting administrative power to directors of cabinet, secretary generals and deputies until as yet unannounced formation of new govt; measures also saw President Doumbouya-led junta temporarily close all borders and restrict activities of sacked ministers through seizure of travel documents, revocation of official vehicles and freezing of bank accounts. Announcement lacked official explanation but may be linked to tensions between PM Goumou and Justice Minister Charles Wright, and to Doumbouya’s attempts to bolster authority amid increasingly open power struggles in govt. Authorities 27 Feb appointed former minister Amadou Oury Bah as PM.

Nationwide strike caused turmoil, saw violent unrest. Trade unions including National Confederation of Workers of Guinea 26 Feb began indefinite nationwide general strike, shuttering schools, banks, and businesses and reducing hospital services, paralysing country; strikers demanded release of Sékou Jamal Pendessa, Secretary General of Union of Guinean Press Professionals arrested in Jan on charge of “participation in non-authorised protest”, lifting of ongoing internet restrictions and reduction in cost of basic goods. In capital Conakry, unrest saw demonstrations and barricades established on city’s main highway, while police reportedly killed two demonstrators during clashes on first day of strike. Unions 28 Feb suspended strike after Pendessa’s release that day.

Dissatisfaction with govt continued on other fronts. Dozens of women in Coronthie neighbourhood of Conakry 1 Feb blocked roads and protested govt’s failure to provide aid after mid-Dec gas depot explosion that killed at least 23; other demonstrators joined, citing increased cost of living, political repression and internet restrictions.

In another important development. West African regional bloc ECOWAS 24 Feb announced lifting of financial and economic sanctions on govt but gave no further details.

Kenya

Govt discussed preparations for police deployment to Haiti while tensions between President Ruto and courts continued.

Govt continued preparations for police deployment to Haiti. After court late Jan blocked deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police to lead UN-backed multinational mission in Haiti, U.S. 2 Feb reiterated “commitment to collaborating with Kenya” as it leads mission. Kenyan, Haitian and U.S. officials 12-14 Feb met in U.S. to discuss preparations, and Haiti 14 Feb said it was working on reciprocal agreement with Kenya, main point of Kenyan court’s opposition. Haiti’s acting PM Ariel Henry 29 Feb visited Kenya and met with Ruto to “finalise modalities” for agreements between two countries on deployment.

Tensions between judiciary and executive persisted. Following Court of Appeals late Jan decision to suspend govt tax that President Ruto said he would appeal, concerns grew that current administration would threaten judiciary’s independence and ignore court ruling related to Kenyan police deployment to Haiti.

Authorities continued to combat Al-Shabaab, banditry-related violence. Interior Cabinet Secretary Kithure Kindiki 15 Feb said govt would begin upgrading security equipment and give priority to forces in unstable areas, including locations vulnerable to Al-Shabaab attacks near Somalia border and North Rift regions subject to banditry.

Mali

West African regional bloc urged govt to remain within group as Bamako insisted exit was immediate; authorities remained embroiled in conflict with 2015 peace agreement signatories and jihadist groups.

ECOWAS took conciliatory approach to Sahel trio’s exit. After Mali, alongside Niger and Burkina Faso, late Jan announced withdrawal from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), regional bloc 8 Feb called on trio to “prioritise dialogue and reconciliation”, and ECOWAS chairman, Nigerian President Tinubu, 24 Feb urged departing countries to “reconsider the decision”. Tinubu’s comments were made at extraordinary ECOWAS summit, during which bloc lifted most coup sanctions on Niger (see Niger) and restrictions on recruitment of Malians into ECOWAS institutions. Conciliatory approach has yet to bear fruit, however, with Bamako 7 Feb arguing trio does not need to respect one-year withdrawal period, and all three countries 15 Feb reiterating decision to leave ECOWAS was irreversible.

Conflict between govt forces and rebel groups continued in north. After terminating 2015 Algiers peace agreement in Jan, transitional president, Col. Goïta, 5 Feb installed steering committee in charge of preparing inter-Malian dialogue for peace and reconciliation; committee president 20 Feb said armed groups “must lay down arms” to participate. Under pressure from community leaders and economic operators, coalition of 2015 Algiers Accord signatory armed groups, Permanent Strategic Framework, 11 Feb lifted two-month blockade on Timbuktu and Gao towns.

Jihadist violence remained high in north, centre and west. After al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) late Jan intensified attacks in north, notably targeting two army positions in Timbuktu region, govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group reportedly stepped up violence against civilians, with seven killed 1 Feb in Djounhane village, Kidal region, and at least eight others killed 5 Feb in Dianké town, Timbuktu region. In centre, JNIM 3 Feb attacked N’Donuna village in Ségou region, leaving ten Dozo militiamen dead, and 8, 20 Feb raided army positions in Melga village, Kayes region, and Niono town, Ségou region, killing at least five soldiers. In neighbouring Nara region, sophisticated jihadist attack on Kwala military outpost reportedly left 30 soldiers reportedly killed.

Mozambique

Jihadists advanced south in Cabo Delgado province and threatened to cross into Nampula province as attacks caused mass displacement; preparations began for Oct general elections.

Islamic State-affiliated militants attacked southern districts of Cabo Delgado. Following uptick in Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) violence in Jan, group continued to target security forces and civilians with at least sixteen attacks between late Jan and 16 Feb, including 9 Feb raid on security forces near Mucojo village, Macomia district that killed at least twenty soldiers. Militants advanced into south-eastern districts of Cabo Delgado province close to provincial capital Pemba, including Ancuabe, Chiure, Mecufi, and Metuge. Notably, ISMP 19 Feb killed four in Chiure amid reports suggesting group burnt public buildings including churches and forced some residents to convert to Islam. New reports also emerged of military indiscriminately targeting civilians including arbitrary arrests and beatings on suspicion of supporting or being militants. UN 28 Feb reported violence 8-27 Feb displaced over 68,000 people predominantly from Chiure districts. ISMP advance took advantage of disarray of military and withdrawal of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), due to be completed by July; militants may also be avoiding Rwandan troops who have been effective in fighting group in northern districts.

Militants reached border of Nampula province. Some insurgents reached southern border of Cabo Delgado province and may attempt to cross Lùrio River to enter Nampula as part of recruitment drive; ISMP, whose size has reduced from around 3,000 at peak in early 2021 to 200-500 currently, may attempt to capitalise on Nampula’s socio-political and economic grievances, compounded by large refugee influx from Cabo Delgado. Opposition 22 Feb demanded govt find mechanism for dialogue with insurgents.

Preparations began for vote expected to be contentious. Ahead of general elections due to be held 9 Oct, electoral commission 7 Feb announced tentative electoral calendar with voter registration starting 15 March. Political tensions are expected to remain high in lead-up to polls that include vote for president, with both ruling FRELIMO and main opposition RENAMO parties struggling to designate their respective presidential candidate.

Niger

West African regional bloc lifted most sanctions imposed on Niger following 2023 coup and urged govt to reconsider decision to leave group.

ECOWAS took conciliatory approach to Sahel trio’s exit. At extraordinary summit of heads of state held 24 Feb, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lifted most sanctions imposed on Niger following 2023 coup, including no-fly zone, border closures and asset freezes; ECOWAS chairman, Nigerian President Tinubu, same day urged Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to “reconsider the decision”, announced in Jan, to withdraw from regional bloc and said trio should “not perceive our organisation as the enemy”. Earlier in month, ECOWAS 8 Feb called on all three countries to “prioritise dialogue and reconciliation”. Conciliatory approach has yet to bear fruit, however. Niamey, Bamako and Ouagadougou 15 Feb discussed framework to create three-state federation at Alliance of Sahel States ministerial summit, and reiterated decision to leave ECOWAS was irreversible. Transitional President Gen. Tiani 11 Feb contemplated leaving West African Economic and Monetary Union and creating new currency.

Anti-junta armed group clashed with army for first time. Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) fighters and govt forces 7 Feb clashed near Arlit town in Agadez region for first time since creation of armed group following 2023 coup. Authorities reported ten FPL members killed and one captured, with several soldiers wounded; FPL claimed killing 27 soldiers, while acknowledging loss of five fighters.

Jihadist-related violence persisted in Tillabery, Diffa regions. In Tillabery region (south west), military 3 Feb carried out counter-insurgency operation in Kokoloukou area of Torodi department, allegedly killing 50 suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants; suspected jihadist militants next day attacked several villages of Méhana commune, Téra department, killing nine civilians. In Diffa region (south east), Islamic State West Africa Province militants 19 Feb attacked national guard position in Assaga Koura (Diffa department), with two guards and unspecified number of militants killed; incident came after militants late Jan attacked special intervention batallion at N’guigmi airport (N’guigmi department), leaving ten soldiers injured.

Nigeria

Islamic State affiliate launched series of explosive device attacks in North East; bandit groups continued killings and kidnappings for ransom in much of north.

Despite security operations, jihadist violence continued in North East. Series of incidents from late Jan through Feb highlighted Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants’ increased use of improvised explosive devices in Borno state, causing dozens of casualties, restricting humanitarian services and hindering resettlement programs. Also in Borno, security forces 2-3 Feb repelled suspected ISWAP attack on Gajiram town in Nganzai area, with at least four police officers killed. In Yobe state’s Damaturu area, ISWAP 4 Feb killed two and abducted three others in Kukareta town, while in nearby Maltari village soldiers 18 Feb killed three militants forcefully collecting levies from residents; insurgents 24 Feb also blew up two transmission towers in area, cutting electricity supply to parts of Yobe and Borno states.

Criminal groups continued attacks and kidnappings for ransom across north. Notably, in Sabuwa area of Katsina state, armed group 1 Feb abducted bride and more than 60 other women and children, killing four vigilantes escorting them and demanding ransom payment. State’s governor Dikko Umaru Radda 9 Feb urged citizens to organise self-defence groups. Many other attacks, kidnappings and looting of villages by criminal groups occurred in Kaduna, Katsina, Nasarawa, Niger and Zamfara states throughout month, killing scores and leaving hundreds abducted.

North Central and North East zones saw incidents of herder-farmer violence. Armed attacks in Apa area of Benue state 14-16 Feb reportedly killed ten and displaced thousands; locals blamed raids on herders. In Yobe state, police said herders 12 Feb killed two people, forcing 1,500 to flee, in Gurjaje village in Fika area in apparent reprisal for Sept 2023 herder-farmer clash.

South East remained fragile despite lull in attacks by Biafran separatists. Gunmen 12 Feb attacked correctional facility in Umualomoke village in Imo state, killing officer, freeing seven inmates and abducting facility’s head.

In other important developments. National Bureau of Statistics 15 Feb reported Jan inflation rate at 29.9%, highest since 1996; economic hardship throughout month led to sporadic protests in several cities while workers union 27 Feb organised nationwide protest.

Rwanda

International actors hardened their stance against Rwanda’s actions in eastern DR Congo as M23 conflict escalated.

Criticism grew of Kigali’s backing of rebel group in DR Congo (DRC). Amid M23 rebel group’s advance on North Kivu regional capital in DRC (see DR Congo), U.S. state dept 17 Feb condemned M23 violence and urged Rwanda to withdraw soldiers and remove surface-to-air missile systems from eastern DRC; Rwanda’s foreign ministry next day rejected U.S. call, citing defensive measures against DRC’s perceived “dramatic military build-up”, and said U.S. statement “distorts” reality. France 20 Feb also expressed grave concern over security situation in North Kivu, urged Rwanda to cease support for M23 and withdraw from Congolese territory. In response, Rwanda’s govt next day pointed to France’s responsibility for longstanding conflict in eastern DRC.

Govt opposed UN support for southern African mission in DRC. Kigali 13 Feb objected to UN plan to provide logistical and operational support to southern African bloc (SADC) mission in eastern DRC, whose deployment started in Dec 2023, alleging it is aligned with anti-Rwanda groups, and warned of pre-emptive and defensive measures against perceived threats from DRC and Burundi.

Senegal

Constitutional crisis erupted after authorities postponed presidential election amid violent protests and international alarm.

Election delay sparked constitutional crisis. National Assembly 5 Feb formally extended President’s Sall mandate beyond constitutional deadline of 2 April and delayed presidential vote from 25 Feb until 15 Dec; move came after Sall 3 Feb repealed decree convening electoral body, saying “crisis” between parliament and Constitutional Court over disqualification of potential candidates motivated decision. In wake of announcement, several high-level govt officials resigned, including govt’s secretary-general and one state minister. Opposition leaders, civil society activists and former ministers condemned delay and questioned its legality. Notably, leading opposition figure and former mayor of capital Dakar, Khalifa Sall, 3 Feb denounced “constitutional coup d’état”. Following petition by collective of opposition candidates, Constitutional Court 15 Feb ruled law postponing elections was unconstitutional and overturned Sall’s decision to change electoral calendar, calling on authorities to hold elections “as soon as possible”. Sall next day vowed to respect ruling, and 22 Feb said his mandate would end as planned on 2 April; national dialogue sponsored by president and attended by only four of nineteen presidential candidates 27 Feb proposed 2 June as new election date.

Security forces cracked down on opposition protests, leaving several dead. Govt forces 4 Feb violently repressed demonstrations in capital Dakar, arresting high-profile opposition figures Aminata Touré and Anta Babacar Ngom, and 6 Feb arrested at least two opposition MPs as they attempted to organise protest in Dakar’s suburbs. Gendarmes and police 9-10 Feb used tear gas to repress protests nationwide, arresting around 250 people as clashes left at least three people dead. Following talks between Sall and opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, govt 1-17 Feb released some 250 imprisoned members of Sonko’s dissolved PASTEF party and other opposition and civil society groups. In apparent attempt to de-escalate tensions, Sall 26 Feb announced plans for general amnesty for political demonstrators from 2021 to 2024.

International actors denounced election delay. Notably, West African bloc ECOWAS 3 Feb expressed “concern” over Sall’s announcement, and three days later urged authorities “to restore the electoral calendar”.

Somalia

Al-Shabaab conducted significant attacks, authorities launched contentious constitutional review process, and Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal continued to fuel tensions.

Al-Shabaab militants continued to pose major threat amid high-profile attacks. In main theatre of govt’s offensive in southern Mudug region (centre), group launched attacks on several areas security forces recently retook, including 3 Feb in Shabellow village, with reported high casualties on both sides but no significant territorial shift. Militants also claimed 10 Feb killing of four Emirati and one Bahraini military trainer at General Gordon military camp in capital Mogadishu; attack was reportedly carried out by undercover insurgent who had claimed to have defected from group. Govt’s efforts against Al-Shabaab during month consisted mainly of sporadic air operations supported by foreign partners in southern regions of Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle, and central regions of Galgaduud and Hiraan. Meanwhile, AU mission (ATMIS) announced 2 Feb official completion of second phase of withdrawal. Govt 15 Feb signed agreement with U.S. to build five bases for 3,000-strong U.S.-trained Danab commando unit.

Domestic tensions emerged over constitutional review process. Parliament 12 Feb initiated constitutional review process, one of President Mohamud’s priorities, amid significant domestic opposition. Notably, Puntland state rejected proposals, and former presidents 13 Feb announced failure of mediation attempt between Mogadishu and Garowe. In speech to parliament, former President Sheikh Sharif 19 Feb also denounced constitutional review process.

Govt continued to push back against Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. Mogadishu remained focussed on diplomatic efforts to pressure Addis Ababa to walk back its Jan agreement with Hargeisa that potentially paves way for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence. Mohamud 16 Feb travelled to Ethiopian capital for AU summit, lobbying for support; Mohamud next day alleged Ethiopian security forces tried to bar him from attending closing session of AU summit, which Ethiopian govt denied, and again accused Ethiopia of trying to annex part of Somalia’s territory. Meanwhile, amid tensions with Somaliland over deal, airspace control became battleground between Mogadishu and Hargeisa (see Somaliland).

In another important development. Amid tensions with Ethiopia, govt 8 Feb signed deal with Ankara for Türkiye to help Somalia defend its territorial waters by providing support to Somali navy.

Somaliland

Election-related dispute kept domestic politics tense ahead of Nov polls, while fallout from port deal with Ethiopia continued to loom large.

Electoral uncertainty persisted. House of Elders and House of Representatives 17-18 Feb passed revised electoral law paving way for presidential and political party elections in Nov. President Bihi has 21 days to sign bill, but opposition remains concerned that he will not do so and instead seek to delay vote, reneging on Aug 2023 govt-opposition deal.

Fallout from deal with Addis Ababa continued. As Bihi 22 Feb vowed to implement agreement with Ethiopia to lease stretch of Somaliland’s coastline to establish naval base and commercial maritime services in return for potential acknowledgement of Somaliland as sovereign state, Mogadishu-Hargeisa tensions remained high over agreement. Series of suspicious deaths in Mogadishu of civilians originally from Somaliland further stoked tensions, while airspace control, which currently falls under Somalia’s purview, became battleground. Somalia around 23 Feb accused Somaliland of interfering in communications with flights, while Somaliland around 25 Feb claimed contradictory instructions from Somalia 24 Feb nearly led to mid-air collision.

South Africa

Electoral tensions continued to run high in KwaZulu-Natal province ahead of general elections set for May.

President Ramaphosa’s office 20 Feb scheduled general elections to elect new National Assembly and legislature in each province for 29 May. Meanwhile, electoral violence persisted amid steep competition in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province, key battleground for May elections. Unidentified gunmen 7 Feb killed Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) councillor of Nongoma local municipality, KZN, bringing total number of reported political assassinations in province since July 2023 to six. Police same day said political killings task team is investigating cases. Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) early Feb dismissed former President Jacob Zuma’s claims that IEC is colluding with ruling African National Congress (ANC) to rig elections, challenging him to produce evidence, and urged all political leaders to exercise restraint; comments came after Zuma – who is campaigning mainly in KZN for newly formed uMkhonto weSizwe party – and his allies late Jan doubled down on criticism of ANC and IEC.

South Sudan

Intercommunal violence escalated across much of South Sudan, killing hundreds; pipeline damage and Sudan war disrupted oil exports, threatening economy and regime stability.

Intercommunal violence killed hundreds. Deadly clashes between Twic Dinka from Warrap state and Ngok Dinka from Abyei Administrative area continued; notably, Twic Dinka 3-4 Feb attacked villages in southern part of Abyei, killing 37. Overcrowding and insufficient grazing land in parts of Warrap state heightened tensions between Dinka from Tonj county, Warrap, and Lou from Jur River county, Western Bahr al-Ghazal state; Dinka 5 Feb attacked police station protecting Lou community in Jur River, killing over twenty. In Jonglei state, Murle youth 4 Feb attacked Thep cattle camp, killing seven Lou Nuer youth; Lou Nuer from Uror, Akono and Nyriol counties reportedly contemplating joining Dinka from Duk and Twic East counties to attack Greater Pibor Administrative Area, where Murle hail from. UN Envoy 26 Feb warned that intercommunal fighting will undermine ability to hold elections in December. Meanwhile, rebel group National Salvation Front 25 Feb claimed attack on army ammunition store in capital Juba.

Pipeline damage and Sudan war disrupted oil exports. Sudanese Bashayer Pipeline Company 12 Feb reported loss of pressure in oil pipeline running from Upper Nile state to Port Sudan city in Sudan; 16 Feb reportedly fixed issue, but lack of maintenance and regular supply of diesel to run pumping stations, many of which run through territory controlled by Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, will potentially lead to other problems that could cause irreparable damage to pipelines; building new ones amid Sudan war would be logistically challenging. Meanwhile, UN Envoy 20 Feb warned of indications that Sudanese warring parties were recruiting in South Sudan.

Economic crisis weighed heavily on political apparatus. Permanent shutdown of oil exports from Upper Nile, which account for 60% of oil production, would threaten economy and President Kiir’s patronage system. Minister of Finance Bak Barnaba 18 Feb said govt was unable to pay civil servants and soldiers, called for drastic austerity measures as value of South Sudanese pound dropped; govt 26 Feb blamed economic crisis in part on impact of Sudan war on oil exports.

Sudan

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched offensives against paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both sides faced internal challenges, and U.S. named special envoy in push to end war.

SAF offensives yielded some success, RSF advanced in North Kordofan. Following months of setbacks, SAF made gains in Omdurman city, Khartoum state, 16 Feb claimed to have broken RSF siege on Engineers and Medical Corps there. SAF also defended positions in West Kordofan state’s Babanussa town, splitting Misseriya community’s allegiance to RSF. Reports of summary executions of alleged RSF supporters, however, increased opposition to SAF. Meanwhile, RSF 17 Feb claimed capture of SAF’s Jebel Al Daier base in North Kordofan, leaving paramilitary in control of state apart from state capital and paving way for expansion into White Nile state. In South Kordofan, SAF, rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (al-Hilu) and SAF-affiliated Public Defence Forces, mostly from Nuba community, 9-10 Feb attacked RSF in Habila town; RSF counterattack 9 Feb killed over twenty as fighting turned into communal conflict between RSF-affiliated Arab tribes and Nuba.

SAF faced internal divisions and RSF struggled to administer areas it controls. SAF 6 Feb arrested officers in Omdurman, sparking flurry of rumours including that army had foiled coup attempt, laying bare divisions within SAF and raising fears of breakdown in command and control. Meanwhile, RSF faced mounting opposition among local communities in Gezira state and struggled to enforce law and order in South Darfur; it also struggled to protect Reziegat communities in North and South Darfur from SAF bombardment, fuelling discontent among paramilitary’s main support base.

U.S. appointed special envoy for Sudan. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 26 Feb announced appointment of Special Envoy for Sudan, signalling stepped-up efforts to end war following months of failed mediation. Humanitarian situation remained dire; SAF late Jan-early Feb reportedly blocked aid to RSF-controlled areas, while RSF and SAF traded blame for early Feb disruptions to telecommunications networks that impacted aid deliveries. UN Human Rights Office 23 Feb issued report detailing abuses by both sides, some of which UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said “would amount to war crimes”.

Uganda

President Museveni’s son attempted to consolidate support and broaden appeal ahead of 2026 presidential election.

Succession battle continued. MK Movement, created in 2022 to support political ambitions of President Museveni’s son, Lt-Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, 7 Feb rebranded to Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU) in lead-up to Muhoozi’s expected candidacy for 2026 presidential election. While newly appointed PLU chairman, Michael Mawanda, described it as civic non-partisan entity, ruling party National Resistance Movement (NRM) Secretary General, Richard Todwong, said PLU was part of teams mobilising for ruling party. But opposition to Museveni’s son among elite remained present; Internal Affairs Minister Maj. Gen. Kahinda Otafiire 20 Feb reiterated he did not support Muhoozi becoming president.

Army continued anti-ADF operations. Army continued counter-insurgency operations around Rwenzori mountains. Notably, security forces 19 Feb arrested suspected Islamic-State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel Abdul Razak Bahati in Kasese district near Congolese border.

Uganda faced allegations of collusion with M23. Military 15 Feb said only Ugandan troops left in DR Congo are those deployed under Operation Shujaa to hunt down ADF; comments came after allegations by Congolese civil society in Rutshuru territory and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group that Ugandan forces are deployed in Rutshuru alongside Rwandan troops to support M23 armed group.

Zimbabwe

By-election wins cemented govt’s parliamentary control amid opposition disarray; mass evictions targeted those living on state-owned land.

Ruling party won all by-elections seats as opposition split further. Amid low turnout, ruling ZANU-PF party 3 Feb won all six National Assembly seats in controversial by-elections triggered after recall of CCC elected officials by self-proclaimed secretary-general of main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) Sengezo Tshabangu; victory restores ZANU-PF two-thirds majority in parliament lost in Aug general elections, amid opposition and civil society fears that party will alter Constitution and extend presidential term limits. Recalls further weakened CCC. After Nelson Chamisa late Jan resigned from position as CCC president, another CCC heavyweight Job Sikhala 8 Feb announced leaving party and creating new, as yet unnamed political movement. CCC 17 Feb reportedly named Chamisa’s long-time rival, Welshman Ncube, as well as two other senior CCC members, Tendai Biti and Lynette Karenyi-Kore, as acting co-presidents of party, fuelling rumours that Ncube and Biti worked with ZANU-PF and Tshabangu to remove Chamisa.

Govt carried out mass evictions as EU renewed sanctions. Authorities mid-Jan to mid-Feb evicted hundreds of residents from rural areas and informal settlements in peri-urban areas, particularly in Masvingo province, in campaign targeting “illegal” dwellings on state-owned land, drawing condemnation from traditional leaders and civil society. Amid continued concerns over human rights, EU Council 2 Feb extended sanctions including arms embargo and targeted asset freeze against one entity by one year.

Asia

Afghanistan

UN reconsidered political process after failure of Sec-Gen’s meeting in Qatar that exposed international divisions, while World Bank resumed development funding after long pause. 

UN convened international actors to discuss how to engage with Afghanistan. UN Sec Gen Antonio Guterres 18 Feb convened meeting in Qatari capital Doha to discuss path forward following UN Security Council resolution 2721 (2023), which called for appointment of UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan. Taliban boycotted meeting after UN rejected its demand to attend as sole representatives of Afghanistan; opposition groups – including National Resistance Front, Afghan Freedom Front and others – had prior to meeting issued joint statement contesting Taliban’s claim to be legitimate govt. Doha meeting disappointed UN officials who had hoped to draw Taliban into high-level talks, and exposed widening gap between regional and Western actors, with most regional states seeking to forge ahead with closer engagement as Western states hope to alter Taliban behaviour through isolation; Guterres said that more work is required on political process “in order to make it attractive from the point of view of the Taliban.” 

World Bank restarted projects in major strep, amid regional economic coordination. In significant move, World Bank 15 Feb announced “Approach 3.0”, which will provide support for basic services and economic revival; package allows for resumption of Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000), $1.2bn project to bring electricity from Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan. Underlining growing economic coordination with regional actors, Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoub 1 Feb also met Uzbekistan’s chief of intelligence to discuss border issues and implementation of development projects, and FM Amir Khan Muttaqi 25 Feb visited Turkmenistan to discuss economic activities. Meanwhile, energy authority 6 Feb announced it had paid off all loans, totalling $627mn, and prepaid future electricity imports. Deputy PM Salam Hanafi 15 Feb asserted govt was paying salaries to some 1.2mn public servants. 

In another important development. UN Sanctions Monitoring Team 29 Jan assessed Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) retained capacity to conduct external operations. Still, ISKP related fatalities remained at historic lows.

Bangladesh

Political tensions appeared to ease following Jan election, signs of communal conflict surfaced in Chittagong Hill Tracts, and conflict in Myanmar imperilled border and displaced more Rohingya. 

Authorities released two senior opposition leaders. Court 15 Feb released two senior Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) officials on bail more than three months after they were detained, possibly signalling softer position from ruling Awami League (AL) toward opposition after it dominated parliament following 7 Jan flawed election. Internal fighting continued to wrack AL as rival factions of Chittagong University branch 14-16 Feb clashed, injuring four including police officer. 

Tensions rose in Chittagong Hill Tracts in south east. Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) – which claims to represent six Kuki-Chin subgroups, largest of which is Bawm – 7 Feb briefly detained six Marma minority group residents in Bandarban’s Ruma Upazila. Marma leaders accused KNF of shooting Marma man in Ruma Upazila on 13 Feb; local Marma protests next day turned against several Bawm people-owned homes and shops in Ruma. KNF accused rival insurgent group Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) of being behind protests, raising prospect of clashes. 

Hostilities in Myanmar spilt over border, Rohingya refugees faced violence in camps. As Arakan Army consolidated control along Myanmar-Bangladesh border (see Myanmar), shells crossed border and 6 Feb killed two civilians, prompting evacuation of hundreds. Conflict could force more Rohingya to flee. Govt 14 Feb rejected UN request to permit entry to 900 refugees. As of mid-Feb, thousands of Rohingya waited in small boats on Myanmar side of Naf River, with security forces pushing back hundreds who attempted to cross. Meanwhile, Rohingya in refugee camps continued to endure high levels of violence. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 6 Feb killed member of rival Rohingya Solidarity Organisation. Ten masked men 11 Feb shot dead Rohingya refugee, with another stabbed to death 17 Feb. Security forces 6 Feb detained 23 armed Rohingya at border in Cox’s Bazar’s Ukhiya district. Refugees sought to flee camps: authorities 14 Feb voluntarily transferred 1,500 to Bhasan Char island in Bay of Bengal, marking largest transfer since March 2022.

China/Japan

China maintained naval activity in East China Sea as U.S. and Japan held joint exercises in wider region. 

Beijing continued maritime presence. As of 28 Feb, Japan spotted 106 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone, while four vessels were detected within Japan’s territorial sea. Japan’s Coast Guard 6 Feb urged the four Chinese vessels to leave its territorial waters, which after almost two hours sailed northward. According to Japanese officials cited by media, Chinese authorities have ships constantly stationed north west of disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea, which Japan claims as its territorial waters. 

Japan and U.S. held joint exercises. U.S. and Japan 1 Feb conducted joint military exercises in Philippine Sea, demonstrating their ability to respond to contingencies across regional waters; exercises involved dozen warships, including two U.S. aircraft carriers. Japanese Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military 2 Feb identified China as hypothetical enemy in their joint command post exercise for first time, reflecting growing concerns over potential future invasion of Taiwan by Beijing. 

Japan sought to deepen maritime cooperation across region. Reports mid-month indicated Japan is drawing up new ten-year plan to improve maritime capabilities of four nations in Southeast Asia that are struggling to resist growing encroachment into their territorial waters by China.

India

Ethnic conflict in Manipur in far north east continued, Maoists staged attacks in centre and relations with China remained under strain amid border dispute. 

Manipur continued to be roiled by deadly unrest. Separate shootings 13 Feb killed three in Imphal East and Kangpokpi districts. Mob same day broke into camp of paramilitary force 5th Indian Reserve Battalion in Chingarel district, looting arms and ammunition. Following suspension of police constable from Kuki-Zo tribal community, mob 15 Feb stormed govt complex housing senior police in Churachandpur district, killing two and injuring 30. Around 200 members of radical Meitei group Arambai Tenggol 27 Feb abducted senior police officer after he had arrested six members of group in Imphal East district. After Manipur Chief Minister 3 Feb met Union Home Minister in capital New Delhi, home minister announced decision to suspend Free Movement Regime with Myanmar under which hill tribes can cross border with relative ease, citing need to “ensure internal security” and “maintain demographic structure”; move reflects Chief Minister’s inflammatory rhetoric that Kuki-Zo are illegal immigrants. 

Maoist militants continued attacks in centre. After over 500 Maoists 30 Jan killed three police members in Chattisgarh state (centre) in bid to resist deployment to security camps established by authorities, two Maoists 18 Feb hacked to death armed forces officer in Chattisgarh’s Bijapur district. IED blast 25 Feb killed security forces member in Bijapur. Security forces 27 Feb killed four Maoists in Bijapur. 

Relations with China remained under stress. Marking first meeting in more than six months, FM S. Jaishankar 17 Feb met Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on sidelines of Munich Security Conference. Indian and Chinese corp commanders 19 Feb held 21st round of talks over disputed boundary known as Line of Actual Control; India said discussions sought “complete disengagement” in eastern Ladakh, referring to two remaining friction points at Demchok and Depsang. Defence secretary 21 Feb referred to China as “a bully”. 

In another important development. Farmers from Punjab state (north) 13 Feb commenced protest march to New Delhi to demand guaranteed minimum crop prices, following last round of protests in 2021; authorities 21 Feb deployed force to prevent farmers marching on capital, killing young farmer.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Militants staged first deadly attack this year on non-local residents in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), while PM Narendra Modi claimed “progress” in region despite signs of mounting local anger. 

Militants killed two non-local labourers in J&K. Marking first killing of non-local residents in Kashmir Valley in 2024, militants 7 Feb shot dead two carpenters from Punjab in Srinagar city; militants have regularly targeted non-local workers in valley since J&K’s special status was scrapped in 2019. Former Chief Minister Omar Abdullah same day said continued attacks in heart of Srinagar city are proof that situation is not normal as govt claims. Meanwhile, security forces 2 Feb busted militant hideout in Jammu’s Poonch district and 15 Feb arrested militant associate in North Kashmir’s Kupwara district. Security forces 12 Feb shot down drone allegedly entering Poonch district from Pakistan. 

PM Modi visited Jammu, claiming progress in development. Ahead of national elections due to be held by May, PM Modi 20 Feb visited Jammu and kickstarted construction of numerous projects in several sectors, including education, health, aviation, roadways and railways; Modi’s claim that “In the past, only sad news, like bomb blasts, kidnappings and separatism, would emerge from Kashmir” but now “J&K is on the path of progress and development” appeared to contrast with feelings of widespread alienation, anger and frustration among local population. 

Authorities prevented chief cleric of J&K addressing Friday prayers. After local authorities 9 Feb blocked chief cleric of J&K, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, from delivering special sermon meant to mark Islamic celebration Shab-e-Mehraj at Srinagar’s Jamia Masjid, Farooq approached High Court challenging continued restrictions on his religious duties; reports indicated govt is concerned cleric may address Israel-Palestine conflict and spark protests, which could morph into political mobilisation on other local issues. 

In another important development. Locals in Ladakh 3 Feb held large-scale protest and observed complete shutdown in Leh city to demand constitutional safeguards, protection of cultural identity and statehood for union territory created in 2019.

Korean Peninsula

Ahead of U.S.-South Korea military drills in March, North Korea tested missiles and maritime tensions persisted with Seoul, while Moscow publicly flouted UN sanctions in sign of eroding enforcement and adherence. 

North Korea tested missiles in east amid maritime tensions in west. South Korea 14 Feb said North Korea had fired multiple cruise missiles in waters off its eastern port of Wonsan. North Korean state media next day confirmed leader Kim Jong Un supervised “evaluation test-fire of new-type surface-to-sea missile Padasuri-6”. After Kim in Jan announced north would no longer recognise de facto maritime boundary in West Sea known as Northern Limit Line, state media 15 Feb quoted Kim accusing Seoul of frequently violating north’s sovereignty by insisting on boundary, warning “if the enemy violates what we consider as our maritime border lines, we will take that as a violation of our sovereignty and an armed provocation”, vowing to “defend our maritime sovereignty by force of arms and actions”. 

U.S. and South Korea prepared for March’s military drills. North Korea is expected to respond to alliance military exercises – set to begin 4 March – but it is not clear whether Pyongyang is keen to be, by its standards, highly provocative at this moment, given that it is focused on relations with Russia. 

Russia gifted luxury car to Kim, violating UN sanctions. In sign of deepening ties between Russia and North Korea, President Putin 18 Feb gifted Kim luxury car – violating UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea. After South Korea and U.S. criticised move, Moscow retorted: “If Seoul has concerns about the ‘adherence to U.N. sanctions’ regarding North Korea, then it should address it directly at the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, rather than rushing to the microphones”. Episode underscores lack of security council unity in enforcing and adhering to sanctions resolutions. Meanwhile, South Korea 26 Feb said Pyongyang had shipped 6,700 containers carrying millions of munitions to Russia since July. 

Seoul established formal relations with Cuba. In unanticipated step, South Korea and Cuba 15 Feb forged diplomatic ties, marking apparent setback for North Korea that has historically emphasised fraternal socialist connections with Caribbean island.

Myanmar

Arakan Army won string of victories against regime in Rakhine state, while ceasefire in Shan state permitted regime to reclaim territory in centre as it activated conscription law amid battlefield losses. 

In Rakhine state, Arakan Army maintained battlefield momentum. Following its capture of towns and military camps in Jan, Arakan Army evicted military from several key strongholds and gained control over four more towns, as well as seizing huge quantities of arms and ammunition. Notably, Arakan Army 8 Feb captured Mrauk-U town – marking highly symbolic victory given town’s status as capital of Rakhine kingdom until 18th century. Group now enjoys firm grip on much of northern and central Rakhine state, with state capital Sittwe possibly within reach. Hostilities in Rakhine raised prospect of spillover into Bangladesh, including thousands of Rohingya fleeing from Myanmar (see Bangladesh). Likewise, India’s foreign ministry 1 Feb voiced “concern over deteriorating situation in Myanmar”, with hundreds of regime soldiers having fled into India to escape Arakan Army. 

Limited ceasefire held in Shan state, as military turned focus to central Myanmar. Military, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army all largely observed 11 Jan ceasefire during Feb, while Kachin Independence Army continued attacks in region. Military launched offensives in country’s centre to recapture several towns lost to resistance forces since early Nov. Notably, regime 10 Feb recaptured Kawlin town – largest to come under resistance control – after week of heavy fighting. 

Regime activated old conscription law. Regime 10 Feb announced it had put into effect People’s Military Service Law more than decade after it was enacted, enabling men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to be conscripted for five years; measure raises questions about military’s troop levels given heavy losses it has endured in recent months and difficulties it has faced recruiting since coup. Activation of law caused panic, with thousands of young men trying to flee country, despite regime claims that it would only conscript 5,000 per month out of 10mn people potentially eligible for service. 

In another important development. UN Security Council 5 Feb held closed-door meeting with ASEAN Special Envoy following his Jan visit to Myanmar.

Pakistan

Disputed national election results triggered protests and deepened political crisis, as surge in militant attacks in provinces bordering Afghanistan killed dozens.

Election results triggered fraud allegations and protests. Voters 8 Feb went to polls as govt imposed communication blackout nationwide, citing security threats, which raised widespread concerns that vote was neither transparent nor fair. Election Commission, after some delay, announced no party won simple majority (169 seats) but in shock result, candidates backed by former PM and imprisoned leader of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Imran Khan secured largest bloc with 93 seats, while Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) came second with 75 seats and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won 54. PTI disputed results, insisting it had won 190 seats but was deprived victory in federal and Punjab parliaments through electoral fraud, and called for vote recount as party lodged appeals with courts and election commission; PTI held public protests alongside other parties, such as Jamaat-e-Islami. U.S. 9 Feb noted “undue restrictions on freedoms” and called for investigations into “claims of interference or fraud”, while UK and EU raised questions about vote’s “credibility” and “lack of fairness”. 

PML-N sought to lead new govt. Amid protests in various provinces over results, PML-N and PPP 21 Feb struck agreement on forming coalition govt with PML-N nominating Shehbaz Sharif as PM; with its credibility damaged by deeply flawed elections, govt is set to govern over deeply-fractured polity, with political polarisation undermining its ability to address crises, including on economic front. 

Militants ramped up deadly attacks around election, killing dozens. In bid to disrupt voting, Baloch militant groups and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) conducted over 50 attacks in run up to vote on political rallies, election offices, and homes of candidates in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Notably, militants 1 Feb conducted at least ten bomb and grenade attacks across Balochistan. Militant attack on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Dera Ismail Khan district 5 Feb killed ten police officers. In deadliest attack of month, bomb blasts outside election offices in Balochistan’s Pishin and Qila Saifullah districts 6 Feb killed 28 and injured over 50.

Papua New Guinea

Tribal clashes in restive Highlands Region killed over 40 people. 

Police commander in Enga province, in Highlands Region, reported that two tribes and their respective allies 18 Feb clashed with reported automatic and heavy weaponry in Middle Lai area, killing at least 49 by some estimates, likely marking deadliest upsurge in tribal violence in region in recent years; police said Amublin tribe had set up ambush on rival Sikin tribe after allegedly anticipating planned attack. Enga Governor Peter Ipatas claimed as many as seventeen tribes were involved in long-running escalation in region, describing it as “probably the biggest tribal fight we’ve ever had”.

Philippines

Peace process remained on track in south amid low-level violence, while govt forces continued to clash with Communist rebels. 

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Peace process remained on track as govt and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace delegations 10 Feb met for first time since Aug 2023, but no major agreement on vital issues was reached; sides, however, committed to continuation of peace process and general agreement on compensation packages for demobilised guerrilla fighters. Meanwhile, in Lanao del Norte province, military operation 19 Feb left state soldiers and three suspected Maute Group/Daulah Islamiyah militants dead in Munai municipality. Authorities 15 Feb arrested 32-year-old woman, suspected of facilitating transfer of funds to Islamic State (ISIS), in Sulu province. 

Clashes continued between Communist rebels and military. Fighting between govt forces and Communists in Luzon Island (Camarines), Mindanao Island (Misamis and Surigao) and Visayas Islands (Leyte and Negros) killed at least nineteen combatants and civilians, and injured at least seven, in Feb. After govt and communist group New People’s Army struck agreement in Norway to restart talks, both sides continued constituting panels to launch dialogue.

South China Sea

Tensions persisted in South China Sea (SCS) between Philippines and China, while Manila signed off on expanding defence budget and continued to deepen cooperation with U.S. 

China continued presence near disputed feature, stoking tensions with Manila. Chinese military 9 Feb announced it conducted routine patrols in SCS. China’s coast guard 22 Feb said it drove away Philippine govt vessel for “illegally intruding” into waters near Scarborough Shoal; Manila same day called claim “inaccurate”. Manila 27 Feb reported patrol of Chinese aircraft near Scarborough Shoal for first time in recent years. Philippine President Marcos Jr 28 Feb labelled China’s presence in SCS “worrisome”. During state visit to Australia beginning 29 Feb aimed at deepening security ties, Marcos Jr vowed to resist “any attempt by any foreign power to take even one square inch of our sovereign territory”. Meanwhile, USS John Finn and USS Gabrielle Giffords 8 Feb conducted trilateral operations with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Navy in SCS. 

Manila continued to bolster defence posture and ties with Washington. Marcos Jr 1 Feb approved third phase of military’s modernisation plan, which includes purchase of country’s first submarine, to defend its maritime sovereignty in SCS; plan is estimated to cost 2 trillion pesos ($35.62 bn), reflecting shift in strategy from internal to external defence. Philippine Navy mid-Feb deployed BRP Emilio Jacinto, an upgraded patrol vessel, to waters off Palawan province in effort to bolster its forces. Media reports indicated U.S. and Philippines plan to hold meeting between top officials in coming months to address Beijing’s aggressive actions in SCS; meeting aims to reaffirm U.S. commitment to defend Philippines under their mutual defence treaty, amid China’s disruptive tactics against Philippine military’s resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal.

Sri Lanka

Opposition challenged President Wickremesinghe’s pursuit of authoritarian legislation, as speculation grew over potential delay to presidential election and govt touted economic recovery. 

Opposition challenged govt and parliamentary Speaker over constitutionality of recent actions. Main opposition party Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) 26 Feb, later joined by other parties, began effort to bring no-confidence motion against Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardana for his decision to certify enactment of widely-criticised Online Safety Act (OSA) on 24 Jan, pointing to law’s failure to incorporate amendments required by earlier Supreme Court judgment. Supreme Court 29 Feb dismissed Tamil parliamentarian M.A. Sumanthiran’s “fundamental rights” petition challenging law’s validity on same grounds; govt 13 Feb had announced plans to amend law without specifying how. Parliament 20 Feb received Supreme Court ruling approving constitutionality of main thrust of proposed Anti-Terrorism Act, while requiring amendment of some clauses. Other legislation likely to restrict political freedoms remained in pipeline, including tighter controls on NGOs and community groups. Meanwhile, SJB leader Sajith Premadasa 26 Feb challenged validity of Constitutional Council’s appointment of Deshabandu Tenakoon as head of Police Service, arguing Speaker had no right to cast decisive vote. 

Uncertainty rose regarding upcoming presidential election. Feb saw renewed public speculation that govt may postpone presidential election – mandated by constitution between 18 Sept and 17 Oct. Former president Maithripala Sirisena 11 Feb claimed Wickremesinghe had convened group of lawyers to advise him on options for abolishing executive presidency. In response, Wickremesinghe’s media division 13 Feb asserted election will be held within mandated period. Public concern about possible postponement of election comes in wake of opinion polls showing Wickremesinghe receiving support from just 9% of those polled in Dec 2023. 

Wickremesinghe boasted of economic progress. Wickremesinghe 7 Feb gave strikingly upbeat assessment of economy in speech to parliament, citing improvements in multiple macroeconomic indicators, even as govt 28 Feb announced plans to expand beneficiaries of its flagship welfare program to nearly 40 percent of population; speech laid out ambitious agenda for deep structural changes to economy unlikely to be accepted easily by powerful constituencies. U.S. Assistant Sec of State Donald Lu 15 Feb praised country’s “historic comeback” from economic crisis.

Taiwan Strait

China commenced regular law enforcement patrols in Kinmen waters to challenge Taiwan’s jurisdiction after drowning of two Chinese fishermen; U.S. and China continued talks to manage competition. 

Beijing seized maritime incident to challenge Taipei’s authority in Kinmen waters. Two Chinese fishermen 14 Feb drowned as result of chase by Taiwan’s Coast Guard off coast of Taiwan’s Kinmen Island, located close to China’s mainland, after Chinese vessel allegedly sailed approximately one nautical mile off Kinmen’s coast. Chinese officials 17 Feb denied existence of prohibited and restricted waters around Kinmen, declared by Taiwan, and 18 Feb announced regular patrols around Kinmen, which began next day. Chinese coast guard vessel 19 Feb briefly boarded Taiwanese tourist boat. Taiwan’s coast guard 20 Feb said it had expelled Chinese coast guard vessel in waters near Kinmen by verbally telling vessel to leave. Five Chinese coast guard vessels 26 Feb entered Kinmen’s prohibited or restricted waters. China 28 Feb said Taiwan’s ruling party lied about drowning incident, called on Taipei to meet demands of, and apologise to, victims’ families. 

China continued military activity. As of 28 Feb, Taiwan detected 275 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which at least 84 either crossed unofficial “median line” or were seen in Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone; Taiwan spotted 256 Chinese naval vessels in surrounding waters. According to Japanese officials cited by media, China has four warships constantly deployed around Taiwan, aiming to pressure Taipei and prevent U.S. ships from approaching in case of regional conflict. 

U.S. and China continued diplomatic engagement. China’s top diplomat Wang Yi 16 Feb emphasised one-China principle in his meeting with U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken, stating that stability in Taiwan Strait depends on U.S. not supporting “Taiwan independence”; meeting followed another between Wang Yi and U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan late Jan, where pair agreed to prevent relationship from veering into conflict. 

Beijing emphasised progress toward peaceful unification. In annual meeting on Taiwan, senior Chinese leader Wang Huning 23 Feb stated China “must resolutely combat” Taiwan independence and “further grasp the strategic initiative to achieve the complete reunification of the motherland.”

Thailand

Govt and main southern separatist group resumed dialogue after more than year, amid surge in attacks in deep south; Move Forward Party (MFP) faced prospect of dissolution, which could spark resurgence of 2020 protests. 

Peace process with main southern separatist group resumed amid surging attacks. In first meeting in over a year, delegations of govt and main southern separatist armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional 6-7 Feb held seventh round of talks in Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur; two sides discussed revised “Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace”, submitted by Thai delegation. Although Malaysian facilitator 7 Feb described outcome as “major breakthrough”, sides appeared only to agree in principle to peace plan, with more technical talks scheduled 7-8 March. Meanwhile, militants in deep south stepped up attacks. Notably, gunmen 2 Feb killed former assistant village headmen in Saiburi district, Pattani province. Former insurgent leader, Wae Ali Copter Waeji, was found shot dead 3 Feb in Reuso district, Narathiwat province. Militants 6 Feb threw grenade at police apartments and killed officer in Reuso district. Six militants 18 Feb killed two defence volunteers in Tak Bai district, Narathiwat. 

Possible ban of election-winning party raised spectre of major street unrest. After Constitutional Court 31 Jan ruled that election-winning party MFP’s proposal to reform lèse-majesté constituted effort to overthrow Thailand’s “system of government”, former senator 1 Feb filed petition with Electoral Commission seeking MFP’s dissolution via Constitutional Court; chairman 16 Feb said commission was examining case. MFP’s dissolution could trigger mass protests, considering ban of MFP’s progenitor, Future Forward Party, sparked months-long nationwide demonstrations in 2020. Pathumwan District Court 5 Feb sentenced MFP leader Pita Limjareonrat and Future Forward Party founder Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit to four months in prison, suspended for two years, for violations in connection with protest in 2019. 

Authorities freed former PM Thaksin Shinawatra. After six-month stay in police hospital upon returning to Thailand after fifteen years in exile, authorities 18 Feb released former leader of Pheu Thai party Thaksin on parole; release appears to result from undisclosed deal with military and royalist establishment set on confronting MFP challenge.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met for German-facilitated talks following deadly escalation along border; PM Pashinyan’s calls for new constitution triggered criticism.  

Deadly border clashes shattered months of relative calm. Azerbaijan’s State Border Service 12 Feb reported that Armenian troops fired at Azerbaijani positions in its Zangelan district, wounding one soldier. Situation escalated as Azerbaijan’s State Border Service 13 Feb announced “retaliatory operation” that left four Armenian soldiers dead, one wounded and an army post near Nerkin Hand village in southern Syunik region destroyed. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 13 Feb condemned Baku’s “disproportionate” response to shooting and reiterated that EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), tasked with monitoring situation along Armenian side of border, had been reinforced; announcement came amid growing dissatisfaction from Baku with EUMA, whom it 12 Feb accused of facilitating visits by European officials and unofficial delegations to border. Risk of further small-scale clashes persists. 

Armenian, Azerbaijani leaders met in Munich, paving way for talks between FMs. Pashinyan, Aliyev and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz 17 Feb held tripartite meeting on sidelines of Munich Security Conference. Less than two weeks later, German FM 28-29 Feb hosted her Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts for talks focused on peace treaty; pair vowed to continue negotiations. 

Pashinyan’s calls for new constitution ignited controversy. Pashinyan 1 Feb reiterated mid-Jan call for fresh constitution, citing “new geopolitical and regional realities”. Among other reforms, Pashinyan said it should remove provision calling for unification of Armenia with (now former) Nagorno-Karabakh. Aliyev same day weighed in, stating peace could be achieved if Yerevan amends constitution and other laws, which he said make claims on Azerbaijani territory. Comments prompted critics to accuse Pashinyan of bowing to Azerbaijani demands, and may lead to renewed calls for his resignation or fresh protests. 

In other important developments. Pashinyan 22 Feb announced Yerevan had frozen membership in Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization amid souring ties with Moscow, though latter same day said Yerevan had not launched formal process to suspend membership. Armenia and France 23 Feb struck defence deal.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers met for German-facilitated talks following deadly escalation along border; President Aliyev won landslide victory in snap poll.  

Deadly border clashes shattered months of relative calm. State Border Service 12 Feb reported that Armenian troops fired at Azerbaijani positions in Zangelan district, wounding one soldier. Situation escalated as State Border Service 13 Feb announced “retaliatory operation” that left four Armenian soldiers dead, one wounded and an army post near Armenia’s Nerkin Hand village in southern Syunik region destroyed. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 13 Feb condemned Baku’s “disproportionate” response to shooting and reiterated that EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), tasked with monitoring situation along Armenian side of border, had been reinforced; announcement came amid growing dissatisfaction from Baku with EUMA, whom it 12 Feb accused of facilitating visits by European officials and unofficial delegations to border. Risk of further small-scale clashes persists. 

Azerbaijani, Armenian leaders met in Munich, paving way for talks between FMs. Aliyev, Pashinyan and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz 17 Feb held tripartite meeting on sidelines of Munich Security Conference. Less than two weeks later, German FM 28-29 Feb hosted her Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts for talks focused on peace treaty; pair vowed to continue negotiations. 

Aliyev secured fifth presidential term. President Aliyev won 7 Feb snap presidential election with 92% of vote. In lead up to poll, Aliyev mid Jan stated that Azerbaijan had regained full sovereignty and expressed readiness for peaceful future with Armenia, though subsequent border clashes laid bare challenges ahead.

Belarus

President Lukashenko revealed plans to run in 2025 presidential election as voters cast their ballot in parliamentary and local polls; crackdown continued. 

U.S. condemned “sham” elections. Voters 25 Feb cast their ballots in parliamentary and local elections, choosing candidates from four parties that all back President Lukashenko. U.S. same day condemned “sham” polls in which “all independent political parties were denied registration”. Election Commission 26 Feb announced that 73% of eligible voters turned out for ballot and that all 110 seats in parliament had been filled, further cementing Lukashenko’s rule. Day of election, president announced intention to run in 2025 presidential election. 

Crackdown continued, notably targeting LGBTQ+ community. European Council 19 Feb expressed “continued and deep concern” about human rights situation, stated readiness to take further targeted measures. Crackdown continued, however. Notably, state news agency Belta 19 Feb reported Minsk has prepared draft law proposing penalties for “promotion of non-traditional relationships”, referring to LGBTQ+ relationships. 

Lithuania sealed another border crossing with Belarus. Lithuania 21 Feb decided to seal off two checkpoints with Belarus, bringing total of closed border crossings to four; Vilnius’ Interior Minister announced decision was due to “risks associated with the increased activities of the Belarusian intelligence and security services against Lithuania and our citizens”.

Cyprus

Newly-appointed UN personal envoy kickstarted first round of deliberations in search of common ground between parties. 

UN Sec-Gen’s new Personal Envoy for Cyprus, Maria Holguin Cuellar, 30 Jan commenced visit to Cyprus, stating that her first mission would be to investigate whether there is “common ground” and “listen attentively” to parties’ positions; Cuellar early Feb met Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides and “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) leader Ersin Tatar before visiting Athens, Ankara and London. Notably, Turkish Cypriot leadership remained sceptical of prospects of new negotiations, as de facto FM Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu suggested he did not expect Holguin to finish her mandate and that there was no common ground to be found. “TRNC” seeks recognition of existence of “two states and two democracies” on island, while Republic of Cyprus seeks return to dialogue on basis of 2017 framework.

Georgia

Irakli Kobakhidze became new prime minister following ruling party reshuffle, and breakaway Abkhazia stepped up restrictions on international organisations and civil society. 

Parliament named new PM as Oct elections inched closer. Following resignation of former PM Gharibashvili late Jan and return to politics of ruling Georgian Dream party’s billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, parliament 8 Feb appointed Irakli Kobakhidze as new PM; move came as Georgia gears up for Oct parliamentary elections. Opposition same day dismissed reshuffle as little more than a swap between “Ivanishvili’s political puppets”. 

Concerns grew about deepening restrictions in breakaway Abkhazia. EU Special Representative Toivo Klaar 14 Feb met with key Georgian officials in capital Tbilisi to discuss situation in breakaway regions and EU’s conflict resolution efforts. Meetings came after Abkhazia late Jan declined Klaar’s request for visit to region, prompting concern about region’s reduced engagement with EU and, according to Klaar, “increasing restrictions being placed on our work and the work of UN agencies, international NGOs and local civil society organisations”. De facto presidential administration 7 Feb submitted draft “foreign agents” law to de facto govt, which mimics Russia’s increasingly repressive legislation on “foreign representatives”; if approved, bill would designate individuals and organisations that receive money from abroad (excluding countries that recognise Abkhazia as an independent state) “foreign agents”.

Kosovo

New currency regulation restricted use of Serbian dinar, sparking outrage among Kosovo Serbs and criticism from international actors. 

New currency rules came into force, fuelling tensions. Regulation establishing euro as only currency permitted for cash transactions came into effect 1 Feb; move bans financial institutions from using Serbian dinar, primary currency for cash and commercial transactions in Kosovo’s Serb-majority communities. European Commission 1 Feb warned that “short transition period for the regulation’s implementation, combined with a lack of information and practical solutions for all affected communities, risk seriously complicating their lives”. Authorities 6 Feb announced one-month transition period; Kosovo police, however, 3 Feb confiscated 4mn Serbian dinar and vehicle transporting it to distribute social benefit payments from Serbia, 7 Feb prevented entry of cash-transfer truck into Kosovo. Hundreds of Kosovo Serbs 12 Feb protested new regulation in North Mitrovica town. 

UN Security Council held briefing on currency issue. Speaking at extraordinary session of UN Security Council, Serb President Aleksandar Vučić 8 Feb argued new regulation “disables all medical, educational, social, cultural and other institutions that enable Serbs to live with a minimum of human dignity”; PM Kurti insisted regulation doesn’t prevent Belgrade from providing financial support to Kosovo Serbs, but “seeks to ensure the transparency and legality of cash imported into Kosovo”. Head of UN Mission in Kosovo Caroline Ziadeh said actions “exacerbate an environment of insecurity and mistrust”.

Kyrgyzstan

Chorus of voices protested draft law on “foreign representatives”, Bishkek and Dushanbe advanced toward border deal, and UN, EU and Central Asian officials held talks on Afghanistan. 

Criticism of “foreign representatives” bill continued. Parliament 22 Feb approved second reading of controversial ‘foreign representatives’ bill amid chorus of voices underscoring risks to civil society and free speech. Notably, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 7 Feb warned it “would have an overwhelmingly negative impact on civil society, human rights defenders, and the media”, while rights group Amnesty International 8 Feb said proposed legislation and amendments bill “mimic the infamous Russian ‘foreign agents’ law”. President Japarov 9 Feb responded to Jan letter from U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken expressing concern about bill, accused U.S. of “interference” in country’s internal affairs.

Bishkek and Dushanbe advanced toward final border agreement. Tajik state news agency Khovar 5 Feb reported that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had agreed on another 3.71km of state border, as sides inched closer toward final agreement. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon same day met with FM Kulubayev in Tajik capital Dushanbe; pair reportedly discussed recent progress on border delimitation, as well as water resource management. 

Kyrgyzstan hosted talks on Afghanistan with UN, EU and regional officials. Bishkek 14 Feb hosted UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Roza Otunbaeva, along with officials from all five Central Asian nations and EU, for talks ahead of UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan 18-19 Feb in Qatar. Meeting came amid efforts among regional powers for closer engagement with Kabul, and reportedly focused on current challenges obstructing assistance to Afghanistan and how to ensure country’s long-term peace and stability.

Moldova

Congress of Deputies from breakaway Transnistria called for Russian protection from mounting Moldovan pressure. 

Congress of Deputies from Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria 28 Feb held extraordinary session – seventh in its history – amid intensifying dispute with Chișinău over customs duties. De facto lawmakers and officials adopted seven declarations, including appeal to Russia to “protect” region from growing pressure from Moldova; they stopped short, however, of calling on Moscow to annex region despite fears.

Russia (Internal)

Opposition leader Alexei Navalny died in penal colony weeks before presidential election, Moscow reiterated openness for Ukraine talks but on its terms, and West imposed more sanctions. 

Opposition leader died in prison. Weeks before 15-17 March presidential election, Alexei Navalny 16 Feb died in penal colony in northern Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, dealing blow to already weak opposition. Cause of death unknown, though opposition abroad and Navalny’s wife Yulia Navalnaya blamed President Putin. Commemorative rallies held 16-19 Feb in 39 cities; authorities detained 397 people. Navalnaya 19 Feb vowed to continue her husband’s work. Meanwhile, Election Commission 8 Feb refused to register opposition presidential hopeful Boris Nadezhdin’s candidacy for election. 

Russia alleged openness for Ukraine talks. As Russia gained battlefield momentum in Ukraine (see Ukraine), Putin 8 Feb expressed willingness for talks and claimed Kyiv refused negotiations with Moscow “under instructions from Washington”. FM Lavrov 14 Feb said Moscow was ready to settle conflict if Ukraine takes into account ground realities. During 29 Feb annual state-of-the-nation address, Putin praised battlefield advances in Ukraine and stated readiness for dialogue with U.S.; he also warned of “tragic” consequences should NATO military contingents be sent to Ukraine, after French President Macron 26 Feb refused to rule out sending troops there. Meanwhile, media company Bloomberg 20 Feb reported that U.S. told allies Russia is developing nuclear anti-satellite weapon, which could be launched into space in 2024. 

Ukraine war continued to be felt at home. Drone strikes targeting oil infrastructure continued, shelling into Belgorod region 15 Feb killed seven. Deputy Chairman of Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev 19 Feb claimed military had recruited 53,000 personnel since 1 Jan 2024. According to 15 Feb report by media outlet The New York Times, U.S. estimated roughly 300,000 Russian soldiers killed or injured since full-scale invasion. Mothers and wives of mobilised soldiers 3 Feb protested in capital Moscow, calling for return of soldiers from frontline. 

Western countries imposed more sanctions. EU 21 Feb agreed 13th sanctions package, U.S. 23 Feb announced over 500 new sanctions. Moscow 13 Feb added Estonia’s PM and others on wanted list.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan made progress on border deal with Kyrgyzstan and sought to improve water resource management with Uzbekistan; UN, EU and Central Asian officials held talks on Afghanistan. 

Dushanbe pursued border talks with Bishkek and opened water-monitoring station with Tashkent. State news agency Khovar 5 Feb reported that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had agreed on another 3.71km of state border as sides inched closer toward final agreement. President Rahmon same day met with Kyrgyz FM Kulubayev in capital Dushanbe; pair reportedly discussed recent progress on border delimitation, as well as water resource management. Meanwhile, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 23 Feb installed two new measuring stations along border to monitor transboundary water flows in effort to improve cooperation on water resource management. 

Officials attended talks on Afghanistan. Tajik representatives 14 Feb attended meeting in Kyrgyzstan along with UN Special Representative for Afghanistan and other Central Asian, EU officials ahead of UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan 18-19 Feb in Qatar. Meeting came amid efforts among regional powers for closer engagement with Kabul, and reportedly focused on current challenges obstructing assistance to Afghanistan and how to ensure country’s long-term peace and stability.

Türkiye

Hostilities with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) remained concentrated in northern Iraq and northern Syria, while govt retained pressure on Islamic State (ISIS) at home and improved ties with regional states. 

Amid clashes with PKK and its affiliates, Ankara engaged with Iraqi authorities and local actors. Military carried out airstrikes targeting PKK in northern Iraq and People’s Protection Units (YPG)/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) members in northern Syria as well as critical infrastructure belonging to groups. Notably, Turkish defence ministry 4 Feb announced killing or capturing of five PKK fighters in northern Iraq, while Turkish drones 11 Feb struck targets in northern Syria’s Qamishli, killing two high-ranking SDF members (see Iraq and Syria). Meanwhile, Defence Minister Yaşar Güler and Army Chief of Staff Metin Gürak 6 Feb visited Iraq’s capital Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan regional capital Erbil, reportedly to propose new defence treaty that includes measures to safeguard security and strengthen cooperation against PKK. In capital Ankara, FM Fidan 19 Feb met with Falih Alfayyadh, chairperson of Iran-backed Iraqi paramilitary coalition Hashd al-Shaabi. 

Authorities conducted operations against alleged ISIS members in Türkiye. Security forces during Feb apprehended over 400 individuals with suspected links to ISIS. Notably, police 13 Feb detained alleged ISIS operative working at Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant construction site, Mersin province, under fake identity. 

Ties with Greece, U.S. and Egypt remained on track for improvement. FM Hakan Fidan 7 Feb said that inherited disputes with Greece can be “set aside” as negotiations on other bilateral issues continue; Fidan and Greek counterpart Giorgos Gerapetritis 18 Feb met on sidelines of Munich Security Conference to discuss progress on bilateral issues and Greek PM Mitsotakis’ upcoming visit to Ankara currently scheduled for later this year. U.S. Congress 10 Feb approved sale of 40 F-16 fighter jets and 80 modernisation kits to Ankara; U.S. ambassador Jeff Flake 13 Feb emphasised Türkiye’s strategic importance. U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Chris Murphy 20-21 Feb visited Ankara and met President Erdoğan and Fidan. Erdoğan 15 Feb visited Egypt for first time since 2013 coup, signalling Ankara’s efforts to normalise ties with former adversaries.

Ukraine

As war entered third year, Avdiivka town fell to Russia, marking significant setback for Ukraine as its forces felt sting of waning Western support and momentum swung toward Moscow. 

Russian forces captured Avdiivka and nearby settlements. Following months of intense bombardment, Ukraine 17 Feb announced withdrawal from eastern Donetsk region’s Avdiivka town; retreat marks country’s most significant setback since loss of Bakhmut town in May 2023 and, according to military analysts, is consequence of ammunition shortages and Western hesitancy to sustain military aid. During final days of fighting, Russia appears to have established localised air superiority for first time since invasion, hastening Ukraine’s loss of control. Ukraine late Feb withdrew from several settlements west of Avdiivka. In south, Russian forces 17 Feb launched forward operations on Zaporizhzhia region’s Robotyne village. With pressure mounting along frontline, Ukraine could lose more territory in coming weeks. 

Ukraine sunk two ships in Black Sea, Russian strikes continued. Ukrainian forces 1 and 14 Feb sunk two ships from Russian Black Sea fleet using domestically produced naval drones; 29 Feb reportedly shot down three Russian Su-34 jets. Russian airstrikes continued across country, increasingly featuring North Korean ballistic missiles. Media outlet The New York Times 9 Feb quoted warning from U.S. official that Ukraine could run low on air defence interceptors within weeks, which could lead to intensified Russian bombardments and more casualties. 

President Zelenskyy dismissed top general. Zelenskyy 8 Feb replaced commander of armed forces General Zaluzhnyy with Oleksandr Sirskyy following souring Zelenskyy-Zaluzhnyy relations over competing narratives of counteroffensive and former’s hesitancy to mobilise more soldiers. Govt continued work on mobilisation reform bill. 

Europeans pledged more military aid amid concerns about future of U.S. support. EU 1 Feb passed €50bn support package for Ukraine after long delays. Deadlock in U.S. Congress over support package persisted, however, amid opposition from staunchest supporters of Republican Party’s presumptive nominee for 2024 presidential election Donald Trump. Kyiv during month signed long-term security agreements with number of European countries amid fears U.S. support is drying up. Meanwhile, protests by Polish farmers and lorry drivers over cheap Ukrainian grain continued.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan sought to improve water resource management with Tajikistan; UN, EU and Central Asian officials held talks on Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 23 Feb installed two new measuring stations along border to monitor transboundary water flows in effort to improve cooperation on water resource management. Meanwhile, Uzbek representatives 14 Feb attended meeting in Kyrgyzstan along with UN Special Representative for Afghanistan and other Central Asian, EU officials ahead of UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan 18-19 Feb in Qatar. Meeting came amid efforts among regional powers for closer engagement with Kabul, and reportedly focused on current challenges obstructing assistance to Afghanistan and how to ensure country’s long-term peace and stability.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Govt-ELN talks faced setback following ceasefire renewal; violence remained high across countryside. 

Govt-ELN talks faced challenges despite ceasefire renewal. After challenging discussions in Cuban capital Havana, govt and guerrilla group National Liberation Army (ELN) 5 Feb announced extension of bilateral ceasefire for further six months. Agreement includes unilateral commitment from ELN to end kidnapping for ransom and to release all those detained. Days later, however, group’s western front 10 Feb launched armed strike in Chocó department along San Juan, Sipí and Cajón rivers in order to block advance by rival armed group Gaitanista Self Defense Forces. New crisis erupted 20 Feb when ELN recalled its negotiators for consultations, accusing govt of trying to undermine national talks by sponsoring regional dialogue initiative in Nariño department; ELN’s central command objects to involvement of local ELN front in a regional process, as it undermines group’s coherency at national dialogue. Sides 26 Feb reaffirmed commitment to continue negotiations despite disagreement. 

“Total peace” efforts with FARC dissidents and other groups continued. Govt 1 Feb signed agreement to open talks with dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction called Segunda Marquetalia. Separately, tensions mounted between govt and second dissident faction already in talks, known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC); FARC-EMC 15 Feb issued communiqué accusing security forces of advancing on its troops in Buenos Aires town, Cauca department (along Pacific coast). Meanwhile, two criminal groups in Buenaventura city 5 Feb extended truce; agreement includes crucial provision allowing for creation of monitoring mechanism. 

Gaitanistas clashed with army. Violence intensified mid-Feb between Gaitanista Self Defence forces and military, which is escalating pressure campaign against group. Clashes 16-17 Feb left five soldiers dead along border between Antioquia and Bolívar departments. President Petro 17 Feb issued ultimatum to group, saying security forces would dismantle it if forces are not willing to demobilise. 

Petro faced criticism for slow implementation of coca substitution programs. Major civil society and farmer’s organisations from Catatumbo region, home to some of Colombia’s highest density coca crops, 11 Feb sent letter to Petro urging his administration to accelerate coca substitution programs; protests likely if there is no govt response.

El Salvador

President Bukele and his Nuevas Ideas party won landslide victory in elections marred by irregularities; authorities once again extended state of exception. 

Bukele secured presidency amid irregularities in vote count. Salvadorans 4 Feb cast their votes in elections to select president and congress, with Bukele on ballot despite constitution prohibiting immediate presidential re-election. As expected, electoral tribunal 9 Feb announced Bukele won with 82.66% of votes, 18 Feb declared his Nuevas Ideas party had secured 54 congressional seats out of 60. Election marred by irregularities, however, leading to allegations of fraud ostensibly aimed at making sure Nuevas Ideas secured large congressional majority. Notably, electronic electoral system failed, leading to manual vote count that Electoral Tribunal president Dora Martinez 6 Feb suggested could have been intentional. Several opposition parties 19 Feb claimed to have documented dozens of “anomalies” during count, including system failures when inputting opposition votes and duplication of votes in favour of Nuevas Ideas. However, Electoral Tribunal 22 Feb rejected petition by opposition parties to annul elections. Organization of American States’ Electoral Observation Mission 21 Feb said that, despite electoral process being “deficient, slow and disorganised”, results reflected will of voters. 

Authorities extended state of exception as mass trials continued. Legislative Assembly 9 Feb extended state of exception for additional thirty days. Earlier, Salvadoran courts 8 Feb began mass trials against 492 Mara Salvatrucha gang leaders, which human rights organisations have said violate due process and right to legal defence. Meanwhile, former national security advisor Alejandro Muyshondt, accused of being a double agent and sharing confidential information, 7 Feb died in state custody; his lawyer and mother 9 Feb claimed he had been tortured.

Haiti

Violent protests erupted calling for PM Henry’s resignation as gang violence, both between rival outfits and against govt, wreaked havoc in Port-au-Prince. 

Anti-Henry protests spread across country. Former coup leader Guy Philippe, who has urged Haitians to join him in peaceful revolution to remove acting PM Henry, 6 Feb joined anti-govt protests in Pétionville neighbourhood of capital Port-au-Prince. Demonstrations 7 Feb took place in over twenty cities, turning violent as protesters looted and set fire to state buildings; police killed five members of Brigade for the Security of Protected Areas, armed environmental agency led by close friend of Philippe. Henry that night urged calm and promised to hold meetings with opposition to organise elections. Leading politicians including Jean Charles Moïse, now allied with Philippe, and former PM Claude Joseph 18 Feb organised fresh protests in Port-au-Prince, Ouanaminthe and Les Cayes cities. CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) 28 Feb announced Henry agreed to hold elections by Sept 2025. 

Resurgent gang rivalry displaced thousands, wave of attacks rocked capital. After two-month lull in fighting between G9 and Gpèp coalitions in Cité Soleil, at least three gangs from Gpèp 5 Feb launched attack on area controlled by rival gang from within G9 coalition; UN 13 Feb said fighting displaced almost 10,000. G9 leader Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier 29 Feb claimed responsibility for wave of attacks on police stations and airport in Port-au-Prince; he stated it was coordinated offensive by gangs belonging to G9 and Gpèp to capture national police chief and govt ministers, and prevent Henry (on visit to Kenya – see below) from returning to Haiti. Apparent gang coordination suggests they could now be seeking to form united front and potentially join forces with Guy Philippe and his allies to oust PM in coming months.

Preparations for Kenyan-led multinational mission to Haiti continued. Henry 29 Feb visited Kenya amid efforts to overcome legal obstacles preventing Nairobi from instigating multinational mission to Haiti. Canada and other countries 22 Feb pledged another $120mn for mission amid funding concerns. U.S. ambassador to UN 26 Feb said Benin offered to contribute 2,000 troops to mission. 

In another important development. Judge 19 Feb charged 51 individuals in relation to 2021 killing of President Moïse.

Mexico

Killings of political candidates raised fears of an uptick in violence ahead of 2 June polls; ruling party faced criticism for constitutional reform package and allegations of ties to criminal outfits.

Assassinations of political figures raised fears of violent electoral season. As 2 June elections drew closer, unknown gunmen 15 Feb assassinated ruling MORENA party hopeful for local congress in Misantla city, Veracruz state (east), 26 Feb assassinated two MORENA mayoral candidates in Maravatío, Michoacán (centre); nineteen potential candidates killed since June 2023, majority from MORENA. Amid govt failure to prevent criminal influence in elections or implement protective measures for other candidates, fears abound that campaign season beginning 1 March will see uptick in political violence as groups battle over territory and state access. 

Critics accused govt of weakening checks and balances before poll. President López Obrador 5 Feb presented constitutional reform package targeting autonomous federal institutions he accuses of serving “neoliberal” opposition forces, including National Electoral Institute (INE). Tens of thousands 18 Feb protested in capital Mexico City voicing support for INE, while political opponents accused MORENA of trying to orchestrate election result by weakening checks and balances. 

Ruling party faced more allegations of ties to criminal groups. Following late Jan allegations that López Obrador received criminal financing for his unsuccessful 2006 presidential bid, armed group Los Ardillos alleged in 15 Feb interview that Los Zetas crime group also contributed to his campaign. Media outlet The New York Times 22 Feb published further allegations about links between drug cartels and officials close to president; López Obrador same day attacked paper’s correspondent and published her mobile number, 24 Feb claimed his “moral and political authority” is “above the personal data protection law”. 

Criminal violence continued. In sign of criminal groups’ increasing use of explosive devices, bomb-laden drone 7 Feb killed civilian in Gabriel Zamora municipality, Michoacán state. Meanwhile, church officials in Guerrero state 14 Feb said four bishops met with leaders of Tlacos and Familia Michoacana criminal groups in bid to halt rising violence; priest 22 Feb said groups had agreed to respect each other’s territories. Similar informal negotiations growing in high-conflict areas to address violence.

Nicaragua

U.S. sanctioned 100 officials in response to govt crackdown; Managua granted asylum to Panama’s former president. 

Crackdown on religious organisations, civil society and opposition persisted. Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1 Feb called for immediate release of Brooklyn Rivera and Nancy Henriquez, Indigenous political leaders of outlawed Yatama party who have been detained since late 2023. Meanwhile, targeting of religious organisations and civil society continued. Notably, govt 6 Feb shuttered five evangelical NGOs; state’s official gazette 16 Feb reported closure of Scouting Association of Nicaragua alongside seven other NGOs, four of them religious, said authorities would confiscate assets of all eight groups. U.S. 16 Feb announced visa restrictions on over 100 Nicaraguan municipal officials, accusing them of supporting a regime that “continues to engage in a repressive campaign that silences civil society and unjustly detains courageous individuals for exercising their fundamental freedoms”. UN 29 Feb accused Nicaragua’s govt of “serious systematic human rights violations, tantamount to crimes against humanity”. 

In another important development. Ortega 7 Feb granted asylum to former Panamanian President Martinelli, whose July 2023 conviction for money laundering was upheld by Panama’s Supreme Court 2 Feb; move in line with Managua increasingly offering asylum to former Central American officials accused of corruption.

Venezuela

As presidential poll inched closer, crackdown deepened with arrest of prominent activist and expulsion of UN human rights monitors; govt prepared electoral timetable. 

Authorities detained high-profile activist. Security forces 9 Feb arrested lawyer and human rights activist Rocío San Miguel at airport in capital Caracas, holding her for over three days incommunicado. Chief Prosecutor Tarek W. Saab 12 Feb announced San Miguel had been charged with treason and terrorism in connection with alleged plot to assassinate President Maduro. Rights groups and international actors, including U.S., demanded her release. Arrest of San Miguel, a moderate who heads an NGO focused on defence and security, seen as govt message that dissent will not be tolerated. Meanwhile, discussions in govt-controlled National Assembly to restrict, or even eliminate, NGOs continued. 

Govt expelled UN human rights monitors in further sign of crackdown. FM Gil 15 Feb announced govt had given officials at Caracas office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 72 hours to leave country. Decision came after OHCHR 13 Feb said San Miguel’s detention could amount to forced disappearance and called for her “immediate release”; Gil said comments violated Venezuela’s sovereignty and that office had become “private law firm of coup plotters and terrorist groups”. Expulsion bodes ill for govt cooperation with other outside monitors, including potential EU election observation mission for 2024 presidential vote. 

Govt held consultations on electoral calendar. Govt-controlled National Assembly 5-16 Feb held consultations with political parties, businesses, unions and others to suggest date for presidential election; opposition coalition Unitary Platform 4 Feb declined invitation, saying meeting contravened Oct 2023 govt-opposition Barbados Agreement, in which sides agreed to “jointly” present election authority with their proposal; it accused govt of planning election without adequate guarantees for free and fair vote. Consultations led to proposal 28 Feb that includes over twenty potential dates for poll; electoral authorities to finalise date in March. 

In other important developments. Tensions with Guyana continued over contested Essequibo, oil-rich region currently administered by Guyana, with Caracas reportedly bolstering troops near border and Georgetown receiving increased military assistance from Washington. Russian FM Lavrov 20 Feb visited Caracas to reaffirm ties.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Algiers conducted military exercise near Malian border amid diplomatic strains with Bamako and announced free-trade zones in bid to maintain influence in Sahel region.

Algeria conducted military exercise near Malian border. Malian religious leader Mahmoud Dicko, whom Bamako accuses of backing Tuareg rebels, around 25 Feb reportedly visited Algeria for second time since Dec. Mali’s PM Choguel Kokalla Maïga next day reiterated condemnation of alleged Algerian interference in Malian affairs. Algerian army Chief of Staff Said Chengriha 27 Feb oversaw live-ammunition military exercise in Bordj Badji Mokhtar area near Malian border; defence ministry described exercise as preparation to “destroy a non-conventional enemy”.

Algeria announced creation of free-trade zones with Sahel countries. President Tebboune 13 Feb announced plan to open free trade zones with neighbouring countries, starting with Mauritania and expanding to Sahel countries like Mali and Niger, followed by Tunisia and Libya. Move, which comes after Morocco in late 2023 launched initiative aimed at providing Atlantic access to three landlocked Sahelian countries, is part of Algeria’s efforts to maintain influence in Sahel despite diplomatic tensions with Bamako, in context that favours intervention of more dynamic and aggressive players, including Russia.

Country started gearing up for election year. Ahead of presidential election due to be held by year’s end, political parties close to ruling elites displayed semblance of opposition to Tebboune’s still unconfirmed candidacy in bid to provide veneer of legitimacy to predictable ballot. Abdelkader Bengrina, president of Islamist movement El-Bina, 12 Feb advocated for transfer of power to new generation. President of centre-left party Rally for Culture and Democracy, Atmane Mazouz, 17 Feb urged authorities to release all prisoners of conscience and establish “democratic minimum” to avoid “sham election”.

Egypt

Cairo continued to grapple with repercussions of Israel’s war on Gaza, reportedly preparing for refugee influx in case of ground offensive on Rafah; Cairo and UAE signed major investment deal, alleviating Egypt’s foreign currency shortage.

Egypt reportedly built security zone in Sinai anticipating refugee influx from Gaza. Responding to speculation that Egypt was ready to suspend peace treaty with Israel if latter launches ground offensive on Gaza’s southern city of Rafah, FM Sameh Shoukry 12 Feb said Cairo remained committed to agreement as long as Israel was, too. NGO Sinai for Human Rights 14 Feb said Egypt was building fortified buffer zone along border with Gaza to accommodate refugees in case of mass exodus from Gaza, while isolating them from rest of Sinai Peninsula. North Sinai governorate 17 Feb refuted report, claiming ongoing construction works were meant to create logistics zone to manage humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, efforts to broker truce in Gaza picked up pace. After Egypt, Israel, Qatar, and U.S. representatives met in French capital Paris, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan 25 Feb said parties “came to an understanding” on basic contours of hostage deal and ceasefire; senior Hamas official 27 Feb however said “big gaps” remained on major issues, notably length of truce.

UAE signed agreement for largest foreign direct investment in Egypt’s history. Egypt 23 Feb announced mega-deal with United Arab Emirates sovereign wealth fund for development of real estate on Mediterranean coast; deal will bring in $35bn, virtually solving Egypt’s liquidity problems. International Monetary Fund Director Kristalina Georgieva 2 Feb said talks over new loan were in final stretch. Exchange rate devaluation likely to take place before IMF disburses first tranche of new loan.

Turkish president’s visit marked culmination of rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara. Turkish President Erdoğan 14 Feb met with President Sisi during first official visit to Egypt since 2012, marking further step in diplomatic reconciliation between two countries and offering opportunities for understandings on issues including East Mediterranean and Libya. Sisi expected to visit Türkiye in April.

Iran

Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance” groups and U.S./Israel continued confrontations across region, while UN’s nuclear watchdog expressed concern over govt’s nuclear advancement.

U.S. launched retaliatory strikes on Iran-linked groups. In response to 28 Jan drone attack killing three U.S. soldiers in Jordan, attributed to Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq, U.S. 2 Feb launched most substantial retaliatory operation in Iraq and Syria since escalatory cycle began in Oct with strikes on more than 85 military targets, killing estimated 40 (see Iraq and Syria); Tehran labelled strikes “strategic mistake”. U.S. 7 Feb killed Kata’ib Hizbollah commander known as Abu Baqr al-Saeedi in Iraq, allegedly “responsible for directly planning and participating in attacks on U.S. forces”. Following strikes, frequency of attacks against U.S. forces particularly in Iraq appeared to decline, reportedly with Iran’s encouragement, but it remains to be seen if relative lull will be sustained. Elsewhere, U.S. and UK continued strikes against Houthis (see Yemen); media reports 15 Feb indicated U.S. had carried out cyberattack against Iranian vessel suspected of intelligence gathering in Red Sea. Iranian media 2 Feb confirmed death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) member in Syrian capital Damascus, marking another fatality in series of recent unconfirmed Israeli strikes (see Syria). In attack potentially portending greater Israeli covert operations on Iranian soil, reports attributed 14 Feb blasts damaging gas pipelines to Israel.

Concerns persisted over Iran’s nuclear program. International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Director General, Rafael Grossi, 1 Feb noted “a bit of slowing down” of growing stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%. Grossi 13 Feb reiterated concerns over Iran’s lack of transparency, given curtailed IAEA monitoring, and noted “loose talk” among Iranian officials on nuclear weapons capability. Serious diplomatic engagement between Tehran and Western powers remained absent ahead of IAEA Board of Governors meeting in March.

Washington’s sanctions continued to mount. Notably, U.S. 2 Feb blacklisted “network of prolific suppliers of materials and sensitive technology for Iran’s ballistic missile and [drone] programs”, as well as half dozen IRGC officials engaged in “malicious cyber activities”. U.S. 14 Feb sanctioned seven persons and entities, including Central Bank of Iran subsidiary.

Iraq

U.S. launched wave of retaliatory airstrikes against Iran-backed groups following killing of soldiers in Jan, as calls grew for foreign troops’ expulsion; hostilities between Türkiye and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continued.

U.S. retaliated against Iran-backed groups, which appeared to cease attacks in Iraq. In response to 28 Jan drone attack killing three U.S. soldiers in Jordan, attributed to Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq, U.S. 2 Feb launched most substantial retaliatory operation in Iraq and Syria since escalatory cycle began in Oct with strikes on more than 85 military targets; in Iraq, targets included bases and weapons facilities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hashd al-Shaabi, and resistance factions. Notably, strikes killed sixteen Hashd fighters and one civilian and injured at least two dozen in al-Qaim and Akasht, Anbar province. Govt accused U.S. of breaching Iraqi sovereignty. In further escalation, U.S. drone strike 7 Feb killed Kata’ib Hizbollah commander Abu Baqr al-Saeedi and two others in Baghdad. Following Iran’s Quds Forces commander’s visit to Baghdad late Jan where he reportedly instructed armed groups to lie low, no attacks from Iran-backed groups were recorded, despite Kata’ib Hizbollah rescinding its late Jan suspension of attacks; for now, it appears that escalation has reached ceiling, although attacks conducted by Iraqi groups in Syria may continue.

U.S. attacks fuelled calls for withdrawal of foreign troops. Following U.S. assassination of al-Saeedi, resistance and Hashd al-Shaabi leaders demanded govt deliver timeline for ending U.S.-led coalition’s mandate. Over 100 parliamentarians 8 Feb signed motion to pass law expelling foreign troops; however, parliament 10 Feb failed to convene for vote on expelling U.S. troops, as Kurdish, Sunni, and almost half of Shia legislators boycotted session, indicating widespread reluctance for rushed withdrawal. Iraq and U.S 11 Feb resumed talks on drawdown of forces.

Türkiye-PKK conflict continued in north. Turkish defence ministry 4 Feb announced killing or capturing five PKK fighters. Turkish defence ministry 17 Feb announced PKK attack on base in northern Iraq killed Turkish soldier. Security officials said alleged Turkish strike 20 Feb killed two in Akre region, Dohuk governorate.

Israel/Palestine

Israel killed thousands more in Gaza, as over half a million faced famine, and threatened all-out Rafah attack that could decimate 1.5m there; Israel’s Ramadan restrictions could fuel violence in West Bank and beyond.

Israel targeted Gaza’s south, as aid restrictions increased risk of mass starvation. Israeli forces continued massive bombardment and operations across strip, bringing Palestinian death toll to over 30,000 as of 29 Feb. Israel expanded attacks on Rafah in south that hosts over half of strip’s population, vast majority of which is displaced. Even as Israeli military intelligence warned Hamas will remain intact as guerrilla group, war cabinet repeatedly insisted on large-scale ground offensive in Rafah to take out remaining Hamas battalions and 18 Feb said all-out offensive would commence if hostages were not released by Ramadan on 10 March; operation will likely be bloodbath, worsen already-catastrophic conditions and fuel further displacement, including potentially into Egypt (see Egypt). Israeli forces also battled Palestinian militants in Jabalya and Gaza city (north), Deir el Balah (centre) and Khan Younis (south), as rockets into Israel continued. Risk of mass starvation rose further, as aid inflow fell by half in Feb and UN reported 90% of population facing high level of acute food insecurity and almost 600,000 “one step away from famine”; report by U.S./UK universities 19 Feb estimated tens of thousands could die in next six months due to collapsed services. UN special rapporteur on right to food 27 Feb asserted Israel is intentionally starving Palestinians and declared “situation of genocide”.

Ceasefire negotiations continued. After PM Netanyahu 7 Feb rejected Hamas ceasefire proposal as “delusional”, Israel and Hamas late Feb continued negotiations via mediators, offering hope ceasefire could avert Rafah offensive and release hostages; Netanyahu vowed any ceasefire would merely delay Rafah invasion.

West Bank braced for heightened turmoil during Ramadan. Israel mulled restrictions on Muslim worshippers’ access to Al-Aqsa mosque complex in Jerusalem during Ramadan, which could inflame tensions across West Bank and connect arenas by provoking violent actions by Hizbollah/Palestinian factions in Lebanon. Israeli settler violence could escalate, fuelled in part by extremists’ fears that international community may recognise Palestinian state.

Israel-Hizbollah hostilities continued. Deadly cross-border strikes persisted, underscoring lingering risk of wider war (see Lebanon).

Lebanon

Deadly cross-border clashes between Hizbollah and Israel escalated further in scope, underscoring risk of expanded regional conflict during Ramadan in March.

Border clashes further expanded in scope, killing dozen civilians in Lebanon. Israeli strike 10 Feb killed two civilians and wounded senior Hizbollah commander in Jadra town, north of major city Saida. Missiles originating from Lebanon 14 Feb struck Israeli military base in Safed in northern Israel, killing soldier and wounding eight others. In retaliation, Israel unleashed widespread bombing in southern Lebanon, which killed at least ten civilians and several Hizbollah members. Israel 26 Feb launched strikes near Baalbek, in eastern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, some 100km from border – marking deepest attack inside Lebanese territory since 7 Oct; in response, Hizbollah claimed it fired 60 rockets at Israeli base in Golan Heights. Hamas 28 Feb said it fired two salvos of rockets from Lebanon into Israel. Israeli attacks since Oct have seriously damaged vital local infrastructure and agricultural assets, on which many households in south depend, and displaced at least 86,000 residents.

Amid conflict escalation risks, diplomatic engagement remained limited. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 26 Feb said attacks on Hizbollah would continue regardless of whether there is a ceasefire in Gaza. Hostilities risk propelling Israel and Lebanon’s strongest militant group toward open-ended, disastrous war, just as Israel faces significant public pressure to confront group more forcefully. Further heightening conflict risk, start of Ramadan on 10 March could see rising tensions between Palestinians and Israel – including at Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade as Israel mulls restrictions on Muslim worshippers’ access to Al-Aqsa – which could provoke further violent actions by Hizbollah or Palestinian armed groups in Lebanon. While various diplomatic missions proposed potential terms for settlement, it appeared unlikely such efforts will bear fruit before ceasefire is reached in Gaza.

Executive vacuum and economic crisis persisted. Presidential vacuum that has prevailed since 1 Nov 2022 continued with little apparent prospect of resolution as parliament did not hold presidential election session, reflecting deadlock between political factions. Meanwhile, economic crisis remained severe. Notably, telecommunications workers and army retirees in Feb held strikes and demonstrations in protest of devalued wages and retirement benefits, respectively.

Libya

New initiatives to facilitate transfer of money from Tripoli to east reduced financial incentives to agree on political solution; Tripoli-based govt struck deal with militias for regular forces to police city.

Rival authorities continued to strike arrangements to maintain status quo. Eastern-based parliament, House of Representatives (HoR), 5 Feb established Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund tasked with leading reconstruction efforts across country, and funded directly by Central Bank in capital Tripoli; HoR 19 Feb appointed at its helm east-based military strongman Khalifa Haftar’s son, Belqasem. HoR early Feb also established new financial committee that will sign off on countrywide budgetary disbursements; Tripoli’s position on move unclear. Meanwhile in address to UN Security Council, UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily 15 Feb warned Libya could slide into “disintegration” if unable to form unified govt and move toward elections. UN Security Council 27 Feb reiterated call for elections “as soon as possible”.

Eastern forces reportedly prepared for show of force and received Russian tanks. Libyan news outlets 12 Feb reported 40 Russian T72 tanks were unloaded in eastern port of Tobruk, allegedly to support Haftar-led Libyan National Army (LNA). Pro-LNA official in following days confirmed reports, adding they expected to receive more fighter jets from Russia. Ahead of thirteenth anniversary of toppling of former leader Muammar Qadhafi on 17 Feb, Haftar-led forces reportedly dispatched military vehicles to Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte (north) to conduct military exercises there, allegedly with Russia’s support.

Militias agreed to leave Tripoli after series of clashes in recent months. Tripoli-based Interior Minister Imad Trabelsi 21 Feb said at least five militias that have been controlling Tripoli for past ten years agreed to return to their barracks by 9 April; Trabelsi said regular forces will police Tripoli again. Earlier in month, inter-militia clashes continued in western Libya. Notably, apparent revenge attack against militiaman 17 Feb left ten people dead in Tripoli’s Abu Salim neighbourhood.

In another important development. Petroleum Facilities Guard militiamen 25 Feb shut down oil facilities across country in dispute over pay, next day suspended strike after Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba agreed to raise their salaries.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh reiterated that recognition of Palestinian state must come before normalisation with Israel, as regional diplomacy aimed at ceasefire in Gaza continued.

Riyadh continued diplomatic pressure for Palestinian state and Gaza ceasefire. Foreign Ministry 7 Feb said it will not resume diplomatic relations with Israel unless Palestinian state is recognised along 1967 borders. Riyadh 8 Feb hosted summit with FMs of Egypt, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Palestinian representative to discuss using reconstruction funding for Gaza as leverage for ceasefire. Saudi Arabia 16 Feb attended Munich Security Conference to discuss so-called “day-after” plans. Despite U.S. insistence that Houthi attacks on shipping in Red Sea are independent from Gaza, Saudi FM 13 Feb said attacks were linked and reiterated call for ceasefire (see Yemen).

Syria

U.S. launched wave of retaliatory airstrikes against Iran-backed groups following killing of soldiers in Jan, Türkiye continued attacks on Kurdish targets, and clashes persisted between regime and rebels in north west.

In east, U.S. targeted Iran-backed groups, which continued attacks. In response to 28 Jan drone attack killing three U.S. soldiers in Jordan, U.S. 2 Feb launched most substantial retaliatory operation in Iraq and Syria since escalatory cycle began in Oct with strikes on more than 85 military targets, killing 29 Iran-backed militants in Syria; in show of restraint, U.S. allowed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers to evacuate beforehand. Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone 5 Feb killed six U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) at al-Omar base housing U.S. troops in Deir ez-Zor. Compounding risks of escalation, tribal militias backed by regime and IRGC 6 Feb targeted SDF. U.S.-led coalition 10 Feb intercepted six drone attacks targeting Conoco base, Deir ez-Zor. Meanwhile, Israel 2 Feb reportedly killed three Iran-backed militants in capital Damascus; 7 Feb struck Homs city, reportedly killing ten, including civilians; 21 Feb killed at least two in Damascus; IRGC reportedly scaled back deployment of senior officials and repositioned forces to western countryside.

In north east, Türkiye conducted repeated attacks on SDF. Notably, in Qamishli city, Hasaka province, Türkiye 11 Feb killed two SDF fighters and next day killed Kurdish administration official. With Türkiye seemingly taking advantage of U.S. preoccupation in east to destabilise Kurdish administration, SDF 12 Feb called on U.S. to strengthen its presence in region. Islamic State (ISIS) landmine 25 Feb killed fifteen civilians in Al-Raqqa’s eastern countryside.

In north west, regime forces and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) clashed. Regime forces, backed by Iranian proxies, targeted HTS with suicide drones in Idlib province: notably, 12 Feb killed two near Jisr al-Shughur city and 18 Feb killed and injured eight HTS fighters near Saraqib city.

Islamic State (ISIS) continued attacks; security forces killed protestor in south. ISIS 13 Feb reportedly killed nine soldiers near al-Sukhna town, Homs province. Security forces 28 Feb killed demonstrator at anti-govt protest in Suwayda city in first fatality since protests erupted in Aug.

Tunisia

Judicial authorities sentenced several govt critics to prison, including Islamist leader Rached Ghannouchi; President Saïed sent mixed signals on economic policy.

Judicial repression of opposition intensified. Tunis Court 1 Feb sentenced Rached Ghannouchi, imprisoned president of Islamist-inspired An-Nahda movement, and Rafik Abdessalam, his son-in-law and former FM, to three years’ imprisonment on charges of illegal foreign financing of their party. Five imprisoned senior politicians, including members of opposition coalition National Salvation Front, 11 Feb went on hunger strike to protest arbitrary detention; Ghannouchi 19 Feb announced joining strike in solidarity. Tunis courts 23 Jan sentenced former President Marzouki to eight years in prison in absentia for allegedly attempting to overthrow govt; next day sentenced prominent opposition figure Jawher Ben Mbarek to six months in prison on charges of conspiring against state security. Authorities 29 Feb arrested Tunisian General Labour Union’s deputy secretary-general, Tahar Mezzi, on undisclosed charges, before releasing him next day.

Election cycle proceeded despite widespread voter disaffection. Second round of local council elections, which will determine composition of second chamber of parliament, 4 Feb took place in 800 of 2,155 electoral districts. Amid boycott from opposition parties, voter turnout reached just 12.44%, almost as low as in first round. Independent High Authority for Elections 12 Feb said presidential election would be held in 2024 in accordance with Constitution.

Saïed sent mixed signals on economic policy. Parliament 6 Feb adopted amendment allowing “exceptional” direct financing of budget by Central Bank, sparking concerns over latter’s independence, as well as fiscal stability and debt burden. Authorities in following days used foreign currency reserves to pay for $850mn Eurobond, leading to 20% fall in foreign currency reserves by mid-Feb. Meanwhile, Saïed 15 Feb appointed Fethi Nouri as new Central Bank governor to replace Marouane Abassi, whose mandate expired; Nouri has demonstrated commitment to orthodox economic policies as member of Central Bank’s board of directors since 2016.

Western Sahara

UN Envoy continued consultations to revive peace process as international pressure on Morocco and Polisario Front independent movement continued to fade.

De Mistura’s South Africa visit drew Morocco’s ire. UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura 1 Feb visited South Africa, one of Polisario Front independence movement’s main sponsors, in likely attempt to explore what leverage he has over Polisario and put pressure on Rabat by broadening his consultations. Moroccan ambassador to UN, Omar Hilale, 3 Feb condemned trip, said de Mistura ignored Rabat’s “categorical opposition” to visit and “rejection of any interaction with Pretoria on the subject of the Moroccan Sahara question”.

Growing gap between Polisario leadership and more radical activists came to fore. In interview to Spanish left-wing outlet, Nueva Revolución, Mansur Omar, Polisario Front representative to European Union, 10 Feb said Polisario was trying to contain intensity of conflict with Morocco to avoid stoking regional tensions and broaden conflict. Statement, which contradicted conclusions of Jan 2023 Polisario congress calling for military escalation with Morocco, triggered vocal opposition from some Polisario activists, who accused Omar and Polisario leadership of letting down fight for independence of Western Sahara.

Yemen

Undeterred by U.S.-UK bombing campaign, Houthis continued attacks on international shipping as hostilities could escalate further in coming weeks; military build-up along frontlines threatened return to war between Houthis and govt forces.

Houthis could step up maritime attacks despite U.S.-UK airstrikes. Houthis launched near-daily attacks on shipping in Red Sea, expanding into Gulf of Aden, signalling ineffectiveness of U.S.-UK bombing campaign. Notably, U.S. and UK 3 Feb struck at least 36 Houthi targets in thirteen locations and 11 Feb struck Houthi weapons systems in Salif port, north of Hodeida city; 13 Feb expanded airstrikes to Hajjah province. Houthis 18 Feb attacked Belize-flagged and UK-registered vessel in Gulf of Aden loaded with 41,000 tons of fertilizer, which is critically endangered and poses substantial threat of environmental catastrophe if ship sinks. EU 19 Feb officially launched Red Sea maritime mission to ensure “freedom of navigation”, which Houthis may target when mission becomes operational; Houthi leader 29 Feb threatened military “surprises” in upcoming Red Sea operations.

Military build-up raised spectre of escalation in Marib, Shabwa, Taiz. Houthis reinforced forces along several frontlines, while govt forces showcased preparedness to confront Houthis, seeking assistance from U.S. and others impacted by Houthi maritime actions. Notably, Houthi artillery 15 Feb targeted Al-Miriyah area in Al-Dhale province. Bomb targeting separatist Southern Transitional Council leader next day killed two in Aden. Houthis 17 Feb killed three govt soldiers in Saada province; 19 Feb attacked military site in Taiz province. Risk of wider ground fighting loomed as Houthis may initiate new major offensive, particularly if external actors provide support to anti-Houthi groups.

UN continued efforts to avoid peace process derailing. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg met local and regional leaders during Feb in effort to keep peace process alive, including Iranian, Saudi Arabian and Emirati officials as well as Presidential Leadership Council VP Aiderous al-Zubaidi and Chairman al-Alimi and leader of National Resistance Forces Tareq Saleh in Mocha city.

In another important development. U.S. designation of Houthis as Global Terrorist organisation 16 Feb came into effect amid increasing food prices and suspension of operations by World Food Program in Houthi-controlled areas, and rising inflation in govt-controlled areas.

Africa

Benin

Jihadist violence persisted and opposition warned President Talon against seeking third term in 2026 election.

Jihadist attacks persisted in north. Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) insurgents 1 Jan clashed with military in Tissoua locality, Alibori department, leading to death of five militants. Local sources also reported movement on 9 Jan of JNIM militants near Park W, Alibori. 

Tensions started to build ahead of 2026 general elections. Former president and leader of opposition party Les Démocrates Thomas Boni Yayi 1 Jan warned President Talon against attempting unconstitutional third term in 2026 and accused ruling party of planning to change constitution; govt denied claim. Constitutional Court 4 Jan called on National Assembly to amend electoral calendar for 2026 general elections, and MP from ruling coalition 26 Jan submitted constitutional amendment bill to parliament to revise electoral calendar. Les Démocrates and three other opposition parties 29 Jan held consultations in commercial capital, Cotonou, stated opposition to constitutional reform.

Burkina Faso

Ouagadougou announced withdrawal from West African regional bloc alongside Mali and Niger, dealing blow to regional integration; authorities claimed foiling coup attempt and Russian troop deployment continued.

Junta announced leaving ECOWAS, defying pressure to restore constitutional rule. Junta leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 28 Jan announced leaving ECOWAS, denouncing “inhumane” sanctions imposed by regional bloc following coups. ECOWAS immediately said three countries were “important members of the Community” and bloc “remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the political impasse”; also said it had not yet received formal withdrawal notification.

Deployment of Russian troops accelerated. Contingent of about 100 Russian military personnel 24 Jan reportedly arrived in capital Ouagadougou in what appeared to be initial phase of 300-member force deployment.

Authorities continued to silence dissent amid report of coup plot. Authorities 18 Jan announced foiling coup attempt scheduled to take place 14 Jan, accused network of military officers, as well civilians and activists, of conspiring to destabilise institutions. Meanwhile, silencing of dissent continued. Notably, men in civilian clothes 24 Jan arrested lawyer and political activist Guy-Hervé Kam in capital Ouagadougou on undisclosed charges; his political movement accused transitional authorities of orchestrating “kidnapping”.

Govt forces and civilian auxiliaries continued to clash with jihadist militants. In Centre-North region, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 3 Jan attacked military base in Gabou town, Sanmatenga province, killing seventeen members of state-sponsored civilian militia (VDPs). In Sahel region, army 21 Jan reportedly killed prominent leader of Islamic State Sahel Province, Harouna Oulel, near Oueldi village, Oudalan province. NGO Human Rights Watch 25 Jan accused security forces of killing at least 60 civilians in drone strikes between Aug and Nov 2023, said attacks may amount to war crimes. Transitional President Capt. Traoré 5 and 10 Jan shared details about previously announced tax hikes on salaries and govt bonuses and benefit increases for VDPs; new taxes illustrate Ouagadougou’s financial difficulties, while prospect of better conditions for VDPs may backfire if authorities fail to fulfil promises.

Burundi

Diplomatic spat with Rwanda intensified with border closure, amid escalating rhetoric and reports of troop build-up along border; crisis is part of three-way tussle involving DR Congo

Burundi closed border with Rwanda amid escalating rhetoric. Interior Minister Martin Niteretse 11 Jan announced decision to suspend diplomatic relations and close all borders with Rwanda over Kigali’s alleged support for RED-Tabara rebels. Kigali immediately labelled move “unfortunate decision” that violates principles of East African Community (EAC) regional bloc, which 12 Jan called for “peaceful settlement” of dispute. SOS Médias Burundi 14 Jan reported arbitrary arrest of at least 38 Rwandan nationals in Mugina commune, and 58 others in Rugombo commune, both Cibitoke province, since 11 Jan; most of them were reportedly repatriated to Rwanda in following days. President Ndayishimiye 21 Jan said Rwandans are “prisoners of bad leaders”. Kigali next day denounced “inflammatory allegations aimed at sowing division among Rwandans”, and President Kagame 23 Jan vowed to “fight” to protect Rwanda. Gitega same day accused Rwanda of recruiting Burundian refugees in Rwanda to join RED-Tabara. In further sign of growing tension, SOS Médias Burundi 25 Jan reported increasing number of soldiers and ruling party youth wing (Imbonerakure) policing border with Rwanda (see Rwanda). 

Authorities intensified clampdown on main opposition party. Interior ministry 17 Jan sent letter to main opposition party, National Council for Freedom (CNL) – whose activities are currently suspended due to govt-orchestrated internal dispute – accusing it of collaborating with terrorist organisation and threatening “consequences”. Move came after CNL 2 Jan co-signed letter sent by platform of civil society and political groups to guarantors of 2003 Arusha agreement, urging them to support agreement’s continued application. 

In another important development. Former PM Alain-Guillaume Bunyoni 2 Jan reportedly lodged appeal after being sentenced late 2023 to life imprisonment on several charges including attempting to overthrow govt and threatening president’s life.

Cameroon

Govt continued military campaign to subdue independence-seeking Anglophone militias, while jihadists kept up attacks in Far North region. 

Security situation in Anglophone regions remained dire. Govt aircraft 10 Jan crashed in Kikaikelaki town, near Kumbo city, Bui division (North West region); exchange of fire followed between Anglophone separatist combatants and govt forces, with unknown casualties; military said aircraft suffered mechanical failure, while separatists claimed shooting it down. For first time since Dec 2019, govt 20 Jan said army 9 Jan killed separatist militia Ambazonia Defence Forces ground commander in clashes near Batibo town, Momo division (North West). Meanwhile, govt’s renewed attempt to crush weekly general strike called by separatists, dubbed “Monday ghost town”, ratcheted up tensions. Notably, separatists reportedly trying to enforce ghost town 15 Jan attacked police station and fired shots for hours in Nkwen neighbourhood of North West regional capital Bamenda. Fako Black Tar separatist militia overnight 29-30 Jan raided parts of South West regional capital Buea and killed at least two civilians, claiming residents did not comply with ghost town order. Separatist faction Interim Government of Ambazonia 29 Jan announced ending cooperation with UN agencies, putting humanitarian operations at risk. Biafra separatist militants from Nigeria 12 Jan reportedly attacked Cameroonian govt forces in Abana town, Bakassi Peninsula (South West).

Jihadist militants kept up attacks on military, civilians in Far North region. Boko Haram 1 Jan killed four Christians and abducted ten others celebrating New Year in Bargaram village, Logone-et-Chari division; in video posted online, militants vowed to avenge Palestinian victims of war in Gaza. Army 7-8 Jan repelled jihadist attack on military post in Zamga town and cleared three landmines near Djibrili town, both Mayo-Tsanaga division, while Boko Haram 20 Jan killed at least five civilians in two villages of Mayo-Tsanaga. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen 10 Jan abducted three staff members of international humanitarian organisation Première urgence in Yémé village, Mayo-Sava division. 

President Biya announced fuel price increase in bid to cut spending. In his end-of-year address, Biya 31 Dec announced further reduction of fuel subsidy in 2024; move could further increase cost of living and fuel popular discontent.

Central African Republic

Authorities appeared set to eliminate potential rivals before 2025 elections, while incidents involving explosive device attacks compounded already dire security situation. 

Authorities settled scores with potential dissidents and election rivals. Joint patrol of govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 3 Jan arrested mayor of Baboua, Caprang Ephraim, and commander of north west defence zone, Col Modoua, in Nana-Mambéré prefecture; detentions may be related to inter-ethnic disputes within military, particularly over control of mineral resources. Court in capital Bangui 17 Jan sentenced in absentia former National Assembly speaker, Karim Meckassoua, to life imprisonment on charges of endangering state security and colluding with Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) rebels. 

President Touadéra continued hazardous push to diversify security partners. Around 150 people from pro-Russian civil society platform Initiative Committee for the Control and Investigation of the U.S. Actions 25 Jan demonstrated in front of U.S. Embassy in Bangui to demand withdrawal of U.S.-based private security company Bancroft Global Development; protest came after presidency in Dec confirmed military cooperation agreement between govt and Bancroft. Wagner’s reaction could turn into something more worrisome if Touadéra is not able to share duties and benefits among security partners. 

Security situation marked by resurgence of explosive device attacks. Improvised explosive device (IED), possibly linked to armed group Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation (3R), 11 Jan killed three civilians and injured another in Bouar town (Nana-Mambéré prefecture). Another IED 15 Jan killed one UN peacekeeper and wounded another five in Mbindale village (Lim-Pendé prefecture). Meanwhile, Wagner elements 9 Jan attempted to shoot down unidentified object flying over their base in Ndélé town (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture); local authorities next day imposed curfew and arrested ten civilians. Violent clashes between armed actors took place in various regions. Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) combatants 7 Jan attacked Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG) ethnic militia in Obo town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture), resulting in at least three deaths. CPC elements 8 Jan attacked base hosting army and Wagner elements in Kabo town (Ouham-Fafa prefecture); fifteen rebels and four govt soldiers killed, and at least ten civilians wounded.

Chad

Transitional president maintained tight grip on power despite appointment of opposition leader as PM; authorities announced foiling destabilisation attempt, and pro-Sudanese armed forces hacking group targeted Chad

Opposition leader named PM, Deby endorsed as presidential candidate. Transitional President Gen Mahamat Déby 1 Jan appointed Succès Masra, founder of opposition party Les Transformateurs, as PM of transitional govt. Déby in following days asserted his authority, however. New govt formed 2 Jan kept key figures from previous govt while Masra secured only three ministries for his party. In likely bid to tighten control over Masra’s actions, Déby 8 Jan appointed Les Transformateurs defector, Moustapha Masri, as deputy head of his civilian cabinet. Ruling party Patriotic Salvation Movement of late President Idriss Déby 13 Jan nominated President Mahamat Déby as candidate for presidential election due to be held in Oct. 

Security situation remained precarious. Military 12 Jan announced foiling planned “insurrection” and arresting 80 armed officers, including alleged coordinator of insurrectional movement, Lt. Kouroumta Levana Guelemi; development might be related to interethnic struggles within national army. Almost 900 fighters from rebel coalition Union of Democratic Forces for Democracy 2 Jan gathered in Faya-Largeau city (Borkou province) with their president, Mahamat Nouri, to disarm as per 2022 Doha agreement, but govt’s inability to fund disarmament program could lead to tensions and further instability. Meanwhile, intercommunal conflicts continued in country’s centre and south; notably, clash between herders and farmers 6 Jan left one dead and unknown number injured in Abtouyour department (Guéra province). 

Cyberattack targeted Chad over stance on Sudan conflict. Pro-Sudanese armed forces hacking group, Anonymous Sudan, 10 Jan hit Chad’s internet infrastructure, causing hours-long internet blackout; group said attack was in retaliation for N’Djamena’s alleged support for paramilitary Rapid Support Force (RSF). Meanwhile, Chadian and Sudanese FMs 18 Jan met in Ugandan capital Kampala to discuss bilateral relations. 

In another important development. Déby 24 Jan met with Russian President Putin in Russia’s capital Moscow.

Comoros Islands

Post-election violence erupted as opposition contested President Assoumani’s re-election. 

Presidential election held 14 Jan despite boycott call by some opposition leaders accusing electoral commission of favouring ruling party. Electoral body 16 Jan declared incumbent President Azali Assoumani winner, giving him fourth five-year term. All five opposition candidates immediately cried foul, alleging ballot-stuffing and inconsistent results. Violent protests 17-18 Jan erupted in capital Moroni against Assoumani’s re-election; clashes between demonstrators and security forces left one person dead and at least 25 injured. Interior ministry 17 Jan imposed countrywide night-time curfew. Supreme Court 24 Jan confirmed Assoumani’s re-election.

Côte d’Ivoire

Main opposition party laid out plans for return to power in 2025, and govt affirmed American and Chinese diplomatic ties.

New PDCI leader promoted participatory and inclusive decision-making. Former Credit Suisse CEO, Tidjane Thiam, inaugurated 24 Jan as president of main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI); Thiam mapped out party’s strategy to return to power in 2025, vowing to promote participatory decision-making to strengthen PDCI’s internal democracy, while calling for reform of Independent Electoral Commission. After launching membership campaign, party early Jan reportedly recruited nearly 4,000 new members.

Relations remained strong with Washington. During visit to Côte d’Ivoire, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 23 Jan praised govt’s approach to security, notably making sure security forces understand “the needs, the concerns of communities”, as model for other countries. Earlier, Wall Street Journal newspaper 3 Jan reportedU.S. diplomats met with Ivorian officials to discuss possibility of setting up reconnaissance drone base in Côte d’Ivoire. 

In another important development. Govt 17 Jan also reaffirmed long-standing strategic partnership with China, as Chinese FM Wang Yi publicly thanked Abidjan for “firm support” on Taiwan issue.

Democratic Republic of Congo

President Tshisekedi inaugurated for new term as his coalition swept legislative and provincial elections; eastern provinces saw fierce M23 conflict and attacks on civilians by other groups. 

Tshisekedi sworn in as his coalition scored big in elections. Constitutional Court 9 Jan confirmed Tshisekedi’s victory in presidential election with 73% of vote, rejecting two legal challenges to provisional results. Tshisekedi sworn in 20 Jan after Moïse Katumbi and Martin Fayulu, second and third respectively in presidential contest, 18 Jan condemned decision but declined to call protests on inauguration day, citing security risks. Fayulu 20 Jan turned down Tshisekedi’s offer of official opposition spokesman position. Electoral commission (CENI) 14, 22 Jan published legislative and provincial election results, giving Tshisekedi’s coalition comfortable majorities. Earlier in month, CENI 5 Jan cancelled legislative and provincial elections results in two constituencies citing irregularities and disqualified 82 candidates for legislative, provincial and municipal elections over suspected fraud. 

M23 conflict persisted in North Kivu province. Pro-govt Wazalendo militia around 16 Jan clashed with M23 rebels on Karuba-Mushaki road in bid to capture Mushaki town (Masisi territory). After Wazalendo and army around 22 Jan launched offensive to take Mweso town (Masisi) from M23, bombing of civilian homes 25 Jan left at least nineteen dead. Fighting also reported in and around Sake town (Masisi), where bomb 27 Jan killed one civilian. Army drone strike 16 Jan killed two M23 commanders in Kitshanga town, which straddles Rutshuru and Masisi territories. Meanwhile, army 17 Jan claimed three Congolese soldiers killed or captured by Rwandan army previous day had crossed border “inadvertently” (see Rwanda). 

Other armed groups continued to wreak havoc in eastern provinces. In Ituri province, Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 8 and 12 Jan killed seven people in Irumu territory; 14 Jan killed eight in Mambasa territory. Group 23-30 Jan killed 26 in attacks across Beni territory (North Kivu). CODECO association of ethnic Lendu militias attacked Djugu territory settlements (Ituri), with eight people killed 1-2 Jan and three others 4 Jan. 

In another important development. Adam Chalwe, former leader of ex-president Joseph Kabila’s party, 6 Jan joined Alliance du Fleuve Congo, newly created politico-military group allied with M23.

Eritrea

President Isaias met with Somali counterpart amid heightened tensions over Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding.

Ethiopia and Somaliland 1 Jan signed memorandum of understanding that would allow Ethiopia to develop naval base along coast of Somaliland; Hargeisa said deal includes recognition of Somaliland’s independence, though Addis Ababa’s commitment to this step appears tentative (see Ethiopia, Somaliland). Announcement ratcheted up regional tensions. Mogadishu, which views Somaliland as part of Somalia’s territory, 2 Jan called agreement an “act of aggression” and began rallying regional allies in order to exert pressure on Addis Ababa to halt deal (see Somalia). Notably, Somali President Mohamud 8 Jan met with President Isaias in capital Asmara. Mohamud next day claimed Isaias supported “the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somalia”; Asmara issued no official statement but is widely expected to side with Mogadishu on issue amid deteriorating relations with Ethiopia. 

Ethiopia

Govt struck deal with Somaliland to secure Red Sea access, ratcheting up regional tensions; violence in Amhara and Oromia persisted; and Tigray’s humanitarian crisis mounted.

Tensions with Somalia spiked over Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia and Somaliland 1 Jan signed memorandum of understanding that would allow Ethiopia to develop naval base along Somaliland’s coast; Hargeisa said deal includes recognition of Somaliland’s independence, though Addis Ababa’s commitment to this step appears tentative. Announcement fuelled regional tensions. Mogadishu, which views Somaliland as part of Somalia’s territory, 2 Jan called agreement an “act of aggression” and rallied regional allies (see Somalia). African Union Peace and Security Council 17 Jan held emergency session, agreed to dispatch envoy to mediate. Regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 18 Jan called extraordinary meeting, Ethiopia did not attend but in leaked letter dated 22 Jan requested IGAD summit to discuss issue. Despite backlash, ruling Prosperity Party 26 Jan pledged to press ahead with deal.

Violence in Amhara region persisted. Military continued battling Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano. Notably, Fano militants 3 Jan entered North Shewa Zone’s administrative capital, Debre Berhan, assassinated head of zonal peace and security office before military next day ejected them. Fano 6 Jan attacked Gondar city, disrupting transport and business for two days. Ethiopian Air Force 12 Jan conducted drone strikes on Fano units near school in Merhabete Woreda (North Shewa Zone), killing two. State of emergency due to expire early Feb, even as military struggles to suppress rebellion.

Oromia insurgency continued. Insurgency in Oromia region pitting govt forces against Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) continued. Notably, security forces 12 Jan conducted drone strike in Horo Guduru Wollega Zone, killing four. OLA 28 Jan declared twenty-day ban on transport and business throughout region.

Humanitarian situation in Tigray region deteriorated further. Tigray interim administration’s (IRA) emergency task force 10 Jan said about 4.5mn people are at risk of famine, wrought by war-related economic destruction, drought and inadequate relief efforts; IRA 29 Jan said region is on brink of humanitarian catastrophe not seen since “infamous” 1984-1985 famine. Meanwhile, internally displaced persons in regional capital Mekelle 24 Jan protested slow implementation of Pretoria peace agreement. 

Guinea

Military govt granted pardon to alleged coup plotters, while international community voiced concern over media repression.  

Military officers pardoned of alleged coup attempt. Govt 2 Jan released video detailing coup attempt allegedly undertaken by two senior military officers at unclear date several months ago, which govt did not report at the time; pair admitted to attempting to overthrow transitional President Col. Doumbouya but were granted presidential pardon without official trial, amid lack of clarity over incident. 

Uncertainty around constitutional referendum persisted. Govt 23 Jan announced Doumbouya elevated to rank of general amid continuing doubts over domestic political future after he used 31 Dec New Year’s address to announce plans to hold constitutional referendum in 2024 as part of transition to civilian rule. Announcement came hours after deposed President Condé 31 Dec released video stating his intention to return to country and “re-establish democracy and constitutional order”. 

International community voiced concern over repressive govt tactics. After Dec crackdown on critical media, diplomats representing country’s most important partners in Conakry (including U.S., EU and China) 10 Jan expressed dissatisfaction with military govt’s restrictions on internet, social media and press; in response, govt in following days cited national security concerns and need to capture revenue generated by social media, while saying restrictions would end “very soon”. Media regulator, High Authority of Communication (HAC), 17 Jan suspended website Dépêche Guinée for nine months, and prohibited publishing director Abdoul Latif Diallo from “creating or providing his services to a news organisation” for six months. NGO Committee to Protect Journalists 31 Jan urged authorities to “immediately roll back the wave of censorship efforts unleashed on the press in recent months”.

Kenya

President Ruto threatened to defy courts, sparking fears of manipulation of judiciary, while sporadic attacks by Al-Shabaab, cattle-rustlers and criminal groups continued.

Ruto’s criticism of judiciary sparked concerns about independence of courts. President Ruto 2 Jan accused unnamed judges of “corruption” and working with opposition to impede govt’s policies, suggesting govt could defy judges’ orders; courts had put govt’s plans to raise taxes for projects including universal health coverage and affordable housing on hold citing unconstitutionality. Bar association Law Society of Kenya 12 Jan held countrywide protests denouncing attempt to intimidate judges. Chief Justice Martha Koome and Ruto 22 Jan met in Nairobi in bid to prevent further escalation; opposition leader Raila Odinga called meeting “irresponsible” accusing executive of holding judiciary “hostage”.

Al-Shabaab continued attacks near Somali border. Al-Shabaab 4 Jan attacked Kenyan military base in El-Waq town, just across border in Somalia’s Gedo region. Roadside bomb 15 Jan injured five police officers in Lafey town, Mandera county. Suspected Al-Shabaab explosive device 18 Jan killed police officer and injured four others near Bula Hawa border crossing in Mandera county.

Deadly cattle rustling and banditry persisted. Unidentified assailants 5 Jan killed three people attempting to retrieve stolen livestock in Elgeyo-Marakwet county. Suspected banditry attacks in Baringo county 8 Jan left three people dead on road from Marigat town to Chemoe village, and around 13 Jan killed another two people in Natan village.

In other important developments. Court 26 Jan blocked govt plan to deploy police to Haiti to lead UN-backed multinational mission, saying it was “unconstitutional, illegal and invalid” due to lack of “reciprocal arrangement” between Kenya and Haiti; govt same day vowed to appeal decision. Ruto 30 Jan said he would sort “paperwork” to push ahead with deployment.

Mali

Bamako announced withdrawal from West African regional bloc alongside Burkina Faso and Niger, dealing blow to regional integration; junta also ended 2015 Algiers Accord with separatist rebels.

Junta announced leaving ECOWAS, defying pressure to restore constitutional rule. Junta leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger 28 Jan announced leaving ECOWAS, denouncing “inhumane” sanctions imposed by regional bloc following coups. ECOWAS immediately said three countries were “important members of the Community” and bloc “remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the political impasse”; also said it had not yet received formal withdrawal notification.

Bamako terminated 2015 Algiers peace agreement, launched own peace initiative. Amid resumption of hostilities in northern Mali in recent months, coalition of 2015 Algiers Accord signatory armed groups, Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), 2 Jan rejected junta-proposed inter-Malian dialogue for peace and reconciliation, denouncing manoeuvre to definitively invalidate Algiers accord and sideline international mediation. Diplomatic spat with Algiers over Algeria’s mediation role persisted despite Algerian ambassador returning to Bamako 5 Jan and Malian ambassador returning to Algeria 7 Jan. Junta 25 Jan declared “immediate termination” of Algiers Accord, accusing Algeria of interfering in its affairs, and next day issued decree establishing committee to organise national peace and reconciliation dialogue.

State violence against civilians continued amid conflict with jihadist groups. In north, air force 5 Jan carried out drone strike against civilian vehicles in Almoustarat area, Gao region, killing three; govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 9 Jan burned several encampments for internally displaced persons in Tabagart village, Timbuktu region, and reportedly killed ten people after abducting them. In centre, army and Wagner group 2 Jan reportedly killed at least ten civilians on outskirts of Touara village, Ségou region. Explosive device likely planted by al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 5 Jan killed five civilians in Ogossagou village, Mopti region.

In another important development. FM Abdoulaye Diop 12 Jan said withdrawal of UN mission (MINUSMA) was nearly complete with 95% peacekeepers gone and all assets transferred to state. 

Mozambique

Jihadist attacks surged in northern Cabo Delgado province, undermining govt’s claim of return to stability. 

Islamic State-affiliated militants intensified attacks in Cabo Delgado. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) from late Dec until 20 Jan carried out at least fourteen attacks, primarily in Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia and Muidumbe districts, leading to dozens of deaths and kidnappings. Notably, ISMP attack 5 Jan killed at least four people in Chimbanga village, Mocímboa da Praia. UN 22 Jan said attacks in Macomia and Muidumbe 26 Dec-17 Jan displaced 5,343 people amid reports of food shortages. ISMP 21 Jan reportedly occupied strategic Mucojo village in Macomia district, marking first significant settlement held by ISMP since it was expelled from Mbau town (Mocímboa da Praia) in Aug 2021; Mozambican troops abandoned their position after receiving threats from militants, amid reports suggesting deteriorating relations between Mucojo residents and military after troops mid Jan killed three civilians. ISMP explicitly linked series of attacks to Islamic State’s central command’s 4 Jan call for global offensive and 30 Jan said “preaching trip” was under way in northern Mozambique.

Attacks undermined govt’s claim that ISMP no longer poses threat. Bishop of Pemba diocese 2 Jan warned of “attitude of complacency” over situation in Cabo Delgado, while Denis Hurley Peace Institute of Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference 17 Jan accused Rwandan and Mozambican troops of preventing people from fleeing Mocímboa da Praia. Surge in attacks also heightened concerns that withdrawal of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), due to be completed by July, may be premature. Meanwhile international commission, announced late Nov by president of Islamic Council of Mozambique, in Jan began work to promote talks between govt and insurgents in Cabo Delgado. 

Political fallout from contested municipal elections continued. Attorney General 9 Jan dismissed request from main opposition party RENAMO to suspend Constitutional Council ruling that validated results of Oct local elections. Divisions also emerged within RENAMO after spokesperson 4 Jan announced current leader Ossufo Momade will be candidate in presidential election due to be held in Oct; others in party wished to wait for vote at party congress.

Niger

Niamey announced withdrawal from West African regional bloc alongside Burkina Faso and Mali, dealing blow to regional integration; Niamey strengthened ties with Russia. 

Junta announced leaving ECOWAS, defying pressure to restore constitutional rule. Junta leaders of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso 28 Jan announced leaving ECOWAS, denouncing “inhumane” sanctions; move defies pressure to restore constitutional rule and deals blow to regional integration. ECOWAS immediately said three countries were “important members of the Community” and bloc “remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the political impasse”; also said it had not yet received formal withdrawal notification. Earlier in month, ECOWAS mediation led by Togo 8 Jan obtained release of deposed President Bazoum’s son, Salem Bazoum. ECOWAS delegation visit originally scheduled for 10 Jan and postponed to 25 Jan at Niamey’s request did not take place, as ECOWAS delegation reported “technical issues”.

Authorities kept severing ties with France and strengthening relations with Russia. France 2 Jan confirmed permanent closure of its embassy in Niamey citing “serious impediments making it impossible to carry out its missions”. Authorities 26 Jan reportedly sent home fifteen European training mission (EUCAP) staff and 26-27 Jan prevented their head of mission and at least five French nationals from entering country. After signature of military cooperation agreements with Russia in Dec, PM Zeine 16 Jan led delegation to Russian capital Moscow; both countries announced plans to enhance military cooperation.

Insecurity persisted in Tillabery region (south west). In Gotheye department, air force 5 Jan launched airstrikes on Garé Garé gold miners camp, Tiawa village, reportedly killing at least 30 jihadist militants and at least fifteen civilians; NGO Center for Civilians in Conflict 11 Jan called for “full, impartial, and transparent investigation”, reminded armed forces of their obligation to “never target civilians”. In Kollo department, suspected jihadist militants 11 Jan attacked gendarmerie post in Laoudou village, south of Niamey, killing two gendarmes and five civilians.

Nigeria

Islamic State affiliate claimed rare attack outside Lake Chad Basin; tide of kidnappings for ransom continued in and around Federal Capital Territory

Rare jihadist attack reported in central Nigeria amid continued violence in North East. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) claimed first attack outside Lake Chad Basin since April 2022 with 2 Jan killing of four Christians in Nasarawa state’s Karu area, about 15km from federal capital Abuja; group vowed to attack non-Muslims anywhere to avenge Palestinians killed in Gaza. Meanwhile in north-eastern Borno state, Boko Haram 1 Jan killed twelve people in Gartamawa village, Chibok area, and 8 Jan attacked Gajiram town in Nganzai area, burning six people to death; two commercial vehicles 9 Jan ran over landmines along Ngala-Dikwa road in Ngala area, with eight people dead.In neighbouring Yobe state, suspected jihadist militants 5 Jan killed several people and set church ablaze in Kwari village, Geidam area.

Surge in kidnappings for ransom continued in and around Abuja. FCT’s Commissioner for Public Complaints, Dalhatu Ezekiel, 15 Jan urged federal govt to declare state of emergency in Federal Capital Territory (FCT) amid spate of kidnappings for ransom, including 2 Jan abduction of man and his six daughters in Bwari area. Similar attacks also took place in adjoining states. Notably in Kaduna state, armed groups 2-7 Jan killed at least 21 people and kidnapped 143 others in three villages of Kauru area and near Katari town in Kachia area, along Abuja-Kaduna highway. Gunmen 16 Jan also abducted seventeen residents of Tafa area, Niger state.

Criminal groups continued attacks and abductions in North West. In Katsina state, armed group 14 Jan stormed military camp in Nahuta town, Batsari area, forcing troops to flee; toll unknown. In Zamfara state, kidnappings for ransom 9-10 Jan targeted state’s finance ministry official and senior university lecturer in state capital Gusau. 

North Central saw several incidents of herder-farmer violence. Notably, gunmen 22-23 Jan killed at least 50 villagers in Plateau state, prompting 24-hour curfew and calls for authorities to curb herder-farmer violence. Suspected herders 31 Jan raided village in Agatu area, Benue state, killing at least nine people and kidnapping others.

Rwanda

Three-way tussle with Burundi and DR Congo intensified as Gitega closed border with northern neighbour amid escalating rhetoric, while Rwandan army shot Congolese soldier dead. 

Burundi closed border with Rwanda as both sides escalated rhetoric. Burundian govt 11 Jan announced suspending relations and closing all borders with Rwanda over Kigali’s alleged support for RED-Tabara rebels; Rwandan govt immediately labelled move “unfortunate decision” that violates principles of East African Community regional bloc, which 12 Jan called for “peaceful settlement” of dispute. Burundian President Ndayishimiye 21 Jan said Rwandans are “prisoners of bad leaders”. Kigali next day denounced “inflammatory allegations aimed at sowing division among Rwandans”, and President Kagame 23 Jan vowed to “fight” to protect Rwanda. Burundian govt same day accused Rwanda of recruiting Burundian refugees in Rwanda to join RED-Tabara, and late Jan reportedly increased number of soldiers and ruling party youth wing (Imbonerakure) policing border with Rwanda (see Burundi). 

Tensions with DR Congo led to deadly border incident. Army 16 Jan announced capturing two Congolese soldiers after they crossed into Rwandan territory near Rubavu town, and shooting another dead as he tries to open fire on Rwandan forces; Congolese army next day claimed trio had crossed border “inadvertently” and said it had referred to Regional Joint Verification Mechanism for repatriation of soldier’s body and release of other two. Congolese President Tshisekedi 30 Jan reiterated claims that M23 rebels are backed by Rwanda, referred to Kigali as “aggressor” which “occupies a portion of our territory” (see DR Congo).

Senegal

Top opposition leadersuffered major setbacks in presidential bids. 

Supreme Court 5 Jan upheld defamation conviction against opposition leader Ousmane Sonko and Constitutional Council hours later rejected his presidential candidate application. Constitutional Council 20 Jan released final list of twenty candidates for presidential election due in Feb, not including Ousmane Sonko and other opposition heavyweight Karim Wade, son of former president Abdoulaye Wade. Sonko 28 Jan endorsed Bassirou Diomaye Faye, imprisoned secretary-general of Sonko’s dissolved PASTEF party, as replacement candidate and called for his release.

Sierra Leone

Fallout from alleged coup attempt continued. 

Govt 2 Jan announced treason charges against twelve people for suspected involvement in alleged coup attempt in Nov 2023, and next day said former President Ernest Bai Koroma had also been charged with treason. Govt 8 Jan indicted 27 military personnel and sacked 48 others in connection with incident. Court 17 Jan granted Bai Koroma permission to travel abroad for medical treatment.

Somalia

Mogadishu reacted furiously to Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal; absent de-escalation, diplomatic row could weaken anti-Al-Shabaab campaign and further undermine regional stability.

Diplomatic row erupted over Ethiopia’s sea access deal. Govt rejected Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement signed 1 Jan, which grants Ethiopia sea access for naval facility via Somaliland, and potentially paves way for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence (see Somaliland); Mogadishu 2 Jan denounced “act of aggression” violating Somalia’s sovereignty and recalled ambassador to Ethiopia for consultations. Thousands 3 Jan protested against agreement in capital Mogadishu, and President Mohamud 6 Jan signed bill nullifying deal. Govt mobilised support among international partners, with AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, EU, U.S. and others reiterating support for Somalia’s sovereignty. Mohamud also engaged regionally, travelling to Eritrea 8 Jan and to Qatar 22 Jan. Mogadishu 18 Jan rejected engagement with Ethiopia, saying “there is no space for mediation” until Addis Ababa retracts agreement. 

Operations against Al-Shabaab militants continued at slow pace. In Mudug region of Galmudug state (centre), security forces and Al-Shabaab 6 Jan clashed in Jeeh-jeeh area, and militants 24 Jan temporarily overran pro-govt clan militia position in Caad district. Airstrikes targeting militants in central states of Galmudug and Hirshabelle, including in Galhareeri 25 Jan, Cali Heyle 27 Jan, and Buq Aqable same day, showed govt’s reliance on international air support. Meanwhile, militants continued attacks, albeit at lower level; in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab 11 Jan killed UN security guard in mortar attack targeting airport compound, and 16 Jan killed four people in suicide attack near Banadir regional administration. Suspected Al-Shabaab combatants 10 Jan also kidnapped several UN contractors after their helicopter crashed in Galmudug. Potential rupture in Somalia-Ethiopia relations would have significant consequences on security operations, given Somalia’s cooperation with Ethiopia against Al-Shabaab.

Puntland election cycle concluded peacefully with President Deni’s re-election. Puntland President Said Deni 8 Jan won second five-year term in indirect election; opposition largely accepted result despite alleging manipulation in selection of MPs who took part in vote; legislators representing Dhulbahante community participated in elections after SSC-Khatumo (self-declared administration for Dhulbahante in territory also claimed by Somaliland) vowed not to in Dec. Vote concluded peacefully, offering parties opportunity to move on from divisive episode.

Somaliland

In move that could revive election-related dispute, President Bihi refused to sign electoral laws; govt announced plan to give landlocked Ethiopia commercial and military access to sea, sparking domestic opposition and ratcheting up regional tensions. 

Electoral tensions re-emerged. President Bihi 22 Jan returned recently-approved electoral laws back to House of Elders over alleged procedural flaws, instead of signing them into law. Move re-ignited tensions and suspicions among opposition that Bihi does not want to hold presidential election by year’s end. Notably, opposition party Waddani same day vowed to “respond strongly and take swift action”. 

Deal with Addis Ababa sparked diplomatic crisis. Govt and Ethiopia 1 Jan signed Memorandum of Understanding for Addis Ababa to lease 20km stretch of Somaliland’s coastline to establish naval base and commercial maritime services; Hargeisa claimed Ethiopia would in return acknowledge Somaliland as sovereign state, which would make Addis Ababa first capital to recognise its independence from Somalia, while Ethiopia said it would conduct “in depth-assessment” of its position on the matter. Somaliland and Ethiopia’s army chiefs 9 Jan met in Addis Ababa to discuss military cooperation. Deal, which came days after Bihi and Somalia President Mohamud agreed to resume Somalia-Somaliland dialogue, caused international consternation. Notably, Mogadishu 2 Jan denounced “act of aggression”, vowed to defend Somalia’s territorial integrity by “any legal means” (see Somalia).

Domestic opposition to deal also emerged, auguring difficult implementation. Opposition called for more transparency over agreement, with Waddani party in days after announcement pointing to significant discrepancies between Ethiopia and Somaliland’s accounts of deal. Communities in western Somaliland (where naval base may be located), who hold historical grievances over perceived marginalisation by Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan), 6 Jan held demonstrations against potential transfer of land to Ethiopia. Police 6 Jan detained three journalists holding debate about agreement at TV station in capital Hargeisa. Meanwhile, defence minister 7 Jan resigned in protest at agreement, saying Ethiopia remained “number one enemy” and having Ethiopian troops stationed in Somaliland would be inappropriate.  

In another important development. Lull in fighting between govt and Dhulbahante clan militias in Sool region persisted.

South Sudan

Calls to postpone elections rose, intercommunal violence escalated in Warrap state and Abyei administrative area, as well as Jonglei state, and Sudan’s war drew closer to South Sudan. 

Calls to delay 2024 elections rose amid lack of preparedness. More voices called for extension of transitional govt’s mandate due to inadequate time to organise credible elections. Notably, South Sudan Opposition Alliance MP David De Dau 2 Jan proposed five-year extension. During meeting with UN envoy Nicholas Haysom, opposition leader Riek Machar 11 Jan maintained that his party Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in Opposition (SPLA-IO) will participate in polls only if key prerequisites, including census, constitution and unification of forces, are in place. 

President Kiir expelled Nuer leader as violence escalated in Abyei. Fighting between Twik Dinka from Warrap state and Ngok Dinka from disputed Abyei region continued to escalate. President Kiir 10-11 Jan met local officials amid mounting pressure, 16 Jan ordered expulsion of Nuer spiritual leader Gai Maciek from Warrap for aggravating violence; Maciek refused to leave, 18 Jan attacked cattle camp in Mayom county, killing fifteen and stealing 800 cattle. Twic youth and Maciek’s forces 27-28 Jan carried out attacks in Abyei, killing over 50, including two UN peacekeepers. 

Jonglei saw stepped-up intercommunal violence; army and opposition clashed in Unity. In breach of Jonglei State’s 2021 peace agreement, armed Murle youth from Greater Pibor Administrative Area 4 Jan attacked Dinka cattle camp in Duk county, killing 24 Dinka and stealing 7,000 cattle; gunmen 15 Jan killed Duk county chief in Poktap town. With Dinka mobilising for possible revenge attack, peace dialogue among Murle, Dinka and Nuer communities is at risk. Meanwhile, army-SPLA-IO skirmishes in Unity State 29 Jan injured at least two.

Alleged alliance between rebel general and Sudan’s paramilitary raised concern. Advances by Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) brought war closer to border with South Sudan (see Sudan). Unity State commander William Manyang Mayak 10 Jan claimed rebel general Stephen Buay and hundreds of Nuer fighters had allied with RSF and were planning attacks on oilfields, prompting army to deploy along border; Buay 30 Jan denied claims. 

Sudan

Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advanced south into Sennar, White and Blue Nile states, and began consolidating power in Darfur region; RSF leader’s diplomatic tour continued.

RSF advanced south and began consolidating power in Darfur. Following RSF’s Dec advance toward central-eastern Sudan and subsequent capture of Gezira state capital, army early Jan began arming civilians in Gezira; RSF 18 Jan threatened to continue offensives into eastern Gedarif, Kassala and Port Sudan states if civilian recruitment continues. In south, RSF early Jan surrounded Sennar city, Sennar state, and advanced toward White and Blue Nile states, triggering formation of new militias that support army. Meanwhile, RSF stepped up efforts to form civil administration and security structures in parts of Darfur region it controls. Notably, in West Darfur state it appointed new governor and pursued peace deals with local actors; in North Darfur state, it worked to de-escalate tensions with Darfuri armed groups, most of whom are Juba Peace Agreement signatories, and forged alliances to bolster security presence in state capital El Fasher. 

Fighting fuelled ethnic conflict in Kordofan region. In South Kordofan state, RSF 8 Jan attacked army position around Dilling town, leading to skirmishes with rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (al-Hilu) due to group’s ethnic affiliation with army; confrontation turned into ethnic-based conflict between non-Arab Nubian SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and RSF-affiliated Misseriya and Hawazma Arab militias. In West Kordofan state’s Babanusa town, RSF-army clashes 22-24 Jan reportedly killed and injured dozens.

Army stepped up offensives. Army renewed aerial offensives in capital Khartoum, as well as South Darfur and Gezira states; 27 Jan launched ground attacks in Khartoum’s north and south east amid offensive in sister city Omdurman. Addressing troops in Kassala state, Burhan 30 Jan announced shift in strategy, directing army and allies to launch full-scale offensive against RSF.

RSF leader continued diplomatic engagement. RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” continued regional tour, 18 Jan attended Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in Uganda, prompting army 20 Jan to suspend Sudan’s membership in setback for IGAD mediation effort. Hemedti 2 Jan signed declaration with civilian coalition TAQADDUM, agreeing to ceasefire talks with army; army leader 5 Jan rejected declaration. 

Uganda

Human rights violations and repression of dissent continued, while govt kept up operations against Islamic State-affiliated rebels.

Civil society activists and opposition politicians remained under threat. Unidentified assailants 3 Jan stabbed prominent gay rights activist Steven Kabuye on outskirts of capital Kampala, leaving him in serious condition; fellow LGBTQ+ activists said homophobia and harassment have soared since draconian anti-LGBTQ law was enacted in May 2023. Police 18 Jan placed three opposition leaders under house arrest, including former presidential candidates Robert Kyagulanyi, alias ‘Bobi Wine’, and Kizza Besigye, ahead of planned protest demanding govt action to address deteriorating road conditions. In interview with French TV channel France 24 published 30 Jan, Wine called for “civil disobedience, a moral uprising, a revolution” against President Museveni.

Govt’s campaign against Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continued. Museveni 9 Jan called on Islamic State-affiliated ADF rebels based in DR Congo (DRC) to surrender, and military 20 Jan reported killing three ADF combatants and rescuing eight hostages in Irumu territory, Ituri province in eastern DRC

In another important development. Museveni 5 Jan appointed three former govt-aligned legislators to leadership roles at electoral commission. Amid outcry from opposition, Museveni 17 Jan backtracked on two of these appointments prior to parliamentary confirmation hearings. 

Zimbabwe

Opposition leader Nelson Chamisa left Citizens Coalition for Change, claiming party had been hijacked by ruling ZANU-PF; economic climate drove migration. 

Widening rift between rival factions of main opposition party led to its implosion. Self-proclaimed secretary-general of main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), Sengezo Tshabangu – who triggered series of by-elections by recalling CCC elected officials – 15 Jan announced interim party leadership structure, challenging CCC president Nelson Chamisa’s hold on party. High Court 19 Jan ruled recalled CCC MPs and municipal councillors could not be candidates in next by-elections for six parliamentary seats due to be held 3 Feb. Chamisa 22 Jan accused unnamed members of CCC of “selling out”, and 25 Jan announced leaving “hijacked” party, reiterating Tshabangu’s rise is part of ploy by ruling party ZANU-PF party to infiltrate and divide CCC, and ultimately regain two-thirds majority in parliament. Meanwhile, court 30 Jan gave former opposition MP Job Sikhala two-year suspended sentence for allegedly inciting violence, but released him on bail after almost 600 days in pre-trial detention.

Gloomy economic outlook drove migration. Hike in passport application fees, effective 1 Jan, sparked rush for passports with long queues reported late Dec outside Harare’s passport office. Govt’s move is part of attempt to stem surge in migration amid lack of formal jobs and low prospects of economic recovery; govt data from 2022 reported 900,000 Zimbabwean emigrants, though number likely an undercount. 

Asia

Afghanistan

Islamic State’s local branch launched multiple attacks across country and in neighbouring Iran, while Taliban authorities made first arrest under draconian 2022 decree on women’s dress. 

After short pause, Islamic State resumed deadly attacks. In its first attack of 2024 following pause since mid Nov 2023, Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) 4 Jan beheaded Taliban member in Kunar province (north east). IS-KP 6 Jan conducted explosive strike in capital Kabul’s Dasht-e Barchi district, which killed two and injured over a dozen. Suicide explosion 14 Jan rocked office of provincial governor in Nimruz province (south west), killing three security guards; although unclaimed, it also bore hallmarks of IS-KP. Relatedly, IS-KP claimed twin bombings in Iran’s Kerman city that killed scores (see Iran). 

Taliban enforced conservative dress rules on women. Reports 2 Jan surfaced that Taliban authorities had arrested women in Kabul for violating religious hijab-wearing rules, marking first reported arrest for such violation since May 2022 decree enforcing rules; Taliban officials claimed women were detained and released on bail after male relatives had been informed. Meanwhile, crackdown on political space continued: reports indicated that Taliban authorities had arrested over dozen Hizb-ut-Tahrir members in Takhar province (north) as part of broader crackdown on group. 

Pakistan and Afghanistan took steps to repair ties, but bilateral tensions remained. Acting Deputy Defence Minister Shirin Akhund 3 Jan visited Pakistan for meetings with senior Pakistani officials. Pakistani politician Fazal-ur-Rehman 7 Jan visited Kabul; unconfirmed reports claimed Rehman was granted audience with Taliban emir, making him only the second foreign dignitary to meet Taliban leader in recent years. Talks followed months of tension between two countries over anti-Pakistan militants growing active in borderlands, but issue remains unresolved. 

Norway and UK engaged diplomatically with Taliban. Norway’s Chargé d’Affaires to Afghanistan Paul Klouman Bekken 9 Jan met Taliban’s Deputy FM for Political Affairs Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai. UK’s Chargé d’Affaires to Afghanistan Robert Dickson 12 Jan met Stanekzai; Dickson stated bilateral “engagement will be further enhanced in the future”.

Bangladesh

Ruling Awami League won fourth consecutive election marred by low turnout and boycott by main opposition party, while insecurity and hardship continued in Rohingya refugee camps. 

Awami League secured massive majority in largely uncontested election. Awami League 7 Jan secured 222 of 300 elected seats in national parliament, awarding PM Sheikh Hasina another five-year term that marks her fourth consecutive and fifth overall election victory; Awami League members who ran as “independent” won additional 61 seats. Poll, however, was uncompetitive as main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) boycotted vote following arrest of most of its party leaders since Oct. Officials claimed turnout was 42%, although many suspected real figure was as low as 28%. Voting on 7 Jan passed without major incident, although violence occurred between supporters of official Awami League candidates and those standing as independents. Potential arson on train in capital Dhaka 5 Jan killed four, which govt blamed on BNP, while police arrested Awami League youth leader after he 15 Jan allegedly hacked to death BNP supporter in Mymensingh city. After vote, U.S., UK and Canada said poll fell short of democratic standards, while India, China and Russia enthusiastically supported its outcome; threat of U.S. sanctions appeared to recede. Hasina now faces challenge of navigating crisis of declining foreign currency reserves and high inflation. While election marks major blow to BNP, party announced plans to hold “black flag” processions countrywide on 30 Jan to coincide with first session of new parliament; although party was able to reopen head office in Dhaka, Hasina before poll hinted at further crackdowns, including possible deregistration of party. 

Insecurity and hardship continued in Rohingya refugee camps. Newly-appointed FM Hasan Mahmud 14 Jan signalled support for proposed repatriation pilot project to return 3,000 refugees to Myanmar’s Rakhine state; heavy fighting in Rakhine, however, cast doubt over returns (see Myanmar). Meanwhile, police said armed and criminal violence 4-16 Jan killed four refugees. UN 23 Jan reported at least 569 Rohingya dead or missing in attempts to flee Bangladesh/Myanmar in 2023, highest toll since 2014. Following election, national newspapers displayed growing anti-Rohingya sentiment.

China/Japan

China maintained naval activity in East China Sea, while Japan strengthened defence posture amid regional threats. 

Beijing continued maritime presence. As of 28 Jan, Japan spotted 105 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone, with six vessels detected in Japan’s territorial sea. Japan’s Coast Guard 11 Jan urged four Chinese vessels to leave its territorial waters, which marked first time Chinese coast guard ships entered such waters since 18 Dec. Japanese, South Korean and U.S. navies 16 Jan held three-day trilateral maritime exercise off South Korea’s Jeju Island to bolster regional security. 

Tokyo continued military build-up. Tokyo late Dec approved record increase in defence spending for 2024, accelerating deployment of long-range cruise missiles, amid perceived regional threats. Japan 18 Jan signed deal with U.S. to purchase up to 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Japan late Dec revised arms export guidelines to enable Patriot missile systems to be delivered to U.S. for onward transfer to Ukraine, prompting Russia to warn move could have “grave consequences” for bilateral relations.

India

Ethnic conflict in Manipur state in north east showed no sign of ending, security forces stepped up anti-Maoist operations in centre, and regional competition with China came into focus amid ongoing border dispute. 

Deadly attacks persisted in Manipur. Authorities 11 Jan recovered bodies of three people from Meitei community after four went missing previous day. Gunfight on border of Imphal West and Kangpokpi districts 17 Jan killed Meitei village volunteer; Meiteis 20-22 Jan held strike in protest. Armed assailants 17 Jan killed two police personnel in Moreh district, forcing state govt to ask central govt to send helicopters. Mob 17 Jan tried to attack police headquarters in Thoubal district, with three security forces personnel wounded from gunfire. Unidentified gunmen 18 Jan killed three Meitei men on Bishnupur-Churachandpur district border. Gunfight between armed Meiteis and Kuki tribals 27 Jan killed Kuki village defence volunteer in Kangkokpi district. Army chief 11 Jan said insurgent groups operating in Myanmar were seeking to cross into India to set up bases. 

Chhattisgarh state (centre) witnessed uptick in anti-Maoist operations. Shootout between Maoists and security forces 1 Jan killed six-month-old baby and injured mother in Bijapur district. Security forces 12 Jan killed Maoist commander in Bijapur. Security forces 20 Jan killed three Maoists, including two women, in Bijapur. Clashes 30 Jan killed three paramilitary soldiers. In state capital Raipur, Home Minister Amit Shah 21 Jan urged security forces to eradicate Maoism within three years. In Jharkland state (east), suspected Maoists 8 Jan set ablaze several vehicles near mine in Gumla district. 

Amid border dispute, strategic competition with China heightened in Indian Ocean. Army chief 11 Jan described situation along disputed “Line of Actual Control” as “stable but sensitive”, saying priority was to continue talks with Beijing and return to state quo ante before 2020 clashes. Indian media 14 Jan reported that Indian and Chinese forces had clashed on two occasions in 2022, which were previously undisclosed. In sign of strategic competition spilling into region, Maldives President Muizzu’s staff 14 Jan reaffirmed decision that Indian military personnel must leave country by 15 March; move followed Muizzu’s five-day state visit to China 7 Jan, where pair agreed to elevate ties.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Militant activity remained at low ebb in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), while mandate of grassroots body of representatives expired as new regional elections remained in doubt. 

Militant attacks and security operations remained at low ebb due to winter. Security forces and militants 3 Jan engaged in gun battle in Kulgam district. Security forces 4 Jan arrested Hizbul Mujahideen militant from New Delhi. Security forces 5 Jan killed alleged Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militant in Shopian district. Authorities 21 Jan arrested juvenile harbouring militants. During annual press conference, India’s army chief 11 Jan claimed “increase in terrorism” in last five-six months in J&K’s Rajouri and Poonch districts, describing it as “one area our adversaries have been active in”; he claimed security forces killed 45 militants in last three years in area, while militants killed seven soldiers in Kashmir valley and twenty in Rajouri-Poonch area in same period. Security forces 27 Jan busted module of cross-border arms smuggling and arrested five militant associates in Kupwara district. 

Terms of grassroots political representatives expired. Mandate of 28,000 grassroots representatives elected in 2018 to first-ever three-tier system of representation in J&K officially ended on 9 Jan after completion of five-year term, bringing end to last semblance of political representation in region; calls continued for regional assembly election to be held this year, last of which was held in 2014, but no date has been set. 

Govt banned two separatist organisations. Ministry of Home Affairs 27 Dec declared Muslim League Jammu Kashmir “an unlawful association” for five years under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, accusing it of seeking to establish “Islamic rule in J&K”. Ministry 31 Dec declared Tehreek-e-Hurriyat unlawful for five years under same law, alleging “terror activities to fuel secessionism in J&K”. 

In other important developments. India’s Border Security Force 20 Jan seized consignment of arms and ammunition smuggled by drone, allegedly from Pakistan, in Punjab district. India 13 Jan protested UK High Commissioner to Islamabad’s visit to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, asserting “such infringement of India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is unacceptable”. Pakistan’s FM 25 Jan claimed “credible evidence” of links between Indian agents and 2023 killings of two Pakistanis in Pakistan; India rejected allegation.

Korean Peninsula

Inter-Korean tensions escalated after North Korea fired artillery near South Korean island and formally dropped goal of unification, signalling Pyongyang’s intention to stoke tensions on peninsula in 2024. 

North and South Korea exchanged fire at sea, raising risk of major crisis. North Korea starting 5 Jan fired more than 200 rounds of artillery shells into seas around South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. In response, South Korea same day launched more than 400 artillery shells into same waters, having ordered civilians to seek shelter on island. Incident follows collapse in Nov 2023 of agreement reached at Sept 2018 inter-Korean summit, which had prohibited artillery fire in area, and may indicate North Korea’s intention to drastically raise tensions by manufacturing conditions for deadly clash in West Sea – scene of past deadly maritime escalations. 

North Korean leader took aim at reunification. Leader Kim Jong Un 15 Jan announced that Supreme People’s Assembly “newly legalised the policy of [North Korea] toward the south on the basis of putting an end to the nearly 80 year-long history of inter-Korean relations and recognising the two states both existing on the Korean peninsula”; Kim also called for reinforcement of land border with south, dissolved institutions dealing with inter-Korean relations, and urged constitutional revision to eliminate references such as “northern half” of peninsula. Moves mark most assertive measures against South Korea in recent years, likely aimed at countering Seoul’s soft power, exerting pressure on U.S. and south in election year and diminishing public resistance to war; steps nonetheless are reversible and align with Kim’s framework for reunification through federation – one state under two systems.

Pyongyang conducted weapons testing. 14 Jan tested solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate range and 19 Jan conducted test of nuclear-capable underwater attack drone. North Korea 24, 28 and 30 Jan test fired cruise missiles into waters off western coast. 

Russia and North Korea continued engagement. North Korean FM Choe Son Hui 16 Jan met Russian President Putin in Russian capital Moscow in bid to "strengthen strategic and tactical cooperation". UK 22 Jan presented fresh evidence to UN indicating transfer of North Korean weapons to Russia for Ukraine war.

Myanmar

Regime remained on backfoot as ethnic armed groups in north expanded control before agreeing to another tenuous ceasefire, while Arakan Army made major gains in west; regime extended state of emergency for six months. 

Three Brotherhood Alliance seized territory in Shan State before partial ceasefire. After collapse of China-brokered peace talks on 23 Dec, heavy clashes continued between Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – member of Three Brotherhood Alliance – and regime in Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Shan State, where MNDAA seized full control of Laukkai town as 2,400 soldiers 3 Jan surrendered. Brotherhood Alliance 6 Jan attacked Hopang and Pan Lone towns in regime-controlled part of Wa Self-Administered Division. Concurrently, Brotherhood member Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) clashed heavily with regime forces in bid to solidify its control in northern Shan State, capturing Kutkai town on 7 Jan; TNLA consolidated its position around Lashio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw towns. Following third round of China-brokered talks, regime and Brotherhood Alliance 11 Jan agreed to ceasefire in northern Shan State; TNLA, however, 13 Jan accused regime of launching airstrikes in Kyaukme and Mogoke townships. 

Arakan Army (AA) broadened its offensive in Rakhine. With 11 Jan ceasefire not applying to Rakhine theatre, AA (member of alliance) 15 Jan captured all of Paletwa township and detained regime brigadier-general before expanding operations further south, forcing battalion of regime soldiers to surrender in Minbya on 17 Jan, and seizing Pauktaw town, close to state capital Sittwe, on 24 Jan. 

Hostilities persisted in Kachin and Kayah states. After Kachin Independence Army (KIA) mid Dec captured two outposts in Kachin State from military and allied militia forces, KIA 3 Jan shot down regime Mi-17 transport helicopter near Laiza, killing six crew members. In Kayah, Karenni Nationalities Defence Force and other allied groups claimed to control more than 80% of state capital Loikaw. 

Regime extended state of emergency. Despite devastating battlefield losses and unprecedented nationalist criticism of regime leader Min Aung Hlaing, regime showed little sign of panic: Min Aung Hlaing 4 Jan announced plans to hold national census to improve voter list for general election. On eve of third anniversary of coup, regime 31 Jan extended state of emergency for six months.

Pakistan

Iran and Pakistan launched tit-for-tat cross-border strikes on alleged insurgents, militants continued deadly attacks in provinces along Afghan border and country prepared for 8 Feb general election. 

Iran launched cross-border strikes, prompting Pakistani retaliation. Dispute erupted after Iran 16 Jan launched cross-border strikes on village in Balochistan’s Panjgur district, claiming to target “strongholds” of Jaish al-Adl – anti-Iranian Baloch militant group. Pakistan claimed strike killed two children and recalled its ambassador in Tehran. Pakistan 18 Jan launched strikes on village near Iranian border city of Saravan, claiming to target Pakistani Baloch militants. De-escalating crisis, Tehran and Islamabad 29 Jan struck agreement on FM-level coordination mechanism and stationing military liaison officers at border. 

Militant attacks continued in provinces bordering Afghanistan, including on election candidates. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants 9 Jan killed six police constables and injured 28 in Bajaur district; militants next day shot dead three constables in Kohat district. Assailants 10 Jan shot dead election candidate in North Warizistan district. In Balochistan province, bomb 13 Jan killed five soldiers in Kech district. In Turbat town, assailants 25 Jan killed police constable in attack on election official’s office. Baloch militants 30 Jan killed four security personnel and two civilians in Mach city. Meanwhile, Interior Ministry 2 Jan said over 500,000 Afghans had been “repatriated” under ongoing forcible deportation drive. Head of Deobandi party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam –Fazl (JUI-F) 8 Jan met senior Afghan Taliban officials and, reportedly, the Emir (see Afghanistan). 

Opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) faced setbacks ahead of 8 Feb elections. After former PM Imran Khan 26 Dec appealed to Supreme Court in bid to remove ban from public office ahead of polls, Khan’s main competitor Nawaz Sharif 8 Jan overcame last legal hurdle to contest polls after Supreme Court overturned lifetime ban. Supreme Court 13 Jan upheld Election Commission ruling that denied PTI its recognisable election symbol; PTI candidates will now contest election as independents. In further blow to PTI, special court 30 Jan sentenced Khan to ten years imprisonment in diplomatic cable case; Khan’s lawyers lodged appeal. In third conviction, court 31 Jan sentenced Khan to fourteen years imprisonment for illegally selling state gifts.

Papua New Guinea

Protests over surprise public sector wage cut sparked widespread rioting, killing at least 22 and forcing govt to declare state of emergency. 

Following unannounced docking of paycheques, which govt blamed on computer glitch, police and other civil servants 10 Jan declared strike and staged protest outside parliament in capital Port Moresby. Rioting and looting erupted throughout Port Moresby and Lae city, which observers blamed on opportunistic residents of poorer suburbs exploiting absence of police; unrest reportedly left 22 dead and caused extensive property damage. PM James Marape same day called in military and next day declared fourteen-day state of emergency, while suspending chief of police, who was reinstated 26 Jan. Marape 19 Jan announced cabinet reshuffle, facing prospect of no-confidence vote in Feb. Telecommunications Minister Timothy Masiu same day threatened social media shutdown over widespread misinformation around riots.

Philippines

Clan violence, rebel infighting and security operations continued in south, while security forces battled Communist insurgents.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). During reconciliation ceremony between members of Sinsuat clan in Cotabato city, shootout 3 Jan erupted between escorts of two prominent clan politicians. Bangsamoro regional police 15 Jan deployed personnel of elite Special Action Force in three towns in Lanao del Sur province and its provincial capital Marawi city to help local officials guard against clan wars and protect constituents from local terrorists. In Maguindanao del Sur province, armed men associated with Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) 105 and 106 Base Command 19 Jan clashed in Kulambog village, motivated by political rivalry. Security forces 26 Jan launched operations against jihadist group Daulah Islamiya in Lanao del Sur, killing nine militants – including two alleged suspects linked to deadly bombing in Marawi in Dec – and leaving four soldiers wounded. 

Clashes persisted between Communist rebels and military. Clashes between govt forces and Communists in Luzon Island (Sorsogon) in north, Mindanao Island (Agusan del Norte) in south and Visayas Islands (Negros and Samar) in centre killed at least nine combatants and civilians.

South China Sea

Amid mounting tensions, China and Philippines struck deal to improve maritime communication, while Manila sought to deepen military ties with Western partners. 

Beijing and Manila brokered communication agreement. China’s military 3 Jan launched two-day routine patrol in SCS, concurrently as USS Carl Vinson began drills with Philippine navy; Philippines military 4 Jan reported two Chinese navy vessels shadowed Philippine and U.S. ships. Philippine Coast Guard revealed video purportedly showing China’s Coast Guard harassing Philippine fishermen near Scarborough Shoal on 12 Jan; 27 Chinese maritime militia ships were spotted near Scarborough Shoal on 21 Jan. In rare move by regional leader, Philippines’ President Marcos Jr. 15 Jan congratulated winner of Taiwan’s presidential election and expressed hope for cooperation (see Taiwan Strait); China next day summoned Philippine ambassador, warned Manila “not to play with fire”. Philippine military chief 15 Jan announced intention to develop islands and reefs in SCS to make them habitable for troops, including enhanced provisions for troops stationed at grounded warship on Second Thomas Shoal. Philippine Defence Secretary Teodoro Jr. 17 Jan announced country was planning “more robust” military activities with U.S. and its allies in face of “more aggressive” China. In positive step, Manila and Beijing 19 Jan brokered agreement to enhance maritime communication in SCS, aiming to defuse tensions and manage differences around contested areas. 

Philippines deepened defence ties with Western partners. Philippines 11 Jan signed defence agreement with UK that could expedite Manila’s military modernisation through access to UK’s advanced weapons systems. German FM Annalena Baerbock 13 Jan met Marcos Jr. and FM Enrique Manalo and pledged €129mn assistance to coast guard, including additional drones for SCS operations; Baerbock expressed concern over China’s SCS activities. Philippines and Canada 19 Jan signed memorandum of understanding to enhance defence cooperation. 

Disputes between China and Vietnam came into focus. U.S.-based research organisation early Jan reported presence of Chinese coast guard ship 5901 near Vietnam’s oil exploration blocks at Vanguard Bank in SCS since early Dec. Vietnam 20 Jan asserted its claim over Paracel and Spratly Islands, prompting China 24 Jan to reiterate its own claims. Philippines and Vietnam 30 Jan agreed coast guard cooperation pact in SCS.

Sri Lanka

Govt began 2024 with raft of legislation to expand powers of surveillance and repression and advance its contested reconciliation agenda, while police crackdown on drugs led to tens of thousands of arrests. 

Govt moved to retain and expand surveillance powers. Parliament 24 Jan passed govt’s Online Safety Bill, despite uncertainty whether it included amendments required by earlier Supreme Court review; civil society and opposition parties criticised expansive powers law would afford state to regulate speech on social media, as opposition lawmaker labelled it “threat to our democracy”. Global tech and social media companies 16 Jan urged govt to withdraw bill. Govt 10 Jan presented to parliament proposed Anti-Terrorism Act, which was only modestly changed from version first introduced in early 2023 that was roundly criticised; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 19 Jan criticised new draft, while bill’s constitutionality was challenged in numerous Supreme Court petitions.

Govt sought to advance its reconciliation program amid opposition. Govt 1 Jan publicised text of legislation to establish Commission for Truth, Unity and Reconciliation amid near unanimous opposition from survivors’ groups and rights activists who view it as designed to win support at UN Human Rights Council. Parliament 9 Jan passed legislation to establish eleven-member “Office for National Unity and Reconciliation” despite opposition from most Tamil parliamentarians and many civil society groups. Police 4 Jan arrested and detained for eight days prominent Tamil woman campaigner seeking truth about enforced disappearance of her son, following protest against President Wickremesinghe’s visit to northern town of Vavuniya. 

Police faced criticism for heavy-handed drug crackdown. Public Security Minister Tiran Alles continued to champion police operation which to date has led to arrest of over 40,000 suspected of using or selling drugs and detention in prison or “rehabilitation” centres of more than 3,000; while popular among some parts of public, OHCHR 12 Jan criticised “heavily security-based response to country’s drug problem”. 

International creditors recognised economic progress. International Monetary Fund officials 19 Jan stated reforms had produced first signs of recovery but stressed importance of “sustaining the reform momentum”.

Taiwan Strait

Taiwan’s incumbent party won unprecedented third presidential term, as China downplayed result and refrained from significantly intensifying military activity around island.

Democratic Progress Party (DPP) won presidential election. Taiwan’s incumbent DPP secured historic third term in 13 Jan presidential poll, which elected William Lai as new president having emerged with 40% of vote; DPP, however, did not secure majority in Legislative Yuan as it won only 51 seats, while opposition Kuomintang won 52, likely reflecting voters’ frustration over domestic issues. In response, China same day dismissively stated election result “does not represent mainstream opinion in Taiwan” and reiterated commitment to complete national unification. Taiwan’s senior representative in U.S. 19 Jan described status quo as “neither unification, neither independence”; Chinese embassy 23 Jan responded that “independence forces are trying to stoke confrontation and antagonism”. 

China maintained military activity in Taiwan Strait. As of 29 Jan, Taiwan detected 318 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which 89 either crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected inside Taiwan’s air defence identification zone – approximately on par with activity in Dec; notably, over thirteen planes 27 Jan crossed “median line”. Taiwan spotted 132 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Taiwan reported significant increase in balloons from China crossing “median line”, tallying at least 22 in Jan compared to seven in Dec. Taiwan’s Defence Ministry 9 Jan issued nationwide emergency alert after China launched satellite which passed through Taiwan’s airspace. USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier 11 Jan deployed east of Taiwan; USS John Finn destroyer 24 Jan transited Taiwan Strait. 

U.S. maintained diplomatic support; Nauru severed ties with Taiwan. Senior U.S. delegation 14 Jan met with political leaders in Taiwan, expressing concern about stability in strait. U.S. House of Representatives 12 Jan passed “Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act of 2023” and “PROTECT Taiwan Act” aimed at advocating Taiwan’s membership of International Monetary Fund and countering Beijing’s efforts to exclude island from financial institutions. Meanwhile, Pacific nation Nauru 15 Jan severed ties and aligned with China, leaving Taiwan with just twelve states recognising it; Pacific island Tuvalu late Jan signalled it would review ties with Taiwan after its own election.

Thailand

Constitutional Court ruled Move Forward Party’s lèse-majesté stance unconstitutional, Court of Appeals handed activist 50-year prison sentence, and govt signalled talks with main southern separatist group may resume in Feb. 

Constitutional Court ruled on cases concerning future of Move Forward Party. After stunning victory in May 2023 general election, Move Forward Party’s leader Pita Limjareonrat was suspended from MP duties due to allegations he broke election law by holding shares in media company during election campaign. Constitutional Court 24 Jan ruled Pita did not violate election regulations. Constitutional Court 31 Jan ruled that Move Forward Party’s efforts to amend Section 112 of Criminal Code – the lèse-majesté law – violate constitution and must cease; verdict will likely trigger legal proceedings to dissolve party. 

Court sentenced activist to 50 years for lèse-majesté conviction. Court of Appeals in Chiang Rai 18 Jan found Mongkol “Busbas” Thirakot, a 30-year-old activist, guilty of eleven counts of lèse-majesté associated with 27 Facebook posts, for which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment on each count, which combined with earlier convictions marked record sentence of 50 years. Bangkok criminal court 17 Jan convicted attorney Arnon Nampa of lèse-majesté for three Facebook posts from Jan 2021, sentencing him to four years imprisonment. 

Govt signalled potential return to southern dialogue amid militant attacks. Deputy PM Somsak Thepsuthin 10 Jan met with Malaysia’s General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, facilitator of peace dialogue with main southern separatist armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional; talks have been in abeyance for almost one year but govt’s chief negotiator said he expected talks to resume in Feb. Meanwhile, four motorcycle-borne militants 10 Jan opened fire on Border Patrol Police (BPP) vehicle in Bannang Sata district, Yala province, injuring two officers. Militants next day ambushed BPP vehicle in Rueso district, Narathiwat province, killing lieutenant. IED attack 16 Jan damaged BPP vehicle in Sri Sakhon district, Narathiwat province, but caused no injuries.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Baku and Yerevan continued bilateral work on peace treaty, but internationally mediated talks remained on hold. 

Baku and Yerevan exchanged draft peace treaty amid simmering tensions. Bilateral efforts on Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty continued, with Yerevan 4 Jan returning draft proposal to Baku. In interview that nearly derailed efforts, however, Azerbaijani President Aliyev 10 Jan said Baku could cease participation in talks should Yerevan refuse to compromise, notably regarding security measures along border; he also reiterated calls for Russian-supervised corridor connecting mainland with exclave Nakhchivan, threatened military action if Armenia continued to procure weapons or ever sought to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh (see Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict) and claimed “all of Zangezur” – alluding to southern Armenia – and other areas were historically Azerbaijani territory. PM Pashinyan 13 Jan decried “unacceptable territorial claims” but later softened stance, while EU 22 Jan threatened “severe consequences” if Armenia’s territorial integrity is violated. Sides 31 Jan held fresh talks on border delimitation but provided no details on what was discussed. 

Baku continued to reject foreign mediation as Russia sought greater role. Senior EU and U.S. officials mid Jan travelled to capital Yerevan for talks, but not to Azerbaijan amid speculation in Azerbaijani media about cooling relations with West over Baku’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh (see Azerbaijan). Russia, meanwhile, sought to reassert its dominant role in region. Notably, ruling party 16 Jan confirmed partial delivery of Russian weaponry to Armenia after two-year delay; Russian FM Lavrov 18 Jan touted Russian mediation in 2023, blamed West for acting as spoiler. 

In another important development. PM Pashinyan and his Georgian counterpart 26 Jan signed memorandum on “strategic partnership” in Georgia’s capital Tbilisi.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh formally ceased to exist. 

Nagorno-Karabakh formally dissolved. Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) 1 Jan officially ceased to exist following Azerbaijan’s lightning military operation in Sept 2023 that ended three decades of de facto self-rule. In lengthy interview about conflict with Armenia (see Armenia, Azerbaijan), Azerbaijani President Aliyev 10 Jan threatened military action if Yerevan ever sought to reclaim enclave; he also announced govt’s goal is to return 140,000 Azerbaijani internally displaced people “to their ancestral lands by the end of 2026” and reiterated that “the Armenians of Karabakh… would live as Azerbaijani citizens” should they choose to return to region. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan 25 Jan extended pre-trial detention of fifteen members of former de facto authorities. 

France-Azerbaijan tensions persisted over latter’s Sept military operation. French Senate 17 Jan adopted non-binding resolution calling on govt to condemn Azerbaijan’s military takeover of NK and impose sanctions, and to demand guarantees for right of ethnic Armenian population to return to NK; Azerbaijan’s legislature next day responded with similar calls to impose sanctions on France. Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe 24 Jan did not ratify credentials of Azerbaijani delegation, citing among other things concern about Baku’s Sept 2023 military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, “which led to allegations of ‘ethnic cleansing’”.

Azerbaijan

Baku and Yerevan continued bilateral work on peace treaty, but internationally mediated talks remained on hold; tensions with EU rose ahead of 7 February presidential election. 

Baku and Yerevan exchanged draft peace treaty amid simmering tensions. Bilateral efforts on Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty continued, with Yerevan 4 Jan returning draft proposal to Baku. In interview that nearly derailed efforts, however, President Aliyev 10 Jan said Baku could cease participation in talks should Yerevan refuse to compromise, notably regarding security measures along border; he also reiterated calls for Russian-supervised corridor connecting mainland with exclave Nakhchivan, threatened military action if Armenia continued to procure weapons or ever sought to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh (see Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict) and claimed “all of Zangezur” – alluding to southern Armenia – and other areas were historically Azerbaijani territory. Armenian PM Pashinyan 13 Jan decried “unacceptable territorial claims” but later softened stance, while EU 22 Jan threatened “severe consequences” if Armenia’s territorial integrity is violated. Sides 31 Jan held fresh talks on border delimitation but provided no details on what was discussed. 

Baku continued to reject foreign mediation as Russia sought greater role. Senior EU and U.S. officials mid Jan travelled to capital Yerevan for talks, but not to Azerbaijan; EU Special Representative for South Caucasus Toivo Klaar 19 Jan cited Baku’s need to focus on Feb election, though Azerbaijani media suggested cooling relations with West over Baku’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh could be reason for not involving foreign mediators. Russia, meanwhile, sought to reassert its dominant role in region. Notably, Armenia’s ruling party 16 Jan confirmed partial delivery of Russian weaponry after two-year delay; Russian FM Lavrov 18 Jan touted Russian mediation in 2023, blamed West for acting as spoiler. 

In other important developments. Ahead of 7 Feb presidential poll, authorities 13 Jan arrested Elnara Gasimova in Baku for alleged people smuggling, tenth journalist detained in three months. Meanwhile, Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe 24 Jan did not ratify credentials of Azerbaijani delegation, citing among other things concern about “free and fair elections”, “respect for human rights” and Baku’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Belarus

Authorities deepened crackdown, arresting over 200 people in lead-up to February elections; govt proposed new military doctrine. 

Authorities conducted mass raids as crackdown escalated. In lead-up to Feb parliamentary elections, Viasna human rights centre 23 Jan said authorities detained or interrogated scores for alleged “involvement in extremist groups”, including former political prisoners; as of 30 Jan, over 200 people “persecuted” amid ever-worsening crackdown. EU and U.S. 25 Jan decried “wave of repression”. 

Minsk announced monitors for Feb elections. Govt 5 Jan invited Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Commonwealth of Independent States – regional intergovernmental organisation comprising former Soviet republics – to observe 25 Feb polls, 8 Jan announced it would not invite Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe due to organisation’s “double standards”. Opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya 12 Jan reiterated call to boycott elections. 

Minsk put forward updated national security doctrine. Lukashenko 16 Jan convened Security Council to discuss updated military doctrine draft, which for first time provides for use of nuclear weapons (Russia stationed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in 2023). Defence Minister Viktor Khrenin 19 Jan said weapons were “an important component” of doctrine’s overall focus on “preventive deterrence of potential adversaries”. Meanwhile, Lukashenko 29 Jan met with Russian President Putin 29 Jan in Russian city St. Petersburg to discuss ways to deepen alliance.

Cyprus

UN appointed new personal envoy, which could mark possible step toward eventual return to formal talks although sides clung to long-held positions. 

UN Sec Gen filled “personal envoy” role. UN Sec Gen António Guterres 5 Jan announced former Colombian FM Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar would fill UN “personal envoy” position, last appointed in 2017 and vacant since Oct 2021, after relevant parties gave their consent to appointment. Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides same day welcomed appointment and said he was determined to resume formal talks based on UN resolutions. Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar cautioned that new negotiations could only begin if de facto Turkish Cypriot administration in north was given same international status as Republic of Cyprus, while both Ankara and “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) clarified they approved appointment on condition that mandate does not exceed six months and focuses solely on exploring if there exists “common ground” for talks. Turkish Cypriot “FM” Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu 11 Jan rejected possibility of continuing negotiations from where they left off in failed 2017 summit, calling for new process based on rectifying unequal status of two sides. Cuellar 29-30 Jan visited Cyprus and met with various political and civil society actors, including leaders of two communities. Meanwhile, Christodoulides 27 Jan unveiled fourteen-point plan of measures and benefits for Turkish Cypriots; “TRNC’s” “PM” Ünal Üstel denounced plan as attempt to “fool Turkish Cypriots”. UN Security Council 30 Jan voted unanimously to renew mandate of UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another twelve months. 

Arrest of Turkish Cypriot lawyer stoked controversy. Tatar 11 Jan said that late Dec arrest of lawyer Akan Kürşat in Italy, prompted by Republic of Cyprus police filing complaint over money laundering and embezzlement, was attempt to disrupt Cuellar’s work; Christodoulides 13 Jan denied any link between case and recent attempts at putting negotiations back on track.

Georgia

PM Garibashvili resigned from office, official in breakaway Abkhazia announced construction of Russian naval base in region could begin in 2024, and ruling party sought closer ties with China. 

PM Garibashvili tendered his resignation. PM Garibashvili 29 Jan resigned from his post, citing ruling Georgian Dream party’s “internal democratic principle of rotation” amid reports he will switch positions with party chairman, Irakli Kobakhidze; news came month after return to politics of party’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili. 

De facto Abkhaz official said work on Russian naval base could commence in 2024. During interview with Russian news agency RIA Novosti, breakaway Abkhazia region’s de facto Security Council secretary 12 Jan confirmed Moscow is preparing to build naval base in region, and that construction would likely begin in 2024; de facto president Aslan Bzhania in Oct 2023 had announced agreement with Moscow to construct base in Ochamchira town along Black Sea coast amid stepped-up Ukrainian attacks on its Black Sea Fleet in Russian-annexed Crimea. 

Tbilisi strengthened ties with China and Armenia. Kobakhidze 14-20 Jan led delegation to China, held meetings with senior officials to ensure “proper implementation” of 2023 Strategic Partnership Agreement; Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee Nikoloz Samkharadze 15 Jan said delegation “received a promise of unwavering support from China” to support Georgia’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, then-PM Garibashvili and his Armenian counterpart 26 Jan signed memorandum on “strategic partnership” in capital Tbilisi.

Kosovo

Pristina and Belgrade resolved license plate dispute in positive step toward normalisation, but sparred over currency; Kosovo Serbs in north launched petition to remove Albanian mayors from office. 

Normalisation process between Serbia and Kosovo saw progress and setback. Serbia 1 Jan enforced Dec decision allowing cars with Kosovo license plates to enter its territory, though insisted this did not equal recognition; in return, Kosovo 4 Jan ended requirement to cover Serb license plates with stickers. EU 7 Jan welcomed “positive step” toward normalisation. Simultaneously, EU 1 Jan opened visa-free travel to Schengen area for Kosovar citizens. Despite progress, Central Bank 17 Jan announced decision to suspend Serbian dinar beginning 1 Feb, after which Euro will be “only currency allowed” in Kosovo; Serbia 19 Jan condemned measure. EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák 30 Jan urged sides to step up normalisation efforts ahead of June 2024 EU parliamentary elections.

Kosovo Serbs launched petition to remove Albanian mayors from office in north. Hundreds of Kosovo Serbs from northern municipalities 17 Jan started petition to remove four Albanian mayors from office, who were elected in April 2023 municipal polls boycotted by local Serbs. Process began after Pristina issued administrative order in Sept 2023 allowing removal of mayors through petition process as first step toward holding new election. 

Germany bolstered NATO-led force. Germany 16 Jan increased troop contribution to NATO-led force KFOR from 80 to 300 soldiers, citing “worsening security”.

Kyrgyzstan

Efforts to crack down on independent media and civil society drew condemnation from human rights groups and UN. 

Authorities moved against several media outlets and over a dozen journalists. Law enforcement agents and security services 15 Jan searched offices of news agency 24.KG and detained outlet’s director and two chief editors, Makhinur Niyazova and Anton Lymar, for several hours on charges of “war propaganda”; Niyazova told reporters actions linked to outlet’s coverage of Ukraine war. Ministry of Interior next day searched several other independent media organisations and detained eleven journalists and media workers on charge of “calls for disobedience and mass riots”. 

Human rights groups warned of growing threat to freedom of expression. Eight international human rights groups 16 Jan said raids came amid “worsening campaign against free speech in Kyrgyzstan”; UN human rights office 20 Jan echoed warning, saying actions “appear to be part of a larger pattern of pressure against civil society activists, journalists and other critics of the authorities”. Days later, parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Legislation 23 Jan endorsed draft law on “foreign representatives”, prompting number of human rights organisations 25 Jan to issue statement urging parliament to reject “Russia-style ‘foreign-agents bill’”. 

In another important development. During visit to Tajik capital, Dushanbe, Türkiye’s FM hinted at imminent border deal between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (see Tajikistan).

Russia (Internal)

Russian leaders alleged readiness for Ukraine peace talks but on their terms, Kyiv intensified drone attacks, and Bashkortostan region witnessed large-scale protests over jailed activist. 

Moscow accused Kyiv of hindering peace efforts, attacks into Russia persisted. Speaking in Moscow region about Ukraine war, President Putin 16 Jan dismissed Kyiv’s “peace formulas” and said Russia would not give up occupied territories. In further sign Kremlin is only prepared to negotiate on its terms, FM Lavrov 22 Jan said Russia was ready for talks but that Kyiv seeks to “perpetuate the war”; he added that Western aid to Ukraine complicates search for peace. Meanwhile, Ukraine stepped up drone attacks into Russia, notably targeting oil infrastructure. Ukrainian forces 14 Jan shot down early warning and control aircraft A-50 over Sea of Azov and damaged Il-22M aircraft, killing unknown number. Moscow and Kyiv traded blame for downed plane in Russia’s Belgorod region 24 Jan that left 74 dead, including 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war. 

Anti-war presidential candidate saw surge of support. As March election drew closer, anti-war presidential hopeful Boris Nadezhdin 25 Jan said he had collected around 200,000 signatures endorsing his candidacy, double amount required for him to run in poll, 31 Jan submitted application to Central Election Commission to run. Two other candidates 30 Jan withdrew from race and endorsed Putin. 

Thousands protested in Bashkortostan in support of jailed activist. Protest 15 Jan took place in Baymak city of Bashkortostan region against trial of Fail Alsynov, environmental activist and campaigner for preservation of Bashkir language and culture. Authorities 17 Jan sentenced Alsynov to four years in prison for “inciting hatred”, prompting more protests that led to clashes with police. Despite warnings from authorities, protesters 19 Jan rallied again in Ufa city. 

Russia allegedly acquired Iranian and North Korean weapons. U.S. 4 Jan said Russia used North Korean ballistic missiles to strike Ukraine (see Ukraine), while UK 22 Jan presented fresh evidence to UN indicating transfer of North Korean weapons to Russia. Sky News 10 Jan claimed Iran has developed new attack drone and appears close to providing Moscow with surface-to-surface missiles.

Tajikistan

Watchdog painted grim picture of media freedom in Tajikistan, and Türkiye’s foreign minister hinted at possible border deal between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during working visit. 

Watchdog warned of intensified media crackdown since 2022. Committee to Protect Journalists 4 Jan warned in its annual report that Tajikistan’s media “are in their worst state since the violent years of the civil war” of 1992-1997. Watchdog said series of harsh sentences handed down to seven journalists in 2022 and 2023 marked “a deeply chilling escalation in the years-long constriction of independent media”, with several journalists reportedly linking crackdown to suppression of May-June 2022 protests in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. 

Türkiye’s FM hinted at imminent border deal between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. President Rahmon and FM Muhriddin 10 Jan met with Türkiye’s FM Hakan Fidan in capital Dushanbe to discuss bilateral ties, with sides reportedly stressing need to boost cooperation “in all areas of mutual interest”. Speaking with reporters after meeting, Fidan also hinted that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could sign border deal in March 2024, but offered few details.

Türkiye

Islamic State (ISIS) conducted first attack in seven years, killing one and prompting intensified crackdown, while clashes with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) killed over dozen soldiers in Iraq, prompting wave of airstrikes. 

ISIS killed one in first attack since Jan 2017. In first claimed attack on Turkish soil in over seven years, ISIS 28 Jan carried out armed assault on Italian Catholic Church located on outskirts of Istanbul, killing one individual. Subsequently, security forces conducted series of raids in Istanbul, detaining nearly 50 ISIS-linked suspects, including two assailants identified as nationals from Russia and Tajikistan. Detentions brought total number of individuals apprehended by security forces (including foreign nationals) during Jan to 280. Earlier, security units 1 Jan apprehended alleged ISIS ring leader Abdullah al-Jundi in northern Syria. 

Clashes with PKK killed more than a dozen Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq. Late Dec spate of attacks on Turkish troops in northern Iraq continued, as PKK 5 Jan killed five soldiers in attack on military base and clash 12 Jan killed nine Turkish soldiers (see Iraq). In response, military 12-16 Jan launched airstrikes in both northern Iraq and Syria, targeting PKK/People’s Protection Units militants as part of strikes on 114 targets in both countries; military’s intensified shelling in northern Syria marked unusually high level for winter months (see Syria). In south east Türkiye, Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya 16 Jan announced security forces had destroyed eighteen PKK winter shelters in drone strikes in rural areas. 

Parliament ratified Sweden’s NATO bid, govt actively engaged abroad. Parliament 23 Jan ratified Sweden’s membership to NATO; Ankara expects U.S. to greenlight sale of F-16s in return. Relations with Greece remained on course for improvement, although Greece’s steps to purchase U.S. jets and combat ships stoked concern in Ankara. Attempting to play constructive role in Ukraine-Russia war (see Ukraine), Erdoğan 5 Jan told Ukrainian President Zelenskyy Türkiye was ready to host peace talks. Govt continued to voice strong opposition to Israel’s war in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine); police 2 Jan detained 34 people on suspicion of working for Israeli intelligence. Iranian President Raisi 24 Jan visited Ankara, meeting President Erdoğan; pair called for end to Israeli attacks in Gaza.

Ukraine

Russia conducted deadly airstrikes as its ground forces retook battlefield initiative, which could shift war’s centre of gravity north; Ukraine stepped up diplomatic efforts. 

Russia escalated strikes on Ukrainian cities as Kyiv scaled up air defence. Russia 29 Dec-8 Jan launched massive airstrikes targeting civilian and military infrastructure; U.S. and allies 10 Jan alleged attacks featured first use of North Korean ballistic missiles (see Russia). UN humanitarian agency 16 Jan claimed hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded; energy infrastructure remained operational. President Zelenskyy 30 Jan said Russia had launched nearly 1,000 missiles and drones at Ukraine since beginning of 2024. In effort to counter attacks, Ukraine 17 Jan claimed first successful use of hybrid ‘FrankenSAM’ air defence system against Russian drone, 20 Jan claimed scaled-up electronic warfare capabilities enabled interception of twenty missiles on 13 Jan. Sides, meanwhile, traded blame for downed plane in Russia’s Belgorod region 24 Jan that left 74 dead, including 65 Ukrainian prisoners of war. 

Moscow regained battlefield initiative and could shift war’s epicentre north. Russia’s ground forces continued attacking Avdiivka town in eastern Donetsk region, with reports late Jan indicating they had entered town’s southern periphery. In northern Kharkiv region, stepped-up Russian attacks near Kupiansk city 16 Jan prompted governor to order nearby villages to evacuate; Russian military 21 Jan claimed capture of Krokhmalne village, south east of Kupiansk; 29 Jan reported capture of Tabaivka village, which Ukraine denied. With Moscow increasingly able to dictate battlegrounds, fighting’s epicentre could shift north in coming weeks. 

Kyiv sustained high-intensity diplomatic activity. Ukraine 12 Jan signed ten-year security cooperation agreement with UK. Govt delegation 14 Jan attended meeting on Ukraine’s peace plan at World Economic Forum in Davos, along with 82 other countries; China remained absent. Polish PM Donald Tusk 22 Jan met President Zelenskyy in capital Kyiv, announced military assistance and commitment to dialogue over trade issues. 

In other important domestic developments. Govt 30 Jan filed revised version of mobilisation reform bill to parliament following criticism over potential constitutional violations and corruption risks. Meanwhile, Zelenskyy 29 Jan asked top commander Valerii Zaluzhnyi to step down amid rising tensions between the two; Zaluzhnyi refused.

Uzbekistan

Tashkent upgraded diplomatic relations with Beijing. 

President Mirziyoyev 23-25 Jan visited China amid efforts to deepen bilateral ties and secure investment. Mirziyoyev 24 Jan met with China’s leader Xi Jinping in capital Beijing, during which pair announced they have upgraded diplomatic ties from “comprehensive strategic partnership” to “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership”, meaning deeper cooperation and mutual support in regional and international affairs. Sides also agreed to work closely on range of infrastructure projects, including China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Govt renewed ceasefire with FARC dissident faction and resumed talks with ELN, with latter discussions focused on continuation of six-month ceasefire; confrontations between armed groups persisted. 

Govt renewed ceasefire with FARC dissident group. Providing important continuity for Petro’s “total peace” policy, govt and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) 14 Jan agreed on six-month extension of bilateral ceasefire. During negotiations in capital Bogotá, parties reiterated commitments to protect civilians, release kidnapped persons and end kidnap-for-ransom, work toward environmental protection, increase community participation in talks and create joint agenda, though specifics remained unclear. In further positive step, govt and rebels 4 Jan inaugurated joint monitoring mechanism that will eventually have national as well as regional chapters, and is intended to receive information about possible ceasefire infractions and prevent or de-escalate clashes. 

Govt and ELN resumed talks but did not agree on six-month ceasefire renewal. Govt negotiations with National Liberation Army (ELN) 22 Jan resumed in Cuban capital Havana; group said it would end kidnappings if ceasefire is renewed, but conditioned on govt filling gap in financing that lack of ransom payments would incur for rebels; sides 29 Jan said they would extend bilateral ceasefire for seven days while they determine if and under what terms to continue truce for another six months. UN 11 Jan presented report to Security Council detailing 170 possible incidents of ceasefire violation from both sides since 30 Nov, though none officially adjudicated. Meanwhile, govt and country’s largest armed organisation, Gaitanista Self Defense Forces, 21 Jan expressed willingness to enter dialogue, though lack of mutual trust could hinder prospects for talks. 

Armed violence between rival groups continued in several regions. ELN and FARC dissident group Segunda Marquetalia 13 Jan announced alliance in Nariño department in apparent attempt to stem advance of FARC-EMC; fighting between these groups in south west displaced at least 3,000 people in first two weeks of Jan. ELN mid Jan clashed with Jaime Martínez faction of FARC-EMC on southern outskirts of Colombia’s largest port city, Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca department, displacing and confining hundreds. Fighting between Gaitanistas and ELN in Chocó confined 9,000 families.

Ecuador

President Noboa declared first-ever “internal armed conflict” in country’s history after criminal groups unleashed wave of violence in prisons and cities nationwide. 

Violence spiked following disappearance of crime boss. Police in Guayaquil city 7 Jan reported disappearance of Adolfo ‘Fito’ Macías, imprisoned boss of Los Choneros gang, who was due for transfer to high-security jail. As authorities commenced hunt involving 3,000 police and army officers, rival criminal factions capitalised on chaos. Prison riots erupted across country, with inmates from seven prisons taking 178 staff hostage, while at least 30 prisoners 9 Jan escaped from Riobamba facility, including leader of “Los Lobos” group Fabricio Colón Pico, who authorities 5 Jan arrested over kidnapping and alleged plot to murder Attorney General Diana Salazar. Meanwhile, violence escalated mostly in capital Quito and Guayaquil as criminal groups looted stores and detonated explosives; gunmen 9 Jan stormed television studio in Guayaquil during live broadcast, though police quickly regained control. Gang members 21 Jan attempted to take over hospital in Yaguachi town (Guayas province) where one of their members was receiving treatment; police same day arrested 68 suspects involved. Over 200 violent deaths reported since 9 Jan, including prosecutor leading investigation into television studio attack. 

President Noboa declared first-ever “internal armed conflict”. Noboa 8 Jan declared 60-day state of emergency, facilitating military and police interventions in prisons nationwide. But amid spiralling violence and worldwide media coverage of television studio raid, Noboa 9 Jan declared Ecuador’s first ever “internal armed conflict” and announced use of lethal force and military assets to combat 22 criminal groups, now labelled terrorists. Move raised fears that intensified security operations could prompt violent backlash from criminal groups. 

International partners offered support to embattled nation. Peru 9 Jan and Colombia 10 Jan bolstered troop presence along border, while around 40 countries offered military assistance to Quito, including Argentina, U.S. and Brazil. U.S. 11 Jan announced it would send officials to assist Ecuador with criminal investigations. Govt 21 Jan signed security cooperation agreement with fellow members of regional bloc Andean Community, aimed at tackling transnational criminal networks.

El Salvador

President Bukele looked set for re-election in February; Minister of Justice announced start of trials against gang leadership as authorities again renewed state of exception. 

Poll suggested Bukele poised for victory in Feb election. Salvadorans will head to polls on 4 Feb to elect president, vice-president and legislative assembly, with possible runoff in March if no presidential candidate secures over 50% of vote. This appeared unlikely, however, after Francisco Gavidia University Centre for Citizen Studies 16 Jan presented their final poll prior to election day, which gave Bukele (who is constitutionally banned from seeking immediate re-election) 71% lead over his nearest rivals. 

Authorities renewed state of exception as trials of gang leadership began. Congress 9 Jan extended state of exception until 10 Feb amid continued criticism from human rights groups. Minister of Justice Gustavo Villatoro 4 Jan declared that El Salvador’s 2023 homicide rate was lowest in Latin America; he added that authorities had arrested 75,163 “terrorists” under measure and that approximately 18,000-20,000 gang members are still at large. Trial to prosecute 494 gang leaders 22 Jan commenced. Meanwhile, Legislative Assembly 3 Jan approved reform granting Attorney General capacity to declare persons or entities “national terrorists”, and to petition for their inclusion on UN Security Council terrorist list.

Guatemala

Country saw transfer of power as planned, with Bernardo Arévalo assuming presidency after months of tireless efforts to block August election result and turbulent inauguration. 

Arévalo assumed office after last-ditch attempt by opposition to stall proceedings. Following months of relentless attempts to overturn election result, Bernardo Arévalo and Karin Herrera 15 Jan were sworn in as President and VP. Inauguration started nine hours later than scheduled after outgoing Congress 14 Jan tried to stall swearing in of new members of legislature; it also decided that, due to ongoing legal cases, incoming deputies from Arévalo’s Movimento Semilla party would be considered “independent”, leading to confrontations among lawmakers. Legislative body eventually sworn in after hours of delays, however, with Semilla’s Samuel Pérez selected as President of Congress; Pérez immediately reinstated deputies into party, while Arévalo was sworn in to presidency. Thousands of supporters celebrated in capital Guatemala City as Arévalo thanked Ancestral Authorities for leadership during transition; Indigenous leaders ended 106-day-long strike. Constitutional Court next day invalidated election of Congress’ leadership and in new vote 19 Jan Partido Azul’s Nery Abilio was elected its president. 

International community signalled support for Arévalo. Representatives from countries across the world attended swearing in ceremony, including heads of state from Colombia, Honduras, Chile and Paraguay, exerting pressure on Congress to allow transfer of power. Following inauguration, U.S. aid agency chief Samantha Powers 15 Jan announced $6mn for program to develop rural areas while U.S. State Department 17 Jan sanctioned former President Giammattei for corruption. EU High Representative Josep Borrel 16 Jan announced €50mn investment to support Indigenous communities and cooperation with Arévalo administration on strengthening democracy, and combating climate change and corruption.

Haiti

Former rebel leader rallied support for protests to topple acting PM Henry, raising risk of instability in coming weeks. 

Former rebel leader sought to oust PM. With acting PM Henry due to step down on 7 Feb but unlikely to stick to his pledge, supporters of former rebel leader Guy Philippe 15 Jan launched protests in several cities demanding Henry’s resignation. Philippe, meanwhile, expanded alliances with security forces and political actors as he called on “all sectors” to join “revolution” to transform Haiti. Most notably, he forged alliance with several units of Brigade for the Security of Protected Areas (BSAP), armed body attached to National Agency for Protected Areas led by his close friend Jeantel Joseph. Joseph took part in several anti-govt demonstrations and promised to bring protests to capital Port-au-Prince to oust Henry, prompting govt 23 Jan to sack him; move angered BSAP members, who 24 Jan clashed with police in north east Ouanaminthe commune. Govt 29 Jan ordered all BSAP workers to report to nearest Ministry of Environment office for registration. Philippe’s movement could gain steam in coming weeks, especially if gangs join alliance, raising risk of clashes in Port-au-Prince and other cities. 

Gang-related insecurity persisted in capital and in south. In Mariani village south west of Port-au-Prince, police operations failed to oust gang led by alias Bout ba, whose members throughout Jan kidnapped dozens along National Route 2 and attacked people travelling by boat to avoid route. In Port-au-Prince, members of Bel-Air gang led by Kempès Sanon 16 Jan launched several days’ attack on Solino neighbourhood, trapping residents in their homes and killing unconfirmed number. Clashes between G9 coalition and at least two gangs that defected from coalition 28 Jan broke out in capital. 

Kenyan court prohibited police deployment to Haiti. Kenya’s High Court 26 Jan prohibited deployment of police officers to Haiti, saying National Security Council lacked authority to dispatch police beyond Kenya’s borders and that no “reciprocal agreement” exists between two nations; Kenyan President William Ruto 30 Jan, however, said mission “is on course” and could go ahead “as soon as next week”.

Honduras

Govt extended state of exception and political crisis eased. 

Authorities again renewed tough security measures. Executive 1 Jan renewed state of exception for ninth time until 15 Feb amid continued concern about measure’s impact. Violence against women remained particularly acute. Notably, human rights secretary Natalia Roque and UN Coordinator in Honduras Alice Shackelford 10 Jan expressed particular concern over impunity in femicide cases following discovery previous day of bodies of three women on Honduran island, Roatán. Meanwhile, Colonel Ramiro Muñoz 16 Jan announced closure of three prisons – La Esperanza, Trujillo and Cortés – due to “deplorable conditions”, said inmates would be transferred to other prisons. 

Political crisis eased. Following months of congressional paralysis, lawmakers 16 Jan elected 2024-2026 Board of Directors for Congress in extraordinary session; five political parties have representation but ruling LIBRE party has majority. Congress next day approved budget for next fiscal year, 30 Jan resumed deliberations to appoint officials to vacant posts such as Institute of Access to Public Information and magistrates for Superior Court of Accounts. 

Mexico

Criminal violence remained high, with LGBTQ community notably targeted; opposition accused President López Obrador of using govt powers to strengthen ruling party’s electoral campaign. 

Criminal violence persisted. Shootout between Jalisco and Sinaloa Cartels in Chicomuselo municipality, Chiapas state (south), 4 Jan killed twenty; fighting between groups during month displaced hundreds. Alleged members of La Familia Michoacana crime group 4 Jan attacked rival group Los Tlacos in desert area of Buenavista de los Hurtado, Guerrero state (south west), using drones and killing unconfirmed number. Gunmen 15 Jan abducted activist searching for her disappeared son and killed two of her family members at her house in Salamanca city, Guanajuato state (centre). Meanwhile, concerns grew over stepped-up violence in run up to 2024 elections as rival groups jockey for influence. 

Month saw number of attacks targeting LGBTQ+ community. Four transwomen were assassinated in first two weeks of 2024: attacks include 11 Jan killing of activist and Movimiento Ciudadano politician Miriam Noemí Ríos in Zamora municipality, Michoacán state (centre) and 14 Jan murder of activist and ruling MORENA party candidate for Senate Samantha Gómez Fonseca in Mexico City. Activists following day protested in capital Mexico City, calling on govt to take action. 

Critics accused govt of using state functions for campaigning. As 2024 presidential election edged closer, López Obrador 8 Jan announced doubling of pension payments and urged senior citizens to vote for party for benefits to continue. Use of state bodies and resources to campaign for MORENA is banned by constitution, and 47 such complaints against both govt and opposition are pending before National Electoral Institute (INE). Meanwhile, former head of recently dissolved state news agency NOTIMEX 9 Jan accused Labour Secretary of asking channel to divert 20% of employee payouts into campaign of MORENA presidential candidate Claudia Sheinbaum in return for kickback. López Obrador next day denied accusations, while opposition candidate Xóchitl Gálvez 11 Jan filed complaint with INE to investigate. Lopez Obrador 31 Jan rejected allegations that his unsuccessful 2006 presidential campaign received criminal financing. 

Nicaragua

Govt released nineteen members of Catholic Church and handed them to Vatican; opposition leader suffered assassination attempt. 

Managua handed over nineteen religious leaders to Vatican. Pope Francis 1 Jan used New Year’s Day address to express concern about Ortega regime’s targeting of Catholic Church, saying he was “following with concern what is happening in Nicaragua, where bishops and priests have been deprived of their freedom”, and expressed hope for “dialogue to overcome difficulties”. Govt 14 Jan released nineteen jailed religious leaders, including Bishop Rolando Álvarez, following negotiations and handed them over to Vatican. Meanwhile, govt 16 Jan cancelled legal status of sixteen NGOs, some of them Catholic organisations. 

Opposition leader suffered assassination attempt. Unknown gunmen 10 Jan shot and wounded opposition leader Joao Ismael Maldonado Bermúdez, who has lived in Costa Rica since 2018 govt crackdown, and his partner; attack marked second assassination attempt on Maldonado since his exile. Members of Exiled Nicaraguans in Unity in Costa Rica 12 Jan attributed attack to “hired assassins” of regime.

Venezuela

In blow to prospects for competitive election, Supreme Court upheld decision banning opposition’s candidate María Corina Machado from standing for office, while authorities cracked down on armed forces and civil society. 

Supreme Court reaffirmed opposition candidate’s ban from running for office. Despite govt-opposition agreement in Barbados in Oct 2023 to improve electoral conditions, govt-controlled Supreme Court 26 Jan upheld ban on opposition leader María Corina Machado’s candidacy, meaning she cannot run in 2024 presidential poll. Opposition coalition Unitary Platform dismissed decision as illegal and in breach of Barbados deal, while platform’s chief negotiator Gerardo Blyde appealed to presidents of France, Brazil and Colombia to convince Maduro to reverse it. EU and U.S. expressed deep concern, along with many of Venezuela’s neighbours; U.S. 29 Jan announced it will begin reinstating sanctions, having eased them following Barbados; govt next day called decision “blackmail”. 

Govt clamped down on security forces and civil society. Police 17 Jan raided office of teachers’ union in Barinas state (west) and arrested union leader Victor Venegas for alleged involvement in anti-govt conspiracy. Attorney General Tarek Saab 22 Jan announced authorities had arrested at least 32 civilians and former military personnel and issued warrants against eleven others for allegedly conspiring against govt in several different plots; govt claimed plans were backed by U.S. and implicated Machado. National Assembly 23 Jan approved law that could severely curtail activity and, in some instances, lead to closure of NGOs, sparking condemnation from civil society and human rights groups. 

Opposition prepared for 2024 elections despite uncertainty. Ahead of Supreme Court announcement, Machado 23 Jan announced alliance of political parties and civil society groups to organise electoral campaign and called on govt to announce exact date of poll. 

Caracas-Georgetown talks continued over disputed region. Govt and Guyana 25 Jan agreed to continue diplomatic efforts over contested Essequibo area, oil-rich region currently administered by Guyana, during talks in Brazilian capital Brasília.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Ruling party confirmed ambition to play active role in President Tebboune's re-election campaign after years on the sidelines; amid strained bilateral relations, Bamako denounced Algiers-sponsored 2015 peace accord.

Ruling party and military asserted support for Tebboune’s re-election bid. At Central Committee session, National Liberation Front’s new secretary general, Abdelkrim Benmbarek, 7 Jan expressed support for President Tebboune’s candidacy in presidential election due to be held before year’s end; stance confirms party’s comeback on political stage after being sidelined in wake of 2019-2021 Hirak protest movement. Army also expressed support for Tebboune. During inspection visit to second military region (west), army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Saïd Chengriha, 15 Jan called on citizens to adhere “to the project of the rebirth of a new Algeria, led … by Abdelmadjid Tebboune”.

Algeria-Mali diplomatic tensions remained elevated. Mali’s junta 25 Jan revoked Algiers-sponsored 2015 peace deal with separatist rebels, citing “increasing number of unfriendly acts, instances of hostility and interference in Mali’s internal affairs” by Algiers. Foreign ministry next day denounced Mali’s “use of international mercenaries” and rearmament program “funded by third countries”. Earlier in month, Algerian ambassador to Mali and Malian ambassador to Algiers 5 and 7 Jan returned to their posts two weeks after being recalled for consultations; diplomatic row erupted in Dec over Algiers’ consultations with rebel leaders and Tebboune’s meeting with Malian opposition leader Mahmoud Dicko. 

Algeria took seat on UN Security Council. Algeria’s two-year term as non-permanent member of UN Security Council started 1 Jan, with Western Sahara and Palestine as priority issues on country’s agenda.

Egypt

Amid Gaza war, tensions between Egypt and Israel continued to rise; IMF held talks with Cairo to expand $3bn loan and potentially soften reform program. 

War in Gaza continued to strain Egypt-Israel relations. Israel’s request to occupy fourteen-kilometre-long buffer zone on Egypt’s border with Gaza, known as Philadephi Corridor, with a view to halting weapons smuggling route from Egypt into Gaza, ratcheted up tensions. Cairo, which currently patrols area, 22 Jan issued warning to Israel, saying any move to control Philadelphi Corridor would pose serious threat to bilateral relations. Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) director Ronen Bar 29 Jan met with head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate Abbas Kamel in Cairo to discuss tensions over control of Philadelphi Corridor. Meanwhile, security situation remained precarious along border with Gaza and Israel. Egyptian forces reported preventing drug smuggling attempt 15 Jan on Egyptian-Israeli border near Awja crossing, with six suspected smugglers arrested; Israeli army reported one soldier wounded same day in exchange of fire with armed individuals near Awja. Anonymous military source quoted next day by The New Arab website said they were not smugglers, but pro-Hamas militants attempting to infiltrate Gaza.

IMF showed readiness to expand loan amid economic impact of Gaza war. Insecurity in Red Sea impacted shipping traffic through Suez Canal. Osama Rabie, chairman of Suez Canal Authority, 11 Jan said traffic since 1 Jan had dropped by 40% compared to a year prior, inflicting damage to key source of foreign reserves. Drop in Suez Canal traffic also contributed to further weakening of Egyptian pound on black market. Egyptian media outlet Al Ahram 14 Jan reported exchange rate on black market had shot up to record high level of close to 60 pounds to the dollar. International Monetary Fund (IMF) confirmed readiness to help Cairo. Financial institution 11 Jan said increasing size of IMF loan to Egypt was “critical”, and delegation led by IMF Egypt Mission Chief Vladkova Hollar mid Jan travelled to Cairo to discuss $3bn loan and reform program.

Iran

Islamic State (ISIS) killed 80 in deadliest bombing in decades, while Iran struck Syria, Iraq and Pakistan in sign of increasingly assertive regional posture amid escalation on multiple fronts fuelled by Gaza war.

ISIS killed scores at ceremony for slain commander. ISIS 3 Jan conducted dual bombings at commemoration ceremony for Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in Kerman city (south east), which killed over 80 and injured more than 200, marking deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since 1979 revolution. 

Tehran struck out at foes both east and west. IRGC 15 Jan announced it had launched ballistic missiles into Syria’s Idlib purportedly aimed at ISIS, and northern Iraq at sites it claimed were linked to Israeli intelligence. Iranian forces next day launched strikes on village in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, claiming to target “strongholds” of Jaish al-Adl – anti-Iranian Baloch militant group that 15 Dec conducted deadly attack in Iran’s Balochistan province; Pakistan condemned strike and claimed it killed two children. Pakistan 18 Jan launched strikes on village near Iranian border city of Saravan (south east), claiming to target Pakistani Baloch militants; pair took steps to de-escalate late Jan (see Pakistan). Unidentified gunmen 27 Jan killed nine Pakistani workers in Saravan.

Iran-aligned groups continued attacks across region amid Gaza war. Amid Houthi attacks in Red Sea and U.S.-UK retaliatory airstrikes (see Yemen), Iran 15 Jan disavowed involvement. Iran 21 Jan confirmed deaths of five IRGC members in alleged Israeli strikes in Syrian capital Damascus, as President Raisi pledged revenge. Attacks against U.S. and allied forces in Iraq and Syria by Iran-aligned groups continued, exceeding 160 incidents from mid Oct to late Jan (see Iraq and Syria). In significant escalation, drone strike 28 Jan, attributed by U.S. to Iran-backed militants, killed three U.S. service members in Jordan; U.S. pledged retaliation (see Jordan).

Iran expanded nuclear activities. After International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) late Dec announced Iran increased three-fold its production of uranium enriched up to 60%, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi 18 Jan stressed need for urgent diplomacy; nuclear expansion, hampered cooperation with IAEA and limited diplomacy with West bode ill for swift resolution of simmering nuclear crisis. 

Iraq

Iran launched first direct attack in Iraq since Gaza war and hostilities between U.S. and Tehran-backed militias escalated; region braced for retaliation after Iraqi umbrella group killed U.S. troops in Jordan.

Gaza war continued to fuel escalation. In first direct Iranian attack since start of war in Gaza, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 15 Jan launched three missiles at house of prominent Kurdish businessman in Kurdistan’s regional capital Erbil, killing at least four; like similar strike in March 2022, Iran claimed attack targeted Mossad activities, which Kurdistan Regional Govt (KRG) denied. Meanwhile, U.S. 4 Jan struck Iran-backed Harakat al-Nujaba group in capital Baghdad, reportedly killing four, including commander of paramilitary coalition Hashd al-Shaabi. U.S. for first time acknowledged use of ballistic missiles by Iran-backed umbrella group Islamic Resistance in Iraq in 20 Jan attack on Ain al-Asad base in Anbar governorate, injuring several personnel. In major escalation marking first fatal strike on U.S. forces since Gaza war, drone attacks by Islamic Resistance in Iraq, likely operating in Syria, 28 Jan killed three U.S. personnel in north-eastern Jordan (see Jordan). U.S. and Iraq late Jan began formal talks on withdrawal of U.S. forces. Militant group Kataib Hizbollah 30 Jan announced suspension of attacks on U.S. forces “to prevent embarrassment” of Iraqi govt.

Türkiye-PKK attacks intensified in north. Late Dec spate of attacks on Turkish troops continued, as PKK 5 Jan killed five soldiers in attack on military base and clash 12 Jan killed nine Turkish soldiers. In response, Türkiye 12-16 Jan launched airstrikes in both northern Iraq and Syria, targeting PKK/People’s Protection Units militants. Ankara also increased attacks on Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), party based in Sulaymaniyah province; Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 16 Jan threatened “further measures” if PUK did not change its attitude toward PKK.

Baghdad and Erbil ended budget dispute; Islamic State (ISIS) maintained activity. After KRG President Barzani’s 13 Jan visit to Baghdad, govt next day agreed to allocate monthly funds to KRG, marking shift from previous arrangement of loans. Suspected ISIS militants 6 Jan reportedly attacked Hashd al-Shaabi forces in Salah al-Din governorate, killing two; 14 Jan killed three soldiers near Haditha town.

Israel/Palestine

Israel intensified assault on southern Gaza amid widespread starvation and disease, as momentum built toward possible ceasefire; West Bank braced for further turmoil and risk of wider conflict with Hizbollah loomed.

War approached fifth month. Israel’s assault on Gaza, which passed its 100th day, displaced 85% of population and killed over 27,000 Palestinians; Israeli soldier death toll reached 218 as of 30 Jan, with 22 Jan marking Israel’s deadliest single day of war. Israel stepped up bombardment in Khan Younis city, including zones it declared “safe”, and indicated plans to expand operations to Rafah, which hosts huge proportion of 2mn displaced. Israel also signalled intent to control Philadelphi Corridor between Gaza and Egypt, fuelling tensions with Cairo who warned of “serious threat” to relations and raising risk of mass casualties or mass expulsion. Hamas continued ambush attacks and rocket fire, as reports late Jan suggested group had reconstituted in northern Gaza. Amid collapsing and besieged health services, starvation risks rose: after U.S. and other states suspended funding to relief organisation UNRWA, following allegations of staff involvement in 7 Oct attacks, UN special rapporteur on right to food 28 Jan said “famine is now inevitable”.

Hamas mulled latest ceasefire proposal; Israeli cabinet grew divided. Amid talks in Paris, Hamas 30 Jan said it was considering new ceasefire and hostage release proposal, signalling some diplomatic progress and fuelling hope of possible multi-stage truce. Public and international pressure mounted as Israel appeared no closer to achieving its two main objectives – destroying Hamas and liberating hostages – and war cabinet grew visibly conflicted over path forward: PM Netanyahu 18 Jan rejected two-state solution, openly contradicting Washington. International Court of Justice 26 Jan found it plausible Israel’s acts amount to genocide and ordered Israel to prevent committing/inciting genocide acts. 

Violence in West Bank continued. Israeli forces and settlers have killed 370 Palestinians since 7 Oct; Israeli air strike 7 Jan killed seven Palestinians in Jenin. Reports mid Jan indicated Israeli security agency Shin Bet had warned Palestinian Authority at risk of financial collapse and territory on brink of explosion of violence.

Israel-Hizbollah hostilities continued. Risk of expanded conflict on northern front grew (see Lebanon).

Jordan

Iran-backed Iraqi umbrella group conducted first deadly strike on U.S. forces in region since Gaza war; Jordan’s military continued airstrikes in Syria aimed at combatting smuggling.

Iran-backed militants killed three U.S. troops at base in north east. In significant escalation, Tehran-aligned Iraqi umbrella group Islamic Resistance in Iraq – likely operating in Syria – 28 Jan launched drone strike on U.S. base in Jordan’s north east, known as Tower 22, killing three U.S service members and wounding at least 34; U.S. President Biden vowed retaliation, saying “we will hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner of our choosing”. Since Gaza war, militants have launched over 160 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, although causing no fatalities until 28 Jan.

Jordan-Syrian border remained wracked by instability. After deadly clashes erupted between Jordanian security forces and militants/drug smugglers from Syria in Dec, Jordanian jets 4 Jan launched airstrike in Syria’s Suwayda province and 9 Jan launched four airstrikes in same area; security forces 7 Jan killed five drug traffickers in gun battle on Jordanian-Syrian border. Jordan 18 Jan reportedly struck two houses in Syria’s Arman town in Suwayda, reportedly killing nine people, including children. Amman blames Iran-backed militant groups in govt-controlled areas of Syria for surge of cross-border smuggling activity.

Lebanon

Cross-border hostilities between Hizbollah and Israel continued at high intensity as Israel stepped up pressure to secure Hizbollah’s withdrawal, highlighting risk of expanded regional conflict.

Amid deadly clashes, Israel warned of war. Lebanon continued to face spectre of all-out war as Israel’s campaign in Gaza continued (see Israel-Palestine). In notable escalation, Israeli strike 2 Jan killed senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri and six companions in Hizbollah-controlled area of southern Beirut; in retaliation, Hizbollah 6 Jan attacked Israel’s Meron air control base some 5km from border. Israel 8 Jan killed Hizbollah commander Wissam al-Tawil 10km from border, marking most senior party figure to be killed since 7 Oct; Hizbollah next day claimed to strike Israel’s northern command HQ in Safed city. Anti-tank missile from Lebanon 14 Jan killed two Israel civilians who refused to evacuate border community of Yuval. Hizbollah 23 Jan again struck Mount Meron base. Israeli strikes brought number of displaced residents to at least 82,000, many of whom crowded into nearby urban centres such as Tyre. Meanwhile, Israeli govt continued to face pressure to confront Hizbollah’s presence south of Lebanon’s Litani River, which violates UN Security Council Resolution 1701. As Israel continued to threaten war on northern front, U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein 11 Jan met Lebanese leaders in Beirut to discuss diplomatic options for calming border tensions that could both allay Israel’s security concerns and prove acceptable to Hizbollah. Without immediate diplomatic off-ramp, however, risk of all-out conflict between pair remains pertinent as Israel has signalled willingness to escalate militarily against Hizbollah unless diplomacy succeeds soon. Adding to pressure, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 29 Jan warned Israeli forces will “very soon go into action” on northern front. 

Presidential vacuum persisted. Country’s presidential vacuum entered its fourteenth consecutive month in Jan with little prospect of breakthrough. Parliament 26 Jan approved budget within constitutional deadline for first time in twenty years but faced widespread criticism over its content. Unidentified hackers 7 Jan launched cyberattack at Beirut airport; Public Works Minister 12 Jan bemoaned 2024 budget’s paltry allocation to airport’s cybersecurity. 

Libya

Tripoli-based govt’s decision to lift fuel subsidies sparked backlash, and latest UN-sponsored national dialogue initiative aimed at resolving political stalemate remained stalled.

Public debate revolved around financial and economic feuds. Tripoli-based PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba 10 Jan announced controversial plan to remove fuel subsidies, in likely attempt to curb smuggling of subsidised fuel. Move created uproar among constituencies and politicians who have ties to smuggling rackets, and eastern-based govt in following days called decision “null and void”. Amid opposition and concern that removal of subsidies without proper compensation plans could cause significant inflation and impact ordinary Libyans, Dabaiba 17 Jan said issue will be put to referendum. 

More controversies affected oil sector. National Oil Corporation (NOC) 7 Jan declared force majeure at Sharara Oil Field after protesters closed site in uproar over deteriorating economic conditions in southern region; NOC 21 Jan lifted force majeure after deal with protesters.

UN envoy initiative to resolve political stalemate found no traction. U.S. ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, in Jan visited capital Tripoli and eastern city of Benghazi to mobilise support for UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily-sponsored meeting of Libya’s five main political stakeholders to settle “issues impeding progress toward elections”. Speaker of eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), Aguila Saleh, 23 Jan met with Norland in Benghazi and confirmed rejection of Bathily’s invitation, insisting that first step toward unification should be appointment of new unity govt. Norland same day also met with Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi to discuss political stalemate. Following meetings with Norland, Dabaiba and head of Tripoli-based advisory body High Council of State, Mohamed Takala, around 25 Jan announced accepting Bathily’s invitation. Bathily also held series of meetings, including with Haftar 30 Jan and Saleh next day, who reiterated his side would not attend UN-brokered political dialogue unless govt appointed by east-based parliament was present, or both govts were excluded. Meanwhile, Presidency Council pushed separate initiative, National Reconciliation Conference, with preparatory committee meeting held 14 Jan in Zuwara city; conference would supposedly be held in Sirte city in April and include members of former Qadhafi regime. 

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh conditioned normalisation with Israel on Palestinian statehood, while Germany further loosened restrictions on exporting offensive weapons to kingdom.

Riyadh publicly toughened stance on price of normalisation with Israel. During regional tour, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 8 Jan met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Al-Ula city to discuss war in Gaza and hostilities in Red Sea; Blinken said Saudi Arabia and other regional states remained opened to building diplomatic ties with Israel but Israel must first end Gaza war and work toward Palestinian state – marking first time senior U.S. official explicitly linked Palestinian statehood with normalisation. Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to UK, Prince Khaled bin Bandar, next day reiterated Riyadh was open to normalisation but “we can’t live with Israel without a Palestinian state”. Survey conducted by Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Nov-Dec found 96% of Saudis believe Arab countries should cut all ties with Israel in protest of Gaza war (see Israel-Palestine).

Germany supplied offensive weapons, citing Israel’s security. After U.S. officials late Dec announced preparations to loosen ban on offensive weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, German FM Annalena Baerbock 7 Jan said Germany would stop blocking sale of Eurofighters to Riyadh, citing its “constructive attitude toward Israel” amid reports Saudi Air Force had shot down Houthi projectiles fired at Israel (see Yemen). Germany 10 Jan announced it approved export of 150 Iris-T guided missiles, resuming arms sales banned in response to 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Syria

Hostilities escalated as Iran-backed groups traded blows with U.S. forces, Israel killed Hamas and Iranian commanders, and Türkiye intensified attacks in north; killing of U.S. soldiers in Jordan could provoke retaliatory strikes in Syria.

In east, Iran-backed groups and U.S. exchanged tit-for-tat attacks. Iran-backed militias launched nearly 30 attacks on U.S. bases during Jan: notably, Islamic Resistance in Iraq 2 Jan announced attacks on Al-Shaddadi, Al-Rumaylan, Al-Malikiyah bases housing U.S. personnel in Hasakah province; 14 Jan attacked U.S. Kharab Al-Jir base in Hasakah province and Conoco base in Deir ez-Zor province. U.S. retaliatory attacks on 7, 8 and 14 Jan targeted Iran-backed groups in Al-Bukamal, Al-Mayadeen, and Deir ez-Zor cities. In major escalation marking first fatal strike on U.S. forces since Gaza war, Iran-aligned Iraqi militants – likely operating in Syria – 28 Jan killed three U.S. personnel in Jordanian base on Syrian-Iraqi border (see Jordan), raising prospect of imminent U.S. retaliation in Syria.

In south, Israel targeted Hamas and Iran, Jordan continued airstrikes. Iran-backed fighters 1 Jan reportedly launched rockets at Israeli-occupied Golan Heights; Israel next day struck Kanaker village in southern Damascus countryside. Israel 8 Jan killed Hamas commander Hassan Akasha in Beit Jinn village, Rif Dimashq. Israeli airstrike 20 Jan struck capital Damascus, killing five Iranian military personnel, including Iran’s head of intelligence in Syria, and several civilians; Iran vowed to respond. Presumed Israeli missile targeting IRGC base in Damascus 29 Jan killed seven, including three IRGC members and civilians. Israel 31 Jan struck army positions in Deraa city. In Suwayda province, Jordan continued airstrikes targeting trafficking.

In north, Türkiye intensified shelling as part of strikes on Kurdish militants. In response to killing of over a dozen Turkish soldiers in Iraq (see Iraq), Turkish military announced it 12-16 Jan conducted 114 airstrikes targeting Kurdish forces in Syria and northern Iraq; notably, Turkish drone 14 Jan killed three regime soldiers in Qamishli, Hasakah province. In north east, intensified Turkish shelling cut over 1mn off from electricity. 

In north west, hostilities persisted between regime and opposition. Deadly clashes between regime forces and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)/National Liberation Front 3, 9, 10, 18 and 19 Jan erupted along frontlines in southern Idlib province; shelling 1 Jan killed eleven civilians near Aleppo city. Meanwhile, Iran 15 Jan launched direct attack on alleged ISIS target in Idlib, in retaliation for deadly bombing (see Iran). 

Tunisia

Crackdown on free speech continued with judicial harassment of journalists, and IMF for first time placed Tunisia on so-called black list.

Repression of dissent continued. Tunis court 10 Jan gave journalist and columnist Zied el-Heni six-month suspended prison sentence for allegedly insulting minister during radio broadcast, and released him from prison, where he had been held since 28 Dec. Authorities 3 Jan arrested Al Jazeera journalist Samir Sassi on suspicion of belonging to “terrorist organisation”, before releasing him few days later. Interior ministry note leaked on social media 13 Jan requested opening of investigation against twenty public figures (most of whom are likely to stand in presidential election due to be held by year’s end) on allegations of money laundering. 

Protesters took to streets on different occasions. Demonstration in support of Palestinians 11 Jan took place in front of South Africa embassy in capital Tunis; protesters expressed support for Pretoria’s genocide case against Israel at International Court of Justice. Hundreds of people 14 Jan demonstrated in Tunis to mark anniversary of 2011 uprising that led to ousting of then-President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and to demand release of jailed opposition leaders. Demonstrations 17-18 Jan broke out in El Hencha village, north of Sfax city, after boat carrying 37 residents attempting to cross Mediterranean Sea went missing.

In another important development. Tunisia 5 Jan appeared on International Monetary Fund’s “negative list” of countries with over eighteen-month delay in completion of consultations with financial institution. President Saïed late Jan extended state of emergency by eleven months until 31 Dec 2024. 

Western Sahara

Reports of Moroccan artillery movement fuelled speculation of possible military operation in Western Sahara; Rabat secured chairmanship of UN Human Rights Council.

Media reports emerged of possible Moroccan military operation in buffer zone. Spanish newspaper La Razón 16 Jan reported movement of heavy artillery in Bir Gandouz area in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara. Local sources indicated Morocco might be preparing limited operation against Polisario Front independence movement inside UN-monitored buffer zone, while Moroccan press speculated Rabat may want to take over buffer zone, which could spark escalation with Algeria. Meanwhile, drone allegedly fired by Moroccan military 31 Dec killed three Mauritanian civilians in Guerguera area, Morocco-controlled Western Sahara. In retaliation, Mauritania early Jan reportedly increased customs duties applied to Moroccan goods entering Mauritania through Guerguera border crossing.

Rabat scored symbolic win at UN Human Rights Council. Morocco 10 Jan secured chairmanship of UN Human Rights Council despite strong opposition from Algeria and South Africa, who argued situation in Western Sahara and Rabat’s human rights record make country unfit to preside over intergovernmental body.

Yemen

U.S. and UK began bombing campaign against Houthis, risking wider escalation, as U.S. “terrorist” designation of group could compound humanitarian crisis and hamper peace process; frontlines displayed signs of possible renewed conflict.

U.S. and UK launched anti-Houthi airstrikes. In major escalation, U.S. and UK 11 Jan launched airstrikes against dozens of Houthi targets in Sanaa, Sa’adah, Taiz, Hajjah and Hodeida governorates, and 13-14, 16-202224, 27 and 31 Jan struck locations in Hodeida, Taiz, Dhamar, al-Bayda, and Sa’adah governorates, citing Houthi attacks on international shipping. Houthis remained defiant, as strikes appeared to inflict limited damage on group’s capabilities or morale and proved counterproductive: Houthis 1517 Jan struck U.S.-operated ships in Gulf of Aden and vowed further action, raising prospect that attacks from both sides could escalate in coming weeks.

U.S. re-designated Houthis terrorist organisation. After removing group from “Foreign Terrorist Organisation” list in Feb 2021, U.S. 17 Jan designated Houthis “Specially Designated Global Terrorist”, citing need to impede funding. Designation may hamper international response to humanitarian crisis, further complicate peace talks between Riyadh and Houthis and dampen prospects of dialogue with other conflict actors.

Local fighting escalated in several regions, threatening to upend de facto truce. Houthi shelling 12 Jan killed two govt soldiers in Hodeida governorate. Houthi drone 14 Jan targeted Shabwa Defence Forces in Marib governorate, killing two soldiers. Houthis next day attacked border guards in al-Jawf governorate, killing two. Giants Brigade 23 Jan claimed it repelled Houthi offensive in Bayhan town, Shabwa, causing casualties. Risk of wider ground fighting along frontlines loomed as Houthis may initiate new major offensive, particularly if U.S. and UK provide support to anti-Houthi groups.

Eastern leaders formed new group; regional proxy competition continued. In move seen as countering separatist Southern Transitional Council’s attempts to assert control in east, prominent local leaders in eastern governorates (Hadramawt, al-Mahra, Shebwa and Socotra) 9 Jan announced formation of single entity to counter external influence and advocate equal representation in any political settlement. Highlighting competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates-backed Hadhrami Elite Forces 16 Jan blocked entry of Saudi-backed Nation Shield Forces into Mukalla city.

Africa

Benin

Cotonou continued to strengthen ties with Western partners as govt forces combat jihadist violence in northern departments.

Sporadic jihadist violence against military and civilian targets persisted. Troops 12 Dec hit explosive device likely planted by al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) in Karimama commune, Alibori department, leaving two soldiers dead. Meanwhile, 223 of 250 Beninese troops deployed in Mali as part of UN mission (MINUSMA) 11 Dec returned home as peacekeeping force pulled out; soldiers will reportedly be deployed to Benin’s northern border to help guard against jihadist incursions.

Govt discussed partnership with Western partners amid jihadist threat. Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Fructueux Gbaguidi, received French and Belgian counterparts to discuss deepening military cooperation. France Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Thierry Burkhard, travelled to Benin 8-9 Dec, and Belgium Chief of Defence Staff, Adm. Michel Hofman, followed suit 13-14 Dec. Military cooperation with former colonial power remains highly unpopular, however, and Burkhard’s visit gave wind to rumours on social media of French military base in Benin, which both generals denied in joint press conference.

Burkina Faso

Civilians remained caught in crossfire between jihadists and govt forces, and Ouagadougou continued to draw closer to other military govts in Sahel region.

Levels of violence remained elevated, with heavy toll on civilians. Gunmen wearing military uniform 8 Dec allegedly killed over 30 civilians in Dongounani village, Hauts-Bassins region; local sources blamed attack on members of armed forces or army auxiliaries (VDPs). Suspected jihadist militants 14 Dec reportedly killed dozens of people in Balavé commune, Boucle du Mouhoun region. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 24 Dec attacked gendarmerie post in Gorgadji town, Sahel region; security forces claimed repelling attack with a dozen assailants killed. Unidentified jihadist militants 30 Dec attacked Nouna military base (Boucle du Mouhoun), killing unknown number of soldiers and civilians.

Ouagadougou pulled out of G5 Sahel, announced Sahelian confederation. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 1 Dec announced intention to form three-state confederation and to establish stabilisation fund, investment bank and eventually common currency. Burkina Faso and Niger 2 Dec announced withdrawal from regional anti-jihadist alliance G5 Sahel, following in Mali’s footsteps; two remaining members Mauritania and Chad 6 Dec acknowledged departure of three founding members, which paves the way for alliance’s dissolution. Meanwhile, West African regional bloc ECOWAS 10 Dec lifted travel restrictions on key transition officials.

Silencing of dissent continued. Unidentified individuals 1 Dec abducted rights defender Daouda Diallo, who was targeted in Nov by govt’s conscription order forcing dozen people into army including journalists, civil society activists and opposition party members; administrative tribunal of Ouagadougou 6 Dec deemed conscription order illegal. Authorities 2 Dec suspended all distribution methods of French newspaper Le Monde, citing “biased article” about large-scale jihadist attack on Djibo town (Sahel region) in late Nov. Unidentified individuals 24 Dec abducted another critic of transitional authorities, former FM Ablassé Ouédraogo.

In other important developments. Relations with France continued to worsen as authorities 1 Dec arrested four French citizens in capital Ouagadougou on suspicion of espionage, saying they were intelligence agents; France denied accusations. Transitional President Capt. Traoré 17 Dec reshuffled cabinet, notably replacing education and mine ministers. Russia 28 Dec reopened embassy in Ouagadougou after 31-year gap.

Burundi

RED-Tabara rebels launched deadly attacks, dealing major blow to security forces and confirming group’s comeback in Burundi after lull in violence since 2021; Gitega accused Kigali of supporting rebellion.

Rebel group made comeback with several security forces and civilians killed. DR Congo (DRC)-based RED-Tabara rebels 10 Dec allegedly clashed with army in Bubanza province, killing three soldiers, and 22 Dec launched attack in Vugizo town near border with DR Congo; govt said raid left 19 civilians and one policeman dead, while RED-Tabara claimed nine military and one policeman killed, saying attack targeted Vugizo border post. Incidents come after RED-Tabara in Sept launched first attack on Burundian soil since 2021. Violence led to renewed tensions with Rwanda after months of improvement. President Ndayishimiye 29 Dec accused Kigali of funding and training rebel group, which Kigali immediately denied.

Allegations persisted of Burundian troops fighting Rwanda-backed M23 in DRC. Army 11 Dec reported “all” soldiers of Burundian contingent deployed in eastern DRC as part of East African Community regional force had returned to Burundi after force’s mandate ended. Army same day refused to comment on allegations that Burundian troops have been deployed to DR Congo as part of bilateral agreement between Kinshasa and Gitega, including various accounts of Burundian soldiers wearing Congolese army uniform and combatting Rwanda-backed M23 rebels.

In other important developments. Supreme Court 8 Dec sentenced former PM Alain-Guillaume Bunyoni to life imprisonment on several charges including attempting to overthrow govt and threatening president’s life; alleged violations by security forces during his time as security minister until 2020 were not investigated. Ahead of 2025 legislative elections and 2027 presidential election, Senate 6 Dec and National Assembly next day approved composition of electoral commission, with govt spokesman, Prosper Ntahorwamiye, as commission’s president.

Cameroon

Violence continued in Anglophone and Far North regions; release order in high-profile judicial case caused confusion.

Violence persisted in Anglophone regions. In North West, separatist militia 12 Dec briefly held eight secondary school students hostage and kidnapped two school staff in Wum town, Menchum division; suspected separatists 20 Dec targeted military convoy with improvised explosive device in same area, killing five soldiers. Defence Minister Beti Assomo 31 Dec started visit to Bakassi Peninsula (South West) following weeks of violence and threats from Nigeria’s Biafra separatist militia, which in Oct 2023 signed cooperation agreement with Anglophone separatist group Ambazonia Governing Council. Separatist faction (self-proclaimed Interim Govt of Ambazonia) 11 Dec opened Washington D.C. office after hiring U.S. firm in Oct to lobby for referendum.

Jihadist and other violence continued in Far North region. Suspected Boko Haram combatants 18 Dec attacked security post in Mayo-Sava division; soldiers killed two combatants. Also in Mayo-Sava, residents of Tokombere town 19 Dec demonstrated to demand resignation of mayor, accusing him of land grab and corruption, with some rioters setting gendarmerie office on fire; security forces used live rounds to push back protesters, leaving at least eight dead and others injured.

Military judge dismissed amid tug-of-war over high-profile judicial case. State scandal triggered by kidnapping and murder in Jan 2023 of journalist Martinez Zogo, who had denounced corruption at top of state, continued to linger. Yaoundé military court 1 Dec allegedly ordered provisional release of former intelligence minister Eko Eko and wealthy businessman Amougou Belinga, who have been in detention since March for alleged involvement in Zogo’s murder. Decision was reversed later same day, however, and President Biya 13 Dec replaced military judge in charge of case.

Political manoeuvres started ahead of 2025 presidential election. Opposition party Mouvement pour la Renaissance du Cameroun 10 Dec re-elected Maurice Kamto, runner-up in 2018 presidential election, as chairman; Kamto was sole candidate as internal critics avoided event. Another opposition leader, Cabral Libii, 19 Dec accused govt of trying to prevent him from standing in 2025 after authorities banned his party’s elective congress initially scheduled for 15-17 Dec.

Central African Republic

Rebel groups remained active in northern regions, exposing limits of govt’s strategy of weakening them from top down; battle for influence raged between Russia and U.S.

Northern regions remained subject to armed violence, mainly along Chadian border. Clashes between Russian paramilitary Wagner Group and rebels of Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) 9 Dec left 30 fighters and one Wagner officer dead in Markounda town (Ouham prefecture); violence, which took place after MPC leader Mahamat Al-Khatim in Nov signed agreement with govt allowing MPC’s return to 2019 Khartoum peace deal, illustrated limits of govt’s strategy of pushing warlords to announce dissolution of their groups in absence of credible way out for militiamen under their command. Drones 10 Dec dropped explosive charges on Wagner’s Kaga-Bandoro base (Nana-Gribizi prefecture), killing four Wagner elements and wounding another 13; alliance of major rebel groups Coalition of Patriots for Change denied responsibility. 3R armed group 21 Dec killed 23 civilians in Nzakoundou village, Lim-Pendé prefecture; UN force 27 Dec announced deployment of peacekeepers to reinforce security in area and facilitate humanitarian access.

Russian govt tightened grip on paramilitary Wagner Group empire in CAR. Unconfirmed rumours circulated in capital Bangui of upcoming departure of Vitali Perfilev, once in charge of Wagner Group military operations in Central African Republic, and his replacement by secret intelligence agent Vladimirovich Denis Pavlov, who arrived in Bangui in Sept. Move would suggest that Russian defence ministry is taking control of paramilitary organisation’s activities in country.

U.S. activism against Wagner sparked tensions. As part of its strategy to reduce Wagner influence in Bangui, Washington continued to negotiate security alternatives. U.S.-based private military company Bancroft Global Development late Dec denied having deployed to Bangui but admitted contacts with President Touadéra’s govt to discuss potential cooperation. Presidency late Dec confirmed govt is working to diversify security partnerships, said U.S. is offering to train soldiers. Recent cases of harassment against U.S. nationals suggest reaction to U.S. activism from pro-Wagner factions in govt. Notably, authorities have arrested at least ten international and private sector American workers in Bangui since Oct.

Chad

Country approved junta-sponsored constitution in divisive referendum marred by calls for boycott; mounting accusations of Chad taking sides in Sudan conflict strained bilateral relations.

New constitution approved by referendum amid opposition boycott. Constitutional referendum held 17 Dec, with low turnout observed in most major towns and particularly in country’s south; military rulers promoted new constitution as key step toward elections in late 2024 and return to civilian rule, but some opposition and civil society groups had called for referendum boycott, saying new constitution silences debate on federalism by entrenching unitary state, and prepares ground for election of military leader Gen Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno as president. Succès Masra, president of prominent opposition party Les Transformateurs, who returned from exile in Nov, 9 Dec however called for “yes” vote, paving way for his appointment as PM. Electoral commission 24 Dec said new constitution approved by almost 86% of voters, and placed turnout at 63.75%; some opposition leaders including former PM Pahimi Padacké and former minister Yaya Dillo 26 Dec contested figures before Supreme Court, which nonetheless validated results 28 Dec.

Accusation of Chadian interference in Sudanese conflict soured bilateral relations. Sudanese army and foreign affairs ministry late Nov-early Dec alleged Chad is facilitating United Arab Emirates’ support to paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. N’Djamena vehemently denied allegation and 16 Dec expelled four Sudanese diplomats. Khartoum immediately took reciprocal action and expelled three Chadian diplomats.

Several incidents of violence reported across country. In south, farmer-herder violence 7 Dec broke out in Koida village, Moyen-Chari province, with one dead and at least two injured, and 11 Dec left several people seriously injured in Birigui village, Logone Oriental province. Road blockers made comeback to Nord Kanem department, Kanem province in west near border with Niger, with 9 Dec attack on vehicle leaving at least two dead in Nokou locality.

Chad disengaged from region amid reconfiguration of Sahel security architecture. Amid pull-out of UN Mission (MINUSMA) from Mali, Chadian contingent 1 Dec returned home. Chad and Mauritania 6 Dec said exit of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from G5 Sahel means effective dissolution of anti-jihadist alliance created in 2014.

Côte d’Ivoire

Main opposition party’s elective congress highlighted internal divisions and rekindled animosity with ruling party.

Main opposition party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) prepared to hold extraordinary congress on 16 Dec to elect successor to long-time party leader, Henri Konan Bédié, who died in Aug. In last-minute ruling, Abidjan court of first instance 15 Dec ordered suspension of congress following urgent request from two senior party members, who alleged lack of transparency and irregularities in process. Controversy highlighted internal divisions between party’s old guard and younger reformist wing, and rekindled animosity between PDCI and ruling party Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP). PDCI interim president Alphonse Cowppli-Bony Kwassy 16 Dec denounced “practices from another era that undermine democracy and freedoms”, seemingly accusing RHDP of orchestrating suspension of congress. Plaintiffs 21 Dec withdrew complaint, and congress was held 22 Dec in capital Yamoussoukro. Former Credit Suisse CEO Tidjane Thiam won bid with 96,48 % of votes, defeating businessman and diplomat Jean-Marc Yacé.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Opposition rejected presidential election results giving victory to President Tshisekedi, amid widespread logistical issues and reports of irregularities; former election commission chief launched political-military alliance including M23, vowing to oust Tshisekedi.

Electoral commission declared Tshisekedi presidential winner, opposition cried foul. Electoral commission 20 Dec extended voting for general elections by one day amid widespread reports of voting stations unable to operate properly due to missing equipment, voter registers or other paperwork. Four opposition candidates, including Martin Fayulu and Denis Mukwege, 20 Dec denounced breach of electoral law and uneven playing field, calling for rerun. Former President Kabila’s political party same day issued strong statement, implicitly threatening destabilisation. Banned opposition protest 27 Dec left several people wounded in capital Kinshasa, with some protesters throwing stones at security forces who fired tear gas and stormed Fayulu’s campaign headquarters. Election observers from DR Congo’s Protestant and Catholic churches 28 Dec reported “numerous cases of irregularities likely to affect the integrity of the results”. Electoral commission 31 Dec said Tshisekedi re-elected with over 73% of vote. Moïse Katumbi and Fayulu, who came second and third respectively, denounced election as sham and rejected result outright.

Fighting continued between M23 rebels and govt-aligned forces in east. In North Kivu province, M23 maintained pressure on govt forces and allies especially around Sake town in Masisi territory. Fighting reported 4-7 Dec near Mushaki and Kilolirwe towns as M23 reportedly attempted to take over Mushaki. U.S.-sponsored 72-hour ceasefire 11 Dec entered into force, but M23 reportedly used pause to reinforce positions around Sake, allegedly with major reinforcements from Rwanda. M23 around 26 Dec moved closer to Sake and attempted breakthrough toward mining town of Rubaya, further west. East African regional force 21 Dec completed withdrawal after mandate expired.

Political-military coalition, allied to M23, created in Kenya. In Kenya’s capital Nairobi, former head of Congolese electoral commission Corneille Nangaa 15 Dec presented new political-military alliance with M23 and other groups. Kinshasa next day summoned Kenyan ambassador and recalled its own ambassador to Nairobi in protest. Nangaa, speaking from M23 stronghold of Rutshuru territory, 31 Dec vowed to march on Kinshasa to oust Tshisekedi from power.

Eritrea

23rd anniversary of Algiers Agreement with Ethiopia passed amid deteriorating bilateral relations.

12 Dec marked 23 years since Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded Algiers Agreement to establish peace and demarcate common border. U.S. and UK issued statements urging sides to honour their commitments under deal and emphasising respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and pursuit of regional peace and stability. Anniversary came amid deteriorating bilateral relations, however, fuelled by competing ambitions and unresolved grievances; Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed’s Oct comments on access to Red Sea port exacerbated mistrust. Rising tensions have increased prospect of slide toward war, though unlikely in near term given both countries’ weakened militaries and war-ravaged economies. Meanwhile, clashes 30 Dec erupted in UK capital London between supporters and opponents of Isaias’ govt, with supporters reportedly calling on Eritrean community to prepare for another war with Ethiopia; police intervened, said four officers were injured in violence.

Ethiopia

Hostilities in Amhara and Oromia regions continued unabated; Tigray region faced prospect of large-scale famine.

Amhara rebellion persisted amid human rights abuses. Clashes between federal forces and Amhara nationalist militia known as Fano continued, with govt stepping up airstrikes. Notably, Ethiopian Air Force early Dec conducted drone strikes in North Wollo and North Shewa zones, killing fifteen; drone attacks in South Wollo Zone 10 Dec killed around 40. Civilians suspected of Fano ties faced extrajudicial killings; notably, BBC 12 Dec reported that Ethiopian soldiers killed around 30 people allegedly providing Fano with resources. Rebels, meanwhile, targeted local officials, notably claiming 7 Dec assassination of ruling party head in Sayint Woreda (South Wollo).

Violence in Oromia intensified. Hostilities escalated in Oromia region following collapse of negotiations between govt and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Nov. Notably, govt-insurgent clashes erupted in Kombolcha district late Dec, with drone strike 25 Dec killing eight. Meanwhile, Oromo-Amhara tensions triggered more attacks on civilians. Notably, suspected Fano militants 12 Dec attacked civilians in Horo Guduru Wollega Zone, killing at least thirteen; Oromo militants, possibly OLA, 24 Nov-4 Dec attacked Orthodox Christians and mostly Amhara civilians in Arsi Zone, killing around 40.

Tigray truce held despite unresolved issues, threat of famine loomed. African Union’s monitoring team, established to oversee implementation of Tigray peace process, 1 Dec met with federal and Tigray leaders in capital Addis Ababa; sides extended team’s mandate until Dec 2024 and committed to talks within two months to address outstanding issues, including demobilisation of Tigray combatants, disputed territories and Eritrean troop presence. Meanwhile, interim administration 29 Dec appealed to federal govt and international partners, warning that over 90% of Tigray’s population are on brink of starvation due to drought, exacerbated by war’s destruction of agricultural systems.

In other important developments. Authorities 12 Dec arrested State Minister of Peace and former ally of PM Abiy, Taye Dendea, who days before criticised govt’s failure to end conflicts and tackle corruption. Latest round of talks on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam failed (see Nile Waters). Ethiopia-Eritrea relations remained strained (see Eritrea).

Guinea

In alleged attempt to tighten grip on power following major jailbreak in Nov, transitional authorities muzzled critical press and continued anti-corruption campaign targeting former state officials.

Manhunt continued after high-profile prison escape. Former minister of presidential security, Col. Claude Pivi, who escaped from prison in Nov alongside former President Moussa Dadis Camara and several collaborators, remained at large; all escapees had been on trial for alleged involvement in Conakry stadium massacre of 28 September 2009.

Authorities clamped down on critical media. Guinea’s media regulator, High Authority for Communication, 6 and 9 Dec ordered suspension of Djoma TV Channel, owned by close aide of deposed President Condé, and two other radio and television stations critical of military rule, citing unspecified “national security reasons”. In response, Guinean press union 7 Dec called for boycott of govt-sponsored events, while NGO Reporters Without Borders 14 Dec denounced “attacks on press freedom” and urged authorities to remove restrictions on private media.

Govt continued to harness legal system to silence opponents. Anti-corruption court 11 Dec summoned Amadou Damaro Camara and Mohamed Diané, former president of National Assembly and former defence minister under Condé, respectively, for hearings in corruption cases; Diané failed to appear and was ordered to come before court in Jan. Authorities have used anti-corruption campaign both to build popular support and silence potential opponents and critics.

Guinea-Bissau

Fighting broke out between security forces aligned with rival political factions; President Embaló described incident as attempted coup.

Battle overnight 30 Nov-1 Dec erupted between National Guard and special forces in Bissau, leaving two dead. Tensions started to rise after Economy and Finance Minister Souleiman Seidi and Treasury Secretary Antonio Monteiro were detained 30 Nov over corruption allegations prompting National Guard, which reports to Interior Ministry aligned with Seidi’s African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), to free pair from police custody in capital Bissau. Fighting 1 Dec subsided by noon after army captured Seidi and Monteiro, as well as National Guard commander. President Embaló immediately called incident “attempted coup” and 4 Dec dissolved PAIGC-dominated parliament, requesting fresh elections without setting date. PAIGC leader and parliamentary speaker Domingos Simões Pereira same day labelled move unconstitutional, vowed to continue holding parliamentary sessions, and 8 Dec reported deputies were being blocked from accessing parliament. Security forces 13 Dec used tear gas to disperse group of PAIGC deputies and supporters attempting to enter parliament. Embaló 20 Dec sacked PM Geraldo Martins, later appointed new govt.

Kenya

Cost of living crisis remained centre stage; Al-Shabaab and cattle-related violence persisted.

Govt struggled with cost of living crisis, bribery allegations. Treasury Cabinet Secretary Njuguna Ndun’gu 6 Dec admitted govt has been unable to pay public servants for five months. During independence celebrations, President Ruto 12 Dec acknowledged cost of living crisis but said tough fiscal policies were necessary and helped stabilise economy. Opposition leader Raila Odinga 31 Dec warned of new wave of demonstrations if Finance Act of 2023 is not repealed. Meanwhile, allegations mid-month surfaced in local media that Odinga received $30mn from President Ruto to stop anti-govt protests.

Al-Shabaab and cattle-related attacks continued. Al-Shabaab 2 Dec attacked police station in Hagadera refugee camp, Garissa County, injuring one; 15 Dec detonated explosive device on govt vehicle travelling on Dabaab-Garissa road, killing four. Meanwhile, gunmen 5 Dec attacked herders in Kangeta settlement, Meru County, killing one; herders retaliated killing one. Local residents 9 Dec killed three suspected cattle rustlers in Isiolo County, and police next day killed two cattle raiders in Kapturo village, Baringo County. Interior Cabinet Secretary Kithure Kindiki 28 Dec announced extension of Operation Maliza Uhalifu, launched in early 2023 in Rift Valley, to other banditry-prone areas in Meru, Isiolo and Marsabit counties.

Nairobi withdrew troops from DR Congo, prepared for deployment to Haiti. Kenyan-led East African Community regional force 21 Dec completed withdrawal from eastern DR Congo as force’s mandate expired. Nairobi prepared for deployment of police officers to lead UN-backed multinational force in Haiti despite High Court temporarily blocking deployment: Kenyan delegation 5-7 Dec visited Haiti, and Kenyan police chief Japhet Koome 14 Dec received Haitian police chief in capital Nairobi.

Madagascar

Top court confirmed President Rajoelina’s re-election for third term as opposition insisted it will not recognise result.

High Constitutional Court 1 Dec validated re-election in November polls of President Rajoelina, who was sworn in for third term 16 Dec. Collective of 11 opposition candidates 1 Dec once again rejected election results and called for national protest movement, and 8 Dec announced creation of “crisis unit” aimed at coordinating nationwide action. Police 11 Dec detained prominent journalist Gascar Fenosoa and opposition politician Christian Tabera for allegedly inciting police mutiny during 4 Dec TV interview. Antananarivo court 13 Dec gave senior opposition party official Ny Riana Randriamasinoro two-year suspended sentence for participating in unauthorised demonstration before election. Rajoelina sworn in 16 Dec; ahead of inauguration ceremony, authorities banned protests in capital.

 

Mali

As UN mission completed troops drawdown, jihadist and rebel blockades in north increased hardship facing civilians, and jihadist attacks targeted army positions in various regions.

Authorities faced challenges as they took steps to cement control of Kidal region. Govt late Nov-early Dec sent hundreds of soldiers and police to help enforce order in Kidal region after recently capturing regional capital from coalition of 2015 Algiers Accord signatory armed groups Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) – which includes Coordination of Azawad Movements separatists. New Kidal governor Gen. El Hadj Ag Gamo – tutelary figure of pro-govt signatory armed group, Imghad Tuareg Self-Defence Group and Allies – took office 13 Dec. Troops 20 Dec moved into rural town of Aguelhok and regained control of only vacated UN mission (MINUSMA) camp that had come under CSP control. In leaked document dated 8 Dec, CSP announced blockade on roads leading to major northern towns of Menaka, Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and Taoudeni in effort to step up pressure on govt forces. Meanwhile, MINUSMA completed drawdown of troops with handover of Sévaré base (Mopti region) and Timbuktu camp on 8 and 28 Dec, respectively.

Jihadist violence continued in north and centre. Jihadist groups 3 Dec launched spate of attacks mainly on military targets in northern regions. Notably, Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) attacks in Ménaka town (Ménaka region) and Labbezanga army base (Gao region) left at least 33 soldiers and three civilians dead; 14 militants also killed, including prominent leader Adamou Diallo. Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) same day attacked other military posts including Tessalit (Kidal region). JNIM 11 Dec reinstated blockade on Timbuktu town after easing it in Nov following negotiations with local elites. In Ségou region in centre, suspected JNIM militants 12 Dec killed at least 30 soldiers, allied militiamen and civilians in Farabougou village and nearby military camp.

In other important developments. West African regional bloc ECOWAS 10 Dec lifted travel restrictions on key transition officials and refrained from denouncing electoral delays. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 1 Dec announced forming three-state confederation and establishing stabilisation fund, investment bank and eventually common currency.

Mozambique

Insurgents launched deadly attacks on security forces and continued move southward in northern Cabo Delgado province, while partial re-run of municipal elections kept political tensions high.

Islamic State launched deadly attacks on security forces, continued to move south. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) combatants 7 Dec attacked military positions near Manhiça, Muidumbe district, killing five soldiers and looting food and weaponry in deadliest attack on security forces since Sept; ISMP 26-28 Dec killed unconfirmed number of soldiers in Pangane and Mucojo-Sede areas of Macomia district, displacing hundreds of civilians. Group of militants continued to move toward Cabo Delgado’s southern districts of Meluco and Quissanga in apparent attempt to avoid Rwandan and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) patrols in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia and Muidumbe districts; at least 50 armed insurgents 11 Dec passed through village in Quissanga without engaging local community. President of Islamic Council of Mozambique late Nov announced creation of international commission due to begin work in Jan to promote talks between govt and insurgents in Cabo Delgado.

Political fallout from contested municipal elections continued. Preliminary results gave ruling FRELIMO party winner of by-elections held 10 Dec in four municipalities where Constitutional Court had ordered new vote (either for whole municipality, or only for number of polling stations) due to widespread irregularities in October local elections. In some places, notably in Nacala, where main opposition party RENAMO boycotted vote, turnout was below 30%. Heavy police presence and clashes with opposition supporters reported near most polling stations on voting day, and RENAMO alleged police attacked party supporters in run-up to vote including raiding party offices in capital of Nampula province 5 Dec. Following elections, RENAMO 11 and 16 Dec marched in capital Maputo and police 12 Dec killed civilian bystander during opposition protest in Marromeu town, Sofala province. Constitutional Court 26 Dec said process had “deficient organisation, administration and management” but 30 Dec confirmed FRELIMO had won repeated votes.

Niger

West African regional bloc recognised military govt and set up committee to negotiate return to civilian rule; Niamey continued to expand ties with military-led neighbours and move away from erstwhile partners.

West African leaders recognised junta, set conditions for sanctions relief. Regional bloc ECOWAS Court of Justice 7 Dec dismissed junta’s request to lift sanctions imposed by ECOWAS after July coup, and 15 Dec ordered “immediate” release of deposed President Bazoum. At ECOWAS summit in Nigeria, West African leaders 10 Dec dropped demand for coup reversal, set up committee of three heads of state to negotiate with junta for “short transition” period to constitutional order, saying sanctions relief would depend on outcome of discussions.

Niger announced federation with Burkina Faso, Mali, withdrew from G5 Sahel. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 1 Dec announced intention to form three-state confederation and to establish stabilisation fund, investment bank and eventually common currency. Burkina Faso and Niger 2 Dec announced withdrawal from G5 Sahel anti-jihadist alliance, following in Mali’s footsteps; two remaining members Mauritania and Chad 6 Dec acknowledged departure of three founding countries, which paves the way for alliance’s dissolution. Meanwhile, junta 4 Dec ended two EU defence and security partnerships, and next day joined Mali in denouncing tax cooperation treaty with France. Transitional President Gen. Tchiani 4 Dec received Russian delegation and signed treaties strengthening bilateral military cooperation. Following visit to Niamey, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee 13 Dec said U.S. was ready to resume cooperation with Niger. Last French soldiers deployed in Niger 22 Dec left country following end of bilateral military cooperation.

Insecurity persisted in Tillabery region (south west). Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims 3 Dec killed two civilians in Tondia village, Gotheye department. Armed forces 27 Nov-3 Dec conducted security operations in Abala and Banibangou areas, killing two suspected Islamic State Sahel Province militants and arresting 19. Unidentified jihadist militants 29 Dec attacked Amara and Loutchi villages, Téra department, reportedly killing 11 civilians.

Nigeria

Armed groups and govt forces killed 300 civilians as violence remained widespread in North West and North Central zones; Supreme Court ruled separatist leader must be tried for terrorism.

Army mistakenly launched drone strike on civilians in North West Zone. During routine security operation in Kaduna state, army 3 Dec mistook villagers celebrating Muslim festival in Tudun Biri village for armed group members, and struck them with two drones, killing at least 85 people. After some initial confusion, army 4 Dec confirmed striking civilians by mistake, and President Tinubu 5 Dec ordered investigation. UN Human Rights Office 6 Dec urged authorities to “take all feasible steps” to protect civilians as they combat various armed groups in northern states.

Gunmen went on killing spree in North Central Zone. Armed groups 24-25 Dec rampaged through about 25 farming villages of Bokkos and Barkin Ladi areas in Plateau State, killing at least 198 people, and displacing more than 10,000. No group claimed responsibility, but attacks occurred in area long plagued by herder-farmer violence. Kidnappings for ransom continued to surge in Federal Capital Territory, with victims abducted not only in peripheral settlements but also inside city: at least 73 residents abducted 9-29 Dec in Bwari and Kuje areas, as well as villages in neighbouring Niger state.

Supreme Court reinstated terrorism charges against Biafra separatist leader. Supreme Court 15 Dec ruled leader of separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Nnamdi Kanu, must be tried for terrorism although his extradition from Kenya in 2021 was illegal; decision, which reversed Appeal Court’s October 2022 ruling, may prompt hardline IPOB faction to escalate violence. Meanwhile, unidentified gunmen 10 Dec killed seven people, including members of local vigilante group, in attack on nightclub in Oba town, Idemili area of Anambra state.

Cost-of-living crisis deepened as inflation rose to 18-year high. World Bank 13 Dec said national currency (naira) has lost 41% of its value against dollar on official currency market since May and 30% on parallel market, urged govt to “take additional measures” for economy. National Bureau of Statistics 15 Dec said consumer inflation rose to 28.20% in Nov from 27.33% in Oct.

Nile Waters

Latest round of talks on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) failed to produce agreement.

Latest round of trilateral talks between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan on GERD 19 Dec ended without agreement. Cairo 19 Dec issued statement saying “meeting was unsuccessful due to Ethiopia’s persistent refusal … to accept any of the technical or legal compromise solutions that would safeguard the interests of all three countries”; Addis Ababa same day said it sought “amicable agreement” but accused Egypt of maintaining “colonial era mentality” and erecting “roadblocks against efforts toward convergence”.

Rwanda

Kinshasa’s rhetoric against Kigali reached new heights, while Burundi accused Kigali of supporting RED-Tabara rebel group.

Regional tensions remained elevated. Amid sustained offensive by Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern DR Congo (see DR Congo), Congolese President Tshisekedi 8 Dec compared President Kagame to Hitler and his “expansionist aims”, and around 19 Dec threatened to declare war should Rwanda “persist in its aggression”. Renewed RED-Tabara rebel attacks in Burundi ratcheted up bilateral tensions after months of improvement. Burundi’s President Ndayishimiye 29 Dec accused Rwanda of funding and training rebel group, which Kigali immediately denied (see Burundi).

In another important development. Election commission 12 Dec scheduled presidential and parliamentary polls for 15-16 July 2024; Kagame expected to run for fourth term in office.

Senegal

Court cleared opposition leader Ousmane Sonko to run in February presidential election, but his candidacy continued to face obstacles.

Dakar court of first instance 14 Dec reinstated Sonko on electoral register, clearing him to run for president in February. Sonko’s lawyers same day called on govt to issue Sonko with sponsorship forms needed for candidacy registration ahead of 26 Dec deadline. Sonko’s representatives 18-20 Dec claimed govt was refusing to follow court order and reinstate Sonko on electoral roll, said security forces had denied them access to electoral commission headquarters to collect sponsorship forms. Govt in following days reportedly challenged court decision to reinstate Sonko on electoral roll before Supreme Court. Sonko’s lawyers 26 Dec said they had submitted Sonko’s presidential candidacy to Constitutional Council despite lack of required documents. “Sonko President 2024” coalition 31 Dec nominated Sonko as presidential candidate in online ceremony after authorities banned nomination meeting initially scheduled for 30 Dec in Dakar, citing risks to public order.

Sierra Leone

Fallout from alleged coup attempt continued to loom large, with former president named as suspect.

Govt 4 Dec announced 43 new arrests, the vast majority of them military personnel, in connection with 26 Nov attack on military barracks and other locations in capital Freetown, which authorities called “attempted coup”. Authorities 9 Dec said former President Ernest Bai Koroma had been confined to his home and summoned for questioning as part of police investigation into case. Police chief 12 Dec confirmed Koroma was “suspect” in organisation of late-Nov events. Authorities 20 Dec lifted nationwide curfew imposed following late-Nov incidents. Meanwhile, leaders of West African regional bloc ECOWAS 10 Dec condemned attempted coup and ordered deployment of stabilisation mission to Sierra Leone; ECOWAS delegation 23 Dec visited country to prepare ground for deployment.

Somalia

Puntland made breakthrough to resolve electoral dispute, reducing prospect of conflict; govt took steps to resume operations against Al-Shabaab.

Puntland president announced return to clan-based voting system for parliament. Puntland President Said Deni 6 Dec abandoned plan to move from clan-based system to universal suffrage, saying parliamentary elections would be held 8 Jan with clan representatives selecting MPs, who in turn would choose state’s next president; decision significantly reduced prospect of conflict between state govt and opposition-aligned forces, but challenges remained. Puntland’s parliament 7 Dec announced plans to form committee in charge of electing state’s next president and voted to extend its own mandate for another year. Puntland’s constitutional court 10 Dec annulled one-year extension following request by govt. Deni 28 Dec announced re-election bid.

Military operations against Al-Shabaab set to resume as rainy season ended. Govt forces took positions in preparation for resumption of offensive as rainy season concluded mid Dec, and clashed with Al-Shabaab in some areas of Galmudug and Hirshabelle states (centre). Harardhere district of Mudug region saw most significant activity: govt claimed around 30 Al-Shabaab members killed 7 Dec in Baraag Gugurte, and 80 insurgents killed around 26 Dec near Caad town. In Hiraan region, govt-aligned clan militias 3 Dec clashed with Al-Shabaab militants trying to infiltrate area along Shabelle river, claimed 60 militants killed. Operations also continued in recently opened front in South West state. Notably, army 1-4 Dec cleared several villages on border between Bay and Bakool regions. Govt said U.S. airstrike 17 Dec killed senior Al-Shabaab leader Maalim Atman in group’s stronghold of Jilib (Middle Juba region, Jubaland state). Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab suicide bomber 3 Dec wounded five military recruits at Turkish-run training centre in capital Mogadishu.

In other important developments. AU mission (ATMIS) 17 Dec resumed drawdown including from president’s residence in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, Somalia continued to reach milestones on international stage, including UN Security Council 1 Dec lifting arms embargo imposed in 1992. President Mohamud and Somaliland President Bihi 28-29 Dec met in Djibouti, agreed to resume talks to resolve political tensions, after previous negotiations stalled in 2020.

Somaliland

Tensions persisted between govt and Dhulbahante clan militias in Sool region, while new Dhulbahante authorities insisted on becoming federal member state of Somalia.

Situation remained precarious in Sool region despite lull in fighting. Govt and Dhulbahante clan militia in Dec continued to reinforce positions near frontline, leading to concerns of resumption in fighting. Risk of further skirmishes between Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan) and Dhulbahante militias around Buhoodle town also remained high. Meanwhile, govt 4 Dec and 8 Dec claimed arresting spies working for Somali, Dhulbahante and Puntland authorities.

Dhulbahante administration continued to assert independence. SSC-Khatumo state (new self-declared administration for Dhulbahante community) 23 Dec rejected participation in Puntland elections in Jan and insisted on being autonomous Somalia state.

Somaliland and Somalia agreed to resume dialogue. President Bihi and Somalia President Mohamud 28-29 Dec met in Djibouti, agreed to resume dialogue to resolve political issues, after previous talks stalled in 2020; sides also agreed to cooperate on security and fight against organised crime. Bihi 31 Dec also travelled to Ethiopia for talks with PM Abiy Ahmed.

South Sudan

Intercommunal fighting continued in Abyei region and spilled into Warrap state, tensions between Riek Machar’s forces and defected commander escalated in Unity state, and concerns about 2024 poll persisted.

Hostilities between rival Dinka in Abyei and Warrap state continued. Fighting between Ngok Dinka from disputed Abyei Administrative Area and Twic Dinka from Warrap state continued in Abyei. Notably, Twic 2 Dec set up checkpoints in Athony-Ayuok village, prompting clashes 2, 3 Dec that killed at least six. Armed men 31 Dec killed six, including Abyei deputy chief administrator, on Abyei-Aneet town road; Abyei authorities blamed Twic youth from Warrap state. Crisis contributed to breakdown of security situation in Warrap. Notably, Twic youth 3 Dec attacked state prison, freeing and arming 57 cattle guards, 35 of which reportedly joined militias. Two sections of Rek Dinka 8 Dec fought over ownership of cattle camp, killing five armed Dinka youth. Fighting in Atonj area 14 Dec killed at least eight, 17 Dec killed seven.

Tensions between Riek Machar’s forces and defected commander sparked fighting. Standoff between forces of Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) and Simon Maguek Gai (IO commander who defected to army in Oct) sparked sporadic fighting in Unity state. SPLA-IO late Nov left Leer town following clashes and by 2 Dec fighting had reached Guit county. Weakened SPLA-IO 14-15 Dec also withdrew from Bentiu town near Guit and moved to cantonment after army allegedly threatened force if they did not leave, which army denied; Panyijiar county now last SPLA-IO stronghold in Unity and likely target of Maguek Gai’s next military operation.

Concerns about election preparedness mounted. 70 local civil society organisations 1 Dec issued statement warning country is not ready for elections; UN Special Representative Nicholas Haysom 14 Dec reiterated concerns before UN Security Council. Meanwhile, President Kiir 12 Dec replaced Minister of Presidential Affairs Barnaba Marial Benjamin with new ally Joseph Bakosoro, an Equatorian Zande seen as possible running-mate in election to garner support in Equatorian region.

Sudan

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured Wad Madani city in first major offensive east, raising fears group could try and conquer entire country by force; RSF leader embarked on major diplomatic tour.

RSF seized Gezira state capital, triggering mass displacement. RSF 15 Dec launched offensive on El-Gezira state capital Wad Madani in east, sparking clashes with army and shattering relative stability of regional state. Paramilitary 18 Dec stormed Wad Madani after capturing army base, army next day announced withdrawal from city. Fighting displaced around 300,000 people, while UN humanitarian agency 15 Dec suspended field missions in state. RSF 20 Dec claimed capture of military base in Gezira’s al-Hasaheisa town. Paramilitary’s advance east marked new phase in war and signalled it could attempt to conquer Sudan by force.

RSF eyed capture of North Darfur capital El Fasher. Joint Force of Armed Groups, comprised of Juba Peace Agreement signatories, 2 Dec announced troop deployment to North Darfur in preparation for RSF attack on El Fasher, only Darfur state capital not under its control. Chairman of rebel group Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council Al-Hadi Idris 12 Dec warned RSF attack could “transform the ongoing war into a tribal conflict”. Army and RSF 16 Dec clashed in northern El Fasher and Abu Shouk displacement camp.

Fighting continued in capital Khartoum, RSF clashed with rebel group in South Kordofan. Clashes 14 Dec reignited around strategic sites of Khartoum North and persisted elsewhere in capital, killing dozens. In North Kordofan, clashes continued over state capital El Obeid. In South Kordofan state, RSF 5 Dec launched attack on Tukma village, sparking clashes with rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North.

In other important developments. After army official late Nov accused Chad and United Arab Emirates of supporting RSF, N’Djamena and Abu Dhabi expelled Sudanese diplomats, prompting tit-for-tat measures from Sudan. Regional bloc Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD) 9 Dec held emergency summit in Djibouti; sides agreed to ceasefire and face-to-face meeting, but next day denied commitments were unconditional. RSF leader Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo late Dec embarked on major diplomatic tour, meeting with leaders of Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti in effort to improve RSF’s diplomatic standing.

Uganda

Islamic State-affiliated rebels intensified violence and govt remained under pressure over human rights abuses.

Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) stepped up attacks on Ugandan soil. Two bombs 2 Dec exploded in suburbs of capital Kampala, injuring one. President Museveni next day blamed Islamic State-affiliated ADF and vowed to “intensify” army operations against group in neighbouring DR Congo. ADF 19 Dec launched attack in Kitehurizi village in Kamwenge district, killing ten civilians and forcing hundreds to flee; Museveni 20 Dec announced retaliatory airstrikes against group in DR Congo. ADF 25 Dec killed three civilians in another village of Kamwenge.

Controversy over human rights persisted, inflamed by army scandal. As political opposition 30 Nov ended month-long parliamentary boycott over human rights abuses, U.S. 4 Dec expanded visa restrictions on senior govt officials over human rights and democracy concerns. Govt 13 Dec ordered investigation into viral video purportedly showing soldiers torturing suspected thief in Lagot village, Kitgum district, and military court 15 Dec sentenced soldiers identified in video to one year in prison.

In other important developments. Military court 5 Dec remanded into custody 31 people, including seven soldiers, on charges related to alleged plot to overthrow Museveni between Feb 2022 and Oct 2023. Leader of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, 27 Dec said he travelled to Uganda to discuss developments in Sudan with Museveni; trip is Hemedti’s first confirmed appearance outside of Sudan since war between RSF and Sudanese army broke out in April.

Zimbabwe

Ruling party won most parliamentary seats in controversial by-elections; conduct of election cycle stymied international re-engagement efforts.

Ruling party won majority of seats in contested recall vote. ZANU-PF 9 Dec won seven of nine by-elections for parliamentary seats which had been secured by main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) candidates in Aug elections; by-elections were triggered by recall of CCC MPs by party’s self-proclaimed secretary-general Sengezo Tshabangu, who CCC leader Nelson Chamisa claims is working for ruling ZANU-PF party. ZANU-PF now holds 184 National Assembly seats, three short of two-thirds majority lost during Aug elections, with CCC claiming govt is using recalls to reclaim majority. Tensions likely to continue with another round of by-elections due 3 Feb as dozens of other CCC MPs, senators and local councillors have been recalled by Tshabangu. In lead-up to by-elections, High Court 7 Dec barred recalled CCC MPs from contesting votes, while police 3 Dec reportedly prevented opposition rallies in cities of Bulawayo and Masvingo.

Conduct of elections continued to isolate Zimbabwe internationally. Govt’s international re-engagement drive, which seeks to receive debt and sanctions relief, faltered amid widespread criticism of handling of votes. Notably, U.S. 4 Dec announced additional sanctions including visa restrictions on individuals responsible for “undermining democracy”.

Asia

Afghanistan

Taliban continued crackdown on Islamic State’s local branch as armed opposition groups raised political profile abroad, while tensions persisted between Taliban and Pakistan.

Anti-Taliban groups continued armed and political activities. Taliban security forces 8 Dec targeted Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) cell in Herat province (west) and neighbouring Nimroz province (south west). While attacks by ISKP have reduced in recent months, Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) has emerged as one of most active armed opposition groups inside Afghanistan: group 24 Nov claimed attack against Taliban in Bagram district of Parwan province (north east). Although no attacks were attributed to National Resistance Front (NRF), group’s leader participated in conference organised in Russian capital Moscow, marking first time Russia has invited anti-Taliban groups to publicly held conference; NRF also held event in Austrian capital Vienna in early Dec, where it presented its roadmap for new Afghanistan, after group’s spokesman 28 Nov attended Herat Security Dialogue in Tajikistan capital Dushanbe. Increased international activity by armed opposition groups suggest level of international frustration with de facto authorities’ refusal to meet external demands.

Relations with Pakistan continued to exhibit strains. Militants 12 Dec conducted major attack in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, killing 23 soldiers (see Pakistan); hours later, Pakistani FM Jalil Abbas Jilani delivered strong demarche to Afghan chargé d’affaires, calling for Kabul to take verifiable action against perpetrators.

In other important developments. Taliban’s FM Amir Khan Muttaqi 16 Dec met with Turkmenistan FM Rasit Meredow at Torghundi border crossing of Herat province, marking first such high-level interaction between Taliban and Turkmenistan. U.S. Department of Treasury 8 Dec imposed sanctions on two Taliban officials, Fariduddin Mahmoud and Muhammad Khalid Hanafi, allegedly for their role in restrictions on women; Taliban criticised move, pointing to U.S.’ opposition to Security Council resolutions on Gaza as evidence of country’s duplicitous approach to human rights.

Bangladesh

Amid govt crackdown on opposition, country braced for potentially chaotic, violent and disputed general election in January 2024.

Govt continued crackdown on opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Ruling Awami League-controlled courts convicted at least 1,600 BNP leaders and activists since 1 Aug, while authorities reportedly arrested up to 25,000 BNP members since late Oct, with most leaders in prison and many members in hiding. Having formally boycotted 7 Jan general election by refraining from registering any candidates before 30 Nov deadline, BNP continued campaign of demonstrations, blockades and “hartals”: party members 10 Dec formed human chains countrywide to draw attention to human rights situation. BNP 16 Dec organised its largest rally since late Oct crackdown, with tens (possibly hundreds) of thousands demonstrating in capital Dhaka. BNP reportedly sought to assemble political parties not participating in vote into single platform. In attempt to lend credibility to vote, ruling Awami League struck series of seat-sharing deals to give impression of opposition participation. While Awami League appeared set to win with large majority, it remained unclear whether it can successfully project image of credible election amid risks of voting descending into chaotic violence between rival supporters within ruling party or so-called opposition parties, as well as clashes involving BNP; if voter turnout proves low, officials could resort to rigging ballots.

Violence and insecurity continued in Rohingya refugee camps. Security forces 15 Dec broke up Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) meeting in camps, arresting four following shootout. Separate attacks 21 Dec killed three refugees – at least one linked to rival group Rohingya Solidarity Organisation. Dire conditions in camps prompted growing numbers of refugees to flee to Indonesia’s Aceh province, bringing total to 1,500 since mid Nov: Indonesian authorities signalled patience was wearing thin, while some locals refused to provide assistance and demanded deportation of refugees.

Chittagong Hill Tracts remained restive. Dialogue between govt and Kuki-Chin National Front was postponed until 2024. Armed group formed by Bengali settlers 11 Dec reportedly killed four activists from armed organisation United People’s Democratic Front in Khagrachari; three others were abducted in attack.

China/Japan

China maintained high naval activity in East China Sea and conducted joint aerial operations with Russia, while Beijing and Tokyo continued diplomatic engagement.

Maritime and aerial activity continued around disputed East China Sea islands. As of 31 Dec, Japan spotted 91 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone during Dec and eight vessels within Japan’s territorial sea. China’s and Japan’s coast guards 10 Dec accused other of intrusions previous day in territorial waters of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; two Chinese Coast Guard ships 9 Dec and 10 Dec, and four ships 18 Dec entered Japan’s territorial waters around Senkaku/Diaoyu. Japanese Coast Guard revealed Chinese vessels made incursions into island’s contiguous zone on 352 days in 2023, highest number since records began in 2008. Meanwhile, Japan’s defence ministry 14 Dec reported two Chinese H6 bombers flew from East China Sea to Sea of Japan, meeting with two Russian TU95 bombers for joint flight, just as around seventeen Chinese and Russian aircraft flew around Japan, prompting Japanese fighter jets to scramble.

Japan and China continued diplomatic engagement. China’s ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao 6 Dec met with representative of Japan’s Komeito political party Natsuo Yamaguchi to discuss promoting exchanges and communication in various fields, including party exchanges. China’s foreign ministry 8 Dec stated China holds open attitude towards exchanges and cooperation with Japan, including party-to-party exchanges, and expressed hope that Japan will make efforts to build constructive and stable relationship. Japan’s new ambassador to China, Kanasugi Kenji, 19 Dec arrived in China’s capital Beijing, expressing his intention to advance dialogue between two countries and address pending issues, including China’s restrictions on imports of Japanese fishery products over concerns related to release of treated water from Fukushima nuclear power plant.

In other important developments. Japanese, U.S. and Australian militaries 4 Dec initiated their first trilateral command post drill aimed at enhancing their readiness for Japan’s defence. China’s defence ministry 14 Dec urged Japan to stop interfering in China’s internal affairs and spreading false narratives about “Chinese military threat” as excuse for its military expansion.

India

Instability and violence persisted in Manipur state in far north east, Maoist militants increased attacks in centre, and breakthrough on border dispute with China remained elusive.

Ethnic conflict in Manipur state entered seventh month in Dec. Intra-community clashes 19 Dec flared up between Kuki-Zo tribes over naming of tribal burial site ahead of mass burial of 87 victims on 20 Dec by Indigenous Tribal Leader’s Forum, in line with Supreme Court ruling late Nov instructing govt to ensure dignified burials of tribal victims whose bodies had been held in morgues in state capital Imphal. In response, Manipur state govt same day imposed restrictions on Churachandpur district for two months, prohibiting assembly of five or more people and carrying of sticks or weapons. Suspected militants 30 Dec fired RPG rockets in ambush injuring five security forces personnel in Moreh district. Unidentified gunmen 1 Jan killed four Meitei Muslims, who have remained neutral in ethnic conflict, in Manipur’s Thoubal district.

Centre saw uptick in Maoist attacks. Following state elections in Chhattisgarh state (centre) in Nov, Maoist attacks killed several. Maoists 9 Dec killed ruling Bharatiya Janata Party member in Narayanpur district. IED blast 11 Dec injured two security personnel in Sukma district. IED blast 13 Dec killed security forces member in Narayanpur district. IED blast 14 Dec killed one security forces member in Kanker district. Gun battle 17 Dec erupted during anti-Maoist security operation in Sukma district, killing one security forces member.

Border dispute with China continued to smoulder. India and China 30 Nov held fourteenth meeting since May 2020 of Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, but made no progress despite in-depth discussions on proposals to achieve complete disengagement in Eastern Ladakh; troops from both sides remain forward deployed in Demchok and Depsang friction points. Indian and Chinese commanders reportedly continued to meet during Dec. Reports during Dec indicated counter-insurgency force Assam Rifles will undertake preparations for deployment along Line of Actual Control in event of contingencies.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Deadly militant attack killed five soldiers in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) despite onset of winter, while Supreme Court in landmark ruling upheld govt’s decision to scrap J&K’s special status.

Militants continued attacks, defying harsh winter conditions. Militants 21 Dec ambushed two army vehicles in Jammu’s Rajouri district, killing five soldiers and injuring two. Army subsequently launched security operation; three of eight civilians apprehended for interrogation died due to injuries next day, with some family members alleging torture. Earlier, security forces 6 Dec arrested two alleged militants in Rajouri district, recovering arms. Militants 9 Dec shot and injured police officer in Srinagar; The Resistance Force claimed responsibility. Security forces 17 Dec claimed to have arrested cell of three militants targeting police officers in Srinagar.

Supreme Court upheld govt’s abrogation of Article 370. Five-judge Supreme Court bench headed by Chief Justice of India 11 Dec upheld govt’s decision in 2019 to revoke Article 370 of constitution, which offered J&K semi-autonomous status; court also ordered Election Commission to organise J&K regional polls – last of which were held in 2014 – before 30 Sept 2024 and directed govt to restore J&K’s statehood. In response, former chief minister Omar Abdullah vowed “the struggle will continue”, national newspaper The Hindu said ruling “legitimises subversion of federal principles”, while Pakistan denounced ruling, saying “international law doesn’t recognise India’s unilateral and illegal actions” and decision has “no legal value”. Police same day reportedly placed political leaders in Kashmir in detention.

Central govt passed two controversial bills. Parliament 6-11 Dec adopted The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Amendment) Bill, allowing for increase in number of constituencies and nominations by New Delhi, and The Jammu & Kashmir Reservation (Amendment) Bill, declaring two communities – Hindu community of Kashmiri Pandits and hill tribe of Pahadis – eligible for affirmative action; critics of legislation accused govt of attempting to manipulate political landscape to its advantage ahead of 2024 national elections by wooing Pandits and Pahadi community.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea conducted third test of solid-fuelled inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) and kicked off annual ruling party review, while U.S. and South Korea held nuclear consultations.

Pyongyang conducted operational exercise of solid-fuel ICBM. North Korea 18 Dec conducted its third test of solid-fuelled ICBM, marking its fifth ICBM test of 2023; new ICBM HS-18 forms third prong of North Korea’s current ICBM armoury. Latest test was described as “launching drill of an ICBM unit”, presumably intended to imply new ICBM is operational. State media described launch as being conducted with due regard for other states in region, as missile flew for more than 70 minutes on very lofted trajectory without crossing Japanese territory.

North Korea held annual ruling party performance review. Start of ruling Korean Workers’ Party’s annual review meeting was reported by state media on 27 Dec; forum, held in capital Pyongyang, serves as review of party performance during 2023, gauging implementation of goals set down in country’s five-year plan; leader Kim Jong Un called 2023 “year of great transformation” in fields ranging from military development to construction and warned “war can break out at any time” on peninsula. Results will give clearer indication of regime’s foreign policy priorities and stance for 2024.

U.S. submarine made port visit to South Korea after second nuclear talking shop. U.S. and South Korea 15 Dec held second Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting in U.S. capital Washington; NCG, part of Washington Declaration agreed in April 2023, aims to give South Korea more voice in deciding alliance nuclear strategy and, accordingly, to reduce domestic pressure for Seoul to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent capability. Following meeting, U.S. nuclear-powered submarine USS Missouri 17 Dec made port visit to Busan in South Korea.

In another important development. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and U.S. late Nov both raised concerns that North Korea had begun to bring experimental light-water nuclear reactor – type of reactor that Pyongyang has no experience in operating – online at its Yongbyon nuclear research facility.

Myanmar

China brokered limited truce between military and ethnic armed group in Shan State before talks faltered, while fierce fighting persisted in several areas between regime and other ethnic armed groups.

Armed groups expanded control over northern Shan State. Following launch of “Operation 1027”, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – member of Three Brotherhood Alliance – early Dec continued to expand control over northern Shan State by capturing several major bases and outposts, including around Laukkaing town where group established stranglehold; MNDAA 29 Nov said 184 regime soldiers surrendered in area. Elsewhere in Shan State, Three Brotherhood member Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) continued to press regime along much of Mandalay-Muse highway; clashes 1 Dec took place near Kyaukme town and group 6 Dec seized regime outpost in Monglon town. TNLA 15 Dec captured Namhsan town despite intensive regime airstrikes. Offering respite after six weeks of hostilities, China 11 Dec brokered limited ceasefire between regime and MNDAA in meeting in China, as sides reportedly agreed to halt fighting until end of Dec and create safe corridor for civilians and officials to leave Laukkaing; however, limited fighting continued and then escalated after further talks on 23 Dec broke down.

In Rakhine State, Arakan Army (AA) struggled against well-prepared regime. AA clashed with regime forces in several parts of Rakhine State during Dec, as regime maintained blockade on major roads and waterways that led to skyrocketing food, fuel and medicine prices. In Chin State, AA early Dec captured two large bases on Kaladan River in Paletwa Township, after weeks of heavy fighting.

Hostilities persisted in Kayah and Kayin states and Bago Region. In Kayah State, regime and resistance forces remained locked in month-long battle for state capital Loikaw; Karenni Nationalities Defence Force claimed control of more than half of town, but regime airstrikes destroyed hundreds of homes. Regime artillery fire 9 Dec scorched town’s main market. In Kayin State, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) struggled to capture Kawkareik town on Yangon-Myawaddy highway. In Bago region, KNLA and allied PDF forces 2 Dec captured most of Mone town before subsequently retreating under heavy regime airstrikes.

Pakistan

In deadliest attack of 2023, jihadist militants killed almost two dozen soldiers in north west; authorities prepared for 8 February general election as opposition leaders battled legal challenges.

Militants staged deadliest assault of 2023. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, militants 12 Dec rammed explosive-laden vehicle into gate of military compound in Dera Ismail Khan district and conducted multiple suicide bombings, collapsing building and killing at least 23 soldiers and wounding over 30 – marking deadliest attack of year; Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan militant outfit claimed responsibility. Militant attack on military-police checkpoint in Khyber district 15 Dec killed two paramilitary personnel and three police officers.

Relations with Afghanistan continued to exhibit strains. Islamabad attributed spike in militant attacks to Afghan Taliban authorities’ refusal to take action against Pakistani Taliban and its affiliates. Notably, hours after 12 Dec attack, FM Jalil Abbas Jilani delivered strong demarche to Afghan chargé d’affaires, calling for Kabul to take verifiable action against perpetrators; Taliban dismissed claims of Afghan link to attack as “baseless”. Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to deport undocumented Afghans to Afghanistan, with more than 500,000 forcibly sent across border since Oct.

Political tensions continued to mount ahead of Feb elections. Supreme Court 15 Dec suspended Lahore High Court’s ruling two days earlier in favour of petition of former PM Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) against deployment of bureaucrats (as opposed to judicial officers) to oversee elections on 8 Feb. Election Commission same day issued election schedule, ruling out any further delays in election process. Continuing to criticise appointment of bureaucrats as election supervisors, PTI still vowed to contest polls; Khan’s ability to stand for public office, however, rests on whether courts will overturn his corruption conviction. Khan’s legal hurdles mounted further as special court 12 Dec indicted him in relation to case of misusing diplomatic cables. Khan’s main political opponent, former PM Nawaz Sharif, benefitted from two Islamabad High Court rulings 29 Nov and 12 Dec overturning corruption cases; to stand in election, Sharif requires Supreme Court to overturn life ban on holding office, issued in 2017.

Philippines

Jihadist bombing killed four Christians in Marawi city in south, while hostilities persisted between military and Communists despite dialogue deal struck in Nov.

Jihadist bombing killed four in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Members affiliated with remnants of Maute Group – also known as Dawlah Islamiyah – 3 Dec bombed church service at Mindanao State University in Marawi city, killing four and injuring over forty individuals. In response, military conducted several air and ground offensives in Maguindanao province and adjacent areas of Cotabato province, particularly Ligawasan marsh area, killing at least nine members of Dawlah Islamiyah 7-9 Dec. Dawlah Islamiyah 8 Dec launched ambush on Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) near Ligawasan marsh on boundary of Maguindanao del Sur and Cotabato provinces, reportedly killing several MILF members. Clashes 18 Dec erupted between armed men associated with MILF’s 105 Base Command in Mamasapano town over existing feud, lasting for several days until ceasefire was brokered.

Clashes persisted between Communist rebels and military. Despite agreement struck in Nov in Norwegian capital Oslo between main Communist umbrella group and govt to renew talks after six-year hiatus, hostilities on ground continued. Clashes between govt forces and Communists in Luzon Island (Quezon and Batangas) in north and Visayas Islands (Negros and Samar) in centre killed at least 25 combatants and injured three civilians.

South China Sea

China and Philippines remained in tense dispute over contested South China Sea (SCS) features, leading to maritime collision near Second Thomas Shoal.

Amid war of words, Chinese and Philippine vessels collided in SCS. Philippines 3 Dec reported “alarming” increase of over 135 Chinese naval ships “swarming” Whitsun Reef in SCS. Manila 9 Dec accused Chinese coast guard of obstructing three military boats on resupply mission to fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal. Further fuelling animosity, Chinese and Philippine vessels 10 Dec collided near Second Thomas Shoal – source of tensions between pair in recent months – after similar incident in Oct: Philippine coast guard accused Beijing of firing water cannons and ramming resupply vessels and coast guard ship, causing “serious engine damage”, while China’s coast guard accused Manila of intentionally ramming one of its boats. Collision occurred after Manila deployed “Christmas convoy” of around 40 vessels to distribute gifts and provisions to Philippine troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal. U.S. 11 Dec underscored “ironclad” commitment mutual defence treaty with Philippines. Philippines foreign ministry 12 Dec summoned China’s ambassador to protest “back-to-back harassments” in SCS. Philippine ambassador to U.S. next day warned SCS was more dangerous flashpoint than Taiwan and called for multilateral responses to China’s coercive actions. Earlier, USS Gabrielle Giffords 4 Dec sailed past Second Thomas Shoal, which China strongly protested. Philippine President Marcos Jr. 19 Dec called for “paradigm shift” in approach to SCS, citing poor progress in diplomacy with Beijing.

In other important developments. Philippines 1 Dec inaugurated new coast guard station on contested Thitu Island to enhance monitoring capabilities. Chinese leader Xi Jinping 12 Dec visited Vietnam, declaring that pair will “enter a new era”; Vietnam elevated ties with U.S. and Japan to “comprehensive strategic partners” in recent months, a status previously reserved for China. Japan and regional bloc ASEAN 17 Dec held special summit commemorating 50 years of official ties; leaders adopted joint vision emphasising security and economic cooperation and respect for rule of law.

Sri Lanka

Govt unlocked new tranches of international financial assistance in bid to raise revenue, while inter-ethnic reconciliation generated debate and allegations of abuse dogged police leadership.

Govt secured international financial support. International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Executive Board 12 Dec announced completion of first review of Extended Fund Facility, opening way for cash infusion of $337mn; IMF judged govt’s performance “satisfactory” for raising revenue and rebuilding reserves, while noting challenges ahead, including need to further raise revenue, eradicate corruption and enhance governance. Meanwhile, Asian Development Bank 8 Dec announced it had approved $200mn concessional loan to help stabilise financial sector and World Bank 20 Dec announced release of $250mn in budget support. Parliament 13 Dec approved govt’s 2024 budget featuring plans for ambitious increase in revenue.

Inter-ethnic reconciliation initiatives provoked controversy. Sangha for Better Sri Lanka, comprising half a dozen Buddhist monks, and members of diaspora-based Global Tamil Forum (GTF) 7-15 Dec jointly conducted series of meetings with wide range of religious, political, civil society leaders and diplomats in effort to launch “national conversation” based on “Himalaya Declaration” agreed by pair in April 2023; GTF described initiative as attempt to create country based on “pluralistic character”, “equal citizenship” and devolution of power to provinces. Domestic and diaspora Tamil groups attacked initiative for falling short of long-standing Tamil demands and for supporting govt’s reconciliation agenda, including controversial truth and reconciliation commission due for 2024 launch. In eastern district Batticaloa, Buddhist monk-provocateur Ampitiye Sumanarathana physically blocked two Tamil parliamentarians from joining Tamil cattle herders demanding return of land forcibly seized by Sinhala farmers.

Controversy swirled around leadership of Sri Lanka police. Supreme Court 14 Dec ruled that acting Inspector General of Police (IGP), Deshabandu Tenakoon, and three other police officials had illegally detained and tortured man in 2011. Police arrested more than 15,000 people in island-wide anti-drug blitz, amid allegations of excessive force and lack of due process; campaign was personally directed by Tenakoon and public security minister Tiran Alles, who 16 Dec announced police had been authorised to use “maximum force” against suspected criminals.

Taiwan Strait

Cross-strait tensions heightened ahead of Taiwan’s tight January election as China maintained military activity and described reunification as an “inevitability”.

China stepped up stern rhetoric in final days before Taiwan’s high-stakes election. Competition ahead of 13 Jan presidential and legislative polls remained fierce, with polls during Dec indicating that support for incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and opposition Kuomintang (KMT) remain within five percentage points, underscoring chance DPP may secure unprecedented third term. Amid electoral preparation, Taiwan officials warned of China’s potential influence through disinformation, including narratives casting doubts on U.S. credibility as partner and competency of DPP. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office 30 Dec condemned DPP candidate William Lai’s remarks at recent debate, calling him “the instigator of a potential dangerous war in the Taiwan Strait”. In New Year’s address, China’s leader Xi Jinping 31 Dec described “reunification” with Taiwan as “historical inevitability”. If DPP wins vote, China will likely opt for show of force, stepping up its military activities in strait as well as economic and other forms of coercion in bid to deter new DPP govt from crossing its red line, namely declaration of formal independence; such actions heighten risk of misjudgement or miscalculation. Alternatively, if KMT or smaller Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) wins, cross-strait tensions might ease, at least temporarily, and prospects for cross-strait dialogue could improve.

Chinese military maintained pressure on island ahead of vote. As of 31 Dec, Taiwan spotted 313 Chinese military aircraft around island during Dec, of which at least 92 crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected in Taiwan’s air defence identification zone; Taiwan sighted 172 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Notably, China’s Shandong aircraft carrier group 11 Dec sailed through Taiwan Strait.

U.S. moved toward deepening military support for Taiwan. U.S. Senate 7 Dec passed 2024 National Defense Authorisation Act, which calls for military cooperation with Taiwan, including comprehensive training, consultation, and institutional capacity-building plans for Taiwan’s military, as well as military cybersecurity cooperation, and authorises information sharing between U.S. and Taiwan militaries.

Thailand

Militant attacks in deep south subsided as part of annual end-of-year lull, while courts prosecuted activist and opposition MP on lèse-majesté charges.

Deep south witnessed annual lull in militant violence. Heavy rain and flooding across southernmost provinces brought customary end-of-year lull in militant attacks. Nonetheless, rangers and police 14 Dec detained militant suspect in Si Sakhon district, Narathiwat province, and recovered AK-47 assault rifle and ammunition. Motorcycle-borne militants 21 Dec fired several rounds at army base in Tak Bai district, Narathiwat province, wounding one soldier. Security forces 23 Dec used robot to disarm IED in Panare district, Pattani province.

Courts handed down series of lèse-majesté convictions. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights reported series of convictions in Dec: notably, group 6 Dec reported that South Bangkok Criminal Court convicted online clothes seller of lèse-majesté for three Facebook posts deemed to have defamed king, sentencing individual to six years imprisonment; 12 Dec reported same court convicted computer programmer of royal defamation and resisting arrest, sentencing individual to three years imprisonment. Group 13 Dec reported Bangkok Criminal Court convicted Move Forward Party MP Rukchanok Srinork for posts deemed damaging to people’s faith in monarchy. Court 14 Dec convicted pro-democracy activist and protest leader Shinawat Chankrajang for comments made in speech, sentencing him to three years in prison.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Yerevan and Baku agreed to confidence-building measures, including prisoner swap, in bilateral deal; Armenia accused Azerbaijani forces of killing soldier.

Baku and Yerevan announced surprise deal. PM’s Office and Azerbaijan’s Presidential Administration 7 Dec issued joint statement announcing sides had agreed to seize “historical chance to achieve a long-awaited peace” with bilateral deal on confidence-building measures. Statement said Baku would release 32 Armenian soldiers and Yerevan would release two Azerbaijanis in “gesture of goodwill”; as part of deal, Armenia also voted in support of Azerbaijan’s bid to host UN climate change conference in 2024 (COP29), while Azerbaijan agreed to support Armenia’s candidacy for membership in COP Bureau. EU, U.S., Türkiye and Russia 7-8 Dec welcomed agreement.

International efforts to resume formal peace talks continued. U.S. Assistant Sec State James O’Brien 6 Dec met with Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev in Baku; during meeting Aliyev acknowledged that U.S. “could contribute” to peace process, O’Brien said he looked forward to hosting both countries’ FMs “soon”. PM Pashinyan and Aliyev 26 Dec met informally on sidelines of Commonwealth of Independent States summit in St. Petersburg city (Russia); Kremlin same day announced sides expressed readiness to finalise peace treaty, offered Russian assistance but gave no indication on timeline. Meanwhile, Yerevan 25 Dec confirmed receiving latest peace deal draft from Baku.

Armenia claimed Azerbaijani forces killed soldier. Yerevan 4 Dec accused Baku of killing Armenian soldier, which latter denied. Meanwhile, EU 11 Dec agreed to expand civilian mission in Armenia from 138 to 209 staff; Azerbaijan next day criticised move, claiming mission had failed to foster regional stability.

In other important developments. Authorities rejected proposal from former Nagorno-Karabakh representatives to create govt-in-exile in capital Yerevan (see Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict).

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh’s (NK) former de facto authorities sparked controversy in Armenia over plans for govt-in-exile amid uncertainty over enclave’s future.

Yerevan and exiled de facto NK officials sparred over proposal for govt-in-exile. After Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan 6 Dec emphasised that his constitutional responsibility is solely for Armenia, NK’s exiled former de facto leadership 10 Dec criticised attempts to “finally close” NK issue and promised “to stand up for the rights of the people of Artsakh”. Armenian MP and deputy chair of ruling Civil Contract party Gevorg Papoyan 11 Dec ruled out proposal by former de facto NK officials to create govt-in-exile in Armenian capital Yerevan. Vladimir Grigoryan, adviser to NK’s former de facto leader, 22 Dec described Sept decree dissolving enclave’s de facto institutions as void, saying “Republic of Artsakh, its government and other bodies will continue to operate after 2023”. Comments elicited strong reactions from some Armenian govt officials, prompting Grigoryan to clarify his comments were his personal opinion and that he was no longer an adviser.

Political and public organisations from NK proposed UN-led transition for region. Around 200 civil society and political organisations from NK, now based in Armenia, 10 Dec issued statement calling for region to be placed under UN administration for transition period before referendum on its future; proposal indicated reluctance to return under Azerbaijani rule.

Azerbaijan

Baku and Yerevan agreed to confidence-building measures in bilateral deal, Armenia accused Azerbaijani forces of killing soldier, and President Aliyev called for snap election in February.

Baku and Yerevan announced surprise deal, Baku denied killing Armenian soldier. Armenian PM’s Office and Presidential Administration 7 Dec issued joint statement announcing sides had agreed to seize “historical chance to achieve a long-awaited peace” with bilateral deal on confidence-building measures. Statement said Baku would release 32 Armenian soldiers and Yerevan would release two Azerbaijanis in “gesture of goodwill”; as part of deal, Armenia also voted in support of Azerbaijan’s bid to host UN climate change conference in 2024 (COP29), while Azerbaijan agreed to support Armenia’s candidacy for membership in COP Bureau. EU, U.S., Türkiye and Russia 7-8 Dec welcomed deal. Earlier in month, Yerevan 4 Dec accused Baku of killing Armenian soldier, which latter denied; Azerbaijan 12 Dec criticised EU decision to expand civilian mission in Armenia, claiming mission had failed to foster regional stability.

International efforts to resume formal peace talks continued. U.S. Assistant Sec State James O’Brien 6 Dec met with President Aliyev in Baku; during meeting Aliyev acknowledged that U.S. “could contribute” to peace process, O’Brien said he looked forward to hosting both countries’ FMs “soon”. Armenian PM Pashinyan and Aliyev 26 Dec met informally on sidelines of Commonwealth of Independent States summit in St. Petersburg city (Russia); Kremlin same day announced sides expressed readiness to finalise peace treaty, offered Russian assistance but gave no indication on timeline. Meanwhile, Yerevan 25 Dec confirmed receiving latest peace deal draft from Baku.

President announced elections in Feb 2024. Aliyev 7 Dec called snap presidential election for 7 Feb 2024, previously slated for April 2025; several opposition parties announced they would boycott poll. News came amid harsh crackdown on independent media, with around thirteen govt critics and journalists detained in Nov and Dec. EU 21 Dec criticised “narrowing space” for independent journalism and free speech. Meanwhile, Baku 26 Dec expelled two French diplomats for actions “incompatible with their diplomatic status”; Paris next day denied allegations and reciprocated with expulsion of two Azerbaijani diplomats.

Belarus

U.S. and UK issued new sanctions amid continued domestic repression, and President Lukashenko embarked on diplomatic tour in Asia, Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

Lukashenko held intelligence summit, repression campaign continued. Lukashenko 14 Dec hosted intelligence chiefs of regional bloc Commonwealth of Independent States, claiming “foreign intelligence” operations on “our territory” were becoming “increasingly aggressive”. Meanwhile, crackdown on dissent continued. Notably, police 8 Dec detained two journalists in south-east city of Svetlahorsk on extremism charges; court in Hrodna city (west) 19 Dec sentenced human rights activist Alyaksandra Kasko to ten years in prison for participating in 2020 election protests.

President embarked on major diplomatic tour. Lukashenko 4 Dec met President Xi in Chinese capital Beijing before 8 Dec visiting United Arab Emirates for talks with Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed. Lukashenko next day travelled to Equatorial Guinea, signing cooperation agreements with President Obiang, concluded tour with 10 Dec visit to Kenya.

Opposition leader renewed drive for international support. Exiled opposition head Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya 5 Dec testified before U.S. Congress, calling for increased support for opposition and expansion of sanctions against govt; Washington same day issued new sanctions targeting entities generating revenue for regime. UK 6 Dec announced new sanctions related to govt support for Russian invasion of Ukraine. Tsikhanouskaya 10 Dec met with EU FMs and EU High Representative Josep Borrell, who announced €30mn opposition support package.

Cyprus

Tensions persisted over activity in buffer zone, while Greek and Turkish Cypriots appeared to inch toward agreement on new UN envoy.

Tensions continued in buffer zone and over other issues. Strains between Republic of Cyprus and “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) remained high over buffer zone activities following what Republic of Cyprus in Nov called Turkish Cypriot “violations”, including installation of camera and antenna on uninhabited house; after late Nov announcing “invisible and visible” measures in response to activity, Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides 1 Dec discussed situation in Ayios Dhometious area with UN Sec Gen Antonio Guterres and 3 Dec visited area. Meanwhile, Republic of Cyprus parliament 21 Dec approved “Maritime Spatial Plan” concerning maritime resource exploitation off Cyprus; Turkish Cypriot “foreign ministry” 23 Dec denounced plan as “unacceptable”, saying it ignored Turkish Cypriot rights. Republic of Cyprus 22 Dec said it was closely monitoring property developments in “TRNC” concerning appropriation of Greek Cypriot properties. Christodoulides 7 Dec suggested improved Greek-Turkish ties could help progress on Cyprus issue (see Türkiye).

Parties reportedly moved closer to appointing first UN envoy in six years. Greek sources announced Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides had agreed on new UN envoy, vacant since 2017, but Ankara, “TRNC” or UN did not officially confirm appointment during Dec; Republic of Cyprus 6 Dec announced its consent to appoint envoy, rumoured to be former Colombian FM Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar.

Georgia

EU granted Georgia candidate status, prompting thousands to celebrate in capital as PM Gharibashvili hailed “historic victory”; breakaway Abkhazia’s FM declared U.S. official persona non grata.

European Council granted Georgia long-awaited candidate status. European Council 14 Dec granted EU candidate status to Georgia. PM Gharibashvili hailed decision and thanked European leaders, members of ruling Georgian Dream party and govt for their contributions to “historic victory”. Gharibashvili next day spoke in front of thousands gathered in capital Tbilisi to celebrate, saying victory “belongs to you”. Georgian Dream did not invite President Zourabichvili, currently embroiled in bitter dispute with ruling party, onto stage after accusing her of “doing everything to prevent Georgia from obtaining candidate status”.

In important developments in breakaway Abkhazia. Police in breakaway Abkhazia region 6 Dec reportedly beat up Georgian citizen Temur Karbaia, who died from injuries three days later. Abkhazia’s de facto FM Inal Ardzinba 7 Dec accused U.S. development agency of “non-transparent activities” and “perceived misinformation”, declared its South Caucasus director John Pennell persona non grata and announced foreign ministry would not certify new projects partially or fully funded by agency. European Court of Human Rights 19 Dec found Russia responsible for murder of Georgian citizen Giga Otkhozoria, killed in 2016 on Georgian side of line separating Abkhazia from Georgia proper.

Kosovo

Discussions on normalisation process between Kosovo and Serbia continued amid breakthrough on license plate dispute.

Efforts to normalise Kosovo-Serbia relations persisted. Belgrade 14 Dec told EU that March 2023 agreement with Pristina to normalise relations was “not legally binding”, prompting PM Kurti 22 Dec to accuse Serbia of withdrawing from deal. EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák 21 Dec promised EU would formalise “Serbia’s commitments” from March agreement by Jan 2024; he added that Kosovo could advance without Serb signature on EU and U.S. proposal for creation of Community of Serb municipalities – which enables self-governing association for Serb municipalities – as it is Kosovo’s “internal document”. Kurti 22 Dec responded with proposal to draft new proposal on the “Community” and sign normalisation deal with Serbia at European Council summit in March 2024.

Belgrade moved to allow Kosovo license plates. Authorities 15 Dec ended amnesty for use of Serb license plates registered before 1999, which marked end of Kosovo-Serbia war. Serbia 25 Dec decided to allow vehicles with Kosovo license plates to enter its territory; EU same day welcomed move, calling it “a positive step” toward normalisation. Dispute over license plates had long stirred tensions between the two.

Kyrgyzstan

Bishkek repatriated 96 Kyrgyz nationals from displaced persons camp in Syria; talks between Tajik and Kyrgyz security officials on disputed border issue continued.

Authorities repatriated 96 women and children from Syria. Authorities 8 Dec announced they had repatriated 96 women and children from al-Hol displaced persons camp in north-east Syria, bringing total number of Kyrgyz nationals repatriated in 2023 to 333. U.S. same day welcomed announcement, praising Kyrgyzstan’s “tremendous commitment to both its nationals and to alleviating a security and humanitarian crisis”.

Bishkek and Dushanbe made further progress on border demarcation. Chief of State Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev and his Tajik counterpart Saimumin Yatimov 12 Dec said 90% of Kyrgyz-Tajik border had been agreed upon following negotiations in Batken city, and promised talks on remaining parts of disputed border would continue; earlier, pair 1 Dec announced progress on issue after talks in Tajikistan’s Buston town. President Japarov 11 Dec said he hoped sides could finalise border demarcation by spring of 2024.

Russia (Internal)

President Putin reiterated objectives of war in Ukraine, campaign for presidential election in March 2024 kicked off, and Kyiv shelled Belgorod city in largest attack since full-scale invasion.

Putin confirmed Russia’s goals in Ukraine remain unchanged. In televised press conference, Putin 14 Dec proclaimed there will only be peace in Ukraine “when we achieve our goals”, which remain “Ukraine’s denazification, demilitarisation and neutral status”; he said 617,000 military personnel are in combat zone, of which 244,000 are mobilised soldiers. Putin 19 Dec reiterated remarks during meeting with top defence officials, said Moscow is upgrading its nuclear arsenal as west wages “hybrid war” against it but emphasised Russia will not attack NATO countries. Meanwhile, mothers and wives of mobilised soldiers organised more protests during month, 18 Dec called on Putin to end war for first time.

Putin announced presidential bid. Federation Council 7 Dec approved resolution setting date of presidential election for 17 March 2024. Putin next day announced bid for fifth presidential term; ten others announced their participation in poll, though some have yet to collect enough signatures to run. Independent candidate Yekaterina Duntsova, who has called for end to Ukraine conflict, announced bid but authorities 27 Dec barred her from running. Team of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny 7 Dec sponsored billboards in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other Russian cities urging Russians not to vote for Putin.

Kyiv launched deadliest attack on Belgorod since full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine 30 Dec attacked Belgorod city in heaviest shelling of Russian city since full-scale invasion, killing at least 24 and injuring over 100; Putin promised to retaliate (see Ukraine). Meanwhile, Freedom of Russia Legion (Russian combatants fighting for Ukraine) 17 Dec claimed responsibility for cross-border attack into Belgorod region. Former Ukrainian parliamentarian Ilya Kiva, who fled to Russia early 2022 ahead of full-scale invasion, was shot dead 6 Dec in Moscow region; media reports alleged Ukrainian special services carried out operation.

Japan and EU introduced further sanctions on Russia. Japan 15 Dec imposed new sanctions against Russia. EU 18 Dec adopted twelfth sanctions package; Russia next day expanded list of EU representatives banned from entering country.

Tajikistan

Talks between Tajik and Kyrgyz security officials on disputed border issue continued.

Chief of State Committee for National Security Saimumin Yatimov and his Kyrgyz counterpart Kamchybek Tashiev 12 Dec said 90% of Kyrgyz-Tajik border had been agreed upon following negotiations in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken city, and promised talks on remaining parts of disputed border would continue; earlier, pair 1 Dec announced progress on issue after talks in Buston town. Kyrgz President Sadyr Japarov 11 Dec said he hoped sides could finalise border demarcation by spring of 2024.

Türkiye

President Erdoğan’s visit to Greece marked significant improvement in bilateral ties following months of engagement.

Summit in Greece produced numerous agreements. Relations with Greece further improved as Erdoğan and Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 7 Dec met in Greek capital Athens, signing fifteen agreements alongside “Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good Neighbourliness”, committing to military confidence building measures, consultations on political issues and cooperation on issues of mutual interest. Leaders agreed to continue dialogue and spoke of turning Aegean into “sea of peace and cooperation”.

Military clashed with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliates, leaving dozen soldiers dead in Iraq. In Türkiye, security forces 4 Dec killed two wanted PKK militants in rural area of Mardin province. Main focus of anti-militant efforts remained concentrated in northern Iraq and northern Syria, with authorities claiming to have killed, including with targeted strikes, several high-ranking insurgents. In northern Iraq, attacks included 1 Dec drone strike that killed five, while militants 12 Dec killed Turkish second lieutenant. Marking escalation in casualties, clashes with PKK 22-23 Dec killed twelve Turkish soldiers; Turkish Defence Minister 27 Dec said retaliatory attacks struck 71 sites in Iraq and Syria, “neutralising” 59 PKK/People’s Protection Units militants. In Syria, Turkish forces 19 Dec said they had killed seven militants in Türkiye-controlled area.

Tensions continued with Israel and U.S. over Gaza. Ankara continued war of words with Israel over latter’s military campaign in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine); Erdoğan 8 Dec asserted all perpetrators of “genocide” must be punished, including Israeli PM Netanyahu. Events in Gaza also increased strains on U.S.-Türkiye relationship; Erdoğan 8, 14 and 19 Dec criticised Washington’s policy. Turkish parliamentary commission 26 Dec approved Sweden’s NATO membership bid, which awaits parliamentary ratification.

Operations against Islamic State (ISIS) continued. Security forces in Dec detained at least 630 individuals with alleged links to ISIS, marking notable increase compared to Nov. Notably, security forces 29 Dec apprehended three allegedly senior ISIS members and 29 others who were suspected of planning attack on churches and synagogues in Istanbul.

Ukraine

Russia pounded Ukrainian cities in largest wave of airstrikes since full-scale invasion, govt sought to reform mobilisation system, and U.S. approved military aid to Ukraine amid uncertainty about future assistance.

Russia launched wave of deadly airstrikes on Ukrainian cities. Russia 8 Dec launched nineteen cruise missiles in attack on capital Kyiv and Dnipro city, killing one; 28-29 Dec conducted largest wave of air attacks since full-scale invasion, striking cities across Ukraine using cruise and ballistic missiles, killing at least 40 and wounding over 160. Three-month pause in cruise missile use prior to strikes had raised fears that Moscow was stockpiling for massive attack that could overwhelm air defences. In Donetsk region, Russian forces advanced in pincer movement around Avdiivka town, which remained under Ukrainian control; Moscow 25 Dec claimed capture of Marinka town. Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops retained hold of bridgehead on Russian-occupied left bank of Dnipro River in southern Kherson region, but were unable to advance under heavy Russian fire. Kyiv 26 Dec destroyed Russian warship during air raid in Russian-annexed Crimea.

Tensions emerged over conscription system and plans for demobilisation. President Zelenskyy 1 Dec announced plans to reform conscription system amid increasing recruitment difficulty. Zelenskyy 19 Dec said military proposal to mobilise up to 500,000 additional troops required revision, citing lack of information on funding or plan for demobilisation and rotation of long-serving soldiers; announcement came amid several protests in Dec calling for demobilisation of troops fighting since beginning of war. Govt 25 Dec submitted conscription reform bill to parliament; Defence Minister Umerov previous day said document would give clarity about rotation but would not lead to demobilisation of long-serving soldiers.

U.S. approved military assistance to Kyiv while EU faced setback. EU member states 14 Dec voted to initiate accession talks with Ukraine, but Hungary next day vetoed €50bn military support package. U.S. 27 Dec approved more military aid to Ukraine, but future assistance will require Congressional approval and prospects for deal are uncertain. Senior army commander 18 Dec announced his troops had begun rationing artillery shells and scaling back operations due to uncertainty about Western assistance.

Uzbekistan

Jailing of lead activist raised concerns over media freedom.

Following 1 Dec sentencing of popular blogger from Ferghana region to eight years in prison for “insulting” and “slandering” public officials, NGO Human Rights Watch 5 Dec warned decision “will have a chilling effect on free speech and media freedoms in Uzbekistan”; statement added that “respect for freedom of speech and media freedoms has taken a negative turn and these rights are increasingly coming under attack”.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Govt resumed peace talks with FARC dissident faction and ELN after Constitutional Court set limits on scope of President Petro’s “total peace” policy; confrontations between armed groups continued.

Govt negotiations with FARC dissident faction and ELN resumed. Petro administration and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) 7 Dec returned to talks in Popayán town, Cauca department (Pacific Coast); dissidents had temporarily withdrawn from talks mid Nov to reconfigure negotiating team to favour military factions, 2 Dec appointed three temporary advisers to process including senior commanders, elevating level of delegation. Parties 12 Dec announced series of agreements, including FARC-EMC pledge to stop kidnappings for ransom and inauguration of joint monitoring mechanism for ceasefire; talks to resume 8 Jan in capital Bogotá, with ceasefire due to expire 20 Jan. Govt negotiations with National Liberation Army (ELN) 4 Dec also resumed in Mexico. Insurgents 17 Dec agreed to request from govt’s new peace commissioner Otty Patiño to stop kidnappings but suggested govt needs to fill gap in financing this would incur for rebels. Sides said they hope to extend ceasefire, due to expire end of Jan.

Constitutional Court upheld, with limits, govt’s “total peace” policy. Patiño 6 Dec began role amid new limits on govt’s overall strategy after Constitutional Court late Nov ruled executive could still decide which armed groups to engage with, but found that congress should pass legal framework setting terms for any eventual demobilisation agreement with criminal groups. In immediate term, decision may impact urban dialogue processes in cities of Buenaventura, Medellín and Quibdó, where Petro administration has secured truces between gangs. Govt can still advance conversations with country’s largest armed organisation, Gaitanista Self Defense Forces, but discussions about demobilisation or judicial guarantees must wait until congress approves legal framework.

Armed organisation sought to expand territory, clashing with FARC dissidents. Gaitanistas continued to expand in trafficking corridor that stretches from Bajo Cauca subregion of Antioquia department (north) to south of Bolívar department (north east), facing resistance from temporary ELN-FARC-EMC alliance; clashes between group and FARC dissidents displaced almost 1,000 people in Briceño municipality, Antioquia, late Nov-9 Dec.

El Salvador

Claudia Rodríguez became interim president as 2024 election cycle kicked off, and govt again extended state of exception.

Presidential designee appointed as Bukele stepped back for election campaign. President Bukele and VP Ulloa 1 Dec began leave of absence to focus on electoral campaign ahead of Feb 2024 presidential poll. Bukele ally Claudia Rodríguez, who independent media outlet Gato Encerrado previously accused of corruption, same day became interim president. At request of women candidates facing online harassment, Supreme Electoral Tribunal 5 Dec began investigating political violence against Nuestro Tiempo and ARENA political parties.

Emergency security measures extended amid human rights violations. Authorities 6 Dec extended state of exception for 21st time amid more concerns about human rights abuses under measures. Notably, NGOs Movement of Victims of the Regime and Humanitarian Legal Aid 3 Dec discovered four more people had died in prison, none of whom had been sentenced; according to NGOs, around 200 people have died in prison. Human rights monitor Amnesty International 5 Dec warned El Salvador “is experiencing an alarming regression in the respect for and protection of human rights”.

In other important developments. Bukele 1 Dec announced construction of National Stadium and Library with Chinese funding, signalling deepening ties. Court 22 Dec ordered arrest of former president Alfredo Cristiani for alleged cover-up in relation to 1981 El Mozote massacre during civil war.

Guatemala

Political volatility remained high amid relentless attempts to discredit election winner Bernardo Arévalo, due to take office on 14 Jan; ability for president-elect to assume office will be test case for country’s stability.

Judiciary continued to interfere in electoral transition. Public Prosecutor’s Office 8 Dec argued elections should be annulled due to administrative irregularities, including falsified signatures used to create Arévalo’s party Movimiento Semilla, and accused Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) of complicity. TSE same day said results were “official” and “unalterable”, and warned that if Arévalo did not take office on 14 Jan it would “break institutional order”. Amid international and domestic scrutiny, outgoing President Giammattei 12 Dec promised transition of power would occur but criticised international pressure (see below). Constitutional Court 14 Dec declared all officials elected in 2023 elections must take office on 14 Jan, but allowed Prosecutor’s Office to continue investigations. Tensions also continued over late-Nov removal of TSE magistrates’ immunity, though they remained in post.

Continued assault on election result triggered more support for Arévalo. Washington 11 Dec restricted visas of almost 300 Guatemalans, including 100 Congress members and private sector actors suspected of supporting campaign against Arévalo. UN human right chief Volker Turk 9 Dec called “persistent and systematic” attempts to undermine election result “extremely disturbing”. Organization of American States 12 Dec gave its sec gen authority to conduct visits and make decisions to preserve democratic institutions. EU parliament 14 Dec called for asset freezes and travel bans of Attorney General Consuelo Porras, top prosecutor Rafael Curruchiche and judge Fredy Orellana, among others. Meanwhile, Arévalo 7 Dec organised march to “defend truth, justice and democracy”, attended by Indigenous groups, politicians from different parties and civil society organisations. Strike led by Indigenous leaders continued throughout month.

Guyana

Relations with Venezuela remained tense after latter’s December referendum on disputed territory, despite agreement to avoid hostile acts.

Venezuelan govt 3 Dec held referendum on policy toward contested Essequibo area, oil-rich region currently administered by Guyana. Voters answered affirmatively to all five questions on ballot, with authorities saying 10.5mn people participated. Caracas claimed binding mandate for non-recognition of International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction and creation of new Venezuelan state in disputed territory, ratcheting up tensions with its neighbour. Venezuelan President Maduro and President Ali 14 Dec met in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines under auspices of CELAC and CARICOM regional bodies and in presence of UN, Brazilian and Colombian representatives; parties agreed not to “threaten or use force” and to establish joint commission to mutually “address matters” and report within three months. UK 24 Dec announced its warship would visit Guyana 29-31 Dec, however, prompting Venezuela 28 Dec to hold military exercises near disputed waters.

Haiti

Security situation remained dire, with violence in capital Port-au-Prince and anti-gang operations in south; govt-opposition negotiations failed to secure deal; and preparations for multinational mission continued.

Gang-related insecurity persisted in capital and in south. Gang violence continued to spread in capital; notably, NGO Doctors Without Borders 15 Dec indefinitely suspended activities at emergency centre in Turgeau district after group of armed men 12 Dec stopped ambulance leaving facility and killed patient. Gunmen 25 Dec killed four members of family and kidnapped four others in Croix-des-Bouquet district. Meanwhile, public prosecutors in southern Haiti carried out operations against gangs amid concerns over legality. Notably, Minister of Justice Emmelie Prophète 15 Dec publicly criticised Miragoâne commune’s public prosecutor Jean Ernest Muscadin for conducting illegal operation to drive out gang that had taken over Mariani village south west of Port-au-Prince in early Nov.

Negotiations between interim govt and opposition continued. CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) experts 6-14 Dec visited Haiti for fifth round of negotiations between interim govt and opposition, but no agreement was reached. Spokesperson for civil society platform Montana Accord 8 Dec declined invitation to join talks, alleging disagreement over attendees and that acting PM Henry’s resignation was not on agenda; next day, however, sixteen members of platform’s leadership denounced spokesperson’s unilateral decision and said they would continue negotiations. UN Sec Gen 7 Dec expressed concern over limited progress of dialogue.

Reciprocal visits took place in preparation for Kenyan-led multinational mission. Kenyan delegation 5 Dec visited Haiti and met with govt officials and U.S. diplomats. Head of police Frantz Elbé 13-15 Dec travelled to Kenya for fact-finding mission and bilateral discussions between security forces; media later suggested first batch of 300 officers may arrive in Feb 2024.

In other important developments. UN Security Council 8 Dec added four gang leaders to sanctions list, while UK and U.S. sanctioned various former officials for involvement in abuses and corruption. Judge in Miami 19 Dec sentenced former Haitian senator to life in prison for conspiring to kill President Moïse in 2021.

Honduras

Institutional crisis persisted amid Congressional paralysis, and violence remained high despite state of exception.

Legislature remained blocked amid divides over appointment of officials. Parliament closed 2023 amid four months of congressional paralysis, during which no laws were passed, including 2024 budget. Ruling Libre party took advantage of situation to appoint more officials through controversial Congressional Permanent Commission, comprising eight pro-govt and one opposition legislator. Though opposition parties insisted govt’s appointments were illegal, actions appeared to push former toward compromise: notably, opposition National Party 7 Dec announced it was close to agreement with Libre party over members of Supreme Chamber of Accounts, body that oversees public finances. Crisis continued to hinder progress on creation of UN-led anti-corruption commission (CICIH); govt and UN 18 Dec extended memorandum for CICIH’s creation until June 2024.

Stringent security measures failed to slow violence. Despite state of emergency, new data showed that violence and crime still plague country. Notably, NGO Observatory of Violence 6 Dec reported 27% increase in multiple homicides in 2023 compared with 2022; Association for a Just Society 12 Dec reported 11% of citizens are victims of extortion; and violence against women remained acute, with UN body CEPAL 2 Dec reporting one woman is murdered every 21 hours.

Mexico

Criminal violence continued at high levels, govt faced criticism over reported number of disappearances, and President López Obrador called for disbandment of autonomous federal bodies.

Criminal violence remained rampant. Clash between La Familia Michoacan crime group and residents who reportedly resisted extortion attempt left four civilians and ten alleged criminals dead 8 Dec in Texcaltitlán town, State of Mexico (centre); at least fourteen people from area abducted by end of Dec in possible retaliation. Clash between Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels in Boquilla del Carmen rural area, Zacatecas state (north), 12 Dec killed six. Efforts to tackle criminal activities continued. Notably, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen 6 Dec announced Office of Foreign Assets Control had sanctioned fifteen members of Beltran Leyva crime group and two affiliated companies for drug trafficking. Govt 14 Dec arrested sister and nephew of Genaro García Luna, former public security official sentenced in U.S. for collusion with Sinaloa cartel, for alleged involvement in organised crime and money laundering.

Govt faced criticism for alleged deflation of number of disappearances. Govt 14 Dec announced it had identified whereabouts of around one third of 110,000 persons on national registry of disappeared persons through census conducted by Ministry of Wellbeing, claimed number of missing people is much lower than previously thought. Rights groups and community organisations searching for disappeared people criticised authorities for making neither methodology nor data public for independent verification, said Ministry is not mandated to do count and accused govt of reducing true number by not taking new cases into account and leaving some states out of census.

Critics accused López Obrador of removing checks and balances. President López Obrador 11 Dec said he would call on parliament to dissolve all autonomous federal bodies, including one that processes freedom of information requests; judges belonging to National Magistrates’ Association 13 Dec submitted complaint before Inter-American Court of Human Rights against attacks on its independence. President next day designated member of ruling MORENA party a seat on Supreme Court after no candidate received required two-third majority of congressional votes, raising concerns about Supreme Court’s independence.

Nicaragua

Crackdown on church continued amid international condemnation over human rights violations, and Managua upgraded diplomatic ties with China.

Authorities arrested senior bishop amid continued attacks on Catholic Church. Police 21 Dec arrested Bishop Isidoro Mora of Siuna diocese in north west; Mora day prior had spoken publicly about Bishop Rolando Álvarez, first major clerical figure detained by govt and sentenced in Feb 2023 to 26 years in prison for treason. Authorities 20-30 Dec arrested thirteen priests and two Seminarians.

Ortega regime rejected accusations of human rights violations. UN Human Rights Council 18 Dec held special session on Nicaragua, where Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif asked Ortega govt to engage with her office and address human rights violations; govt rejected concerns as misinformation and foreign interference in domestic affairs. Nicaragua same day expelled International Committee of the Red Cross.

Beijing and Managua deepened ties. Nicaragua and China upgraded diplomatic ties, with pair 20 Dec announcing new strategic partnership; Chinese President Xi Jinping same day described move as beginning of relationship modelled on “solidarity, cooperation and mutual benefit”. Ortega and Xi also announced China-Nicaragua Free Trade Agreement will take effect 1 Jan 2024. Earlier, govt 4 Dec recalled Ambassador to Argentina after Argentinian President Javier Milei called Nicaraguan rulers “dictators”.

Venezuela

Relations with Guyana remained tense after Caracas’ December referendum on disputed territory; Maduro administration continued to stall full implementation of Barbados deal with opposition.

Relations with Guyana remained tense despite agreement to avoid hostile acts. Maduro govt 3 Dec held referendum on policy toward contested Essequibo area, oil-rich region administered by Guyana, with voters answering affirmatively to all five questions on ballot, including whether they support non-recognition of International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction and creation of new Venezuelan state in disputed territory. Govt subsequently claimed binding mandate resulting from poll, ratcheting up tensions with neighbour. Maduro and Guyanese President Irfaan Ali 14 Dec met in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines under auspices of CELAC and CARICOM regional bodies and with UN, Brazilian and Colombian representatives; parties agreed not to “threaten or use force” and to establish joint commission to mutually “address matters” and report within three months. UK 24 Dec announced its warship would visit Guyana 29-31 Dec, however, prompting Venezuela 28 Dec to hold military exercises near disputed waters.

Govt-opposition tensions simmered ahead of 2024 elections. Flare-up with Guyana distracted attention from govt’s slow implementation of 17 Oct Barbados Agreement with opposition, with some progress but also attacks on opposition. Notably, Chief Prosecutor Tarek W. Saab 6 Dec announced arrest warrants for a dozen opposition activists; accused included three members of opposition presidential candidate María Corina Machado’s team and Roberto Abdul, head of NGO that Machado founded and member of opposition Primary Commission; authorities reportedly held Abdul incommunicado. In attempt to compete in next year’s polls, Machado 15 Dec appealed to govt-controlled Supreme Court to overturn ban from running for office, despite previously saying she would not.

Washington and Caracas agreed prisoner swap. U.S. official Brian Nichols 5 Dec said Washington continued to engage with Caracas and reiterated threat to reimpose sanctions if more prisoners were not released and Barbados conditions not fulfilled. Govt and U.S. 20 Dec announced prisoner swap, exchanging ten jailed Americans for Maduro ally Alex Saab, who was awaiting trial on money laundering charges; agreement also saw Abdul and twenty other Venezuelans released.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Algiers reiterated commitment to Palestine amid war in Gaza, and relations with Bamako soured over northern Mali rebellion.

Algeria reiterated support for Palestine amid war in Gaza. Jibril Rajoub, secretary general of Palestinian political party Fatah’s central committee, 17 Dec visited Algiers and met with President Tebboune; Rajoub reportedly asked Algeria to help unify different Palestinian factions to constitute national unity govt.

Mali recalled ambassador to Algeria. Amid renewed conflict between Bamako and coalition of mostly Tuareg rebel groups (CMA) in northern Mali, tensions heightened between Mali and Algeria, which has been main mediator in peace efforts. Mali 20 Dec summoned Algeria’s top diplomat accusing Algiers of holding meetings with Tuareg separatists without involving Malian authorities. Algeria next day summoned Malian ambassador urging “all Malian parties to renew commitment to implementation of [2015] agreement on peace and national reconciliation”. Bamako 22 Dec recalled ambassador to Algeria condemning interference in internal affairs.

In other important developments. PM Nadir Larbaoui 10 Dec instructed govt to implement wage increase for civil servants starting next Jan, citing Tebboune’s commitment to improving purchasing power; increase will be third and final stage in process of raising civil servants’ salaries by 47% between 2022 and 2024. International Monetary Fund 14 Dec presented conclusions of visit carried out in Algeria 3-14 Dec, highlighting need to diversify economy in view of threats posed by volatile hydrocarbon price, among others; mission also recommended “gradual fiscal rebalancing to limit expected increase in financing requirements and public debt in medium term”. During Algerian-American military dialogue held 4-6 Dec in Washington, American suppliers of military equipment encouraged Algeria to diversify its suppliers (which are mostly Russian) by turning to American ones.

Egypt

Election authority announced President Sisi’s re-election by landslide in presidential vote; Cairo accelerated talks for new loan with IMF, and put forward three-step plan for ending war in Gaza.

President Sisi secured third consecutive term in power. Following presidential election held 10-12 Dec, National Elections Authority 18 Dec declared Sisi winner with 89.6% of votes, and turnout highest ever at 66.8%; Alongside threats and intimidation deployed by authorities to make sure voters turned out, Gaza war seems to have had mobilisation effect on voters, who have rallied behind Sisi’s public stance against threat of forced displacement of Gazans and narrative that he is able to provide security and stability to country surrounded by crises.

Govt accelerated talks for new loan with International Monetary Fund (IMF). IMF 7 Dec confirmed discussing with Egypt possible increase in loan that Cairo originally secured in 2022. News Agency Bloomberg 20 Dec reported IMF loan would be expanded from $3bn to $6bn; IMF expected to request depreciation of exchange rate as prerequisite to agreement.

Cairo continued to promote ceasefire in Gaza. Egypt maintained mediation efforts amid growing pressure from displaced Gazans crowding Rafah border area. Egyptian security sources 25 Dec said Hamas and allied Islamic Jihad rejected Egyptian proposal that they relinquish power in Gaza Strip in return for permanent ceasefire. Govt 28 Dec confirmed having put forward three-stage proposal to end conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, security forces 16 Dec shot down drone near resort town of Dahab on Red Sea, highlighting security repercussions that Gaza war and Yemen’s Houthi rebels’ attacks on shipping have on Egypt; another “flying object” reportedly shot down 26 Dec off coast of Dahab.

GERD talks ended with failure. Water Resources Ministry 19 Dec said fourth round of direct talks between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) ended without breakthrough.

Iran

War in Gaza reverberated across region as Iran-backed groups engaged in hostilities with U.S. forces and Israel, spotlighting risks of escalation; West imposed series of sanctions against Iran.

Iran-backed groups maintained regional pressure amid ongoing Gaza onslaught. Iran-backed groups continued engagement in hostilities with Israel and/or U.S. throughout Dec as Israel continued war in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine): hostilities between Hizbollah and Israel continued to expand in frequency and intensity, “Axis of Resistance” attacks on U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq reached 113 as of 31 Dec as Iran 25 Dec vowed retaliation for killing of senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps official by alleged Israeli strike in Syria, and U.S. Navy killed Houthi militants in Red Sea amid threats against commercial vessels (see Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen). Iran disavowed direct engagement, but White House official 22 Dec accused Tehran of being “deeply involved in planning” Houthi attacks in Red Sea, and Israeli PM Netanyahu 30 Dec contended Iran was leading “aggression against us on various fronts”.

Western sanctions continued to mount on Iran-linked entities. U.S. Commerce Department 5 Dec added eleven companies linked with “Iranian-Russian efforts to develop unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) facility” to its Entity list. U.S. 7 Dec sanctioned another thirteen persons and companies said to be financing Houthis. U.S. 8 Dec blacklisted two Iranians for various operations, notably plots against U.S. officials. UK same day sanctioned five Iranian officials over human rights concerns. EU 11 Dec announced sanctions against eleven persons and entities involved in development of UAVs used in Russia-Ukraine war. U.S., UK 14 Dec designated several Iranian officials and Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad representatives to Iran.

In other important developments. Sunni militant group Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility for 15 Dec attack against police station in Balochestan (south east), which killed eleven. International Atomic Energy Agency 26 Dec informed member states that Iran increased production rate of 60% enriched uranium since Nov; U.S., UK, France and Germany 28 Dec jointly condemned Iran’s action.

Iraq

Iran-backed groups and U.S. traded deadly attacks amid Israel-Gaza war, country held first provincial elections in a decade, and lethal clashes occurred in north between Türkiye and Kurdish militants.

Iran-backed militias attacked U.S. assets, U.S. conducted retaliatory strikes. Iran-linked groups throughout Dec continued multiple attacks targeting U.S. troops at Ain al-Asad base, Anbar governorate, and Hareer base, Erbil governorate; groups launched attacks into eastern Syria targeting U.S. bases. Notably, U.S. drone 3 Dec killed five Iran-linked militants in Kirkuk governorate. Rockets 8 Dec targeted U.S. embassy in capital Baghdad in first attack on non-military U.S. asset since outbreak of Gaza war (see Israel-Palestine) and rockets same day struck Ain al-Asad airbase; in response, govt took stance against groups, established investigative task force and 14 Dec announced detention of several affiliates of groups. Kataib Hizbollah 25 Dec attacked Erbil airbase, injuring three U.S. personnel; U.S. same day struck three Kataib Hizbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba sites, killing one and injuring eighteen; govt condemned U.S. strike as “hostile act”.

Country held first provincial elections in ten years. Iraq 18 Dec held first provincial elections since 2013 in which Shia Coordination Framework reportedly won 101 of 285 seats. In southern governorates, Shiite State of Law Coalition, tied to former PM Nuri al-Maliki, and Nabni coalition, tied to Popular Mobilisation Forces, stood out among Shia parties. In Kirkuk governorate, where voter turnout reached highest nationwide at 66%, Kurdish parties such as Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party won most votes.

Türkiye-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) clashes killed twelve Turkish soldiers. Marking escalation in casualties, clashes with PKK 22-23 Dec killed twelve Turkish soldiers in north; Turkish Defence Minister 27 Dec said retaliatory attacks struck 71 sites in Iraq and Syria, “neutralizing” 59 Kurdish fighters. Meanwhile, two explosive-laden drones 30 Dec struck Peshmerga base in Primam, north of Erbil; regional authorities blamed “government-linked outlaw groups”.

In another important development. Clashes in Baghdad between militiamen loyal to Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and rival Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) group 26 Dec reportedly injured two, after AAH erected portraits of slain Iranian general Qassem Soleimani.

Israel/Palestine

Israel resumed onslaught in Gaza, expanding operations in south as famine loomed, while violence in West Bank worsened; hostilities with Hizbollah escalated, highlighting regional conflict risks.

Israeli assault on Gaza intensified and expanded south, as risk of starvation spread. After seven-day humanitarian pause 1 Dec collapsed, Israel intensified ground operation in Gaza’s north and expanded in south, focusing on Khan Younis city and escalating bombardment, bringing Palestinian death toll since 7 Oct to over 22,000; clashes with Hamas and other militants killed at least 175 Israeli soldiers since start of ground offensive. Gaza authorities late Dec reported Israel had killed 106 Palestinian media workers, marking deadliest conflict for journalists globally. Israeli assault displaced 1.9m amid relentless bombing of hospitals, schools, mosques and churches. Notably, Israeli forces 12 Dec raided Kamal Adwan hospital in north, allegedly crushing dozens of patients and displaced persons with bulldozers; 16 Dec killed two women in Catholic church in Gaza city. Survivors alleged Israel summarily killed civilians, including at UN-run Shadia Abu Ghazala school and in Gaza city. Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch 18 Dec accused Israel of using starvation as war tactic. Multi-stakeholder global initiative Integrated Food Security Phase 21 Dec estimated Gaza population at imminent risk of famine. Internationally, U.S. shifted rhetoric, warning Israel against indiscriminate bombing despite continuing to block UN Security Council resolutions for ceasefire.

Talks on hostage exchange resumed. Israeli soldiers 15 Dec mistakenly killed three Israeli hostages in Gaza, increasing pressure on govt to restart hostage negotiations. Israel 19 Dec reportedly offered week-long pause and prisoner release in exchange for 40 hostages; Hamas rejected negotiations without end of bombardment. 

Conditions in West Bank continued deteriorating sharply. Since 7 Oct, Israeli forces and settlers killed over 319 Palestinians, with over 4,500 arrested amid ubiquitous drone strikes and raids. Notably, Israel 14 Dec launched 60-hour operation in Jenin, killing at least twelve.

Border clashes with Hizbollah intensified. Israel expanded targets to residential areas in southern Lebanon. Hizbollah 7 Dec killed Israeli civilian in first non-military casualty since 7 Oct (see Lebanon).

Jordan

Security forces resisted cross-border armed raids by smugglers and militants from Syria, as military reportedly launched retaliatory airstrikes.

Security forces battled drug smugglers and cross-border raids from Syria. Notably, army 5 Dec killed three drug smugglers seeking to cross border from Syria during operation that seized over 200,000 captagon pills. Dozens of alleged drug smugglers from Syria 12 Dec crossed border at undisclosed location and exchanged fire with soldiers, leaving several smugglers and one soldier dead. Army 18 Dec said Iran-backed militants armed with advanced weaponry attempted to cross border from Syria’s southern Suwayda province into Jordan’s Mafraq governorate; armed forces reportedly struck vehicle and clashed with militants who fled back to Syria, killing several militants and injuring several army personnel. Armed forces that night reportedly launched multiple airstrikes in Syria’s Suwayda and Deraa provinces in retaliation. Earlier on 18 Dec, army said it seized nearly five million pills of captagon, marking one of its largest busts in years.

Lebanon

Lebanon continued to face spectre of war as deadly border clashes between Hizbollah and Israel continued to increase in frequency and intensity.

Hostilities resumed on border after temporary de facto truce. Hizbollah and Israel 1 Dec resumed attacks after collapse of so-called humanitarian pause in Gaza lasting seven days, which sides had unofficially observed in north (see Israel-Palestine). Israel expanded its range of targets in southern Lebanon to include residential areas, notably destroying many homes in Aitaroun village on 12 Dec and bringing number of displaced on Lebanese side to over 50,000; Hizbollah reportedly lost some 134 fighters, as of late Dec, while Israeli strikes killed several civilians and one Lebanese Armed Forces soldier. Hizbollah during Dec frequently claimed “direct hits” on Israeli military personnel and infrastructure; notably, Hizbollah strike 7 Dec killed Israeli civilian, marking first such non-military fatality near border since 7 Oct. Although Hizbollah and Israel have avoided large-scale escalation to date, Israeli government increasingly faces domestic pressure to confront Hizbollah’s presence along border, as tens of thousands of residents in northern Israel have been displaced. Israel Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 6 Dec assured Hizbollah would be forced away from border, either by diplomatic or other means. Gallant and Israeli PM Netanyahu 18 Dec reportedly informed U.S. they will allow some time for diplomacy but expect tangible progress; spectre of wider conflict will continue to loom so long as no general ceasefire is reached in Gaza and border hostilities continue, raising risk of escalation by accident or design. Following alleged Israeli assassination of deputy Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut on 2 Jan, Hizbollah vowed retaliation.

Domestic crisis and executive vacuum persisted. Govt continued to struggle to secure funding for its national emergency plan to deal with spillover of Hamas-Israel war. Armed Forces 1 and 17 Dec announced it had rescued 110 and 50 refugees, respectively, off Lebanese coast on Europe-bound boats. Meanwhile, presidential vacuum entered its thirteenth consecutive month in Dec. Parliament 14-15 Dec convened on exceptional basis to extend term of army commander Joseph Aoun, who was scheduled to retire on 10 Jan.

Libya

UN-led push to convene meeting of five major political stakeholders faced setbacks as disagreements persisted on whether new govt or elections should come first.

UN envoy’s initiative to convene stakeholders’ meeting faced obstacles. UN Special Representative for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, 18 Dec briefed members of UN Security Council on his latest initiative to convene meeting of Libya’s five main political stakeholders, said all invitees had submitted names of their respective delegations but lamented that “Libyan leaders show no commitment to ending the long-standing stalemate”. Stakeholders have reportedly stated irreconcilable conditions for their participation. Notably, eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh conditioned attendance to focusing discussions on formation of “new govt for elections” and rejected participation of Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba on grounds that he is no longer legitimate. Meanwhile, Dabaiba, while ready to discuss outstanding issues in electoral laws, categorically rejected any discussions on “new govt”. Libyan National Army (LNA) chief Khalifa Haftar conditioned Dabaiba’s Govt of National Unity (GNU) participation to inclusion of HoR-appointed govt, or exclusion of both govts.

Drone allegedly targeted Russian military cargo in country’s east. Local media reports suggested drone mid Dec targeted Russian Ilyushin military cargo aircraft in Jufra airbase in central Libya; U.S. Africa Command denied involvement. Cargo plane could have presumably been used to deliver equipment to Haftar or to his allies as Jufra airbase falls under LNA’s authority; base is also known, however, to be transit point for Russian military activity in neighbouring African states. Some foreign analysts suggested strike could be work of Tripoli-based authorities who possess armed drones but whether these have sufficient autonomy to carry out strike in Jufra, some 500 kilometres from capital, is unclear.

In other important developments. UN Mission 21 Dec expressed concern over death in custody of former Defence Minister Al-Mahdi al-Barghathi after authorities in Oct arrested him in Benghazi city, demanded independent investigation. Presidency Council early Dec expressed concern after Niger in Nov repelled law that criminalised transportation of irregular migrants to neighbouring Libya and Algeria for onward travel to Europe, while GNU reportedly appealed for urgent EU support to secure country’s southern border.

Saudi Arabia

Kingdom continued rapprochement with Iran against backdrop of escalation in Red Sea, while Russian President Putin visited capital Riyadh.

Riyadh and Tehran reasserted commitment to normalisation. Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s deputy FMs 15 Dec held tripartite meeting in Chinese capital Beijing to reassert commitment to normalisation deal brokered in March 2023. Iran previous day announced it would lift visa restrictions for 33 states, including Saudi Arabia, while Iranian pilgrims from 19 Dec were allowed to complete Umrah pilgrimage in Mecca city for first time in eight years. Despite improvement in relations between pair, Riyadh fears regional escalation as result of Israel’s war in Gaza and reportedly asked U.S. to show restraint in responding to attacks in Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis; regional media reports mid Dec surfaced accusing U.S. of putting pressure on Riyadh to postpone deal with Houthis and join maritime task force in Red Sea (see Yemen).

Crown Prince met Putin. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 6 Dec met Putin in capital Riyadh to discuss oil, trade, Ukraine, and Israel-Hamas war. Mohammed bin Salman 13 Dec met U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to discuss Gaza crisis.

Syria

Israel and U.S. traded deadly tit-for-tat attacks with Iran-backed groups amid tensions over Israel-Hamas war, hostilities persisted in north west, and Islamic State (ISIS) maintained its desert insurgency.

Israel launched airstrikes, U.S. and Iran-backed groups targeted each other. Israel continued to target various locations, including in retaliation against alleged Hizbollah rocket launches. Notably, Israeli airstrike 2 Dec killed four Iran-linked militants in capital Damascus; drone 8 Dec killed four, including three Hizbollah fighters in Quneitra province. In significant attack, airstrike 25 Dec killed prominent Iranian commander Razi Mousavi; Tehran warned Israel to expect “smart response”. Drone attack 29 Dec targeted warehouses in Al-Bukamal; confirmed casualties included at least four Hizbollah members and six Iranian-linked militants. Meanwhile, U.S. 1 Dec struck alleged “Islamic Resistance” headquarters in Al-Bukamal. Attacks 14 Dec targeted U.S. base in Conoco gas field, Deir ez-Zor, and Al-Tanf and Rukban bases, Homs; in response, U.S. 9 Dec struck military site in Al-Mayadin, Deir ez-Zor.

In north west, hostilities continued. Rebel raid 7 Dec targeted army in Aleppo province, claiming seven army members as casualties. Rebels 17 Dec targeted govt forces in Latakia province, prompting Russia 18, 19, 25 Dec to resume airstrikes targeting Idlib city and countryside, killing at least five civilians. Shelling in Idlib throughout Dec killed at least sixteen civilians; UN reported 40% of fatalities since early Oct were children. Meanwhile, in Aleppo province, Manbij Military Council 16 Dec fired rockets at Turkish base in Sheikh Nasser village. SDF claimed Turkish airstrikes 23-25 Dec killed eight civilians in SDF-controlled area (see Türkiye).

ISIS continued to show signs of resurgence. Suspected ISIS attack 8 Dec killed Iranian commander and four others in Al-Bukamal city, Deir ez-Zor province; same day killed seven pro-regime fighters near Al-Bukamal. Russian airstrike 15 Dec killed ISIS militants near Al-Sukhna village, Homs province, and Al-Rasafa villages, Hama province.

Anti-govt protests continued in south amid unstable Syrian-Jordanian border. Anti-govt protests in Suwayda city 1, 9, 10, 15, 20 Dec demanded political change, release of detainees. Jordan mid Dec reportedly launched airstrikes after cross-border raids (see Jordan).

Tunisia

Local elections recorded low voter turnout amid boycott by parties across political spectrum; repression of govt critics continued.

Local council elections underscored voter disaffection. First round of local elections, which will determine composition of second chamber of parliament, took place 24 Dec; some 150 intellectual and political figures mid Dec signed petition calling for election boycott, saying vote would participate in “consolidation of the system of repression and oppression”. Election Commission 27 Dec placed turnout at 11.84%, highlighting high level of voter disaffection; second round scheduled for Feb 2024.

Crackdown on businessmen and journalists continued. Authorities 12 Dec issued arrest warrant against Adel Grar, former managing director of Al Karama Holding (responsible for sale of companies confiscated during 2010-2011 revolution), for allegedly using his position to obtain unjustified advantage and improperly disposing of public or private funds. Police 28 Dec arrested journalist Zied el-Hani and judge later issued arrest warrant against him for defamation against trade minister. Opposition Free Destourian Party mid Dec said authorities banned demonstration in support of party president Abir Moussi, who has been in detention since 3 Oct following scuffle with staff of president’s palace.

In other important developments. Shortages of basic commodities persisted, leading to tense scenes in queues, filmed and broadcast on social networks. Notably, Tunis region 7 Dec ran out of fuel for several days due to delayed delivery by tanker, and many bakeries around Tunis mid Dec were unable to make bread due to shortage of flour. Meanwhile, interior ministry said National Guard and military personnel 27 Dec killed three “terrorists” in mountainous area of Kasserine near Algerian border.

Western Sahara

In renewed effort for Western Sahara conflict resolution, U.S. administration dispatched key North Africa diplomat to conduct new round of consultations with Algeria and Morocco.

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Africa, Joshua Harris, 7 Dec met with Algerian FM Ahmed Attaf in capital Algiers, and 17 Dec met with Moroccan FM Nasser Bourita in capital Rabat. Washington’s engagement with both Algeria and Morocco is part of U.S. efforts to take more balanced stance on Western Sahara dispute in context where regional repercussions of Gaza war increase risk of escalation.

Yemen

In escalation in Red Sea, U.S. killed ten Houthi militants attempting to board commercial ship as group’s drones targeted Israel; Yemen’s warring parties agreed steps toward peace process under UN auspices.

U.S. took first military action to rebuff Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. After Houthis in Nov threatened to target any ship travelling to or from Israel unless food and medicine are allowed into Gaza (see Israel-Palestine), Houthi attacks on shipping since 19 Nov reached at least two dozen as of 31 Dec, according to U.S. forces. Notably, Houthi missiles and drones 3, 11, 15, 18 Dec struck ships in Red Sea; Houthis 15 Dec launched drones toward Israeli city Eilat; Egypt next day intercepted suspected Houthi drone off Red Sea coast. International naval presence grew: French navy 9 Dec shot down two alleged Houthi drones; UK navy 15 Dec downed drone; U.S. navy 16 Dec intercepted fourteen drones originating from Houthi-controlled territory and 30 Dec intercepted two missiles targeting container ship. U.S. 19 Dec announced maritime task force to protect shipping; Iran’s defence minister 14 Dec warned task force would face “extraordinary problems”. In significant escalation that may reset rules of engagement, U.S. navy helicopters 31 Dec fired on small boats carrying Houthis attempting to board container ship, killing ten; UK and U.S. vowed more action if necessary, underscoring risk of further hostilities that could broaden Gaza war.

Govt and Houthis committed to steps toward ceasefire and UN-led peace process. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 23 Dec announced govt and Houthis committed to steps toward ceasefire, including resumption of oil exports, opening of roads in Taiz and easing restrictions on Sanaa airport and Hodeida port, and said parties would work toward roadmap under UN auspices. Announcement came after Houthis and Saudi-led coalition late Nov finalised draft deal addressing humanitarian issues, including Riyadh’s commitment to pay public sector salaries for one year.

In other important developments. U.S. 8 Dec imposed sanctions on thirteen individuals and entities accused of financing Houthis. World Food Programme 5 Dec suspended food aid in Houthi-controlled areas due to limited funding and disagreement with local authorities.

Africa

Benin

Govt forces continued to battle jihadist insurgency in country’s north.

Military early Nov conducted operations targeting suspected Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) militants around Boiffo village, Malanville commune, and Kompa town, Karimama commune (both Alibori department), with unknown casualties. Troops 9 Nov killed suspected JNIM guard near Porga town, Matéri commune, Atacora department, during counter-insurgency operation.

Burkina Faso

Amid widespread fighting between jihadists and govt forces, deadly attacks targeted civilians, leaving over 100 killed; Russian soldiers reportedly took charge of presidential protection.

Civilians remained at forefront of hostilities between govt and jihadist groups. In Centre-Nord region, unidentified gunmen around 5 Nov killed at least 70 and up to 100 people, mostly civilians, in Zaongo village (Namentenga province). EU 12 Nov and UN 15 Nov condemned massacre and urged Ouagadougou to open investigation and bring perpetrators to justice, and authorities 13 Nov announced investigation. Meanwhile, fierce fighting continued between jihadists and govt forces and allies. In Sahel region, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 26 Nov launched complex, simultaneous attacks on army base, army auxiliary positions and camps for internally displaced persons in and around Djibo town (Soum province); UN Human Rights Office 28 Nov said fighting left at least 40 civilians dead, while military claimed killing up to 400 assailants before repelling them. In East region, govt forces and VDPs 2, 6 Nov killed around 30 presumed JNIM militants in Yamba town (Gourma province) and Tipoli village (Gnagna province).

Forced conscription of civil society activists sparked outrage. Military govt 2 Nov issued order to conscript into army a dozen people, including journalists, civil society activists and opposition party members. Several local civil society organisations denounced move and rights group Human Rights Watch 8 Nov accused junta of using emergency law to punish critics and silence dissent. Administrative court 20 Nov rejected petition filed by three conscripts and confirmed conscription order.

Media reported Russia deployed small military contingent. French-language magazine Jeune Afrique and newspaper Le Monde reported Russian plane with about 20 Russian soldiers on board 10 Nov landed in capital Ouagadougou; soldiers were reportedly deployed to support army’s efforts against jihadist groups, but also to protect transitional President Capt. Traoré, pointing to fragility of his rule as military remains divided.

In another important development. As Malian forces early to mid-Nov launched offensive and eventually captured Kidal town (see Mali), Ouagadougou reportedly provided material support as part of close security cooperation between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

Burundi

Public prosecutors called for life imprisonment for former PM Alain-Guillaume Bunyoni, while govt troops engaged in DR Congo faced challenges.

Trial of former PM Bunyoni over alleged coup attempt ended. Supreme Court trial of Bunyoni 9 Nov concluded, with public prosecutors seeking life imprisonment on multiple charges including undermining national security for allegedly plotting coup against President Ndayishimiye in 2022; prosecutors also requested 30 years in prison for Bunyoni’s six co-defendants. Since Bunyoni’s arrest in April, human rights groups have called in vain for full judicial investigation into abuses committed by security forces during his time as security minister from 2015 to 2020.

Soldiers abandoned positions in DR Congo under pressure from M23. Amid renewed offensive by M23 armed group in North Kivu province (see DR Congo), Congolese civil society said Burundian troops deployed as part of East African Community regional force 22 Nov left Kitshanga town (which straddles Masisi and Rutshuru territories) and Mweso city (Masisi territory); military denied leaving Kitshanga. Meanwhile, M23 rebels 7 Nov accused Burundian troops of collaborating with Congolese armed forces and allied armed groups, including anti-Kigali Hutu-led Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, in eastern DR Congo; Gitega denied claim, which could strain relations with Rwanda after period of improvement. Radio France Internationale 17 Nov reported Gitega deployed at least four battalions of soldiers to North Kivu as part of bilateral agreement with Kinshasa.

Cameroon

Anglophone conflict took heavy toll on civilians, with over 30 killed in two major attacks; jihadist groups continued targeting civilians and govt forces’ positions in Far North.

Massacres highlighted civilians’ vulnerability amid Anglophone conflict. In South West region, unidentified gunmen overnight 6 Nov rampaged through Egbekaw neighbourhood of Mamfe town (Manyu division), setting houses ablaze and killing at least 25 civilians; day marked anniversary of President Biya’s rise to power (see below). In Francophone West region, near border with Anglophone North West, suspected armed separatists 21 Nov raided market in Bamenyam village (Bamboutos division), killing nine people, abducting at least ten and wounding two soldiers. UN condemned both attacks, urged govt to conduct investigations and hold perpetrators accountable. Meanwhile, fighting continued between Anglophone separatists and govt forces. In North West region, separatist combatants 8, 11 Nov clashed with army in regional capital Bamenda, leaving two soldiers dead; army 11 Nov raided separatist hideout in Nguri locality (Donga-Mantung division), killing six fighters including one commander; separatists 10 Nov attacked soldiers with rocket-propelled grenade in Belo town (Boyo division), killing three.

Jihadist groups kept up attacks on military, civilian targets in Far North region. Suspected Boko Haram (BH) combatants early to mid-Nov attacked several localities in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga and Logone-et-Chari divisions, with four civilians killed 12 Nov in Kolofata and Hile Alifa towns. Fighting between militants and govt forces continued. Suspected Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) elements 5 Nov attacked military post in Fotokol town (Logone-et-Chari), killing one soldier. BH-army clashes 9-13 Nov also left four dead in several areas of Mayo-Sava.

Ruling party celebrated President Biya’s 41st anniversary in office. Ruling party 6 Nov held rallies in several cities to celebrate Biya’s 41st anniversary in power, called on 90-year-old president to vie for eighth term in 2025 presidential election.

Central African Republic

Govt forces and allies continued to hunt down rebels in several regions, and authorities dismissed UN mission’s call for national dialogue.

Increased rebel activity prompted military to step up presence in hinterland. Between 100 and 150 govt troops 1 Nov deployed to Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture’s capital Ndélé, after around 120 unidentified armed men late Oct took control of nearby Miamani village, killing one soldier and forcing other soldiers and civilians to flee. In Ouham-Fafa prefecture, Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) rebels 2 Nov claimed control of Sido town near Chadian border, with two soldiers and several civilians reportedly killed; military and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 5 Nov recaptured town, and Wagner plane on search mission in Ouham-Fafa 11 Nov briefly crossed into Chad, prompting N’Djamena to threaten defensive action; CPC 24 Nov once again attacked Sido before leaving next day. After govt and Wagner forces late Oct attacked Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC) armed group and killed about 20 fighters, MPC leader Mahamat Al-Khatim 3 Nov announced leaving CPC and reintegrating 2019 peace agreement with govt.

UN renewed mission’s mandate amid tensions over national dialogue proposal. After UN mission (MINUSCA) late Oct called for new dialogue between govt and both civilian and armed opposition, President Touadéra’s special adviser Fidèle Gouandjika 2 Nov dismissed proposal, claimed it was part of “genocidal plot” hatched by MINUSCA and France to destabilise country. Opposition and armed groups reacted cautiously to MINUSCA’s proposal, with some voicing concern that any such dialogue would legitimise Touadéra-sponsored constitutional referendum held in July. UN Security Council 15 Nov renewed MINUSCA’s mandate for one year until Nov 2024, demonstrating international community’s almost unanimous support for Touadéra despite authoritarian drift.

Intercommunal tensions flared in north west. Muslim trader 8 Nov attacked and killed non-Muslim man following land dispute in Paoua town, Lim-Pendé prefecture; in response, crowd next day set fire to over 20 Muslim houses.

Chad

Opposition heavyweight Succès Masra returned from exile ahead of constitutional referendum due in December; N’Djamena faced growing risk of becoming embroiled in Sudan conflict.

Authorities allowed Succès Masra to return, prepared constitutional referendum. Succès Masra, leader of Les Transformateurs party, 3 Nov returned to Chad after year-long exile; agreement for his return, facilitated by Economic Community of Central African States, includes amnesty for all military and civilian actors involved in deadly violence of 20 Oct 2022, and Masra’s commitment to support transition process. Authorities 5 Nov released 72 members of Les Transformateurs who had been detained since 2022. Masra 19 Nov addressed hundreds of supporters in capital N’Djamena, urged “reconciliation” with military rulers. Civil society movement Wakit Tama refused to recognise amnesty, and Les Démocrates party leader rejected “fool’s agreement”, urged justice for victims of 2022 police crackdown. Meanwhile, govt 7 Nov published decree convening electorate for constitutional referendum scheduled for 16-17 Dec. Several opposition and civil society figures continued to denounce draft constitution’s focus on unitary state to the detriment of federal one, lack of participation of main political actors and hasty nature of census, which did not cover entire electorate, especially in southern provinces.

Chad denied taking sides in Sudan’s war amid mounting risk of destabilisation. Govt 6 Nov denied rumours that Chad and United Arab Emirates use Amdjarass airport to send military supply to Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Recent clashes in Sudan between RSF and Juba Peace Agreement signatories, whose members largely hail from Zaghawa community, could increase tensions between Arabs and Zaghawa in govt and military (see Sudan).

In another important development. Coordinated offensive launched in August by Libyan National Army and Chadian military continued to weaken rebel movement Front for Alternance and Concord in Chad (FACT). Prominent FACT leader Mahamat Barh Béchir Kendji late Oct or early Nov reportedly surrendered to Chadian authorities alongside between 130 and 1,000 combatants; FACT 9 Nov accused Kendji of treason.

Côte d’Ivoire

Former PM Guillaume Soro announced intention to end self-imposed exile; govt highlighted criminal convictions facing him.

Opposition party Generations and Peoples in Solidarity (GPS) claimed Ivorian authorities 3 Nov attempted to arrest party leader, former PM Guillaume Soro, at Istanbul airport in Türkiye; govt 6 Nov denied allegation. Soro 12 Nov announced intention to end self-imposed exile and return home, said he was back in Africa for first time in five years. In defiance of President Ouattara, who has taken firm stance against military takeovers in West Africa, Niger and Burkina Faso junta leaders 13, 21 Nov met with Soro in Niamey and Ouagadougou, respectively. Govt 23 Nov said Soro can return to Côte d’Ivoire “whenever he wants”, adding it was up to justice system to implement sentences handed down against him in 2020-2021, which include life imprisonment for “undermining state security” over accusations of plotting coup against Ouattara.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Distrust in electoral process continued to mar prospects for peaceful vote on 20 December; M23 rebels stepped up offensive, threatening key cities in North Kivu province.

Electoral preparations progressed haltingly as opposition discussed coalition. Constitutional Court 18 Nov validated all 26 presidential candidacies for 20 Dec election, and electoral campaign started next day. Six opposition candidates, including heavyweights Martin Fayulu and Denis Mukwege, 24 Nov filed complaint against head of electoral commission, Denis Kadima, and Interior Minister Peter Kazadi, accusing them of manipulating electoral process. EU 29 Nov cancelled election observation mission, citing security and technical reasons. Meanwhile, opposition representatives 13-17 Nov met in South Africa, and three candidates 19-20 Nov withdrew from presidential race to back Moïse Katumbi; neither Fayulu nor Mukwege followed suit.

M23 captured positions in east around North Kivu’s provincial capital Goma. Amid ongoing tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali (see Rwanda), Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continued offensive in North Kivu, with intense fighting in Masisi, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru territories. M23 from late Oct reoccupied most positions they had ceded to East African regional force and repelled army and loyal militias, formerly known as Wazalendo, on Sake-Kitshanga axis and Goma-Rutshuru axis. Notably, M23 14 Nov took control of Kishishe village, Rutshuru territory, 22 Nov captured Mweso city, Masisi territory. Clashes between M23 and army 26 Nov intensified around Kilolirwe village; several thousand households took refuge in Sake town, last stop before Goma. Responding to resurgent M23 threat, UN peacekeeping force (MONUSCO) 3 Nov launched operation with army to reinforce security around Goma; plans for mission’s withdrawal continued unhindered, as MONUSCO and govt 21 Nov agreed on timeline for complete disengagement. East African regional force, whose mandate is set to expire on 8 Dec, largely stayed out of fight. President Tshisekedi 17 Nov signed agreement on Southern African regional force, confirmed deployment “in the coming days”.

ADF continued to wreak havoc in eastern provinces. Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels 7 Nov killed at least 12 civilians in three localities of Irumu territory, Ituri province; 12 Nov reportedly slaughtered up to 42 people in Watalinga chiefdom, Beni territory, North Kivu.

Eritrea

Asmara defended its role in Ethiopia’s Tigray war, and President Isaias attended Saudi Arabia-Africa summit.

Asmara defended involvement in Tigray war. On first anniversary of peace deal between Ethiopian govt and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Asmara 2 Nov defended its involvement, saying it was compelled to enter war amid alleged TPLF plans to invade Eritrea, overthrow govt and expand its territory. Minister of Information Yemane Gebremeskel same day accused U.S. and “certain European countries” of making “unsubstantiated allegations” about continued presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray region.

Isaias attended Saudi Arabia-Africa summit. President Isaias 9 Nov travelled to Saudi capital Riyadh for three-day Saudi Arabia-Africa summit beginning 10 Nov; 13 Nov met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. While in Riyadh, Isaias held separate meetings with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Somali President Hassan Sheik Mohamud to discuss Red Sea security. Isaias and Sisi also discussed Sudan crisis, during which Isaias reportedly called for African Union (AU)-led peace initiative. In interview with media outlet Asharq al-Awsat next day, however, Isaias launched scathing critique of AU, alongside Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Economic Community of West African States, dismissing them as ineffective.

Ethiopia

Hostilities continued to intensify in Amhara region, talks between govt and Oromo Liberation Army ended without agreement, and frictions within Tigray’s leadership simmered.

Fano-federal violence continued in Amhara, with heavy clashes in Lalibela town. Hostilities between federal forces and Amhara militias known as Fano intensified in Amhara region. Notably, fierce clashes 8 Nov erupted around Lalibela (North Wollo Zone), with Fano militants briefly taking control of town before withdrawing 9 Nov amid heavy artillery and drones. Fano fighters 25 Nov reportedly entered strategic Addis Zemen town (South Gondar Zone). Meanwhile, news agency Reuters 7 Nov reported that skirmishes between armed Amhara and Oromo militia in Oromia Special Zone killed 30 civilians.

Talks to end Oromia insurgency broke down. Govt and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) early Nov resumed high-level talks in Tanzania, facilitated by Intergovernmental Authority on Development, U.S. and Norway; talks 21 Nov ended without agreement, sides traded blame for breakdown; previous talks failed due to disputes on key political issues, such as OLA demands for greater political role in Oromia. Meanwhile, govt-insurgent fighting continued. Notably, radio network VOA Amharic 1 Nov reported that shootouts in North Shewa Zone left at least twelve civilians dead and displaced unknown number.

Tigray’s interim administration dismissed four top officials. Tigray region’s Interim Regional Administration (IRA) 8 Nov announced it had 28 Oct removed four high-ranking officials for failing to adequately perform their duties; IRA had dismissed six others late Oct. Move comes amid simmering power struggle between IRA and disgruntled senior faction of region’s ruling party, Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Another high-level meeting between IRA, TPLF leadership and Tigray military leaders began 12 Nov to address disagreement.

In other important developments. After PM Abiy’s Oct remarks on securing access to seaport raised concerns in region, Abiy 14 Nov reiterated he has no intention of using military force; still, he underscored importance of seaport access for Ethiopia’s development and warned failure to resolve issue now could trigger future conflict. U.S. development agency 14 Nov announced resumption of food assistance to Ethiopia, suspended in May due to aid diversion and theft.

Gabon

Junta disclosed timetable for transition back to civilian rule, setting August 2025 as tentative election date.

Military govt 13 Nov announced that presidential and legislative elections will be held in Aug 2025, according to “indicative” timetable to be validated by national dialogue scheduled for April 2024.

Guinea

Armed individuals broke former military ruler out of prison, sparking military purges and suggesting that President Doumbouya faces opposition from within armed forces.

High-level prison escape sparked manhunt. Armed men 4 Nov stormed prison in capital Conakry, freeing former strongman Moussa Dadis Camara and three close associates on trial since last year for 2009 Conakry stadium massacre; authorities said nine people, including two civilians, were killed during breakout. Security forces later same day recaptured Dadis and two other officials, who claimed incident was kidnapping rather than breakout. Govt 5 Nov said last escapee, former minister of presidential security Col. Claude Pivi, was still at large and accused his son of leading breakout. Security forces 6 Nov conducted intensive search for Pivi in Conakry neighbourhoods known to be sympathetic to deposed President Condé. Conakry stadium massacre trial resumed 13 Nov in Pivi’s absence.

Breakout led to purges in military, pointing to divisions within regime. Govt 5 Nov announced removal of over 60 soldiers, gendarmes, and prison officials suspected of involvement in prison breakout; also announced legal proceedings against some for abandonment of post and violation of orders. Breakout reportedly featured fighting between Special Forces, formerly led by interim President Col. Doumbouya, and Autonomous Battalion of Airborne Troops (BATA), of which Col. Pivi was once a member; both units reportedly also clashed in September 2021 during Doumbouya’s coup against Condé. Doumbouya 14 Nov sacked four senior military officers, next day appointed new head of BATA.

In other important developments. Justice Minister Charles Wright 20 Nov announced investigation into Condé for treason; Condé 22 Nov said Wright had “lost his bearings” due to Pivi’s escape.

Kenya

Bipartisan talks produced report calling for reform to electoral commission and audit of last presidential elections; court extended suspension of police deployment to Haiti.

National Dialogue Committee (NDC) published final report. NDC, platform for bipartisan talks between governing Kenya Kwanza alliance and opposition Azimio la Umoja coalition on conduct of last year’s elections and other issues, 25 Nov published report calling for “restructuring and reconstitution” of electoral commission, audit of last presidential election and urged govt to review tax policy, rationalise public expenditure and expand social protection to reduce cost of living. President Ruto next day welcomed budget cut recommendations as “practical”. Meanwhile, High Court 28 Nov ruled that salary levy introduced by Ruto in June was illegal, dealing a blow to govt’s efforts to increase tax revenue; Azimio leader Kalonzo Musyoka same day welcomed “win for Azimio”.

Violent incidents continued, notably Al-Shabaab attacks near Somalia border. Suspected al-Shabaab combatants 25 Nov raided Marafa and Poromoko villages, Lamu county, killing one; 28 Nov attacked police post in Garissa county, injuring one officer. Meanwhile, suspected cattle rustlers from Turkana county same day raided Lochacha village, West Pokot county; resulting clashes killed six.

Parliament approved police deployment to Haiti, court extended suspension. Parliament 16 Nov approved police deployment as part of UN-backed mission to Haiti. High Court same day extended order to suspend deployment until 26 Jan 2024 pending ruling on petition questioning constitutionality of deployment.

In another important development. Authorities 28 Nov said flooding linked to weather phenomenon El Niño killed 120 people and displaced tens of thousands since Oct.

Madagascar

Political tensions escalated as opposition boycotted presidential election and rejected incumbent President Rajoelina’s win amid crackdown on protests; authorities accused army officers of inciting rebellion.

Opposition parties rejected results of presidential election held on 16 Nov. Electoral commission 25 Nov announced provisional results of presidential poll, with Rajoelina winning 59% of votes and turnout just over 46%. Collective of ten opposition candidates rejected results, claimed election saw lowest voter turnout on record at roughly 20%; at least one opposition candidate in following days lodged appeal with High Constitutional Court to have election annulled.

Security forces clashed with opposition protesters amid calls for election boycott. Ahead of election, police wielding tear gas and stun grenades 4 Nov dispersed opposition-led protest in Antananarivo, arresting 11 people and leaving around 20 injured. Security forces 8 Nov arrested opposition lawmaker Fetra Ralambozafimbololona at demonstration in Antananarivo, sparking violent clashes with protesters which left 16 people injured. President of National Assembly Christine Razanamahasoa 9 Nov endorsed opposition collective’s demand to postpone election and hold consultations on electoral rules, citing procedural irregularities and ongoing unrest. Interim govt next day condemned “attempted institutional coup” by Razanamahasoa. Collective of ten opposition candidates 13 Nov called on voters to boycott presidential election, denouncing “unbearable” actions of electoral commission, top court and incumbent President Rajoelina. Authorities imposed nightly curfew in capital Antananarivo on eve of presidential vote.

Army warned against destabilisation attempt after plot allegations. Country’s top prosecutor 28 Nov said two senior army officers had been detained and charged with “threatening state security” for allegedly inciting soldiers to mutiny ahead of election. Army next day warned against any attempt to destabilise country, said army committed to respecting election’s outcome.

Mali

In latest blow to 2015 peace agreement, army seized strategic town of Kidal from former separatist armed groups; fighting for control of vast northern region will likely continue in coming weeks.

Army captured formerly separatist armed groups’ stronghold of Kidal. After UN mission (MINUSMA) left Kidal base earlier than planned on 31 Oct, govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 11-13 Nov clashed with members of Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), coalition of armed groups signatory to 2015 Algiers Accord, around latter’s stronghold of Kidal; death toll unknown. Transitional President Col. Goïta 14 Nov announced army had seized Kidal town, celebrating major victory; Goïta’s speech was less triumphalist than expected, however, giving credence to idea that maintaining control of Kidal and upcoming campaign for rural areas in Kidal region, where CSP and jihadist groups remain implanted, may be more difficult. Govt forces 16 Nov claimed discovering mass grave in Kidal, accused CSP members of committing atrocities; CSP rejected allegation. Govt and Wagner forces continued to face criticism for impact of northern campaign on local populations. Notably, reports emerged that govt airstrikes 7 Nov killed civilians including children in Kidal town, and that govt forces and Wagner elements 12 Nov executed dozens of detainees in Tonka town, Timbuktu region. Lacking armoured protection or air cover during withdrawal, MINUSMA continued to suffer attacks: UN peacekeepers traveling from Kidal to Gao town 1-3 Nov encountered six explosive devices, leaving at least 37 injured. MINUSMA 18 Nov handed over Ansongo camp, Gao region, to Malian authorities.

Jihadist violence continued in centre and north. In northern Timbuktu region, Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 24 Nov launched simultaneous attacks on army positions in Niafunké and Goundam towns; JNIM claimed taking control of Niafunké camp and killing around 50 soldiers, while military said they repelled attacks. Meanwhile, conflict gave rise to intercommunal violence and abuses, notably in centre. Suspected Dan Na Ambassagou militiamen 2 Nov killed four Fulani pastoralists in Sévaré town, Mopti region. Malian and Wagner troops 7 Nov allegedly killed 12 people near Molodo and Diabaly towns, Ségou region.

Mozambique

Islamic State militants pushed toward southern districts of Cabo Delgado province, and opposition continued to reject October municipal elections’ results.

Islamic State militants moved south in Cabo Delgado province. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) combatants late Oct-early Nov moved into Cabo Delgado’s southern districts of Meluco and Quissanga, the latter for the first time in a year, leading army to fortify positions against potential attack on provincial capital Pemba. Move may have been forced by military operations in Catupa forest area straddling Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe and Macomia districts, or be part of ISMP efforts to recruit and rebuild strength, with reports of peaceful interactions with residents in Quissanga; concerns also grew that group may try to free militants imprisoned in Pemba or neighbouring Metuge district. Meanwhile, militants launched several attacks in northern districts, forcing thousands to flee. In Macomia, combatants 10 Nov attacked Novo Cabo Delgado village, killing three and wounding four including community militia members. In Muidumbe, militants 12 Nov killed four people in Lagoa Nguri area, and 16 Nov killed another two and took several hostages in Mapate village.

Opposition protests over contested municipal elections continued, with one killed. Strains between ruling FRELIMO and main opposition RENAMO parties remained high following electoral violence in wake of October municipal elections. Interior Minister Pascoal Ronda 1 Nov announced 149 people arrested during unrest. RENAMO in Nov continued demonstrations and boycott of parliament to denounce widespread irregularities during vote; police 16 Nov used live bullets to repress opposition protest in Angoche town, Nampula province, killing one and wounding several others. Constitutional Council 24 Nov proclaimed final results with FRELIMO winning 56 municipalities, RENAMO four, smaller opposition party one, and ordered re-vote in four others, set for 10 Dec; preliminary results announced late Oct by electoral commission gave FRELIMO 64 of 65 municipalities. RENAMO 27 Nov announced it would file extraordinary appeal to annul Constitutional Council’s judgment validating ballot, arguing it jeopardises fundamental rights.

Niger

Junta asked Togo for help to extract concessions from erstwhile partners as sanctions continued to cripple economy and state finances; jihadist threat remained elevated.

Ruling military turned to Togo to mediate with regional bloc. Military govt continued to grapple with economic crisis sparked in large part by West African regional bloc’s (ECOWAS) sanctions, and budget reduction of around 40% following withdrawal of much of country’s foreign aid. Authorities 31 Oct-4 Nov detained Central Bank of West African States local director in likely bid to pressure institution to lift economic and financial sanctions. Defence minister Gen. Salifou Mody 6 Nov asked Togolese President Gnassingbé to facilitate dialogue between Niger and ECOWAS and serve as guarantor of French withdrawal from Niger, which in Nov continued apace; Togo’s FM Robert Dussey said Lomé ready to “help as a facilitator”.

Govt denied rumours of large-scale jihadist attack amid persistent insecurity. Junta mid-Nov denied rumours of complex ambush on army convoy by Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) in Tissilatane area, along border with Mali; unconfirmed reports claimed as many as 200 soldiers killed. Smaller-scale incidents involving al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and IS Sahel continued in Tillabery region (south west), where presumed JNIM fighters 10 Nov killed six civilians and abducted 11 more in Kakou village, Torodi department. Meanwhile in Diffa region (south east), JAS faction of Boko Haram 8 Nov killed three soldiers along Nigerian border near Abadam village, Diffa department. As part of close security cooperation between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, Nigerien Air Force early Nov reportedly contributed to capture of Kidal town by Malian forces (see Mali); Niamey 15 Nov congratulated Bamako on “liberation of Kidal”.

In other important developments. In southern region of Maradi, herder-farmer violence 4 Nov killed three people in Danja village, Madarounfa department. Junta 25 Nov revoked 2015 law aimed at curbing migration to Europe, adding new twist to growing political tensions between Niger and EU countries.

Nigeria

Violence by diverse armed groups continued in many states, while ruling party consolidated power at state level.

Fighting between rival jihadist groups continued in North East. Clashes between Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) combatants 18 Nov left about 70 dead on Tumbum Ali Island in Marte area, Borno state; security sources said fighting escalated following influx of arms and fighters from Islamic State Sahel Province joining ISWAP. Two trucks loaded with ISWAP militants 26 Nov hit landmine in Marte area, leaving about 50 dead. Meanwhile, also in Borno, Boko Haram combatants 6 Nov killed at least 15 farmers in Mafa area, and ISWAP 18 Nov ambushed Yobe state governor’s convoy on Maiduguri-Damaturu highway, wounding six security personnel.

Armed groups killed and abducted scores in North West. In Sokoto state, gunmen 2-12 Nov attacked villages in Wurno, Rabah and Tangaza areas, killed at least 24 people and abducted unconfirmed number. In Katsina state, armed group 5 Nov attacked Muslim Maulud celebration in Musawa area, killing at least 20 people and abducting others. In Zamfara state, armed group 24 Nov abducted at least 100 people in four villages of Maru area, after residents failed to pay “tax” demanded by group.

Criminal violence and Biafra separatist unrest continued in South East. Abia state govt late Oct discovered over 70 bodies in Umunneochi area, said bodies must be those of kidnapping-for-ransom victims. Gunmen 17 Nov killed two police officers in Ebonyi state capital Abakaliki, 27 Nov killed another two in Ahiazu Mbaise area, Imo state; police blamed armed wing of Indigenous People of Biafra separatist group.

Ruling party consolidated power at state level. President Tinubu’s All Progressives Congress (APC) won two of three governorship elections held 11 Nov. APC also made major gains through election petitions: Appeal Court in capital Abuja 16-19 Nov annulled opposition’s victory in March 2023 governorship elections in Zamfara state, Kano and Plateau states; 23 Nov reversed election petition tribunal’s verdict sacking Nasarawa state APC governor, upholding his re-election. APC now controls 22 of country’s 36 states.

Rwanda

U.S. secured commitments from Kigali and Kinshasa to de-escalate tensions as Rwanda-backed M23 armed group made territorial gains in DR Congo.

U.S. said Kigali, Kinshasa agreed on de-escalation steps. U.S. govt 21 Nov said Intelligence Chief Avril Haines 19-20 Nov travelled to Rwanda and DR Congo, secured commitments from Kigali and Kinshasa to de-escalate tensions, although specific measures were not articulated publicly. Congolese army same day prohibited all soldiers, regardless of their ranks, from establishing or maintaining “any contact” with anti-Kigali Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. Fighting in following days continued in North Kivu between M23 rebels and Congolese forces.

Kinshasa continued to accuse Kigali of incursions, support for M23 rebels. Earlier in month, DR Congo’s permanent representative at UN, Zénon Mukongo Ngay, 1 Nov said images captured by UN mission (MONUSCO) surveillance drones show columns of Rwandan soldiers crossing border to reinforce M23 rebel positions in Runyoni, Kibumba and Tshanzu localities in North Kivu province. Following request filed by Kinshasa in May, International Criminal Court 4 Nov confirmed it will conduct preliminary examination to “determine the advisability of opening a new investigation” into crimes committed by M23 and others in North Kivu since 2022.

Senegal

Ahead of February 2024 election, Supreme Court foiled opposition leader Ousmane Sonko’s presidential bid.

Supreme Court 17 Nov overturned lower court’s ruling ordering opposition leader Ousmane Sonko’s reinstatement on voter roll, asked for case to be decided afresh by high court in capital Dakar. Sonko’s lawyer immediately deplored decision, said time is running short for Sonko to get sponsorship and submit candidacy for Feb 2024 presidential election. Separately, West African regional court same day rejected Sonko’s claim that state violated his human rights. Sonko’s PASTEF party 19 Nov designated its secretary-general and Sonko’s right-hand man, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, as its presidential candidate, likely to act as placeholder while Sonko is ineligible. Meanwhile, Sonko 14 Nov returned to prison after having spent weeks in hospital since launching hunger strike in mid-Oct. Local media 23 Nov reported Sonko had ended hunger strike.

Sierra Leone

Armed men attacked main military barracks and prison in capital Freetown; govt denounced coup attempt.

Unidentified gunmen 26 Nov launched assault on main military barracks in capital Freetown, seemingly attempting to access key armoury. During ensuing battle with security forces, assailants attacked detention centres, including Freetown Central Prison, from which 1,890 inmates were freed or abducted. Govt same day imposed nationwide curfew, said security forces repelled attack by “renegade soldiers”, while President Bio that evening announced most leaders of attack had been detained. As fragile calm returned to Freetown, govt 27 Nov said attack had left 20 people dead, including a dozen soldiers, and most inmates remained missing. Delegation of West African regional bloc ECOWAS same day arrived in country, expressed solidarity with govt and readiness to “deploy elements” upon request. Information Minister Chernoh Bah 28 Nov described incident as “attempted coup” and announced 13 military officers had been arrested. As night-time curfew remained in place, police same day published list of 34 people wanted in connection with incident, including current and former security forces members.

Somalia

Election-related tensions persisted in Puntland even as state president appointed dialogue committee, offensive against Al-Shabaab remained largely on pause, and UN delayed drawdown of AU mission.

Amid election stalemate in Puntland state, opportunity for de-escalation emerged. Opposition in Puntland continued to accuse President Said Deni of attempting to manipulate upcoming parliamentary and presidential election process to his advantage, by determining rules of game with little consultation as Puntland moves from clan-based selection to universal suffrage. Group of Puntland clan elders 1 Nov argued for return to clan-based selection to ensure timely vote on 8 Jan 2024; but govt said it would not change path. Opposition 14 Nov announced parallel clan-based vote for 8 Jan. In local incident partially related to dispute, govt and opposition forces 7 Nov clashed in state capital Garowe, killing one civilian; UN 21 Nov called for restraint, expressed concern over recent mobilisation of forces in city. Parliament 26 Nov called for more time to resolve issues between govt and opposition, did not endorse electoral commission’s proposal to postpone elections to 25 Feb 2024. Deni 27 Nov appointed election negotiation committee, providing some hope for dialogue to break deadlock.

Govt offensive against Al-Shabaab remained on hold. Large-scale military operations against Al-Shabaab militants remained on pause due to heavy rain and troop rotation, as govt forces used time to regroup. Several small clashes reported, however, including in South West state. Notably, army 1-5 Nov engaged Al-Shabaab during clearing operations around Xuddur town, Bakool region, and late Nov conducted further operations in Bakool and Bay regions. In Galmudug state, main focus of recent efforts, govt forces 7 Nov captured small village of Barag Mohamud Daaud. Govt-allied clan militias continued attempt to clear militants from both banks of Shabelle river in Hirshabelle state. Al-Shabaab attacks also occurred at low frequency. Notably, two suicide attacks 3 and 13 Nov caused minimal damage in capital Mogadishu.

AU mission (ATMIS) drawdown official delayed. UN Security Council 15 Nov approved extension of ATMIS mandate until 30 June 2024, including postponing second phase of mission’s drawdown until 31 Dec 2023.

Somaliland

Inter-clan clashes pitted Dhulbahante militias against Isaaq sub-clan fighters in Sool region and parliament prepared for Nov 2024 elections.

Security situation remained precarious in Sool region. Dhulbahante clan militias 6-9 Nov clashed with fighters from Haber Jeclo sub-clan of Isaaq (Somaliland’s largest clan) at Buq-dharkayn town, 20km south of frontline of conflict between Somaliland govt and SSC-Khatumo state (new self-declared administration for Dhulbahante community) around Oog town, leading to unconfirmed number of deaths and capture of prisoners. Govt and SSC-Khatumo state accused each other of stoking violence and reinforced nearby positions. Deadly clashes 22 Nov resumed in Buq-dharkayn and Maygaale areas. Though fighting has mostly been on clan militia level, Somaliland pointed to involvement of Somalia’s Puntland state, while SSC-Khatumo called on Somali and international actors to pressure Somaliland President Bihi to cease hostilities. Ruling party’s deputy chairman, Hussein Aden Adde, 27 Nov reportedly defected to SSC-Khatumo. Meanwhile, self-declared administration continued lobbying to become member state of Somalia.

Electoral tensions remained low amid preparations for Nov 2024 vote. August agreement between Bihi and opposition to simultaneously hold political party and presidential elections on 13 November 2024 continued to hold. House of Elders 18 Nov agreed to form committee to review amendments to election law made by parliament.

South Sudan

Hostilities between Twic Dinka from Warrap state and Ngok Dinka from disputed Abyei area escalated, leaving scores dead amid retaliatory violence and reported army involvement.

Violence spiked in Abyei area and Warrap state, killing dozens. Border skirmishes 13 Nov erupted between Twic Dinka from Warrap state and Ngok Dinka from disputed Abyei Administrative Area; Abyei officials accused national army, which is prohibited from entering Abyei (a demilitarised zone), of fighting alongside Twic youth, though army denied allegations. Hostilities reportedly left dozens dead. Violence 19 Nov intensified again when armed Twic youths entered several villages in Abyei in attacks, killing at least 27. Head of UN mission in South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom, 23 Nov said recent violence killed at least 75 and urged govt to investigate. Meanwhile, Sudan conflict neared Abyei (see Sudan) and could aggravate tensions between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities given latter’s proximity to paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and recruitment campaigns of Sudan’s warring parties.

President Kiir reconstituted key electoral institutions. As 2024 elections inched closer, President Kiir 3 Nov reconstituted National Election Commission (NEC), Political Parties Council and National Constitution Review Commission. Failure to appoint single opposition candidate to NEC leadership, which will play crucial role in conduct of polls, prompted Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) to reject its composition.

South Sudan deployed first Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). After four-year delay, South Sudan 15 Nov deployed first 750 NUF members as stipulated in peace agreement. Deployment sparked controversy as most troops selected are former members of South Sudan People’s Defence Forces, army of governing party; troops were also deployed to Tonga town (Upper Nile state), where hostilities between SPLM-IO and govt-allied Agwalek militia reignited late Oct, raising fears NUF could intervene against SPLA-IO.

In another important development. Security forces 10 Nov increased presence in capital Juba during President Kiir’s trip to Saudi Arabia, triggering rumours of coup attempt; army leadership dismissed Inspector General of National Police Services. President Kiir 27 Nov reshuffled cabinet, replacing Warrap state governor and three national ministers.

Sudan

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) scored major victories in Darfur, reportedly targeting ethnic Massalit communities; RSF advances to North Darfur triggered Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signatories to renounce neutrality, raising risk of all-out ethnic conflict in Darfur.

RSF captured West Darfur and East Darfur state capital, left trail of alleged mass atrocities. Having captured South and Central Darfur states late Oct, RSF 4 Nov seized West Darfur, 21 Nov captured East Darfur state capital El Daein. Refugees in Chad claimed RSF committed “many atrocities” during early Nov attacks on Ardamata in West Darfur, including ethnically-motivated killings and sexual violence. Thousands of people fled Ardamata and evidence of mass graves emerged.

JPA signatories threatened to fight RSF if it advances towards El Fashir, North Darfur. Paramilitary early Nov began march on North Darfur state capital El Fasher, prompting two JPA signatories, Sudan Liberation Movement under Minni Minawi and Justice and Equality Movement, 16 Nov to renounce neutrality and fight alongside Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); third signatory, Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces, 20 Nov followed suit. Groups deployed forces across North Darfur, raising fears of all-out ethnic conflict. Involvement of JPA signatories, whose members largely hail from Zaghawa community, could reverberate in Chad, where Zaghawa community lives and dominates govt and military (see Chad).

Fighting in Kordofan and capital Khartoum persisted. RSF continued advance in Kordofan region, targeting oil infrastructure. Notably, paramilitary launched more attacks on North Kordofan state capital El Obeid, through which major pipeline runs. Offensive brought fighting near border with South Sudan and disputed Abyei region, raising risk of spillover (see South Sudan). Meanwhile, battle for Khartoum continued. Notably, RSF 20 Nov claimed it had seized Jebel Awlia army base south of Khartoum, which could facilitate advance into White Nile state.

In other important developments. U.S.-Saudi facilitated talks in Jeddah city 7 Nov failed to yield ceasefire. Reports late Nov surfaced of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) plans to hold emergency summit on Sudan in early Dec. Army General 28 Nov publicly accused United Arab Emirates of supplying RSF.

Togo

President Gnassingbé carried out security reshuffle while court sentenced former top military official to prison, signalling potential divisions within military; jihadist threat persisted in north.

Former top military officer convicted amid security reshuffle. Gnassingbé 3 Nov appointed new head of his personal security team and made several changes to leadership of anti-jihadist operation deployed in country’s north, notably appointing new operation commander. Meanwhile, military court 7 Nov sentenced Maj. Gen. Abalo Kadangha, former armed forces chief of staff, to 20 years in prison for complicity in murder of Col. Bitala Madjoulba in May 2020. Trial and conviction came as a shock to many Togolese due to Kadangha’s high military rank and family ties with Gnassingbé; affair could be linked to inter-military rivalries, with murdered Col. Madjoulba being brother of newly appointed Security Minister Calixte Madjoulba.

Jihadist threat persisted along northern border with Burkina Faso. In northern Savanes region, Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims 11 Nov claimed killing three soldiers and seizing their vehicle and weapons near Dapaong city, Tône prefecture.

Uganda

Opposition MPs continued to boycott parliament over rights violations, and military captured suspected ADF commander.

Opposition boycott continued to paralyse parliament. Opposition leader in parliament, Mathias Mpuuga, 15 Nov said boycott of parliamentary plenary sessions launched in Oct would continue until govt addresses series of issues, including shrinking civic space and trial of civilians in military courts, also requested information on whereabouts of 18 supporters of opposition party National Unity Platform (NUP) who went missing two years ago. Parliament Speaker Anita Among 22 Nov barred boycotting MPs from other parliamentary activities including attending committee meetings; Mpuuga urged boycotting MPs to defy order, which came into force 28 Nov. State minister for internal affairs, Gen David Muhoozi, 29 Nov presented statement on human rights violations before parliament, said many of alleged missing persons have never been reported to police and some are fictitious.

Authorities continued to claim gains against Islamic State-affiliated militants. Military 2 Nov announced capture of Abdul Rashid Kyoto, also known as Njovu, said he was commander of Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) unit responsible for 17 Oct attack that left three dead, including two foreigners, in country’s west; Nakawa court 13 Nov charged Njovu with terrorism and murder. Congolese civilians continued to seek refuge in Uganda amid ADF attacks, with over 1,000 arriving mid-Nov in Bundibugyo district.

President Museveni lashed out at U.S., UK and UN. After U.S. 30 Oct excluded Uganda from African trade initiative over human rights violations, Museveni 5 Nov accused Washington of “underestimating the freedom fighters of Africa”. Museveni 15 Nov also condemned “interference in our internal affairs” after U.S. and UK early Nov issued security warning over situation in Uganda; same day accused UN of “conserving” terrorism in DR Congo.

Zimbabwe

Violent attacks on political leaders persisted, while recalls of some opposition MPs continued to fuel tensions.

Political violence targeted opposition, causing outrage. Gunmen 1 Nov abducted Takudzwa Ngadziore, MP from main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) in capital Harare, with legislator tortured and released later that day. Body of CCC activist Tapfumaneyi Masaya found 13 Nov, days after armed men abducted him in Harare; Masaya was campaigning for CCC candidate in parliamentary by-election scheduled for 9 Dec. U.S. embassy 14 Nov called for full investigation and end to political violence, while UN human rights office 17 Nov urged authorities to keep their pledge to investigate Masaya’s killing, hold perpetrators accountable in fair trials. High Court 28 Nov overturned lower court’s conviction of Job Sikhala, CCC deputy chairman, for obstructing justice; Sikhala, however, remained behind bars facing other charges.

Confusion over recalls of opposition MPs continued to fuel tensions. Political tensions ran high ahead of 9 Dec by-elections for several parliamentary seats won by CCC candidates in Aug elections; re-runs come after self-proclaimed secretary-general of CCC, Sengezo Tshabangu, in Oct recalled 15 members of National Assembly, claiming they were no longer party members, and High Court 4 Nov dismissed affected lawmakers’ request to be reinstated. Confusion persisted as Tshabangu 14 Nov recalled another 13 National Assembly members, with CCC lawyers saying new recalls contradict High Court order issued earlier same day temporarily blocking him from doing so. CCC throughout month continued to accuse ruling ZANU-PF party of orchestrating recalls.

Asia

Afghanistan

Tensions mounted between Taliban and Pakistan as Islamabad forcibly deported hundreds of thousands of Afghans, while Islamic State’s local branch targeted ethnic minority Hazara community.

Tensions continued to rise with Pakistan amid Afghan exodus. Relations between Kabul and Islamabad continued to face strains as pair traded public criticism and Pakistan forcibly deported hundreds of thousands – and perhaps soon millions – of Afghans to Afghanistan ahead of harsh winter months, which could overwhelm Taliban authorities ill-prepared for massive influx amid one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises and as country reels from devastating earthquakes, economic challenges and sanctions. Some of those forced by Pakistan to cross border fled Taliban rule after group’s takeover in August 2021 and could risk Taliban reprisals (see Pakistan). After Pakistan’s caretaker PM stated that relations will improve when “a legitimate government is established in Kabul”, Taliban 17 Nov responded that ties will improve when “there is wise leadership in Pakistan”. Taliban-affiliated media during month continued to imply that Pakistan is supporting anti-Taliban armed groups inside Afghanistan.

Islamic State targeted ethnic minority Hazaras. Reeling from losses inflicted by security forces in recent months, Islamic State Khorsan Province (ISKP) maintained low-level activity, opting to target unarmed Hazara civilians whom group sees as soft target. Notably, ISKP 7 Nov targeted van in the Hazara enclave of Dasht-e Barchi in western neighbourhoods of Kabul, killing at least seven and wounding over dozen. Taliban intelligence forces 6 Nov reportedly targeted ISKP cell in Suki district, Kunar province (east).

Taliban convened high-level meeting to address economy and Pakistan ties. Taliban’s Emir 19 Nov held meeting with de facto cabinet in Kandahar city, which appeared to be primarily concerned with economic direction of govt as well as deteriorating relations with Pakistan; although exact details are unknown, such meetings are significant as key govt policies are often decided.

Bangladesh

Govt crackdown on opposition continued ahead of Jan elections, protests by garment workers turned deadly and Rohingya refugees fled country amid dire conditions and rampant insecurity.

Govt continued pressure on opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). After security forces broke up BNP’s “grand rally” in capital Dhaka on 28 Oct, opposition claimed authorities subsequently arrested at least 13,200 activists and leaders. In response to crackdown, BNP organised series of “blockades” and “hartals” throughout Nov aimed at inflicting economic damage to pressure govt to give way to neutral govt ahead of vote, leading to confrontations between police and opposition supporters that killed paramilitary officer and several civilians. Ruling Awami League dispatched stick-wielding supporters to keep roads opens and employed harsh rhetoric: PM Sheikh Hasina 4 Nov instructed supporters “burn the hands of those who are out to set vehicles on fire”. U.S. ambassador Peter Haas 13 Nov sought political dialogue between main parties but govt rejected offer, claiming “the ship has sailed”. With BNP certain to boycott poll, Awami League is trying to entice or pressure wavering parties to participate and enhance election’s credibility.

Garment workers staged protests, leading to deadly clashes. Tens of thousands of garment workers starting late Oct demanded higher wages to meet rising living costs, forcing hundreds of factories to close; garment sector accounts for 80% of exports. Near-daily clashes between police and protestors killed four before protests 14 Nov ended amid police crackdowns, threats from employers and govt pressure.

Prospects of Rohingya refugee repatriation appeared dim. Resumption of heavy fighting in Myanmar’s Rakhine state mid-Nov dashed govt’s hopes for repatriation (see Myanmar). Rohingya continued to flee dire conditions in camps and pay people smugglers to flee across Bay of Bengal: five vessels carrying 866 people 14-19 Nov landed on Indonesia’s Aceh province after two months at sea. UN estimated over 3,500 refugees took the perilous journey in 2022, up from 700 year before.

Dialogue resumed in Chittagong Hill Tracts. Militant group Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) and govt’s Peace Establishment Committee 5 Nov held first face-to-face meeting and first dialogue since July ceasefire; KNF reiterated demands for greater autonomy ahead of further talks in Dec.

China/Japan

China and Japan continued maritime presence around disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea, while their leaders held first direct talks in year.

China and Japan continued maritime presence around contested islands. As of 28 Nov, Japan spotted 98 Chinese navy vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone and twenty vessels in its territorial sea. Chinese Coast Guard 1 Nov reported that three Japanese vessels and several patrol boats “illegally” entered “territorial waters” near disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Chinese Coast Guard ships 1-5 Nov entered Japanese waters around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and four such vessels 9 Nov entered Japan’s territorial waters off islands, which prompted Tokyo to lodge protest with Beijing. Chinese Coast Guard 28 Nov reported that it warned off Japanese ships in waters surrounding islands.

China and Japan held high-level dialogue. Marking their first direct talks since Nov 2022, Chinese President Xi and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida 16 Nov met in U.S. city San Francisco on sidelines of APEC summit. Kishida expressed serious concerns about China’s frequent military activities near Japan, including cooperation with Russia, and reiterated importance of peace and stability in Taiwan Strait. Kishida also strongly urged China to remove buoy set up in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone in East China Sea. Chinese FM Wang Yi 9 Nov met sec gen of Japan’s National Security Secretariat Takeo Akiba ahead of Xi-Kishida meeting; Wang urged counterpart to translate intention to improve ties into concrete action. FMs of China, Japan and South Korea 24 Nov held trilateral meeting first time in four years.

Japan courted closer defence ties with partners. Kishida 11 Nov stated that with increasing military activities of China and Russia, Japan is in most severe and complex security environment since World War II. Japan and Philippines 4 Nov announced negotiations on deal to deploy troops on each other’s territory. Japan and UK 7 Nov reaffirmed their comment to strengthen security cooperation. During visit to Australia, VP of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party 13 Nov urged Japan, U.S. and Australia to unite against any forceful change to status quo; Aso proposed inclusion of Japan in AUKUS framework, suggesting “JAUKUS” alliance.

India

Instability and violence persisted in Manipur in far northeast, border talks with China continued, and Maoist militants targeted Chhattisgarh state poll.

In Manipur, militants targeted Indian security forces and Kuki community. Around 700 armed men 1 Nov attacked police camps in state capital Imphal and looted assault rifles, over 600 rounds of ammunition, and at least six vehicles. Meitei militant organisation People’s Liberation Army 16 Nov attempted to ambush Indian security forces in Tengnoupal district but Indian personnel escaped unhurt. Meitei militants 20 Nov killed two Kuki men in Kangpokpi district, raising death toll since outbreak of hostilities in May to at least 183 with more than 30 missing and thousands displaced. Meanwhile, Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum representing Kuki community 15 Nov declared “self-rule” in Tengnoupal, Kangpokpi and Churachandpur districts, citing demand for separate administration from Manipur govt that central govt has not addressed; body intends to instate separate chief minister and officials from community who were forced out of Imphal when hostilities began. In response, state police filed sedition case against tribal body, raising prospect of clashes between pair, particularly if central govt fails to heed body’s demands and replace state’s chief minister.

Military dialogue continued with China over border. After twentieth round of military talks between pair in Oct witnessed no progress, both sides early Nov reportedly began talks ahead of winter to rule out any incident as troop deployments are readjusted for harsh months ahead.

Maoist attacks continued in centre. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), bomb blast by Maoists 6 Nov injured two and killed one in Kanker district, one day ahead of state assembly elections. Bomb blast 17 Nov killed security forces member in Gariaband district during second phase of state assembly elections. State police of West Bengal (east) 18 Nov arrested two Maoists and recovered weapons in Murshidabad district.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Indian and Pakistani border forces exchanged heavy fire in violation of 2021 ceasefire amid uptick in militant infiltration attempts, while security operations in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) triggered deadly gun battles.

India and Pakistan exchanged fire, violating Line of Control ceasefire. After India claimed Pakistani border troops late Oct opened fire unprovoked in RS Pura and Arnia sectors of border in Jammu region, which led to exchange of heavy fire and shelling, Indian forces 9 Nov claimed Pakistani border troops opened fire again in Arnia and Ramgarh sectors of border in Jammu region. Move prompted Indian forces to retaliate, killing one Indian security forces member; gunfire marks another violation of ceasefire since 2003 agreement was renewed indefinitely in Feb 2021, which brings total violations in 2023 to six. New Delhi also claimed uptick in attempted infiltrations of militants from Pakistan in Rajouri and Poonch sector in Jammu region and Kupwara and Baramulla sectors in Kashmir region, which may further increase ahead of harsher winter weather; border troops 15 Nov killed two alleged infiltrators in Uri sector.

Security operations inside J&K triggered deadly clashes. Marking uptick in lethality, security forces 16-17 Nov killed five militants in two-day gun battle in Kulgam district and security operation 22-23 Nov left two LeT militants and five security personnel dead in Rajouri district. Earlier, security forces 1 Nov arrested four alleged militant associates of Laskhar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) in Baramulla district and 2 Nov arrested two alleged militant associates of Al-Badr militant outfit in Srinagar city. Security forces 9 Nov killed one militant of The Resistance Front in Shopian district; 17 Nov killed alleged militant in Rajouri.

High Court granted bail to imprisoned journalists. High Court of J&K 17 Nov granted bail to Fahad Shah, editor of news portal The Kashmir Walla imprisoned since Feb 2022 under anti-terrorism laws for publishing article in 2011; court quashed some charges, such as “abetting terrorism, waging war against the country and promoting enmity” under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act. Court 9 Nov granted bail to journalist Sajad Ahmad Dar, arrested in Jan 2022 under Public Safety Act.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea successfully launched satellite and abrogated 2018 military agreement with South Korea, removing important safeguard against risk of cross-border clashes.

North Korea put satellite into orbit on third attempt of 2023. North Korea 21 Nov launched military reconnaissance satellite in country’s third launch attempt this year, following previous failures in May and Aug, and first since North Korean leader agreed with Russian President Putin in Sept to conduct unspecified collaboration in field of satellite launches; there is no evidence, however, that Russian help was determinative in launch. Pyongyang detonated first stage of rocket in mid-air to ensure it could not be retrieved from sea. If satellite will function as intended, it will provide north with upgraded surveillance of South Korean and U.S. militaries, although South Korea asserted scepticism of North’s technology.

Inter-Korean military deal collapsed, heightening conflict risks at border. In response to satellite launch, South Korea next day announced suspension of one-part of 2018 military agreement with Pyongyang – designed to ease bilateral tensions during period of diplomacy in 2018-19 – thus permitting Seoul to restore full aerial reconnaissance and surveillance along inter-Korean border. North Korea next day abrogated whole deal, accusing South of “frontal challenge to the spirit of the agreement”. Collapse of agreement heightens risk of accidental or deliberate cross-border clashes in coming months as North Korea is now likely to begin rebuilding border guard posts destroyed during 2018, bringing soldiers into closer contact; Pyongyang could redeploy soldiers to Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism resort at Mount Kumgang, as well as step up drone activity near border and cross-border propaganda leafleting and loudspeaker broadcasts.

North Korea continued close engagement with Russia. North Korea’s minister of external economic relations Yun Jong Ho and Russia’s natural resources minister Alexander Kozlov 15 Nov met in North Korean capital Pyongyang to discuss implementation of agreements reached between leaders Kim Jong Un and Putin in Sept; Kozlov noted agreement on joint geological explorations in North Korea in search of gold, iron, and rare earth metal deposits, intention to increase Russia’s agricultural exports and bring bilateral trade back to pre-pandemic levels.

Myanmar

Military faced largest battlefield challenges since Feb 2021 coup as ethnic armed groups conducted attacks on multiple fronts; regime may step up brutal response, including indiscriminate bombings, in coming weeks.

Ethnic armed groups and resistance forces made major gains in north. After Three Brotherhood Alliance – comprising the three ethnic armed groups active in northern Shan State: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA) – and allied resistance groups 27 Oct launched “Operation 1027”, in Nov their forces seized over 130 outposts from regime, inflicted casualties (including Brigadier-General) and major materiel losses on military, captured string of towns in China border area, and destroyed or secured important bridges and blocked major highways, constituting significant strategic, economic and psychological blows to military. Military responded with airstrikes and artillery, which failed to counter operation but caused civilian casualties and displaced some 82,000 in Shan state and 335,000 nationwide (bringing total number of civilians displaced since coup to over 2m). In sign of possibly greater inter-ethnic tensions to come, Shan State Progress Party 7 Nov clashed with TNLA in Muse Township, killing several.

Other groups took advantage on several fronts, threatening to overstretch military. In early Nov, one of largest ethnic armed groups – Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) – led assault together with people’s defence forces on north-western Kawlin town in Sagaing Region, which fell after several days of fighting. Additionally, resistance forces in Kayah State 11 Nov commenced “Operation 1111”, assaulting state capital Loikaw; they claimed to have shot down air force jet. Even more significantly, AA 13 Nov started series of attacks in Rakhine State, ending period of calm that followed informal ceasefire in Nov 2022. In western Myanmar, Chin forces 13 Nov attacked Rikhawdar town on India-Myanmar border, ultimately seizing it. For first time in decades, military will have to fight numerous, determined and well-armed opponents simultaneously in multiple theatres; it may double down on brutal efforts to reverse tide on battlefield, including scorched-earth tactics and indiscriminate bombing in coming weeks.

Pakistan

Authorities set Feb 2024 election date, deadly attacks continued in Afghan border provinces, and govt faced international rebuke for forcibly deporting hundreds of thousands of Afghans.

Apex election body set election date amid political jostling. After weeks of delay and finally compelled by Supreme Court, Election Commission 4 Nov announced election had been set for 8 Feb 2024; all political parties welcomed decision, although former PM Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) bemoaned unlevel playing field and Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) accused caretaker govt of bias in favour of Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League. PTI continued to face significant crackdown, particularly in main political battleground Punjab province, as provincial authorities refused party permission to hold public gatherings. Khan, who remained in prison, submitted petitions to Supreme Court for post-arrest bail and to overturn indictment regarding misusing diplomatic cables; Islamabad High Court 21 Nov accepted Khan’s petition ruling out trial in prison. Open trial will resume 1 Dec but within prison premises, ostensibly on security grounds.

Militant attacks and military operations continued, primarily in Afghan border provinces. In one of most lethal attacks in recent months, Baloch militants 3 Nov killed fourteen soldiers in Balochistan province’s Gwadar district. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, bomb blast targeting police and military 3 Nov killed five civilians and soldier in Dera Ismail district, while militants 6 Nov killed two police constables. During military operation in Khyber district, militants 6 Nov killed four soldiers, including Lieutenant Colonel. In Punjab province, affiliate of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 4 Nov assaulted Pakistan Air Force training base in Mianwali district, leaving all nine attackers dead.

Govt continued forcible deportation of Afghans en masse. Govt had reportedly forced more hundreds of thousands of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan (see Afghanistan). In attempt to justify policy, caretaker PM Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar blamed “illegal immigrants” for “spreading insecurity” and cited Taliban’s failure to take action against “anti-Pakistan terrorists”. International rights group Amnesty International 10 Nov condemned Pakistan’s use of Afghan refugees as “political pawn” and UN human rights chief 16 Nov expressed concern over reports of “ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and detention, destruction of property and personnel belongings and extortion”.

Philippines

Govt and Communist rebels struck deal to restart peace talks after six-year hiatus; insecurity continued in south amid local feuds and targeted killings.

Govt and communist militants agreed to reignite formal dialogue. Manila and National Democratic Front – umbrella organisation representing communist rebels, including main armed group New People’s Army (NPA) and Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) – 23 Nov struck deal following engagement in Norwegian capital Oslo, agreeing in principle to restart peace talks to achieve “peaceful resolution of the armed conflict”; formal talks between pair broke down in Nov 2017 under then President Duterte. Meanwhile, fighting persisted between govt security forces and NPA in Luzon Island (Mindoro) in north and Visayas Islands (Negros and Samar) in centre, killing at least ten combatants and civilians during Nov.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). In Maguindanao del Sur province, armed men associated with Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) 118 Base Command and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) 7 Nov clashed in Tukanalipao village over existing feud; fighting lasted for days and injured six combatants as well as one civilian. In Basilan province, shooting attack 9 Nov killed member of Basilan Provincial Board near Sumisip District Hospital. In Sultan Kudarat province, gunmen 15 Nov killed school principal in ambush in Lambayong town. In Lanao del Sur and Sulu provinces, authorities 16 Nov arrested six suspected drug dealers and seized significant quantities of “shabu” (methamphetamines) during separate anti-drug operations. Bomb 25 Nov exploded in centre of Pikit town, wounding six Moro civilians.

Implementation of Bangsamoro peace deal progressed. President Marcos Jr. 14 Nov attended BARMM’s first local legislative general assembly, which he described as “historic” and “crucial to achieving our goal of achieving peace and progress” in region.

South China Sea

Tensions continued to mount between Philippines and China amid maritime incidents near flashpoints in South China Sea (SCS).

China sought to impede Philippines’ access to disputed shoal. Philippine frigate 1 Nov entered waters near Scarborough Shoal, prompting China’s navy to quickly dispatch warships and fighter jets to track and ward off vessel. As Philippines continued resupply mission to its grounded ship on Second Thomas Shoal – significant source of tension in recent months – Chinese and Philippine vessels 10 Nov engaged in another standoff near shoal as Chinese coast guard ships fired water cannon at Philippine boat; Manila accused China of “dangerously harassing” its ships. Manila 11 Nov announced China had deployed record 38 vessels near shoal, with eleven actively involved in intercepting Philippine boats. Philippine President Marcos Jr. 18 Nov met Chinese President Xi on sidelines of APEC summit in U.S., where former expressed concern over recent incidents. Marcos next day said SCS situation had become “more dire”, warning Beijing had “started to show interest” in building bases on reefs that were “closer and closer to the Philippine coastline”.

U.S. maintained support for Manila. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin 15 Nov met Philippine counterpart Gilberto Teodoro Jr; pair criticised China’s recent harassment of Philippine vessels and confirmed commitment to Mutual Defense Treaty. Meanwhile, U.S. navy 3 Nov conducted freedom of navigation operation near Spratly Islands, marking first such operation in six months, and 25 Nov near Paracel Islands, which China protested. Manila 21 Nov held joint air and maritime patrols with U.S. in its northernmost province near Taiwan Strait, and held patrols for first time with Australia 25-27 Nov, during which two Chinese fighter jets orbited Philippine patrol aircraft.

Manila sought closer defence ties with regional countries. Following talks in Philippine capital Manila between Marcos Jr. and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida, pair 4 Nov announced they will begin negotiations on deal to deploy troops on each other’s territory. Japan reached agreements with Malaysia and Vietnam to deepen security cooperation. Marcos Jr. 20 Nov said Philippines is approaching Malaysia and Vietnam to discuss separate SCS code of conduct, citing lack of progress in ASEAN-China negotiations.

Sri Lanka

President Wickremesinghe presented ambitious 2024 budget ahead of next year’s presidential polls, while Supreme Court ruled on former presidents’ economic mismanagement and anti-terrorism regulations.

Govt’s 2024 budget goals met with scepticism. Ahead of presidential elections set for late 2024, President Wickremesinghe 13 Nov presented to parliament 2024 budget. Extremely ambitious target of raising revenue by 47% was widely questioned given govt’s failure to make sufficient progress raising chronically low revenue, which fell about 15% below International Monetary Fund’s projections in 2023. Budget also boosts govt workers’ pay, increases state pensions and proposes new taxes and crackdown on tax avoidance.

Supreme Court issued landmark judgment on former presidents’ economic mismanagement. Supreme Court 14 Nov found former presidents Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and other top officials, responsible for economic mismanagement between 2019-2022, which violated public trust and Sri Lankans’ constitutional rights. Judgment brought no immediate legal repercussions, though opposition called for Rajapaksas to be barred from holding office in future. In another important ruling, Supreme Court 14 Nov ordered state to pay 1mn rupees ($3,000) to Muslim social media activist Ramzy Razeek, whose detention for five months on charges of breaching often-abused International Convention on Civil and Political Rights Act violated his fundamental rights.

Calls mounted for new 2019 Easter bombings investigation. In interview with ABC Australia, former Deputy Inspector General of Police and head of Criminal Investigation Dept Ravi Seneviratne 16 Nov for first time publicly accused intelligence agencies of actively interfering with police investigations into 2019 Easter bombings; Sri Lankan Catholic Church next day repeated calls for new, independent investigation. Separately, Supreme Court 13 Nov ruled as unconstitutional anti-terrorism regulations on “religious extremism” introduced in 2021 but never applied, designed to process hundreds of Muslims arrested following 2019 Easter suicide attacks.

Tamils held commemorations. Thousands of Tamils across north and east took part in annual ceremonies in week leading to “Great Heroes Day” on 27 Nov, commemorating those who died in struggle for independent state; police disrupted or blocked numerous local gatherings, with at least one organiser arrested under anti-terrorism law.

Taiwan Strait

China continued military activity around island as presidents Biden and Xi discussed Taiwan face-to-face, while Beijing issued warning ahead of Taiwan’s Jan 2024 general elections.

Chinese military continued operations around island. As of 28 Nov, Taiwan spotted 324 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which at least 98 crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected in Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone. Taiwan reported 171 sightings of Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. China’s Shandong aircraft carrier group conducted exercises southeast of Taiwan and 8 Nov traversed Taiwan Strait. U.S. navy destroyer USS Rafael Peralta and Royal Canadian frigate HMCS Ottawa 1 Nov transited Taiwan Strait. Australian warship HMAS Toowomba 23 Nov passed Taiwan Strait.

U.S. and Chinese leaders held in-person meeting and discussed Taiwan. During meeting between U.S. President Biden and China’s President Xi on sidelines of APEC summit in U.S. city San Francisco, Xi 15 Nov stated that Taiwan is “most important and sensitive issue” in U.S.-China relations and called for Washington to stop arming Taiwan and support China’s peaceful unification, while Biden described talks as constructive and effective, and reiterated “one China” policy remained unchanged. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin 17 Nov said U.S. will continue to develop military ties with Taiwan amid resumed dialogue with China. Earlier, G7 FMs meeting in Japanese capital Tokyo 8 Nov concluded with joint statement reaffirming importance of peace and stability in Taiwan Strait and supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations.

China warned Taiwan’s presidential candidates of consequences of independence. Ahead of Jan presidential and legislative polls, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office 15 Nov warned that “Taiwan independence” means war, adding that Beijing sees combination of incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s candidate Lai Ching-te and running mate Hsiao Bi-Khim – Taiwan’s de facto representative to U.S. – as “independence plus independence”. Taiwanese premier Chen Chien-jen 14 Nov claimed security agencies had detected China’s interference in upcoming elections. Attempts by Taiwan opposition parties Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) to run on joint ticket fell apart. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s President Tsai 30 Nov assessed Chinese invasion was unlikely as Beijing is overwhelmed with internal challenges.

Thailand

Violence persisted in deep south, as govt appointed new head in dialogue with main southern separatist group.

Violence continued in southernmost provinces. In Narathiwat province, militants 3 Nov detonated 25kg IED targeting paramilitary rangers travelling in private vehicle in Tanyong Mas subdistrict, Rangae district. One ranger was killed 9 Nov after stepping on improvised mine in forested area of Tanyong Mas; militants 10 Nov fired small arms at security outpost in same subdistrict, causing no casualties. Authorities same day discovered and safely detonated IED in Bacho District, Narathiwat. Seven motorcycle-borne militants 12 Nov surrounded Muslim ranger officer, then on leave, who was travelling on motorcycle with his wife in Rueso district; they forced both to ground and shot officer more than ten times before fleeing. Media reports 27 Nov indicated that PM Srettha Thavisin appointed Chatchai Bangchuad, deputy sec gen of National Security Council, to lead govt’s delegation in dialogue with main militant group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN).

National politics remained in holding pattern. Since formation of Pheu Thai Party-led govt in Sept, national politics entered routine holding pattern marked by opposition focusing on criticising govt policy proposals, such as 10,000-baht digital wallet.

In other important developments. FM Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara 1 Nov visited Qatar to meet Iranian FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in efforts to secure release of 32 Thai hostages held in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine); Hamas 24-28 Nov released nineteen Thai hostages but thirteen Thais remain in captivity. As fighting spread across northern Myanmar (see Myanmar), some 260 Thais on 19 Nov were evacuated from Shan State to China’s Yunnan province; most are believed to have been victims of human trafficking, forced to work in scam call centres.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks remained on hold amid latter’s cooling relations with EU and U.S., ties with Russia deteriorated further, and fears of border escalation simmered.

Peace talks with Azerbaijan remained on hold. Azerbaijan’s drift away from EU and U.S.-facilitated peace talks continued. Having twice cancelled participation in EU-mediated meetings in Oct, Baku 16 Nov withdrew from meeting between Azerbaijani and Armenian FMs slated for 20 Nov in Washington DC, criticising “one-sided and biased” remarks by Assistant Sec State James O’Brien; O’Brien earlier that day had spoken publicly about U.S. decision to pause bilateral cooperation with Azerbaijan until peace deal was reached with Armenia. Instead, Azerbaijan 21 Nov proposed direct negotiations with Armenia in “mutually acceptable” location. In meantime, Armenia 21 Nov returned sixth draft of peace treaty to Azerbaijan. Deputy PMs of Azerbaijan and Armenia 30 Nov held fifth meeting of border-delimitation commissions, agreed to “intensify” talks.

EU boosted support to Armenia, whose relations with Moscow kept worsening. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 13 Nov announced decision to expand EU Mission in Armenia with “more observers and more patrols” along border with Azerbaijan; Borrell also said EU would consider military support and visa liberalisation options for Armenia. Baku next day responded to “biased policy” by cancelling bilateral projects and visits to EU. French delivery of 50 armoured vehicles 13 Nov arrived in Armenia, which Azerbaijan same day “strongly” condemned. Meanwhile, Armenia 14 Nov announced it would skip Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization summit in Belarus amid deteriorating relations with Moscow; Kremlin next day said West was “obviously behind” decision.

Yerevan worried about potential border escalation. As fears of new escalation along border due to stalled talks persisted, Yerevan 18 Nov reported one soldier injured close to Azerbaijani exclave Nakhichevan. Yerevan next day hosted Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit, where PM Pashinyan reiterated desire for peace but warned Baku was preparing for “new armed aggression”.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on provisional measures for ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh (NK).

International Court of Justice announced provisional measures for NK. Following Armenia’s Oct submission to ICJ requesting provisional measures against Azerbaijan for what it calls “ethnic cleansing” in NK, ICJ 17 Nov published preliminary order: court decided that Azerbaijan should ensure free return and departure of ethnic Armenians from NK, along with protection of those who decide to stay; it also called on Azerbaijan to preserve their “registration, identity and private property documents”. ICJ ordered Azerbaijan to submit report to Court in two months. Baku same day welcomed decision, highlighting how court had “reconfirmed Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and rejected Armenia’s call for Azerbaijan to withdraw troops from NK, protect cultural sites and release all military and civilian detainees.

Azerbaijan handed out fifteen-year sentence for war crimes in first NK war. Baku court 7 Nov sentenced ethnic Armenian from NK Vagif Khachatryan, arrested in July while travelling along Lachin road to Armenia for medical treatment, to fifteen years in prison for alleged involvement in 1991 Meshali massacre; according to court, Armenian armed attack on Meshali village killed 25 Azerbaijanis, injured fourteen and forcibly expelled 358 people. Khachatryan has repeatedly denied all charges.

Azerbaijan

Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks remained on hold amid latter’s cooling relations with EU and U.S., and fears of border escalation simmered.

Peace talks with Armenia remained on hold. Azerbaijan’s drift away from EU and U.S.-facilitated peace talks continued. Having twice cancelled participation in EU-mediated meetings in Oct, Baku 16 Nov withdrew from meeting between Azerbaijani and Armenian FMs slated for 20 Nov in Washington DC, criticising “one-sided and biased” remarks by Assistant Sec State James O’Brien; O’Brien earlier that day had spoken publicly about U.S. decision to pause bilateral cooperation with Azerbaijan until peace deal was reached with Armenia. Instead, Azerbaijan 21 Nov proposed direct negotiations with Armenia in “mutually acceptable” location. In meantime, Armenia 21 Nov returned sixth draft of peace treaty to Azerbaijan. Deputy PMs of Azerbaijan and Armenia 30 Nov held fifth meeting of border-delimitation commissions, agreed to “intensify” talks.

EU announced renewed support to Armenia, including along border with Azerbaijan. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 13 Nov announced decision to expand EU Mission in Armenia with “more observers and more patrols” along border with Azerbaijan; Borrell also said EU would consider military support and visa liberalisation options for Armenia. Baku next day responded to “biased policy” by cancelling bilateral projects and visits to EU. French delivery of 50 armoured vehicles 13 Nov arrived in Armenia, which Azerbaijan same day “strongly” condemned.

Yerevan worried about potential border escalation. As fears of new escalation along border due to stalled talks persisted, Yerevan 18 Nov reported one soldier injured close to Azerbaijani exclave Nakhichevan. Yerevan next day hosted Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit, where Armenian PM Pashinyan reiterated desire for peace but warned Baku was preparing for “new armed aggression”.

In other important developments. Authorities late Nov arrested four leaders of media channels AbzasNews and Kanal 13 TV over alleged cash smuggling and illegal property use; Govt 28 Nov summoned ambassadors of U.S., France and Germany, accusing them of “illegal contributions” to AbzasMedia, which U.S. next day rejected.

Belarus

Govt continued opposition clampdown, Minsk hosted Russia-led military alliance summit, and tensions with Poland persisted.

Authorities continued stifling dissent. Human rights group Viasna 1 Nov reported media personality Larisa Gribaleva had been detained, though authorities same day released her. Maladechna court 3 Nov sentenced journalist Alyaksandr Mantsevich to four years’ imprisonment for “discrediting Belarus”. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 12 Nov warned of ever-deteriorating human rights situation in Belarus since disputed 2020 presidential election sparked crackdown, spotlighting over 40,000 arrests, 12,000 criminal cases and nearly 1,500 political prisoners. Meanwhile, President Lukashenko 20 Nov signed decree announcing parliamentary and local polls in Feb 2024, first nationwide elections since 2020. Authorities 28 Nov searched homes of opposition figures, as “preliminary stage” of election preparations.

Minsk hosted military alliance summit. Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization summit 23 Nov took place in capital Minsk, bringing together leaders from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; Armenia’s leader did not attend amid deteriorating relations with Russia (see Armenia). During summit, Lukashenko defended hosting Russian tactical nuclear weapons as necessary response to NATO threat.

Minsk accused Warsaw of airspace violation. Foreign ministry 3 Nov summoned Polish Chargé d’affaires over alleged violation of its airspace day before.

Cyprus

UN-brokered understanding on buffer zone faced strains, while agreement on new UN envoy remained elusive.

Tensions resurfaced around buffer zone, undermining UN deal struck in Oct. After UN in early Oct brokered deal on road construction by Turkish Cypriots to connect Pile/Pyla village (located in UN buffer zone) to “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), leader of “TRNC” Ersin Tatar 1 Nov met UN Deputy Sec Gen for Peace Operations, claiming Greek Cypriots had “started construction activities” in areas around village and requesting UN intervention. “TRNC” FM Tahsin Ertugruloglu same day argued such works breached UN-brokered mutual understanding and demanded cessation. Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides 6 Nov reported that UN had “requested a short pause” in construction to deal with “TRNC” complaints and 11 Nov denied the works violated UN understanding, asserting that “TRNC” had effectively “backed away” from it. Republic of Cyprus 21 Nov ruled out renegotiating deal and called on UN to facilitate “swift resumption of work”. Republic of Cyprus 27 Nov claimed “serious ongoing violation of the buffer zone” in reference to installation by Turkish Cypriots of rotating camera and antenna on uninhabited house; TRNC said it was aimed at preventing illegal immigration. Christodoulides 28 Nov warned of consequences if status quo not restored after around 40 armed Turkish Cypriot soldiers were sighted in buffer zone previous day.

Search for agreement on UN envoy continued. After Greek Cypriot media late Oct reported that “TRNC” had rejected Julie Bishop, potential candidate to fill UN envoy role vacant since 2017, due to her Australian nationality, Christodoulides 11 Nov accused Türkiye of “making excuses” by not accepting her for coming from “Commonwealth country”. Tatar 15 Nov said “TRNC” was waiting for new envoy proposal; Christodoulides 20 Nov said he expected new choice imminently.

In another important development. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and nearly 70 media organisations 14 Nov published report alleging dozens of Russian oligarchs used financial services in Republic of Cyprus to evade Western sanctions, including those imposed in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in Feb 2022; Republic of Cyprus police subsequently opened criminal investigation.

Georgia

European Commission recommended Georgia be granted long-awaited candidate status; Russian border guards killed Georgian civilian in breakaway South Ossetia.

European Commission recommended EU candidacy status for Georgia. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 8 Nov announced that “Commission recommends that the (European) Council grants Georgia the status of a candidate country on the understanding that certain reforms steps are taken”; European Council will take formal decision in Dec 2023. Both PM Garibashvili and President Zourabichvili welcomed decision as thousands took to streets of capital Tbilisi to voice support for EU membership. Head of EU Delegation to Georgia, Paweł Herczyński, same day congratulated country but noted that candidate status is contingent on “fulfilling important steps”, including need to align Georgia’s foreign policy on Russia with EU.

Russian border guards killed Georgian civilian in South Ossetia. Russian troops 6 Nov shot dead Georgian civilian Tamaz Ginturi and detained another near line that separates breakaway South Ossetia from Georgia proper; de facto South Ossetian officials next day published statement claiming civilians had “illegally crossed” into breakaway region, “displayed an extreme level of aggression” and that Ginturi was killed “during the measures taken to detain the violators”. EU Monitoring Mission 6 Nov assembled officials from Georgia, Russia and breakaway South Ossetia, next day announced increased presence along separation line; de facto officials 9 Nov released second civilian.

Kazakhstan

France’s president sought to boost ties with Kazakhstan, and FMs from Central Asian countries attended G7 online meeting.

Macron sought to bolster cooperation. French President Macron 1 Nov met with President Tokayev in capital Astana during regional tour (see Uzbekistan) to “accelerate cooperation” in key sectors. Pair signed raft of agreements, including on transport engineering, agribusiness and pharmaceuticals; Macron also praised Astana for refusing “to be a vassal of any powers”. Days after Macron’s visit, Russian President Putin 9 Nov met with Tokayev in Astana to discuss bilateral cooperation, with Putin calling for stronger military ties. In interview broadcast 12 Nov, Russian FM Lavrov accused west of trying to “push” Moscow out of Central Asia.

G7 hosted Central Asian FMs for virtual meeting. During 7-8 Nov G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Japan, FMs from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan 8 Nov attended virtual session amid efforts by G7 to strengthen engagement with Central Asia. G7 promised to “support the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries” and to strengthen cooperation on “regional challenges”, such as impact of war in Ukraine, water security and climate change. Meanwhile, Belarus 23 Nov hosted Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization summit, bringing together leaders from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (see Belarus).

Kosovo

EU pushed for progress on normalisation with Serbia, NATO mulled expanding peacekeeping force amid tensions in north, and Kosovo Serb participation in Serbia’s Dec poll remained uncertain.

EU reiterated normalising relations with Serbia “essential”. In 8 Nov reports on EU enlargement, EU Commission reiterated normalisation process “essential” for both parties, pledged for “more serious commitment” on both sides; EU report on Kosovo also called on authorities to organise “fully inclusive” local elections “as soon as possible” in Serb-majority northern municipalities. Meanwhile, EU 13 Nov confirmed existence of proposal for establishing Community of Serb Municipalities (CSM); FM Donika Gërvalla 24 Nov said European CSM proposal was “good basis” for discussions.

Kosovo warned of continued threat from Serbia. Following deadly attack in northern Kosovo late Sept, PM Kurti 19 Nov warned of continued threat emanating from Serbia. NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg 20 Nov confirmed NATO is considering “more enduring increased presence” in Kosovo, while warning Belgrade to avoid another military build-up near border. German FM Baerbock 29 Nov announced deployment of “150 additional troops” to NATO-led force in Kosovo.

Uncertainty over Kosovo Serb participation in Serbia’s elections persisted. After Serbia 13 Oct scheduled snap parliamentary elections for 17 Dec, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 3 Nov received Serb request to support participation of voters living in Kosovo; OSCE made support conditional on Pristina’s approval. After PM Kurti 19 Nov insisted on need for “special agreement”, Serbia 22 Nov changed tack, allowing voters to cross border to cast their ballot.

Six arrested in Pristina at protest against Head of Hague-based War Crimes Court. Protesters 29 Nov reportedly used smoke grenades to protest at visit of Ekaterina Trendafilova, President of Kosovo Specialist Chambers, Hague-based court with jurisdiction over crimes “either commenced or committed” in Kosovo 1998-2000; police subsequently arrested six members of Social Democratic opposition party.

Kyrgyzstan

FMs from Central Asian countries attended G7 online meeting.

During 7-8 Nov G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Japan, FMs from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan 8 Nov attended virtual session amid efforts by G7 to strengthen engagement with Central Asia. G7 promised to “support the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries” and to strengthen cooperation on “regional challenges”, such as impact of war in Ukraine, water security and climate change. Meanwhile, Belarus 23 Nov hosted Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization summit, bringing together leaders from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (see Belarus).

Moldova

Parliament adopted bill to join EU sanctions regime against Russia.

European Commission 8 Nov released report on enlargement that recommended commencement of membership talks with Moldova. Parliament 24 Nov passed bill to join EU sanctions regime against Russia; Moscow same day denounced move as “another hostile step” and vowed retaliation. Govt 28 Nov stripped pro-Russia politician Alexandr Kalinin of citizenship for “recruitment into the armed forces of a foreign state”.

Russia (Internal)

Moscow withdrew from several arms treaties and announced record military expenditures in 2024; Finland closed border with Russia.

Russia withdrew from two arms treaties, ramped up military spending. President Putin 2 Nov signed legislation revoking ratification of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, though Russian officials reportedly said withdrawal did not mean Russia would resume nuclear testing; Russia 7 Nov withdrew from Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. State Duma 17 Nov approved 2024 federal budget, which devotes record 10.8tn rubles (approximately $119bn) to defence compared with 6.4tn rubles (approximately $71bn) in 2023. Police conducted raids to draft new army recruits, particularly targeting migrants; notably, police in Voronezh city 14 Nov raided restaurant hosting group of Azerbaijani immigrants and handed around 50 summonses to military enlistment offices.

Crackdown continued, notably targeting war opponents and LGBTQ+ community. Wives of mobilised soldiers 7 Nov staged protest calling on authorities to demobilise their husbands who, according to Putin’s mobilisation decree, could remain in military service until end of so-called special operation in Ukraine. Court in Saint Petersburg city 16 Nov sentenced artist Aleksandra Skochilenko to seven years’ imprisonment for spreading disinformation or “fakes” about Russian army; court in Moscow same day sentenced opposition politician Vladimir Milov in absentia to eight years in prison, also for “fakes”. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 30 Nov labelled “international LGBT movement” as “extremist”, banned activities; UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk same day “deplored” decision, called on authorities to repeal laws that place “improper restrictions on the work of human rights defenders or that discriminate against LGBT people”.

Finland closed checkpoints along border with Russia, Ukrainian strikes continued. Finland 22 Nov announced closure of all but one of its border crossings with Russia beginning 24 Nov, accusing its neighbour of purposely pushing asylum seekers toward border; 28 Nov closed last border crossing point, saying closure would last until 13 Dec and banned filing of requests for “international protection” at border. Meanwhile, authorities 26 Nov announced its air defences had intercepted Ukrainian drones over several regions, including Moscow, day after Kyiv reported one of biggest drone attacks since full-scale invasion (see Ukraine).

Tajikistan

Iranian president visited Dushanbe amid deepening ties, and FMs from Central Asian countries attended G7 online meeting.

Tajik and Iranian presidents pledged to boost ties. Iranian President Raisi 8 Nov met with President Rahmon in capital Dushanbe to discuss bilateral ties; pair signed raft of documents, including memorandums of understanding on visa-free visits for citizens, transportation, economic and technological cooperation, and efforts to tackle drug-trafficking.

G7 hosted Central Asian FMs for virtual meeting. During 7-8 Nov G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Japan, FMs from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan 8 Nov attended virtual session amid efforts by G7 to strengthen engagement with Central Asia. G7 promised to “support the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries” and to strengthen cooperation on “regional challenges”, such as impact of war in Ukraine, water security and climate change. Meanwhile, Belarus 23 Nov hosted Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization summit, bringing together leaders from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (see Belarus).

Türkiye

Authorities continued targeting Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) at home and in Iraq and Syria, while govt continued positive engagement with Greece and rebuked Israel for Gaza onslaught.

Military maintained operations against PKK and affiliates. In Türkiye, police 2 Nov reportedly detained eleven PKK suspects in Istanbul city. IED explosion 4 Nov killed soldier during operation in rural area of eastern Van province. Security forces 5 Nov announced capture of PKK militant on Syrian border. In northern Iraq, defence ministry 13 and 17 Nov claimed operations killed total nineteen PKK members and intelligence services 17 and 20 Nov reportedly eliminated senior PKK members in targeted operations; PKK attack 26 Nov killed three soldiers. In northern Syria, intelligence services same day killed alleged senior People’s Protection Units (YPG) official (see Iraq and Syria).

Dialogue with Greece yielded progress. In first such meeting in three years, Greek diplomatic and military officials 13 Nov visited capital Ankara, agreeing to implement and reactivate numerous confidence-building measures over coming year and establish new dialogue mechanism, marking positive sign ahead of 7 Dec meeting between President Erdoğan and Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Greece. Meanwhile, FM Hakan Fidan 2 Nov attended EU enlargement meeting in Berlin. EU 8 Nov released progress report on Türkiye’s candidate status, which noted “democratic backsliding” among list of other concerns; Ankara same day branded report unfair. European Commission and EU High Rep 29 Nov proposed enhanced cooperation in areas such as trade, transport, energy and migration.

Tensions increased with Israel. In protest of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine), Türkiye 4 Nov recalled ambassador to Israel. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar 8 Nov announced freeze on energy cooperation until Gaza ceasefire declared. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu 15 Nov labelled President Erdoğan’s criticism over human rights hypocritical, which foreign ministry called “slander”. Erdoğan 20 Nov accused Israel of “genocide” and 29 Nov called Netanyahu “the butcher of Gaza”.

Clampdown on Islamic State (ISIS) continued. Security forces in Nov detained at least 44 individuals with alleged links to ISIS. Notably, authorities 12 Nov detained high-ranking ISIS member in Istanbul.

Ukraine

Russia intensified attacks in Donetsk region as Ukraine targeted occupied left-bank of Dnipro river, key allies promised more military aid, and European Commission recommended accession talks.

Russian forces made small gains in east and escalated airstrikes. In Donetsk region, Russia stepped up attacks around Bakhmut city and Avdiivka town, making modest gains at high cost. In Odesa region, Russian missile 9 Nov hit freight ship in Odesa port, killing one in first strike on civilian vessel since withdrawal from Black Sea grain deal. Authorities 26 Nov said Russia had conducted one of largest drone attacks since war began, notably targeting capital Kyiv, with over 75 Iranian-made drones injuring five and damaging infrastructure.

Ukraine stepped up attacks across Dnipro river and continued targeting Crimea. Russian military bloggers 6 Nov reported Ukraine had transferred armoured vehicles across Dnipro River into bridgeheads on Russian-held left bank in southern Kherson region. In following days, troops managed to expand bridgeheads and Kyiv 15 Nov claimed foothold; Russia-installed Kherson governor same day admitted Ukrainian gains but promised reversal. In Russian-annexed Crimea, Ukrainian missile 4 Nov damaged under-construction missile carrier in port city of Kerch; Russian officials 26 Nov claimed its air defence averted several Ukrainian drone attacks on occupied Crimea and Moscow.

U.S. and Germany pledged more military assistance. U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin 20 Nov visited Kyiv, announcing new military aid package and promising continued support, even as worries grew over approval of further spending in U.S. Congress and supply capacity amid Israel-Hamas war (see Israel/Palestine). German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius 21 Nov announced €1.3bn military aid package during Kyiv visit; France 29 Nov announced intention to sign bilateral defence accord with Kyiv in early 2024.

European Commission recommended accession talks, tensions with EU neighbours rose. European Commission 8 Nov recommended accession negotiations with Ukraine; Hungarian PM Orbán 18 Nov said Ukraine was “light-years away” from membership, signalling intent to block proceedings. Meanwhile, Polish lorry drivers 6 Nov began blockade of border crossings, alleging EU suspension of entry permits for Ukrainian truckers had created unfair competition; after traffic diverted to Slovakia, Slovak border guards 15 Nov increased checks.

Uzbekistan

France’s president sought to boost ties with Uzbekistan, and FMs from Central Asian countries attended G7 online meeting.

Macron sought to bolster cooperation. President Macron 1-2 Nov visited Uzbekistan following trip to Kazakhstan (see Kazakhstan) amid efforts to strengthen ties. Sides reportedly discussed projects in agriculture and uranium, while Macron 2 Nov said countries would develop strategic partnership; Mirziyoyev praised “historic” visit and confirmed leaders had “agreed to advance bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership”. In interview broadcast 12 Nov, Russian FM Lavrov accused west of trying to “push” Moscow out of Central Asia. French newspaper La Tribune 26 Nov reported Macron pitched replacing Tashkent’s Russian-made fighter planes with French jets during meeting.

G7 hosted Central Asian FMs for virtual meeting. During 7-8 Nov G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Japan, FMs from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan 8 Nov attended virtual session amid efforts by G7 to strengthen engagement with Central Asia. G7 promised to “support the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries” and to strengthen cooperation on “regional challenges”, such as impact of war in Ukraine, water security and climate change.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Peace talks with FARC dissident faction and ELN suffered setbacks, though ceasefires held.

Govt negotiations with FARC dissident faction suffered setback. Fallout from late Oct local elections rocked three-month bilateral ceasefire between govt and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC). Parties had reached agreement for military presence in El Plateado town, Cauca department (Pacific coast), for election day but disagreed on when military would leave. FARC-EMC’s Carlos Patiño Front, dominant in El Plateado, 5 Nov pressured unarmed civilians to surround soldiers and force them to withdraw, which they did; FARC-EMC same day said it would pull out of negotiations for internal consultations but that bilateral ceasefire would remain. President Petro 7 Nov said pause in violence would only be upheld if dissidents returned to talks; group 17 Nov said it would return to talks with re-configured negotiating team; discussions due to restart early Dec.

Kidnappings strained negotiations with ELN. National Liberation Army (ELN) 2 Nov admitted to kidnapping Luis Manuel Díaz, father of Liverpool footballer Luis Díaz, in Barrancas municipality, La Guajira department (north), 28 Oct and his wife; police same day rescued wife but group held Luis Manuel until 9 Nov, sparking outrage over continued ELN abductions during ceasefire and talks with Petro administration. Govt 9 Nov issued statement urging ELN to stop kidnappings, which group 10 Nov rejected as “blackmail”. Govt 17 Nov announced delay in starting fifth round of talks after ELN failed to respond to govt lead negotiator Otty Patiño’s letter demanding meeting to discuss abductions. Amid public concerns over “total peace” policy, Petro 22 Nov replaced Peace Commissioner Danilo Rueda with Patiño. Meanwhile, ELN 6 Nov declared 72-hour armed strike in parts of Chocó department (Pacific coast) where group is under significant pressure from Gaitanista Self Defence Forces.

In other important developments. Gunmen 12 Nov assassinated second place mayoral candidate in Toribío, Cauca; attack follows late-Oct local elections, which saw significant losses for Petro’s governing coalition and at least 77 protests or riots around voting stations and verification centres.

Dominican Republic

Tensions with Haiti escalated as sides traded accusations of border violations.

According to Haitian govt, Dominican soldiers 7 Nov breached border wall near site where disputed Haitian canal is being built into Massacre River; Haitians immediately protested, setting up barricades at border and burning tires. Dominican authorities, however, argued wall does not delimit actual border and instead claimed group of Haitians had entered its territory and interfered with army patrols. Both countries regarded incident as act of provocation by other side. Haiti 8 Nov announced countries’ FMs had agreed to de-escalate, though FM Roberto Alvarez next day questioned its neighbour’s commitment. Haitian govt 14 Nov banned trade at Ouanaminthe border crossing. Haitian merchants 29 Nov attempted to forcibly break through border but were prevented by security forces.

El Salvador

Justice system struggled under state of exception, and Congress granted President Bukele leave of absence to contest Feb 2024 polls.

Authorities renewed state of exception amid concerns of violations in prisons. Legislative Assembly 8 Nov extended state of exception for twentieth time. Mass arrests put pressure on justice system, with 85% of 5,000 people released from prison between March 2022 and July 2023 still awaiting trial. Human rights organisations continued to denounce violations in prison. Notably, NGO Cristosal 1 Nov reported that 191 persons had died in custody since March 2022. Meanwhile, authorities in Mexico 8 Nov arrested Salvadoran MS-13 gang leader Elmer Canales, 9 Nov extradited him to U.S.; U.S. claimed authorities released him from prison in El Salvador in Jan 2021, boosting claims widely reported in Salvadoran media that President Bukele negotiated directly with gangs to reduce violence.

Election Tribunal approved Bukele’s bid for second term. Electoral Tribunal - which is elected by govt-controlled Congress – 3 Nov approved President Bukele’s candidacy for 2024 presidential election despite constitutional ban on consecutive presidential re-election. Bukele 28 Nov said he would ask Congress for leave of absence from presidency for six months to allow him to run; Congress 30 Nov granted permission for period 1 Dec to 31 May 2024, with current head of National Directorate of Municipal Works due to replace Bukele in his duties.

Guatemala

Judicial attempts to undermine August presidential election result continued to fuel political instability; more moves against President-elect could fuel mass protests and unrest in coming weeks.

Judicial persecution threatened to cause further turmoil. In moves that could spark further unrest, Public Prosecutor’s Office 16 Nov opened investigation into President-elect Arévalo, VP-elect Karin Herrera and four other politicians for allegedly promoting May 2022-June 2023 student protest; judiciary accused them of destruction of cultural property, illicit association and influence peddling, and asked Supreme Court to remove their immunity; fears rose that removal of immunity or arrest of President-elect in December would lead to mass protests. Earlier, Supreme Electoral Court 2 Nov confirmed suspension of Arévalo’s party Movimiento Semilla over alleged anomalies during its creation; original suspension issued in July but only became legal after electoral period ended 31 Oct. Public Prosecutor’s Office 22 Nov levelled same charges against two other politicians. Arévalo and Herrera 16 Nov said charges were “spurious” and an “assault on democracy”. Prosecutor’s office also issued arrest warrants for 27 other individuals for their role in university protest.

Congress appointed Supreme Court judges. Constitutional Court 7 Nov ordered Congress to elect magistrates for Supreme Court of Justice and Court of Appeals before end of Nov, reinvigorating process on pause since 2019. Congress 15 Nov elected thirteen magistrates to Supreme Court of Justice, some of whom have been accused of corruption, triggering protests in capital Guatemala City; 21 Nov appointed Appeal Court magistrates.

International and domestic actors reiterated support for Arévalo. Indigenous leaders and private sector actors 1 Nov signed “Action for Democracy” charter with Arévalo, which reiterated support for election result, and pledged to defend and strengthen democratic institutions. Meanwhile, twenty countries from Organization of American States Permanent Council 15 Nov voted that Prosecutor’s Office sought to undermine democracy, while U.S. and EU continued to threaten sanctions. EU electoral observation mission 13 Nov presented final report which found no fraud in vote and concluded results were legitimate.

Guyana

Tensions with Venezuela ran high over December referendum on disputed territory.

Tensions between Georgetown and Caracas spiked as latter prepared for 3 Dec referendum on contested Essequibo area, oil-rich region currently administered by Guyana. Plebiscite will ask Venezuelans if they agree to reject International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) jurisdiction over region, create state called Guayana Esequiba and grant its population Venezuelan citizenship. Guyana continued to protest referendum, claiming Maduro govt seeks to use vote to justify region’s “annexation”. VP Jagdeo 23 Nov said U.S. defence officials would visit country late Nov.

Haiti

Ever-worsening gang violence displaced thousands, Kenya’s supreme court blocked police deployment to Haiti, and negotiations to resolve political crisis failed to produce breakthrough.

Gang efforts to expand territory triggered mass displacement. Alleged members of Grand Ravine gang 1 Nov launched offensive in Mariani district south-west of capital Port-au-Prince to expand territory along National Route 2 and increase extortion opportunities; International Organization for Migration 6 Nov estimated 2,500 people were displaced in five days of fighting. Meanwhile, Iskar Andrice, one of G9 gang coalition’s founders and key leaders, 12 Nov died in unclear circumstances; leader of rival Gpèp coalition Ti Gabriel next day launched attacks in several G9-controlled areas of capital’s Cité Soleil neighbourhood to expand turf; OCHA 17 Nov said clashes killed at least 166 and displaced over 1,000. Iskar’s successor David Ganier aka Black Alex Mana, 21 Nov killed by member of same coalition, James Edmond aka Benji, replacing him as gang head. Bel-Air gang 19 Nov launched offensive to invade Solino neighbourhood of capital.

Kenya’s high court extended orders blocking police deployment to Haiti. Kenya’s parliament 16 Nov approved govt request to deploy 1,000 police officers to Haiti as part of multinational support mission. Hours later, however, Supreme Court extended Oct order blocking deployment until it rules on case in late Jan. Kenyan President Ruto 21 Nov said mission should be 5,000-strong. Meanwhile, poll by Haitian company Diagnostic and Development early Oct found 70% of Haitians favoured deployment of international armed force.

Negotiations between interim govt and opposition made little progress. CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) experts 8-14 Nov visited Haiti for fourth round of negotiations between govt and opposition but no agreement was reached. Meanwhile, president of High Council for Transition Mirlande Manigat 2 Nov criticised lack of progress in implementing Dec 2022 agreement between acting PM Henry, opposition and civil society to organise new elections.

Dispute with Dominican Republic over canal construction continued. Dominican soldiers 7 Nov breached border wall near site where disputed Haitian canal is being built into Massacre River; Haitians immediately protested, setting up barricades at border and burning tires (see Dominican Republic).

Honduras

Appointment of temporary Attorney General fuelled political tensions, and govt extended state of exception for eighth time.

Selection of new Attorney General sparked political crisis. Tensions over selection of new Attorney General spiked after Congressional Permanent Commission, formed of eight pro-govt and one opposition legislator, 1 Nov appointed Johel Zelaya to act as interim chief prosecutor. Move triggered controversy as many deemed commission, appointed by legislative president and ally of President Castro, Luis Redondo, bypassed legislative debate. Opposition criticised appointment as power grab and 11 Nov organised protest in capital Tegucigalpa. Despite promising not to carry out “selective persecution”, Zelaya 9 Nov removed several investigative and former opposition judicial officials. Civil society, private sector and international community condemned irregular naming of Attorney General, with U.S. 7 Nov announcing Honduras would not receive certain funds, citing failure to combat corruption.

Govt extended stringent security measures. Govt 21 Nov announced extension of state of exception until Jan 2024. Police 13 Nov claimed it had arrested 1,895 people, including over 700 from Barrio 18 and MS-13 gangs, since state of exception began Dec 2022. Meanwhile, security minister 8 Nov announced seizure of 48,600 doses of fentanyl hidden in container in Puerto Cortes, Cortes department (north), amid concerns of stepped-up drug production in Honduras.

In other important developments. President of main opposition National Party David Chávez Madison 28 Nov fled arrest after police prevented him from boarding flight to U.S.; same day, judge ordered Chávez’s arrest in fraud case, which Chávez denies.

Mexico

Criminal violence remained rampant, govt faced more backlash for high number of disappearances, and ruling party healed split ahead of 2024 presidential election.

Criminal violence persisted at high levels. Authorities 13 Nov found Jesús Ociel Baena, second openly non-binary person to occupy magistrate position in Mexico, and partner dead at home; state attorney ruled incident murder-suicide but Ociel had received threats before, prompting rights groups, U.S. and Inter-American Court of Human Rights to call for full investigation. Meanwhile, security forces 3 Nov killed four members of alleged criminal group in Celaya city, Guanajuato state (centre), while another clash 11 Nov left three police officers and three suspected crime group members dead in Zacatecas city, Zacatecas state (centre). Armed assailants 19-22 Nov abducted three journalists and two relatives in Taxco, Guerrero state (south west). Armed men 28 Nov shot at four journalists returning from murder scene in Chilpancingo city, Guerrero state (south), injuring three; another journalist same day was also shot and injured in Michoacan state. Gunmen 21 Nov killed prominent activist documenting murders in León city, Guanajuato. Security forces 22 Nov captured alleged security chief for Sinaloa cartel faction in Culiacan, Sinaloa state (west).

Govt continued to face criticism for high number of disappearances. Former head of National Search Commission Karla Quintana 7 Nov accused govt of attempting to deflate official number of missing persons from 113,000 by using data from bodies other than official Search Commission; President López Obrador 13 Nov accused Quintana of manipulating data to discredit govt.

Ruling MORENA party presidential candidate and former FM reached agreement. Former FM Ebrard, who came second to Claudia Sheinbaum in internal MORENA vote to select presidential candidate, 13 Nov announced he would not leave party or run as independent in 2024 polls after “political agreement” with Sheinbaum.

In other important developments. Opposition forces and some MORENA members 7 Nov criticised govt over lack of budget allocation for areas affected by Hurricane Otis, which caused $16bn worth of damage. Caravan of hundreds of migrants 5 Nov left Tapachula city, Chiapas state (south) on journey toward U.S. border.

Nicaragua

Govt dismissed hundreds of justice officials amid ongoing crackdown; ties with Russia and China deepened as Managua formally withdrew from Organization of American States (OAS).

Govt dismantled judiciary and continued crackdown on civil society. Govt late Oct dismissed President of Supreme Court and dozens of officials in justice system; by 6 Nov had removed 450 officers from posts, including four Supreme Court magistrates; media report 7 Nov suggested vacancies would be filled by loyalist politicians and former members of security forces. Govt 6 Nov proscribed 25 NGOs, including religious institutions and 27 Nov closed or dissolved fifteen others. Indigenous party YATAMA 13 Nov announced it did not know whereabouts of party leaders seized by security forces late Sept.

Managua strengthened ties with Russia and China, and withdrew from OAS. Commander of armed forces 7 Nov visited Russia to negotiate technical cooperation, reiterated support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Economic Congressional Committee 14 Nov announced National Assembly would soon ratify Free Trade Agreement with China. Meanwhile, Nicaragua 19 Nov formally withdrew from OAS following two-year process launched in 2021 by Ortega regime in response to condemnation from body about rights violations. Ahead of withdrawal, OAS members 8 Nov approved resolution calling for continued monitoring of rights in country.

Venezuela

Fallout from govt’s suspension of opposition primary results continued, and tensions with Guyana ran high over Caracas’ upcoming referendum on disputed territory.

Govt-opposition tensions simmered over ban on presidential candidate. Tensions persisted over Supreme Court’s 30 Oct decision to suspend results of opposition primary, which María Corina Machado – currently banned from running for office – won in landslide victory. Govt-controlled Supreme Court in same ruling described bans on politicians as “firm”, fuelling concerns govt will not allow fair vote in 2024 poll; U.S. official Juan González 8 Nov said in interview with Colombian television that Washington would take steps to snapback sanctions, provisionally lifted 18 Oct following govt-opposition agreement in Barbados, if Maduro administration did not lift ban by end of month; in sign of slight easing tensions, govt and opposition joint statement 30 Nov said barred candidates would be able to appeal against bans 1-15 Dec. Earlier, govt’s chief negotiator and National Assembly president Jorge Rodríguez 17 Nov said govt would not accept “ultimatums from anyone”. EU, meanwhile, 13 Nov extended individual sanctions until May 2024; Rodríguez next day said govt would not invite EU to monitor elections while sanctions persist.

Tensions with Guyana escalated over disputed region. Tensions between Georgetown and Caracas spiked as latter prepared for 3 Dec referendum on contested Essequibo area, oil-rich region currently administered by Guyana. Plebiscite will ask Venezuelans if they agree to reject International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) jurisdiction over region, create state called Guayana Esequiba and grant its population Venezuelan citizenship. Guyana continued to protest referendum, claiming Maduro govt seeks to use vote to justify region’s “annexation”. U.S. defence officials 27-28 Nov visited country to “deepen partnership”.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

President Tebboune appointed new PM in apparent preparation for re-election bid; Algiers reiterated support for Palestine and appeared set to mend diplomatic ties with Spain.

Tebboune continued to centralise decision-making ahead of re-election campaign. One year ahead of presidential election scheduled for Dec 2024, Tebboune 11 Nov appointed his chief of staff, Nadir Larbaoui, as PM. Move took place few weeks after Tebboune reorganised president’s office, appointing several advisers whose responsibilities appear to duplicate those of govt. Meanwhile, historical ruling party, National Liberation Front, 13 Nov elected Abdelkrim Benmbarek as new general secretary; in inaugural statement, Benmbarek praised Tebboune’s track record and vowed to support his “vision”, pointing to party’s ambition to return to prominence after being sidelined in wake of 2019-2021 Hirak protest movement.

Algiers sent ambassador to Spain, ending 19-month crisis. Govt 16 Nov appointed new ambassador to Spain; post had remained vacant since Algiers in March 2022 recalled its diplomatic representative in protest at Madrid’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

In other important developments. Tebboune 6 Nov called on International Criminal Court to take action to hold Israel accountable for crimes committed against Palestinians in Gaza since October. Army chief of staff, Saïd Chengriha, 12 Nov began visit to China in bid to diversify weapons and military equipment purchases as Algeria’s main arms supplier, Russia, faces difficulties in fulfilling export contracts amid Ukraine war.

Egypt

Presidential election campaign kicked off, with President Sisi set to win third term in December; Cairo allowed entry of several groups of wounded Palestinians and dual nationals from Gaza Strip.

Sisi bound for re-election having sidelined all serious contenders. Election authority 8 Nov announced final four candidates in 10-12 Dec presidential election, and electoral campaign started 9 Nov. Amid ongoing restrictions on free speech, Sisi’s re-election for third term is virtually guaranteed even as country grapples with record inflation and massive debt. Prominent presidential hopeful Ahmed Tantawi, who in Oct withdrew his presidential bid after failing to gather necessary endorsements to run, 28 Nov faced trial on charges of “circulating election-related papers without official authorisation”.

Some wounded Palestinians and foreign passport holders left Gaza Strip for Egypt. Cairo 1 Nov for first time allowed 76 wounded Palestinians and 335 dual nationals stranded in Gaza Strip to pass through Rafah border crossing. Evacuations in following weeks continued at slow pace amid difficult security situation, and truck carrying fuel 15 Nov crossed from Egypt into Gaza for first time since start of Israel’s war with Hamas. Pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas 24-30 Nov allowed larger amounts of fuel and humanitarian aid to reach Gaza (see Israel/Palestine). Foreign ministry 14 Nov once again rejected Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s suggestion that Palestinians leave Gaza, slamming it as “irresponsible” and violation of international law.

International donors offered fresh support amid new pressures arising from Gaza. With war in Gaza putting new strain on Egypt’s economy, notably threatening tourism industry and natural gas imports, ratings agency Fitch 3 Nov downgraded Egypt’s sovereign rating from B to B-, while country’s main international partners appeared set to offer fresh credit. Cairo 14 Nov reported Qatar was ready to invest $1.5bn in Egypt’s industrial sector in 2024. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 18 Nov visited Egypt, reportedly discussed possibility of enhanced partnership on migration and economic cooperation with Sisi.

Iran

Hostilities between Iran-backed groups and U.S. forces across region underscored risk of escalation amid Israel’s onslaught in Gaza, while UN’s nuclear watchdog voiced concern over Tehran’s nuclear activities.

Tit-for-tat attacks between Iran-backed groups and U.S. continued across region. String of attacks since mid-Oct attributed to Iran-linked factions against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria continued during Nov amid Israel’s onslaught in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine), further eroding relative quiet stemming from informal diplomatic understandings between Tehran and Washington; as of 29 Nov, U.S. tallied approximately 74 incidents and around five dozen casualties, though pace of attacks fell as Gaza truce took effect late Nov. Notably, U.S. 8 and 12 Nov launched retaliatory airstrikes in eastern Syria against facilities allegedly linked to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) (see Syria), and 20-21 Nov launched first deadly retaliatory strikes on Iran-backed targets in Iraq (see Iraq). FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian 15 Nov maintained perpetrators were making “own decisions”; attacks seem intended to dissuade Israel from deepening campaign in Gaza and to signal to Washington risks of association with Israel but any attack claiming significant casualties could trigger escalatory spiral. Meanwhile, Iranian officials sought to push for Israel’s diplomatic isolation, including during President Raisi’s attendance at summits 11 Nov (see Saudi Arabia).

Concerns over Iran’s uranium enrichment resurged. International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) quarterly report 15 Nov showed further growth of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and continued impasse over safeguards concerns and transparency; Iran has amassed total enriched uranium stockpile of almost 4.5 tonnes, including 6.7kg enriched to 60%, closest to weapons grade. IAEA at 22 Nov board meeting reiterated criticism of Iran’s 16 Sept decision to bar top inspectors and reported no progress in investigations into past activities at undeclared sites.

U.S. sanctioned Iran-affiliated militias and military financial networks. Washington and UK 14 Nov blacklisted Gaza- and Lebanon-based entities linked to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. U.S. 17 Nov sanctioned six individuals linked to Kata’ib Hizbollah militia in Iraq and another group linked to IRGC. U.S. 29 Nov designated more than twenty persons/entities part of “financial facilitation networks” benefitting Iranian military.

Iraq

U.S. launched first deadly strikes on Iran-backed militias after facing dozens of attacks since Israel-Hamas war; Supreme Court removed Parliament Speaker amid forgery scandal.

U.S. forces struck Iran-backed militias in first airstrikes since Israel-Hamas war. U.S. as of 29 Nov tallied around 74 attacks against its forces in Iraq and Syria since 17 Oct – of which approximately half occurred in Iraq – that injured around 60 personnel. Notably, two drone attacks 9 Nov targeted Ain al-Asad airbase, Anbar governorate, and al-Harir airbase, Erbil governorate. IED same day struck U.S.-led coalition convoy near Mosul Dam. Two drones 20 Nov targeted Harir air base in Erbil. Close-range ballistic missile 20 Nov struck Ain al-Asad airbase, injuring eight, which prompted U.S. to use airborne gunship to respond, killing at least one alleged militant of Kata’ib Hizbollah – associated with Iran-backed umbrella group Islamic Resistance in Iraq. In further escalation, U.S. 21 Nov carried out second series of airstrikes, killing eight Kata’ib Hizbollah members in Jurf al-Sakhar area; group vowed retaliation. While pace of attacks on U.S. declined as Gaza truce took effect late Nov (see Israel-Palestine), further attacks claiming significant casualties could trigger escalatory spiral toward wider conflict.

Federal Supreme Court suspended Parliament Speaker. Supreme Court 14 Nov terminated Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi’s tenure following accusations that he forged resignation letter of MP from Halbousi’s Taqqadum party, Layth al-Dulaimi, who was also suspended; Sunni parties are expected to appoint new speaker before Dec provincial elections. In response, Taqqadum party same day announced resignation of three govt ministers and boycott of parliament; PM Sudani 20 Nov rejected resignations. In separate case, Halbousi faces investigation for alleged relations with company tied to former Israeli PM Ehud Barak, illegal under anti-normalisation law.

In other important developments. Islamic State (ISIS) bomb and gun attack 30 Nov killed eleven civilians in Muqdadiyah city, Diyala province. Türkiye 13 and 17 Nov claimed operations killed total nineteen PKK members and its intelligence services 17 and 20 Nov reportedly eliminated senior PKK members; PKK attack 26 Nov killed three Turkish soldiers. Unknown gunmen 20 Nov reportedly attacked office of Kurdish politician Shakhawan Abdullah in Kirkuk city.

Israel/Palestine

Qatar-brokered truce won pause in Israel’s war in Gaza amid humanitarian crisis, but efforts to extend deal may falter and see return to onslaught; West Bank violence escalated amid hostilities with Hizbollah.

First respite in Israel’s pummelling of Gaza, which killed over 15,000. Israel and Hamas 22 Nov agreed to Qatar-mediated four-day truce beginning 24 Nov that was extended until 30 Nov, pausing hostilities in Gaza to exchange over 100 women and children captured by Hamas with 240 Palestinian women and children detained in Israel; truce held but Israeli forces 24, 26 Nov reportedly killed three Palestinians in Gaza trying to move north. Ahead of pause, Israel escalated bombing campaign and broadened ground incursion, bringing Palestinian death toll to over 15,000, including 6,150 children, with at least 75 Israeli soldiers killed. Despite announcing “safe corridors” for civilians to leave north, Israel bombed evacuation routes and so-called “safe areas” in south, and 15-16 Nov dropped leaflets on eastern Khan Younis calling for evacuation ahead of potential operations that could commence after truce in Gaza’s south. In north, health infrastructure collapsed amid shortages and Israeli assault on hospitals; malnutrition and dehydration killed at least dozen, as UN warned disease could kill more than bombardment. Israel 15-24 Nov conducted ground operations inside al-Shifa hospital in Gaza city, making unverified claims that it contains Hamas command centre.

Conditions in West Bank continued to deteriorate sharply. Since 7 Oct, Israeli forces killed over 240 Palestinians and Israeli settlers – launching almost 300 attacks on properties and individuals – killed at least eight and forcibly displaced fifteen Palestinian communities. Palestinians killed seven Israelis; Hamas 30 Nov claimed gun attack in West Jerusalem that killed three. Palestinian armed groups began to reestablish in north and spread into Bethlehem, Hebron and Ramallah, clashing with Israeli forces; in Jenin, Israeli forces 9 Nov killed fourteen and 29 Nov killed four, including eight-year-old boy.

Border clashes with Hizbollah continued, underscoring risk of wider war. Cross-border attacks penetrated further into respective territories, killing civilians and risking spiral of escalation that could trigger all-out war. Israel-Hamas pause was upheld along Israel-Lebanon front late Nov (see Lebanon).

Jordan

Kingdom slammed Israel for its “barbarism in Gaza”, recalling its ambassador and ruling out any further cooperation.

Kingdom 5 Nov recalled its ambassador from Israel in protest of Israeli military operations in Gaza, which killed over 14,800 Palestinians as of late Nov (see Israel-Palestine). PM Bisher Khasawneh next day declared “all options are on the table” in dealing with “Israeli aggression on Gaza”. FM Ayman Safadi 16 Nov declared kingdom would not sign any cooperation deals with Israel amid its “barbarism in Gaza”, saying: “Can you imagine a Jordanian minister sitting next to an Israeli minister to sign a water and electricity agreement, all while Israel continues to kill children in Gaza?”; Safadi also accused Israel of not upholding its part of 1994 peace treaty, namely to establish a two-state solution, “so the peace deal will have to remain on the back burner gathering dust for now”; he also asserted “Israel’s aggression and crimes [in Gaza] can no longer be justified as self-defence”. Further, Safadi 27 Nov said Israeli actions in Gaza constituted genocide.

Lebanon

Deadly border clashes between Hizbollah and Israel expanded in scale and scope, further underscoring looming risk of full-scale war.

Hostilities continued in southern Lebanon amid risk of wider conflict. Border clashes persisted between Hizbollah and Israel throughout Nov, with intensity of fighting and casualty count increasing and operations from both sides penetrating deeper into other’s territory, although both appeared keen to avoid massive expansion of conflict; fighting since 7 Oct has killed over 80 Hizbollah fighters and at least ten Israeli soldiers, while displacing over 46,000 residents in south. Notably, Israeli strike in south 5 Nov killed four civilians, including three children. Israeli forces same day claimed Hizbollah killed Israeli civilian with anti-tank missile. Hizbollah’s cross-border attacks 12 Nov reportedly wounded seven Israeli military personnel and ten others. In sign of expanding theatre of fighting, Hamas 6 Nov claimed to have launched rockets from inside Lebanon towards Israeli cities of Haifa and Nahariya, and Israeli drones 11 Nov struck target more than 40km from border. In one of its largest salvos, Hizbollah 23 Nov fired some 50 rockets at Israel after Israel killed five fighters. Such strikes risk high number of casualties, which may unintentionally trigger spiral of escalation toward all-out war. Alternatively, either side may opt to escalate conflict intentionally: if Israeli campaign in Gaza were to pose existential threat to Hamas, Hizbollah’s stance may turn more aggressive, while Israel faces domestic pressure to confront Hizbollah. After ceasefire between Hamas and Israel 24 Nov began (see Israel-Palestine), Hizbollah signalled it would honour ceasefire as long as Israel did. Clashes between group and Israel also occurred in Syria (see Syria).

Executive vacuum and parliamentary paralysis continued. Presidential vacuum prevailing since 1 Nov 2022 persisted with little apparent prospect of resolution. Likewise, parliament remained at virtual standstill as several political parties argue it cannot meet for legislative sessions until it has elected new president. Leading Christian party Lebanese Forces 13 Nov proposed exceptional legislative session to parliament speaker solely to extend term of army chief Joseph Aoun, who is scheduled to retire on 10 Jan 2024.

Libya

Attempts to break political deadlock and unify state institutions continued to fail as distrust between rival authorities remained high.

Rival authorities remained at loggerheads on new unified executive and elections. Heads of rival assemblies, Aghela Saleh of eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), and Mohamed Takala of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC), around 8 Nov met in Egypt but failed to reach breakthrough; Saleh continued to back HoR-approved election laws and called for formation of interim unity govt, while Takala insisted that his assembly did not approve final version of laws and allegedly refused to back new govt formation. Taking stock of impasse, UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily 23 Nov invited key stakeholders – Presidential Council, HoR, HSC, Tripoli-based govt and Libyan National Army – to attend meeting to reach settlement on outstanding issues pertaining to electoral process. Eastern-based govt of Osama Hamad immediately denounced its exclusion from UN-led talks, said Bathily has “entrenched division among Libyans” and called on UN Sec Gen António Guterres to “appoint a new UN envoy”.

Unified mechanism to lead reconstruction of flood-hit city of Derna remained elusive. Eastern-based govt headed by Osama Hamad 1-2 Nov hosted international conference for reconstruction of Derna city following September devastating floods; over 70 foreign companies and handful of diplomats attended, but Tripoli-based authorities were not invited and western diplomats, who do not recognise eastern-based govt, boycotted. UN mission (UNSMIL) continued to call for unified and coordinated mechanism for reconstruction, warning that unilateral initiatives risk deepening existing rift between rival administrations.

In other important developments. Tensions remained elevated in eastern city of Benghazi and western city of Gharyan following deadly fighting in October; separate incidents were triggered by return of two military commanders to their hometowns, and served as reminder that perceptions of hostile movement by rival forces can fuel localised violence. Meanwhile, dispute between Tripoli-based PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba and Central Bank Governor Seddiq al-Kebir early Nov reached new peak, allegedly over latter’s plan to meet eastern-based authorities; following spat, al-Kebir reportedly left Tripoli and flew out to Türkiye. Turkish Parliament 30 Nov approved extension of military mission in Libya for additional 24 months.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia hosted Arab-Islamic diplomatic initiative amid Israel’s onslaught in Gaza, while leaving door open to resume normalisation process with Israel.

Riyadh hosted summit on Gaza, stopping short of concrete steps against Israel. After noticeable absence from humanitarian and diplomatic initiatives, govt 2 Nov launched humanitarian aid campaign for Gaza. Riyadh 11 Nov hosted joint Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit, which condemned “Israeli aggression” and demanded halting weapons export to Israel; Saudi Arabia reportedly refrained from voting for concrete measures against Israel, including cutting diplomatic and economic ties. Meanwhile, Saudi Minister of Investment Khalid Al-Falih 8 Nov said normalisation with Israel “remains on the table” but depends on peaceful resolution of Palestinian question.

Saudi and Iranian leaders met for first time since restoration of ties in March. In first for Iranian president in eleven years, Iran’s President Raisi 11 Nov met Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in Riyadh on sidelines of Arab League-OIS summit to discuss bilateral relations and situation in Gaza.

Syria

Hostilities in north west and Türkiye’s operations in north east continued at lower intensity, Islamic State (ISIS) maintained deadly desert insurgency, and Israel, U.S. and Iran-backed groups traded fire amid Gaza war.

In north west, fighting eased. Hostilities between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and regime gradually returned to levels before escalation triggered by 5 Oct attack on Homs military academy. Nevertheless, Russian airstrikes 11 Nov continued in Idlib province, regime continued shelling south of M5 highway and suspected HTS suicide drone attacks on army positions persisted; drone attack 18 Nov killed regime colonel at Aleppo military college.

In north east, Türkiye continued intermittent strikes. After ending major air campaign late Oct against Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-affiliated targets, Turkish drone strike 15 Nov reportedly killed three militants near Kobane city, Aleppo province. Türkiye 17 Nov announced killing PKK’s “ideological division manager”. Four drone strikes 23-25 Nov hit vehicles across north east, killing veteran PKK commander.

ISIS exacted high toll on regime forces in centre. ISIS maintained high-level of attacks, making Nov deadliest month for pro-regime security forces in central desert in 2023. Notably, fighting around Doubayat gas field, Homs province, early Nov killed over dozen Iran-backed Afghan fighters. Two ISIS attacks 8 Nov killed at least 30 pro-govt militants and soldiers. ISIS cells expanded operations to Kawm axis between Sukhnah town, Homs, and Resafa town, Raqqa, and 11 Nov besieged regime forces. ISIS militants 22, 24 Nov conducted rare attacks inside regime-held towns along Euphrates.

Syria saw Israel-Hizbollah clashes and hostilities between U.S. and Iran-backed forces. Suspected Hizbollah drone from near Homs city 9 Nov targeted school in Israeli city Eilat; in response, Israeli airstrikes 10 Nov killed at least seven Hizbollah members south of Homs. Rockets 11, 14 Nov targeted northern Israel, triggering retaliatory shelling. Israeli airstrikes 22 Nov reportedly killed two Hizbollah affiliates near Damascus. Israel 26 Nov again incapacitated Damascus International Airport. Meanwhile, Iranian and Iran-backed forces continued dozens of attacks on U.S. positions, including rocket strike 29 Nov; U.S. 8, 12 Nov retaliated by striking two targets in Deir ez-Zor, killing at least eight in latter.

Tunisia

In surprise move, President Saïed objected to bill criminalising normalisation with Israel, while authorities detained several high-profile businessmen on corruption allegations.

Saïed changed tack on bill to criminalise normalising relations with Israel. Parliament 2 Nov started debating draft law criminalising recognition or establishment of relations with Israel. Parliament Speaker Brahim Bouderbala same day suspended session, citing Saïed’s concern that bill could harm Tunisia’s foreign affairs and security, and Saïed next day confirmed he objected to bill. MP and rapporteur for Rights and Freedoms Committee, Mohamed Ali, 6 Nov said U-turn came after U.S. threatened “economic and military sanctions”.

Security forces arrested several prominent businessmen. Police 7 Nov arrested Marouane Mabrouk, head of country’s largest oligopolistic group and one-time son-in-law of former President Ben Ali, as well as former Transportation Minister Abderrahim Zouari, representative in Tunisia of French car company Peugeot. Judiciary few days later issued arrest warrants against them, notably for corruption and money laundering. Authorities 14 Nov also arrested coordinator of leftist Al Qotb party, Riadh Ben Fadhel, allegedly in relation to his buyback of Ben Ali’s cars. Moves came as mandate of special commission set up in 2022 expired, having failed to collect up to €4bn allegedly looted by businessmen under Ben Ali.

In other important developments. Interior ministry 7 Nov said security and defence forces had apprehended all five individuals convicted of terrorism who late Oct escaped from Mornaguia high-security prison. New clashes between security forces and sub-Saharan African migrants reported 24 Nov in Al Amra neighbourhood on outskirts of country’s second largest city of Sfax, with unclear casualties; police and national guard in following days allegedly locked area down searching for gun and ammunition reportedly lost during confrontation.

Western Sahara

Polisario Front independence movement launched rare rocket attacks in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara.

Four explosions overnight 28-29 Oct struck Moroccan-controlled city of Smara; Polisario claimed rocket attacks, said it targeted military infrastructures, but rockets hit residential areas, leaving one civilian dead and three others injured. New round of attacks reported 5 Nov in same area, with no casualties. Moroccan authorities opened investigation into blasts and FM Nasser Bourita 15 Nov said investigation’s outcome will inform Morocco’s response.

Yemen

Saudi-Houthi dialogue appeared to gather steam, while Houthi rebels launched attack in Marib governorate, fortified presence in southwest and attacked Israeli and U.S. targets in Red Sea.

Houthi-Saudi talks continued, boosted by Saudi-Iranian communication. Houthi delegation early month reportedly visited Saudi capital Riyadh – in second such visit in 2023 – to discuss technical details of deal on humanitarian issues, including salary payments. Saudi defence minister 15 Nov met Presidential Leadership Council members in Riyadh for update on talks. Dialogue appeared to benefit from increased engagement between Riyadh and Iran: notably, Iran’s President Raisi 11 Nov met Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in Riyadh (see Saudi Arabia).

Houthis launched attack in centre, strengthened presence in Taiz, Hodeida and Al-Dhale governorates. Houthis 6-7 Nov launched attack on govt position in Alkassara area, northwestern Marib, triggering clashes that killed eight govt soldiers and injured 17. Govt’s Army Chief of Staff 7 Nov survived assassination attempt in Marib governorate that Ministry of Defence blamed on Houthis. Following recruitment drive fuelled by resentment over Israel’s campaign in Gaza (see Israel-Palestine), Houthis fortified military presence in Taiz and Hodeida governorates near strategic Bab al-Mandab strait; Houthis reportedly installed ballistic missile launch pads in Hodeida. In Al-Dhale governorate, Houthis 12 Nov launched attacks targeting Southern Transitional Council forces in Mount Satah Bab Ghalaq; group escalated activity north of Al-Dhale, 12 Nov launching drone strikes on Habil Al-Abdi district.

Houthis continued to take aim at Israeli and U.S. targets. Houthis 6, 9, 13, 14 Nov claimed drone and ballistic missile attacks on Israeli targets. Group 8 Nov shot down U.S. drone. Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi 14 Nov vowed to continue attacks on Israel and Israeli ships in Red Sea. U.S. officials 15 Nov reported intercepting drone originating in Yemen in Red Sea. Houthis 19 Nov hijacked ship in Red Sea partially owned by Israeli businessperson and declared all Israel-linked vessels “legitimate target”. U.S. officials said two ballistic missiles were launched 27 Nov from Houthi-controlled areas towards general location of U.S. warship in Red Sea. U.S. Navy 29 Nov shot down drone launched from Houthi-controlled area.

Africa

Benin

Armed clashes continued at low level in north, and former president staged political comeback.

Military 3 Oct reportedly repelled suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) attack in Koualou area, Atakora department. Meanwhile, former President Thomas Boni Yayi 14-15 Oct reassumed leadership of party he founded, The Democrats, during party congress in Parakou town, Borgou department; Boni Yayi’s return to political stage could signal desire to challenge as-of-yet undesignated heir of term-limited President Talon in general elections set for 2026.

Burkina Faso

Junta purged disloyal elements within armed forces following alleged coup attempt in September, while violence remained widespread across country.

Authorities dismissed head of gendarmerie. After govt late Sept claimed to have foiled coup attempt, with several senior officials of national gendarmerie and army’s special forces among alleged plotters, interim President Capt. Traoré 4 Oct replaced gendarmerie chief of staff; defence minister same day suspended eight officers and three non-commissioned officers. Media outlets including Paris-based Jeune Afrique early Oct reported that Traoré boosted his personal security, including by stationing armoured vehicles around his office in capital Ouagadougou.

Govt continued to tighten control of civic space. Council of ministers 4 Oct adopted draft bill which would, among other measures, give head of state authority to appoint president of High Council of Communication. Association of Journalists of Burkina Faso next day dismissed bill as “total negation of press freedom”. President of transitional legislature, Ousmane Bougouma, 9 Oct submitted report on politico-institutional reforms to govt, notably calling for elections to be administered by Ministry of Territorial Administration instead of independent commission. General Confederation of Workers of Burkina Faso, most influential trade union in country, 18 Oct accused govt of taking “liberticidal” measures, including forced recruitment of civilians into govt-aligned vigilante groups and closure of media outlets.

Jihadist violence remained elevated across country. In East region, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 11 Oct ambushed special police unit in Yamba town, Gourma province, killing 27 officers, with retaliatory govt airstrikes allegedly killing around 30 militants. In North region, presumed JNIM militants 2 Oct killed around ten civilians in Pogoro-Silmimossi village, Yatenga province, and next day killed unknown number of army auxiliaries (VDPs) and lost ten of their own fighters in attack on Tibou village, Loroum province. In Boucle du Mouhoun region, special police units and VDPs 3 Oct allegedly killed between ten and 40 presumed JNIM militants in Ouarinogo village, Sourou province, while presumed JNIM fighters 6 Oct killed 12 students in besieged town of Nouna, Kossi province.

Burundi

President Ndayishimiye reshuffled govt in apparent attempt to ensure loyalty of inner circle amid ruling party divisions.

Govt reshuffle exposed ruling party divisions. PM Gervais Ndirakobuca 2 Oct presented review of govt performance to parliament, acknowledging achievement gaps in several sectors, including interior, justice and education. However, govt reshuffle announced next day seemed to reward ministers for their loyalty, rather than performance, with President Ndayishimiye replacing health, agriculture, public service and youth ministers, while those in charge of poorly performing sectors stayed on. Reshuffle came as Sec Gen of ruling party, Révérien Ndikuriyo, recently toured country in apparent attempt to bolster his popularity; Ndikuriyo’s mounting ambitions could presage growing frictions with Ndayishimiye.

Authorities arrested opposition party leader. Authorities 17 Oct arrested head of opposition party Council for Democracy and Sustainable Development in Burundi, Kefa Nibizi, over accusations of undermining state security days after party blamed “unprecedented misery” on “failing leadership”; Nibizi granted provisional release 21 Oct. In separate development, Supreme Court 2 Oct denied bail to former PM Alain Guillaume Bunyoni, who has been held in pre-trial detention since April on charges of undermining state security.

Burundi saw wins and losses at UN Human Rights Council. UN General Assembly 10 Oct elected Burundi and 14 other member states to Human Rights Council for three-year term. Human Rights Council 12 Oct extended mandate of special rapporteur for Burundi for another year, citing continued “human rights violations and abuses” in country; Gitega expressed frustration, saying resolution was politically motivated. UN special rapporteur 25 Oct presented annual report on situation of human rights in Burundi to UN General Assembly, noted “shrinking civic space” and “growing pressure on political parties, civil society organisations and the media” ahead of 2025 legislative and municipal elections.

Cameroon

Anglophone regions observed general strike on self-proclaimed independence anniversary, as separatists redoubled efforts to reduce internal wrangling and come closer to Nigerian separatists.

Anglophone conflict continued. Anglophone regions 1 Oct went silent on anniversaries of British Southern Cameroons’ 1961 reunification with Francophone Republic of Cameroon and 2017 unilateral declaration of independence by now-detained Anglophone leader Sisiku Ayuk Tabe. Most residents 30 Sept-2 Oct stayed indoors as businesses closed and transportation halted. Some administrators in South West regional capital Buea sanctioned businesses observing general strike. Low-level violence persisted: Ambazonia Defence Forces 4 Oct killed two men they accused of spying for govt forces in Batibo town (North West region), and govt forces 12 Oct killed six suspected separatist rebels in Akwaya subdivision (South West). Meanwhile, Anglophone separatist groups 5-8 Oct met in Canada to draw up plans to reduce internal wrangling and splintering of movement. Ayaba Cho Lucas’ Ambazonia Governing Council and Nigerian separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) factional leader Simon Ekpa 21 Oct signed cooperation agreement in Finland’s capital Helsinki, pledging mutual assistance in their respective separatist struggles. Following petition by 30 U.S. Congress members, U.S. President Biden 6 Oct extended Temporary Protected Status for Cameroonians for additional 18 months on account of thousands of people fleeing Anglophone conflict.

Jihadist and intercommunal violence persisted in Far North region. Authorities in Mayo-Sava division 3 Oct enforced night curfew in Mora and Kolofata towns in response to increasing jihadist violence. Boko Haram militants 4 Oct killed two vigilante members in Grea village, Mayo-Sava. Unidentified jihadist group same day kidnapped local chief and two staff members from multinational company in Bargaram locality, Logone-et-Chari division. Meanwhile, Kotoko farmers and Choa Arab herders 6 Oct clashed in Makary, Logone-et-Chari, with one killed and four injured.

Unknown assailants launched rare mass kidnappings in North region. Unidentified gunmen 21 and 23 Oct kidnapped at least 50 people near Touboro town in North region.

Central African Republic

Rebel groups continued low-intensity attacks in hinterland amid military operations by govt forces and allies.

Rebel activity persisted across country despite operations by govt forces and allies. In Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, alliance of major rebel groups Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) 2 Oct attacked gold mine near Birbatouma village, prompting riposte from military, with fighting reported next day near Ndélé town; govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 30 Oct launched search operation in same area. In Haute-Kotto prefecture, reinforced presence of UN mission (MINUSCA) peacekeepers around Ouadda town in Oct led elements of Gen Mohamed Moussa’s Party of the Rally of the Central African Nation and other CPC-affiliated groups to leave Ouadda and relocate further north to Sam-Ouandja area in Vakaga prefecture, while other fighters returned to Bria-Yalinga-Nzacko triangle in southern Haute-Kotto. Meanwhile, as influx of Sudanese refugees toward Am Dafok and Birao towns in Vakaga prefecture continued, armed elements allegedly belonging to paramilitary Rapid Support Forces of Gen Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo reportedly engaged in opportunistic crimes around Birao.

Agropastoral conflicts continued to claim lives. After herder-farmer violence in Sept affected Miamani area in Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, several similar incidents reported in Oct in Ouham-Pendé prefecture. Notably, armed Fulani herders 10 Oct clashed with group of armed individuals in Bossemptélé sub-prefecture, and violence 12 Oct broke out between armed herders and residents in Bézéré village, leading to deaths of three soldiers who had been deployed to area; armed elements of CPC-affiliated 3R rebel group late Oct abducted a dozen individuals near Bohong village over accusations of cattle theft. In Lobaye prefecture, transhumant herders armed with assault rifles 22 Oct shot one farmer dead and wounded another.

UN urged Bangui to launch inclusive dialogue ahead of 2024 local elections. Valentine Rugwabiza, UN Special Representative and head of MINUSCA, 26 Oct presented Sec Gen’s report on Central African Republic to UN Security Council ahead of vote on mandate renewal expected in Nov. Rugwabiza highlighted govt’s progress in advancing peace process, and urged Bangui to engage in inclusive dialogue with political opposition and armed groups ahead of local elections scheduled for Oct 2024.

Chad

Authorities arrested dozens after opposition leader announced imminent return from exile.

Interim President Déby strengthened grip on security apparatus. Déby 21 Sept and 9 Oct conducted two important army reshuffles, with 66 new generals appointed, majority of them from ruling clan. Meanwhile, online media Tchad One 7-8 Oct reported elements of elite force that includes presidential guard attempted to overthrow Déby; govt did not react to claim.

Opposition leader delayed return from exile amid crackdown on supporters. Succès Masra, exiled president of Les Transformateurs party, 5 Oct informed public security ministry of his return to Chad on 18 Oct. In response, police 8 Oct arrested over 70 party supporters, citing risk to public order. Govt 14 Oct said negotiations for Masra’s return were continuing under Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) auspices, and Masra next day announced postponing return until early Nov at request of ECCAS facilitator, Congolese President Tshisekedi. Security forces 20 Oct deployed to N’Djamena in anticipation of unrest on one-year anniversary of deadly crackdown on opposition protests. Kinshasa 31 Oct announced agreement between Chad’s govt and Masra for latter’s return.

Herder-farmer conflict flared up in Moyen-Chari province. After apparent lull in herder-farmer violence in Moyen-Chari province since Dec 2022, conflict between herders and farmers late Sept escalated in Korbol department, near Lake Iro, resulting in around ten people killed as rebel group Movement for Peace, Reconstruction and Development entered fray.

In other important developments. Amid growing hostility to French presence, over 20 leaders of political parties and civil society organisations, both in Chad and among diaspora, 10 Oct sent letter to Déby to request withdrawal of French troops from Chad.

Côte d’Ivoire

President Ouattara reshuffled govt in wake of landslide victory in September local elections, while opposition remained in disarray.

Ouattara revamped leadership team, keeping tight grip on power. After ruling party Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) won landslide victory in Sept regional and municipal elections, President Ouattara 6 Oct dismissed PM Patrick Achi, and 16 Oct appointed governor of Abidjan and RHDP heavyweight Robert Beugré Mambé as new PM. Appointment came as a surprise to many observers who expected more political appointment giving indication about Ouattara’s succession plans ahead of 2025 presidential election. Mambé 18 Oct announced new govt mostly composed of previous govt’s key figures; reconciliation ministry abolished, which suggests that opposition’s poor performance in local elections bolstered RHDP confidence; Mambé himself took charge of sports ministry as country prepares to host Africa Cup of Nations football competition in Jan. Meanwhile, senators 12 Oct elected Ouattara’s close ally, former FM Kandia Camara, as head of upper legislature.

Opposition struggled to come to terms with electoral defeat. Former President Laurent Gbagbo 6 Oct circulated memo within his opposition party African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) announcing audit of local election campaigns; 23 Oct reshuffled PPA-CI leadership, notably replacing party’s executive president, sec gen and spokesperson. Amid power struggle within Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) following death in Aug of long-time leader Henri Konan Bédié and electoral defeat in Sept, PDCI 14 Oct scheduled extraordinary party congress for 16 Dec to elect new president.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Large-scale fighting between M23 rebels and govt forces resumed in North Kivu after six months of precarious calm, fuelling tensions with Rwanda; political climate remained heated ahead of December elections.

Ceasefire between M23 and govt collapsed in North Kivu province. Wazalendo coalition of pro-govt armed groups 9 Oct seized strategic town of Kitshanga in Masisi territory from M23 rebel group after intense fighting, and around 11 Oct drove M23 from their stronghold of Bwiza (Bwito chiefdom) in neighbouring Rutshuru territory. Violence 15 Oct flared in Bwito’s Tongo and Bishusha groupements, and M23 overnight 22-23 Oct reportedly killed over 50 civilians in several villages of Tongo. Fighting also reported around 21 Oct in Masisi, with M23 regaining control of Kitshanga. Direct clashes between M23 and govt forces 24 Oct resumed at Kibumba town in Nyiragongo territory, about 20km north of provincial capital Goma. M23 rebels 25-26 Oct opened new front, seizing Bambo town in Rutshuru territory, 60km from Goma. Kinshasa 23-24 Oct released drone footage purportedly showing Rwandan army incursion into DR Congo in support of M23. Meanwhile, UN regional envoy 17 Oct said risk of “direct confrontation” between Kigali and Kinshasa is “very real” (see Rwanda).

Presidential election candidates engaged in heated rhetoric. Electoral commission 19 Oct published list 24 candidates registered for 20 Dec presidential election, pending Constitutional Court confirmation expected 18 Nov. Harsh rhetoric continued between candidates. Notably, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Denis Mukwege 2 Oct called current leadership “inconsistent, irresponsible and incompetent”, while incumbent President Tshisekedi 7 Oct warned against “candidates from abroad” in thinly veiled reference to Mukwege. Opposition seemed unable to build electoral alliance to rally behind single candidate against Tshisekedi. Fuelling divisions, prominent candidate Martin Fayulu 10 Oct said he was only candidate fit for the role and dismissed other candidates as “thieves”.

In other important developments. Suspected Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces 23 Oct killed at least 26 civilians in Oicha town, Beni territory in North Kivu. Tshisekedi 12 Oct announced easing of state of siege (akin to martial law) in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, notably lifting curfew and allowing peaceful demonstrations, with military remaining in charge at provincial level.

Eritrea

Authorities rejected Ethiopian PM’s calls for direct access to sea, laying bare deteriorating bilateral relations; govt continued to expand regional partnerships.

Asmara dismissed Abiy’s calls for negotiations over sea access. In audio released 13 Oct, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed said that securing direct access to sea (Ethiopia has been landlocked since 1993 Eritrean independence) is vital for Ethiopia’s development and stressed historic links to Red Sea; he called for open discussions with neighbours about possible solutions and warned that Ethiopia’s lack of access was potential source of future conflict. Eritrea 16 Oct responded harshly, dismissing “excessive discourses” on water and sea access and emphasising that Asmara will not “be drawn into such alleys and platforms”. Response laid bare worsening relations between Addis and Asmara, with latter fearful that its larger neighbour may have territorial ambitions.

Eritrea continued to strengthen regional ties. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud 8-9 Oct visited Asmara amid concerted Eritrean efforts to enhance bilateral relations. High-level delegation led by FM Osman Saleh 12 Oct travelled to Egypt to discuss Sudan conflict with Egypt’s FM Sameh Shoukry; delegation 14 Oct met with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Meanwhile, delegation led by Ambassador Negasi Sengal 23-24 Oct attended Forum on China-Africa cooperation in Chinese capital Beijing.

Ethiopia

Violence in Amhara and Oromia regions remained rampant, and PM Abiy’s calls for sea access rattled Ethiopia’s neighbours amid deteriorating relations with Eritrea.

Fano-federal fighting continued in Amhara region. Clashes between federal forces and Amhara nationalist militia known as Fano occurred in rural areas and small towns of Amhara’s North Wollo, South Wollo, West Gojjam, East Gojjam and North Shewa zones, as well as Oromia region’s North Shewa Zone. Indications mid Oct surfaced that military is planning final offensive to “eliminate” Fano, though rebellion’s decentralised structure will likely complicate efforts. Ethiopian Human Rights Commission 30 Oct warned of high civilian casualties.

Hostilities in Oromia persisted amid rising risk of intercommunal violence. Clashes between govt forces and Oromo Liberation Army continued throughout Oct. Govt drone strikes 7-8 Oct in Horo Guduru Wollega Zone killed at least twelve. In North Shewa’s Dera Woreda (home to significant number of Amharas), federal forces fought OLA and Fano; with both insurgencies operating in area, risk of ethnically motivated attacks on Amhara and Oromo civilians is high. Kidnappings-for-ransom continued to rise. Notably, suspected OLA militants 3 Oct abducted nine civilians from Sululta city, demanding 300,000 birr (approx $5,500) per victim; 19 Oct abducted unknown number of Chinese nationals.

Abiy’s calls for talks on sea access laid bare deteriorating relations with Eritrea. In audio released 13 Oct, PM Abiy pronounced that securing direct access to sea (Ethiopia has been landlocked since 1993 Eritrean independence) is vital for Ethiopia’s development and stressed historic links to Red Sea; he called for open discussions with neighbours and warned that Ethiopia’s lack of access was potential source of future conflict. Eritrea 16 Oct said “discourses” on water and sea access had become “excessive” and emphasised that Asmara will not “be drawn into such alleys”; response revealed deteriorating relations between Addis and Asmara (see Eritrea). Somalia and Djibouti 17, 19 Oct respectively rejected Abiy’s appeal for talks.

In other important developments. Situation in Tigray region remained static. UN humanitarian agency 9 Oct warned that “drought-like conditions” in parts of Amhara, Tigray, Somali and Afar regions have increased food insecurity. Third round of talks on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 24 Oct concluded without breakthrough (see Nile Waters).

Gabon

Coup leader visited several Central African countries to press for reintegration into regional organisations.

Junta leader, Gen Brice Oligui Nguema, in late Sept embarked on regional tour in bid to get Gabon’s suspension from Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and African Union reversed. Nguema notably met with presidents of Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda, but has yet to secure meeting with Cameroon’s head of state, Paul Biya. Meanwhile, U.S. President Biden 30 Oct announced plans to expel Gabon and three other African countries from special U.S.-Africa trade program on grounds of “gross violations” of human rights or absence of progress toward democratic rule.

Guinea

Junta continued to restrict press freedom and fundamental rights; ECOWAS court of justice ordered release of deposed President Condé-era ministers.

Crackdown on journalists sparked outcry from opposition. Union of journalists (SPPG) 16 Oct held demonstration in capital Conakry calling on authorities to lift restrictions on privately-owned news website Guinee Matin, which has been inaccessible within Guinea since mid-Aug; police and gendarmerie enforced ban on protests and dispersed rally, reportedly injuring three journalists and arresting a dozen, who were freed later that day but charged with “participating in an unlawful assembly”. Opposition movements Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea, Union of Republican Forces, and National Front for the Defence of the Constitution immediately condemned crackdown and restrictions imposed by junta on fundamental freedoms. Deposed President Alpha Condé’s Rally of the Guinean People 21 Oct followed suit, calling for “coalition of forces” to protect journalists. Telecommunications Minister Ousmane Gaoual Diallo 17 Oct announced defamation suit against Sec Gen of journalist union, Sékou Jamal Pendessa, who accused Gaoual Diallo of engineering restrictions on Guinee Matin. SPPG 29 Oct announced plans to hold new march on 6 Nov.

In another important development. Court of Justice of West African regional bloc ECOWAS 16 Oct ruled continued detentions of former PM Ibrahima Kassory Fofana and two Condé-era ministers were “arbitrary”, ordered their immediate release; authorities have three months to comply with judgement.

Kenya

Parliament extended bipartisan talks between govt and opposition, border dispute between Kericho and Kisumu counties turned deadly, and court paused police deployment to Haiti.

President Ruto reshuffled cabinet, parliament extended bipartisan talks. Ruto 4 Oct replaced eight cabinet ministers, notably moving FM Alfred Mutua to Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, adding foreign affairs ministry to Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi’s portfolio. National Assembly 17 Oct approved 30-day extension of bipartisan talks between govt and opposition, giving National Dialogue Committee until 28 Nov to submit report.

Intercommunal clashes flared on Kericho-Kisumu border. Armed individuals from Kericho county 4 Oct reportedly raided East Kadiang’a location near disputed Sondu town in Kisumu county, killing seven and allegedly targeting hospital; govt 5 Oct announced deployment of special police units to area to contain violence.

Al-Shabaab continued operations in eastern counties bordering Somalia. In Garissa county, two Al-Shabaab fighters 3 Oct died while attempting to set up explosive device in Amuma area; security forces in second half of Oct destroyed at least two Al-Shabaab logistics bases in Fafi constituency, where police 17 and 30 Oct Oct killed at least five al-Shabaab militants; explosive device 30 Oct killed two security officers near Dadaab town. U.S. embassy in Kenya 13 Oct issued security alert, warning of “potentially imminent [terrorist] attacks” in capital Nairobi and elsewhere.

Court temporarily suspended police deployment to Haiti. UN Security Council 2 Oct approved deployment of Kenyan-led multinational police force to combat gang violence in Haiti; Nairobi volunteered to lead international force in Haiti as part of Ruto’s efforts to signal Kenya is reliable foreign affairs partner. However, High Court 9 Oct temporarily suspended deployment, and 24 Oct extended suspension until 9 Nov pending decision on opposition’s petition citing concerns over constitutionality of deploying police officers abroad.

Lesotho

Political tensions ran high as opposition tabled motion of no-confidence in govt, prompting security forces to threaten intervention.

Opposition 16 Oct submitted motion of no-confidence against PM Sam Matekane’s govt, with 61 MPs out of 120 in parliament pledging support for motion; vote deferred after Matekane resorted to court to challenge move. Police and army same day called on opposition not to go ahead with no-confidence motion, saying they would only work with current govt. Security forces 18 Oct briefly detained leader of opposition party Socialist Revolutionaries Teboho Mojapela. Matekane 26 Oct wrote to Southern African Development Community (SADC) arguing that opposition’s move aims to “subvert our democratic norms and principles” and could usher in period of “political uncertainty”. Opposition parties next day wrote to SADC highlighting threat of military coup, as well as harassment of Mojapela and other opposition figures. South African outlet News24 31 Oct reported that Matekane had gained support of opposition party Basotho Action Party, with their six seats returning parliamentary majority to his control and seemingly ending prospect of no-confidence vote.

Madagascar

Authorities violently dispersed opposition rallies denouncing govt interference in electoral process; political tensions could rise further and fuel violence around mid-November presidential election.

Opposition protests left two presidential candidates injured. Opposition coalition of 11 presidential candidates in Oct continued to protest to denounce lack of level playing field and demand disqualification of incumbent President Rajoelina from presidential race, saying he holds dual citizenship. Police and soldiers 2 and 7 Oct dispersed opposition rallies in capital Antananarivo with tear gas and rubber bullets, reportedly leaving opposition presidential candidates Andry Raobelina and Marc Ravalomanana injured. Amid unrest, High Constitutional Court (HCC) 12 Oct ordered one-week postponement of first round of presidential election to 16 Nov. Opposition demonstrations continued on almost daily basis until month’s end.

Tensions engulfed ruling party. Senate President Herimanana Razafimahefa 9 Oct said he had renounced interim presidency in Sept under pressure from govt officials, including death threats. In extraordinary session, ruling party-dominated senate 12 Oct voted to dismiss Razafimahefa on grounds of “mental deficiency”. Razafimahefa same day referred decision to HCC, which 28 Oct rejected appeal; HCC same day named new Senate President Richard Ravalomanana as interim president, reversing previous decision to put PM Christian Ntsay at head of “collegiate govt”. Collective of opposition candidates called Ravalomanana’s installation “very serious breach of the Constitution”. National Assembly President Christine Razanamahasoa 17 Oct highlighted “democratic backsliding”, calling for action from international community to prevent “internecine war”; colleagues in ruling party immediately denounced her remarks.

International community expressed concern over deteriorating political climate. UN Human Rights Office 10 Oct warned of “deteriorating human rights situation” in lead-up to presidential election, saying security forces used “unnecessary and disproportionate force” against peaceful opposition protesters. In joint statement, EU, U.S. and other govts 16 Oct expressed “worry” over “tense political climate”.

Mali

Military authorities appeared committed to taking control of 2015 peace deal signatories’ stronghold of Kidal, and could launch offensive in days or weeks to come.

Escalation between former rebel groups and govt forces continued in north. In Kidal region, govt and allied Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 7 Oct carried out strikes and took control of Anefis town from Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), which gathers northern armed groups signatory to 2015 peace agreement. As part of second phase of withdrawal, UN mission (MINUSMA) mid-Oct started leaving Tessalit and Aguelhok camps in Kidal region; two Malian military planes that landed in Tessalit to take control of base 16 Oct came under fire from CSP-affiliated Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), who worry arrival of Malian troops in Tessalit may be last step before offensive on Kidal town. CSP 31 Oct claimed takeover of vacated MINUSMA camp in Kidal town. Meanwhile in Gao region, CMA 2 and 4 Oct claimed seizing Bamba and Taoussa bases from army. Divisions emerged within CSP as founding member Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) late Sept announced departure from coalition over CMA’s bellicose stance toward govt; MSA Sec Gen 8 Oct said conflict only benefited jihadists, and several other CSP members also expressed commitment to peace.

Jihadist violence continued in centre and north. In centre, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 7 Oct ambushed soldiers near Batouma, Douentza region, killing 16, and 10 Oct ambushed joint convoy of army, Dan Na Ambassagou militiamen, and Wagner near Sibo village, Bandiagara region, claiming to have killed ten. Civilians continued to pay heavy toll in north. Wagner 8 Oct allegedly killed seven civilians in Takoukate village, Kidal region, while Wagner and govt forces 15 Oct reportedly killed six civilians and committed sexual abuse in Agumeimin and Tichilit villages, Timbuktu region.

Political tensions continued around postponed presidential election. Prominent religious and political figure, Imam Mahmoud Dicko, convened demonstration for 13 Oct in capital Bamako to protest indefinite delay to presidential election, while pro-govt civil society organisation called for counterprotest; authorities 9 Oct banned both gatherings, citing “high risk of unrest”.

Mozambique

Protests erupted as opposition denounced fraud in municipal elections, with violence and repression leaving several people dead; insurgent activity remained low in northern Cabo Delgado province.

Municipal elections marred by deadly violence. Municipal elections, seen as test for presidential election due in 2024, held 11 Oct. Election day went relatively smoothly, but violence broke out in following days. Notably, police 12 Oct brutally dispersed gathering of RENAMO opposition party supporters in Chiúre district, Cabo Delgado province, killing 16-year-old boy. Ruling FRELIMO party 15 Oct claimed victory in all but one of 65 municipalities. Opposition immediately accused FRELIMO of influencing vote counting and 17 Oct held nationwide protests; police crackdown reportedly left dozens wounded notably in capital Maputo and Nampula city. Unrest worsened after electoral commission 26 Oct confirmed FRELIMO’s victory in all but one municipality. Opposition supporters 27 Oct took to streets in several cities to decry results and dismiss elections as rigged; police suppressed protests notably in Nampula, with nine civilians and one police officer reportedly injured, and 60 people detained. Violence next day broke out again, including in Maputo as security forces reportedly used tear gas and live bullets to disperse protesters; at least three people killed. Police late Oct accused RENAMO of using homemade explosives during unrest, while National Human Rights Commission 30 Oct criticised “indiscriminate” use of force by police against demonstrators.

Activity of Islamic State-affiliated militants remained limited in Cabo Delgado. In Macomia district, suspected Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) militants 13 Oct killed two hunters near Chai village, and around 20 Oct reportedly kidnapped two fishermen near Litandacua village. In Mocímboa da Praia district, fear of ISMP attacks early Oct led to displacement of almost 5,000 people from several villages; local source claimed militants 16 Oct kidnapped at least three men from Awasse village.

Niger

Islamic State launched deadly attack on military in south-western region, confirming increase in jihadist violence since July coup; France began troop withdrawal.

Major attack confirmed rise in jihadist violence in south west. In Tahoua region, Islamic State-Sahel Province (IS Sahel) 2 Oct ambushed military in Tabatol village, Tillia department; govt claimed 29 soldiers killed though locals reported total may be much higher. Recrudescence of jihadist attacks reported in neighbouring Tillabery region since July coup continued. IS Sahel militants 10 Oct killed 11 civilians in Karkatia village, Bankilare department, and 16 Oct clashed with troops in several areas of Bankilare and Tera departments, reportedly leading to dozens of casualties on both sides.

Standoff with France and others continued. French soldiers early Oct began withdrawal from Tillabery region; departure of 1,500 troops due to be completed by year’s end will likely cause logistical, security, and political challenges. Govt 10 Oct also expelled UN resident coordinator in Niger, Louise Aubin, citing “underhanded manoeuvres” by UN, including non-accreditation of Niger’s representatives at international conferences. Meanwhile, U.S. same day formally acknowledged July military takeover was coup, suspended $500mn in development aid.

Algiers’ mediation attempt suffered setback. Niamey 3 Oct denied having accepted Algerian mediation promoting six-month transition to restore constitutional order, emphasised transition duration could only be decided by “inclusive national forum”, and Algiers 9 Oct announced putting mediation efforts on hold pending “clarifications” (see Algeria).

In another important development. Authorities 19 Oct alleged deposed President Bazoum attempted to escape from house arrest with help of local and foreign actors, though those close to former president denied claim. Public prosecutor at Niamey court of appeal 31 Oct said investigation was under way and 23 people had been arrested in connection with case.

Nigeria

Supreme Court upheld President Tinubu’s election win, while levels of criminal, jihadist and separatist violence remained high across country.

Tinubu’s presidential win confirmed. Supreme Court 26 Oct refused to overturn Feb election of Bola Tinubu as president, ending legal challenge brought by his rivals, who had argued vote was flawed and Tinubu was not qualified to run.

Suspected jihadists launched deadly attacks in North East. Suspected Islamic State West Africa Province militants 30-31 Oct shot at villagers and set off land mine in Gaidam area of Yobe state, killing at least 37 people. After Bauchi state in Sept reported rising violence, state governor 9 Oct said 67 armed group members killed and 29 abductees rescued during recent security operation in Tafawa Balewa area; attacks continued in Bauchi, however, with gunmen 15 Oct killing nine members of vigilante group in Ningi area. Meanwhile, pro-govt militia group Civilian Joint Task Force 1 Oct announced dismissal of founding leader Lawan Jafar over corruption allegation; move may hamper operations against jihadist groups in North East due to Jafar’s standing among militia members.

Criminal violence continued unabated in North West and North Central zones. Security operations against armed groups, including 10-11 Oct air strikes in Maru area of Zamfara state, remained inadequate to stem attacks and mass abductions. Notably, gunmen 16 Oct killed three and abducted 50 in mining village in Anka area, Zamfara. States of Kaduna, Benue, Niger and Nasarawa in Oct also saw abductions and killings by armed groups.

Targeted killings continued in South East. Following several attacks in Sept on security and state officials in Imo state, suspected Biafra separatists mid-Oct hacked to death Ebonyi state university official during visit to Imo town. Meanwhile, two major factions of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) separatist group issued contradictory messages on future plans; self-proclaimed PM of Biafra Republic Government in Exile, Simon Ekpa, who in Aug declared himself commander of new Biafra Liberation Army, 5 Oct said Biafran authorities would “soon start full government”; however, mainstream faction two days later said group was open to talks with federal govt on Biafran independence, offering opportunity for Tinubu to start dialogue.

Nile Waters

Third round of talks on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) concluded without breakthrough.

Third round of talks between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan regarding rules for first filling and annual operation of GERD 24 Oct concluded in Egypt’s capital Cairo. Sides failed to make progress, with Cairo accusing Addis of refusing to compromise, but agreed to fourth round of talks in Ethiopia.

Rwanda

Resurgence of large-scale hostilities involving M23 militia in eastern DR Congo fuelled inflammatory rhetoric between Kigali and Kinshasa, as UN highlighted risk of direct conflict.

As violence early Oct flared between M23 rebel group, made up primarily of ethnic Tutsi combatants, and coalition of armed groups aligned with Congolese govt (see DR Congo), North Kivu military governor 10 Oct blamed “massacre” of seven civilians, who were found dead same day near Rumangabo military base (40km north of North Kivu’s capital Goma), on M23 and Rwanda Defence Force “terrorists”. At Security Council meeting, UN special envoy for Africa’s Great Lakes region, Huang Xia, 17 Oct said risk of “direct confrontation” between Rwanda and DR Congo is “very real”, citing “military build-up” by both countries, “absence of direct high-level dialogue”, and “persistence of hate speech” as worrying signs. Both countries in following days continued to trade blame for violence as direct clashes between M23 and Congolese govt forces resumed in North Kivu. Kigali 23 Oct said Rwandan citizen was injured along border by stray bullet originating from DR Congo, accused coalition of “Kinshasa-backed illegal armed groups” of responsibility; also said Kinshasa’s “ongoing support” for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda rebels and other armed groups “is escalating provocative actions along the Rwandan border”. Kinshasa 23-24 Oct released drone footage purportedly showing Rwandan army incursion into DR Congo to reinforce M23 positions in North Kivu, and said it had referred matter to joint verification mechanism set up as part of Luanda process.

Somalia

Election-related tensions grew further in Puntland, raising prospect of armed confrontation in lead-up to polls set for early 2024; offensive against Al-Shabaab continued to produce mixed results.

Political dispute worsened in Puntland state. Puntland President Said Deni 10 Oct returned to Puntland after near two-month absence and reaffirmed commitment to hold direct parliamentary and presidential elections by Jan 2024. Opposition continued to accuse him of seeking to use transition to universal suffrage to extend term or set rules in his favour. Notably, representatives of Mideeye and Horseed political associations 10-11 Oct met near Puntland capital Garowe and called for return to clan-based system for Puntland’s elections, also agreeing to form joint front against Deni; absent dialogue between Puntland govt and opposition, alliance further raises prospect of violent confrontations ahead of polls as opposition parties have troops at their disposal. Electoral authorities 23 Oct reaffirmed commitment to hold direct presidential election, but pushed date back to 25 Feb 2024, further raising tensions.

President Mohamud returned from frontlines as insecurity persisted. Mohamud 7 Oct returned to capital Mogadishu after two months in Galmudug state capital Dhusamareb, where his attempts to revive govt’s offensive against Al-Shabaab yielded mixed results. Notably, several clan communities in southern Mudug region agreed to join fight against al-Shabaab, but similar discussions about forming clan alliance against Al-Shabaab in northern Galgaduud region have yet to bear fruit. Militants continued to put up stiff resistance in Galmudug: local sources reported Al-Shabaab attack on clan militia positions in Bar Ujeed area 14 Oct resulted in dozens of casualties. In Hirshabelle state, govt 12 Oct announced it had pushed militants back across Shabelle river with help from AU mission (ATMIS) after Al-Shabaab crossed it mid-Sept. Southwest state President Laftagareen 7 Oct also promised to initiate second phase of anti-Al-Shabaab operations, and federal officials including defence minister 28 Oct arrived in Diinsoor district (Bay region) to coordinate operations. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab car bomb attack 21 Oct killed at least six people at military facility on outskirts of Mogadishu.

In another important development. AU Peace and Security Council 5 Oct backed Somalia’s request to UN to pause ATMIS withdrawal for three months.

Somaliland

Govt messaging signalled desire to retake territory lost to Dhulbahante clan militias in Sool region.

Tensions remained high between govt and Dhulbahante clan forces in Sool region. In strongest public comment since Somaliland army’s pull-out from Dhulbahante-inhabited parts of Sool region in late Aug, President Bihi 14 Oct said Somaliland would not accept separate administration in Sool. Reports emerged of troop mobilisation in Qorilugud area near Buhoodle city, which could augur attempt to retake territory in coming months. Meanwhile, leader of SSC-Khatumo state (new self-declared administration for Dhulbahante community) Abdulkadir Firdhiye 6-22 Oct visited Somali capital Mogadishu, reiterated desire to form new Somali member state during talks with Somali PM Hamza Abdi Barre and President Mohamud; local media 19 Oct reported that Mogadishu recognised SSC-Khatumo as interim administration.

Clan tensions erupted elsewhere. Clan tensions late Sept-early Oct flared around Togdheer region’s capital Burco and Sanaag region’s capital Erigabo, resulting in small skirmishes; SSC-Khatumo 18 Oct accused Bihi of “inciting hatred” among clans.

Electoral dispute de-escalated further. Electoral-related strains continued to dissipate after Gacaan Libaah militia, which originally opposed August agreement between Bihi and opposition to simultaneously hold political party and presidential elections on 13 Nov 2024, late Sept agreed to lay down arms. Election-related tensions continued to simmer in Awdal region, however, with some prominent Gadabursi clan figures attempting to organise themselves both inside and outside Somaliland.

South Sudan

UN denounced repression of civil society amid growing concerns about readiness for 2024 election, key opposition commanders defected to govt, and insecurity continued in several states.

UN condemned govt repression amid concerns about election. UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan 5 Oct issued damning report on civic space in light of 2024 elections, accusing govt and intelligence agency of abuses against journalists and civil society members, and “extreme intolerance towards expressions of criticism”; report concluded that free and fair elections are unimaginable under current conditions. Govt next day cancelled visit of UN special rapporteur on human rights of internally displaced persons. Interim Chair of Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) – tasked with tracking implementation of 2018 peace agreement – Maj Gen Charles Tai Gituai 5 Oct warned lack of progress on election-preparedness is creating uncertainty and urged govt not to abandon constitution-making provisions of peace deal. Briefing UN Security Council, RJMEC Chief of Staff Berhanu Kebede 23 Oct highlighted importance of reconstituting Political Parties Council and National Election Commission before elections.

Collapse of main opposition movement continued unabated. In severe blow to VP Riek Machar’s diminished People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), Unity State Commander Lt. Gen Simon Maguek Gai 10 Oct defected to govt along with several division commanders; Maguek Gai returned to Leer County (Unity State) to mobilise disaffected youth, raising fears of armed confrontation with Machar’s forces; Jonglei State sector commander Lt. Gen Michael Wal Nyak 19 Oct defected. Loss of two key commanders drastically reduced SPLA-IO’s military capacity in Unity and Jonglei states.

Insecurity persisted in several states. Unknown assailants 11 Oct killed four civilians in Budi County, Eastern Equatoria state. Attack by Twic county youth 13 Oct killed four in Athonyi village, Abyei area. Skirmish between two Dinka communities 15 Oct killed three in Twic East County, Jonglei State.

Juba hosted meeting on Sudan crisis as refugees faced hunger crisis. UN World Food Program 3 Oct warned of looming hunger crisis for South Sudanese returnees fleeing war in Sudan. Juba 24-25 Oct hosted Sudan’s Juba Peace Agreement signatories for discussions on ending war.

Sudan

Paramilitary forces (RSF) captured South Darfur state, marking major turn in war, and are expected to push forward in Darfur and Kordofan in coming weeks.

RSF captured South Darfur amid series of battlefield victories. RSF scored major victories against army in Darfur region. Most notably, paramilitary 27 Oct seized army’s 16th Infantry Division in South Darfur capital Nyala, leading to total conquest of state. Elsewhere, RSF 31 Oct captured 21st Infantry Division of army in Central Darfur state capital Zalingei, and by late Oct was moving on army positions in West Darfur and North Darfur state capitals; despite North Darfur state governor and Darfur regional governor urging RSF to halt advance, paramilitary could seek to overtake army garrisons in these state capitals in coming weeks in bid to capture entire region from army. This risks dragging members of Juba Peace Agreement signatories (who until now have remained neutral) into confrontation with paramilitary forces. Hostilities in capital Khartoum, meanwhile, continued unabated.

RSF gained ground in West Kordofan as conflict spread to new fronts. In West Kordofan state, RSF 30 Oct seized Baleela airport and oilfield; forces expected to advance on remaining army garrisons across state in coming weeks in bid to take full control of region. Elsewhere, RSF expanded into White Nile State while army mobilised in Sudan’s south east and east, with new recruits headed for Khartoum allegedly reaching border towns between Gezira State and capital. In response, RSF deployed to Gezira in attempt to cut off crucial supply route for army. Meanwhile, army battled with rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in South Kordofan state; notably, SPLM-N 9 Oct attacked army positions in Delling town, taking control of area.

Jeddah talks resumed. U.S.-Saudi-brokered talks 28 Oct resumed in Saudi city Jeddah, with Intergovernmental Authority on Development and African Union acting as co-facilitators; civilian representatives yet to be invited. Initial rounds will not deal with political issues, but instead focus on humanitarian aid deliveries and negotiations related to ceasefire; major RSF advances, however, dampened hopes for progress on ceasefire agreement.

Togo

Jihadist militants maintained their presence in northern region.

Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 5 Oct attacked Togolese military on Koundjoare-Kpekankandi axis in Kpendjal prefecture, Savanes region, killing at least three soldiers.

Uganda

ADF militants launched new attacks in Uganda as military continued operations against armed group in DR Congo; tensions ran high with South Sudan over border dispute.

ADF launched new attacks against civilians in Uganda. Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 13 Oct ambushed civilian vehicle at Katojo junction near DR Congo border, killing two, and 17 Oct killed two foreign tourists and their local guide in Queen Elizabeth National Park. President Museveni 15 Oct reported army had foiled ADF bomb plot targeting churches in Butambala district, and warned against ADF rebels engaging in retaliatory attacks on Ugandan territory amid Ugandan army operations in DR Congo. Kampala 25 Oct also announced amnesty for ADF members willing to surrender.

Authorities arrested opposition leader, thwarted “one million march”. Police 5 Oct arrested opposition party National Unity Platform (NUP) leader Robert Kyagulanyi, known as Bobi Wine, at Entebbe airport on return from trip abroad; Wine said he was subsequently placed under house arrest. Police same day detained at least 40 NUP supporters in capital Kampala and elsewhere in effort to thwart what party had described as “one million march” to welcome leader home. Opposition 26 Oct walked out of parliament for third time in two weeks, demanding debate on human rights and end to repression of opposition parties.

Border dispute with South Sudan flared up. After South Sudanese authorities claimed ownership of over 20 villages in Kerwa and Kochi areas in Uganda’s Yumbe district, Ugandan troops late Sept reportedly set up bases in South Sudan’s Kajo-Keji county. South Sudan parliamentary spokesperson 1 Oct vowed not to “allow even one metre of our land to be taken by Uganda”, and Museveni 2 Oct sent ministerial delegation to Yumbe and Moyo districts. Governor of South Sudan’s Central Equatoria State and Ugandan local authorities 27 Oct met in Yumbe to resolve disputes.

Zimbabwe

Opposition continued to call for re-run of August elections, while controversy over fake letters recalling some MPs fuelled political tensions.

Opposition continued to dismiss Aug general elections as fraudulent. Main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) 2 Oct called for new elections under international supervision, with “independent and professional” body in place of current electoral commission. Police 16 Oct banned CCC protest march in Bulawayo city. In response, CCC 18 Oct said it is “fundamental constitutional right” of citizens to protest election outcome, and warned that “when all has failed”, citizens might “take matter into [their] own hands”; also said party leader Nelson Chamisa had been mandated to pursue dialogue with President Mnangagwa to find way out of crisis. During extraordinary summit of Southern African Development Community, Angolan President Lourenço 31 Oct congratulated Mnangagwa for “exemplary” elections.

Controversy over fake letters fuelled tensions. Sengezo Tshabangu, claiming to be interim Sec Gen of CCC, early Oct recalled 15 MPs, saying they had ceased to belong to party. Chamisa immediately dismissed individual as ruling party puppet, but Parliament Speaker Jacob Mudenda declared seats vacant. Riot police 10 Oct intervened as CCC MPs protested in parliament, and Mudenda suspended all CCC MPs for six parliamentary sittings. Self-proclaimed CCC Sec Gen 10 Oct also said Chamisa had been expelled from CCC, which party denied. CCC 25 Oct said it would boycott by-elections for 15 vacated seats scheduled for 9 Dec.

In another important development. Mnangagwa 20 Oct named Lt Gen Anselem Sanyatwe, under U.S. sanctions for allegedly leading post-2018 election crackdown, as army commander, and 28 Oct appointed defence forces commander Gen Phillip Valerio Sibanda to ZANU-PF politburo; civil society activists including journalist Hopewell Chin’ono immediately decried move as unconstitutional.

Asia

Afghanistan

Islamic State staged deadly attacks in north and capital Kabul, defying Taliban crackdown, while earthquakes in west compounded suffering and Taliban wrestled for control of embassies.

Islamic State’s local branch conducted attacks despite ongoing Taliban raids. After Taliban security forces early Sept dismantled Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) cell, Taliban-affiliated media Al Mirsad 3 Oct published confessions from the cell, which is purportedly responsible for some of largest attacks in Badakhshan province (north). Dismantling this network will likely represent blow to ISKP’s strong presence in Badakhshan, although group remains active and capable of attacks. Notably, in one of its largest attacks in months, ISKP 13 Oct assaulted mosque in Baghlan province (north), killing around seventeen Shia worshippers. ISKP claimed bomb attack 26 Oct in Kabul that killed at least four in sports club in Shia area.

Earthquakes and aftershocks in west aggravated humanitarian crisis. Powerful earthquake 7 Oct struck Herat province (west), levelling entire villages before series of shallow earthquakes and aftershocks in subsequent weeks hit region, killing over 2,000 people and destroying 2,500 homes. While humanitarian actors quickly provided $18mn in assistance, many affected communities are likely to remain in desperate need as winter fast approaches.

Taliban reportedly clamped down on anti-Pakistan militants and rival group. Following deadly militant attacks in Pakistan in Sept, reports emerged that Afghan security forces arrested hundreds of Pakistani militants and Afghan nationals involved in activities against Pakistan. Taliban forces reportedly also began clampdown on rival group Hizb ut-Tahrir countrywide, arresting dozens of members in multiple provinces.

Taliban intensified efforts to rein in Afghan embassies abroad. Afghan embassy in India 1 Oct stated it would be shutting down operations amid reports of infighting among embassy staff, pressure from Indian govt, and attempts by Taliban to takeover. In subsequent days, Afghan embassies in Netherlands and Spain announced their cooperation with de facto govt. Taliban-run foreign ministry 8 Oct issued notice advising services by Afghan embassies in London and Vienna were invalid; both posts have been most critical of Taliban govt; London embassy rejected notice.

Bangladesh

Govt intensified repression ahead of Jan 2024 elections as opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) held large rally in capital Dhaka, leading to clashes that killed several civilians and police officer.

BNP held large-scale rally in defiance of govt crackdown. As party sought to mobilise supporters ahead of Jan 2024 elections, BNP 28 Oct held “grand rally” in Dhaka to build momentum for demanding caretaker govt ahead of Jan 2024 polls, with estimated 200,000 BNP supporters in attendance despite efforts to stop them gathering. Sporadic clashes, mainly between BNP supporters and police, prompted police to break up rally, firing rubber bullets and tear gas. Street fighting subsequently erupted across city, leaving one police officer and one civilian dead, and hundreds more injured. Violence was also reported in other major cities, with several civilians killed and scores injured. Awami League govt 29 Oct arrested de facto BNP leader and around 100 others, including senior officials, charging them with police officer’s murder; BNP claimed nearly 3,000 party officials were arrested 21-29 Oct. BNP and other opposition forces announced nationwide “hartal”, shutting down streets across Dhaka on 29 Oct, and three-day shutdown 31 Oct-2 Nov, making further clashes likely.

Financial strains persisted. Media 18 Oct reported Central Bank’s net foreign exchange reserves fell to below $17bn, equivalent to around three months of imports, and are declining by as much as $1bn per month. Govt 19 Oct reached staff-level agreement with International Monetary Fund (IMF) to proceed with disbursement of additional $681mn (still subject to IMF board approval).

Violence continued in Rohingya refugee camps. Paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion 2 Oct detained “financial coordinator and personal assistant” of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) chief. Gunfight with armed group 4 Oct killed member of ARSA. Suspected member of rival Rohingya Solidarity Organisation 9 Oct killed two ARSA members. Paramilitary forces 5 Oct arrested local council member in Cox’s Bazar for allegedly trafficking drugs from Myanmar and 15 Oct arrested alleged ARSA member for suspected murder of Rohingya leader in Sept 2021. Meanwhile, UN High Commissioner for Refugees 17 Oct requested more funding for Rohingya response to avert looming disaster.

China/Japan

China’s maritime presence in waters around Japan remained source of tension, Canada and Beijing blamed each other for aerial incident, and U.S. spotlighted China’s “risky” military encounters.

Japan protested China’s regional maritime presence. As of 29 Oct, Japan spotted 100 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone, while it detected eight vessels within Japan’s territorial sea over three days. Japanese Coast Guard 16 Oct said two Chinese ships entered Japan’s territorial waters off disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, south of Minamikojima Island; Japanese Coast Guard warned Chinese vessels to leave waters. Chinese and Japanese coast guards 17 Oct confirmed that their ships faced off in waters around islands. Tokyo next day lodged protest with Beijing after Chinese research vessel “Xiangyanghong 18” was suspected of conducting unauthorised marine survey about 129km north east of Japan-controlled Taisho Island. Two Russian Tu-95 bombers accompanied by two fighter aircraft 17 Oct flew over Sea of Japan, prompting Japan to scramble its fighter jets.

Canada and China traded barbs over mid-air incident. Canada 16 Oct claimed that Chinese military plane intercepted its aircraft in “aggressive manner” in international airspace off Chinese coast; China claimed that Canadian plane was flying over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which violated China’s sovereignty and compelled China to take necessary measures.

U.S. highlighted trend of increasing Chinese coercive action in air. U.S. Defense Department 17 Oct released collection of declassified images and videos depicting fifteen recent cases of “coercive and risky operational behavior” by China’s military against U.S. aircraft in East and South China Sea regions; U.S. claimed that it has recorded more than 180 such incidents since Autumn 2021. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force 9-10 Oct held joint exercise with U.S. and South Korean navies in East China Sea. Japan and Australia 19 Oct agreed to include Australian troops in large-scale joint command post drills with U.S. for first time.

India

Ethnic conflict in Manipur continued to simmer, diplomatic row with Canada escalated further and talks with China on disputed border ended without progress; bombing targeted Christians in south.

Instability and attacks plagued Manipur state in north east. Death toll of conflict that erupted in May reached at least 176 with 67,000 displaced, as sporadic violence continued. Central Bureau of Investigation 1 Oct arrested four for alleged role in abduction and killing of two Meitei students. Video 8 Oct circulated on social media, showing tribal Kuki man lying in trench with face bludgeoned and body set on fire. Armed assailants and security forces 7 Oct exchanged fire and suspected insurgents 8 Oct hurled grenade at state minister’s house, injuring security forces member. Ten opposition parties 13 Oct submitted memorandum to governor expressing concern over lack of initiative to facilitate peace talks, criticising state and central govt for “path of non-intervention”.

Diplomatic spat with Canada deepened. After Canada in Sept alleged India had a hand in killing Sikh separatist leader, Canada 20 Oct announced withdrawal of 41 diplomats for being “in danger of having immunity stripped on an arbitrary date” by govt, which would risk their personal safety; Canadian PM Justin Trudeau same day blamed India for “making it unbelievably difficult for life as usual to continue”. U.S. and UK 21 Oct expressed concern at India’s decision to reduce staff and urged New Delhi to engage with Canadian investigation.

Talks with China ended without breakthrough. India and China 9-10 Oct held 20th round of corps commander-level talks at Chushul-Moldo border meeting point on Indian side but failed to make progress on stand-off along Line of Actual Control (LAC); both sides agreed to continue dialogue. U.S. Pentagon 19 Oct released report assessing negotiations had “made minimal progress” and noting China’s ongoing efforts to “develop military infrastructure” along LAC.

Deadly explosion targeted Christians in south. Suspected improvised explosive device 29 Oct targeted prayer meeting of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ernakulam district, Kerala state (south), killing at least three and injuring dozens.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Opposition parties won first local election in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) since 2019, while India and Pakistan exchanged fire amid ongoing anti-militant security operations.

Kargil region of Ladakh Union Territory held council elections for first time since 2019. Coalition of Kashmir-based National Conference and national opposition Congress party 8 Oct won 22 seats on 26-member Kargil hill development council, while ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured only two seats; election was first to be held since BJP reorganised J&K into two union territories in 2019. National Conference claimed victory sent verdict that people remain opposed to reorganisation, while party leader Omar Abdullah questioned why regional elections had not been held in J&K, accusing Election Commission of “taking decision at the behest of the BJP”.

India and Pakistan traded fire as security operations continued. In ceasefire violation on 17 Oct, Pakistani and Indian border troops exchanged fire at Arnia sector of Jammu region, injuring two Pakistani guards; gunfire 27 Oct wounded four Pakistani civilians. Meanwhile, security forces 4 Oct killed two Hizbul Mujahideen militants in Kulgam district. Militant group The Resistance Front in Anantnag district same day fatally wounded teenager. Security forces 10 Oct killed two suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) militants, who allegedly killed Kashmiri pandit recently in Shopian district. Security forces 26 Oct killed five LeT militants in Kupwara district.

Authorities sought to prevent rallies to support Palestinians. Following outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas (see Israel-Palestine), authorities 13 Oct closed largest mosque in J&K summer capital Srinagar to prevent pro-Palestine protests; citing security concerns, authorities also placed Kashmir’s chief cleric and separatist leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq under house arrest after releasing him in Sept. Former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti 21 Oct led protest in Srinagar against Israel’s offensive in Gaza. The Resistance Front 18 Oct vowed to attack Israeli interests.

In another important development. Govt 5 Oct banned pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom (JKDF) party for five years under Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, citing its “anti-India” and “pro-Pakistan” activities; govt statement alleged JKDF was involved in terror activities with intention of creating “reign of terror”.

Korean Peninsula

U.S. accused North Korea of supplying munitions to Russia, raising concern over pair’s military cooperation, while U.S., South Korea and Japan held first ever trilateral aerial military drills.

U.S. unveiled evidence pointing to North Korean weapons supplies to Russia. After North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia’s Far East in Sept to meet Russian President Putin, fuelling speculation that Pyongyang was planning to supply munitions to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, U.S. intelligence 13 Oct revealed it had observed between 300 and 1,000 shipping containers travelling by boat from North Korean port Rajin to Russian military port Dunay before containers were transported to ammunition depot closer to Russia-Ukraine border. After visiting North Korea for talks with Kim Jong Un, Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 20 Oct denied U.S. allegations, saying he “does not comment on rumours”. North Korean ambassador to Russia next day criticised U.S. deliveries of ATACMS ground-to-ground missiles to Ukraine. Concerns mounted regarding how Russia may compensate Pyongyang, as Kim Jong Un is likely seeking modern fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and assistance with satellite launch technologies banned under UN Security Council resolutions; military cooperation is likely to deepen Western antipathy toward dialogue and further sour relations on peninsula.

U.S., Japan and South Korea conducted military exercises. In their first ever trilateral aerial exercises, U.S., Japan and South Korea 22 Oct staged drill that involved U.S. strategic bombers and fighter aircraft from Japan and South Korea; exercises followed historic Aug summit between three allies where they agreed to deepen defence cooperation. U.S. and South Korea 25-27 Oct staged exercise to counter “Hamas-style” artillery attack on Seoul from North (see Israel-Palestine).

No diplomacy after release of U.S. private. After North Korea late Sept expelled U.S. military deserter Travis King, who returned to U.S. to face range of charges, U.S. State Dept 20 Oct said King’s release “will not lead” to any diplomatic engagement with North Korea.

Myanmar

Ethnic armed group in Shan state launched one of largest offensives in years, which may provoke further clashes with regime in coming weeks; explosion near internally displaced camp in Kachin state killed dozens.

Ethnic armed group launched large-scale offensive in north. In Shan state (north), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – ethnic Kokang armed group – and allies 27 Oct launched seemingly one of its most significant offensives in several years: forces made series of pre-dawn raids on twelve towns across north of state, including Chin Shwe Haw town on Chinese border, in bid to take over Kokang Self-Administered Zone, which it controlled until 2009 when military offensive ousted it and installed rival Kokang faction. Military responded with airstrikes across northern Shan State, with hostilities likely to escalate in coming weeks.

Blast at IDP camp killed dozens amid hostilities in several areas. Huge explosion close to Munglai Hkyet IDP camp in Kachin state (north) 9 Oct killed 29 people and left more than 50 injured; Kachin Independence Army blamed “high-tech” drone strike, but military denied responsibility. Rights group Amnesty International 13 Oct said damage “is consistent with the largest aerial-delivered bombs” possessed by military, while International Institute for Strategic Studies 23 Oct said blast likely caused by regime artillery strike on stored ammonium nitrate or munitions. In central Myanmar, fighting continued between military and People’s Defence Forces and other resistance forces; among heaviest clashes were hostilities in Kantbalu Township in northern Sagaing region, forcing as many as 10,000 people to flee. In Kayah state (south east), 60-vehicle military convoy deployed to recapture territory in Mese township reached its destination in nearby Bawlake after weeks of heavy fighting.

Regime celebrated 2015 nationwide ceasefire. Regime 15 Oct held ceremony marking eighth anniversary of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, but only seven of ten signatories attended as three groups have since aligned with anti-coup resistance forces.

Parallel govt addressed allegations of abuses. Amid growing reports of abuses and infighting among resistance forces, National Unity Govt 3 Oct said “they must be conducted fairly and transparently”; days later, video footage emerged purportedly showing resistance forces in Sagaing region carrying out extrajudicial killings late Sept.

Pakistan

Former PMs Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif sought to overturn disqualifications ahead of elections, sectarian clashes roiled Khyber Paktunkhwa, and govt sought forced returns of Afghan refugees.

Political parties intensified jockeying ahead of elections. Parties prepared for Jan 2024 elections, set to be one of most contested polls in Pakistan’s history; participation of two of main contenders – Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif – depends on series of cases before courts. Khan, who is serving three-year prison sentence, 5 Oct approached Islamabad High Court to overturn his conviction in “Toshakhana” case for false statements and incorrect declarations on gifts received during his premiership, which disqualified him from contested elections; Islamabad High Court 27 Oct rejected Khan’s 11 Oct appeal against special court’s indictment in cipher case, relating to alleged unauthorised disclosure and illegal retention of diplomatic cable, as well as his bail plea. Caretaker provincial govts, particularly in Khan strongholds of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, placed curbs on PTI from holding public rallies. Meanwhile, Nawaz Sharif 21 Oct returned to Pakistan after four-year exile in London in hope of becoming party’s candidate should he overcome legal hurdles, which include appeals against his corruption convictions in 2018. Islamabad High Court, which had given Nawaz protective bail, 26 Oct restored pending appeals.

Sectarian violence erupted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Shia-Sunni clashes 24-29 Oct involving heavy weaponry roiled Khyber Pakthunkhwa’s Kurram district, killing at least twenty, before trial elders reportedly struck ceasefire. Meanwhile, amid counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, clashes 8-9 Oct killed two soldiers in Zhob district, 16 Oct killed two soldiers in North and South Waziristan district and 18-19 Oct killed three soldiers in two districts.

Govt announced plan to forcibly deport “illegal immigrants”. Interior Minister Sarfraz Bugti 3 Oct set 1 Nov deadline for all illegal immigrants to leave Pakistan or face forcible deportation, with clear signals policy was aimed at Afghans. As thousands headed to Afghan border, Amnesty International 31 Oct warned 1.4m Afghan refugees at risk of “being uprooted” ahead of harsh winter months, putting women and girls in particular “in grave danger”.

Philippines

South witnessed ongoing political and criminal violence, while security forces battled Communist insurgents.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In Maguindanao del Sur, two unidentified motorcycle-borne gunmen 10 Oct ambushed and killed Saudi national. Police 12 Oct foiled attempt by suspected illegal gun dealer to transport eight M16 assault rifles from Datu Piang, Maguindanao del Sur, to Sultan Kudarat province. Incidents related to village elections also surfaced: notably, authorities 13 Oct arrested mayor of Datu Salibo town in Maguindanao del Sur, Solaiman Sandigan, with four others over their alleged links to killing of two barangay officials. Military 17 Oct clashed with suspected Daulah Islamiyah armed group in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao del Sur, injuring two soldiers and four militants.

Hostilities persisted between security forces and Communist militants. Fighting between govt security forces and Communist rebels of New People’s Army (NPA), in Luzon Island (Abra province) in north, Mindanao Island (Sultan Kudarat province) in south, and Visayas Islands (negros and Panay islands) in centre, killed at least eight combatants and civilians.

South China Sea

Maritime collision between Philippine and Chinese vessels in South China Sea (SCS) further fuelled tensions, as U.S. spotlighted China’s “risky” military encounters.

Philippines slammed China for dangerous maritime collision near disputed shoal. Philippines 4 Oct announced it had successfully shipped fresh supplies to personnel stationed at BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal, despite “significant number” of Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels seeking to “block, harass and interfere” with resupply mission. China’s coast guard 10 Oct claimed it drove away Philippine navy ship near contested Scarborough Shoal; Manila acknowledged its ship was conducting maritime patrol and engaged in brief encounter but rejected assertion it was chased away. Philippines 16 Oct slammed China for “dangerous and offensive manoeuvres” after Chinese vessel shadowed Philippine ship southwest of Thitu Island – Manila’s largest outpost in SCS – and came within 320m of ship. In sign of further heightening of tensions, Philippines 22 Oct accused China’s coast guard of “dangerous blocking manoeuvres” that caused it to collide with Philippine resupply boat about 25km from Second Thomas Shoal, while another Chinese maritime militia vessel “bumped” Philippine Coast Guard vessel; U.S. condemned Beijing’s actions and reiterated its defence treaty obligations extend to “armed attacks” on Philippine Coast Guard “anywhere in the South China Sea”. President Biden 25 Oct said U.S. defence commitment to Philippines is “ironclad”; China responded that U.S. has “no right to get involved”.

U.S. highlighted trend of increasing Chinese coercive action in air. U.S. Defense Department 17 Oct released collection of declassified images and videos depicting fifteen recent cases of “coercive and risky operational behavior” by China’s military against U.S. aircraft in East and South China Sea regions; U.S. claimed that it has recorded more than 180 such incidents since Autumn 2021. China reciprocated by releasing footage accusing U.S. of “closed-in harassment”. U.S. 24 Oct claimed Chinese fighter jet executed an unsafe intercept of U.S. aircraft.

Sri Lanka

Govt unlocked International Monetary Fund (IMF) support and introduced, then withdrew, controversial bills aimed at boosting executive powers; ethno-religious tensions simmered in northeast.

IMF and govt agreed next steps in economic reform program. Following three-week delay, govt and IMF 19 Oct reached new agreement to complete first six-month review of four-year Extended Funds Facility bailout program, paving path to further $330mn financial support pending approval of IMF’s Executive Board; deal came after China 11 Oct announced one of its two main creditors had reached tentative deal to restructure $4.2bn worth of debt (over half of what govt owes Beijing).

Govt pursued bills expanding executive power. Govt 3 Oct presented – but later in month quietly withdrew – new draft of Anti-Terrorism Act to parliament, which immediately drew domestic and international criticism for over-broad definition of terrorism and dangerously expansive powers afforded to executive and security agencies. Ten UN Special mandate holders 18 Oct argued that bill “does not go far enough to remedy the defects of […] draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act”. Govt 3 Oct also introduced Online Safety Act to parliament that generated strong criticism for its intent to create “Online Safety Commission”, appointed by and answering to president, with sweeping powers to determine that a statement is “false” and remove online content; more than 40 petitions were registered at Supreme Court challenging bill.

Ethno-religious tensions persisted in eastern province. Monk-provocateur Ampitiye Sumanaratna 15 Oct led small procession of Sinhalese to install Buddhist statue on disputed land in Batticaloa district, at site of long-running dispute over land used by Tamil dairy farmers now taken over by Sinhalese farmers. Police, on orders of president, 19 Oct removed Buddhist statue. Sumanaratna 25 Oct was filmed threatening to kill Tamils.

In other important developments. Wickremesinghe 21 Oct announced intention to hold presidential election in 2024, followed by parliamentary elections due by mid-2025; 16 Oct appointed controversial commission to advise on changes to electoral law. Wickremesinghe 3 Oct angrily rejected possibility of international commission to investigate 2019 Easter bombings after UK’s Channel 4 in Sept broadcast allegations that military intelligence facilitated attack and obstructed investigations.

Taiwan Strait

China maintained military activity around Taiwan, while Taiwan President Tsai struck conciliatory tone as she entered final months of presidency.

Chinese jets and navy vessels continued operations around island. As of 29 Oct, Taiwan spotted 299 Chinese military aircraft around Taiwan, of which at least 100 either crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected in Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone; 23 aircraft 26 Oct crossed median line while China aircraft carrier Shandong sailed through Bashi Channel into Western Pacific. Taiwan reported 152 sightings of Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon 12 Oct transited Taiwan Strait in international airspace.

Tsai urged “peaceful coexistence”, Beijing reiterated preconditions for talks. Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen 10 Oct urged “peaceful coexistence” with island and called on Beijing to develop a “mutually acceptable foundation” for interactions; she stressed that her administration had maintained cross-strait status quo since 2016, which was critical to ensuring peace. In response, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said that acceptance of the “1992 consensus” is precondition for both sides to engage in political dialogue. After opposition party Kuomintang (KMT)’s vice chairman Andrew Hsia late Sept said that KMT should not be labelled as “pro-China party” nor “unification party”, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office 11 Oct responded that remarks “undermine mutual trust between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait”.

In other important developments. Speaking in New York city during his U.S. visit, former Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou 16 Oct said that U.S. should play role of peacemaker and broker talks between Taiwan and China; in response, Taiwan’s FM Joseph Wu slammed comments as having undermined Taiwan’s diplomacy. Former Australian PM Scott Morrison 11-12 Oct visited Taiwan to participate in govt-sponsored Yushan forum, in which he expressed his personal support for Taiwan to participate in international organisations, including “Quad” grouping of U.S., India, Japan and Australia, and called for “modernisation” of Australia’s “one China” policy.

Thailand

Authorities convicted several individuals on lèse-majesté charges and condemned killing of Thai nationals in Israel, while violence persisted in deep south.

Courts handed down spate of convictions for lèse-majesté. Notably, Provincial court in Phitsanuloke 4 Oct convicted graduate student of lèse-majesté for Facebook posts, deferred sentencing for two years. Chiang Mai Provincial Court found activist Wanwalee Thammasattaya guilty of lèse-majesté, sentenced to two years and eight months in prison. Ratchapisek Criminal Court 11 Oct convicted man of lèse-majesté for post criticising COVID-19 vaccine production by Siam Bioscience company, which is owned by King Maha Vajiralongkorn; court gave suspended sentence of one year and six months. Activist Saharat Sukkhamla 19 Oct convicted of lèse-majesté for speech at protest Nov 2020, sentenced to two years and granted bail. Meanwhile, parliament 25 Oct voted to reject motion proposed by Move Forward Party to hold referendum on election of Constitution Drafting Assembly.

Govt condemned killing of Thai nationals in Israel. Following outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas (see Israel-Palestine), PM Srettha Thavisin 8 Oct condemned Hamas attack, which killed 29 Thai workers and saw at least eighteen taken hostage; some 30,000 Thai nationals work in Israel.

Insurgents continued attacks across deep south. Militants 30 Sept-1 Oct attacked security outposts in eleven locations across Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces, causing no casualties. In Yala province, IED 3 Oct wounded two workmen in Yaha district. In Pattani province, two motorcycle-borne gunmen 5 Oct threw IED at security post in Nongchik district, lightly injuring two soldiers. Motorcycle-borne gunmen 6 Oct shot and killed chief of Don Sai subdistrict in Mai Kaen district. In Narathiwat, militants 21 Oct staged coordinated attacks in Tak Bai district, including three separate bombings and assault on checkpoint that wounded four police officers. Deputy PM Somsak Thepsutin 12 Oct announced govt would extend emergency decree for three months from 20 Oct but lifted decree in three districts – Krong Pinang in Yala, Thung Yang Daeng in Pattani and Yi-ngo in Narathiwat.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

PM Pashinyan expressed hope for peace deal with Azerbaijan in coming months amid flurry of international diplomacy; Yerevan ratified Rome Statute.

Various international actors stepped up efforts for peace deal with Azerbaijan. Following Azerbaijan’s one-day military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh (see Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan)), EU prepared for 5 Oct talks between PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Granada, Spain, moderated by French, German and EU leaders; Baku day before announced Aliyev would not attend, citing French bias toward Armenia and France’s refusal to include Türkiye in discussions. Meeting in Belgian capital Brussels slated for late Oct postponed. FMs from Iran, Türkiye and Russia 23 Oct met Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts in Iran. Participants reiterated respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and “non-interference in internal affairs” after Iranian and Russian FMs criticised Western intervention in region. Speaking from Georgian capital Tbilisi, with Azerbaijani and Georgian PMs in attendance, Pashinyan 26 Oct announced sides were working on deal that could be signed “in coming months”.

Fears of new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan persisted. Baku’s successful military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh raised fears of another offensive, this time into Armenia’s Syunik region, to establish transport corridor linking Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan’s chief negotiator Elchin Amirbayov 16 Oct sought to assuage fears and emphasised that Baku’s primary concern was safety of Azerbaijani passengers travelling through corridor. Azerbaijan 23 Oct began military drills with Türkiye, including near border with Armenia and in Nakhchivan. France same day announced sale of weapons to Armenia as Pashinyan signalled plans to reduce reliance on Russia for security. Meanwhile, escalation 3 Oct in Vardenis town bordering Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district left one Armenian soldier dead and two wounded; sides traded blame for incident.

In other important developments. Yerevan 26 Oct adopted decree granting refugee status to over 100,000 people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh. Parliament 3 Oct ratified founding treaty of International Criminal Court, known as Rome Statute.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

President Aliyev visited Nagorno-Karabakh following military offensive in September, Baku unveiled reintegration plan for ethnic Armenians, and speculation mounted about future of Russian peacekeepers.

Azerbaijani leader raised national flag in empty towns across Nagorno-Karabakh. Following Azerbaijan’s one-day military offensive in Sept that ended Nagorno-Karabakh’s (NK) de facto self-governance, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev 15 Oct visited enclave. He raised Azerbaijani flags in various abandoned towns and delivered speech from main city of Stepanakert, known as Khankendi to Azerbaijanis, proclaiming nation had “fulfilled the decades-long wish of the Azerbaijani people” and announcing appointment of Maj Gen Sardar Safarov as new commandant.

Baku’s integration plans for ethnic Armenians rang hollow amid mass exodus. Baku 2 Oct unveiled plan for integrating NK’s ethnic Armenian population into Azerbaijan, promising to ensure equal rights regardless of ethnicity, religion or language; document also outlined plans for governance, security, taxation and cultural rights, and vowed to protect Armenian cultural and religious sites. Almost all residents had fled enclave by early Oct, however, leaving virtually no one left for Azerbaijan to integrate.

Future of Russian peacekeepers remained uncertain. Mass exodus from NK triggered speculation about future of Russian peacekeepers stationed in enclave. Moscow continued to insist that any decision about their future would be made with Baku and denied any intent to exit prematurely; 11 Oct it clarified that peacekeepers’ activities “will be adapted” given that “conditions under which the Russian peacekeeping contingent was deployed to the region have changed”. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan previous day dismissed possibility of Russian redeployment to Armenia amid mounting concern in Yerevan.

Armenia condemned arrest of former NK officials. Armenia 4 Oct condemned Azerbaijan’s late Sept arrests of several former NK leaders; Azerbaijan same day justified actions, saying detainees were accused of serious abuses, including war crimes. Military court in Baku 17 Oct began trial of NK resident Vagif Khachatryan, arrested late July for alleged war crimes.

Azerbaijan

Armenia’s leader expressed hope for peace deal with Azerbaijan in coming months amid flurry of international diplomacy.

Various international actors stepped up efforts for peace deal with Armenia. Following Azerbaijan’s one-day military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh (see Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan)), EU prepared for 5 Oct talks between President Aliyev and Armenian PM Pashinyan in Granada, Spain, moderated by French, German and EU leaders; Baku day before announced Aliyev would not attend, citing French bias toward Armenia and France’s refusal to include Türkiye in discussions. Meeting in Belgian capital Brussels slated for late Oct postponed. FMs from Iran, Türkiye and Russia 23 Oct met Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts in Iran. Participants reiterated respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and “non-interference in internal affairs” after Iranian and Russian FMs criticised Western intervention in region. Speaking from Georgian capital Tbilisi, with Azerbaijani and Georgian PMs in attendance, Pashinyan 26 Oct announced sides were working on deal that could be signed “in coming months”.

Fears of new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia persisted. Baku’s successful military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh raised fears of another offensive, this time into Armenia’s Syunik region, to establish transport corridor linking mainland with its exclave, Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan’s chief negotiator Elchin Amirbayov 16 Oct sought to assuage fears and emphasised that Baku’s primary concern was safety of Azerbaijani passengers travelling through corridor. Azerbaijan 23 Oct began military drills with Türkiye, including near border with Armenia and in Nakhchivan. France same day announced sale of weapons to Armenia (see Armenia). Meanwhile, escalation 3 Oct in Armenia’s Vardenis town bordering Kelbajar district left one Armenian soldier dead and two wounded; sides traded blame for incident.

Belarus

Clampdown on dissent persisted, Lukashenko applauded Poland for voting out ruling party, and Minsk sought to deepen ties with friendly states.

Repression of opposition continued. Rechytsa district court 9 Oct sentenced opposition activist Polina Sharendo-Panasyuk to additional year behind bars for disobeying prison authorities during two-year imprisonment. Barysau district court 19 Oct handed one-year sentence to another opposition figure, Zmitser Dashkevich, on same charge. EU 25 Oct expressed alarm at “ever-growing instrumentalisation of the national legislation to shrink Belarus’ civic space and silence any critical voices”.

Lukashenko praised Poles for voting out ruling party amid strained ties. Polish Defence Minister Mariusz Blaszczak 3 Oct announced further troop deployment to Belarus border to repel migrants that he claimed were “sent by [President] Alexander Lukashenko’s regime…to destabilise our country”. Lukashenko 6 Oct proclaimed hope for “reset” of relations if opposition wins 15 Oct Polish elections, 27 Oct congratulated Poland for voting out ruling Law and Justice Party.

Minsk engaged in flurry of diplomatic activity. Minsk hosted number of foreign representatives throughout month. Notably, top legislator Vladimir Andreichenko 16 Oct received Venezuelan FM to discuss collaboration against Western “blackmail, coercion and sanctions”. Lukashenko 17 Oct met with Iranian VP Mohamad Mokhber, 26 Oct met with Hungarian FM Peter Szijjarto. Meanwhile, Lukashenko 29 Oct warned that Ukraine and Russia are locked in stalemate and called for talks to end fighting.

Bosnia And Herzegovina

U.S. sanctioned Bosnian Serb leader’s family and patronage network.

U.S. 20 Oct imposed sanctions on two children of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and four companies under their management. Washington accused them of facilitating Dodik’s “ongoing corruption” in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) Republika Srpska (RS) entity, enabling him “to siphon public funds from the RS and enrich himself and his family at the expense of BiH citizens and functional governance in the country”.

Cyprus

Tensions continued to diminish following agreement on disputed road constructed by de facto Turkish Cypriot authorities and intensified diplomatic efforts to appoint UN envoy.

UN brokered deal between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. UN Mission in Cyprus 9 Oct announced “understanding” between sides on road construction by Turkish Cypriots to connect Pile/Pyla village (located in UN buffer zone) to “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), which had contributed to upsurge in tensions in Aug that led to violent skirmishes in buffer zone; deal granted Turkish Cypriots permission to continue building road, while both sides confirmed inviolability of Green Line demarcating boundary between sides. Republic of Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides 17 Oct said agreement was “important” in restoring status quo in buffer zone, while “TRNC” de facto foreign ministry 18 Oct accused Republic of Cyprus of trying to portray agreement as “own victory” and as step to expand UN Security Council “authority and dominance”; Türkiye 9 Oct welcomed agreement, saying it exemplified “TRNC’s” “constructive attitude”. De facto Turkish Cypriot authorities 23 Oct resumed construction of road as per agreement.

Signs emerged of possible progress toward appointment of UN envoy. After “TRNC” last month refused further talks on UN envoy’s appointment, saying it would not compromise its sovereignty, Republic of Cyprus 16 Oct said it had not reached final decision on appointment, amid reports circulating about potential candidates for role; position has been vacant since 2017 and filling it could symbolise step toward return to formal talks. After meeting with UN Sec Gen António Guterres during Cairo Peace Summit, Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides 22 Oct said he was more optimistic about prospects of resuming formal talks on Cyprus question; govt next day said appointment of UN Envoy to Cyprus as soon as possible would be important development for resumption of negotiations with Turkish Cypriots. Christodoulides 26 Oct said govt had given its consent for UN envoy appointment; Ankara and “TRNC” had not yet announced their consent.

Georgia

Ruling party did not secure enough votes to impeach President Zourabichvili; de facto leadership in breakaway Abkhazia announced Russian plans for naval base in region.

Ruling Georgian Dream party’s attempt to impeach president failed. Constitutional Court 16 Oct ruled in favour of Georgian Dream’s claim that President Zourabichvili violated constitution when she travelled to EU countries late Aug-early Sept, though three of nine judges dissented decision. Georgian Dream 18 Oct initiated impeachment hearings in parliament, but was unable to secure 100 votes needed to remove her from office. Impeachment attempt triggered criticism from European countries, notably France, and threatens Georgia’s prospects for candidate status.

Russian plans to build naval base in breakaway Abkhazia drew condemnation. Following 4 Oct meeting between leaders of Russia and breakaway Abkhazia, region’s de facto president Aslan Bzhania 5 Oct said Moscow is planning to construct naval base in Ochamchira town along Black Sea coast; announcement came after satellite images 1 Oct showed Moscow had withdrawn bulk of its Black Sea Fleet from Russian-annexed Crimea to safeguard it from Ukrainian attacks (see Ukraine). Tbilisi 5 Oct said move would constitute “flagrant violation of Georgia’s sovereignty”, which number of Western countries echoed; several civil society activists in Abkhazia warned region risks becoming entangled in Ukraine conflict.

Kosovo

NATO reinforced peacekeeping force following deadly clashes in northern Kosovo; Serbia and Kosovo leaders met in Brussels amid intense international pressure.

Tensions ran high in northern Kosovo as NATO bolstered troop presence. NATO reinforced its peacekeeping mission in Kosovo following deadly attack on Kosovar police officers in northern Kosovo late Sept. Notably, UK 1 Oct announced deployment of around 200 soldiers, Romania 3 Oct promised some 100 troops and Germany 6 Oct pledged 155 troops. Meanwhile, U.S. 2 Oct welcomed Serbia’s announcement to withdraw some troops from border but emphasised continued concern about “cycle of rising tensions and sporadic violence in northern Kosovo”.

EU and U.S. urged Pristina and Belgrade to resume dialogue. Leaders from EU and Western Balkans nations 16 Oct held ninth Berlin Process summit in Albanian capital Tirana, aimed at boosting cooperation and reconciliation to advance EU integration. During summit, European Council President Charles Michel and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz urged Pristina and Belgrade to return to EU-mediated dialogue on normalisation. Serb President Aleksandar Vučić did not attend, instead travelling to China for Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. PM Kurti and Vučić 26 Oct met on margins of European Council in Belgian capital Brussels, but were unable to reach agreement; France, Italy and Germany 27 Oct called on Kosovo to launch procedure to create Association of Serb-majority Municipalities and on Serbia to “deliver on de facto recognition” of Kosovo.

Kyrgyzstan

Parliament passed “foreign representatives” draft law in first reading amid human rights concerns; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan made progress on border demarcation.

Parliament passed contentious “foreign representatives” draft law in first reading. Parliament 17 Oct held first reading of “foreign representatives” draft law amid rising concerns. Notably, UN Special Rapporteurs 13 Oct warned about wide powers draft law grants, such as unscheduled inspections of NGOs, which “could be used against organizations that voice criticism or dissent against the Government”; High Commissioner for Human Rights 13 Oct said bill “would risk violating fundamental rights to freedom of expression and association”; and NGO Human Rights Watch 16 Oct cautioned it “would have a chilling effect on Kyrgyzstan’s vibrant civil society”. Despite warnings, parliament 25 Oct passed draft law in first reading, with just seven voting against legislation and 52 voting in favour.

Bishkek hosted CIS summit with Putin in attendance. Russian President Vladimir Putin 12-13 Oct visited Kyrgyzstan in first trip abroad since International Criminal Court issued his arrest warrant in March 2023 for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. Other leaders of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – regional intergovernmental organisation comprising former Soviet republics – 13 Oct arrived in capital Bishkek for annual summit, aside from Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan. According to Russian state news agency, Putin pledged to continue strengthening CIS’ “contacts with friendly states and international organisations”, and claimed Russia’s economic ties with CIS partners were expanding despite Western sanctions.

Bishkek and Dushanbe made progress on border delimitation and demarcation. Heads of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s security services 2 Oct reportedly signed protocol in Batken city on demarcation and delimitation of disputed border areas; neither side published details of protocol, but Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev said it “provides a basis for resolving all border issues”. Kyrgyz and Tajik leaders 13 Oct met for further discussions on sidelines of CIS summit.

Moldova

Chişinău labelled Russia “security threat” for first time.

President Sandu 11 Oct announced that Moldova’s new national security strategy refers to Russia as threat to its security for first time ever; document, which still needs parliamentary approval, said “Russian Federation and its proxies in the Republic of Moldova represent the most dangerous and persistent source of threat which, if not countered, can have severe effects on the statehood, democracy and prosperity of the country”. Meanwhile, authorities 30 Oct announced access to TASS website and other prominent Russian media outlets would be blocked amid upcoming local elections in Nov. Actions came amid growing concern about Russian destabilisation efforts in Moldova.

Russia (Internal)

Antisemitic attacks left dozens injured in North Caucasus, Moscow moved to withdraw from nuclear test ban treaty, and Ukrainian strikes continued.

Antisemitic violence erupted in North Caucasus. Amid worrying escalation in Israel-Palestine (see Israel/Palestine), several hundred residents 28 Oct demonstrated outside hotel in Dagestan Republic’s Khasavyurt city following rumours Israeli refugees were staying there; crowd dispersed but notice appeared at hotel saying “entrance is strictly prohibited for foreign citizens of Israel (Jews)”. Hundreds 29 Oct stormed airport in Dagestan’s Makhachkala city to search for Jewish passengers arriving from Israeli city Tel Aviv, clashing with security forces and leaving over twenty injured; authorities arrested 60 people. In Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, unknown assailants 29 Oct set fire to Jewish cultural centre in capital Nalchik and wrote “death to Jews” on wall. President Putin 30 Oct blamed West and Ukraine for helping stoke unrest.

Moscow moved to reverse nuclear test ban ratification and unveiled new missiles. Putin 5 Oct raised possibility of withdrawing ratification of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, citing U.S. failure to ratify. Russia’s envoy to Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Mikhail Ulyanov next day confirmed plans, saying it “doesn’t mean the intention to resume nuclear tests”. State Duma and Federation Council 18, 25 Oct respectively approved bill to withdraw ratification. Meanwhile, Putin 5 Oct announced “successful” test of Burevestnik cruise missile and completion of Sarmat super-heavy intercontinental ballistic missile.

Ukrainian strikes into Russia persisted. Russia faced more Ukrainian attacks, particularly targeting border regions. Notably, military 4 Oct shot down 31 unmanned aerial vehicles in Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk regions. Belgorod regional governor Vyacheslav Gladkov 12 Oct reported fallen drone killed three civilians in Belgorod city. Ministry of Defence 18 Oct announced air defences had shot down 28 drones over Belgorod, Kursk and Black Sea; Ukrainian media outlets same day claimed at least eighteen drones struck military camp near Khalino airfield in Kursk.

Authorities arrested Alexei Navalny’s lawyers. Crackdown on dissent continued. Notably, authorities 13 Oct detained three lawyers representing imprisoned opposition politician Alexei Navalny on charges of participation in “extremist community”; 26 Oct charged Russian-American journalist Alsu Kurmasheva for violating “foreign agents” law.

Tajikistan

Bishkek and Dushanbe made progress on border delimitation and demarcation.

Heads of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s security services 2 Oct reportedly signed protocol in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken city on demarcation and delimitation of disputed border areas; neither side published details of protocol, but Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Committee for National Security Kamchybek Tashiev said it “provides a basis for resolving all border issues”. Tajik and Kyrgyz leaders 13 Oct met for further discussions on sidelines of Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Kyrgyzstan (see Kyrgyzstan).

Türkiye

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) carried out first attack in capital Ankara since 2016, prompting retaliatory Turkish strikes in Syria and Iraq; govt engaged regional actors amid Hamas-Israel war.

Military increased strikes on PKK-linked militants after Ankara bombing. After PKK militants 1 Oct conducted suicide bombing in front of interior ministry in Ankara and opened fire on guards, injuring two, govt same day began intensification of retaliatory airstrikes against PKK targets in northern Iraq and People’s Protection Units (YPG) targets in northern Syria (see Iraq and Syria). FM Hakan Fidan 4 Oct declared all PKK and YPG infrastructure are now “legitimate targets”, as subsequent Turkish airstrikes targeted facilities and infrastructure belonging to YPG as well as its members, exacerbating poor humanitarian conditions in Syria. Air campaign in northern Syria triggered tensions between Ankara and Washington after U.S. fighter jet 5 Oct shot down Turkish armed drone; President Erdoğan 10 Oct reacted harshly, accusing U.S. of “training and arming all terrorist groups”.

Govt pursued diplomacy amid Hamas-Israel war. Following outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel on 7 Oct (see Israel-Palestine), govt 10 Oct offered to mediate dispute. Fidan 17 Oct confirmed engagement with Hamas’s political wing for hostage release and held diplomatic talks on war with Egypt, Lebanon, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Following 17 Oct Al-Ahli hospital blast in Gaza, Ankara hardened stance: President Erdoğan 25 Oct said they will not tolerate Israel acting like “terrorist organisation”, while Fidan warned of “all-out massacre” amid Israel’s ground offensive. Ankara 30 Oct condemned “in the strongest terms Israel’s attack on the Gaza Turkish-Palestinian Friendship Hospital”.

Bilateral ties with Greece remained on track to improve. Deputy FM Burak Akcapar 16-17 Oct met Greek counterpart Konstantinos Fragogiannis in Greek capital Athens for talks, which included discussions on providing “concrete outcomes” for fifth High-Level Cooperation Council to be headed by Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Erdoğan on 7 Dec. Greece and govt 23 Oct agreed to cooperate against migrant trafficking.

Operations against Islamic State (ISIS) continued. Security forces in Oct detained at least 160 individuals with alleged links to ISIS during Oct.

Ukraine

Russia launched new offensive in east and ramped up strikes on civilian targets, while Kyiv targeted Russian-held territory with new U.S. ATACM missiles.

Russia launched offensive in east and intensified attacks on civilian targets. Russian forces 10 Oct launched offensive in east, coalescing around Avdiivka city (Donetsk region); fierce fighting ensued but Russia struggled to breach heavily fortified Ukrainian positions and incurred significant losses. Ukraine 14 Oct reported heavy Russian attacks on well-fortified positions around cities of Lyman (Donetsk) and Kupiansk (Kharkiv), 31 Oct warned Russia had bolstered its forces around Bakhmut (Donetsk). Meanwhile, aid agency International Rescue Committee 6 Oct warned of stepped-up Russian strikes on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Notably, Russian missile 5 Oct killed over 50 people in Groza village (Kharkiv); drones 12 Oct hit Danube port infrastructure; and President Zelenskyy 25 Oct warned of intensifying strikes on energy infrastructure.

Kyiv struck Russian-occupied territory with U.S. surface-to-surface missiles. Arrival of U.S. ATACM missiles bolstered Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian-held territory, with Kyiv 17 Oct striking airfields in occupied Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk regions that destroyed equipment and likely killed scores of Russian soldiers. In southern Kherson region, Ukrainian forces stepped up operations across Dnipro River, forcing Russia to divert troops from main prong of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia. Meanwhile, satellite images 1 Oct showed Moscow had largely withdrawn its Black Sea fleet from Russian-annexed Crimea base after series of Ukrainian strikes in Sept.

Israel-Gaza war raised concerns about Western backing. Amid dramatic escalation in Israel-Palestine (see Israel/Palestine), concerns rose in Kyiv about implications for Western support to Ukraine. Western leaders promised continued assistance, with U.S. President Joe Biden 19 Oct announcing plans to combine aid for Israel and Ukraine in single legislative package. Malta 28-29 Oct hosted Ukraine peace talks with representatives from over 60 countries, but not Russia. Meanwhile, Slovakia’s newly elected PM Robert Fico 26 Oct announced halt to military aid.

In other important developments. According to Razumkov Center survey published 11 Oct, 64 percent of respondents are against holding elections before war’s end. New Defence Minister Rustem Umerov 18 Oct unveiled Defence Ministry reforms.

Uzbekistan

President Mirziyoyev held talks with China’s Xi Jinping.

President Mirziyoyev 17 Oct held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping during Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Chinese capital Beijing; sides vowed to continue bolstering ties, with notable focus on economic cooperation. Meanwhile, Mirziyoyev 13 Oct attended Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Kyrgyzstan – regional intergovernmental organisation comprising former Soviet republics (see Kyrgyzstan).

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Govt struck ceasefire agreement with FARC dissidents, marking further progress for President Petro’s “total peace” policy; armed and criminal violence persisted.

Govt secured ceasefire with FARC dissident faction. Petro administration 16 Oct agreed to three-month bilateral ceasefire with dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC), marking significant political win for govt. Agreement, which went into effect 17 Oct, included specific protocols protecting civilians and ensuring free conduct of local elections on 29 Oct; FARC-EMC had previously said it would not allow unfriendly candidates to run in its territory. While deal is national, sides agreed to define regions where FARC-EMC is present and concentrate implementation and monitoring there. Agreement also officially opened talks between govt and dissidents; negotiations aim to reach partial deals that can be implemented as political talks continue; sides agreed, for example, to undertake “transformation” projects aimed at improving conditions in priority areas, starting with Caño de Micay, Cauca department (south west), where some 1,800 civilians were recently displaced in confrontations between FARC-EMC and military. Meanwhile, govt-ELN negotiating table as of 10 Oct will function permanently in capital Bogotá to maintain progress on implementing agreements on participation, bilateral ceasefire and humanitarian relief.

Violence persisted in several regions. Despite diplomatic advances, clashes between armed and criminal groups continued. Notably, Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces clashed with ELN in attempt to dislodge guerrillas from gold mining areas in eastern Antioquia and southern Bolívar (north). FARC-EMC fought separate dissident faction Segunda Marquetalia in Telembí triangle area in Nariño department (Pacific Coast), displacing almost 500, according to early Oct UN report. Comandos de la Frontera criminal group 6-8 Oct held armed strike in Caquetá and Putumayo departments (south).

Governing party suffered setback at ballot box. Local elections 29 Oct dealt blow to Petro govt, with opposition candidates winning number of key seats, including in major cities and governorships. Authorities reported several incidents of vandalism and clashes between voters at polling centres, while eight candidates were murdered in months leading up to polls.

In another important development. Petro 31 Oct recalled ambassador to Israel over “massacre of the Palestinian people”.

Dominican Republic

Santo Domingo partially reopened border with Haiti, though tensions persisted.

Tensions with Haiti ran high after govt 15 Sept shut shared border, citing construction of canal by farmers on Haitian side of Massacre river (see Haiti). Santo Domingo 5 Oct said it was ready to restart decommissioned canal to collect water from Massacre River before it enters Haiti; Port-au-Prince 9 Oct denounced attempts to divert water as “unacceptable and hostile” and called for dialogue. Govt 11 Oct partially reopened border, including key Dajabón border crossing, to allow trade of essential products, but maintained ban on entry of Haitians. Haiti 12 Oct declined to follow Santo Domingo’s lead and reopen Dajabón, though it did open border gates at Elias Pina and Independencia, allowing some trade to resume. FM Roberto Alvarez same day attended Organisation of American States (OAS) extraordinary session, where he denounced “illegal construction” of Haiti’s canal.

Ecuador

Centre-right businessman Daniel Noboa defeated left-leaning rival in presidential election mired by escalating criminal violence.

Ecuadorians elected new president in run-off overshadowed by security crisis. Centre-right businessman and son of former presidential candidate Daniel Noboa 15 Oct won presidential election, defeating left-leaning rival Luisa González with around 52% of vote. Noboa has promised to “restore peace” by strengthening police force, deploying military to safeguard key infrastructure, beefing up community-based prevention and addressing socioeconomic drivers of violence.

Insecurity persisted at high levels. Violence against public officials continued ahead of election. Notably, armed assailants 5 Oct murdered prosecutor Genaro Oswaldo Reascos Bolaños in Jujan canton (Guayas province); unknown assailants 24 Oct shot and killed councillor from Citizen’s Revolution Movement party in Yaguachi canton, Guayas province; and unidentified assailants 28 Oct attacked former mayor of Duran city, killing his bodyguard. Meanwhile, authorities 6 Oct found six suspects in murder of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio dead in their prison cells in Litoral Penitentiary, Guayaquil city; police next day found seventh suspect dead in prison near Quito. President Lasso 7 Oct announced investigation into officer in charge of Litoral prison and removed several top security officials. Lasso 8 Oct extended state of emergency by one month.

El Salvador

Concerns about human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, under state of exception persisted.

Govt denied allegations of rights violations under state of exception. Legislative Assembly 12 Oct extended state of exception for 19th time, with VP of assembly claiming that human rights violations committed during measure were isolated incidents. Despite claims, civil society organisations and journalists continued to document cases of arbitrary arrests and torture, and shed light on conditions within prisons. Notably, coalition of human rights organisations 18 Oct estimated inmate population of 1,620 people per 100,000, translating into 148% overcrowding rate. Meanwhile, military 11 Oct sent 3,500 soldiers into Apopa municipality, San Salvador department (centre), amid ongoing efforts to root out gangs.

Women’s groups spotlighted sexual violence at hands of military and police. Following late Sept charges brought against six soldiers involved in rape of minor, military and police came under scrutiny for abuse of power and allegations of rape from within their ranks. Notably, several feminist groups 18 Oct protested in front of army headquarters, accusing military and police of using state of exception to act with impunity; they reported, for example, that one soldier had raped an eight-year-old girl in Bajo Lempa area, Usulutan department (south east).

In other important developments. Govt and opposition 3 Oct began campaigns for Feb 2024 general elections, which President Bukele is expected to win; Bukele 26 Oct officially registered as candidate despite constitutional ban on consecutive presidential re-election.

Guatemala

Violence against protesters opposing electoral interference after Bernardo Arévalo’s surprise victory left one dead.

Protests against judicial interference in electoral transition paralysed country. Amid continued efforts by Attorney General Consuelo Porras and Public Prosecutor’s Office to derail electoral transition, indigenous leaders, civil society and student organisations 2 Oct began protesting, establishing roadblocks throughout country and calling for resignation of Porras and other judicial officials; indigenous leaders called for nationwide strike. Blockages led to food and fuel shortages. Porras 9 Oct urged govt to act against “illegal” demonstrations and to clear roadblocks using force if necessary, while outgoing President Giammattei same day suggested protest leaders were receiving foreign funding. Riot police next day began clearing roadblocks and using tear gas. Interior Minister Napoleón Barrientos 16 Oct resigned after Porras requested his dismissal for not forcefully dispersing protests.

Unrest left one dead. In first casualty since protests began, unidentified gunmen 16 Oct killed one person and wounded two other protestors in Malacatan town, San Marcos department (west); videos on social media same day showed machete-carrying assailants attacking protesters in El Asintal township, Retalhuleu municipality (south west), allegedly in concert with police; Arévalo condemned violence.

International community reiterated its support for Arévalo. Arévalo 4 Oct restarted transition process, next day asked govt and demonstrators to engage in dialogue. Meanwhile, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 2 Oct called for “peaceful political transition”, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan 3 Oct promised to ensure accountability for “those who are trying to suffocate democracy”. Organization of American States head Luis Almagro 10 Oct described election interference as “shameful”. U.S. official 24 Oct said Washington could apply sectoral sanctions to “support democratic process”. U.S. and EU same day issued joint statement, expressing concern about “flagrant attempts to undermine” elections.

Haiti

UN Security Council approved Kenya-led security mission to Haiti, assassination of gang leader sparked inter-gang fighting, and tensions with Dominican Republic remained elevated.

UN approved Kenyan-led multinational mission. UN Security Council 2 Oct authorised one-year Multinational Security Support mission to Haiti, to be reviewed after nine months; force will support Haitian police, including by planning and conducting joint operations, restoring security and creating conditions for free and fair elections. Kenya, who is leading mission, 7 Oct began selecting officers for mission; first group of 200 police officers 10 Oct started pre-mission training in Kenya. High Court of Kenya 9 Oct temporarily blocked deployment amid opposition pressure, 24 Oct extended ban for two weeks.

Assassination of gang leader triggered new waves of violence. Late Sept killing of gang leader from G9 coalition known as Tyson, allegedly by other members of coalition, sparked clashes in following weeks between gangs from G9 and Gpèp coalitions in capital Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas. Notably, clashes 13-14 Oct erupted in La Saline district between at least three G9 gangs, trapping around 400 children and teachers in school. Members of 400 Mawozo gang operating in Croix-des-Bouquets 4 Oct set fire to Thomazeau police station, third such attack in two weeks. Attackers reportedly from Village-de-Dieu gang 18 Oct kidnapped High Council for Transition Sec Gen Antony Virginy Saint Pierre. Meanwhile, UNICEF 3 Oct warned of intensifying violence in Artibonite department, known as Haiti’s breadbasket; UN envoy 23 Oct warned “major crimes” had reached “record highs”.

Spat with Dominican Republic over canal construction continued. After Dominican Republic mid Sept shut border with Haiti over dispute about construction of canal by farmers on Haitian side of Massacre River, Dominican Republic 11 Oct partially reopened border to some commercial activity (see Dominican Republic).

In other important developments. Former senator 10 Oct pleaded guilty to role in 2021 assassination of President Moïse, while authorities 19 Oct arrested key suspect in Port-au-Prince and U.S. court 27 Oct sentenced retired Colombian army officer to life in prison. UN Security Council 19 Oct renewed sanctions regime on Haiti for one year.

Honduras

Institutional crisis over Attorney General’s appointment continued, and govt extended state of exception for seventh time.

Congress remained paralysed over selection of new Attorney General. Ruling Libre Party and opposition National Party continued to disagree on candidate for Attorney General, prolonging legislative paralysis. Opposition, who have blocked govt’s choice for new Attorney General in response to amnesty law they claim benefits Libre party, 12 Oct accused Castro administration of using justice system to harass opposition and manipulate selection process; accusation came after anti-corruption unit 11 Oct indicted former presidents Juan Orlando Hernández and Porfirio Lobo (both from National Party) on fraud charges. Crisis hindered progress on creation of UN-led anti-corruption commission.

Stringent security measures remained in place as authorities lauded impact. Govt 6 Oct announced extension of state of exception until 17 Nov, with authorities claiming period Jan-Oct saw 2,306 homicides, down from 2,761 in same period in 2022. Military police commander Ramiro Fernando Muñoz 11 Oct announced that after three months of special measures, prisons (where criminal groups often coordinate their activities) were “no longer a problem”; experts said strategy of splitting gangs into different prisons appeared effective. Concerns about criminality and violence continued, however. Notably, Human Rights Commission report 8 Oct decried high levels of violence and impunity against women and environmental activists, while UN rapporteur on freedom of expression 27 Oct warned that violence and judicial harassment against activists and journalists is “alarmingly high”.

Mexico

Criminal violence remained rampant, govt and security forces faced more backlash for high number of disappearances, and Hurricane Otis wrought destruction in Acapulco city.

Criminal violence, some of it politically motivated, remained high. Bodies of two pollsters from ruling MORENA party were found dead in Tabasco state 1 Oct, alongside message from Jalisco Cartel accusing MORENA and army of protecting rival Sinaloa Cartel in Chiapas. Guerrero state (south west) witnessed several high-profile attacks. Notably, unidentified gunmen 17 Oct killed prominent self-defence group leader Bruno Plácido and his driver in state capital Chilpancingo; and armed men 18 Oct attacked priest and victims’ rights activist Filiberto Velázquez in Tixtla town. Attacks came after 1,500 members of 66 communities from San Miguel Totolapan and Heliodoro Castillo municipalities 3 Oct announced creation of armed self-defence group amid state inertia. Three separate attacks in Coyuca de Benitez municipality (Guerrero), Tacámbaro town (Michoacán state) and San Miguel Cano (Puebla state) 23 Oct left at least 24 dead, including 13 police officers.

State faced more criticism for high number of disappearances. UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances 3 Oct lamented “alarming” number of disappearances in Mexico and “almost absolute impunity”. Group of experts investigating 2014 disappearance of students from Ayotzinapa teacher’s college 17 Oct released documents allegedly showing military had knowledge of crime as it unfolded; govt continued to deny military’s involvement or collusion. Meanwhile, search collective 2 Oct said clandestine burial site found in Tacámbaro likely contains more than the 51 bodies already found, largest identified in state in recent years; another collective 15 Oct reported discovery of clandestine human incineration site containing human remains in Tlaquepaque city, Jalisco state (centre).

In other important developments. Govt and U.S. officials 5 Oct held high-level security talks in Mexico City about fentanyl trafficking, migration and arms trafficking, and agreed to collaborate closely. Acapulco city (along Pacific Coast) was among areas worst hit by Hurricane Otis late Oct, raising fears that organised crime could capitalise on destruction and insufficient govt response to strengthen foothold in area.

Nicaragua

Govt continued to crackdown on opposition and Catholic Church despite sustained international condemnation.

Repression of opposition and Catholic church continued. Following late Sept arrest of Brooklyn Rivera, only indigenous parliament representative, Rivera’s YATAMA party 1 Oct denounced detention and that of fellow politician Nancy Rodriquez. Authorities 3 Oct rescinded YATAMA’s legal status and closed two YATAMA-run radio stations. Govt 12 Oct allocated Rivera’s seat to ruling party politician. Despite Vatican’s late Sept call for diplomatic dialogue, attacks on Catholic church continued. Notably, police and paramilitary groups 1-9 Oct detained six Catholic priests. Govt 18 Oct freed six priests and exiled them to Rome following deal with Vatican. Authorities 24 Oct cancelled legal status of local chapter of Franciscan order and 16 NGOs, many of whom have ties to Catholic Church.

International community kept up pressure on Managua. EU Council 9 Oct extended measures including asset freeze and travel bans on 21 individuals and three entities until Oct 2024. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 10 Oct briefed Organization of American States (OAS) permanent council about situation in country, saying govt’s actions part of repressive strategy to consolidate power and silence critics. OAS next day condemned situation and called on govt to respect and protect human rights.

In another important development. Nicaraguan Central Bank 17 Oct announced reduction in imports and exports in first eight months of 2023 compared to same period in 2022.

Venezuela

In crucial step toward competitive presidential poll, govt and opposition reached deal to improve electoral conditions, leading to substantial U.S. sanctions relief.

Govt and opposition struck deal to improve electoral conditions. Maduro govt and group of opposition parties known as Unitary Platform reached agreement in Barbados on minimum conditions for 2024 presidential poll. Notably, agreement fixes vote for unspecified date in second half of 2024, includes update of electoral registry and commits govt-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) to invite international ‘technical’ observation missions including from EU, UN and AU. Text says parties will promote “authorisation” of all candidates and political parties as long as they “meet requirements to participate in the presidential elections”; govt’s chief negotiator Jorge Rodríguez immediately interpreted clause as stating banned candidates cannot run, which would rule out opposition candidate (see below).

Washington provided ample sanctions relief. Welcoming agreement, U.S. 18 Oct issued broad authorisation of transactions involving Venezuela’s oil, gas and gold sectors, and removed ban on secondary trading of certain Venezuelan sovereign bonds, as well as debt and equity issued by state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela oil company. License lifting sanctions on oil and gas sector issued for six months, with Washington promising to renew it if Caracas complies with electoral agreement and releases U.S. and Venezuelan prisoners. Govt same day released five political prisoners.

María Corina Machado won opposition primary, govt later suspended results. Opposition 22 Oct held primary to select candidate for presidential election. Hardline politician María Corina Machado, currently banned from running for office, won overwhelmingly with 93% of vote after several prominent candidates pulled out of race in weeks before. Turnout was greater than expected, lending legitimacy to Machado’s candidacy for presidential election. Govt officials, however, alleged primary had been fraudulent and 24 Oct said opposition had inflated voter turnout; Attorney General Tarek William Saab next day announced criminal investigation into primary’s organisers. Govt-controlled Supreme Court 30 Oct suspended results of primary and ordered organisers to hand over all materials related to process; U.S. same day warned it would take action if govt fails to uphold commitments under electoral roadmap.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Authorities allowed gatherings in support of Gaza in first exemption to protest ban in place since 2021, while cracking down on dissolved Islamist party.

Israel-Hamas war triggered show of solidarity with Palestinians. Hours after Hamas launched attack against Israel (see Israel/Palestine), foreign ministry 7 Oct denounced Israeli violence against Gaza Strip, indirectly supporting Hamas offensive. Few hundred people 13 Oct took to the streets of capital Algiers to express solidarity with Palestinians; security forces dispersed crowds, citing ban on protest in place since 2021. Under popular pressure to review stance, govt in following days authorised demonstrations in support of Palestinians, and thousands 19 Oct gathered in several cities; marches took place under strict police surveillance as Algiers fears Islamists and 2019-2021 Hirak protest movement leaders could take advantage of pro-Palestinian sentiment to make political comeback.

Authorities cracked down on leaders of dissolved Islamist party. Security services early Oct arrested several senior officials of dissolved Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party, including founder Ali Benhadjar after they criticised govt, thereby contravening provisions of Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation of 2006, under which former FIS members are required to refrain from making political statements; FIS notably said ruling elite’s “unlimited greed” and “incorrect policies” had led to “political deadlock” and “increasing levels of poverty”. Authorities around 12 Oct charged 16 FIS members with “subversion and undermining state institutions”.

Algeria’s mediation initiative in coup-hit Niger faced setback. Foreign ministry 2 Oct announced Niger coup leaders accepted Algerian mediation to resolve “political, institutional and constitutional crisis”, which promotes six-month transition back to constitutional order. Niamey next day denied claim, emphasised transition duration could only be decided by “inclusive national forum”, thereby asserting desire to maintain control over process. Algiers 9 Oct announced postponing preparatory discussions on mediation until “necessary clarifications have been obtained”.

Egypt

Cairo engaged in mediation efforts to stop escalation of violence in Gaza Strip; President Sisi announced re-election bid.

Authorities took steps to stem fallout from Israel-Hamas war. Egyptian policeman 8 Oct killed two Israeli tourists and their Egyptian guide in Alexandria city one day after Hamas launched attack against Israel (see Israel/Palestine), fuelling fears in Cairo of possible “imitation effect”. As Israel in following days laid siege to Gaza Strip and launched airstrikes on enclave ahead of ground offensive, Sisi engaged in diplomatic efforts to pre-empt potential repercussions of Israel-Hamas war for Egypt, including mass influx of refugees from Gaza into Sinai Peninsula and reactivation of jihadist networks. Cairo 19 Oct announced agreement with Israel for humanitarian aid to enter Gaza Strip through Rafah border crossing, and some aid 21 Oct started flowing. Cairo 21 Oct also hosted peace summit to push for ceasefire, but conference ended without breakthrough.

Presidential hopeful forced to withdraw amid harassment by authorities. Sisi 2 Oct confirmed third term bid. Authorities continued to press ahead with organisation of presidential election in December, making it virtually impossible for opposition candidates to challenge incumbent. Prominent presidential hopeful, Ahmed Tantawi, 13 Oct said he had not reached 25,000 individual endorsements required to stand in election, after authorities deployed series of measures to block his supporters, including intimidation, arrests and hacking of phones. Tantawi’s withdrawal leaves only four candidates in presidential race, including Sisi.

Authorities displayed confidence that they can extract concessions from IMF. After authorities late Sept announced that International Monetary Fund (IMF) had accepted to merge first and second review of Egypt’s economic reform program, Bloomberg 13 Oct reported that Egypt is seeking to boost IMF loan from current $3bn to $5bn. Meanwhile, anti-govt demonstrations 3 Oct broke out in Marsa Matrouh town on Mediterranean coast amid deteriorating socio-economic conditions; police reportedly detained dozens of protesters.

Iran

Tehran warned of regional conflagration if Israel expands its military campaign in Gaza, while EU and UK maintained sanctions due to be lifted under 2015 deal, triggering Iran’s ire.

Hamas-Israel war placed spotlight on Iran’s role and future intentions. Following outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel on 7 Oct (see Israel-Palestine), Tehran endorsed Hamas’s actions and warned of regional conflict should situation in Israel-Palestine escalate, while accusing U.S. of “managing” Israel’s assault against Gaza. U.S. and Israeli officials during Oct noted extensive support Iran has provided Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad over years, although U.S. President Biden 12 Oct asserted “no evidence” so far that Tehran had foreknowledge of attack. U.S. 18 and 27 Oct imposed two sets of Hamas-related sanctions; latter included Tehran-based “liaison between Hamas and the Iranian govt” and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials said to help train Hamas and other groups. Against backdrop of looming Israeli ground offensive into Gaza, frequent deadly exchanges occurred along Israel-Lebanon border (see Lebanon), in addition to more than 25 drone and rocket attacks by Iran-backed proxies against U.S. forces in region (see Iraq and Syria); in retaliation, U.S. 26 Oct struck Syrian sites used by “IRGC and affiliated group”. U.S. and allies warned Iran of dangers of regional escalation publicly, privately and by significant U.S. military deployments to region. In case of expanded Israeli ground incursion into Gaza, Iran could support or prod its proxies to escalate attacks against Israel and U.S. in calibrated manner, raising risks of miscalculation and tensions spinning out of control.

EU and UK retained sanctions set to be lifted under 2015 deal. EU and UK 17-18 Oct confirmed they would keep in place non-proliferation sanctions due to expire as part of 2015 nuclear deal’s “Transition Day”, citing Iran’s non-compliance with agreement. Iran 18 Oct labelled decision “unilateral, illegal and politically unjustifiable”. U.S., EU, UK alongside dozens of other states 18 Oct asserted “it is imperative that all States continue to take steps to counter Iran’s destabilising ballistic missile-related activities”. In parallel, U.S. unveiled sanctions against 26 persons, entities and vessel linked to ballistic missile and UAV programs.

Iraq

Iran-backed armed groups could further escalate attacks on U.S. forces as Israel expands military campaign in Gaza; Türkiye intensified airstrikes on Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Iran-backed groups targeted U.S. after Israel-Hamas war erupted. Following outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel on 7 Oct (see Israel-Palestine), Iran-aligned “resistance groups” – including Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Badr Organization and Kataib Hezbollah – stated readiness to support Palestinians, threatening to strike U.S. assets across region. U.S. 31 Oct revealed its forces in Iraq and Syria had suffered 27 attacks with drones or rockets since 7 Oct, of which sixteen occurred in Iraq and caused minor injuries to personnel; attacks come after months-long period of informal truce. Israeli ground operations in Gaza may fuel further such attacks and prompt calls from Iran-aligned politicians for withdrawal of U.S. troops. Notably, drone attacks 18 Oct targeted U.S. forces at Ain al-Assad airbase, Anbar governorate, and al-Harir airbase, Erbil governorate. Rocket attack next day targeted Ain al-Assad airbase and three Katyusha rockets struck international coalition base near Baghdad airport. Coalition of Sunni insurgent groups Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance claimed drone attack on 21 Oct targeting Ain Al-Assad airbase. Meanwhile, thousands 13 Oct responded to calls of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to demonstrate in solidarity with Palestine in capital Baghdad.

Türkiye escalated strikes on PKK targets following Ankara attack. In response to 1 Oct PKK attack in Turkish capital Ankara (see Türkiye), Türkiye escalated attacks targeting PKK in northern Iraq; notably, 1, 3, 4 Oct struck PKK targets along Turkish border, including Metina, Gara, Hakurk, Qandil, and Asos governorates. Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 4 Oct announced all PKK infrastructure, including energy facilities, were “legitimate targets”. Iraqi Kurdish authorities 26 Oct announced ten PKK members were killed in airstrikes in Erbil and Dohuk provinces.

In other important developments. Military and Kurdish Peshmerga forces 22 Oct clashed in dispute over control of strategic military posts previously held by PKK, reportedly in Makhmour district between Erbil and Ninewa governorates, killing four. Iran 2 Oct said Iraq had implemented some parts, but not all, of border security arrangements requiring it to relocate Iranian oppositions groups.

Israel/Palestine

Hamas slaughtered 1,400 in unprecedented attack, triggering indiscriminate Israeli bombardment of Gaza that killed over 8,500 and set off humanitarian crisis; threat of regional war loomed large, as Qatari mediation offered slim hope for talks.

Hamas’s assault triggered full-scale war. Hamas 7 Oct launched multi-pronged offensive into southern Israel, killing around 1,400 Israelis and taking at least 200 hostages. Israeli PM Netanyahu 7 Oct declared Israel “at war” and 11 Oct formed emergency govt with opposition. Israel launched 6,000 airstrikes on Gaza in first six days after attack and thousands more since, killing over 8,500 Palestinians, including over 3,500 children, according to Gaza’s health ministry (as of 31 Oct). Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 9 Oct announced “full siege” of Gaza Strip, cutting off electricity, food, medicine, and water; disease and starvation are poised to become serious additional threats to civilians. Israel 13 Oct ordered evacuation of northern and central Gaza Strip, displacing around 1.4m, and 27 Oct expanded ground operations; while it seems plausible Israel can occupy northern Gaza, how it will deal with Hamas forces in south is unclear; speculation Israel may seek to forcibly displace Gazans into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula triggered fierce Egyptian opposition. Israeli airstrikes 31 Oct hit Jabalia refugee camp, killing dozens. Gaza-based militants fired daily rockets; Israel 31 Oct announced eleven soldiers killed during incursion. Qatari mediation secured release of four hostages, raising prospect indirect communication could release more captives and serve as basis for ceasefire talks. Netanyahu 30 Oct rejected ceasefire, saying “this is a time for war”.

In West Bank, Israeli forces and settlers killed scores of Palestinians. Israel 7 Oct imposed total closure on West Bank and East Jerusalem and reportedly arrested 1,500 Palestinians, while Israeli forces and settlers dramatically stepped up violence, killing at least 118 Palestinians, amid Palestinian protests across territory. In first in decades, Israeli airstrikes 19 and 22 Oct in West Bank killed over dozen.

Border clashes with Hizbollah raised risk of regional war. Near-daily border clashes between Hizbollah and Israeli forces killed dozens of Hizbollah fighters and at least eight Israeli soldiers, raising risk of war spreading to other fronts (see Lebanon).

Jordan

Thousands rallied countrywide in solidarity with Palestinians as govt sharply criticised Israel’s “massacre” and “war crime” in Gaza.

Following outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel on 7 Oct (see Israel-Palestine), Jordanians rallied near-daily close to Israeli embassy in capital Amman in solidarity with Palestinians. Tensions rose as security forces 13 Oct dispersed around 500 protesters with tear gas as they attempted to reach area bordering Israeli-occupied West Bank outside Amman, despite Interior Ministry 12 Oct banning protests in area. Protesters in Amman 13 Oct demanded closure of Israeli embassy and abrogation of 1994 peace treaty with Israel, while thousands also rallied in Irbid and Zarqa cities in support of Hamas. After deadly blast at Al-Ahli hospital in Gaza, security forces 17 Oct clashed with protesters near Israeli embassy as demonstrators sought to storm compound, injuring several anti-riot personnel. Meanwhile on diplomatic front, govt 17 Oct cancelled summit scheduled next day with U.S., Egyptian and Palestinian leaders to discuss situation in Gaza; FM Ayman Safadi said summit would be held later when parties could agree to end “war and the massacres against Palestinians”. At Cairo Peace Conference, King Abdullah II 21 Oct called Israeli bombing campaign in Gaza “a war crime” and lamented “selective” application of international law to Palestinian issue. UN General Assembly 27 Oct adopted resolution proposed by Jordan calling for “immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce” in Gaza. Army 30 Oct said it requested U.S. to deploy air defence systems as tensions rise in region.

Lebanon

Border clashes between Hizbollah and Israeli forces killed dozens of militants and multiple Israeli soldiers; hostilities could open new front in Israel-Hamas war in coming weeks.

Lebanon faced spectre of major conflict. Following outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel on 7 Oct (see Israel-Palestine), Hizbollah repeatedly stated its willingness to militarily intervene to support its ally Hamas. Border areas witnessed pattern of near-daily clashes between group and Israeli forces that killed around 50 Hizbollah fighters and at least eight Israeli soldiers during Oct, with intensity and casualty count inching upward and geographical scope of hostilities reportedly widening late Oct. While clashes appeared to remain manageable, sides ap-peared to be merely one bloody attack – by accident or design – away from triggering escalation that spirals into all-out war, or Hizbollah may intervene to support Hamas as Israeli ground operations in Gaza get under way. Notably, Hizbollah 8 Oct launched several guided rockets into disputed Shebaa farms; Israel 9 Oct killed three Hizbollah fighters in retaliation for alleged infiltration attempt by Palestinian fighters; pair over subsequent days exchanged missiles and shelling. Hizbollah strike 11 Oct allegedly killed Israeli. Israel 17 Oct reportedly killed five Hizbollah fighters in airstrikes.

Syrian refugees faced oppressive govt measures and threats to safety. In sign of rising hostility, caretaker Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi 4 Oct claimed Syrians are responsible for 30% of crime and next day ordered authorities to crack down on Syrians without valid residency permits, close down Syrian-owned businesses operating without valid paperwork and enforce “categorical ban” on donations to support Syrian refugees. Large brawl 5 Oct erupted between Lebanese and Syrians in capital Beirut, while reports indicated bands of Lebanese roamed streets at night searching for Syrians to attack.

Presidential vacuum reached one-year anniversary amid economic crisis. No signs of progress emerged of filling presidency, which has been vacant since 1 Nov 2022, reflecting prevailing political deadlock. Economic crisis remained severe despite ongoing period of relative stability for Lebanese Lira, which may have been buoyed by substantial influx of hard currency but could soon face sharp devaluation.

Libya

Parliament passed election laws, but major obstacles to holding votes remained; deadly clashes erupted between rival forces in eastern city of Benghazi and western city of Gharyan.

Election laws continued to spark controversy. Eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) early Oct approved revised versions of presidential and parliamentary election laws and referred them to High Electoral Commission for implementation. Mohamed Tekala, new head of rival Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC), in following days rejected laws and scrapped cooperation with HoR; some HSC members contended that move did not reflect HSC’s stance, but just that of Tekala-aligned members. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN Special Representative for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 16 Oct welcomed “some progress” in electoral process, but noted most politically contentious issues remained unresolved, with mandatory second round of presidential election and linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections putting electoral process at “high risk of disruption”; Bathily also noted negotiations between rival authorities required to form new govt ahead of elections remain elusive.

Rival forces engaged in deadly clashes. Former Tripoli-based Defence Minister al-Mahdi al-Barghathi early Oct travelled to his home city of Benghazi, allegedly alongside 40 of his followers. Claiming that Barghathi’s return had not been pre-approved and could be first step in plot to mobilise anti-Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar forces in Benghazi, forces aligned with Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) 6 Oct attempted to arrest him in Salmani district, sparking firefight that allegedly left at least 17 people dead, including one of Barghathi’s sons; LNA also cut off all communication in Benghazi for over a week. Meanwhile, clashes 29 Oct erupted in western city of Gharyan between Tripoli-based govt-affiliated militia and forces loyal to militia leader Adel Daab (who was expelled from Gharyan in 2019 by forces affiliated to former Tripoli-based govt after he handed control of city to Haftar’s forces); local sources reported eight people killed and 27 injured.

In other important developments. After flooding in Sept devastated eastern city of Derna, anger continued to simmer among locals who blame disaster on poor governance. Total death toll still uncertain: local authorities confirmed retrieving over 4,000 bodies, but number of missing is unclear.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh criticised Israel following outbreak of war with Hamas, which likely indefinitely postponed Saudi-Israel normalisation process.

Saudi Arabia called for de-escalation in Gaza, condemned Israel. Following outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel on 7 Oct (see Israel-Palestine), Saudi Arabia 7 Oct called for de-escalation and condemned Israel’s “continued occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, and the repetition of systematic provocations against its sanctities”. After Israel 13 Oct ordered over 1m Palestinian in northern Gaza to evacuate south, Riyadh 13 Oct affirmed its “categorical rejection of the calls for the forcible displacement”. Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman 15 Oct met U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in capital Riyadh to discuss conflict; 20 Oct met United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed in Riyadh. Meanwhile, sources reported that normalisation efforts with Israel were put on ice, although FM Faisal bin Farhan 24 Oct asserted “the Arabs are serious” about returning to a peace process and U.S. President Biden and Mohammad Bin Salman in call same day agreed to build on “the work that was already under way”.

Saudi and Iranian leaders held phone call. Mohammad Bin Salman 11 Oct spoke directly with Iranian President Raisi for first time since restoration of diplomatic ties in March, stressing kingdom was engaging “with all international and regional parties to halt the ongoing escalation” in Israel-Palestine.

Syria

Marking one of most violent periods in years, regime and Russia esca-lated bombardment in north west, Türkiye intensified strikes and ISIS maintained desert insurgency; Israel-Hamas war threatened to spread to Syria.

North west witnessed most intense bombing since March 2020 ceasefire. Suspected Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-operated suicide drones 5 Oct struck Homs mili-tary academy graduation, killing at least 89 soldiers and civilians and injuring over 270; by striking more than 140km away from Idlib, attack may signal new phase of HTS campaign against regime. In response, regime and Russian forces same day began intensive shelling of Idlib and Aleppo provinces, which during Oct killed at least 50 civilians and displaced almost 70,000. Drone attacks 7 Oct reportedly targeted Russia’s Istamo airbase in Latakia province and Aleppo city 8-18 Oct. Russia 13 Oct increased airstrikes in Idlib and regime forces mid-month intensified shelling; HTS and allied groups retaliated with artillery, snipers, and guided missiles, while suspected HTS-operated drones targeted communities across north and east Hama.

In north east, Türkiye intensified anti-Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) strikes. In response to 1 Oct PKK attack in Turkish capital Ankara (see Türkiye), Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 4 Oct declared all PKK and People’s Protection Units infrastructure “legitimate targets”; subsequent drone strikes targeted water and energy infrastructure and Syrian Democratic Forces targets, killing more than 50 and exacerbating humanitarian crisis.

Islamic State (ISIS) attacked in centre. ISIS stepped up pressure on regime forces in Homs province; following 5-18 Oct probing attacks, ISIS 18 Oct seized and held six regime outposts south of Sukhnah town and Wadi Doubayat gas field.

Amid Israel-Hamas war, tit-for-tat attacks between Iran-backed groups and U.S., Israel could escalate. Following Hamas-Israel war outbreak (see Israel-Palestine), Iranian forces reportedly repositioned around 300 Syrian and Lebanese fighters to Quneitra, underscoring potential for Israel’s war on Gaza to draw in regional actors. Suspected Iran-backed forces in Quneitra and Dara’a 11-29 Oct fired artillery shells at northern Israel, prompting multiple Israeli retaliatory strikes: notably, Israel shelling 25 Oct killed eight Syrian soldiers. In east, U.S. 31 Oct said suspected Iran-backed forces conducted total eleven attacks on its positions since 7 Oct; U.S. 26 Oct launched two airstrikes near Mayadeen city in response.

Tunisia

Rare prison break prompted govt to dismiss top intelligence officials; crowd torched Jewish mausoleum amid escalation of violence in Gaza Strip.

Five Islamist convicts broke out of prison. Five Islamist prisoners convicted of killing policemen and two secular politicians 31 Oct escaped from Mornaguia prison near capital Tunis. Interior ministry announced dismissing two top officials in intelligence services, while justice ministry sacked director of Mornaguia prison.

Crowd rampaged through Jewish site. As violence escalated in Gaza amid Israel-Hamas war (see Israel/Palestine), thousands 17 Oct gathered in centre of Tunis to condemn Israeli attacks on Gaza Strip and denounce bias of French and other Western media in favour of Israel, demanding departure of French ambassador; rioters same day burned down 16th century El Hamma Jewish mausoleum near Gabès city (south). President Saïed hours later summoned National Security Council, said “the battle today is against international Zionism”, not Jewish people. As protests continued, parliamentary committee 24 Oct approved draft law criminalising normalisation of relations with Israel.

Repression of dissent continued with detention of prominent opposition leader. Presidential guard and police 3 Oct arrested Abir Moussi, president of Free Patriotic Union opposition party, in front of presidential palace as she tried to file appeal against recent presidential decree related to local elections; judge 5 Oct ordered her imprisonment on suspicion of “assault intended to cause chaos”. Around 1,500 supporters of Moussi 15 Oct took to streets of Tunis to demand her immediate release.

Tunis handed back EU money, dealing a blow to controversial migration pact. After European Commission late Sept announced €127mn for Tunisia in support of implementation of “strategic partnership” on economy and migration signed in July, Saïed 2 Oct rejected funds, dismissing “derisory” amount running counter to July agreement. Commission 12 Oct confirmed that Tunis had returned €60mn in budget support. Meanwhile, 2024 draft budget released 16 Oct made no mention of International Monetary Fund deal, and Saïed 17 Oct dismissed economy minister.

Western Sahara

UN Security Council renewed MINURSO mandate.

UN Sec Gen António Guterres’ annual report on Western Sahara 3 Oct highlighted UN envoy Staffan de Mistura’s continuing efforts to relaunch UN-led peace process. UN Security Council 30 Oct voted to extend mandate of UN mission (MINURSO) for another year until 31 Oct 2024; resolution won support of 13 of 15 Security Council members, with Russia and Mozambique abstaining, as council remains divided on Western Sahara crisis.

Yemen

Houthis launched long-range missiles and drones targeting Israel, which were intercepted by Israeli defences; group threatened further such attacks in coming weeks that risk expanding Israel-Hamas war.

Houthis targeted Israel, raising prospect of regional escalation. Following outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel on 7 Oct (see Israel-Palestine), Houthi leader Abdulmalek Al-Houthi 10 Oct declared group’s readiness to respond with drones and missiles to any U.S. involvement in Hamas-Israel war and expressed willingness to coordinate intervention with other Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance” members, including Iraqi factions and Hizbollah in Lebanon (see Iran, Iraq and Lebanon). Underscoring potential for greater involvement of such actors, U.S. navy 19 Oct intercepted three cruise missiles and multiple drones reportedly launched by Houthis, potentially targeting Israel. Drones 27 Oct struck Egyptian Red Sea town Taba, injuring six, while second drone was downed over Red Sea; Israel blamed Houthis for attack aimed at Israel. Houthis 31 Oct fired drones and ballistic missiles at southern Israel, which were intercepted by Israeli jets and air defence systems; group claimed responsibility and vowed further such strikes if “Israeli aggression” against Hamas continues.

Dialogue between Houthis and Saudi Arabia awaited breakthrough. Houthi delegation’s visit to Saudi Arabia in Sept set stage for further talks and possible progress. Houthi attack on Saudi military position in Jazan's Doud mountain near border 25 Oct killed four Saudi soldiers. On diplomatic front, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg 4 Oct met Omani FM Badr Al-Busaidi in Omani capital Muscat to discuss developments in Yemen. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) head Rashad al-Alimi 18 Oct held separate meetings with Grundberg and U.S. envoy Tim Lenderking in Saudi capital Riyadh.

In other important developments. Syria 10 Oct notified Houthis to vacate Yemeni embassy in Syrian capital Damascus, which they have effectively controlled since 2015. PLC 11 Oct said Syria’s decision followed its engagement with Damascus. Explosive device 4 Oct killed commander of Security Belt forces, Salem Sal’an, in Abyan governorate, reportedly during operation against al-Qaeda. Yemenia Airlines 17 Oct resumed six weekly flights from Sanaa international airport to Jordan, after Houthis froze company’s accounts.

Africa

Benin

Niger ended bilateral military cooperation with Benin, weakening country’s counter-insurgency capabilities amid persistent jihadist violence in northern departments.

Niamey denounced military accord with Porto-Novo. Amid threat of military intervention by West African regional bloc ECOWAS to restore constitutional order in Niger, ruling junta in Niamey 12 Sept cancelled military cooperation agreement with Benin, accusing country of hosting “mercenaries and military supplies” intended to support war “wanted by France”; end of security cooperation with Niger could significantly affect Benin’s counter-insurgency capabilities as jihadist militants use cross-border Park W as launching pad for attacks in coastal country. Meanwhile, govt late Sept denied rumours that French military base was being built in Alibori department to house troops exiting Niger.

Northern departments remained under jihadist threat. In Alibori department’s Karimama commune, suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) fighters 6 Sept killed three civilians in Karimama commune, and kidnapped local chief and his advisor from Kangara Peulh village. In Atakora department, suspected JNIM militants 15 Sept killed two soldiers and injured another two in Materi commune near Pendjari National Park.

Burkina Faso

Jihadists escalated attacks on military after a months-long lull, leaving over 50 security forces dead, and transitional authorities announced foiling coup attempt.

Jihadist attacks inflicted heavy losses on govt forces and auxiliaries. After taking over two military bases in East region in late August, presumed al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) combatants 4 Sept killed at least 17 soldiers and 36 civilian auxiliaries in attack on military position in Koumbri town, Yatenga province (North region). In response, govt launched series of airstrikes, with at least 30 JNIM fighters killed 11-14 Sept in Sahel, Centre-East and Centre-North regions. Civilians remained caught between jihadists on one side and state forces on the other. Suspected JNIM fighters 7 and 12 Sept killed eight civilians in Ouaboadi village and near Namagdou town, both Gnagna province (East region). Suspected Islamic State Sahel Province 12 Sept killed eight people in Wendou camp for displaced persons in Seno province (Sahel region).

Transitional authorities announced thwarting coup attempt. Military prosecutor 8 Sept announced arrest of three low-ranking officers, accusing them of plotting to “destabilize the conduct of the transition”. Transitional president, Capt. Traoré, 13 Sept appointed new heads of security services including at National Intelligence Agency, indicating concern about vulnerability to counter-coup. Thousands 26 Sept demonstrated in support of military rulers in capital Ouagadougou as new rumours of mutiny circulated on social media. Transitional authorities next day announced thwarting coup attempt by group of military officers and others, saying plotters planned to seize power and plunge country into “chaos”, and later arrested at least four military officers for alleged involvement.

Ouagadougou cultivated ties with military govts in Niamey and Bamako. As West African regional bloc ECOWAS continued to threaten use of force in Niger to restore constitutional order, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 16 Sept signed charter creating Alliance of Sahel States in bid to establish framework for collective defence and mutual assistance. Transitional legislature 19 Sept approved govt’s proposal to deploy soldiers to Niger to defend against possible military intervention by ECOWAS. Meanwhile, Ouagadougou 14 Sept expelled French defence attaché, accusing him of “subversive activities”, and same day closed military mission in Paris.

Burundi

Suspected RED-Tabara rebels launched deadly attack along border with DR Congo for first time since 2021; President Ndayishimiye dismissed allegations of coup plot.

DR Congo-based rebels launched attack in Burundi after years-long lull. Gunmen 2 Sept ambushed civilian vehicles in Buringa area of Bubanza province, near economic capital Bujumbura, reportedly killing two and injuring one. As security forces deployed to area and subsequently claimed to have repelled assailants, local sources suggested up to 60 govt and allied forces dead, particularly among ruling party youth militia Imbonerakure. In Twitter statement, DR Congo-based rebel group RED-Tabara – which Burundi has been fighting in DR Congo’s South Kivu province since August 2022 – 3 Sept claimed to have “attacked and destroyed a guidance station for aircraft approaching Bujumbura Airport”, in first such claim since Sept 2021.

Tensions ran high in Gitega amid clampdown on judiciary, allegations of coup plot. After authorities in Aug imprisoned at least ten judges on charges of “undermining the security of the state” and “corruption”, Ndayishimiye 1 Sept urged judges to abandon “corrupt” practices, accusing them of sabotaging country’s justice system. Ndayishimiye 25 Sept dismissed allegations of coup plot circulating on social media as rumours spread by “individuals intent on tarnishing Burundi’s international reputation”.

In other important developments. Ndayishimiye 5 Sept presided over Extraordinary Summit of East African Community in Kenya; heads of state extended mandate East African Force in eastern DRC by three months.

Cameroon

President Biya conducted minor military reshuffle; separatists enforced lockdown as school year started in Anglophone regions.

President Biya made changes in armed forces. Amid series of coups in West Africa and neighbouring Gabon, Biya 30 Aug replaced some colonel rank officers holding technical positions, and 4 Sept signed decree creating specialised military school in distant Motcheboum town, East region, to train soldiers for peace missions.

Separatists launched several attacks amid lockdown in Anglophone regions. As new school year started, Anglophone separatists 4-18 Sept violently enforced lockdown in North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions; lockdown served as show of force and protest at unresolved conflict. Notably, armed separatists 2 Sept killed two head teachers in Belo town, Boyo division (NW); 5 Sept attacked military truck with explosive device in Lebialem division (SW), killing at least one civilian and wounding others; and 7 Sept stopped cars and shot at passengers to block access to Muea neighbourhood of SW regional capital Buea, leaving three civilians killed. Suspected separatist fighters 29 Sept also killed gendarme in Awing locality, Mezam division (NW).

Military stepped up monitoring operations in Far North after spate of jihadist attacks. After Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga divisions in Aug experienced surge in violence, soldiers 9 Sept thwarted Boko Haram (BH) raids on Limani and Djakana villages (Mayo-Sava division), killing two militants. Army 21 Sept ambushed BH fighters in Galdala village (Mayo-Tsanaga), killing three. Islamic State West Africa Province militants 21 Sept reportedly killed one gendarme in Darak, Logone-et-Chari division.

In other important developments. Cameroon and Nigeria early Sept launched joint operation against Biafra separatist group Black Marine in Bakassi Peninsula (SW), reportedly dislodging militants from Abana town, Idabato subdivision, by 10 Sept.

Central African Republic

Presidential Guard detained army officers, reflecting widening rifts within army amid series of coups in West and Central Africa; armed group violence continued unabated in hinterland.

Coup in Gabon sparked tensions in Bangui. Amid rumours of imminent coup in Bangui in wake of military overthrow of President Bongo in Gabon, Presidential Guard 10 Sept arrested unknown number of army officers, including Capt. Kamezo-Laï Gilbert and Chief Warrant Officer Kohoté Fabia, both close relatives of diaspora opposition activist Regis Sikangba. Armed forces in following days started identity checks by night on roads of capital Bangui.

President Touadéra proceeded to arrest former rebel leader turned ally. Authorities 4 Sept detained former rebel leader Abdoulaye Hissène, and UN-backed Special Criminal Court 7 Sept charged him with crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 2017 as one of main leaders of Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic. NGO Human Rights Watch next day welcomed move as step toward ending impunity. Many in govt circles however perceived Hissène’s arrest as disloyal move from Touadéra, as Hissène had become govt’s ally since 2019 peace agreement.

Armed groups continued to increase presence in hinterland following referendum. In Nana-Mambéré prefecture (west), govt forces and Russian Wagner Group paramilitaries 2 Sept killed eight 3R rebels in operation 70km from Baoro town; Wagner and 3R elements 10 Sept clashed in Baboua sub-prefecture, leaving one Wagner dead. Attacks by unidentified armed men continued in Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture (north), including ambushes on army checkpoints in Djamassinda and Miaméré villages on 7 and 11 Sept. Rwandan peacekeepers from 26 Aug onward intensified patrols in villages between Mbrès and Koukourou, Nana-Gribizi prefecture (centre), after locals reported increased armed group presence. Meanwhile, UN mission (MINUSCA) 27 Sept announced deployment of peacekeepers in Mboki city, Haut-Mbomou prefecture (east), after Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militia 31 Aug attacked regional peace committee delegation.

In other important developments. As part of unprecedented tour of African countries collaborating with Wagner, Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Col-Gen Yanous Bek Evrourov, 2 Sept met with Touadéra in Bangui. Pursuing diplomatic appeasement initiated since early 2023, French President Macron and Touadéra 13 Sept met in France’s capital Paris.

Chad

Deadly incident at military base run by French forces sparked calls for departure of French troops; influx of Sudanese refugees continued to strain eastern provinces.

Constitutional referendum remained controversial. Opposition coalition led by Republican Platform leader, former minister Sidick Abdelkerim Haggar, 13 Sept called for boycott of constitutional referendum scheduled for 17 December. Another gathering of 15 major opposition parties 13 Sept denounced “violation of the principle of equality and uniqueness of place and time” as authorities 28 Aug-16 Sept conducted electoral census in country’s central and northern provinces after having covered southern provinces between 24 July and 6 Aug.

Killing of Chadian soldier sparked calls for French troops’ departure. French soldier 5 Sept shot and killed Chadian soldier in French military base in Faya city, Borkou province, allegedly in self-defence. Angry residents 5-6 Sept took to the streets in protest and tried to make their way into French base, prompting Chadian security forces to use live ammunition to disperse gathering. Chadian and French armies 6 Sept announced joint investigation into incident. Coalition of opposition parties and civil society organisations Wakit Tama 7 Sept denounced “murder” and called for withdrawal of French troops.

Eastern provinces continued to face humanitarian fallout of Sudan war. International Organisation for Migration 11 Sept said 400,000 people had crossed border into Chad since beginning of war in Sudan, including at least 62,300 Chadian returnees. UN humanitarian agency 12 Sept published revised Humanitarian Response Plan for Chad, with required funds increasing from $674.9mn to $920.6mn. World Bank same day announced new funding of $340mn to help Chad cope with influx of Sudanese refugees and support host communities.

In other important developments. Opposition figure Succès Masra, head of Les Transformateurs political party, late Sept said he would return to Chad no later than 20 October one-year anniversary of crackdown on protests.

Côte d’Ivoire

Ruling party won sweeping victory in local elections, confirming overwhelming dominance over political scene two years before presidential election.

Ruling party consolidated power in local elections. Regional and municipal elections 2 Sept proceeded peacefully, featuring candidacies from across political landscape. Electoral commission 5 Sept announced President Ouattara’s party, Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), won 123 out of 201 municipalities (61%) and 25 out of 31 regions (81%); despite their alliance, main opposition parties Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire and African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire secured only 34 municipalities and four regions. RHDP’s sweeping victory, even in traditional opposition strongholds, inched country closer to return to de facto one-party rule ahead of presidential election due in 2025. RHDP 16 Sept also won 56 of 64 seats in senatorial elections, reinforcing its grip on parliament’s upper chamber.

In other important developments. Ouattara 28 Sept announced plan to reshuffle govt in October. Burkina Faso authorities 19 Sept arrested two Ivorian police officers who had crossed into Burkina chasing illicit gold miners; Ivorian govt 28 Sept said it was negotiating for their release.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Civic space restrictions and armed group violence in eastern and western provinces continued to bode ill for general election due in December.

Political climate remained tense ahead of December general elections. Authorities 8 Sept arrested journalist Stanis Bujakera, later charged him with “forgery” and “spreading falsehoods”, prompting condemnation from Committee to Protect Journalists. Court of Cassation 13 Sept sentenced President Tshisekedi’s former ally, Jean-Marc Kabund, to seven years in prison for “insulting the Head of State and the institutions of the Republic” and “propagation of false rumours”. Opposition heavyweight Martin Fayulu 30 Sept confirmed presidential candidacy.

Fallout of Goma massacre loomed large. Authorities 5 Sept put on trial six soldiers, for “crimes against humanity” in relation to 30 August killing of over 50 people protesting foreign forces’ perceived inaction in North Kivu province’s capital Goma. Tshisekedi 18 Sept replaced North Kivu military governor with another army general, de facto extending unpopular state of siege. At UN general assembly, Tshisekedi 20 Sept advocated starting withdrawal of UN mission (MONUSCO) in December instead of next year.

M23 returned to prominence in North Kivu province. Marking shift from recent low-profile strategy, M23 18 Sept proclaimed takeover of Kiwanja town (Rutshuru territory), nominally controlled by East African Community (EAC) troops, and 22 Sept organised large rally in strategic Kibumba town (Nyiragongo territory), from which they supposedly withdrew last Jan. M23 around 20 Sept also clashed with pro-govt armed groups between Kitshanga and Mweso villages in Masisi territory. Meanwhile, EAC 5 Sept extended mandate of regional force in eastern DR Congo by three months.

Other violence continued in eastern provinces. Maï-Maï militia group 7 Sept attacked Balingina village in Ituri province, killing 18 civilians. Also in Ituri, suspected CODECO militia, which gathers various ethnic Lendu armed groups, 31 Aug-8 Sept killed at least 15 civilians in Mahagi and Djugu territories. Congolese and Ugandan forces throughout month reported gains against Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Ituri (see Uganda).

Mobondo militia continued to extend attacks in western provinces. Govt reported Mobondo rebels 11 Sept killed 19 people in village raid in Kongo Central province. Fighting between Mobondo militia and army 17 Sept left 15 soldiers and three Mobondo fighters dead in Kwango province.

Eritrea

UN report warned of ongoing Eritrean violations in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, President Isaias met with Sudan’s army chief, and several Eritrean diaspora events descended into violence.

UN accused Eritrean forces of ongoing violations in Tigray. UN rights commission report published 18 Sept warned of “ongoing atrocities” in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, confirming that Eritrean troops, alongside militia members from Ethiopia’s Amhara region, “continue to commit grave violations”, including “systematic rape and sexual violence of women and girls”.

Asmara continued work to bolster regional standing. President Isaias 11 Sept met with Sudan’s army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in capital Asmara; according to state media, Isaias reiterated Eritrea’s pre-war plan for political stability and security in Sudan, dubbed “Transition to Safety”, and underscored need to harmonise various external peace initiatives instigated after outbreak of hostilities (see Sudan). Meanwhile, African Development Bank President Akinwumi Adesina 1 Sept met with Isaias, praising govt and pledging more support for country’s economic development.

Violence broke out at Eritrean cultural festivals in Israel and Germany. Supporters and opponents of Isaias’ govt 2 Sept clashed during Eritrean cultural festival in Israel’s capital Tel Aviv, leaving around 150 people injured; violence 16 Sept broke out between opposing sides during another cultural festival in German city of Stuttgart. Asmara 9 Sept accused “Eritrea’s detractors” of fomenting unrest among diaspora communities.

Ethiopia

Violence in Amhara exacted heavy toll on civilians, Tigray’s interim administration faced opposition amid rising crime levels, and govt-insurgent fighting continued in Oromia.

Civilians bore brunt of ongoing hostilities in Amhara region. Fighting primarily between federal forces and nationalist militia known as Fano continued, with latter’s scattered presence and lack of cohesion rendering rebellion difficult to combat. Though most clashes occurred in rural areas, Fano militants 24 Sept managed to enter Gondar city, leading to deadly skirmishes with federal forces. Fano militants same day attacked Debre Markos city (East Gojjam), killing mayor. Conflict exacted heavy toll on civilians. Notably, federal forces late Aug-early Sept reportedly killed at least 70 in northeast Majete town for alleged ties to Fano; drone strikes early Sept in East Gojam, West Gojam and North Shewa zones reportedly killed at least 50; and strike in West Gojjam’s Dembecha and Quarit districts 17 Sept killed at least 48. Fano militants also crossed into Oromia region, 9 Sept attacking civilians in West Shewa and North Shewa zones; alleged Fano militants 15-16 Sept killed around 30 in East Wollega Zone.

Tigray peace process faced new challenges. Tigray region’s interim president Getachew Reda 6 Sept claimed federal govt had agreed to dismantle Amhara’s “illegal administration” in disputed Western and Southern Tigray, though Amhara unrest, in part driven by fears govt will return disputed territories to Tigray, risks complicating issue. Getachew also warned of mounting crime and rising political tensions; opposition-led protesters next day gathered in regional capital Mekelle to denounce administration’s failure to improve security; authorities violently dispersed protesters and arrested scores, including opposition leaders. Meanwhile, UN rights commission 18 Sept warned of “ongoing atrocities” in Tigray, perpetrated by “Eritrean troops and Amhara militia members” (see Eritrea).

Fighting in Oromia region persisted. Hostilities between Oromo Liberation Army and federal forces continued, notably in East Wollega, Horo Guduru Wollega and North Shewa zones. Oromia President Shimelis Abdissa 11 Sept said govt was committed to “silencing guns… through peaceful means”, though no talks have occurred since first round of negotiations ended early May.

In another important development. Final filling of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam completed 10 Sept (see Nile Waters).

Gabon

Ruling junta appeared set to strike a balance between cementing power grip and promoting inclusive transition back to constitutional order.

Under pressure from Central African regional bloc (ECCAS) to return power to civilians, coup leader, Gen Brice Oligui Nguema, 1 Sept said he will not rush to elections that “repeat past mistakes”. Junta next day adopted transitional charter providing for new constitution to be adopted by referendum, and prohibiting members of provisional govt from standing in next elections, but not explicitly excluding Oligui Nguema, who was sworn in 4 Sept as transitional president. Junta 6 Sept said deposed President Bongo has been released from house arrest and is free to leave country for medical treatment. ECCAS 7 Sept suspended Gabon’s membership. Oligui Nguema same day appointed Raymond Ndong Sima, one-time PM under Bongo and subsequent opposition leader, as PM. Ndong Sima 9 Sept unveiled cabinet composed of military officers, Bongo-era officials and civil society activists, and next day hinted at two-year transition period before elections. Nguema 11 Sept appointed mixture of army officers, civil society activists, Bongo regime and opposition politicians to lead transition parliament, notably prominent opposition figure Paulette Missambo as Senate head. Civil society activist and new Senate VP Marc Ona 16 Sept stated civil society’s proposed transition period is six months to one year. Authorities 19 Sept detained Bongo’s eldest son, Noureddin Bongo Valentin, and several members Bongo’s cabinet on charges of “high treason” and “corruption”. Nong Sima 22 Sept addressed UN General Assembly, defended military takeover as “lesser evil” that prevented bloodshed following Bongo’s disputed re-election, and 27 Sept outlined plans for “national dialogue” to be held in 2024 to pave the way for drawing up new constitution.

Ghana

Unidentified assailants conducted deadly attack in north east, while cost-of-living crisis triggered protests in capital Accra.

Unidentified assailants launched roadside ambush in north east, killing nine. Gunmen 21 Sept attacked police convoy escorting traders from Bawku town (Upper East region) to Cinkassé town (Togo), killing nine people and injuring 15 others. Bawku MP Mahama Ayariga and reports by local media in following days suggested incident was related to chieftaincy conflict in Bawku district, which borders Burkina Faso.

Protests over economic crisis gripped capital Accra. Civil society organisation Democracy Hub 21 Sept organised protest against economic crisis and rising cost of living in Accra; police arrested 49 protesters for unlawful assembly. Independent govt agency National Commission for Civic Education 25 Sept reported police violence against protesters and journalists. Protests continued peacefully over next two days without further arrests.

Guinea

Repression of opposition protest left several dead, while transitional authorities reportedly detained military officers amid unconfirmed rumours of coup attempt.

Security forces cracked down on protesters on coup anniversary. On two-year anniversary of military coup, coalition of political parties and civil society organisations, Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG), 4-5 Sept held demonstrations in capital Conakry to voice discontent at military junta’s perceived backsliding on transition commitments. Clashes broke out between demonstrators and security forces attempting to enforce ban on protests; FVG 6 Sept reported four protesters dead. Renewed clashes 8 Sept erupted during protesters’ funerals in Conakry, leaving 12 civilians injured.

Authorities allegedly detained military personnel amid rumours of coup attempt. Civil society activist Sékou Koundouno 4 Sept claimed around 100 military officers were detained following exchange of fire between junta forces and National Guard. French media outlet Jeune Afrique 5 Sept also reported transitional authorities late Aug-early Sept carried out series of arrests of military personnel following unconfirmed rumours of possible coup attempt on 26-27 Aug.

Junta leader Doumbouya struck defiant tone at UN. At UN General Assembly, interim President Col. Doumbouya 21 Sept admonished Western countries for “lecturing” African countries following recent coup wave, labelling Western democracy as “imposed” on Africa and “difficult to adapt to our realities”. FVG next day denounced Doumbouya’s remarks as signalling “an emerging dictatorship”.

Kenya

Govt and opposition made progress toward resolving differences, Al-Shabaab continued deadly attacks, while cattle and banditry-related violence persisted.

Bipartisan talks between govt and opposition inched forward. After signing framework agreement defining dialogue’s agenda in late Aug, National Dialogue Committee led by Kalonzo Musyoka, representing opposition Azimio la Umoja coalition, and Kimani Ichung’wah, National Assembly Majority Leader representing ruling Kenya Kwanza coalition, from 11 Sept onward received submissions from civil society groups and political parties on agenda. Meanwhile, cost of living continued to cause discontent; notably, opposition leader Raila Odinga around 15 Sept criticized govt policies following new increase in fuel price.

Al-Shabaab attacks continued along Somali border. Explosive devices allegedly planted by Al-Shabaab 3 Sept killed two policemen and injured others in Arabia area of Mandera county, 10 Sept injured several soldiers in Boni Forest, Lamu county, and 16 Sept killed four civilian and injured others along Mandera-Elwak road in Mandera county. Security forces 13 Sept reported killing five al-Shabaab combatants in Garissa county. Meanwhile, Kenya and U.S. 25 Sept signed defence cooperation agreement to counter Al-Shabaab and collaborate on domestic and international security efforts.

Western county reported rise in cattle rustling and banditry incidents. Governor of Elgeyo-Marakwet county early Sept reported increase in armed attacks after several months of relative calm amid joint military-police operation in Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, and West Pokot counties. Notably, unidentified armed men 3 Sept killed two people in border area between Elgeyo-Marakwet and West Pokot counties. Meanwhile, West Pokot Senator, Julius Murgor, 11 Sept announced Pokot community leaders will travel to Uganda to negotiate grazing access for Pokot herdsmen and release of 4,000 cattle seized early Sept by Ugandan authorities.

Madagascar

Opposition accused President Rajoelina of “institutional coup” in run-up to November presidential election.

Rajoelina 6 Sept announced he will run for re-election in presidential election scheduled for 9 Nov. Opposition parties 8 Sept filed three constitutional challenges to Rajoelina’s candidacy, relating to controversy over his citizenship status. High Constitutional Court (HCC) 9 Sept rejected appeals, confirmed Rajoelina and 12 others as presidential candidates. Rajoelina same day resigned to contest presidential election, as required by constitution. HCC in following days said presidential powers would now be exercised by govt collectively with PM Christian Ntsay as head, after Senate president, Herimanana Razafimahefa (intended interim head of state by law) declined to assume presidential powers citing “personal reasons”. In joint letter to electoral commission, 10 presidential candidates 12 Sept denounced move as “institutional coup” intended to give Rajoelina undue advantages in Nov election; all 10 candidates 22 Sept met with HCC magistrates to discuss matter. Meanwhile, in joint communique, eight countries and international organisations, including EU and U.S., 19 Sept vowed “greatest vigilance” during electoral preparations.

Mali

Ruling junta postponed presidential election due in February, further pushing back timeline for return to constitutional order; violence escalated between 2015 peace deal signatories, while jihadists stepped up deadly attacks in north.

Military junta extended transition period. Transition authorities 25 Sept announced delaying February 2024 presidential election without setting new date, citing “technical issues” related to adoption of new constitution in June referendum and review of electoral lists. Move sparked outrage from political and civil society groups. Notably, M5-RFP opposition coalition 27 Sept denounced “unilateral” decision, said it is “imperative” that junta “respects its commitments”.

Parties to 2015 peace agreement engaged in intense fighting in northern regions. As UN mission 1 Sept started second phase of withdrawal, alliance of predominantly Tuareg rebel groups, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), 11 Sept said it considered itself “at war” with Bamako, and in following days claimed several gains. CMA 12 Sept claimed seizing control of military camp and posts near Bourem town (Gao region) from army and Russian Wagner Group paramilitaries; 17 Sept said they temporarily seized two army bases near Léré town (Timbuktu region); and 28 Sept announced capturing Dioura military camp (Mopti region in centre) before withdrawing.

Jihadist violence escalated in northern regions, persisted in centre. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) maintained blockade on Timbuktu city in protest at army deployment in region, creating food and aid shortages. Elsewhere in north, JNIM militants 7 Sept attacked river boat near Abakoira village, Timbuktu region, as well as Bamba military camp, Gao region, killing at least 64 people including 49 civilians and 15 soldiers. JNIM next day launched complex attack targeting Malian army and Wagner base near Gao airport, reportedly killing up to 37 Malian soldiers. Islamic State Sahel Province militants 13 Sept attacked Tannal village, Ménaka region, killing 20 people. Fighting also continued in central regions. Notably, JNIM 6 Sept killed a dozen Wagner elements in ambush near Pogo town, Ségou region.

In other important developments. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger 16 Sept signed charter creating Alliance of Sahel States.

Mozambique

Insurgent activity decreased in northern Cabo Delgado province following August killing of militant leader; political tensions persisted ahead of October municipal elections.

Militant activity slowed after death of group leader. After security forces 22 Aug killed Ibn Omar, reported leader of Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP), insurgent activity relatively decreased; death yet to be confirmed from non-govt sources. Despite ISMP cells reportedly pursuing hearts and minds strategy in some coastal areas, group of militants 14 Sept attacked Naquitengue village, Mocímboa da Praia district, killing 11 civilians. Hundreds of civilians 20 Sept also fled Pangane village, Macomia district, after militants launched forced recruitment drive.

Build-up to October municipal elections continued amid concerns of violence. Main opposition party RENAMO leader, Ossufo Momade, late Aug accused ruling FRELIMO party of using police for partisan purposes. Police chief 18 Sept denied his force’s involvement in attempts to assassinate political leaders after reported attacks on Nampula mayor in Aug and Quelimane mayor 11 Sept, both from RENAMO. President Nyusi 25 Sept called on candidates to avoid “incendiary and intimidating speeches” during campaign for 11 Oct municipal elections, which formally began 26 Sept. Opposition party Democratic Movement of Mozambique 28 Sept accused police of illegally detaining its members in Sofala and Cabo Delgado provinces.

Border with Tanzania re-opened. Namoto border crossing between Cabo Delgado and Tanzania’s Mtwara province 11 Sept reopened after two-year closure due to insecurity; move should help boost cross-border trade (see Tanzania).

Niger

Junta signed mutual defence pact with Mali and Burkina Faso, bolstering united putschist front in central Sahel; uptick in jihadist violence continued in south west as attention of top military brass remained focused on Niamey.

Niamey drew closer to other military-led neighbours. As West African regional bloc ECOWAS continued to threaten force to restore constitutional order, Niamey 12 Sept denounced military cooperation agreement with Cotonou, accusing Benin of “planning an aggression” against Niger. Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso 16 Sept signed charter creating Alliance of Sahel States in bid to establish framework for collective defence and mutual assistance.

Junta continued rupture with former colonial power. Junta 1 Sept accused French President Macron of instrumentalizing ECOWAS for “neo-colonial project”, and tens of thousands 2 Sept rallied in capital Niamey and south-western Ouallam town to demand departure of French forces. Paris 24 Sept announced end of military cooperation with Niger and departure of French soldiers by year’s end. France’s ambassador to Niger 27 Sept returned to Paris, one month after junta ordered him to leave. Meanwhile, U.S. military 14 Sept resumed flying drones and aircraft out of its bases in Niger following negotiations with junta.

Uptick in violence continued in south-western Tillabery region. Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) 1 Sept killed three people in Doukou Tegui village, Tillabery department. Govt forces 4 Sept reported thwarting al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) ambush near Ouro Gueladjo, Say department, killing around ten suspected fighters. IS Sahel fighters 13 Sept killed community leader in Garin Wadey town, Abala department. Suspected jihadist militants 28 Sept killed at least a dozen soldiers in Kandadji town, Tillabery department.

In other important developments. Transitional govt 14 Sept announced opening of consultations at local level as prelude to national dialogue, thereby following in footsteps of Mali and Burkina Faso, where national dialogues held shortly after coups helped legitimise military rule; Niamey however did not set date for dialogue. Meanwhile, former PM and prominent opponent to deposed President Bazoum, Hama Amadou, 11 Sept returned to Niger after two-year exile in France.

Nigeria

Court dismissed opposition’s challenge to Bola Tinubu’s presidential election win, while jihadist, criminal and separatist groups continued to fuel insecurity across country.

Election tribunal upheld Tinubu’s presidential win. Presidential Elections Petitions Tribunal 6 Sept rejected opposition parties’ challenges to Bola Tinubu’s win in February presidential election. Main opposition presidential candidates in following days appealed against judgement at Supreme Court.

In North East zone, Bauchi state reported mounting insecurity. As part of military operations against jihadist groups in Borno state, air force 12 Sept announced bombing Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) combatants in Kala/Balge area. Meanwhile in neighbouring Bauchi state, authorities 13 Sept reported increasing attacks by armed groups fleeing military operations in neighbouring states, while security operatives 16 Sept rescued over 30 abductees in Alkaleri area.

Armed group violence continued in North West and North Central zones. In Kaduna state, gunmen 1 Sept killed at least seven people in mosque at Saya-Saya village, Ikara area. In Zamfara state, armed groups 9 Sept reportedly abducted over 50 people near Anka town, and 22 Sept abducted about 24 mainly female students in Sabon-Gida village. Abuja-based Daily Trust newspaper 19 Sept reported armed groups in recent days attacked seven villages at border between Kebbi and Sokoto states, killing unconfirmed number and forcing hundreds to flee. In Plateau state, armed group 10 Sept attacked Kulben village in Mangu area, killing ten people; residents blamed attack on “armed Fulani militia”.

Kidnappings-for-ransom continued in South East amid persistent Biafra agitation. Security personnel continued to battle faction of outlawed separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) enforcing lockdown across South East zone. Notably, suspected IPOB members 19 Sept killed eight security forces in ambush in Ehime Mbano area of Imo state. Air force 26 Sept bombed two locations identified as IPOB training camps and armouries in Nnewi North area, Anambra state, and Okigwe area, Imo state. Meanwhile in Enugu state, police 3 Sept clashed with gunmen allegedly attempting to abduct travellers in Enugu East area, with two assailants and one policeman dead; gunmen 17 Sept abducted Catholic priest and six others in Udi area, demanded ransom for their release.

Nile Waters

Ethiopia announced completion of fourth filling of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) ahead of fresh talks with Sudan and Egypt.

Two weeks after Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan resumed talks on GERD, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed 10 Sept declared Ethiopia had completed “fourth and final filling” of dam; Egypt’s foreign ministry 11 Sept condemned “unilateral, illegal” move, while Sudan did not comment. Sides 23-24 Sept met in Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa for fresh negotiations; Ethiopia 24 Sept said parties exchanged “constructive ideas” on disputes and reiterated “its commitment to continue negotiating in good faith”; in sharp contrast, Egypt said talks did not make “any worthwhile progress” and accused Ethiopia of backtracking on previous agreements.

Rwanda

Relations with DR Congo remained tense amid hostile rhetoric, President Kagame announced candidacy for 2024 election, and Washington scaled back military cooperation.

Kinshasa and Kigali continued to trade blame for M23-related instability. After Congolese President Tshisekedi at UN general assembly 20 Sept once again said M23 armed group was Kigali’s auxiliary, President Kagame same day refuted allegation and blamed DR Congo-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda for instability in Great Lakes region. Kagame 27 Sept appointed Gen James Kabarebe, recently retired from army and regularly questioned for his involvement in M23-related conflict, as minister for regional integration.

In other important developments. Kagame 19 Sept announced he would run for fourth term in 2024 election. French media outlet RFI 21 Sept reported U.S. restricted military cooperation with Rwanda under Child Status Protection Act due to Kigali’s support for M23 rebel group, which recruits child soldiers.

Somalia

Offensive against Al-Shabaab in central regions saw both setbacks and progress, while regional tensions over elections persisted.

Fallout from Aug collapse of frontline hindered anti-militant efforts in centre. After army retreat in southern Galgaduud region of Galmudug state resulted in Al-Shabaab takeover of area, govt redoubled efforts to secure additional support from local clans with a view to reversing losses before rainy season begins in October. Offensive however progressed in other parts of Galgaduud, as govt forces 11 Sept recovered Labidulle, Ceel Garas and Ceel Lahaley villages, south west of state capital Dhusamareb, and 15 Sept withstood major Al-Shabaab attack on positions in Ceel Lahaley. Govt forces 15-17 Sept also recovered Xinlabi, Qod Qod, Qeycad, Bacadweyne, Shebellow and Camaara villages in southern Mudug region (also Galmudug), amid heavy fighting.

Al-Shabaab militants continued to pose major threat, particularly in south. In Lower Shabelle region (South West state), Al-Shabaab 10 Sept attacked army position in Awdheegle town, resulting in significant losses on both sides. Al-Shabaab 17 Sept also caused heavy casualties in attack on convoy of Ethiopian forces in Bakool region (also South West). Targeted attacks continued, including Al-Shabaab suicide bomber 15 Sept targeting Galmudug president Ahmed Kariye ‘Qoor Qoor’ in Las Gacamey village; Qoor Qoor escaped unharmed, but two soldiers killed. In Hirshabelle state’s Hiraan region, bomb attacks 23 Sept killed over 20 in Beledweyne city, and 28 Sept killed at least six in Buloburde city.

Political disputes remained latent in several regions. Puntland President Said Deni made no effort to engage opposition, who continued to accuse him of seeking to use transition to universal suffrage to extend term or set rules in his favour. In South West and Jubaland states, groups of local politicians remained at odds with state leaders over timing of future elections; South West politicians 24 Sept met in Mogadishu, announced they would travel to state capital Baidoa in Oct to push for elections.

In other important developments. In letter to UN Security Council, govt 19 Sept requested three-month pause in drawdown of AU mission (ATMIS) personnel; AU 27 Sept announced withdrawal would continue but troop contributing countries backed request in letter to Security Council.

Somaliland

New front line between Dhulbahante clan militias and govt forces stabilised, while election-related tensions dissipated after President Bihi accepted compromise with opposition.

Front line shifted away from Sool region’s capital Las Anod. Following Dhulbahante militiamen’s major victory with Aug capture of Goojacade army base near Las Anod, new front line emerged between Oog and Guumays villages in western Sool. New division corresponds roughly to boundaries between Isaaq and Dhulbahante clans, with Isaaq being dominant grouping in Somaliland. Both sides in Sept sent reinforcements to area, raising fears of further clashes, but new front line remained quiet. Meanwhile, SSC-Khatumo State (self-declared govt of Dhulbahante separatists) 14 Sept hosted large delegation of MPs from Somalia as it strives to become Somali member state.

President Bihi accepted compromise on longstanding electoral dispute. Weakened by army’s retreat from Sool, Bihi 30 Aug accepted recommendations from elders of Haber Jeclo, sub-clan of Isaaq, who had been mediating between govt and opposition on electoral dispute; agreement will see combined political party and presidential election on 13 November 2024. As Gacaan Libaah militia opposed deal, Bihi 6 Sept offered to pardon group in exchange for their demobilisation, and militia late Sept accepted to disband. Political association headed by prominent figure from Western Somaliland also criticised agreement as Isaaq-mediated deal that leaves out non-Isaaq communities such as Gadabursi, tapping into latent grievances in Awdal region.

South Sudan

Opposition denounced controversial election bill amid ongoing disagreements about South Sudan’s readiness for 2024 poll; insecurity escalated in several states.

Opposition decried controversial election bill. Parliament 18 Sept hastily passed National Election Act amid pressure from President Kiir. VP Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) boycotted vote and staged walkout over last-minute amendment giving president-elect right to appoint additional 5% of legislators, saying bill went against peace agreement and would lead to “undemocratic” poll; stance raises possibility of SPLA-IO boycotting 2024 vote as disagreement on prerequisites for credible election persisted. Other aspects of bill, such as increase in number of MPs from 250 to 332, dashed hopes for simplified and cheaper govt; Kiir 26 Sept signed bill into law. Kiir same day appointed Angelina Teny, former Defence Minister and Machar’s wife, as new Interior Minister; Teny’s sacking from Defence Minister position in March had caused controversy for violating peace agreement.

Insecurity, including abuses by govt forces, intensified. Unknown assailants 16 Sept killed four in ambush on Akobo-Bor road (Jonglei state). Unknown assailants 23 Sept attacked UN children fund (UNICEF) convoy that had been delivering aid in Central Equatoria State, killing two aid workers and destroying humanitarian supplies; UNICEF subsequently paused deliveries to area. Month saw President Kiir’s South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), disgruntled by low wages, step up abuses. Notably, SSPDF soldiers 7 Sept extrajudicially executed civilian in Bor town (Jonglei). SSPDF commander 17 Sept reportedly executed former commander of Pochalla area (Greater Pibor Administrative Area) who had allegedly begun mobilising Anyuak youth after army sacked him; ensuing fighting between SSPDF and Anyuak youth 17-18 Sept killed at least ten, with SSPDF using helicopter gunships against Pochalla town’s population.

President Kiir engaged in flurry of diplomatic activity. President Kiir 4 Sept hosted Sudanese army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Juba, 17 Sept welcomed Sudanese delegation led by Darfur governor Minni Minawi. Kiir 14 Sept visited Ugandan President Museveni in Ugandan capital Kampala, 18 Sept met UN Sec-Gen António Guterres in New York, and 28 Sept met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russian capital Moscow. President’s frequent foreign trips indicated confidence in measures undertaken to coup-proof regime.

Sudan

Fighting between army and paramilitary forces continued in Khartoum and Darfur, killing highest number of civilians in one month since fighting erupted; army leader conducted regional tour.

RSF battled for control of Khartoum. Fighting in Khartoum and sister city Omdurman continued as paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sought to fully conquer capital, 16-18 Sept launching well-coordinated attacks on remaining army bases. Army responded with intensified airstrikes, resulting in high civilian casualties; notably, shelling 5 Sept killed over 30 in Omdurman and alleged army drone 10 Sept killed around 50 in Khartoum. After Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Burhan’s escape from capital late Aug, army announced plans to form emergency govt in Port Sudan; army walked back plans following wide opposition from various actors including civilians and instead late Sept announced reshuffle to various ministries.

RSF-army clashes raged in Darfur, rebel group expanded foothold further east. Having captured most of West Darfur, RSF concentrated its assault on army in North and South Darfur, with latter’s state capital Nyala witnessing most intense fighting outside Khartoum. Army’s indiscriminate airstrikes caused scores of civilian casualties in mostly Arab-populated areas, with shelling 13 Sept killing at least 40. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North continued to expand its foothold, emerging as third major force in conflict. Meanwhile, army and tribal militia known as Forces of the Eastern Sudan Parties and Movements Alliance 18 Sept clashed in Port Sudan over control of security checkpoints.

Burhan met with number of regional leaders. Burhan continued regional tour among countries seen to support army before 21 Sept addressing UN General Assembly in New York. Efforts to restart talks faced more setbacks. Notably, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 8 Sept reiterated rejection of Kenyan-led Intergovernmental Authority on Development mediation, while Burhan 9 Sept rejected African Union’s (AU) mediation after AU Commission Chairperson Musa Faki 3 Sept met RSF special envoy Yousif Izzat. Meanwhile, U.S. 6 Sept sanctioned prominent RSF leaders, which could dissuade group from mediation process involving U.S., 28 Sept levied additional sanctions against prominent pro-Bashir politician and two companies supporting RSF.

Tanzania

Police briefly detained opposition leader Tundu Lissu for alleged unlawful assembly.

Police 10 Sept arrested opposition leader and chairman of opposition party Chadema, Tundu Lissu, and three others for allegedly holding illegal gathering and obstructing police work in Arusha region; police later same day released Lissu on bail. Meanwhile, Namoto border crossing between Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province and Tanzania’s Mtwara region 11 Sept reopened after two-year closure due to insecurity; move should help boost cross-border trade (see Mozambique).

Togo

President Gnassingbé named new security minister in likely attempt to coup-proof govt following recent coups in West Africa and Gabon.

Gnassingbé reshuffled govt ahead of legislative and regional elections. Gnassingbe 8 Sept reshuffled cabinet ahead of legislative and regional elections expected for December, with changes affecting eight ministries. Most notably, long-time ambassador to France, Col. Calixte Batossie Madjoulba, was appointed as security and civil protection minister; change at powerful ministry may come as attempt to prevent military seizure of power after August coup in Gabon, where dynastic Bongo regime shared many similarities with Gnassingbé family’s hegemony over Togo.

Scattered violence from jihadist groups continued in northern region. In Savanes region, explosive device likely planted by al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 11 Sept injured farmer in Djabdjoare village, Kpendjal prefecture.

Uganda

Govt claimed significant gains against Islamic State-affiliated ADF rebels; Kampala faced further backlash to anti-homosexuality law, and crackdown on opposition persisted.

Military reported successes in battle against ADF. Authorities said police 3-5 Sept foiled bombing plots by Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), notably on church in capital Kampala. Ugandan and DR Congo govts 15 Sept publicised agreement on expansion of joint anti-ADF offensive further into Ituri province, eastern DR Congo, and joint operation same day reportedly freed 115 hostages from ADF captivity in Ituri’s Irumu territory. President Museveni 23 Sept said Ugandan army airstrike on ADF base in DR Congo 16 Sept killed “a lot” of militants, including group’s second-in-command Meddie Nkalubo.

International backlash to Anti-Homosexuality Act persisted. European Union 6 Sept announced it would not cut funding to Kampala over anti-gay law enacted in May; local NGO Convening for Equality coalition 8 Sept criticised decision. Museveni 10 Sept denounced several U.S. companies’ decision to stop importing textiles from Uganda because of discriminatory law, vowed not to back down. Deputy Treasury Secretary Patrick Ocailap 26 Sept confirmed govt is negotiating with World Bank for vital funding resumption, said Kampala expects financial institution to rescind funding freeze before Uganda in Feb concludes budgeting for next fiscal year.

Police restricted opposition gatherings. After opposition National Unity Party (NUP) 2 Sept launched nationwide campaign tour, NUP leader Robert Kyagulanyi, known as Bobi Wine, 8 Sept called on Baganda ethnic group to oppose govt. Police in following days opened sectarianism criminal inquiry, and 13 Sept announced banning NUP’s mobilisation activities, claiming they breached safety guidelines. NUP same day vowed to defy ban.

Zimbabwe

Fallout from contested August elections continued as opposition called for election re-run and tensions ran high with Southern Africa’s regional body.

Opposition called for rerun of controversial general elections. Main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) 1 Sept called for re-run of general elections held 23 August and nationwide protests, reiterating process was marred by irregularities and uneven playing field. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition of local civil society groups throughout month called for Southern African Development Community (SADC)-led dialogue to end crisis. Meanwhile, repression of opposition continued after vote. Unidentified assailants 2 Sept abducted and beat CCC elected official in capital Harare. Police 12 Sept briefly detained two CCC elected officials over alleged assassination attempt and malicious damage to property that occurred on election day, and 23 Sept arrested CCC mayor of Bindura town on fraud charges.

President Mnangagwa inaugurated amid persistent tensions with SADC. Mnangagwa sworn in for second presidential term 4 Sept in ceremony attended by South African President Ramaphosa, Mozambique President Nyusi and other leaders; Southern African Development Community (SADC) chair, Angolan President Lourenço, and Zambian President Hichilema, who heads SADC Organ Troika, however did not attend. In inaugural address, Mnangagwa accused foreigners of trying to “sponsor mayhem”. Govt 11 Sept accused Zambia of “treacherous lobbying” over Lusaka’s efforts to convene extraordinary SADC summit on Zimbabwe’s elections. SADC Organ Troika 27 Sept held meeting to discuss elections and criticised govt’s attempts to undermine SADC mission’s credibility; govt minister next day portrayed Hichilema as West’s “puppet”.

Asia

Afghanistan

Tensions mounted between Taliban and Pakistan over Pakistani Taliban attacks and deadly border clashes, while de facto authorities tightened harsh governance policies.

Taliban and Pakistan traded barbs and clashed at border. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 6 Sept launched major offensive in Chitral district in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, leaving four soldiers and dozen militants dead (see Pakistan); Islamabad issued demarche to Taliban authorities, claiming militants directed operation from Afghan soil and demanded Kabul stop the attacks. Pakistani and Taliban border forces same day clashed at Torkham border crossing, killing at least two Taliban soldiers, wounding several others and forcing crossing’s closure for nine days. Reports 18 Sept emerged Afghan authorities were constructing over 100 new border posts in Kunar, Nuristan and Nangarhar provinces purportedly aimed at preventing TTP cross-border movement.

Humanitarian appeal faced chronic under-funding. Ongoing humanitarian crisis continued to suffer funding shortages, prompting further cuts in humanitarian programs and external interventions. Notably, World Food Programme 5 Sept announced it cut rations to two million Afghans due to funding shortages; to plug gaps, Asian Development Bank 21 Sept announced $400mn grant and EU 20 Sept announced €140mn. Afghanistan’s economy continued to remain vulnerable and aid-dependent, albeit there are signs it might be faring slightly better than in past.

Taliban continued to restrict women’s rights and political space. Authorities late Aug prohibited women from visiting Band-e-Amir national park – well-frequented tourist spot – marking latest restriction on women’s social rights. De facto authorities in Sept continued to restrict political and civil space: by mid-Sept, reports emerged that Ministry of Justice had closed provincial offices of Hizb-e-Islami party and were taking similar actions against other political parties, including Hizb-ul-Tahrir. UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 20 Sept published report outlining human rights abuses against detainees, including excessive force and mistreatment during and after arrests.

In other important developments. Newly-appointed Chinese ambassador in Kabul 13 Sept presented credentials to de facto govt, signalling Beijing’s intent to explore avenues for normalisation with Kabul that might prompt regional countries to follow suit. Indications mid-Sept surfaced that security forces arrested major ISKP cell in Badakhshan province (northeast).

Bangladesh

Opposition continued campaign to force PM’s resignation, govt’s human rights record fuelled international criticism and insecurity persisted in Rohingya refugee camps.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) mobilised against ruling Awami League. Ahead of elections in Jan 2024, BNP continued to organise mainly peaceful rallies, marches and sit-ins to demand PM Sheikh Hasina’s resignation, albeit at slower pace and with no sign of demonstrations reaching tipping point to bring country to standstill and dislodge govt; worsening economic crisis, resurgence of Islamist group Jamaat-e-Islami or death of detained BNP leader Khaleda Zia, however, could escalate tensions, or BNP could resort to violent tactics in coming months. Notably, rival supporters and police 1 Sept clashed in at least four districts, injuring more than 120, while attacks by Awami League supporters in Natore district 19 Sept injured 30 BNP members. Court 26 Sept ordered arrest of senior BNP member Ruhul Quddus Talukder Dulu and his wife.

Concerns persisted over govt’s human rights record. Govt 8 Sept fired Deputy Attorney General Imran Ahmed Bhuiyan after he told reporters that Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus – who faces almost 200 charges in case widely seen as govt retribution – is subject to judicial harassment. Court 14 Sept sentenced two members of human rights group Odhikar to two years imprisonment for report published ten years ago on alleged police massacre of members of Islamic organisation Hefazat-e-Islam; European Parliament same day expressed concern over deterioration of human rights, referencing sentencing.

Violence in Rohingya camps continued as govt sought repatriation. Gunmen 11 Sept shot dead man in camp 2. Clashes between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation in camp 7 killed two on 14 Sept. Armed Police Battalion 17 Sept engaged in gunfight with criminal gang. Meanwhile, govt 4 Sept sent delegation to Myanmar’s capital Naypyitaw for talks with regime on “technical issues” related to Rohingya repatriation; while both sides agreed to start repatriation by Dec, few are expected to return absent guarantees for citizenship. UK 12 Sept announced £3mn in aid for refugee response, while U.S. 21 Sept announced $116mn in aid to support Rohingya in Myanmar, Bangladesh and region.

China/Japan

China continued its maritime presence in waters surrounding Japan, while Tokyo rejected Beijing’s claim over disputed islands and voiced concern over its military build-up.

China continued regional maritime presence. As of 28 Sept, Japan spotted 92 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone during month and detected eight vessels within Japan’s territorial sea. China 11-15 Sept conducted five-day military exercise in West Pacific during which its Shandong carrier strike group was spotted entering waters southeast of Taiwan and Bashi Channel, while eight additional Chinese navy warships passed through Miyako straits in East China Sea; during drill, Shandong launched around 40 fighter jet missions and 20 helicopter sorties.

Japan rejected China’s claim over disputed islands. Japan 5 Sept protested new standard map published by China in late Aug, which depicted disputed Senkaku islands – known as Diaoyu islands to China – as part of China’s territory. Japan 20 Sept asked China to remove buoy found by Japan’s Coast Guard near Senkaku/Diaoyu islands believed to be collecting data related to weather and sea conditions.

Tokyo acknowledged strained ties and China’s military development. After Japanese PM Fumio Kishida 13 Sept reshuffled cabinet, newly-appointed FM Yoko Kamikawa next day asserted it is important for Japan to maintain frank dialogue with China to improve strained ties, while newly-appointed Defence Minister Minoru Kihara 17 Sept expressed concern over China’s rapid military build-up in East China Sea and South China Sea; Kihara also said Tokyo and U.S. will step up joint exercises as pair 14 Sept began Orient Shield 23 drills in Hokkaido prefecture.

India

Ethnic conflict in Manipur state showed no signs of ebbing, while major diplomatic row erupted with Canada after govt hosted G20 summit in boost for PM Modi ahead of 2024 elections.

Instability and attacks plagued Manipur state in north east. Meiteis continued to demand withdrawal of paramilitary forces Assam Rifles, as hundreds of protestors 10 Sept sought to storm chief minister’s secretariat; Chief Minister assured forces will be replaced this month. Heavy exchange of fire along border of Kuki-dominated Churachandpur and Meitei-dominated Bishnupur districts late Aug killed six. Suspected sniper 13 Sept shot dead Kuki policeman beyond buffer zone in Churachandpur district. Photos of two murdered Meitei students, missing since July, 25 Sept went viral; protesters angry with govt for slow pace of investigation tried to attack houses of Manipur’s Chief Minister and State President.

Modi govt faced its biggest international crisis to date. Canadian PM Justin Trudeau 18 Sept announced “credible allegations” that India was involved in killing of Sikh independence leader and Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh Najjar in June in Canada. India furiously rejected allegations and 21 Sept suspended visas for Canadian nationals. Allegations pose challenge for India to navigate international opprobrium and risk giving Sikh separatist Khalistan movement in Punjab state new lease of life.

India exhibited diplomatic skill while hosting G-20 summit. At G20 gathering in New Delhi, PM Modi 9 Sept welcomed African Union as group’s latest member and claimed central role in delivering joint declaration amid fraught international environment. Although Indian analysts noted absence of Chinese leader Xi Jinping may reflect sour bilateral relations, summit was seen as political triumph for Modi who seeks third term next year.

Govt sought airfield near disputed China boundary, Maoist violence continued. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh 12 Sept announced construction of Nyoma airfield, located 23km from Line of Actual Control (LAC), calling it “game changer”; airfield could become new friction point with China. Meanwhile, Maoists mid-Sept issued death threats against Maharashtra state minister for supporting six new mining projects and steel plant. Security forces 19 Sept killed two female Maoists in Dantewada district in Chhattisgarh state (centre).

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Security operation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) highlighted threat of underground militancy, authorities clamped down on media and Supreme Court concluded hearing on region’s status.

Security forces continued operations against militants. Security forces 13 Sept started six-day major operation with heavy weapons against militants of The Resistance Force – affiliated to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba – in forested areas of Anantnag district, leaving four security personnel and two militants dead; operation underscored new militant strategy utilised since 2021 to lure security personnel to dense forests to inflict maximum damage and countered New Delhi’s narrative of normalcy in Kashmir. Militant strikes could pick up before onset of winter weather. Elsewhere in J&K, security forces 4-5 Sept killed militant in Jammu’s Reasi district; security forces 6 Sept killed two militants from Pakistan infiltrating Jammu’s Poonch district; clashes in Jammu’s Rajouri district between security forces and militants 12-13 Sept killed two militants and security member; security forces 16 Sept killed three militants during alleged infiltration attempt in Baramulla district along Line of Control. Security forces 18 Sept thwarted attack by militant with pistol in Srinagar.

Authorities continued crackdown on press. Police 1 Sept issued statement threatening legal action against BBC for publishing story on India’s crackdown on Kashmiri journalism. Police 14 Sept arrested journalist Majid Hyderi under stringent Public Safety Act; though seen as pro-govt, Hyderi was likely arrested for raising sensitive questions on social media regarding corruption allegations against Lieutenant Governor and another top official. Former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti 15 Sept said “This is how journalists who expose scams are accused of intimidation and defamation”.

Supreme Court concluded hearings on J&K’s status. Supreme Court 5 Sept reserved judgment, opting to give decision at later date, in petitions challenging constitutionality of govt’s decision in 2019 to revoke Article 370 (which offered J&K semi-autonomous status); Court appeared to urge govt to restore statehood and hold elections but hearings are seen in Kashmir as mere formality.

Korean Peninsula

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia in quest for closer military cooperation, while Pyongyang directed harsh rhetoric at U.S. and expelled detained U.S. soldier held since July.

Kim Jong Un’s trip to Russia signalled potential for deeper military cooperation. In first overseas trip since 2019, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un – accompanied by coterie of military and diplomatic officials – 10 Sept crossed border into Russia’s Far East and 13 Sept met Russian President Putin; meeting came amid speculation over potential deal between pair on provision of North Korean munitions to Russia’s war in Ukraine, as Russia strongly implied it would assist North Korea with its faltering satellite launch program. Pyongyang tried and failed on two occasions this year to launch satellites and vowed third attempt in Oct, which may be timed to coincide with 10 Oct anniversary of founding of Korean Workers’ Party. South Korean President Yoon 21 Sept declared any deal in which Russia assists Pyongyang’s weapons development will be “direct provocation”. U.S., Japan and South Korea 22 Sept called any cooperation “serious concern”.

South Korea held military parade, Pyongyang slammed U.S. during UN address. After one of two regular large-scale U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises ended on 31 Aug, South Korea 26 Sept held major military parade on streets of Seoul for first time in decade. In address to UN General Assembly, North Korean ambassador Kim Song 26 Sept accused U.S. and allies of “reckless and continued hysteria of nuclear showdown” that made 2023 “extremely dangerous year” and accused U.S. of “a sinister intention to provoke a nuclear war.”

North Korea expelled Private Travis King. U.S. soldier who fled across border into North Korea during tour of Panmunjom in July was transferred to American custody in China on 27 Sept; U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan thanked Sweden – U.S. protecting power in North Korea – and China for their roles. According to North Korean state media, King confessed that “he harbored ill feeling against inhuman maltreatment and racial discrimination within the U.S. army and was disillusioned about the unequal U.S. society”.

Myanmar

Regime and resistance forces battled in several regions as tensions rose with Arakan Army in Rakhine state; junta confirmed election delay and regional bloc ASEAN condemned regime’s inaction.

Regime and resistance forces continued hostilities across multiple parts of country. In Kachin state (north), clashes continued between Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and military: fierce fighting 6 Sept erupted south of Namsan Yang village and KIA 9-12 Sept assaulted military convoy seeking to reinforce positions by road from state capital, forcing convoy’s retreat. In northern Shan State (east), hostilities intensified between Ta’ang National Liberation Army and military, notably around Sei Lant village on border with China and between Kuktai town and Namhpatkar village on Mandalay-Muse highway. In Rakhine state (west), tensions rose between Arakan Army and military as both sides staged tit-for-tat arrests of other’s members. In Kayah state (centre-east), regime forces made slow progress towards rebel-held southern areas amid fierce opposition after resistance forces in June seized large parts of Mese township on Thai border. In Kayin state (centre-east), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and allied forces waged attacks on isolated regime outposts: notably, KNLA 1 Sept seized post in Kyaukkyi township, sparking fierce fighting, and allied forces 3 Sept launched drone strike on administrative office in Myawaddy border town, killing five.

Regime signalled election delays and signed confidential agreement with minor groups. Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing 1 Sept reiterated that election will be held only after Oct 2024 national census; data of census is unlikely to be finalised before mid-2025 and conducting count is likely to trigger violence. Meanwhile, regime delegation and five signatories of 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 31 Aug signed “final comprehensive peace agreement”, although terms were not revealed; groups are relatively minor players in country’s conflicts.

ASEAN adopted new response mechanism. ASEAN leaders 5 Sept revealed formation of “troika” comprising former, current and upcoming bloc chairs to manage response to crisis; in group’s strongest condemnation to date, leaders said they “were gravely concerned by the lack of substantial progress”; bloc decided Myanmar will not take up rotating chair in 2026.

Pakistan

Twin suicide bombings in provinces bordering Afghanistan killed scores amid spate of militant assaults, while Pakistani and Taliban forces clashed on border.

Suicide attacks killed dozens in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Two suicide bombers targeting Islamic procession in Baluchistan province’s Mastung district and Mosque in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s Hangu city 29 Sept killed at least 59 people and injured dozens; Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) reportedly denied responsibility, as suspicions centred on local Islamic State affiliates. Earlier in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, TTP 6 Sept launched major offensive on two checkpoints in Chitral district that killed four soldiers and dozen militants; army alleged attack was coordinated from Afghan soil, leading Islamabad to issue demarche to Afghan Taliban authorities (see Afghanistan). Security forces 9 Sept clashed with militants in Chitral, killing seven and injuring six. Security forces 26 Sept arrested four alleged Islamic State-affiliated militants in provincial capital Peshawar. In Baluchistan province, bomb attack 14 Sept injured at least eleven in Mastung district; police suspected Islamic State of targeting Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) leader, Hafiz Hamdullah.

Hostilities flared between Islamabad and Taliban. Pakistani and Taliban forces 6 Sept clashed at Torkham border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan, killing at least two Taliban militants and forcing crossing’s closure for nine days.

Election Commission continued preparations for polls. Amid talks with political parties on timing of election – which according to constitution must be held by 9 Nov – Election Commission 1 Sept announced that it aims to complete process of delimiting new constituency boundaries, following census conducted this year, by 30 Nov; Commission 21 Sept announced elections will be held in last week of Jan 2024. Reuters 14 Sept reported that Election Commission had privately written to caretaker PM Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar expressing concerns about “a general perception that the caretaker government is a continuation of the previous government”. Meanwhile, former PM Imran Khan’s lawyer 13 Sept revealed court had extended Khan’s judicial custody related to charges of publicising state secrets until 26 Sept; Court 26 Sept extended Khan’s custody until 10 Oct.

Philippines

Political and criminal violence persisted in south, while security forces continued to battle Communist insurgents.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In Maguindanao del Sur province, unidentified individuals 4 Sept fired two M-79 grenades in residential areas of Buluan town, injuring one. Gunfight 12 Sept erupted between Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) militants and members of Islamic State-inspired Dawlah Islamiyah in Datu Hoffer Ampatuan town, killing three Dawlah Islamiyah members and displacing 70 families of local indigenous community. Clashes between army and Dawlah Islamiyah 23 Sept killed one militant and injured three others in Ampatuan town, Maguindanao. Rival members of MILF’s 106 Base Command 19 Sept clashed in Datu Abdullah Sangki town, killing one civilian. In Maguindanao del Norte province, assailant 18 Sept killed local candidate for village polls in South Upi municipality. Sulu province’s local govt 11 Sept declared Sulu free of Abu Sayyef Group.

Hostilities persisted between security forces and Communist militants. Clashes between security forces and Communist rebels in Luzon island (Quezon province) in north, Mindanao Island (Surigao and Bukidnon) in south, and Visayas Islands (Negros and Panay) in centre killed at least 23 combatants and civilians.

South China Sea

Standoff continued between China and Philippines over disputed Scarborough Shoal, while regional countries conducted naval drills across South China Sea (SCS).

Dispute continued between Beijing and Manila over shoal. After escalation in tensions in Aug, China and Philippines 8 Sept were embroiled in another standoff over Second Thomas Shoal as Chinese Coast Guard attempted to block entry of Philippine vessels on resupply mission to grounded BRB Sierra Madre; Philippine Defence Secretary Gilbert Teodoro 13 Sept said resupply missions would continue despite “harassment” and called for forging new alliances. Philippines 26 Sept removed 300-metre “floating barrier” erected by Beijing in part of Scarborough Shoal that blocked its fishermen’s activities, calling it “clear violation of international law” and asserting “Filipino people will not back down”. Philippine President Marcos Jr. 29 Sept said “We are staying away from fiery words, but our resolve to defend Philippine territory is strong”.

Military activity in region remained high. Philippines and U.S. 4 Sept conducted joint sail in waters west of Palawan Island; Philippines and Canada 25 Sept conducted joint sail in same area. China’s aircraft carrier Shandong 15 Sept returned to SCS, along with five navy surface ships. Regional bloc ASEAN 19 Sept held its first joint military drill involving ten member states plus Timor-Leste near Indonesia’s Batam Island. Chinese state media 20 Sept reported China had built two ground stations for its BeiDou satellite system on two disputed reefs in Paracel Islands, which are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. China 28 Sept issued navigation warning for planned exercises in SCS.

U.S. and Vietnam boosted ties. During President Biden’s historic visit to Vietnam, pair 10 Sept called for peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law without threat or use of force; Vietnam and U.S. upgraded their diplomatic ties to Comprehensive Strategic partnership, a special category that Vietnam hitherto reserved for Laos and Cambodia. During visit to China, Malaysia’s PM Anwar Ibrahim 17 Sept said Malaysia and China agreed to have continuous and open communication over SCS to ensure situation remains peaceful.

Sri Lanka

New allegations of govt involvement in 2019 Easter bombings took centre stage, UN Human Rights chief lamented country’s poor accountability and ethnic tensions grew more severe.

New claims surfaced alleging govt involvement in 2019 attacks. UK news outlet Channel 4 on 5 Sept broadcast documentary with eyewitnesses alleging military intelligence officials were involved in organising 2019 Easter Sunday suicide bombings and obstructed police investigations before and after attacks, accusing current head of State Intelligence Service Suresh Salley of meeting directly with bombers. In response, Catholic Church reiterated calls for international investigation, while main opposition party called for international support to domestic probe; Salley, former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Defence Ministry rejected accusations, while President Wickremesinghe 10 Sept announced two separate committees to investigate claims.

Ethnic tensions escalated. Tamil district judge T. Saravanarajah 23 Sept resigned his position in northern district of Mullaitivu and fled country, after receiving threats apparently linked to recent rulings that had angered prominent Sinhala nationalist monks and govt parliamentarians. Stick-wielding Sinhala nationalists 17 Sept attacked Tamil parliamentarian Selvarajah Kanjendran in Trincomalee, Eastern Province, during march commemorating death of Tamil nationalist hunger striker; organisers cancelled another commemoration event in capital Colombo amid threats.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) criticized “accountability deficit”. UN Human Rights Council 11 Sept commenced session following High Commissioner’s 6 Sept report that found “lack of accountability at all levels remains the fundamental main human rights problem”; report urged international community “to play an important complementary role”. Govt reiterated its rejection of resolutions that set up OHCHR “accountability project” and criticised OHCHR’s “increasing mandate”. Govt 15 Sept published revised draft of Anti-Terrorism Act, followed on 19 Sept by release of draft Online Safety Act; activists and opposition politicians expressed strong criticism of both, arguing they posed major threats to democratic rights.

In another important development. International Monetary Fund officials 27 Sept announced they had failed to reach agreement with govt to unlock next $330mn tranche of funding; officials expressed concern at lower-than-projected govt revenue and announced completion of first six-month review also depends on foreign debt restructuring.

Taiwan Strait

Taiwan voiced concern over “abnormal” Chinese aerial and maritime presence around island, while U.S. maintained strong military and diplomatic support for Taiwan.

Chinese aircraft around Taiwan set new daily record. As of 28 Sept, Taiwan spotted 512 Chinese military aircraft around island, of which at least 216 either crossed unofficial demarcation median line or were detected in Taiwan’s Southwest air defence identification zone; Taiwan sighted 187 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Notably, 103 Chinese planes 18 Sept were detected around island – marking highest total for incursions in single day – with 40 crossing median line. After Taiwan’s defence ministry 24 Sept announced it observed Chinese activities near Dacheng Bay in China’s southern Fuijan province, Taiwan’s Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng next day said China’s drills and heightened activity are “quite abnormal”; Kuo-cheng 23 Sept said China’s activity risk “getting out of hand” and expressed concern about accidental clash sparking wider conflict. U.S. guided missile destroyer Ralph Johnson and Canadian navy frigate HMAS Ottawa 9 Sept sailed through Taiwan Strait.

U.S. maintained military and diplomatic support for Taiwan. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan 16 Sept met Chinese FM Wang Yi, raising cross-strait issues. U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken and Chinese Vice Premier Han Zheng 18 Sept met in New York on sidelines of UN General Assembly, during which Blinken stressed importance of stability in Taiwan Strait. After U.S. late Aug approved $80mn military package for Taiwan under program typically reserved for sovereign nations, Taiwan and U.S. 20 Sept announced new cooperation deal to build joint cybersecurity supply chain under U.S.-Taiwan Technology Trade and Investment Collaboration framework.

In other important developments. China’s state council 12 Sept announced measures to encourage Taiwanese citizens to visit, study, work and do business in Fujian province to deepen cross-strait development. Kuomintang party presidential candidate Hou You-ih 15 Sept kicked off eight-day visit to U.S., advocating “3D strategy” for managing cross straits relations that includes deterrence, dialogue and de-escalation. Taiwan 28 Sept launched its first indigenous defense submarine “Narwhal”.

Thailand

New cabinet entered office focused on economic improvement, while peace dialogue in deep south awaited new govt delegation amid ongoing insurgent attacks.

King approved new cabinet. After Pheu Thai Party nominee Srettha Thavisin, a real-estate mogul and political novice, was elected Thailand’s 30th prime minister in late Aug, King Vajiralongkorn 2 Sept endorsed new cabinet that is intended to focus on economy; its policy statement issued 11 Sept included controversial 10,000 baht ($280) digital wallet scheme, energy costs and amending constitution to make it more democratic. Supreme Court 20 Sept issued lifetime ban on holding public office for Pannika Wanich, former MP and founding member of Future Forward Party, after National Anti-Corruption Commission accused Pannika of breaching ethical standards for Facebook posts in 2010 deemed disrespectful to monarchy. Court 26 Sept convicted human rights lawyer and activist Anon Nampa of lèse-majesté for Oct 2020 speech, sentencing to four years in prison.

Deep south dialogue remained in abeyance while insurgent attacks continued. Dialogue between govt and main separatist armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) awaited appointment of new delegation by incoming govt. Meanwhile, in major attack late Aug, militants ambushed police patrol in Yarang district, Pattani province, with small arms and improvised grenades, killing four police officers and two defence volunteers; militants simultaneously bombed five power poles at three nearby locations, hampering response of security forces. Elsewhere in Pattani, assailant 1 Sept threw pipe bomb into army base in Thung Yang Daeng district. Motorcycle-borne militants 12 Sept shot and wounded defence volunteer in Saiburi district. In Narathiwat province’s Sungai Padi district, roadside IED 4 Sept injured two military personnel and IED 7 Sept killed ranger at shooting range. Militants 30 Sept-1 Oct staged shooting and grenade attacks on 11 security outposts across three provinces, wounding one ranger and one civilian.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Azerbaijan amassed troops at border with Armenia ahead of its lightening offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), which triggered mass exodus into Armenia and anti-govt protests; EU held talks with envoys from Yerevan and Baku.

Armenia reported troop build-up along Azerbaijan border before NK offensive. Azerbaijan 19 Sept launched military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, 20 Sept declaring victory after 24 hours of fighting that left hundreds dead (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Before offensive, Yerevan early Sept had begun reporting military build-up along Armenia-Azerbaijan border in south close to Iran, and between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region – deadliest front in periodic skirmishes since 2020 war; EU civilian monitoring mission along Armenian side of border 7 Sept echoed concerns. Yet despite rising tensions along border and Azerbaijan’s offensive in NK, sides appeared at pains to avoid escalation, with PM Pashinyan 19 Sept saying Armenia would not be dragged into fight.

Refugees poured into Armenia as anti-govt protests rocked capital. After Baku’s victory in NK, Yerevan 21 Sept announced plans to host up to 40,000 families from enclave amid humanitarian crisis and fears of ethnic cleansing. By 30 Sept, authorities reported over 100,000 arrivals, with more expected in coming weeks. U.S. and EU 26 Sept pledged millions to support displaced. Meanwhile, outrage over Armenia’s inaction in NK spurred thousands into streets of capital, demanding Pashinyan’s resignation. Police 25 Sept confirmed 142 people had been arrested, though opposition groups put number at around 300.

EU held talks with envoys from Yerevan and Baku. Envoys from Baku and Yerevan 26 Sept met with EU, German and French officials in Brussels to prepare for potential meeting between Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev early Oct; meeting followed televised address by Pashinyan 21 Sept, in which he justified talks with Baku “for the sake of independence”. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 25 Sept met with Aliyev in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave for talks; Erdoğan later said Zangezur road, which would link Azerbaijan proper to Nakhchivan via Armenia, should be completed.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Azerbaijan launched military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, claiming victory after 24 hours and ending three decades of de-facto self-governance; mass exodus followed.

Azerbaijan’s 24-hour offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh ended de facto self-rule. Baku 19 Sept launched “anti-terrorist” campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), attacking territory with heavy bombardment and ground offensive. 24 hours later, Azerbaijani forces had advanced to outskirts of Stepanakert city, forcing de facto authorities 20 Sept to surrender in Russian-brokered ceasefire. Fighting reportedly left hundreds dead and many more wounded. Baku and Stepanakert held follow up talks and on 28 Sept, de facto leaders announced their self-declared govt would “cease to exist” by Jan 2024.

Military offensive followed escalating tensions and intense diplomacy. Initial signs early Sept raised fears of new war. Officials in Yerevan start of Sept reported military build-up in several areas along Armenia-Azerbaijan border (see Armenia, Azerbaijan), while de facto authorities in NK 5 Sept released video showing movement of Azerbaijani armoured vehicles near frontline; EU civilian monitoring mission 7 Sept echoed concerns about stepped-up tensions. Despite intensive EU and U.S. diplomacy to avert conflict, including agreement that led to humanitarian deliveries 18 Sept into NK, Azerbaijan launched offensive.

Humanitarian crisis exploded. Humanitarian crisis, already fraught due to Baku’s blockade of Lachin corridor connecting Armenia with NK, escalated. Stepanakert flooded with ethnic Armenians from villages seized by Azerbaijani forces amid scarce supplies of food, medicine and electricity. Azerbaijan 26 Sept announced measures to respond to needs but failed to appease locals, whose fears for their future under Baku’s rule mounted after its forces 26 Sept detained former de facto senior official Ruben Vardanyan as he tried to leave. Beginning 24 Sept, locals streamed out of enclave and as of 30 Sept, over 100,000 had crossed into Armenia; many more expected in coming weeks (see Armenia).

Baku’s actions drew mixed responses from international community. EU and U.S. condemned offensive; Turkish President Erdoğan 20 Sept expressed his support for Azerbaijan before 25 Sept meeting with Azerbaijani President Aliyev in Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave; and Moscow refrained from criticising Baku, 25 Sept criticised Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan’s “reckless approach” toward NK.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan amassed troops at border with Armenia ahead of its lightening offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK); EU held talks with envoys from Yerevan and Baku.

Armenia reported troop build-up along Azerbaijan border before NK offensive. Azerbaijan 19 Sept launched military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, 20 Sept declaring victory after 24 hours of fighting that reportedly left hundreds dead (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Before offensive, Yerevan early Sept had begun reporting military build-up along Armenia-Azerbaijan border in south close to Iran, and between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region – deadliest front in periodic skirmishes since 2020 war; EU civilian monitoring mission along Armenian side of border 7 Sept echoed concerns. Yet despite rising tensions along border and Azerbaijan’s offensive in NK, sides appeared at pains to avoid escalation, with Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan 19 Sept saying Armenia would not be dragged into fight.

EU held talks with envoys from Baku and Yerevan. Envoys from Baku and Yerevan 26 Sept met with EU, German and French officials in Brussels to prepare for potential meeting between President Aliyev and Pashinyan early Oct; meeting followed televised address by Pashinyan 21 Sept, in which he justified talks with Baku “for the sake of independence”. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 25 Sept met with Aliyev in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave for talks; Erdoğan later said Zangezur road, which would link Azerbaijan proper to Nakhchivan via Armenia, should be completed.

Govt arrested several individuals critical of offensive. Authorities 19-21 detained at least five individuals for anti-war posts online and four others for political activism. One detainee, journalist Nurlan Gahramanly, 21 Sept claimed he had been subjected to violence while in detention.

Belarus

48 children removed from occupied Ukrainian territories arrived in Belarus, EU labelled Minsk “an accomplice” of Russian war crimes, and tensions with western neighbours remained elevated.

Dozens of children from occupied Ukrainian regions arrived in Belarus. State news agency Belta 19 Sept reported arrival of 48 children from Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia (which Russia partly occupies and claims to have annexed) in Belarus. Head of charity organising removals said move sought to help “children from dilapidated cities and towns in the new territories of Russia”. Speaking on sidelines of UN General Assembly, Ukraine’s first lady Olena Zelenska 20 Sept called on international partners to help ensure return of Ukrainian children forcibly taken by Russia.

Russia and Belarus continued to deepen ties. Russian President Vladimir Putin 15 Sept hosted President Lukashenko in Black Sea resort of Sochi, days after Putin held summit with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un; during talks, Lukashenko said Moscow and Pyonguang should consider “three-way cooperation” but did not elaborate. Talks follow European Parliament resolution 13 Sept condemning Minsk’s role in Ukraine war and calling govt “an accomplice in the crimes committed by Russia”. Meanwhile, Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation 1-6 Sept held military exercises in Belarus, with troops from Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan participating.

Tensions with Poland and Latvia persisted. State Border Committee 1 Sept claimed Polish helicopter had violated Belarusian airspace, 28 Sept blamed Poland for another airspace violation; Warsaw denied allegations. Belarus 11 Sept accused Poland of using tear gas and physical force to push back migrants trying to cross border. Meanwhile, Latvia 19 Sept announced closure of one of two border crossing points with Belarus, citing “increasing number of illegal travellers”.

Cyprus

Tensions diminished in buffer zone following violent skirmishes in Aug, while rhetoric from Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leadership signalled wide gulf between sides.

After tensions in UN buffer zone subsided following violent skirmishes between Turkish Cypriots and UN personnel in Aug, parties during Sept traded criticism and rhetorical barbs over different visions to resolve Cyprus question. In fiery speech, “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) leader Ersin Tatar 13 Sept asserted that Cyprus is Turkish island and accused those supporting federative formula of aligning with “game” played against Turkish Cypriots. Addressing UN General Assembly, Republic of Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides 20 Sept said “just like in Ukraine, in Cyprus the UN Charter and international law continue to be violated” and asserted “there is not, and never will be, another basis for settlement of the Cyprus question to that dictated by the United Nations Security Council resolutions”, requesting UN to appoint envoy to prepare for resumption of talks. In response, Tatar 21 Sept called remarks “shallow and insincere”, saying that Greek Cypriot administration could not represent Turkish Cypriots. After rejecting calls for unification on 20 Sept, Tatar 23 Sept reiterated “TRNC” “will not compromise on the principle of sovereignty” after meeting UN Sec Gen Antonio Guterres. Ankara and Turkish Cypriot leadership on various occasions during Sept pressed for recognition of de facto Turkish Cypriot administration in north.

Georgia

President Zourabichvili faced impeachment, and PM Garibashvili underscored commitment to EU integration during UN General Assembly address.

Ruling party moved to impeach president over Europe tour. Ruling Georgian Dream party 1 Sept launched impeachment proceedings against President Zourabichvili, who days prior began touring EU countries to drum up support for Georgia’s EU candidate status, for which decision will be announced in Oct. Ruling party chairman Irakli Kobakhidze accused Zourabichvili of violating constitution by visiting EU member states without govt approval and claimed trip “directly opposes the efforts of the Georgian government to receive the said [candidate] status”. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 8 Sept said impeachment was “counterproductive polarisation” and urged Tbilisi to work on “depolarisation”, “de-oligarchisation” and reforms.

PM’s speech at UN focused on breakaway regions and EU integration. Speaking to UN General Assembly 22 Sept, PM Garibashvili emphasized Georgia’s desire to reunite with breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and urged Russia to engage in Geneva International Discussions – multilateral forum to address security and humanitarian consequences of 2008 Russo-Georgian War; Garibashvili further underscored govt’s commitment to EU integration. De facto foreign ministry of breakaway South Ossetia 24 Sept urged Georgia to “accept geopolitical realities” established in 2008.

Kosovo

Fragile calm in north shattered as group of heavily armed Serbs clashed with Kosovo police, leaving one officer and three Serbs dead; coming weeks could see more violence.

Heavily armed Serbs clashed with Kosovo police. Kosovo Police officers 24 Sept arrived at Serb-majority Banjska village in northern Kosovo after receiving reports that two trucks without license plates had blocked bridge. Around 30 heavily armed Serbs ambushed patrol upon arrival, killing one police officer before forcing their way into nearby monastery; shootouts ensued as police mounted “clearance operation”, leaving three Kosovo Serbs dead. Minister of Internal Affairs Xhelal Svecla same day said police had “regained control” of area, made several arrests and seized large amounts of military-grade weaponry including mortars, grenade launchers and anti-tank rockets; weapons indicate Serbs in north are preparing for a fight, raising risk of further escalation in Oct.

U.S. warned of Serbian military build-up along border amid rising tensions. PM Kurti 24 Sept blamed “Serbian-state supported troops” for attacks; Serb President Aleksandar Vučić denied accusation and condemned killing of police officer, but added that gunmen were local Kosovo Serbs who “do not want to suffer under Kurti’s terror anymore”. Former VP of Serbian List – largest Serb political party in Kosovo – Milan Radoičić 29 Sept assumed responsibility for attack, claiming he acted alone without informing Belgrade. U.S. 26 Sept said attack “was coordinated and sophisticated” and that “the quantity of weapons suggests this was serious, with a plan to destabilise security in the region”. U.S. 29 Sept accused Serbia of military build-up along border while NATO allies authorised additional forces, warning of “increasing tensions”. 

EU-mediated Kosovo-Serbia dialogue failed to yield progress. Ahead of escalation, EU High Representative Josep Borrell 14 Sept mediated talks in Brussels, Belgium’s capital, between PM Kurti and Serb President Aleksandar Vučić to advance normalisation process, afterward saying “it was not possible to bridge the differences”; he noted Vučić’s acceptance of EU’s compromise proposal but said “Kurti was not ready” to move forward on establishing Association/Community of Serb municipalities in north, key provision of 2013 and 2015 Brussels agreements. Kurti same day claimed his sequencing plan was “the only proposal on the table”.

Kyrgyzstan

Tensions with Tajikistan increased over top Kyrgyz official’s border dispute comments; U.S. president met with Central Asian leaders amid growing engagement in region.

Tajikistan summoned Kyrgyz ambassador following remarks on border dispute. One year on from deadly clashes along disputed part of Kyrgyz-Tajik border, National Security Committee head Kamchybek Tashiev 15 Sept urged Tajikistan to renounce its territorial claims to Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan’s foreign ministry 16 Sept summoned Kyrgyz ambassador and 18 Sept warned that “such comments could seriously damage the ongoing negotiation process on delimitation and demarcation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border”.

Central Asian leaders pledged greater regional cooperation. Tajikistan 14-15 Sept hosted leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in capital Dushanbe, as well as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev who attended as “honoured guest”. Leaders discussed ways to promote trade, tackle insecurity and better manage energy resources amid water shortages across region.

U.S. president held summit with Central Asian leaders in New York. U.S. President Joe Biden 19 September met with Central Asian leaders on sidelines of 78th UN General Assembly in New York amid stepped-up efforts to bolster ties in region. Biden hailed “historic” meeting and pledged greater cooperation in number of areas, including security, trade and investment, and regional connectivity. NGO Human Rights Watch day prior issued statement noting “renewed focus” on region following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and warning Biden not to “allow this to eclipse urgent human rights concerns”. Meanwhile, Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation 1-6 Sept held military exercises in Belarus, with troops from Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan participating.

Russia (Internal)

Ruling party claimed sweeping victory in local elections held across Russia and in occupied Ukrainian territory, drone attacks continued, and North Korea’s leader made surprise visit.

Ruling party won big in regional and municipal elections. Russians 8-10 Sept cast their ballots for regional governors, regional legislatures, and city and municipal councils. President Putin’s United Russia party won 15 out of 16 elections for regional legislative assemblies and every provincial governor’s race aside from Republic of Khakassia, which re-elected Communist party governor Valentin Konovalov. Russia also held elections in four partially occupied regions of Ukraine, announcing ruling party victory and prompting outrage from Kyiv and its allies. Meanwhile, crackdown on dissent persisted; notably, Justice Ministry 1 Sept added Novaya Gazeta editor-in-chief and Nobel Prize winner Dmitry Muratov to its list of foreign agents.

Ukraine’s campaign of aerial strikes continued. Ukrainian drone attack 7 Sept caused explosion near military headquarters in Rostov region’s Rostov-on-Don city; Kursk region witnessed multiple drone attacks. Notably regional governor 16 Sept announced that strike on Plekhovo village killed one; drone 20 Sept hit oil depot in Sochi city’s Adler district, 25km from Putin’s Sochi residence; and drone attack 25 Sept destroyed several buildings. Meanwhile, reports 4 Sept surfaced claiming authorities had released General Surovikin, detained after Wagner mutiny in June; two days later, Commonwealth of Independent States reportedly appointed Surovikin head of air defence committee.

President Putin held summit with North Korea’s leader. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un 12-18 Sept made surprise trip to Russia and 13 Sept met with Putin at Cosmodrome Vostochny space launch centre for talks. Sides did not provide details on concrete agreements, but Putin later confirmed readiness to assist North Korea with its satellite program; in exchange, Russia is likely to receive ammunition for Ukraine war. Kim also visited Gagarin Aircraft Manufacturing Association, Sukhoi fighter jet production facility in Komsomolsk-on-Amur city and Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok city.

Several EU countries banned entry of Russian-registered cars. Poland 17 Sept joined Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland in banning entry of Russian-registered cars; Norway’s Foreign Ministry 19 Sept announced plans to introduce similar restrictions.

Tajikistan

Tensions with Kyrgyzstan increased over top Kyrgyz official’s border dispute comments; U.S. president met with Central Asian leaders amid growing engagement in region.

Tajikistan summoned Kyrgyz ambassador following remarks on border dispute. One year on from deadly clashes along disputed part of Kyrgyz-Tajik border, Kyrgyz National Security Committee head Kamchybek Tashiev 15 Sept urged Tajikistan to renounce its territorial claims to Kyrgyzstan; Foreign Ministry 16 Sept summoned Kyrgyz ambassador and 18 Sept warned that “such comments could seriously damage the ongoing negotiation process on delimitation and demarcation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border”.

Central Asian leaders pledged greater regional cooperation. Tajikistan 14-15 Sept hosted leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in capital Dushanbe, as well as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev who attended as “honoured guest”. Leaders discussed ways to promote trade, tackle insecurity and better manage energy resources amid water shortages across region.

U.S. president held summit with Central Asian leaders in New York. U.S. President Joe Biden 19 September met with Central Asian leaders on sidelines of 78th UN General Assembly in New York amid stepped-up efforts to bolster ties in region. Biden hailed “historic” meeting and pledged greater cooperation in number of areas, including security, trade and investment, and regional connectivity. NGO Human Rights Watch day prior issued statement noting “renewed focus” on region following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and warning Biden not to “allow this to eclipse urgent human rights concerns”. Meanwhile, Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation 1-6 Sept held military exercises in Belarus, with troops from Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan participating.

Türkiye

Military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in southeast, northern Syria and northern Iraq, while ties with Greece continued positive trajectory and govt engaged EU and Russia.

Military continued operations against PKK. In rural Diyarbakir province, security forces 18 Sept reportedly killed four high-ranking PKK members. In Iraq, clashes 6 Sept killed Turkish soldier; authorities from Iraq’s Kurdistan region 17 Sept reported Turkish drone strikes killed four PKK members near Sinjar mountains (see Iraq). In northern Syria, drone strikes 17 Sept killed five Syrian Democratic Forces members in Hasakah and 19 Sept killed high-ranking People’s Protection Units (YPG) member in Manbij (see Syria). In first attack in Ankara since 2016, PKK militants 1 Oct conducted suicide bombing in front of interior ministry and opened fire on guards, injuring two; in retaliation, military launched airstrikes in northern Syria and northern Iraq and staged wave of raids across Turkish provinces (await next month’s edition for full coverage).

Relations with Greece remained on course to improve. Greek FM Giorgos Gerapetritis 5 Sept met Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan in Ankara, where pair agreed to seek “new approaches” to resolving issues in Aegean. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 17 Sept reiterated importance of dialogue for maritime delimitation, adding that issues of sovereignty will not be negotiated. Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan 20 Sept met on sidelines of UN General Assembly, agreeing to resume 2022 confidence building talks. Mitsotakis next day said geopolitical tensions remain but there has been “good progress” in normalisation.

Govt continued engagement with EU and Russia. EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi 5 Sept visited Ankara and announced several financial aid packages. Responding to European Parliament’s report on 14 Sept that criticised govt’s democracy record, Erdoğan 16 Sept said Türkiye could “part ways” with the EU if necessary but backtracked on 18 Sept, noting “window of opportunity” for revitalising ties. Meanwhile, talks with Russia to reinvigorate Black Sea Grain Deal continued but meeting between Erdoğan and Russian President Putin 4 Sept ended without breakthrough.

Crackdown on Islamic State-linked individuals continued. Security forces during Sept detained at least 125 individuals with alleged links to ISIS.

Ukraine

Ukrainian forces stepped up attacks in Russian-annexed Crimea amid slow-paced counteroffensive, several vessels arrived in Odesa ports to export grain, and tensions with Poland sharpened.

Ukraine’s southern counteroffensive made modest gains. Counteroffensive continued at slow pace along southern front, which stretches across Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions. General Oleksandr Taranavsky 22 Sept announced his forces had broken through defensive lines near Verbove settlement (Zaporizhzhia) and said next goal is Tokmak city. Ukrainian forces 16, 18 Sept recaptured Andriivka and Klishchiivka villages (Donetsk) near Bakhmut city after number of Russian forces redeployed south. Also near Bakhmut, missile 6 Sept struck market in Kostiantynivka town, killing 16; news outlet The New York Times 18 Sept suggested Ukrainian air defence missile malfunctioning may have caused strike. Ukraine escalated attacks on Russian-annexed Crimea having weakened Russia’s air defence. Notably, cruise missile 13 Sept struck naval infrastructure in port city of Sevastopol; pair of cruise missiles 22 Sept struck Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters. Meanwhile, senior official 27 Sept claimed remnants from Russian paramilitary Wagner Group had returned to frontline.

Several ships reached Odesa ports to load grain. Following Russia’s withdrawal from Black Sea grain deal and subsequent attacks on ports and grain facilities, Ukraine mid Aug established temporary shipping corridor from Odesa ports to evacuate civilian ships stuck in Ukraine. Yet infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov 22 Sept announced arrival of two ships in Odesa ports using corridor to load grain bound for ports in Middle East and Africa. Meanwhile, Romania bolstered air defence systems along Danube amid heightened security concerns.

Kyiv-Warsaw tensions rose over ban on agricultural imports. After temporary EU ban on Ukrainian agricultural imports into Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 15 Sept lapsed, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia same day announced unilateral restrictions to protect farmers from cheaper Ukrainian competition. Kyiv 18 Sept filed World Trade Organization lawsuit, claiming bans violate international trade rules. Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki 20 Sept said Poland would cease military aid to Ukraine.

Govt signaled tougher stance on corruption. Parliament 6 Sept appointed Rustem Umerov as defence minister following series of recent corruption scandals. Umerov 18 Sept fired seven top officials from Defence Ministry.

Uzbekistan

U.S. president met with Central Asian leaders amid growing engagement in region.

Central Asian leaders pledged greater regional cooperation. Tajikistan 14-15 Sept hosted leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in capital Dushanbe, as well as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev who attended as “honoured guest”. Leaders discussed ways to promote trade, tackle insecurity and better manage energy resources amid water shortages across region.

U.S. president held summit with Central Asian leaders in New York. U.S. President Joe Biden 19 September met with Central Asian leaders on sidelines of 78th UN General Assembly in New York amid stepped-up efforts to bolster ties in region. Biden hailed “historic” meeting and pledged greater cooperation in number of areas, including security, trade and investment, and regional connectivity. NGO Human Rights Watch day prior issued statement noting “renewed focus” on region following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and warning Biden not to “allow this to eclipse urgent human rights concerns”.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

“Total peace” policy advanced further as govt concluded fourth round of talks with ELN and announced expected start of formal dialogue with FARC dissidents.

Govt-ELN dialogue continued. 180-day ceasefire between National Liberation Army (ELN) and state security forces remained in place, as negotiators from group and govt 4 Sept concluded fourth round of talks in Venezuelan capital Caracas. Sides agreed to proceed with 25 regional consultations, though precise format remained unclear, and govt said it would improve conditions for ELN prisoners. Parties also agreed to undertake “dynamic humanitarian actions” in several areas of Chocó, Antioquia and Bolívar departments to improve conditions for conflict-affected communities.

FARC dissident faction agreed to formal dialogue with govt amid ongoing violence. Petro administration and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) 19 Sept announced formal negotiations and 10-month bilateral ceasefire starting 8 Oct. FARC-EMC violence continued, however; notably, dissidents 14 Sept attacked military patrol in La Argentina municipality, Huila department (south west), wounding four soldiers; 16 Sept killed four soldiers during clashes in Cumbitara municipality, Nariño department (Pacific coast); and 29 Sept killed another soldier in El Plateado town, Cauca department (south west). In first two weeks of Sept, violence between ELN and FARC-EMC in Puerto Rondón town, Arauca department (north west), forcibly confined hundreds of families.

Authorities released long-awaited drug policy. Justice Ministry 10 Sept announced new drug policy, promising to help small-hold coca farmers transition to alternative livelihoods, improve public health responses to drug consumption, and target senior traffickers and money launderers. Some aspects of document, such as authorisation to eradicate crops planted after signing of policy, raised concerns among some that, in practice, current approach won’t change. Meanwhile, Petro 9 Sept proposed Latin American alliance to fight drug trafficking.

Campaigning for Oct elections continued. Campaigning for local elections in Oct continued amid concerns poll may escalate political tensions in conflict-affected regions as armed and criminal groups seek to assert influence. Unknown assailants, for example, 28 Sept assassinated former mayor of Caloto town, Cauca; his son is currently candidate for same position.

Ecuador

Unknown assailants killed municipal councillor amid spate of attacks on political figures throughout electoral period.

One day after being reported missing, authorities 8 Sept found body of Bolivar Vera, municipal councillor from crime-ridden Durán city, in Guayas province. His death, which occurred one month ahead of presidential run-off on 15 Oct, marked latest in string of political assassinations during electoral period and triggered anger toward govt. Notably, Vera’s political party Partido Social Cristiano 8 Sept criticised President Lasso’s administration for failing to adequately protect civilians, while Durán city mayor denounced Lasso for not providing security for officials despite “countless” requests; Organization of American States Electoral Observation Mission 8 Sept said it “firmly repudiates any act of political violence that endangers the security of citizens and the ongoing electoral process”.

El Salvador

Govt introduced initiative to combat poverty, while officials defended President Bukele’s re-election bid.

Bukele launched phase six of his security plan amid ongoing anti-gang efforts. Legislative Assembly 12 Sept extended state of exception for 18th time upon Defence Minister Monroy’s request. Bukele 15 Sept announced phase six of his anti-gang Territorial Control Plan, dubbed “integration”; under this phase, authorities will create Directorate for National Integration to combat poverty with budget of $30mn; several other bodies, including Salvadoran Institute of Professional Formation and National Youth Institute, will now fall under Directorate for National Integration. Bukele 19 Sept defended anti-gang efforts at UN, saying security “results” were “irrefutable”. Several media sources late Sept reported confidential police document from 1 Sept showed nearly 43,000 people allegedly connected to gangs yet to be detained.

Govt defended Bukele’s re-election bid. As Feb 2024 polls drew closer, ruling party Nuevas Ideas’ continued to face accusations that its nomination of Bukele and VP Félix Ulloa as presidential and vice-presidential candidates violates constitutional ban on consecutive presidential re-election. Ulloa continued to describe re-election attempt as “second mandate” rather than re-election. Electoral authorities appear set on allowing Bukele’s re-run after Supreme Electoral Tribunal Magistrate Noel Orellana 31 Aug said only four of five magistrate votes are required to allow Bukele’s re-run; just one magistrate has said he will vote “in accordance with the constitution”.

Guatemala

Judicial efforts to hinder transition process after Bernardo Arévalo’s surprise electoral victory continued, eliciting domestic and international condemnation.

Judicial attacks on Arévalo, his party and electoral authorities persisted. Following electoral victory of Bernardo Arévalo and his centre-left Semilla Movement in Aug, judicial efforts to derail transition continued, led by Attorney General Consuelo Porras, head of Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity Rafael Curruchiche, and Judge Fredy Orellana. Notably, Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), who late Aug confirmed Arévalo’s victory and has since sought to advance transition, 1 Sept said Public Prosecutor’s Office had opened four different investigations against them. TSE 3 Sept announced it had temporarily revoked suspension order issued by Judge Orellana late Aug against Semilla. Judicial authorities 12-13 Sept and 29 Sept raided electoral centre. Video 13 Sept surfaced showing prosecutors opening boxes containing votes and counting ballots during raids; Arévalo accused Attorney General’s office of plotting against him, while Curruchiche claimed boxes were opened as part of investigation into accusation Semilla falsified signatures for legal status.

Civil society denounced judicial persecution. Amid widely held assumption that judiciary is working with powerful political and business figures to prevent Arévalo from taking power, Guatemalans 2 Sept protested in Constitutional Plaza of capital Guatemala City to demand Porras’ and Curruchiche’s resignation. Indigenous groups 18-19 Sept blocked roads and streets in capital, demanding removal of Porras, Curruchiche and Orellana.

International community stepped up pressure to preserve election result. European parliament 14 Sept denounced “repeated attempts to suspend the Semilla movement”, while some deputies proposed provisional suspension of commerce with Guatemala. U.S. official same day said Washington could impose sanctions and reduce aid to country unless election result is respected.

Haiti

Dominican Republic closed its border with Haiti over canal dispute, which risks aggravating ever-worsening humanitarian crisis; gang violence in capital forced thousands to flee.

Dominican Republic closed border with Haiti. Dominican Republic 15 Sept shut all land, air and sea borders with Haiti over dispute about construction of canal by farmers on Haitian side of Massacre River; decision risks harming both countries’ economies when living conditions in Haiti have already deteriorated; UN Haiti expert William O’Neill 18 Sept warned closure would have “dire” humanitarian consequences. Tensions had been escalating in weeks prior to decision. Notably, Dominican govt late Aug raised concerns about potential negative effects of canal on environment and agricultural producers in both countries.

Gang assaults in capital Port-au-Prince triggered mass displacement. Gangs in G-pèp coalition continued offensives in various parts of Port-au-Prince in attempt to expand foothold toward centre. Armed assailants allegedly led by gang leader alias Kempès 6 Sept attempted to invade Solino neighbourhood in downtown Port-au- Prince, prompting civilians to set up roadblocks. Gang violence fuelled new waves of displacement. Notably, International Organisation for Migration 5 Sept reported that gang operations in capital had displaced over 20,000 since mid Aug; alleged members of Canaan gang 22 Sept staged attacks in Saut d’Eau commune and 25 Sept assaulted Mirebalais commune, both near capital, displacing over 10,000 people. Meanwhile, leader of G9 gang coalition Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier 18, 19 Sept organised demonstrations, pledging to overthrow acting PM Henry.

Dialogue to resolve political crisis stalled. CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) experts 4-10 Sept visited Haiti in third attempt to progress govt-opposition negotiations. Civil society platform Montana Accord 5 Sept called for Henry’s resignation, however; Henry dismissed calls and continued attending CARICOM- facilitated discussions. CARICOM mediators 11 Sept said tone of negotiations had hardened. Engagés pour le Développement party led by former PM Joseph organised demonstration in Port-au-Prince 17 Sept, during which Joseph announced party was leaving dialogue to join social movements calling for Henry's resignation.

In another important development. UN Security Council members early Sept received first draft of resolution authorising multilateral security mission for Haiti, 2 Oct approved force (await next month’s edition for full coverage).

Honduras

Country faced institutional crisis over vacant Attorney General role, and govt defended tough security measures.

Constitutional and political crisis continued over vote for new Attorney General. Ruling Libre Party and opposition National Party failed to agree on candidate to replace Attorney General Oscar Chinchilla, whose mandate ended 31 Aug. Opposition have blocked Libre’s choice in response to passing of controversial amnesty law that they claim benefits members of ruling party and persecutes opposition; govt, meanwhile, accuses National Party of preventing appointment to protect themselves from possible future criminal charges. Libre 7 Sept appointed Secretary of Parliament Carlos Zelaya to lead negotiations with opposition, who announced Congress would convene only after agreement on issue; some opposition congress members 27 Sept warned legislative paralysis could continue into 2024. Meanwhile, Chinchilla 1 Sept left Honduras for Nicaragua amid corruption allegations.

Stringent security measures remained in place. Amid ongoing state of exception, authorities 6 Sept claimed period June-Sept saw 40% reduction of homicides compared to same period in 2022; police data, however, showed multiple-homicides (where at least 3 people are killed in one incident) increased by 34% compared with same period in 2022. Meanwhile, military police commander Ramiro Fernando Muñoz 10 Sept declared civil society would soon be able to verify human rights situation inside prisons, which have been under military control since June, and acknowledged allegations of abuses levelled against his agents; Muñoz also warned that there are no effective rehabilitation programs in place as prisons are under reconstruction.

Mexico

Criminal violence remained rampant, political parties announced presidential candidates in upcoming election, and authorities spotlighted uptick in migration.

Violence continued at high levels. In Guerrero state (south), armed men purportedly belonging to La Familia Michoacana criminal group 9 Sept shot dead state attorney Víctor Manuel Salas Cuadra in Coyuca de Catalán city; unknown assailants 12 Sept shot dead federal attorney’s office representative Fernando García Fernández in state capital Chilpancingo. In Tamaulipas state (centre), navy troops 4 Sept killed four alleged aggressors in Matamoros city; four civilians also injured. In Sinaloa state (centre), clashes 8 Sep between criminal groups killed five in El Rosario town. Govt 25 Sept sent 1,500 troops to Frontera Comalapa region of Chiapas state (south) following media reports of fighting between Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels. Meanwhile, govt 15 Sept extradited Ovidio Guzmán, son and principal heir of former Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín Guzmán, to U.S. on organised crime and fentanyl trafficking charges.

Parties selected female candidates for 2024 presidential election. Ruling MORENA party 6 Sept announced former Mexico City mayor Claudia Sheinbaum as party’s candidate for poll. Former FM Ebrard, who came second in internal vote, raised concerns over irregularities and asked for re-run; President López Obrador next day backed Sheinbaum’s candidacy. With opposition block Frente Amplio por México late Aug announcing Xochitl Galvez as its candidate, 2024 race will mark first time two women compete for Mexico’s highest office.

Migration flows increased. Migratory authority 14 Sept said it expected to receive record 150,000 asylum claims during 2023, noting uptick in arrivals during Aug and Sept, particularly from Cuba, Haiti and Honduras. Authorities same day found 350 Central American migrants in trailer suffering from oxygen shortage in Veracruz state (east). International Organization of Migration 12 Sept announced 686 deaths in 2022 by persons trying to cross Mexico-U.S. border, making it most lethal land migration route worldwide.

Nicaragua

Govt continued to stifle dissent and bolster ties with Russia and China amid worsening economic situation.

Repression of opposition, Catholic church and others continued. NGO Mechanism for the Recognition of Political Prisoners 9 Sept identified 89 political prisoners in country. Police 8 Sept arrested priest Osman José Amador Guillén after he expressed support for political prisoner Bishop Rolando Álvarez. Govt 19 Sept announced it had access to all student data from defunct Jesuit-run Central American University, raising concerns about potential harassment of student activists. Fears about treatment of media also increased after army chief 4 Sept labelled all journalists “mercenaries”; according to civil society report 11 Sept, 1,329 violations of press freedom were recorded in Nicaragua over past five years. Meanwhile, UN 11 Sept denounced increased violence against indigenous people in Nicaragua; unidentified settlers next day killed indigenous person in Mayangna Sauni As indigenous area on northern Caribbean coast; authorities 29 Sept arrested Brooklyn Rivera, only indigenous parliament representative, at his home in Bilwi city, Puerto Cabezas (north) on unknown charges.

Managua bolstered ties with China and Russia amid deteriorating economy. Report published by UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 8 Sept highlighted 6% decrease in exports in first six months of 2023, leading to thousands of job losses. Govt continued to strengthen ties with China and Russia in its search for economic lifeline. Notably, parliament 1 Sept ratified free trade agreement with China; Ortega 12 Sept acknowledged Russian military base in Nicaragua is training security forces to fight opposition.

Venezuela

Govt-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) offered support for upcoming primary, sharpening disagreements among opposition parties; govt, opposition and U.S held closed-door talks aimed at improving electoral conditions.

CNE offer to provide support for primary sowed confusion within opposition. Process for opposition primary, due to be held on 22 Oct to select single nominee for 2024 presidential election, continued to face challenges. Notably, opposition parties disagreed on how to proceed if banned candidate, such as Frontrunner María Corina Machado, wins primary; Machado continued to insist that she will not cede candidacy if victorious, raising prospect of intra-opposition squabbling over result. Former vice-president of primary commission María Carolina Uzcátegui 7 Sept said conditions were not in place for successful election and urged opposition to consider accepting CNE involvement. Adding to confusion around process, CNE 22 Sept offered to provide technical/logistical support; primary organisers 25 Sept said they would consider accepting. CNE 28 Sept proposed postponement of vote to 19 Nov. Machado and others continued to oppose idea of CNE involvement, saying it favours President Maduro; Machado also rejected delay to vote. Meanwhile, govt continued to attack primary, 7 Sept launching investigation into its financing.

Efforts to push through deal on electoral conditions continued. Amid growing concern about competitiveness of 2024 elections, several closed-door meetings between govt and opposition, closely monitored by Washington, took place during month, aimed at reaching deal on sanctions relief in exchange for improved electoral conditions. Details unclear but bans on leading opposition politicians reportedly remained key stumbling block: U.S. argues that Maduro cannot choose his electoral opponent by eliminating other candidates, while govt insists Machado’s support for U.S. intervention in Venezuela precludes her from being allowed to run.

Govt deepened ties with China. Maduro 8 Sept arrived in China for official visit; President Maduro and Chinese President Xi Jinping 13 Sept signed bilateral cooperation agreements in areas including economy, trade and tourism.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Shooting incident revived longstanding tensions with Morocco, while UN redoubled efforts to strengthen Western Sahara peace process.

Security forces shot at individuals straying past Morocco’s maritime border. Algerian coastguards late Aug fired on group of individuals after they crossed into Algerian waters from Morocco, leaving two dead; Algerian defence ministry 3 Sept said individuals, who were riding jet skis, had ignored warning shots. Morocco’s National Council for Human Rights 4 Sept strongly condemned use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians, decrying incident as “severe violation of international standards and human rights laws”. Several dozen Moroccan human rights activists same day gathered outside country’s parliament in capital Rabat, denouncing “Algerian military regime” and demanding accountability.

U.S. stepped up diplomacy with Algeria, Morocco over Western Sahara. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Africa, Joshua Harris, late Aug-early Sept travelled to Algeria and Morocco ahead of UN envoy Staffan de Mistura’s first visit to Morocco-controlled Western Sahara since his 2021 appointment (see Western Sahara); Harris reaffirmed U.S. support for UN-led political process, and announced strengthening of “strategic dialogue” with Algeria in likely attempt to encourage Algiers to distance itself from Russia.

UN expert visited Algeria to assess assembly rights after years-long delays. UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, 16-26 Sept conducted first visit of UN special rapporteur to Algeria since 2016; in preliminary remarks, Voule urged govt to pardon people convicted for their involvement in 2019 Hirak protest movement and “loosen up current tight restrictions on associations”.

In other important developments. At UN General Assembly, heated exchange 26 Sept took place between Algerian and Moroccan representatives over Western Sahara.

Egypt

Amid mounting economic hardship, authorities announced bringing presidential election forward to December.

Authorities set presidential vote for December. National Election Authority 25 Sept scheduled presidential election initially expected in 2024 for 10-12 December, with possible runoff to be held on 8-10 Jan 2024; move comes as Cairo faces mounting pressure from International Monetary Fund (IMF) to switch to flexible exchange rate and take other steps which could escalate tensions.

IMF once again delayed disbursement of loan funds. Amid Cairo’s lack of progress in meeting IMF’s terms for $3bn loan, IMF 17 Sept confirmed further postponement of first review of Egypt’s economic reform program and disbursement of second tranche of funds, originally scheduled for March 2023. Meanwhile, statistics agency 10 Sept said annual inflation rate hit new record high of 39.7% in Aug, with food and drinks prices rising by 71.9% over one year.

Repression of opposition continued unabated ahead of presidential election. NGO Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 26 Sept said security forces in recent weeks arrested around 73 campaign volunteers for opposition presidential candidate Ahmed Tantawi. Court 16 Sept sentenced opposition figure Hisham Kassem to six months in prison for slander, defamation and verbal assault on police officer; his political coalition, Free Current, next day announced boycotting presidential ballot in protest.

In other important developments. Explosion at air defence base in North Sinai 17 Sept killed seven soldiers; cause of blast – whether attack by Islamic State-affiliated militants or technical malfunction – remained unclear. U.S. administration mid-Sept reduced impact of human rights-related conditions on its military assistance to Egypt, withholding $85mn of $320mn conditioned on human rights; Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman 30 Sept threatened to place hold on remaining $235mn.

Iran

Ties soured between Iran and nuclear watchdog amid safeguards concerns; govt implemented humanitarian deal with U.S., potentially clearing atmosphere for engagement on regional and nuclear files.

In “unprecedented” move, govt scaled back cooperation with nuclear inspectors. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi 11 Sept opened Board of Governors meeting by noting “no further progress” in resolving outstanding safeguards concerns and voiced worry over “decrease in interest” among IAEA members; while confirmed decrease in Iran’s rate of stockpiling uranium at highest end of enrichment likely forestalled formal censure resolution, 63 countries – including U.S. and E3 (France, Germany and UK) – urged Iran to “immediately” resolve safeguards concerns. U.S. and E3 13 Sept warned of possible censure resolution without Iran’s “urgent actions”. In move he described as “disproportionate and unprecedented”, Grossi 16 Sept announced Iran had “effectively removed about one third of the core group of the Agency's most experienced inspectors”; U.S. and E3 18 Sept demanded Tehran “immediately reverse” decision.

In positive step toward de-escalation, U.S. and Iran concluded humanitarian deal. Five U.S. nationals detained in Iran, along with two family members, 18 Sept departed for Qatar en route to U.S.; Washington in turn released five imprisoned Iranian nationals and, in parallel, approximately $6bn in Iranian assets held in South Korea were transferred to Qatari banks to be accessible for humanitarian purposes. Deal could serve as platform for more concerted diplomatic efforts to contain nuclear concerns and maintain momentum on regional engagement.

West continued sanctions. Citing Iran’s non-compliance with 2015 nuclear deal, E3 14 Sept announced intent “to maintain nuclear proliferation-related measures and arms and missile embargoes” due to expire in Oct; Iran pledged to respond. To mark anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death on 15 Sept, U.S. blacklisted 29 Iranian persons and entities and imposed visa restrictions on thirteen individuals, while UK, Canada and EU issued designations. U.S. 18 Sept sanctioned Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security as well as former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, citing their role in hostage-taking and human rights violations. U.S. 19 and 27 Sep sanctioned total of eighteen entities and individuals linked to Iran’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program.

Iraq

Protests turned deadly in Kirkuk city, govt relocated Iranian Kurdish groups away from Iranian border under pressure from Tehran, and Türkiye struck Kurdish militants in north.

Clashes over Kurdish Democratic Party’s (KDP) presence in Kirkuk killed four. Following protests by Arab and Turkmen residents of Kirkuk city late Aug over govt decree to hand building used by Iraqi army back to KDP in line with deal between Baghdad and Erbil, KDP supporters 2 Sept held counterprotest demanding demonstrators unblock Kirkuk-Erbil highway, creating standoff with police acting as buffer. As clashes between sides erupted, security forces opened fire and killed four Kurds and injured over dozen; security forces next day deployed to city. Supreme Court 3 Sept issued temporary ruling delaying handover of building; absent lasting solution, violence could flare up again in run up to Dec provincial polls.

Govt began relocating Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Ahead of 19 Sept deadline set by Iran for Iraq to disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition parties based in Kurdistan region, FM Fuad Hussein 12 Sept said Iraq had started relocating groups from Iranian border to undisclosed camps; Hussein next day visited Iranian capital Tehran to urge Iran not to resort to military action amid concern Iranian forces may stage operation to create buffer zone on Iraqi territory. Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and Komala parties reportedly vacated bases in Erbil governorate, while Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) – affiliated to Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – refused to hand over weapons; deployment of Iraqi border guards reportedly caused tensions with PKK, raising prospect of violent escalation between pair.

Türkiye continued strikes on PKK targets. In north, clashes 6 Sept killed Turkish soldier. Authorities from Iraq’s Kurdistan region 17 Sept reported Turkish drone strikes killed four PKK members, including one senior member, near Sinjar mountains; drone strike next day killed three members of Peshmerga in Arbat airfield near Sulaymaniyah city. Reportedly, Turkish security forces 27 Sept targeted another seasoned PKK member near Sulaymaniyah. Maritime dispute with Kuwait surfaced. Supreme Court 4 Sept nullified ratification of 2013 Iraq-Kuwait treaty regulating maritime navigation in Khor Abdullah channel.

Maritime dispute with Kuwait surfaced. Supreme Court 4 Sept nullified ratification of 2013 Iraq-Kuwait treaty regulating maritime navigation in Khor Abdullah channel.

Israel/Palestine

Lethal Israeli raids and settler violence continued unabated across West Bank amid Palestinian attacks, Israel launched strikes in Gaza and Saudi Arabia signalled possible normalisation deal.

Israeli forces killed over dozen Palestinians. Israeli forces continued arrest raids across West Bank and killed at least 14 Palestinians. Notably, Israeli forces 19 Sept killed four Palestinians and injured 30 in Jenin, and 24 Sept killed two Palestinians in raid on Tulkarem city. Israeli soldier stationed on watchtower overlooking Al-‘Arroub refugee camp in Hebron 9 Sept opened fire on three children, killing one. Daily Israeli settler violence continued: notably, settlers 9 Sept assaulted shepherd in Jordan Valley and 16 Sept stabbed Palestinian in Hebron. Meanwhile, Palestinians continued attacks: 6 Sept injured one Israeli in stabbing in Jerusalem and shooting attack 13 Sept injured two Israelis in Huwara. Israel advanced home demolitions, mainly in East Jerusalem, bringing total to 261 in 2023.

Israeli forces staged attacks in Gaza. Israeli soldiers 13 Sept opened fire at Palestinians protesting at Gaza border in solidarity with prisoners in Israeli jails and marking eighteenth anniversary of Israel’s withdrawal from strip, killing seven and injuring over 25. Israeli forces 19 Sept killed Palestinian in Gaza and 15, 22, 23 Sept launched air attacks at alleged Hamas targets, while protestors continued activities until late month.

Saudi Arabia signalled progress on possible normalisation deal. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 20 Sept said normalisation with Israel was getting closer “every day” (see Saudi Arabia); Kingdom during Sept hosted first official Israeli delegation at UNESCO meeting and Israeli tourism minister, while Palestinian delegation also visited seeking measures on Palestinian statehood in any deal. First Saudi ambassador to Palestine 26 Sept presented credentials to PA President Abbas.

Regional tensions remained high with Syria and Iran. Syrian state media reported Israeli airstrike on Tartous city 13 Sept killed two soldiers. Israel 20 Sept struck two Syrian structures in Golan Heights; alleged Israeli drone next reportedly killed two near Syrian town Beit Jinn (see Syria). Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 11 Sept accused Iran of building airport in southern Lebanon as launchpad for attacks.

Lebanon

Fighting resurged between Palestinian factions in southern refugee camp, economic crisis and presidential vacuum persisted, and army raised alarm over uptick in irregular Syrian migrants.

Violent clashes continued inside southern Palestinian refugee camp. After period of uneasy calm following clashes in Aug, triggered by late July assassination of Fatah general and three of his bodyguards, intense fighting between Palestinian armed militants 7 Sept resurged in Ein el-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in south; combatants 12 Sept agreed to ceasefire, which collapsed next day before new ceasefire was announced 14 Sept that held thereafter. Fighting killed at least 18 during month, displaced hundreds of camp residents, and forced UN refugee agency UNRWA to suspend all services in camp.

Economic crisis remained severe. Interim Central Bank governor 4 Sept announced replacement of much-criticised Sayrafa platform – used by bank to inject U.S. dollars into market – with alternative system likely using “managed float” of Lebanese Lira; International Monetary Fund 15 Sept praised decision but nonetheless criticised “lack of action” on “urgently needed economic reforms”. Over 100 judges 1 Sept began open-ended strike, protesting devalued salaries. Human Rights Watch 13 Sept reported children in public schools had fallen between one and two years behind their curricula due to school closures. Households in capital Beirut and Mount Lebanon faced recurrent water shortages, as state could not pay for diesel needed to run pumping facilities.

Presidential vacuum entered eleventh consecutive month. French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian 11 Sept conducted three-day visit to try and break prevailing deadlock over election of new president, as parliament had not convened for presidential election session since June, but mission apparently failed to deliver tangible progress.

Concerns rose over irregular Syrian migration. Army 4 Sept claimed that it had stopped more than 1,000 Syrians trying to enter Lebanon over previous week. Caretaker FM Abdallah Bou Habib 6 Sept exhorted international community to provide aid to Syria, arguing deteriorating economic conditions there had sparked recent migration wave. Tensions could rise between host communities and Syrian refugees amid hostile rhetoric from political elites.

Libya

Floods devastated eastern city of Derna after Storm Daniel caused dam collapse, leaving thousands dead; UN envoy for Libya reiterated support for unified govt before elections.

Up to 20,000 people feared dead after devastating floods. As Storm Daniel 11 Sept hit eastern Libya, two dams located upstream from coastal city of Derna collapsed; water swiped away entire neighbourhoods, resulting in an estimated 20,000 deaths. In rare sign of unity, aid in following days poured from across country. Various state agencies affiliated with Tripoli-based govt sent in aid and some military commanders from western Libya arrived in Derna. East-based authorities however denied entry to Derna to Tripoli-based govt ministers in likely attempt to prevent Tripoli from taking credit for rescue efforts. International support effort also defied traditional geopolitical divides. Traditional allies of general commander of Libyan National Army, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, including United Arab Emirates and Egypt, immediately stepped in to help, but historical allies of Tripoli-based authorities, Qatar and Türkiye, also sent search and rescue teams and specialized equipment to help locate survivors. Debate erupted over human responsibility for tragedy. Hundreds of protesters 18 Sept rallied in Derna, blaming long-term neglect for dam collapse and chanting slogans against eastern parliament, House of Representatives (HoR), and its speaker Aguila Saleh. Country’s top prosecutor 25 Sept announced detention of eight current and former officials pending investigation into collapse of dams; several others reportedly detained in following days.

UN envoy for Libya reiterated support for unified govt before elections. UN special envoy to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, early Sept met with several Libyan officials, including Aguila Saleh and Khalifa Haftar, and Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba. In meeting with latter, Bathily 5 Sept reiterated elections should take place under supervision of unified govt. Bathily in aftermath of Derna flood continued to urge Libyan stakeholders to step up efforts toward holding elections and unifying national institutions.

Controversy over former FM’s meeting with Israeli counterpart persisted. After revelation that Tripoli-based FM Najla al-Mangoush held talks with her Israeli counterpart, Eli Cohen, in Aug sparked widespread protests, leading to her dismissal, prosecutor’s office 2-3 Sept launched investigation into bilateral meeting.

Saudi Arabia

Govt and Israel reportedly inched toward normalisation deal, ambassador to Iran commenced diplomatic duties, and officials hosted Houthi delegation for first time.

Saudi Arabia and Israel signalled progress on possible normalisation deal. First official Israeli delegation 10 Sept arrived in capital Riyadh for UNESCO World Heritage Committee meeting. In first public visit by Israeli cabinet minister, tourism minister 26 Sept arrived in Riyadh to attend UN World Tourism Organization event. In interview with U.S. broadcaster, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 20 Sept said normalisation with Israel was getting closer “every day”. Israeli FM next day said normalisation deal could be in place “in first quarter of 2024” but U.S. officials cautioned that “there’s some way to travel” before reaching agreement. Amid reported progress, Palestinian delegation 6 and 14 Sept visited Saudi Arabia, requesting measures on Palestinian statehood be included in any deal with Israel. Saudi delegation 26-27 Sept visited occupied West Bank for first time in three decades; first Saudi ambassador to Palestine 26 Sept presented credentials to PA President Abbas (see Israel-Palestine).

Tehran and Riyadh exchanged ambassadors; officials held talks with Houthis. Fulfilling terms of reconciliation deal in March, albeit three months later than planned, Saudi ambassador to Iran and Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia 5 Sept commenced official duties in respective capitals. Riyadh 14-19 Sept hosted Houthi delegation and Omani mediators for political talks in first visit by rebels since outbreak of war (see Yemen).

Syria

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reasserted control in north east amid tensions with Arab leaders, clashes continued between rebels and regime in north west and anti-govt protests persisted in south.

In north east, tensions simmered between SDF and Arab tribes. Following anti-SDF uprising in Deir ez-Zor province late Aug that saw clashes as Arab tribes effectively abandoned posts and called for unified opposition against group, U.S. officials 3 Sept met Arab tribal leaders and SDF commanders to diffuse tensions. SDF early Sept bolstered forces to regain control of towns and 6 Sept declared end of military operations but near-daily insurgent attacks continued. Renewed clashes 25 Sept erupted in Ziban town, as various actors late month attacked SDF positions across eastern Deir Ez Zor.

In north west, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and regime battled. Hostilities raged in southern Idlib during early Sept amid spate of Russian bombings as regime forces sought to regain strategic hills. HTS raid 1 Sept killed at least 16 soldiers in Latakia province and 2 Sept destroyed regime position in western Aleppo. HTS attack 15 Sept killed five soldiers in Latakia. UN 19 Sept commenced aid deliveries to Idlib for first time since July.

Turkish-Kurdish clashes persisted, Israel conducted airstrikes. Turkish drone 7 Sept killed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) commander in Hasakah province and drone strikes 17 Sept killed five Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) members in Hasakah; 19 Sept killed high-ranking People’s Protection Units (YPG) member in Manbij. SDF 18 Sept reportedly attacked Turkish-backed fighters, killing at least 13 in Tal Battal, Aleppo province. Meanwhile, Syrian state media reported Israeli airstrike 13 Sept targeted Tartous city, killing two soldiers and injuring six, and missile factory in Hama province. Israel 20 Sept struck two Syrian structures in Golan Heights; alleged Israeli drone next reportedly killed two near Beit Jinn (see Israel-Palestine).

Anti-govt protests continued in south. Protests in Suwayda and Deraa provinces, sparked by currency crisis in Aug, took on more overtly anti-Assad tones as thousands marched calling for regime’s downfall. Aside from Baath Party guards 13 Sept firing at protestors in Suwayda, injuring three, regime response centred on negotiations with Druze leaders.

Tunisia

Authorities continued to silence govt critics, controversy over EU-Tunisia migration deal persisted, and President Saïed kept hard stance against austerity despite risk of economic collapse.

Judicial harassment of An-Nahda officials continued. Authorities 5 Sept arrested Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party’s interim president Mondher Ounissi and senior official Abdel Karim Harouni as part of investigation into alleged illegal financing from abroad. Security forces same day also arrested former PM and An-Nahda leader Hamadi Jebali at his home in city of Sousse, released him after 7-hour interrogation by judicial unit responsible for financial corruption cases.

EU-Tunisia migration control deal continued to face pushback. In heated debate at EU parliament, EU lawmakers 12 Sept discussed EU-Tunisia migration control deal signed in July; several MEPs accused EU Commission of failing to recognise mounting evidence of Tunisian authorities’ abusive treatment of sub-Saharan migrants, while others denounced deal’s failure to reduce migration flows. European Ombudsman 15 Sept announced asking EU Commission to clarify how it plans to ensure respect for human rights in migration-related actions resulting from agreement. Meanwhile, Tunis mid-Sept denied entry to EU parliament’s foreign affairs committee delegation; committee later “condemned” decision and demanded “detailed explanation”.

In other important developments. Amid persistent risk of economic collapse, Saïed 8 Sept called on Central Bank to purchase treasury bonds to help finance budget directly, in spite of Central Bank Governor Marouane Abassi’s previous warning that move could lead to higher inflation and greater pressure on banks’ liquidity. Saïed 15 Sept also pressed PM Ahmed Hanachi, who took office 1 Aug, to set up commissions in every ministry to review public sector hiring processes, in likely attempt to break political parties’ patronage networks.

Western Sahara

UN envoy Staffan de Mistura visited Morocco-controlled Western Sahara for first time since appointment two years ago in bid to revive stalled political process on disputed territory.

UN envoy visited Morocco-controlled Western Sahara for first time. Ahead of UN Security Council meeting on Western Sahara in October, UN envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, 4 Sept began first visit to Morocco-controlled Western Sahara since 2021 appointment; de Mistura had renounced previous trips due to Rabat-imposed restrictions on meeting list.

U.S. redoubled engagement to advance UN-led political process. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Africa, Joshua Harris, 31 Aug-4 Sept visited Algeria and Morocco to support UN efforts to revive peace process; Harris notably met with Polisario Front independence movement leader, Brahim Ghali, in Sahrawi refugee camps of Tindouf (Algeria).

In other important developments. At UN General Assembly, heated exchange 26 Sept took place between Algerian and Moroccan representatives over Western Sahara.

Yemen

Houthi delegation visited Saudi Arabia for first time in nine years, sporadic clashes surged between Houthis and govt forces, and Southern Transitional Council (STC) called for separate state.

Houthi representatives travelled to Saudi Arabia for dialogue. In first official visit since outbreak of war in 2014, Houthi delegation and Omani mediators 14-19 Sept held talks with Saudi officials in Saudi capital Riyadh; talks reportedly included reopening of Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa airport and Hodeida port, reopening roads in Taiz, Al-Dhale, Marib and Hodeida governorates, prisoner exchange, roadmap for permanent ceasefire, ending airstrikes and cross-border attacks, establishing timeline for foreign troops to leave Yemen, and payment of public salaries from oil and gas revenues, possibly by directing revenue to neutral country’s bank; talks did not include representatives from Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Meanwhile, Houthis 2 Sept announced that Yemenia airlines would increase flights between Sanaa and Jordanian capital Amman to six per week from 5 Sept.

Houthis and govt forces clashed sporadically. After hostilities broke out along several frontlines in Marib governorate in Aug, clashes 16 Sept erupted between govt forces and Houthis near Al-Mutoon district and 20 Sept reportedly in Taiz governorate. Bahrain late month claimed Houthi drone strike killed four Bahraini soldiers on Saudi Arabia’s border; Saudi-led coalition said it “reserves the right to respond”. In Houthi-controlled Sanaa, Houthis 21 Sept held military parade. Teachers in Houthi-controlled areas, including Sanaa, entered second month of strikes demanding unpaid salaries; in response, after announcing transportation allowance for teachers in late Aug, Houthis 8 Sept arrested representative of Yemeni Teachers Club in Mahwit.

STC leader renewed call for southern state. Following uptick in fighting between Houthis and STC-affiliated brigades in Aug in region straddling Al-Bayda governorate’s Al-Zahir district and Lahj governorates’s Al-Hadd and Yafea districts, resulting in dozens of casualties on both sides, head of STC and member of PLC Ayderous al-Zubaidi 22 Sept called for creation of separate southern state. Clashes between STC-affiliated group and suspected al-Qaeda militants 27 Sept reportedly killed at least five STC-affiliated fighters in Abyan governorate.

Africa

Burkina Faso

Amid countrywide insecurity, military authorities engaged in diplomatic spat with Paris over stance on Niger coup, and intensified crackdown on dissent.

Insecurity remained elevated, with heavy toll on civilians. Military operations against jihadist groups continued. Notably, airstrike 2 Aug allegedly killed around ten al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants in Bourou village, Soum province, Sahel region. Meanwhile in Hauts-Bassins region, presumed JNIM combatants 1 Aug killed around seven army auxiliaries (VDPs) and lost ten of their own militants in attack on Niamana village, Kenedougou province. Civilians remained caught between jihadists on one hand and govt forces and their civilian auxiliaries on the other. Notably, presumed JNIM fighters 6 Aug killed around 22 civilians and wounded another ten near Nohao village, Boulgou province, Centre-East region.

Ouagadougou continued to draw further away from erstwhile allies. French govt 6 Aug announced suspending French development and budgetary aid to Burkina Faso after country expressed support for coup leaders in Niger (see Niger). In response, Ouagadougou next day denounced double taxation treaty with France. After Niger 6 Aug closed its airspace, French flag carrier Air France next day suspended all flights to and from Ouagadougou (and Bamako) citing “geopolitical situation in the Sahel”. Meanwhile, interim President Capt. Traoré 31 Aug reportedly discussed possible military cooperation with Russian delegation in capital Ouagadougou.

Clampdown on dissent intensified. Coalition of around 50 political parties and civil society groups, Patriotic Front, 4 Aug denounced “abuses” and non-inclusive governance by military authorities; statement came days after alleged state agents briefly kidnapped former MP Issouf Nikièma and court sentenced civil society activist Mohamed Sinon to prison for criticising gendarmerie. Authorities 10 Aug suspended prominent media outlet Radio Omega over accusations of promoting “strategy of chaos” in Niger after station broadcast interview with civil society activist opposing coup.

In other important developments. Videos purporting to show gunshots near air base in Ouagadougou 1 Aug circulated on social media, prompting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Col.-Maj. Célestin Simporé to denounce presence of “suspicious” individuals around base; days earlier, latter had denied rumours circulating on social media of mutinous feelings in certain military barracks.

Burundi

Army clashed with anti-Kigali rebels near Rwandan border, while main opposition party continued to crumble with disunity.

Army engaged anti-Kigali rebels based in Burundi. Armed forces 3 Aug engaged Kinyarwanda-speaking rebels from Rwanda in Mabayi district, Cibitoke province; clashes reportedly left six rebels and three soldiers dead, and forced residents to flee. Army’s operations commander subsequently vowed to intensify night-time patrols in area, reflecting army’s growing commitment to combat anti-Kigali rebels against backdrop of improving relations between Burundi and Rwanda. Unidentified assailants 9 Aug killed local leader of ruling party youth militia Imbonerakure, Isidore Niyongabo, at his home in Mabayi commune; locals accused FLN rebels of killing Niyongabo for collaborating with security forces during aforementioned operation.

Standoff continued between rival factions of main opposition party. Group of ten dissident executives of National Congress for Freedom (CNL) party 14 Aug proclaimed Marie Immaculée Ntacobakimvuna as interim party president to replace CNL President Agathon Rwasa; CNL wing loyal to Rwasa rejected move. Meanwhile, interior ministry 18 Aug prohibited planned gathering of party’s political bureau loyal to Rwasa.

In other important developments. Ahead of 2025 legislative elections, senate in Aug started consultations on removal of ethnic-based quotas in public sector employment provided in Burundi’s constitution and 2000 Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.

Cameroon

Anglophone conflict continued in North West and South West regions, while Far North region faced renewed jihadist attacks and violence over land disputes.

Army reported successful operations against Anglophone separatists. Govt forces 6 Aug ambushed Anglophone rebels in Bafut town (Mezam division, North West), killing two, and raided Anglophone separatist camp in Bopo village, Mbonge town (Meme division, South West), killing five rebels and seizing weapons. Separatists who late July mounted roadblocks across North West and South West regions with stated aim of curtailing govt’s extrajudicial killings, 16 Aug allowed road transport again. Unidentified armed group overnight 11-12 Aug reportedly raided Kekukesi-Akwaya locality in Manyu division (SW), killing four civilians.

Boko Haram stepped up attacks in Far North region after brief lull in July. Boko Haram combatants 2-3 Aug killed 12 civilians and kidnapped another 20 on Darak island of Lake Chad (Logone-et-Chari division); 8 Aug also attacked Bakarisse camp for internally displaced persons in Kerawa locality (Mayo-Sava division), killing three. Jihadist insurgents 15-29 Aug carried out nearly two dozen other attacks, killing at least three civilians in Mayo-Tsanaga and Mayo-Sava divisions. Soldiers 18 Aug killed at least four Islamic State West Africa Province militants near Hile-Alifa town (Logone-et-Chari), and 25 Aug killed another four jihadist militants near Mozogo town (Mayo-Tsanaga).

Land disputes evolved into intercommunal clashes in Far North region. Competition over ownership of rice field located near Kai-Kai town (Mayo-Danay division) 10 Aug led to violent clashes between villagers, leaving three casualties. Two weeks earlier, land dispute had turned into confrontation between Christians and Muslims in Warba village (Mayo-Sava division), with four killed and dozens injured.

Central African Republic

Referendum win opened the way for President Touadéra to extend his rule indefinitely, institutionalising authoritarian drift.

Touadéra secured controversial referendum victory. Electoral body 7 Aug announced resounding 95% yes vote for new constitution in referendum held 30 July, and Constitutional Court 20 Aug validated results, saying turnout reached 57%. New constitution, which scraps presidential term limits and bars Central Africans of foreign origin or holding another citizenship from running for president, paves the way for Touadéra to seek third term in 2025. Opposition coalition Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution, which boycotted referendum, claimed results were “fraudulent” and turnout as low as 10%; bloc’s coordinator Crépin Mboli-Goumba 22 Aug vowed to “oppose this desire to liquidate democracy in our country”. Internationally, U.S. 22 Aug expressed “deep reservations” over referendum vote in absence of independent electoral observers and called on CAR authorities to set date for long-overdue local elections.

Violence continued amid growing divisions within rebel coalition. Armed forces 1 Aug killed seven presumed Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) rebels during operation in gold mine in Abba area of Nana-Mambéré prefecture. Amid growing divisions within CPC, locals in Nana-Gribizi prefecture from 19 Aug onward reported presence of unidentified armed group equipped with robust armaments in several villages including Mbrès, Azène, Linguiri, and Koukourou; armed men in Azène allegedly claimed being part of new rebel movement, portrayed it as last chance for rebellion in CAR. In response, UN mission MINUSCA 22 Aug sent blue helmets to patrol area between Mbrès and Koukourou. Unidentified armed group presence also reported late-Aug in Chari village, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, while unidentified armed men 25 Aug attacked army position in Yawa village, Lobaye prefecture, forcing over 2,000 people to flee.

In other important developments. In apparent revenge attack, suspected Fulani herders Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) militiamen 1 Aug killed 13 civilians in Diki village, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture.

Chad

Amid renewed hostilities in northern Tibesti region, prominent rebel group declared an end to 2021 ceasefire with govt.

Two-year ceasefire between FACT and govt collapsed. Military mid-Aug bombed position of prominent Libya-based rebel group, Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), in northern Tibesti region, reportedly killing three rebels. FACT 18-19 Aug denounced act of war and called off 2021 unilateral ceasefire, vowing “quick, powerful and uncompromising” reaction. In televised address from frontline, Interim President Déby 20 Aug vowed to personally lead battle against FACT if rebels do not put down arms. Meanwhile, another Libya-based rebel group, Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR), 10 Aug conducted offensive on Wour, Kouri and Kouri-Zaou army bases in Tibesti, leaving unknown number of soldiers killed and allegedly capturing 23; CCMSR 28 Aug announced death of two senior leaders in airstrike conducted 17 Aug in northern Chad. Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar late Aug announced offensive against positions of Chadian rebels in southern Libya, said operation conducted in coordination with Chadian authorities.

Jihadist, communal and other violence continued to take toll on civilians. Boko Haram 5 Aug beheaded four captives after their families failed to pay ransom in Lac province (west). Chieftaincy dispute between two sub-clans of Mbaye community next day turned violent in Bekourou locality, Mandoul province (south), leaving four dead and 35 injured. Clashes between pastoral herders and local farmers 18-19 Aug left at least ten people dead in Abkhoura village, Mangalme department, Guera province (south). Meanwhile, Logone Oriental province (also south) saw several attacks by unidentified armed men, with two Arab herders and one farmer killed 13-14 Aug.

Exiled opposition leader announced homecoming. Succès Masra, president of opposition party Les Transformateurs, 10 Aug announced his imminent return from exile — where he has lived since October 2022 crackdown on protesters — and outlined intention to prioritise dialogue and national reconciliation. Minister of Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Abderaman Koulamallah 18 Aug said authorities would guarantee Masra’s security.

In other important developments. Prominent Fulani rebel leader from southern Chad, Baba Laddé, 22 Aug called on all “patriotic forces” to unite for “national uprising” against Déby.

Côte d’Ivoire

Death of former President Bédié created power vacuum in main opposition party, and Niger’s junta recalled ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire to protest President Ouattara’s firm stance against coup.

Veteran politician Bédié died, leaving massive void in his party. Veteran politician and leader of Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), former President Henri Konan Bédié, 1 Aug died aged 89. President Ouattara next day declared ten days of national mourning, cancelling 7 Aug Independence Day celebrations. PDCI set to embark on fierce succession struggle one month before local elections set for 2 Sept, and two years before 2025 presidential contest, as Bédié kept strong control over party apparatus during his decades in charge, resisted generational change, and did not designate successor.

Tensions rose between Abidjan and Niamey after coup in Niger. Following extraordinary summit of West African regional bloc ECOWAS, Ouattara 10 Aug affirmed commitment to using all necessary means, including military force, to reinstate constitutional order in Niger; also said Côte d’Ivoire would send battalion of up to 1,100 troops as well as financial resources in case of ECOWAS Standby Force deployment. In response, junta in Niamey 14 Aug recalled Nigerien ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire (see Niger).

Democratic Republic of Congo

Ahead of elections set for December, crackdown on dissent and civil liberties escalated as security forces killed over 40 anti-UN protesters in eastern province of North Kivu.

Anti-MONUSCO protest turned deadly. Govt forces 30 Aug stopped religious group from holding demonstration against UN mission (MONUSCO) in North Kivu’s provincial capital, Goma; crackdown reportedly left at least 43 people dead and 56 wounded, while over 150 people were arrested. Repression sent chilling message across country over space for free speech and dissent in lead-up to general elections due in late 2023.

Armed group violence continued in eastern provinces, mainly targeting civilians. In Ituri province, Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 19-21 Aug killed over 50 people in Irumu territory. Also in Ituri, Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO), which gathers various ethnic Lendu militias, 15 Aug killed 11 civilians in two attacks in Irumu territory, and 27-28 Aug killed 30 people in Djugu and Aru territories. Amid fragile truce with govt, Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continued to fight with local armed groups for territorial control in North Kivu. Notably, clashes between M23 and Democratic Forces for the liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) 6 Aug killed at least two FDLR combatants and ten civilians in Marangara and Ruzanze villages, Rutshuru territory. Meanwhile, participants to President Tshisekedi-sponsored roundtable held 14-16 Aug in capital Kinshasa called for immediate lifting of so-called “state of siege” declared in May 2021 in Ituri and North Kivu provinces, citing lack of conclusive results in fight against armed groups.

In other important developments. In likely bid to strengthen control of security apparatus as elections near, Tshisekedi 1 Aug appointed new heads of National Intelligence Agency and National Security Council. Electoral commission 11 Aug published provisional list of candidates for National Assembly, and 27 Aug completed registration of candidates for provincial and municipal elections; political heavyweights Joseph Kabila and Martin Fayulu boycotted registration process. Electoral commission 22 Aug restricted municipal election on 20 Dec to communes located in provincial capitals, citing customary power conflicts in rural areas; elections projected in 2024 in remaining municipalities.

Eritrea

Asmara rejected fresh accusations of troop presence in Ethiopia’s Tigray region while fears simmered that Ethiopia’s Amhara rebellion could draw Eritrea in; army accused of human rights abuses.

Asmara dismissed allegations of troop presence in Tigray. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10 Aug summoned British Chargé d’Affaires after British Ambassador to Ethiopia Darren Welch 9 Aug called for complete withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Ethiopia’s Tigray region; govt accused Welch of “endorsing the TPLF’s [Tigray People’s Liberation Front] irredentist claims”.

Amhara rebellion heightened risks of Eritrean involvement on insurgent side. Ethiopia’s Defence Minister Abraham Belay 22 Aug announced plans to return hundreds of thousands of people displaced from Western and parts of Southern Tigray (under Amhara’s administration since Nov 2020) to their homes; Abraham added that govt will dissolve Amhara’s “illegal administration” in these areas in accordance with Nov 2022 peace deal with TPLF (see Ethiopia). Remarks came amid escalating rebellion in Amhara region, led by nationalist militia known as Fano, and increased likelihood of Asmara supporting Fano rebellion in order to prevent Tigray from recovering control of disputed territory and gaining access to an external border.

UN spotlighted human rights abuses in army. UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Eritrea Mohamed Babiker 7 Aug said Eritrean conscripts are subjected to torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, forced labour and abusive conditions during military service.

Ethiopia

Amhara region witnessed worsening violence as nationalist militia clashed with security forces, prompting Addis Ababa to declare state of emergency; federal minister vowed to end Amhara’s “illegal administration” in Western and Southern Tigray.

Violence in Amhara region reached new heights. Fighting between Amhara nationalist militia known as Fano and federal and regional forces dramatically escalated, with Fano early Aug seizing control of several towns and cities. Addis Ababa 3 Aug blocked internet access to region, next day declared six-month state of emergency. In following weeks, authorities arrested hundreds of people allegedly linked to militants, including politician and outspoken govt critic Christian Tadelle. By 9 Aug, federal forces had recaptured major towns, pushing Fano militants to rural areas where fighting continued. Clashes late Aug flared in large towns, such as Debre Tabor and Debre Markos. UN 29 Aug said at least 183 killed in clashes since July.

Minister vowed to return IDPs to Western and Southern Tigray. Defence Minister Abraham Belay 22 Aug announced on Facebook govt plans to return people displaced during Tigray conflict from Western and parts of Southern Tigray (under Amhara’s administration since Nov 2020) to their homes; Abraham added that govt will dissolve Amhara’s “illegal administration” in these areas as per Nov 2022 peace deal with Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Remarks risk enflaming perceptions among Amhara that federal govt betrayed them when it struck deal with TPLF, and could empower Fano rebellion and draw Eritrea into conflict (see Eritrea).

Govt-insurgent fighting persisted in Oromia region. Heavy clashes between govt and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) continued in Oromia, with civilians again targeted. Notably, residents in West Shewa Zone’s Chobi district 16 Aug accused govt troops of killing at least 12 civilians during anti-insurgent operations; OLA fighters 17 Aug attacked police station in West Guji, killing local official. Fano continued to mount attacks and abduct residents.

In other important developments. World Food Programme 8 Aug resumed food aid deliveries, suspended in June. BRICS bloc of emerging economies 24 Aug invited Ethiopia to join from Jan 2024. Talks with Egypt and Sudan over Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 28 Aug concluded without breakthrough (see Nile Waters). 

Gabon

Military seized power from President Ali Bongo moments after authorities announced his re-election for third term.

As general elections 26 Aug drew to a close, authorities cut internet access and announced nightly curfew. Main opposition candidate in presidential contest, Albert Ondo Ossa, same day denounced “fraud” and 28 Aug claimed to have won, urging incumbent President Ali Bongo to concede defeat and organise handover. Election body 30 Aug however said Bongo had won third term with 64.27% of vote. Moments later, gunfire was reported in capital Libreville, and dozen military officers appeared on state TV to announce “putting an end to the current regime”; officers said they had detained Ali Bongo, election results were cancelled, all borders closed and state institutions dissolved. Hundreds of people immediately filled streets in multiple cities to celebrate change of leadership. Military junta, calling itself Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions, later same day named head of Republican Guard, General Brice Oligui Nguema, as country’s transitional president. Coup drew international condemnation. Notably, African Union 31 Aug suspended Gabon’s membership and “strongly condemn[ed] the military takeover of power” as did, among others, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, and French and U.S. govts.

Guinea

Tensions continued to run high between transitional authorities and political parties.

Opposition expressed concern over transition timeline. Transitional President Col. Doumbouya early Aug amended electoral code by decree, enabling military governors to appoint local state representatives. Opposition immediately denounced attempt by junta to consolidate power. Notably, Edouard Zoutomou Kpoghomou, leader of Union for Progress and Renewal political party, 7 Aug accused Col. Doumbouya’s military govt of attempting to extend transition period beyond 24-month timeline agreed upon with West African regional bloc ECOWAS. Main opposition party Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) 17 Aug also reiterated opposition to future electoral processes being led by military govt.

Political landscape reshaped itself in anticipation of future elections. After 19 opposition parties late July announced creation of National Alliance for Change to serve as common front ahead of next elections, nine political parties in Upper Guinea region 13 Aug announced joining force. Former UN Special Representative for Central Africa, Guinean diplomat François Louncény Fall, 11 Aug announced his candidacy for president. UFDG 15 Aug said preparations for leader Cellou Dalein Diallo’s highly anticipated return from exile still ongoing, with no fixed date in sight.

In other important developments. Delegation from Niger's junta 12 Aug visited Guinea and met with Col. Doumbouya to ask for “stronger support to face the challenges ahead”, in view of ECOWAS threat of military intervention.

Kenya

Govt and opposition returned to negotiating table, but mutual distrust persisted; Al-Shabaab continued to step up attacks near Somalia border.

Govt and opposition resumed talks to bridge differences. Ruling Kenya Kwanza alliance led by President Ruto and Raila Odinga’s opposition Azimio la Umoja coalition 9 Aug agreed to resume bipartisan talks to tackle disagreements on raft of issues, including high cost of living and results of 2022 elections. Bipartisan dialogue committee 21 Aug met and 30 Aug signed framework agreement for dialogue, agreeing to report to respective leaders on five major issues within 60 days. Hard-line politicians from both sides and sour personal relations however risk derailing talks; notably, Deputy President of Kenya Rigathi Gachagua 22 Aug dismissed bipartisan talks as “waste of time”. Meanwhile, energy regulator 14 Aug said govt reinstated limited subsidy to stabilise fuel price for 30 days; along with tax hikes, govt’s removal of fuel and maize subsidies has sparked public anger and protests in recent months.

Al-Shabaab staged multiple attacks in Lamu county near Somalia. Al-Shabaab 1 Aug ambushed and killed two people in Mwembeni area on Lamu-Witu-Garsen road near Lamu-Tana River county border; security forces next day reported killing 60 Al-Shabaab militants in response to series of ambushes in area. Al-Shabaab 10 Aug killed three soldiers near Kiunga town, 15 Aug launched two separate attacks on civilian vehicles near Koreni and Bargoni localities, leaving at least two dead, and 22 Aug killed two civilians in ambush near Lango La Simba area on Lamu-Witu-Garsen road.

Cattle-related violence erupted along Kisumu-Kericho border. Tensions over suspected cattle rustling 19 Aug turned into clashes in Nyakach sub-county along border between Kisumu and Kericho counties; at least two killed and eight injured.

Mali

Amid UN mission’s withdrawal, significant clashes erupted in north between govt forces and former rebels for first time since 2015 peace agreement; coming weeks could see more violence and collapse of peace process.

MINUSMA withdrawal put 2015 peace deal under threat. Permanent Strategic Framework, which gathers northern armed groups signatory to 2015 Algiers peace agreement with Bamako, 1 Aug warned about “serious imminent risks” associated with handover to Malian army of UN mission (MINUSMA) camps in areas controlled by signatory armed groups. In following days, major clashes erupted between alliance of former rebel groups Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and military for first time since peace deal implementation. CMA alleged army and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 4 Aug attacked CMA-controlled border post in Foyta locality (Timbuktu region) near Mauritania, killing two CMA elements; govt forces and CMA 11-12 Aug also clashed near MINUSMA camp in Ber (also Timbuktu region), leaving unclear number dead. MINUSMA 13 Aug accelerated withdrawal from Ber camp in light of security situation, completing it same day, and 16 Aug also left Goundam camp (Timbuktu). CMA 28-29 Aug accused army of launching airstrikes on CMA positions near Anefis town in Kidal region.

Jihadist violence continued in centre and north. Islamic State Sahel Province 3 Aug attacked army-escorted convoy in Essailal locality, Menaka region (north), killing at least six soldiers. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 8 Aug imposed blockade on Timbuktu city, creating food and aid shortages, to oppose Malian army’s deployment in context of MINUSMA’s withdrawal. In Bandiagara region (centre), suspected JNIM elements 18 Aug raided Yarou village, killing 23 people.

In other important developments. Bamako and Ouagadougou 1 Aug warned West African regional bloc (ECOWAS) against any military intervention in Niger, saying it would amount to declaration of war against Mali and Burkina Faso. After Niger 6 Aug closed its airspace, French flag carrier Air France next day suspended all flights to and from Bamako (and Ouagadougou) citing “geopolitical situation in the Sahel”. In escalating row, France and Mali 7-9 Aug stopped issuing visas to each other’s nationals.

Mozambique

Insurgent activity against govt forces remained high in Macomia district in northern Cabo Delgado province; authorities postponed district elections.

Macomia district continued to be hotspot of Cabo Delgado conflict. Suspected Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) fighters 1 Aug killed nine soldiers near Ilala village; Southern African Development Community Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM) patrol hours later engaged insurgent cell, causing unknown number of casualties. ISMP militants 5-8 Aug killed at least seven soldiers in clashes near Catupa forest, and 22 Aug ambushed govt and SAMIM forces convoy travelling to Quiterajo village, killing nine. Army 23-25 Aug announced killing three senior ISMP executives, including commander of operations in Cabo Delgado, in Macomia forests; report is yet to be confirmed by Rwanda and SAMIM. Meanwhile, ISMP cells pursued hearts and minds strategy in some coastal areas, with militants 3 Aug buying goods and food from residents in Pangane (Macomia) and Marere (Mocímboa da Praia district) villages.

Reports of indiscipline within security forces in Cabo Delgado continued to emerge. Rwandan soldiers 1 Aug reportedly intervened after police beat local in Mocímboa da Praia town. Meanwhile, significant number of police officers and soldiers in Aug reportedly had salaries delayed for second month; delays in salary payments could add to indiscipline within security forces, creating additional hurdle in counter-insurgency efforts.

President Nyusi visit to Cabo Delgado overshadowed by postponed elections. As Nyusi visited Palma town and his home district Mueda, National Assembly 3 Aug approved indefinite postponement of district elections initially scheduled for 2024, due to financial and security constraints. Main opposition party RENAMO said decision threatens democracy and will allow ruling party to entrench hold on power. Meanwhile, mayor of Nampula city and RENAMO party member Paulo Vahanle alleged police officer 22 Aug attempted to kill him; RENAMO 26 Aug threatened to “bring country to a halt” in case of attacks on party members.

Niger

West African regional bloc continued to threaten use of force to restore constitutional order; move could trigger major pushback and put Niger and wider region at risk of war.

ECOWAS maintained threat of force to restore constitutional order. Military junta 6 Aug closed Niger’s airspace as West African regional bloc (ECOWAS) seven-day ultimatum to hand power back to elected President Bazoum expired. ECOWAS 10 Aug activated standby force for possible action against junta and 18 Aug reportedly set “D-Day” for military intervention. Regional bloc, which appears divided over course of action, 19 Aug sent delegation to Niger to press coup leader Gen. Tchiani and other junta figures for peaceful return to constitutional order.

Coup leaders found common ground with counterparts in Sahel. Military authorities in Bamako and Ouagadougou 1 Aug jointly said any ECOWAS military intervention in Niger would amount to declaration of war against Mali and Burkina Faso. Senior junta leader, Gen. Salifou Mody, next day met with Malian and Burkinabe transitional presidents in their respective capitals. Coup leaders continued to capitalise on ill feelings toward former colonial power. Junta 25 Aug ordered French ambassador in Niamey, Sylvain Itte, to leave country within 48 hours; French President Macron 28 Aug said Itte would stay at his post, reportedly prompting junta in following days to order police to expel him.

Junta proposed three-year transition to civilian rule. Junta 7 Aug appointed former Finance Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine as interim PM, and 10 Aug announced 21-member interim govt with military officers in charge of six ministries, including defence and interior, and Bazoum’s party holding no ministries. Gen. Tchiani 19 Aug said transition to civilian rule would “not go beyond three years”; also warned ECOWAS that security forces would “not shirk” from defending country. ECOWAS 21 Aug rejected three-year transition plan as “unacceptable”.

Jihadists launched deadliest attacks on military in months. Possibly emboldened by political upheaval in Niamey, suspected jihadists 15 Aug ambushed military detachment near Koutougou town, Tillabery region (south west), killing 17 soldiers and wounding another 24. Another ambush 20 Aug killed 12 soldiers in Anzourou commune, also Tillabery, with military reporting “heavy losses” among assailants.  

Nigeria

Turmoil increased among rival jihadists in North East Zone, while military suffered deadly armed group attack in North Central Zone.

Jihadist violence continued to wreak havoc in Borno state, North East Zone. Boko Haram fighters 12 Aug attacked military base near Konduga town, killing three soldiers, and later same day shot ten farmers dead in Maiwa village, 5km outside Borno state capital Maiduguri. Group 22 Aug also kidnapped over 40 women on their farms near Maiduguri-Mafa road in Jere area, released them three days later after state official reportedly paid ransom. Turmoil continued to increase between – and within – rival jihadist groups. Inter-ethnic clash among Boko Haram fighters 15 Aug reportedly left 82 dead in Kukawa area; crisis allegedly sparked by execution of seven fighters from Buduma tribe after they tried to surrender to govt troops. In what could amount to deadliest confrontation to date, Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province 18-19 Aug clashed near Marte town, allegedly resulting in death of over 100 combatants on both sides.

Army suffered deadly armed group attack in North Central Zone. Armed group 14 Aug ambushed soldiers near Kundu village in Zungeru area of Niger state (North Central); at least 36 soldiers killed in attack and subsequent crash of military medical evacuation helicopter. Domestic intelligence agency 16 Aug warned of imminent kidnapping-for-ransom attack on Abuja-Kaduna railway line. Military operations against criminal groups continued. Notably, security forces 10 Aug rescued ten people held hostage at Birnin Yero village, Igabi area of Kaduna state (North West).

President Tinubu’s economic policies faced opposition amid aggravated hardship. Labour unions 2 Aug led marches across country to protest soaring cost of living notably since Tinubu removed fuel subsidy; labour union representatives later same day met with Tinubu and agreed to return to talks. Meanwhile, nearly three months after taking office, Tinubu 21 Aug swore in 45 ministers; bloated cabinet widely seen as contradictory to Tinubu’s campaign promise of reducing governance costs.

In other important developments. Niger coup leaders 3 Aug announced withdrawing ambassador to Nigeria as West African regional bloc ECOWAS, presided over by Tinubu, threatened to use force to restore constitutional order (see Niger).

Nile Waters

Talks between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) concluded without breakthrough.

Ethiopian, Egyptian and Sudanese officials 27 Aug met in Egyptian capital Cairo to restart negotiations over Ethiopia’s controversial GERD project, though talks 28 Aug concluded without any indication of progress. Resumption of discussions followed mid-July agreement between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed to finalise deal on dam’s filling and operation within four months. Next round of talks scheduled for Sept in Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.

Rwanda

Washington sanctioned Rwandan and Congolese individuals for alleged role in eastern DR Congo (DRC) conflict; President Kagame reshuffled military positions.

U.S. sanctioned individuals for contributing to eastern DRC conflict. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 15 Aug held phone call with Kagame to discuss security crisis involving Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern DRC; Blinken reportedly renewed call for “diplomatic solution to the tensions” between Kinshasa and Kigali and “for each side to take measures to de-escalate the situation”. Meanwhile, U.S. treasury 24 Aug placed sanctions on six individuals for their alleged role in eastern DRC conflict, including one Rwandan and one Congolese senior army officers, one M23 deputy commander, and three Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda militia leaders.

Kagame announced major changes in security forces. Hours after coup in Gabon, Kagame 30 Aug retired 12 army generals, including old guard members, and dozens of other senior military officers; also promoted several young officers to rank of colonel and designated new generals to lead military divisions.

Senegal

Opposition leader Ousmane Sonko continued hunger strike to protest detention, and electoral reform allowed previously sidelined political heavyweights to stand for election.

On hunger strike since late July to protest his detention and dissolution of his PASTEF party, opposition leader Ousmane Sonko was admitted to hospital 6 Aug and to intensive care 16 Aug. PASTEF next day condemned “inhuman persecution” of Sonko. Almost 150 prominent figures, including former minister Serigne Diop, and President of Senegalese League for Human Rights, Alassane Seck, signed petition demanding Sonko’s release and reinstatement of PASTEF. Meanwhile, parliament 5 Aug passed electoral law revision effectively clearing two key opposition figures to run for president in Feb 2024: Khalifa Sall, former mayor of Dakar, and Karim Wade, son of former President Abdoulaye Wade.

Somalia

Govt’s attempt to revitalise offensive against Al-Shabaab in central regions backfired, with military retreating after making initial gains in Galgaduud region.

Military offensive against Al-Shabaab suffered setback as troops retreated. President Mohamud 5 Aug travelled to Galmudug state capital, Dhusamareb, to reinvigorate stalled offensive against Al-Shabaab in central regions. Army and allied clan militias 14 Aug launched operations in Galgaduud and Mudug regions (both Galmudug state) and in following days made initial progress. Notably, army 16 Aug successfully cleared mines in several villages on border between Galgaduud and Hiraan regions, 21 Aug regained key Wabho town, next day captured Cowsweyne village and 24-25 Aug took over strategic Elbur town (all Galgaduud). Troops however lost ground after Al-Shabaab militants 26 Aug launched major attack involving suicide bombs in Cowsweyne, inflicting heavy losses on govt force. Govt forces in following days reportedly pulled back from villages and towns recently captured, including Budbud, Wabho, Galcad, El Dhere and Masagaway, and 29 Aug also left Elbur.

Al-Shabaab militants continued to pose major threat in several regions. In Lower Shabelle region (south), bomb aboard passenger bus 9 Aug killed six and wounded 12 on road between Marka to Qoriyoley districts. In Hiraan region (centre), Al-Shabaab suicide bomber 10 Aug targeted Jalalaqsi district governor, killing five including district officials but leaving governor unharmed. Militants 23 Aug launched suicide attack on security forces in Kadha area on Mogadishu’s outskirts, killing two soldiers. Meanwhile, authorities 4 Aug announced arrest of ten govt staff from various departments including intelligence agency for allegedly collaborating with Al-Shabaab, serving as reminder that group has infiltrated govt security structures.

Security situation remained tense but stable in Puntland state. After Puntland parliament in July passed constitutional amendments allowing for direct election of state president, Puntland President Said Deni 1 Aug pledged to hold presidential and parliamentary polls by 8 Jan 2024; opponents however continued to accuse him of seeking to use transition to direct universal suffrage to extend term or set rules of the game in his favour.

Somaliland

In most significant advance since conflict began, Dhulbahante militias captured several army positions on outskirts of Las Anod town, driving Somaliland forces out of Dhulbahante territory.

Clan militias forced govt troops out of Dhulbahante territory. In major victory, Dhulbahante militiamen 25 Aug captured Goojacade army base from Somaliland forces, as well as several smaller outposts on outskirts of Sool region’s capital Las Anod, meaning Somaliland forces no longer retain significant presence in Dhulbahante territory. Abdulkadir Ahmed ‘Firdhiye’, who was elected 5 Aug as chair of self-declared SSC-Khatumo state’s executive council (new 45-member body tasked with running area), same day gave triumphalist speech vowing to “immediately commence efforts to secure our region and establish our own administration”. Somaliland President Bihi and opposition party leaders next day jointly pledged to defend Somaliland’s territory. In joint statement, UN, African Union mission in Somalia, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, European Union and others 27 Aug condemned “escalation of conflict” and urged all sides to agree to “immediate and unconditional ceasefire”.

Clan militia protesting election delays mounted new attack in Togdheer region. Newly-formed militia composed of members of Haber Yonis clan protesting against delays in Somaliland’s electoral cycle 11 Aug ambushed Somaliland security forces in Godayar district in Togdheer region, killing nine and injuring 17. Abdirahman Irro, founder of main opposition party Waddani (which is dominated by Haber Yonis clan), 12 Aug called on both sides to refrain from violence.

In other important developments. Ruling Kulmiye party 21 Aug elected Bihi as candidate for presidential election set for late 2024, and Interior Minister Mohamed Kahin as new party chair. Elders from Haber Jeclo clan 27 Aug proposed combining political party and presidential elections in Nov 2024 as means to bridge gap between govt and opposition over electoral dispute.

South Sudan

President Kiir appointed ally as finance minister amid deteriorating relations with U.S. over Juba’s economic management; concerns about country’s preparedness for elections persisted.

U.S. issued business advisory over govt’s economic mismanagement. Minister of Petroleum, Puat Kang Chol, and Minister of Roads and Bridges, Simon Mijok Mijak, 3 Aug appeared in front of Public Financial Management (PFM) Oversight Committee, reportedly painting grim picture of govt’s economic mismanagement. Chol presented numbers that revealed misappropriation of oil income while Mijok reportedly described non-transparent procurement process for road building project and vastly inflated prices for its development. Days after presentation and amid years of mounting frustration, U.S. Department of State, Labor and Commerce 14 Aug issued advisory warning U.S. companies that conducting business with enterprises linked to South Sudanese govt officials or their families comes with “reputational, financial and legal risks”. Move marked significant escalation from previous warnings of business dealings with sanctioned individuals and companies. Meanwhile, President Kiir 3 Aug sacked Finance Minister Dier Tong Ngor and replaced him with Bak Barnaba Chol, who hails from Kiir’s home state Warrap; appointment set to tighten Kiir’s grip on public resources.

Stalled election preparations raised concerns. Head of UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Nicholas Haysom 2 Aug said country “is not yet ready for elections”; UNMISS Deputy Head Guang Cong 10 Aug reiterated warning, while interim chairperson of peace monitoring mechanism Charles Tai Gituai same day said authorities had made no progress on implementing key sections of peace deal. Despite concerns, govt 15 Aug said South Sudan would hold elections in 2024 according to schedule without implementing key provisions like census, border demarcation and provisions for displaced populations. VP Machar 29 Aug met with South Africa’s Deputy President Paul Mashatile in capital Juba, with latter offering to help resolve “challenges that may hinder free and fair elections”.

In other important developments. UNMISS 28 Aug reported thousands of South Sudanese refugees had returned to Akobo town from Ethiopia, owing to “ethnically fuelled violence within refugee camps in the Ethiopian Gambella region” and food shortages. Juba 3 Aug acceded to international Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Sudan

Army chief fled Khartoum as fighting in capital raged on, inter-ethnic clashes flared in Darfur, and tribal mobilisation threatened stability in east.

Army leader fled Khartoum amid heavy fighting. Hostilities between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued in Khartoum, with RSF attacking SAF military bases and SAF conducting airstrikes and firing artillery. Notably, SAF early Aug targeted Shambat bridge, key RSF supply line to sister cities Omdurman and Bahri; SAF and RSF 20-23 Aug battled over Armoured Corps base in Al-Shajara neighbourhood, SAF’s only remaining stronghold in capital besides headquarters. Meanwhile, army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan 24 Aug escaped headquarters after months-long RSF siege, subsequently visiting regional bases and Port Sudan before 29 Aug travelling to Egypt for talks.

RSF-SAF clashes in Darfur enflamed intercommunal conflicts. RSF 4 Aug claimed it had defeated SAF in Central Darfur, which SAF denied; in South Darfur, fighting between SAF and RSF throughout month killed scores and displaced 50,000 from state capital Nyala; and in North Darfur, fighting 17 Aug resumed in state capital El-Fasher. SAF-RSF fighting exacerbated intercommunal conflicts, particularly in South Darfur; notably, Salamat and Beni Halba tribes throughout month clashed in Kubum locality; rival Reizigat clans fought in and around Nyala. Meanwhile, media outlet The New Humanitarian 15 Aug reported testimonies of Darfuri refugees in Chad alleging RSF attacks on non-Arab civilians, especially Masalit, fleeing region.

Tribal mobilisation in east threatened stability, fighting continued in Kordofan. In eastern Sudan, RSF late July accused former President Bashir’s National Congress Party and Islamists in military of arming tribal militias, prompting number of Arab tribes to join RSF in Aug. In North Kordofan state, SAF 1 Aug clashed with RSF near Umm Ruwaba city. In South Kordofan state, rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North continued targeting SAF positions, notably in state capital Kadugli and Dalami town.

Burhan rejected RSF call for negotiations. Amid stalled external mediation efforts, RSF 27 Aug expressed willingness for talks and presented ten-point plan for “lasting peace”; Burhan next day rejected initiative.

Tanzania

Govt faced criticism over detention of critics.

NGO Human Rights Watch 7 Aug alleged authorities have detained or threatened 22 people since June for criticising govt decision to let foreign logistics company manage Tanzania’s ports, and urged govt to “respect freedom of expression, right to protest”. Police 12 Aug arrested lawyer Boniface Anyasile Mwabukusi and opposition politician Mpaluka Nyagali on accusations of inciting and planning nationwide anti-govt protests.

Uganda

World Bank suspended new lending to Uganda in response to anti-homosexuality law, while opposition party encountered internal divisions.

World Bank halted funding to Uganda. World Bank 8 Aug announced freezing fresh loans to Uganda over recently passed anti-homosexuality law, setting aside funding worth nearly $2bn. In almost instantaneous reaction, Uganda’s currency went downward to its lowest level against U.S. dollar in nearly eight years. President Museveni in following days released two defiant statements chastising institution for its “insufferable” decision, while finance ministry 10 Aug told parliament that World Bank move would likely affect payment of some public servants’ salaries.

Prominent opposition party faced internal rift. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) Sec Gen Nathan Nandala Mafabi 7 Aug petitioned parliament to replace Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda as FDC Chief Whip in parliament after latter alleged Mafabi and other FDC leaders received “dirty money” from state agents ahead of 2021 general elections. Speaker of Parliament Anita Among 16 Aug declined to dismiss Ssemujju, citing opposition party members themselves sharing dissatisfaction with Mafabi, prompting latter to accuse Among of taking sides in internal party matter to drive wedge between FDC factions.

Violence involving Kenyan Pokot herdsmen persisted in Karamoja sub-region. Armed individuals from West Pokot county of Kenya 21 Aug launched cattle raid and later ambushed Ugandan soldiers in Nakapiripirit district (Karamoja sub-region), killing two.

In other important developments. Authorities looked to domestically promote military successes against Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in DR Congo following militia’s deadly attack on Ugandan school in June. Notably, armed forces 6-21 Aug reported capturing two ADF operatives, seizing 150 firearms and rescuing 26 hostages, and 23 Aug claimed killing several ADF elements including one commander.

Zimbabwe

Multiple observation missions reported widespread irregularities in general elections, casting doubt on legitimacy of vote which saw President Mnangagwa declared winner of second term.

Election authorities Mnangagwa re-elected in elections marred by irregularities. Electoral commission 26 Aug declared President Mnangagwa winner of presidential election held 23 Aug with 52.6% of vote against opposition leader Nelson Chamisa’s 44%; ruling party ZANU-PF also won 136 of 210 parliamentary seats against 73 for main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). Chamisa 27 Aug alleged “gigantic fraud” and 29 Aug called for elections rerun. Conduct of elections could also hamper Zimbabwe’s re-engagement drive with international partners, as most international election observers said vote was marred by irregularities and poor organisation, while pre-election environment was largely favourable to ZANU-PF. Notably, in departure from past statements on elections in Zimbabwe, Southern African Development Community (SADC) 25 Aug said elections “fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe”, citing curbs on freedom of assembly and judicial capture. In response, Mnangagwa 27 Aug criticised outside observers for “interrogat[ing] institutions of a sovereign government”.

Lead-up to vote and election day marred by violence and repression. NGO Zimbabwe Peace Project recorded 84 human rights violations related to elections in first half of Aug, including arson, assaults, kidnapping threats and intimidation. Notably, suspected ZANU-PF activists 3 Aug ambushed and killed CCC supporter near campaign rally in capital Harare; police arrested 10 people in connection with case. Police 15 Aug also arrested 40 CCC members including MP candidate for allegedly blocking traffic and disrupting order during campaign event in Harare suburb. On voting day, journalist and opposition figure Hopewell Chin’ono 23 Aug accused ZANU-PF supporters and officials of intimidating voters outside polling stations, also criticised electoral commission’s lack of preparedness as authorities extended voting to 24 Aug in some wards amid delayed distribution of ballot papers. Police 24 Aug arrested 41 election monitors from civil society groups, accusing them of trying to disrupt voting process by releasing unofficial vote results from independent count.

Asia

Afghanistan

On second anniversary of Taliban’s return to power, countrywide violence remained at historic low but worsening humanitarian crisis loomed large and tensions persisted with Pakistan.

Violence remained at low ebb despite sporadic attacks and Taliban raids. Afghanistan Freedom Front launched attacks on airport in Badakhshan province (north) 9 Aug and in Baghlan province (north) 11 Aug. Reports 19 Aug emerged that Taliban had besieged and dismantled last remnants of rebels in Badakhshan’s Shuhada district, likely referring to renegade Taliban commander who rebelled in Oct 2022; although surrender removes major threat of armed challenge to Taliban’s rule in Badakhshan, insecurity in province – which borders China, Tajikistan, and Pakistan – remains major concern. Meanwhile, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) did not claim major attack in Aug. Taliban-affiliated media 15 Aug claimed security forces’ raid killed two important ISKP members. Fanning fears of transnational jihadist threats, gunman who 13 Aug conducted attack in Iran was Tajik national allegedly trained by ISKP in Afghanistan.

Threat of worsening humanitarian crisis persisted. Humanitarian appeal remained drastically underfunded by 75%, making it most underfunded UN humanitarian program. UN humanitarian coordinator 17 Aug warned that “massive funding cuts are forcing life-saving programs to close at an alarming rate”, with 29.2mn Afghans in need of assistance. U.S. diplomats and Taliban officials late July met for first time since Taliban retook power; despite meeting, impasse over Central Bank’s frozen assets remained unresolved.

Taliban and Pakistan traded barbs over militant threat. Pakistan’s foreign ministry 1 Aug and army chief 7 Aug alleged that Afghan nationals had been involved in July attack in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province; Taliban called allegations baseless, countering that dozens of Pakistani nationals had joined ISKP and Pakistan failed to act on intelligence shared by Kabul. Taliban 11 Aug confirmed that preeminent body for religious edicts had issued fatwa prohibiting Afghans from fighting Pakistan. Reports 14 Aug emerged of blast near hotel in Khost city (south east) that housed refugees from Pakistan’s Waziristan district; reports suggested Pakistani drones targeted site. Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani 20, 23 Aug stated attacks inside Pakistan were country’s own internal problem.

Bangladesh

Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) continued campaign to force govt’s resignation ahead of polls, while police abuses against Rohingyas came to light.

Opposition rallied countrywide, leading to clashes with police. BNP held near-daily rallies, sit-ins and protests in capital Dhaka and elsewhere to force PM Sheikh Hasina’s resignation in order to hold elections – set for late Dec or Jan 2024 – under non-partisan caretaker govt. Ruling Awami League, however, rejected demand and ruled out dialogue, continuing its crackdown on opposition. Notably, BNP protested in capital after court 2 Aug sentenced exiled BNP acting leader Tarique Rahman to nine years in prison for corruption, and his wife to three years, making it impossible for her to contest next election. BNP and allies 17 Aug commenced three-day countrywide activities including mass processions; though mostly peaceful, police 19 Aug opened fire with rubber bullets in Habiganj in north east, injuring up to 300 people. Amid police attempts to disrupt Jamaat-e-Islami organisation, senior party officials 4 Aug held rally in Dhaka and 6 Aug organised processions countrywide, telling govt to “dissolve the parliament, resign immediately.” Member of Awami League’s Youth Wing 15 Aug shot dead Jamaat member in Cox’s Bazar. Police and Jamaat members same day clashed in Dhaka. Thousands of opposition supporters 30 Aug protested in Dhaka to demand information about hundreds of people allegedly disappeared under govt’s rule.

Plight of Rohingya continued amid reports of abuse by security forces. NGO Fortify Rights 10 Aug published report alleging Armed Police Battalion “arbitrarily detained and tortured Rohingya refugees while systematically demanding corrupt payments”. Bipartisan U.S. delegation 14 Aug visited Rohingya camps, urging international community to step up aid amid funding shortfall. Thousands of Rohingya 25 Aug rallied in camps demanding safe return to Myanmar to mark sixth anniversary of Myanmar military campaign against them. Insecurity concerns remained acute: according to local police, 85 of 186 murders in camps since 2017 have occurred in past 12 months.

Authorities arrested suspected militants. Police 12 Aug raided “militant hideout” in north-eastern region Moulvibazar, arresting 10 suspects whom authorities claimed were members of new jihadist group, and recovering explosives and jihadist books.

China/Japan

In East China Sea, China continued its maritime presence and conducted operations with Russia.

As of 25 Aug, Japan had spotted 95 Chinese vessels in its contiguous zone during month. It detected 16 such ships in its territorial sea over three days in Aug. Notably, China’s Maritime Security Administration 9 and 12-14 Aug held military exercises in waters adjacent to Chinese city Ningbo. Joint China-Russia flotilla consisting of around 10 ships 17 Aug operated in East China Sea, after it had sailed near Alaska earlier in Aug; China’s foreign ministry said passage was consistent with international law. Japan next day spotted two Russian IL-38 information-gathering aircraft flying between Sea of Japan and East China Sea, prompting Japan to scramble its fighter jets. Japan 25 Aug sent fighter jets to monitor two Chinese air force bombers flying between Okinawa and Miyako islands.

India

Manipur in north east remained volatile, authorities responded to communal clashes in Haryana state in north with home demolitions, and govt continued talks with China on disputed border.

Ethnic violence in Manipur showed little sign of abating. In Bishnupur district, gunfight between Kuki and Meitei communities 5 Aug killed two Kuki village guards, while assailants same day killed three Meitei men in their sleep; Manipur police, dominated by Meitei, 5 Aug registered case against federal security force Assam Rifles for allegedly helping Kuki militants escape from village where three dead individuals were found. In Ukhrul district, Meitei militants 18 Aug allegedly shot dead three Kuki men guarding village. Border security forces 18 Aug lodged protest with Manipur governor over “blockade on movement of troops” by locals, “mostly women”; amid state-wide insecurity, rule of law has broken down and state machinery seemed to have vanished. Gunmen 29 Aug fired at farmers on Bishnupur-Churachandpur border, killing two. The Wire 11 Aug reported violence erupted in May just as central govt was finalising agreement with Kuki militant groups to create autonomous territorial council within state. United Naga Council 21 August accused Kukis of “distortion of Naga history” and objected to separatist memorandum recently authored by 10 Kuki members of Manipur's legislative assembly sent to PM Modi that included reference to Naga-dominated districts.

Authorities demolished scores of homes following deadly clashes in Haryana. Clashes between Hindus and Muslims 31 July erupted in Nuh town, Haryana state (north), after local Muslims opposed procession by right-wing Hindu groups, killing six and resulting in large-scale property destruction; state authorities in subsequent days demolished more than 300 Muslim homes/businesses and arrested 150 Muslims. In rare criticism of demolition, Punjab and Haryana High Court questioned if “an exercise of ethnic cleansing is being conducted by the state”.

Talks with China on disputed border made little progress. Indian and Chinese commanders 13-14 Aug met in eastern Ladakh for 19th round of talks; joint statement described “positive, constructive and in-depth discussion”, although situation remained unchanged. On BRICS summit sidelines, PM Modi 24 Aug raised concerns with China’s President Xi about border.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Supreme Court began hearing case on Jammu & Kashmir’s (J&K) autonomy revocation, govt signalled intent to hold grassroots poll, and security forces targeted militants.

Supreme Court heard oral petitions challenging abrogation of J&K’s status. After 2 Aug beginning hearings, Supreme Court 10 Aug said J&K’s surrender of sovereignty to India in Oct 1947 was “absolutely complete”, and it was “really difficult” to say Article 370 (which offered J&K semi-autonomous status) was permanent in nature. Due to surveillance and retaliation fears, media coverage of proceedings in Kashmir remained scant but local politicians expressed satisfaction with hearings taking place; former chief minister Omar Abdullah 17 Aug said, “We are fighting and we are there with a hope for justice.”

Authorities signalled support for elections at grassroots level. After J&K in July marked five years without elected regional govt due to ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) reluctance to hold assembly elections, J&K Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha 3 Aug asserted “time has come when we should have Panchayat polls so that people can once again reap the benefits of governance at their doorsteps”, referring to grassroots administrative bodies; govt hopes such local elections will project normalcy in region but significant risk exists that militants could target participants in polls, which could take place in coming months.

Security forces continued operations against militants in J&K. Militants 4 Aug killed three soldiers in Kulgam district during security operation. Security forces 4 Aug killed four militants in Srinagar city; 5 Aug killed Pakistani militant during two-day operation in Rajouri district; 6 Aug killed militant near Line of Control in Kupwara district in north; 7 Aug killed two Hizbul Mujahideen militants, including senior commander, near Line of Contact in Poonch district. Resistance Front Militants 10 Aug threw grenade at security forces during search operation, injuring one soldier and two civilians in Anantnag district. Meanwhile, govt and Pakistan traded blame for violating Line of Control ceasefire, as India 21 Aug claimed to foil infiltration bid by shooting two militants in Poonch district; Pakistan accused India of killing civilian in “unprovoked firing”.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea’s second attempt at satellite launch failed as U.S. and South Korea began summer military drills, which raised tensions and could provoke further missile tests by Pyongyang.

North Korea attempted second satellite launch. After first try to launch military reconnaissance satellite into orbit failed on 31 May, North Korea 24 Aug made second attempt but rocket booster faced issues during third phase, according to state media, and disintegrated before falling into sea. U.S. and South Korea condemned launch as violating UN Security Council resolutions, as Pyongyang vowed to try again in Oct.

U.S. and South Korea began summer military exercises. U.S. and South Korea 21 Aug commenced annual summer drills called Ulchi Freedom Shield. Although arguably essential for military readiness, drills risk fuelling instability on peninsula and triggering North Korea response; South Korean National Intelligence Agency 17 Aug warned that Pyongyang had “provocations” in works to respond to combined drills, which may come in form of missile tests. North Korean military 18 Aug said it dispatched warplanes after U.S. reconnaissance aircraft previous day entered North Korea’s economic zone off eastern coast, denouncing “dangerous military provocation”. Leader Kim Jong-un 29 Aug warned of “danger of a nuclear war” in waters off peninsula. Pyongyang 30 Aug fired two short-range ballistic missiles as part of “tactical nuclear strike drill simulating scorched-earth strikes”.

With North Korea in mind, U.S., South Korea and Japan deepened ties. At historic Camp David summit, leaders of U.S., South Korea and Japan 18 Aug signalled enhanced trilateral relations and coordination against North Korea; three pledged to “share information, align our messaging and coordinate response actions” and embark on joint military exercises as well as “annual Trilateral Indo-Pacific Dialogue”; statement also reaffirmed “commitment to the complete denuclearisation of [North Korea]” and urged north to “abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs”.

Pyongyang began repatriating citizens. North Korea 22 Aug began repatriating its citizens from abroad more than three years after country closed its borders amid COVID-19 pandemic; China and Russia play host to significant cohorts of North Korean workers as well as hundreds of govt personnel.

Myanmar

Regime battled resistance forces, notably in Shan State in north, while regime expelled Timor-Leste’s top diplomat to protest engagement with parallel National Unity Government (NUG).

Clashes continued between military and ethnic armed groups and resistance forces. Fighting escalated in northern and central Shan State (north) between regime forces and ethnic armed groups after military and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) clashed in late July for first time since Dec 2022. Notably, hostilities 29 July-3 Aug continued in pocket of territory in Muse Township; TNLA claimed up to 25 regime soldiers and militia members were killed and released photos of large amount of seized weaponry. Fighting was also reported between two sides further south in Lashio Township. Meanwhile, clashes continued between military and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Military 2 Aug drove KIA and aligned People’s Defence Forces out of strategic Nabar junction in northern Sagaing Region (north) and 4 Aug carried out airstrikes at Mali Yang village in Waingmaw, damaging transmission lines that carry electricity from Kachin Independence Organisation-run hydropower station to state capital Myitkyina. Clashes 7 Aug erupted in jade mining township of Hpakant. Karen National Union 10 Aug declared Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement had been rendered null and void because regime had “destroyed” principles of deal; seven of ten initial groups continue to engage regime in process.

Regime expelled Timor-Leste’s top diplomat. Regime 27 Aug announced that it had ordered charge d’affaires of Timor-Leste’s embassy in Yangon to leave country by 1 Sept following series of engagements between Timor-Leste and rival NUG, including between Timor-Leste’s president and NUG earlier in Aug.

UN’s top humanitarian official visited capital as security council condemned violence. UN Under-Secretary General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths 15-17 Aug visited Naypyitaw, meeting with regime leader Min Aung Hlaing to push for greater humanitarian access; Griffiths called on donors to increase their funding. UN Security Council, except China and Russia, 23 Aug backed statement condemning “unrelenting violence” and lack of progress on Council resolution passed in Dec calling for end to violence and release of all political prisoners.

Pakistan

Court handed former PM Imran Khan prison sentence as govt signalled potential delay to elections, while deadly militant attacks roiled provinces bordering Afghanistan.

Authorities imprisoned Imran Khan and banned him from politics. Police 5 Aug arrested Imran Khan following court order which sentenced him to three years imprisonment for allegedly selling state gifts received in official capacity; Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party called for peaceful protests but response was limited amid heavy police deployment. Citing conviction, election commission 8 Aug declared Khan banned from contesting elections for five years. Federal Investigation Authority 19 Aug registered case against Khan and former FM Shah Mahmood Qureshi under Official Secrets Act 1923, and same day arrested Qureshi, over alleged misuse of diplomatic cable at public rally. Appeals court 29 Aug suspended Khan’s three-year sentence; court next day ordered Khan to remain in judicial custody until mid-Sept pending investigation into diplomatic cable case.

Uncertainty pervaded timing of upcoming elections. Govt 5 Aug claimed upcoming general election – set to be held by Nov – must be based on new census, which implies polls could be delayed by several months; PTI 17 Aug vowed to challenge decision at Supreme Court. President 9 Aug ordered parliament’s dissolution and govt 12 Aug appointed Senator Anwaar-ul-haq Kakar as caretaker PM.

Militants continued deadly attacks in provinces bordering Afghanistan. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s North Waziristan district, suicide bomber 7 Aug killed two; IED 20 Aug killed 11 labourers en route to construction project; Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants 22 Aug ambushed two military vehicles, killing six soldiers and four militants. In Balochistan province, roadside bomb 7 Aug killed seven, including Balochistan Awami Party member, in Kech town. Balochistan Liberation Army 13 Aug attacked vehicles carrying Chinese engineers in Gwadar port city. Amid tensions with Afghan Taliban, FM Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari 1 Aug said Pakistan could act in “self-defence” in Afghanistan (see Afghanistan).

Blasphemy allegations triggered rampage in Punjab. Mob of several hundred Muslims 16 Aug attacked Christian settlement in Faisalabad district, Punjab province, after two locals were accused of “blasphemy”; mob desecrated churches and ransacked properties.

Philippines

Militant attacks and surrenders continued in south, while deadly hostilities between military and Communists persisted.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Around 10 militants 12 Aug killed soldier and wounded eight others in ambush on convoy in Ungkaya Pukan, Basilan province; two Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members 15 Aug surrendered to authorities in Isabela city and claimed responsibility for attack. Explosion 16 Aug killed village official and wounded another local official in Shariff Saidona Mustapha, Maguindanao del Sur province. Thirteen members of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) 12 Aug surrendered in Maguindanao del Sur and North Cotabato provinces, turning over heavy weaponry. Three BIFF members 18 Aug surrendered in Isulan town, Sultan Kudarat. Military 17 Aug declared that 14 towns in Sulu province are free from Abu Sayyaf Group. Armed factions of MILF’s 106 and 108 Base Command 22 Aug clashed in village of Sapakan in Mamasapano, Maguindanao del Sur, displacing at least 40 families. Assailants 28-29 Aug killed several village officials across country as they filed their candidacies for village chief and council positions. Bangsamoro parliament 17 Aug approved creation of eight new towns, emerging from pool of over 60 villages in region’s Special Geographic Area in Cotabato province.

Clashes continued between military and Communist militants. Hostilities between security forces and Communist rebels occurred in Mindanao Island (Misamis Orental) in south and Visayas Islands in centre, resulting in at least 12 fatalities (combatants and civilians alike) and two injuries.

South China Sea

Maritime incident between China and Philippines near disputed shoal in Spratly Islands elevated tensions.

China blocked Philippine resupply mission to disputed shoal. Chinese Coast Guard 5 Aug fired water cannon to drive away Philippine vessels seeking to resupply BRP Sierre Madre, World War II vessel grounded at Second Thomas Shoal in north-eastern Spratly Islands, causing one of supply boats to turn away; Philippine coast guard condemned China’s “dangerous manoeuvres”, while U.S. same day reaffirmed that attacks on Philippine coast guard ships will trigger commitments under 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. Manila 19 Aug vowed to resume supply missions to BRP Sierre Madre, raising prospect of further interceptions by China; Philippine vessels 22 Aug reached Second Thomas Shoal. Amid spat, Philippines 9 Aug announced it will conduct joint patrol with the U.S. this year in SCS and next day revealed plans to deploy maritime militia and establish reserves unit in SCS; Philippines 20 Aug announced U.S., Japan and Australia will organise joint navy drill off its waters. After China’s annual summer fishing moratorium ended 16 Aug, Philippines said it was ready to “take law enforcement measures” as Chinese fishing activities are expected to increase in SCS.

China and U.S. traded criticism as Manila mulled maritime deal with Vietnam. Chinese FM Wang Yi 11 Aug blasted U.S. for being “the biggest source of instability” in world and for “fanning flames” at Second Thomas Shoal. At historic Camp David summit, U.S., Japan and South Korea 18 Aug criticised China’s “dangerous and aggressive behaviour supporting unlawful maritime claims” in SCS. Philippine President Marcos Jr. 10 Aug revealed govt is considering maritime agreement with Vietnam to “bring stability” to SCS. Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia late Aug protested new Chinese govt map laying claim to vast areas of SCS.

Covert construction continued on disputed islands. Planet Labs satellite imagery 17 Aug revealed China appears to be building airstrip on Triton, an island in Paracel group also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. Philippine media 19 Aug reported that Vietnam is planning to fortify its presence on Spratlys.

Sri Lanka

Economic hardship continued amid severe drought and looming debt restructuring, while inter-ethnic tensions spilled over from north east as govt unveiled new measures aimed at reconciliation.

Inflation diminished but concerns grew over drought’s impact. Reports in Aug showed inflation in July fell to under 7%, but relief for average citizens remained limited given high prices of many essentials. Drought conditions during month affected large parts of island, threatening drinking water supplies and farming and possibly reducing hydroelectric power. Meanwhile, govt’s flagship anti-poverty program continued to face serious administrative delays.

Domestic debt restructuring took centre stage. Govt attempted to fend off legal and political criticism of its decision – endorsed in motion by parliament on 1 July – to impose losses on contributory govt and private sector pension schemes while sparing banks. Supreme Court 4 and 11 Aug dismissed lawsuits that sought to block restructuring of debt held by pensions. After parliament speaker argued courts do not have power to rule on parliamentary resolution, opposition leaders 11 Aug criticised alleged blow to separation of powers, arguing parliamentary approval had taken form of non-binding motion.

Inter-ethnic relations faced pressure. Significant tensions surfaced at contested site known in Tamil as Kurunthurmalai, and in Sinhalese as Kurundi in Mullaitivu district (Northern Province), where newly built Buddhist temple sits in close proximity to Hindu Athi Aiyanar temple. Eyewitnesses said Sinhala Buddhist monk and followers 18 Aug attempted to disrupt Tamil Pongal celebration at Hindu temple, despite permission from local magistrate. Sinhala nationalist legislator 22 Aug denounced magistrate in parliament, while second Sinhala nationalist MP 26 Aug led protest outside residence of Tamil MP for his role in supporting Hindu worship at Kurunthurmalai. In separate dispute, Buddhist monks 28 Aug disrupted govt meeting and threatened Eastern Province governor for his decision to halt construction of new temple in traditionally Tamil village in Trincomalee district.

Govt unveiled new policies aimed at inter-ethnic reconciliation. President Wickremesinghe 9 Aug announced series of moves to strengthen provincial devolution of power within terms of existing constitution. Wickremesinghe rejected opposition demands to hold provincial elections, now years overdue, proposing instead to first amend Provincial Council Elections Act.

Taiwan Strait

China maintained aerial and maritime military activity as Taiwan’s VP transited U.S., while Washington, Seoul and Tokyo pledged commitment to strait’s stability.

China held military exercises as Taiwan’s VP transited U.S. As of 28 Aug, Taiwan had detected 351 Chinese military aircraft around Taiwan, of which at least 115 crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected in south-western ADIZ; at sea, Taiwan spotted 183 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters. Taiwan’s VP and presidential candidate Lai Ching Te 12 Aug transited New York en route to Paraguay and 15 Aug went through San Francisco during return trip, meeting Taiwanese Americans and representatives of American Institute of Taiwan; upon his return, Lai said Taiwan’s election in 2024 is choice between democracy and autocracy, declaring that China cannot decide outcome. In response, Beijing 18 Aug launched low-key joint air and sea exercise around island. Taiwan’s military 15-17 Aug carried out “precision missile drill” during which air-to-air and anti-ship missiles were fired at decommissioned vessels. China 21 Aug banned import of Taiwan mangoes, citing concern with pests in likely attempt to create political pressures for Taiwan’s ruling party. U.S. 23 Aug approved $500mn sale to Taiwan of F-16 infrared search-and-track systems. Tsai administration 24 Aug proposed 7.7% increase in next year’s defence budget.

U.S., South Korea and Japan voiced support for stability. In historic trilateral meeting between leaders of U.S., Japan and South Korea, trio 18 Aug reaffirmed commitment to peace and stability across Taiwan Strait and called for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. President Tsai 11 Aug expressed Taiwan’s interest in participating in NATO’s Center of Excellences in Baltic countries, as she urged parliamentary delegations from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to help deepen defence cooperation.

High-profile Japanese figures visited Taiwan. Former Japanese PM Taro Aso 7 Aug visited Taiwan and delivered keynote address at regional forum in which he urged international community to “wake up” to worsening situation in Taiwan Strait. Nobuyuki Baba, leader of Japanese parliament’s second-largest opposition party, 2 Aug visited capital Taipei, asserting “Taiwan’s peace is Japan’s peace" and calling for more cooperation on deterrence.

Thailand

Parliament appointed PM from opposition Pheu Thai after forging coalition with pro-military parties, raising prospect of protests and unstable coalition; insecurity persisted in deep south.

Pheu Thai joined forces with establishment parties to form next govt. Pheu Thai, which came second in May elections, 2 Aug abandoned eight-party coalition led by election winners Move Forward Party, citing latter’s promise to amend lèse-majesté law; Pheu Thai nominated real estate tycoon Srettha Thavisin as its candidate for PM. Pheu Thai 21 Aug announced it had formed 11-party coalition comprising pro-military parties, which essentially pairs party with same pro-military coalition that was rejected in May polls, breaking Pheu Thai’s election promise not to join forces with 2014 coup plotters. Joint sitting of parliament 22 Aug appointed Srettha as PM, ending months of jockeying; all signs, however, point toward unstable coalition hobbled by mutual mistrust, as well as possible street protests by disaffected voters.

Authorities arrested self-exiled former PM upon his return. Pheu Thai de facto leader Thaksin Shinawatra 22 Aug returned to Thailand after 15 years in self-imposed exile to escape abuse of power trials following 2006 coup that deposed his govt. Arrested upon arrival, Thaksin appeared at Supreme Court before being taken to Bangkok Remand Prison to begin eight-year sentence for three convictions; local media late Aug reported Thaksin applied for royal pardon.

Southernmost provinces witnessed slight uptick in attacks. In Narathiwat province, motorcycle-borne gunmen 3 Aug killed Muslim man in Cho Ai Rong district. Motorcycle-borne assailants 7 Aug attacked eight-strong army patrol in Tak Bai district with pipe bombs and small arms, killing soldier. IED attack 17 Aug killed ranger in Si Sakhon district. Gunmen 19 Aug killed off-duty paramilitary ranger in Chanae district. Militants strung banners in Bacho, Cho Ai Rong, Rangae, and Yi Ngo districts with message, “Is there lasting peace?”. In Pattani province, IED attack on military truck 3 Aug killed soldier and wounded five others in Yaring district; gunmen next day killed retired army colonel in Yaring. Combined army, police and defence volunteer force 16 Aug surrounded suspected insurgents in Nongchik district, ensuing gunfight killed two suspects. Gunmen 27 Aug killed former village headman in Saiburi district.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

UN Security Council (UNSC) held emergency session on humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK); violence flared along Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

UNSC failed to pass resolution on NK during emergency session. Deteriorating humanitarian situation in NK due to Lachin blockade (see Nagorno-Karabakh) sharpened tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with latter 11 Aug formally requesting emergency UNSC session to address situation. During 16 Aug session, UNSC members highlighted worsening humanitarian situation and called for resumption of aid deliveries – halted in July – but did not pass resolution on matter. PM Pashinyan 17 Aug said UNSC “reaffirmed the existence of a humanitarian crisis”, which therefore contradicted Azerbaijan’s denial of blockade; Azerbaijan same day dismissed Armenia’s failed “attempt to instrumentalise” UNSC.

Violence flared at Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Azerbaijan early Aug claimed its forces had intercepted two Armenian reconnaissance drones heading toward Lachin region. Sides throughout month traded blame for shootings along border between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region. Notably, Armenia 15 Aug claimed Azerbaijan fired at individuals from EU civilian observation mission, which EU same day confirmed. Armenia 14 Aug reported one soldier injured, 21 Aug reported one serviceman “fatally wounded”; Azerbaijan 16 Aug said it injured and detained Armenian soldier and 22 Aug reported one of its soldiers injured.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Escalating humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh triggered emergency session at UN Security Council (UNSC); de facto authorities and Baku remained at loggerheads.

Humanitarian crisis deteriorated further. Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) continued to experience acute shortages of food, fuel and medical supplies due to Baku’s blockade of Lachin road, which connects NK to Armenia, fuelling humanitarian crisis. International Committee of Red Cross, unable to deliver aid since late July, 18 Aug reiterated appeal to resume assistance. Baku 30 Aug blocked French humanitarian convoy from entering NK via Lachin. Azerbaijani Red Crescent society 29 Aug sent food trucks via Agdam road, which connects NK to Azerbaijan-controlled Agdam region; de facto authorities 30 Aug declared it would not accept aid (many in Armenia and NK view Baku’s preference for Agdam route as tactic to integrate enclave into Azerbaijan and entrench Lachin blockade). Meanwhile, Azerbaijani border guards 28 Aug detained three ethnic Armenians from NK as they attempted to cross Lachin checkpoint; detainees allegedly members of football team filmed stepping on Azerbaijani flag in 2021.

UNSC failed to pass NK resolution during emergency session. UNSC 16 Aug held emergency session on crisis at Yerevan’s request, highlighting worsening humanitarian situation and urging resumption of aid deliveries but failing to pass resolution. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan 17 Aug said UNSC “reaffirmed the existence of a humanitarian crisis”, which therefore contradicted Azerbaijan’s denial of blockade; Azerbaijan same day dismissed Armenia’s failed “attempt to instrumentalise” UNSC.

Baku and Stepanakert disagreed on proposal to resolve crisis. Azerbaijani foreign ministry 11 Aug announced that international “shuttle diplomacy” had produced deal to resolve crisis; agreement (based on Russian proposal put forward in July) envisioned opening Agdam road and in reciprocation, 24 hours later, traffic through Lachin road would be allowed to increase. Despite reportedly considering proposal, de facto authorities 17 Aug rejected it on grounds it gave Baku full control over deliveries via both roads; Baku consequently accused Stepanakert of sabotaging efforts to resolve crisis. De facto leader of NK Arayik Harutyunyan 31 Aug announced intention to resign, marking further blow to work on resolving crisis. Meanwhile, de facto forces and Azerbaijan throughout month traded blame for near daily “ceasefire violations”.

Azerbaijan

UN Security Council (UNSC) held emergency session on humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK); violence flared along Azerbaijan-Armenia border.

UNSC failed to pass resolution on NK during emergency session. Deteriorating humanitarian situation in NK due to Lachin blockade (see Nagorno-Karabakh) sharpened tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with latter 11 Aug formally requesting emergency UNSC session to address situation. During 16 Aug session, UNSC members 16 Aug highlighted worsening humanitarian situation and called for resumption of aid deliveries – halted in July – but did not pass resolution on matter. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan 17 Aug said UNSC “reaffirmed the existence of a humanitarian crisis”, which therefore contradicted Azerbaijan’s denial of blockade; Azerbaijan same day dismissed Armenia’s failed “attempt to instrumentalise” UNSC.

Violence flared at Azerbaijan-Armenia border. Azerbaijan early Aug claimed its forces had intercepted two Armenian reconnaissance drones heading toward Lachin region. Sides throughout month traded blame for shootings along border between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region. Notably, Armenia 15 Aug claimed Azerbaijan fired at individuals from EU civilian observation mission, which EU same day c0nfirmed. Armenia 14 Aug reported one soldier injured, 21 Aug reported one serviceman “fatally wounded”; Azerbaijan 16 Aug said it detained Armenian soldier and 22 Aug reported one of its soldiers injured.

Authorities brought fresh charges against detained opposition politician. News agency Turan 25 Aug reported that authorities had brought new charge – religious extremism – against prominent opposition politician Qubad İbadoğlu, arrested late July for alleged involvement in “preparation, acquisition or sale of counterfeit money or securities by an organised group”.

Belarus

Tensions with western neighbours rose, while govt continued to stifle dissent.

Tensions with neighbouring NATO member states intensified. Following July arrival of mercenaries from Russia paramilitary Wagner Group, tensions between Minsk and its western neighbours escalated further. Notably, Poland 1 Aug accused Belarus of airspace incursion, which latter 3 Aug denied. Belarus 7 Aug began military drills in Grodno region near Polish and Lithuanian borders. Poland 9 Aug deployed 2,000 soldiers to border, citing mercenaries’ presence and rise in illegal border crossings, Latvia 15 Aug announced deployment of “additional forces” to its border and Lithuania 18 Aug closed two border crossings to Belarus. Polish Interior Minister Mariusz Kaminski 28 Aug said Poland, Latvia and Lithuania would close their borders with Belarus if “critical incident” involving Wagner mercenaries took place; Kaminski added that this would include border with Russian exclave Kaliningrad, which lies between Poland and Lithuania. Meanwhile, Polish President Andrzej Duda 22 Aug confirmed Russia had begun transferring short-range nuclear weapons to Belarus, which he said would change regional security architecture.

Western countries imposed more punitive measures on Belarus. EU 3 Aug and U.S. 9 Aug sanctioned dozens of Belarusian individuals and entities for human rights abuses and “involvement” in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Lithuania 4 Aug declared 910 Belarusian citizens living in country were “threat” to national security, revoking residence permits and rejecting residency requests.

Authorities continued to suppress opposition. Supreme Court mid-Aug ordered dissolution of two opposition parties, Belarusian Popular Front Party and United Civil Party. Authorities 23 Aug reportedly declared Vyasna Human Rights Centre “extremist”. Homel regional court 31 Aug sentenced journalist Larysa Shchyrakova to three years and six months in prison for “discrediting” country and facilitating extremism.

Cyprus

Violent skirmishes erupted in buffer zone between Turkish Cypriots and UN personnel, injuring multiple peacekeepers and Turkish Cypriot police officers and sparking diplomatic furore.

Turkish Cypriots and UN peacekeepers clashed, triggering diplomatic spat. Turkish Cypriots 17 Aug began constructing road to connect village of Pile/Pyla, located within UN controlled demilitarised zone known as Green Line, to “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), citing humanitarian reasons. “TRNC” police and construction crews next day approached Green Line where UN peacekeepers bolstered presence with civilian vehicles to prevent construction; construction workers used excavators and physical force to disperse UN troops, leading to skirmishes that harmed at least three peacekeepers and eight Turkish Cypriot police officers. Incident sparked stern diplomatic responses. Notably, Greek PM Kyriákos Mitsotákis 18 Aug denounced Turkish Cypriot actions as “unacceptable”, while “TRNC” and Türkiye same day condemned UN personnel, claiming peacekeepers wrongfully intervened in humanitarian project. Although Russia next day vetoed UN Security Council resolution introduced by UK against actions of Turkish Cypriots, UN Sec Gen along with several embassies, including UK, U.S., EU and China, condemned “TRNC’s” actions. U.S. senator Robert Menendez 24 Aug visited Republic of Cyprus where he described Turkish Cypriot actions as unacceptable violation of international law.

Prospects for relaunching formal talks remained dim. Before buffer zone incident, Republic of Cyprus defence minister 6 Aug repeated that President Christodoulides is focussed on lifting deadlock and welcomes negotiations under UN auspices with active EU engagement. “TRNC” leader Ersin Tatar 11 Aug rejected Christodoulides’ proposal for joint meeting with UN Assistant Sec Gen Miroslav Jenča, who visited island 27-29 Aug, preferring to hold separate meeting on 28 Aug. Meanwhile, after U.S. 18 Aug announced it would continue to lift for another year arms embargo on Republic of Cyprus – imposed in 1987 and first lifted in 2021 – “TRNC” same day expressed concern over “upsetting the delicate balance on the island”; “TRNC” also described docking of U.S. destroyer USS Ramage at Limassol port on 17 Aug as “worrying”.

Georgia

Tense political atmosphere prevailed as Georgia marked 15th anniversary of 2008 war with Russia; former Russian president warned Moscow could annex breakaway regions.

15th anniversary of Russia-Georgia 2008 war provoked fierce debate. Foreign Ministry 7 Aug called on Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgian territory on occasion of 15th anniversary of Russian-Georgian war. Opposing narratives of conflict, meanwhile, dominated anniversary. Notably, PM Garibashvili 8 Aug blamed former govt of jailed ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili for war that “could have been avoided”; move followed chairman of main opposition party United National Movement day before criticising ruling Georgian Dream for allowing Russia to pursue its goals even after war ended. EU and U.S. 7 Aug condemned Moscow’s invasion, while Russian officials sought to shift blame onto NATO; notably, deputy Head of Russian Security Council and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 8 Aug claimed “the U.S. and its vassals” had waged proxy war in Georgia. Breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 7 Aug praised Russian “aid” in 2008.

Former Russian president threatened to annex breakaways. Ahead of 15th anniversary of Russia recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence on 25 Aug, Medvedev 23 Aug published article in Argumenty i Fakty newspaper blaming NATO for escalating tensions over Georgia by discussing country’s potential membership to alliance. He concluded by threatening to annex breakaways “if there are good reasons”; Tbilisi same day condemned comments.

Kosovo

Pristina took further de-escalatory steps in Serb-majority northern municipalities, though tensions remained high; EU stepped up pressure on Pristina and Belgrade to resume normalisation efforts.

Kosovo police further reduced presence at municipal buildings in north. Authorities 3 Aug announced 25% reduction of police presence around municipal buildings in north, second such reduction in two months, while PM Kurti next day described security situation as “calm”. NATO-led force KFOR 4 Aug and EU 10 Aug welcomed move. Tensions simmered, however, after authorities in North Mitrovica town 22 Aug ordered Serbia’s parallel govt institutions to “vacate” their premises within three days; EU 24 Aug condemned move and town’s mayor 25 Aug postponed deadline by two weeks.

EU maintained pressure on Pristina and Belgrade to de-escalate. Following reduced police presence in north, Pristina called for removal of EU’s punitive measures, imposed in June. EU 10 Aug demanded additional de-escalatory steps, however, while stating readiness to impose “punitive measures” against Serbia unless it too works to de-escalate. French President Emmanuel Macron 28 Aug threatened Pristina and Belgrade with “review” of EU visa liberalisation and economic cooperation amid growing EU pressure on sides to resume efforts on normalising relations. EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák same day met with PM Kurti, 30 Aug met with Serb President Aleksandar Vučić ahead of possible trilateral meeting in Sept.

Kyrgyzstan

Activists detained for protesting border delimitation agreement with Uzbekistan went on hunger strike; U.S. and EU raised concerns with govt about circumvention of sanctions on Russia.

Jailed activists launched hunger strike. Six activists detained late Oct for protesting border demarcation agreement that handed Kempir-Abad water reservoir to Uzbekistan 22 Aug launched hunger strike amid ongoing court hearings.

Western powers urged govt to tackle efforts to circumvent sanctions. U.S. Senator and Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Menendez 8 Aug sent letter to President Japarov condemning govt’s “complicit facilitation of trade with Russia in products that implicate sanctions” and urging it to “establish more reliable processes to prevent the illicit flow of goods” to Russia. Delegation from EU’s Foreign Affairs Committee 21-25 Aug visited Kyrgyzstan as well as Kazakhstan, where “issues of the circumvention of sanctions featured prominently” during exchanges with politicians and other stakeholders. Following visit, EU Foreign Affairs Committee Chair David McAllister said “allowing sanction circumvention feeds the Russian war machine” and praised govt’s “readiness… to work with the EU on this issue”.

Russia (Internal)

Authorities confirmed Wagner chief’s death in plane crash amid speculation about Putin’s role; Ukraine intensified drone strikes on Russian territory.

Wagner boss killed in plane crash. Authorities 27 Aug confirmed that head of paramilitary Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin, who staged failed mutiny in June, was killed 23 Aug in plane crash outside capital Moscow alongside nine others. U.S. 24 Aug said explosion on board likely brought down plane as number of Western intelligence assessments suggested President Putin may have ordered his death, which Kremlin 25 Aug denied. Meanwhile, Putin 23 Aug sacked Gen. Surovikin, ally of Prigozhin who many believe knew about plans for June insurrection and possibly aided him.

Ukraine conducted near-daily drone attacks on Russia. Ukraine intensified strikes on Russian territory, with largest drone attack since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine 29-30 Aug targeting seven regions. Among other notable incidents, aquatic drones 4 Aug struck Navy base in Black Sea port city of Novorossiysk; drones 19 Aug struck Soltsy airfield in northwestern Novgorod region; shelling in Belgorod region 23 Aug killed three; and shelling in Bryansk region left several people dead. Moscow targeted throughout month.

Rumours of possible mobilisation swirled. Bloomberg report 20 Aug revealed hardline members within Russia’s security apparatus are pushing for changes to army leadership (including dismissal of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valerii Gerasimov), declaration of martial law and introduction of full-scale mobilisation. Though Putin gave no indication he plans to take such steps, rumours of new mobilisation wave due to shortage of volunteers spread on social networks. Meanwhile, Putin 4 Aug signed into law measures to increase number of potential conscripts.

Crackdown on dissent continued, value of Russian ruble tumbled. Court 4 Aug sentenced imprisoned opposition leader Alexei Navalny to 19 years in prison on extremism charges; authorities 17 Aug searched offices and homes of members of Golos movement, which monitors elections; and Moscow court 29 Aug sentenced in absentia investigator Ruslan Leviev and journalist Michael Naki to 11 years in prison for spreading disinformation or “fakes” about army. Meanwhile, Russian ruble 14 Aug hit 17-month low against dollar.

Tajikistan

President Rahmon visited Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in first trip since May 2022 violence; repression of civil society and curtailment of media freedom continued. 

President Rahmon 15-18 Aug visited Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) for first time since anti-govt protests in May 2022 and subsequent crackdown but reportedly made no mention of violence during trip. Meanwhile, Deputy Justice Minister Asadullo Hakimzoda 8 Aug announced that five NGOs in GBAO had been shuttered in past six months owing to their alleged links with local criminal groups; announcement came amid ongoing crackdown on civil society representatives from region. Committee to Protect Journalists 15 Aug called for “immediate release” of journalist Khurshed Fozilov, sentenced in May to seven years in prison, and condemned “criminalisation of the press” in Tajikistan.

Türkiye

Military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliates – principally in Iraq and Syria – while govt sought improved ties with Greece and EU, and tensions surfaced with Russia in Black Sea.

Military intensified strikes in Iraq and Syria. In northern Iraq, military stepped up strikes (see Iraq): notably, clashes between military and PKK in Zap region 9-10 Aug killed at least six Turkish soldiers; retaliatory Turkish air strikes 10 Aug killed at least four PKK operatives. Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 21-24 August visited Iraqi capital Baghdad and Erbil, met with local and national authorities. In northern Syria, military predominantly struck Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and PKK-linked militants, “neutralising” dozens: notably, drone 4 Aug struck Syrian regime position in northern Aleppo and SDF vehicle near Qamishli, killing four. In Türkiye, security forces 3 Aug captured two alleged PKK members in Istanbul and 22 Aug captured seven in Edirne city.

Ties with Greece and EU showed signs of improvement. Greek FM Giorgos Gerapetritis 3 Aug said Athens was “relatively eager” to enhance relations and political dialogue. After years of strained relations, govt 7 Aug announced plan to improve bilateral trade and economic relations with EU; FM Hakan Fidan same day defined obstruction of Türkiye’s EU membership as “strategic blindness” and asserted “without Türkiye, the EU would never be a truly global actor”. Skirmishes erupted between Turkish Cypriots and UN peacekeepers (see Cyprus).

Tensions with Russia surfaced in Black Sea. Amid intense diplomacy to revive Black Sea grain deal, President Erdoğan and Russian President Putin 2 Aug held phone call to discuss possible avenues for cooperation. Russian navy 15 Aug fired warning shots and raided Palau-flagged Turkish ship near Romanian waters. Ankara 17 Aug announced it had warned Russia against moves “which could escalate tensions in the Black Sea”; Moscow claimed ship had failed to respond to demands to halt.

Anti-Islamic State (ISIS) operations continued. Security forces during Aug detained at least 45 individuals with alleged links to ISIS; notably, security units 10 Aug arrested three ISIS members allegedly readying attack in northern Syria.

Ukraine

South remained epicentre of fighting as Russia intensified attacks on Odesa region and Ukraine’s counteroffensive continued at slow pace; Kyiv sought to drum up support for peace plan during well-attended summit in Saudi Arabia.

Russian withdrawal from grain deal brought more fighting to Odesa region. After scuppering Black Sea grain deal, Moscow intensified air raids on port infrastructure and grain facilities along Black Sea coast and Danube River in Odesa region. Notably, Russian drone 2 Aug destroyed port administration building in Izmail city; military 23 Aug said drones targeted “grain storage facilities and production complex in Danube region”. Russia continued to strike cities elsewhere; notably, missile hit theatre in Chernihiv city 19 Aug, killing at least seven. Kyiv, meanwhile, stepped up drone attacks on Russia (see Russia) and Russian-controlled territory, including massive attack 25 Aug on Russian-annexed Crimea.

Ukrainian counteroffensive ground on slowly. Ukraine’s counteroffensive along southern front, which stretches across Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, continued to make incremental progress at high cost. Forces 16 Aug liberated Urozhaine village (Donetsk) and 28 Aug freed Robotyne village (Zaporizhzhia), pushing frontline closer toward road and rail hub of Tokmak city; neither advance broke through Russia’s main defensive lines. Senior NATO commanders mid-Aug reportedly urged Ukrainian Commander in Chief Gen. Zaluzhniy to concentrate forces on southern front rather than Donetsk, request which Ukrainians appeared to heed. Ukrainian forces 24 Aug raided Russian-annexed Crimea, briefly clashing with Russian forces and planting Ukrainian flag to mark country’s Independence Day. Meanwhile, Russian forces conducted operations near Kupiansk town (Kharkiv region), forcing authorities 10 Aug to issue evacuation order.

Saudi Arabia hosted dozens of nations for Ukraine talks. Kyiv gathered delegations from around 40 countries, including China and India but not Russia, in Saudi city of Jeddah 5-6 Aug to drum up support for peace plan; 7 Aug announced more extensive talks would follow in Autumn 2023.

In important domestic developments. President Zelenskyy 10 Aug announced govt is working on comprehensive framework document, which would lay foundation for “transformation of our state” in order to “win the war [without] losing the country”. Govt 18 Aug prolonged martial law and mobilisation for another 90 days.

Uzbekistan

Court sentenced police officers for abuses during Karakalpakstan unrest, and U.S. sought to strengthen development cooperation.

Court handed prison sentences to police officers over Karakalpakstan unrest. Supreme Court 5 Aug announced that court in Kogon city had sentenced two police officers to seven years in prison for torture during crackdown on July 2022 protests in autonomous Karakalpakstan region; third officer handed three-year prison sentence for failing to prevent crime.

In another important development. U.S. development agency officials 26-30 Aug visited country “to advance the U.S.-Uzbekistan development partnership”.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Govt’s landmark ceasefire with National Liberation Army (ELN) took effect, marking important step forward in President Petro’s “total peace” efforts; govt announced negotiations with FARC dissidents will begin in Sept.

Bilateral ceasefire with ELN commenced. 180-day ceasefire between ELN and state security forces — longest bilateral ceasefire ever concluded with guerrilla group – 3 Aug got under way, marked by ceremony in capital Bogotá. Parties same day inaugurated public participation mechanism with 81 national delegates who are meant to organise several dozen regional consultations; purpose of consultations unclear. Govt and ELN negotiators 14 Aug began fourth round of talks in Venezuelan capital Caracas. Despite progress, Attorney General Francisco Barbosa 8 Aug alleged guerrillas planned to assassinate him, which ELN next day denied. UN Security Council 2 Aug expanded UN mission mandate to include monitoring of ELN ceasefire and expressed willingness to consider covering potential future agreement with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents.

String of attacks by FARC dissident faction threatened progress toward talks. Petro administration 12 Aug announced it would begin formal peace negotiations with dissident FARC faction known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) on 17 Sept, likely in Caquetá department (south). Group launched series of attacks in Cauca department (west). Notably, FARC-EMC 12 Aug killed three police officers in Morales town; several car bombs 13 Aug killed police officer in Buenos Aires town; local Indigenous communities reported at least five assassinations 12-13 Aug; and attack 24 Aug on police station in Santander de Quilichao town wounded four. Attacks follow 1 Aug video circulated by group naming ceasefire with military as first priority in talks and saying it would not consider wider cessation of hostilities; Petro 14 Aug stated that govt would seek cessation of hostilities against civilian population before agreeing to ceasefire.

In other important developments. Official campaigning for Oct local elections began amid concerns poll may escalate political tensions in conflict-affected regions as armed and criminal groups seek to assert influence. Petro’s son, charged with money laundering, 3 Aug reportedly said some of these dubious funds financed president’s 2022 election campaign.

Ecuador

Spate of political assassinations in lead-up to elections prompted President Lasso to declare nationwide state of emergency; first-round voting in poll failed to produce clear winner.

Gunmen shot dead prominent electoral candidate. Ahead of presidential poll on 20 Aug, gunmen 9 Aug killed Construye party candidate Fernando Villavicencio and injured nine others at campaign rally in capital Quito. Security forces shot dead one suspect and arrested six others – all Colombian nationals. Villavicencio had advocated for tough approaches to drug trafficking, corruption and other illicit activity, as well as alleged links between politicians and organised crime. President Lasso same day declared 60-day national emergency. Govt 12 Aug deployed 4,000 armed guards to Prison 8 in Guayaquil city and transferred Jose Adolfo Macias, head of Los Choneros gang, to maximum security prison; Villavicencio had previously mentioned receiving threats from Macias. Just five days after Villavicencio’s murder, gunmen 14 Aug shot dead local leader of left-wing Citizen Revolution Movement Pedro Briones near his home in Esmeraldas province.

Election produced no clear winner, leading to runoff in Oct. Ecuadoreans 20 Aug cast their ballots in poll overshadowed by Villavicencio’s assassination. Voters chose among eight presidential candidates, all of whom named security as their top priority. With no candidate able to secure absolute majority, Citizen Revolution Movement candidate Luisa González will face businessman Daniel Noboa in Oct runoff.

Inmates took dozens of law enforcement officers hostage. Authorities 31 Aug announced over 50 law enforcement officers had been taken captive by inmates from six prisons; hostage-taking followed explosion of two car bombs in capital Quito 30-31 Aug reportedly targeting country’s prisons authority; authorities said actions may be in response to recent security measures inside penitentiaries.

El Salvador

Govt’s hardline security policies continued to fuel concern among rights groups.

Authorities carried out massive security operation amid anti-gang efforts. In one of biggest military operations since President Bukele first declared state of exception in March 2022, govt 1 Aug deployed 7,000 soldiers and 1,000 police officers to Cabañas department (north) to tackle “terrorist cells”. While previous raids had focused on particular communities, Cabañas became first full department to be placed under siege as authorities arrested scores and seized dozens of weapons. Meanwhile, Legislative Assembly 9 Aug approved state of exception’s 17th extension until 13 Sept. Authorities 22 Aug announced 7,000 of 72,000 people detained under measure had been released.

Rights groups kept condemning security measures. Civil society organisations, including Movimiento de Víctimas del Regimen and Institute of Human Rights of the University of Central America, continued to denounce persecution, harassment and abuses under state of exception. Former Supreme Court of Justice magistrate Sidney Blando 1 Aug said no judicial independence existed in El Salvador. Andrés Guzman, appointed to Commission for Human Rights and Freedom of Expression by Bukele, 7 Aug defended administration.

Guatemala

Despite judicial and other interference, presidential election went ahead, resulting in landslide victory for centre-left candidate Bernardo Arévalo; President Giammattei endorsed result.

Surprise candidate won presidential election. Bernardo Arévalo of centre-left Movimiento Semilla won landslide victory in presidential runoff on 20 Aug, securing 60.9% of vote compared with 37.2% for Sandra Torres of right-wing Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza; Arévalo, who takes office on 14 Jan, promised to fight corruption after victory. President Giammattei 21 Aug congratulated Arévalo, inviting him to launch transition. Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) 28 Aug confirmed result.

Attempts to undermine Arévalo and his party persisted. Torres, who had not conceded by end of month, repeatedly claimed election may be stolen and 18 Aug alleged fraud in first round; hours later, director of Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity (accused of corruption) echoed Torres’ accusations, implying possible international interference and claiming advances in investigations into Semilla party. TSE 18 Aug criticised comments so close to second-round vote, but 28 Aug provisionally suspended Semilla after Judge Orellana, at request of Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity, issued order. Organization of American States (OAS) 28 Aug called decision an “abusive interpretation of the law”. Ruling unlikely to affect Arévalo but for now leaves him without party.

International community kept close eye on proceedings. Amid concern about efforts to alter electoral process, external actors including U.S., OAS and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called for transparent elections with no interference. OAS 10 Aug extended observation mission until Jan transition upon request from outgoing president and others. OAS 24 Aug asked govt to provide Arévalo and running mate Karin Herrera with protection amid death threats.

Haiti

Gangs sought to capture new territory in capital Port-au-Prince as discussions on deployment of multinational police force moved forward amid calls for broad political consensus.

Gangs mounted assaults aimed at expanding presence in capital. Gangs stepped up operations in various parts of Port-au-Prince in attempt to expand foothold toward centre of capital. Notably, alleged members of Kraze Baryè gang 8 Aug carried out attacks in Tabarre district in push toward main airport where large companies are located. Alleged members of Grand Ravine gang 5 Aug attempted to invade Carrefour-Feuilles district from their Martissant stronghold and several days later took control of local power plant, leaving several districts without electricity and killing police officer in clash; alleged Grand Ravine gang 25 Aug resumed assaults on Carrefour-Feuilles, forcing around 9,000 people to flee. Alleged members of Canaan gang 26 Aug opened fire on hundreds of parishioners armed with machetes and sticks attempting to confront gang leader in Canaan suburbs, which left at least seven dead. Meanwhile, UN humanitarian office 14 Aug reported number of internally displaced persons had reached nearly 195,000.

Discussions on multinational force moved forward. U.S. 1 Aug praised Kenya’s late July offer to consider leading multinational force and urged Haitian stakeholders to “urgently broaden the political consensus”. CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) 4 Aug welcomed announcements by the Bahamas and Jamaica to commit troops to mission. Following 20-23 Aug security assessment mission to Haiti, Kenya 25 Aug agreed to lead force. Given history of misconduct by external missions in Haiti, NGO Human Rights Watch 14 Aug called for safeguards to prevent abuses. Leader of G9 gang coalition, Jimmy Chérizier aka Barbecue, 16 Aug threatened violence if multinational force commits abuses in poor neighbourhoods.

Dialogue to resolve political crisis made tentative progress. Media outlets reported series of meetings from late July continuing into Aug between main Haitian political groups involved in negotiations to resolve political crisis; CARICOM 14 Aug said its facilitation team had made progress with various stakeholders during virtual meetings.

Honduras

Govt renewed state of emergency for sixth time, while Congress continued work toward establishment of anti-corruption body.

Stringent anti-gang measures remained in place. After enforcing night-time curfew in San Pedro Sula city (Cortés department) early July, authorities 10 Aug implemented further security measures, deploying 500 police officers throughout city as well as plainclothes unit and unmarked cars. Authorities took similar measures in other areas, including Olancho department (centre). Military police, meanwhile, 4 Aug announced its mano dura approach in penitentiary system would continue despite concerns about rights violations. Authorities 7 Aug claimed national homicide rate had decreased by 44% since state of exception came into effect Dec 2022 and 20 Aug extended measure for sixth time.

Efforts to enable creation of anti-corruption commission continued. Congress 2 Aug repealed further decrees that protected its members from prosecution for corruption; Secretary of Parliament Carlos Zelaya 6 Aug said Congress had completed all necessary steps for establishment of International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity.

Constitutional crisis loomed over blocked vote for new Attorney General. National Party, main opposition group in Congress, 22 Aug prevented vote to replace incumbent Attorney General Oscar Chinchilla, whose mandate ended 31 Aug; move was in response to passing of controversial amnesty law that National Party claim benefits members of ruling party while persecuting the opposition; President Castro 11 Aug and 29 Aug organised national protest to demand Congress proceed with vote.

Mexico

Criminal violence continued at high levels amid rising discontent over govt handling of disappearances; tensions with U.S. simmered over fentanyl crisis.

Growing number of disappearances raised concerns. Though National Institute of Statistics and Geography report late July said 2022 marked lowest homicide rate in Mexico since 2017, rising number of disappearances underscored persistently high levels of insecurity. Notably, five youths 11 Aug disappeared from Lagos de Moreno city in Jalisco state (centre). Four days later, video surfaced in media allegedly showing victims being forced to kill one another; video reportedly attributed to MZ faction of Sinaloa Cartel, which is in competition with Jalisco Cartel New Generation for control of drug trafficking and fuel theft in area. Case triggered alarm, with opposition presidential candidate Xochitl Galvez 16 Aug announcing suspension of campaign activities for 24 hours. Head of National Search Commission 23 Aug resigned amid growing frustration with govt’s handling of disappearances, further underscored by late July decision of independent investigators to end probe into 2014 disappearance of students from Ayotzinapa college due to lack of collaboration from authorities. Some 200 protesters 30 Aug took to streets in Mexico City to mark International Day of the Disappeared, chanting “Where are our children” and calling for more concerted govt efforts to locate missing persons.

Attacks on state forces and civilians continued. Coahuila’s Prosecutor’s Office 1 Aug announced detention of “criminal leader” who could be responsible for series of late July attacks on police checkpoints in Coahuila state (north). Army 22 Aug said cartels are increasingly deploying roadside bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with 42 soldiers, police and suspects wounded by IEDs in 2023, up from 16 in 2022. Cartels in Michoacán state (centre) late Aug burnt trucks and shops and blocked roads, prompting govt 28 Aug to send 1,200 troops to quell uptick in violence.

Frictions with U.S. over fentanyl crisis simmered. Tensions between Mexico and U.S. over responsibility for fentanyl drug crisis continued to rise; U.S. officials blame Jalisco Cartel New Generation and Sinaloa Cartel for production and trafficking of fentanyl, while Mexican govt claim country is only transit route.

Nicaragua

Govt crackdown on Catholic Church, political opposition and media persisted.

Authorities targeted Jesuit order amid crackdown on Catholic Church. Govt 9 Aug froze bank accounts and 16 Aug seized assets of Jesuit-run Central American University in capital Managua, accusing institution of being “centre of terrorism”; UN rights office and Jesuit movement same day criticised move. Govt 23 Aug declared Jesuit order illegal and ordered confiscation of all its property over alleged tax reporting issues. U.S. 19 Aug announced sanctions on 100 municipal officials for role in suppression of Catholic Church.

Repression of opposition and independent media continued. Police 2 Aug arrested opposition leader Juan Carlos Baquedano Castro upon his return from exile in Mexico, next day apprehended opposition activist Lester Macolla Solís when he returned from U.S. Court 8 Aug found political prisoner and VP of April 19 University Movement Jasson Salazar Rugama guilty of “undermining national integrity and spreading false news”. Meanwhile, govt 4 Aug expelled Honduran journalist Kenya Volkanoe from country for publishing pro-Christian posts. Collective of media outlets known as Digital Mercenaries 6 Aug said regime used 1,400 social media accounts to serve as disinformation network.

Venezuela

Opposition candidates competing in Oct primary kicked off their campaigns as authorities announced new National Electoral Council; govt saw progress and setbacks in court rulings on foreign assets.

Campaigning for opposition primary kicked off. Candidates 22 Aug began campaigning for opposition primary on 22 Oct to select single nominee for 2024 presidential election. Primary process continued to encounter obstacles, however, with no clarity from govt about location of voting centres opposition will be able to use, raising concerns about voters’ ability to cast ballots. Opposition candidates also faced threats. Notably, Attorney General Tarek Saab 13 Aug launched investigation into death threats against primary candidate Delsa Solórzano, including one that referenced murdered Ecuadorean presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio (see Ecuador); and reported govt supporters 15 Aug violently dispersed campaign event of Henrique Capriles in Apure state (west), injuring ten. Meanwhile, National Assembly 24 Aug appointed new National Electoral Council headed by govt loyalist Elvis Amoroso, which signalled govt’s unwillingness to allow competitive presidential race.

Govt won lawsuit to recover frozen assets from Portuguese bank. Govt 9 Aug announced it had won legal battle to release $1.5bn in state assets from Portuguese bank, which were frozen in 2019 following imposition by U.S. and other countries of sanctions on govt; Venezuela 16 Aug petitioned U.S. Supreme Court to overturn U.S. judge’s late July ruling, criticised by govt and opposition, which set Oct start date for auction of shares of Venezuela-owned refiner Citgo Petroleum’s parent company to pay off creditors.

Dismissal of Red Cross chief in Venezuela sparked condemnation. Supreme Court 4 Aug dismissed President of Venezuelan Red Cross Mario Enrique Villarroel and ordered organisational restructuring after VP of ruling United Socialist Party accused Villarroel of “mafia activity” and conspiring against govt; international and domestic NGOs criticised move while Red Cross 9 Aug said “any state intervention in our National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies raises serious concerns regarding their independence”. Meanwhile, rights group Amnesty International 29 Aug published report accusing govt of using arbitrary detentions as tool of repression.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Algiers posed as mediator in Niger crisis amid fears of greater instability along shared border; BRICS bloc of emerging economies dealt a blow to Algeria’s membership bid.

Algiers offered to mediate Niger crisis. Tebboune 5 Aug said Algeria was “ready to help” resolve crisis in Niger following late-July coup against elected President Bazoum; Algiers, which favours diplomatic path to ensure return to constitutional order, has intermediate position between West African regional bloc ECOWAS’ threat of military intervention, and Burkina Faso and Mali’s support for military coup leaders. FM Ahmed Attaf 23 Aug started tour of three ECOWAS member states – Nigeria, Benin and Ghana – to hold consultations on Niger crisis, and 29 Aug proposed six-month transitional plan to restore “constitutional and democratic order”; Niger coup leader Gen. Abderrahmane Tchiani 19 Aug had called for three-year transition.

Repression of dissent continued. Constantine court 29 Aug sentenced Algerian-Canadian researcher for NGO Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Raouf Farrah, and Algerian journalist Mustapha Bendjama, to two years in prison for allegedly publishing classified information; their lawyers same day filed appeal.

In other important developments. BRICS bloc of emerging economies 24 Aug invited six countries to join alliance, not including Algeria; move deals a blow to President Tebboune who in recent months had engaged in advocacy drive to advance Algiers’ candidacy. Meanwhile, Ahmed Attaf 9 Aug met with U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in U.S. capital, Washington DC, to discuss situations in Niger, Ukraine and Western Sahara; visit also focused on reinforcing bilateral ties.

Bahrain

Hundreds of prisoners began mass hunger strike in protest of detention conditions.

Prisoners in Jau prison in south – which incarcerates majority of Bahrain’s 1,200 political prisoners – 7 Aug began hunger strike to demand better conditions, including increased time outside cells and better health and education facilities; by late month, reports suggested more than 800 prisoners had joined action, making it largest prisoner hunger strike in country’s history. In rare demonstrations, villagers 7 Aug in Sanabis, on outskirts of capital Manama, held protest in solidarity with prisoners; protesters also took to streets in downtown Manama.

Egypt

Govt continued to shy away from fulfilling International Monetary Fund loan conditions, and President Sisi received timid recommendations from national dialogue.

Implementation of IMF reform program remained suspended. Govt continued to prioritise boosting country’s foreign currency liquidity over implementing politically-sensitive structural reforms negotiated with International Monetary Fund. Notably, in effort to boost foreign currency inflow, govt 14 Aug announced measures targeted at Egyptians abroad, including U.S. dollar pension plan and $5,000 fee to avoid military draft. Authorities 18 Aug extended acting Central Bank governor Hassan Abdalla’s term by another year, providing further sign of continuity in current approach.

National dialogue submitted conclusions. National Dialogue Board of Trustees mid-Aug submitted recommendations on number of topics to President Sisi; proposals however fall short of addressing pressing issues including plight of political detainees and exercise of political rights.

Tensions persisted with U.S. over human rights record, stance on Ukraine war. In joint letter, group of U.S. lawmakers 10 Aug urged President Biden’s administration to withhold $300mn conditional to human rights record out of annual $1.3bn in military assistance to Egypt, citing continuous repression of journalists, opposition officials and civil society activists; U.S. administration expected to release decision before 30 Sept. Meanwhile, U.S.-based daily newspaper The Wall Street Journal 11 Aug published article detailing Egypt’s reluctance to meet U.S. request to provide weapons to Ukraine, highlighting Cairo’s still warm relations with Moscow.

In other important developments. BRICS bloc of emerging economies 24 Aug invited Egypt and five other countries to join alliance. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan 27-28 Aug held direct talks on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) for first time in two years; talks ended without breakthrough (see Nile Waters).

Iran

De-escalatory understandings between U.S. and Iran began to take shape, underscoring potential for sustained mutual restraint on nuclear and regional fronts, but maritime tensions remained elevated.

First evidence emerged of U.S.-Iran de-escalation. U.S. 10 Aug confirmed Iran’s release of five U.S. nationals from prison to house arrest. Iran’s deputy FM same day indicated that frozen Iranian assets in South Korea were in process of being released, along with “several Iranians who were illegally detained in America”; assets, estimated at around $6bn, will be held in Qatar, where they be available for non-sanctionable humanitarian trade. Additionally, U.S. media reports mid-Aug indicated Tehran had tapered growth of its enriched uranium stockpiling at highest end, while major attacks on U.S. and allied forces by Iranian/Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria appeared to be in lull.

Tensions in maritime domain persisted. After U.S. throughout July announced series of military deployments to Gulf region, various media outlets 3 Aug reported Washington was in advanced deliberations about possibility of dispatching U.S. forces aboard commercial vessels that request it. U.S. 6 Aug announced arrival of 3,000 forces in region facilitating “greater flexibility and maritime capability”; next day Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps warned Iran would “respond in kind to any U.S. action and mischief, including the seizure of ships”. U.S., EU and UK naval authorities 12 Aug alerted commercial vessels of unspecified threat and advised distance from Iranian waters.

Normalisation with Saudi Arabia continued. After Iranian officials 13 Aug reported reopening of Saudi consulate in Mashhad, FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian 17-18 Aug travelled to Saudi Arabia for meetings with his Saudi counterpart and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman; Amir-Abdollahian described meetings as “frank, beneficial and productive” (see Saudi Arabia).

Western sanctions mounted. Canada 8 Aug sanctioned seven Iranian individuals, including secretary of Supreme National Security Council, citing their involvement “in activities that gravely threaten international peace and security or that constitute gross and systemic violations of human rights”. UK same day blacklisted nearly dozen Iranian persons and organisations as part of set of 25 designations of foreign entities giving military support to Russia.

Iraq

Hostilities intensified between Türkiye and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in north, parties formed lists ahead of provincial elections in Dec, and Islamic State (ISIS) continued low-scale insurgency.

Türkiye escalated drone strikes on PKK. Turkish drone 6 Aug killed two PKK militants in separate strikes in Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk governorates; 9 Aug killed two PKK members in separate strikes in Sulaymaniyah. Clashes between Turkish forces and PKK 9-10 Aug killed at least six Turkish soldiers in Zap region, Dohuk governorate; Türkiye 10 Aug responded with airstrikes, killing four PKK members. Türkiye 24 Aug launched drone strikes in Erbil governorate, killing seven PKK members. IED 25 Aug killed Turkish soldier in north. Turkish FM Hakan Fidan 22 Aug visited capital Baghdad and Erbil, declaring “we will clear this virus [PKK] from Iraq together”.

Shiite parties formed separate lists for forthcoming provincial elections. Ahead of provincial polls set for 18 Dec, party registration 14 Aug closed with 303 registered parties and 37 coalitions. Shiite Coordination Framework parties decided to compete separately through multiple lists, including former PM Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition and Hadi al-Ameri’s Fateh alliance comprising many Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)-affiliated groups; scattered coalition reflects parties’ competing local interests, particularly in south. While Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement continued boycott of formal politics, it could back independents.

ISIS continued attacks as govt discussed role of U.S. forces. ISIS 7 Aug attacked PMF position in Salah al-Din governorate, killing one. Clashes between French/Iraqi forces and ISIS cell 28 Aug killed French soldier in Salah al-Din. UN experts 14 Aug warned that ISIS still commands 5,000-7,000 members in Iraq and Syria. Defence Minister Thabit Muhammad al-Abbasi 7 Aug met U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in U.S. capital Washington to discuss defence partnership beyond defeat of ISIS; continued presence of around 2,500 U.S. troops is recurring issue of contention, particularly for pro-Iran parties that constitute governing coalition and in wake of reports that U.S. forces recently bolstered presence at Ain-al-Asad airbase.

In another important development. Iran 28 Aug said it agreed with Iraq that “armed separatists and terrorist groups” in Kurdistan would be disarmed before 19 Sept.

Israel/Palestine

Israeli forces and settler attacks killed over a dozen Palestinians, as settler violence reached highest levels ever recorded and govt expanded settlement funding.

Israeli raids, settler violence and Palestinian gunmen roiled West Bank and Israel. Israeli military forces and settlers killed at least 18 Palestinians in Aug, while Palestinian attacks killed five Israelis. UN 4 Aug recorded 39% annual increase in settler attacks in first six months of 2023, highest since it began gathering data in 2006, while UN envoy 21 Aug said Palestinian casualties in 2023 have already surpassed 2022 figures, marking highest toll since 2005. Notably, Palestinian 1 Aug shot and injured six Israelis before being killed in Maale Adumim settlement. Israeli settlers 4 Aug killed Palestinian in Burqa village and 6 Aug killed Palestinian near Ramallah; Palestinian hours later killed Israeli security guard before being shot dead in Tel Aviv. Israeli forces 6 Aug killed three Palestinians near Jenin. Suspected Palestinian gunmen 19 Aug killed two Israelis in Huwara village. In rare clash, Palestinian security forces 30 Aug killed Palestinian in Tulkarem refugee camp.

Israel accelerated settlement building, Palestinian prisoners began hunger strike. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich 15 Aug announced plans to allocate $180mn to West Bank settlements after freezing funds to Palestinian communities in Israel and East Jerusalem; Arab local councils 21 Aug held strike in protest and Smotrich 28 Aug said he would unblock funds. Meanwhile, Palestinian administrative detainees in Israeli prisons early Aug began open-ended hunger strike in protest of detention without charge or trial; issue could provoke retaliation if any prisoner dies. Hundreds of Arab citizens of Israel 23 Aug voiced anger at govt’s failure to curb wave of criminal violence.

In other important developments. Amid legitimacy crisis facing Palestinian Authority (PA), PA President Abbas 10 Aug fired 12 governors in West Bank and Gaza in apparent attempt to reclaim public confidence. Tens of thousands of Israelis 17-19 Aug continued protesting govt’s judicial overhaul in Tel Aviv. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 8 Aug threatened to “return Lebanon to the Stone Age (see Lebanon). Suspected Israeli airstrikes struck Syrian capital Damascus.

Lebanon

Palestinian factions battled in southern refugee camp and Christian and Shiite groups clashed near capital Beirut; Hizbollah-Israel tensions remained high and presidential vacuum continued.

Intra-Palestinian fighting continued, Shiite-Christian hostilities erupted. After 30 July assassination of Fatah general, violent clashes early Aug continued inside Ein el-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in south, resulting in at least 13 deaths, destruction of 400 houses and displacement of several hundred families. Separately, vehicle allegedly carrying Hizbollah ammunition 9 Aug crashed in Kahaleh, Maronite Christian-majority village outside capital Beirut, triggering gunfight that killed resident and Hizbollah member; various Christian parties denounced incident as consequence of Hizbollah maintaining its independent weapons arsenal. Hizbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah 14 Aug called for calm but warned that party’s rivals were seeking to push country into civil war. Leader of Lebanese Forces (LF) party Samir Geagea 14 Aug suggested that Hizbollah may be behind death of former LF coordinator in southern town of Ain Ibl.

Hostile rhetoric continued between Hizbollah and Israel. Following tensions in July over Hizbollah’s alleged build-up of military infrastructure along border, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 8 Aug threatened to “return Lebanon to the Stone Age”; Nasrallah 14 Aug returned threat. Israel’s UN ambassador 30 Aug said Israel is closer to launching military action in Lebanon than at any time since 2006 war. Bellicose statements come after series of altercations at border, which have increased in regularity since mid-2022. U.S. Treasury 16 Aug designated Hizbollah-linked Lebanese NGO Green Without Borders as terrorist group.

Presidential vacuum entered its tenth consecutive month. Parliament speaker and Hizbollah ally Nabih Berri 8 Aug said Sept dialogue proposed by French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian is opportunity that “should not be missed”. Lack of president kept parliament at standstill, as body 17 Aug failed to secure necessary quorum to hold proposed legislative session.

Economic hardship persisted. Interim Central Bank governor, who succeeded Riad Salameh on 31 July, 17 Aug announced that total liquid foreign exchange reserves are down to around $7bn. Army 9 and 13 Aug announced that it had arrested dozens of people accused of involvement with irregular migration to Europe.

Libya

In apparent policy shift, UN envoy for Libya called for unified govt before elections take place; rival militias engaged in deadly clashes in Tripoli, revealing precarious security outlook in capital.

Amid political gridlock, UN urged unified govt for elections. Tripoli-based consultative body, High State Council (HSC), 6 Aug elected Mohamed Takala as new leader, unseating incumbent Khaled Mishri, with unclear consequences on HSC’s support for eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR)’s plan to appoint interim govt as part of roadmap to general elections. HoR 8 Aug discussed draft election laws agreed upon in June by UN-backed “6+6” joint committee (composed of HoR and HSC representatives) and referred comments back to committee. Meanwhile, UN envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 22 Aug told UN Security Council agreement on unified govt is “imperative” to lead country to elections; statement appears as reversal of UN longstanding position that elections should be held ahead of govt unification.

Central Bank announced reunification after decade-long division. Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir 20 Aug said Central Bank of Libya reinstated as unified institution almost ten years after splitting into two rival branches; it is still unclear, however, whether procedures required to make unification operational have been activated.

Fighting between rival Tripoli militias left dozens dead. Members of Special Deterrence Force (alias Rada militia) 14 Aug detained commander of 444 Brigade, Mahmud Hamza, at Mitiga airport in capital Tripoli. In response, members of 444 Brigade opened fire at Rada militiamen, leading to intense fighting with heavy artillery around Mitiga airport and elsewhere in Tripoli that continued into 15 Aug; UN reported at least 55 people killed and over 100 injured. Fighting, which in following days subsided as Hamza was released, took place amid turf war between Rada militia and 444 Brigade commanders (both allied to Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba) for control of Tripoli International Airport upon its reopening.

In other important developments. Eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army 25 Aug launched airstrikes against Chadian rebel positions on Libyan side of border with Chad (see Chad). Dabaiba 28 Aug suspended FM Najla Mangoush after protests previous day erupted in several cities over Mangoush’s meeting with Israeli counterpart.

Saudi Arabia

Govt pursued normalisation process with Iran and cracked down on freedom of expression at home.

Iranian-Saudi rapprochement made progress as normalisation with Syria stalled. Iranian FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian 17 Aug met Saudi counterpart in capital Riyadh, describing relations “on the right track”; Amir-Abdollahian next day met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in highest-level talks since March reconciliation. Reports during month indicated Saudi Arabia delayed opening of embassy in Syria, which was reportedly planned for June. Amid talk of U.S. efforts to secure normalisation deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia 12 Aug named its ambassador to Jordan, Nayef al-Sudairi, non-resident envoy to Palestine. Riyadh 5-6 Aug hosted Ukraine “peace summit”. BRICS 24 Aug invited Saudi Arabia alongside other nations, including Iran, United Arab Emirates and Egypt, to join bloc.

Govt continued domestic crackdown. Amid series of arrests of social media personalities, authorities early Aug arrested public health expert and social media influencer, Mohammed Al Hajji, before releasing him on 15 Aug; arrests point to authorities’ attempt to stifle perceived criticism of govt policies. Human Rights Watch 21 Aug alleged Saudi border guards conducted “widespread and systematic” killings of hundreds of Ethiopian migrants between March 2022 and June 2023.

Syria

Major battle erupted between Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and regime in northwest as Russia renewed airstrikes and Islamic State (ISIS) killed dozens in centre; collapsing currency triggered protests.

Hostilities escalated between HTS and regime, leading to fierce battle. In Idlib province, HTS 7 Aug launched raid 10km behind regime lines to destroy Russian-Syrian base, 11 Aug conducted raid on Latakia front, and 26 Aug detonated tunnel bomb beneath regime base in southern Idlib. As of 28 Aug, HTS continued to heavily shell regime forces around southern Idlib amid one of most intense battles in northwest since 2020 ceasefire, although fighting remained contained to artillery and sniper fire. Amid hostilities, Russian resumed airstrikes in Idlib: 21-22 Aug killed 15 HTS members and late Aug intensified deadly strikes across region.

ISIS attacks surged in centre. ISIS 7 Aug temporarily captured largest regime position near village of Shoula, Deir Ez Zor and two checkpoints along Raqqa-Deir Ez Zor highway. ISIS 8 Aug killed eight regime troops and pro-govt fighters in Raqqa province and 10 Aug killed at least 25 soldiers outside Mayadeen town. Upsurge in attacks may indicate group’s shift away from areas dominated by international coalition. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 18 Aug killed group’s eastern region emir in Raqqa city.

Currency crisis sparked rare anti-govt rallies. Syrian pound 16 Aug fell to 15,500 to $1 USD, sparking general strike next day in Suwayda province, protests 18 Aug in Daraa city and rare protest in capital Damascus amid reports of increased social media criticism of govt among Alawites; protestors in Suwayda city 24 Aug raided ruling party’s office. Anti-regime protests persisted late month among Druze population of Suwayda and across opposition-held northern Syria.

Hostilities erupted in northeast, regime allowed aid in northwest. In eastern Deir Ez Zor in northeast, clashes beginning 28 Aug between SDF and Arab groups reportedly killed dozens after SDF 27 Aug arrested commander. After month-long pause, Damascus 8 Aug acquiesced to UN efforts to reopen Bab al-Hawa border crossing for humanitarian aid for six months; HTS-aligned authorities in Idlib, however, rejected aid sanctioned by Damascus.

Tunisia

Grain and bread shortages turned into crisis, and govt reached agreement with Libya to share responsibility for rescuing migrants expelled by Tunis to border zones.

Bread shortages turned into crisis. Govt 1 Aug issued decree banning privately-owned bakeries – employing around 20,000 people across country – from purchasing subsidised flour, blaming country’s grain and bread shortages on their selling of bread at higher price than govt-subsidised baguette. Move prompted most privately-owned bakeries to close doors, while around 200 bakery owners 7 Aug protested in front of trade ministry in Tunis. Trade ministry 19 Aug cancelled decree and agreed to restore subsidised flour supply to private bakeries.

President Saïed dismissed PM, showing continued rejection of IMF program. Saïed 1 Aug sacked PM Najla Bouden and appointed little-known former central bank executive Ahmed Hachani as replacement; move indicates Saïed’s continuous rejection of International Monetary Fund loan terms, including economic reform program that Bouden had tried to advance.

Tunisia and Libya agreed to rescue migrants stranded along border. UN Sec Gen António Guterres 1 Aug called on Tunis to stop expelling migrants into desert border areas and demanded “urgent relocation of those stranded along the border to safe locations”. Interior Minister Kamel Fekih 2 Aug conceded authorities have pushed back “small groups” of sub-Saharan migrants trying to enter Tunisia into desert no man’s land, but labelled claims of collective deportations and mistreatment of migrants as “false allegations”. Libyan authorities 8 Aug reported death of at least 27 sub-Saharan migrants in Tunisia-Libya border zone. Tunis and Tripoli next day reached agreement to share responsibility for providing shelter to at least 300 migrants stranded in shared border zone. Meanwhile, EU-Tunisia migration control deal faced pushback. In confidential note leaked early Aug, German Federal Foreign Office argued Germany and other EU member states were not properly consulted before EU Commission and Tunisia mid-July signed migration deal.

Western Sahara

Polisario Front independence movement leader attended summit of BRICS bloc of emerging economies in South Africa.

Amid tense relations between South Africa and Morocco, president of self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Polisario Front independence movement leader, Brahim Ghali, 22-24 Aug attended summit of BRICS bloc of emerging economies in South African city of Johannesburg. Earlier in month, Morocco’s state news agency MAP 19 Aug denied South Africa’s FM Anil Sooklal’s claim that Morocco was among countries seeking to join BRICS, said Morocco would not send delegation to BRICS summit in South Africa.

Yemen

Oman sought to advance peace talks as Huthis threatened escalation and clashed heavily with separatists in south, while armed raid on Aden’s presidential palace revealed deep govt divisions.

Omani delegation visited capital Sanaa in hope of fostering talks. Amid growing resentment among civil servants over stalled salary payments, Huthi leader Abdul Malek al-Huthi 11 Aug threatened escalation against Saudi-led coalition if talks do not make progress. After last visit in April, Omani delegation 17 Aug arrived in Sanaa to meet Huthi leadership and discuss latest developments in talks; while Huthis want humanitarian file and salaries addressed first, Omanis suggested addressing salary payments and concurrently establishing principles. Meanwhile, UN special envoy Hans Grundberg 8-9 Aug met Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) members and Saudi officials and 15 Aug met Omani and Huthi officials. In briefing to UN Security Council, Grundberg 16 Aug highlighted dire economic situation and intermittent fighting on Taiz, Marib, Dhale, Hodeida, Shebwa and Saada front lines.

In south, Huthis and Southern Transitional Council (STC) clashed amid spate of militant attacks. Huthis attempted to seize control of strategic military sites in Al Hadd Yafea, northeast of Lahj governorate, triggering clashes with STC on 26 Aug that killed eight STC fighters with unknown Huthi causalities. Meanwhile in Abyan governorate, suspected al-Qaeda attack 1 Aug killed at least five STC-affiliated troops in Wadi Omran; similar assault 10 Aug killed six fighters, including senior STC commander, in Mudiyah district. Unknown gunmen 15 Aug assassinated govt officer in Taiz city investigating last month’s killing of UN official.

Southern militia raided presidential palace. Giants Brigades, southern salafi group aligned with United Arab Emirates (UAE), 13 Aug stormed presidential palace in Aden, besieging PM Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed’s residence for several hours following his return from Riyadh in attempt to pressure Saeed to agree to financial benefits for associates of salafi commander Abu Zara’ah al-Mahrami; raid underscored divisions within PLC, likely stemming from tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

In other important developments. Saudi Arabia 1 Aug announced $1.2bn economic aid for PLC. UN 11 Aug removed over 1m barrels of oil from decaying FSO Safer to avert ecological disaster.

Africa

Burkina Faso

All-military approach to jihadist insurgency led to large numbers of casualties among army auxiliaries and local communities; pro-regime groups voiced support for new constitution.

Civilians continued to bear the brunt of spreading violence. Conflict actors continued to target civilians suspected of collusion with opposing side. Notably, presumed al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) combatants 1 July killed 11 civilians near Partiaga town, Tapoa province, and unidentified jihadists 5 July killed 15 civilians in Sorgha town, Gnagna province (both East region). Soldiers and army auxiliaries (VDPs) 8 July killed around 12 ethnic Fulani passengers on bus near Dedougou city, Mouhoun province, Boucle du Mouhoun region. Military 8-9 July also reported killing around 90 jihadist militants near Partiaga (Tapoa) and Ougarou town (Gnagna) (both East region) and near Sofikel town, Seno province (Sahel region). Several attacks led to heavy casualties on govt’s side, particularly among VDPs. Notably, JNIM 7 July killed around 16 VDPs and two civilians, while losing ten of their own, in Kogossablogo village, Namentenga province (Centre-North region).

Demonstrators rallied in favour of new Constitution. Amid rumours that transitional authorities are looking to adopt new constitution and delay elections scheduled for July 2024, thousands 1 July demonstrated in capital Ouagadougou to demand constitutional revision; gathering also reported same day also in second-largest city Bobo-Dioulasso.

In other important developments. West Africa’s regional bloc ECOWAS 9 July held summit in Guinea-Bissau, regretted Ouagadougou and other West African transitional regimes’ “very limited” cooperation with ECOWAS mediators; also reiterated call on transitional authorities to restore constitutional order and voiced concern over humanitarian situation of people displaced from “front line countries”, including Burkina Faso, to neighbouring coastal states. Ouagadougou and Bamako 31 July warned military intervention against coup leaders in Niger would be considered “declaration of war” against them (see Niger).

Burundi

Main opposition party entered near-complete paralysis and Burundi delegation boycotted UN periodic review of country’s human rights record.

Main opposition party experienced split in leadership. National Congress for Freedom (CNL) President, Agathon Rwasa, 28 June dismissed 11 members of CNL’s political bureau, labelling them as “dissidents” and accusing them of insubordination and collusion with Interior Minister Martin Niteretse. In response, ten suspended members 4 July announced Rwasa’s suspension, accusing him of plotting against CNL, embezzlement and misappropriation of assets. Group thereafter named CNL Sec-Gen Simon Bizimungu as temporary party leader, who in turn urged CNL members to disregard announcement.

Burundi’s UN walkout deepened human rights concerns. Burundi delegation 3 July walked out of UN Human Rights Committee session in Geneva, Switzerland. Bujumbura cited presence at session of “criminals”, notably Armel Niyongere, one of 12 human rights activists and journalists convicted in Burundi for their alleged involvement in 2015 coup attempt. Committee same day expressed “deep regret” at move, said review of Burundi’s human rights record would continue without delegation. NGO Human Rights Watch 5 July said walkout was indicative of Burundian authorities’ “contempt for human rights”.

Imbonerakure violence continued. Two groups of ruling party youth militia Imbonerakure, including one returning from DR Congo, overnight 30 June-1 July engaged in violent clashes along Burundian bank of Rusizi River, reportedly leaving three dead. Imbonerakure 15 July allegedly beat 14-year-old to death in Ntega commune, Kirundo province, and around 17 July killed resident of Muhanga commune, Ngozi province.

Cameroon

Anglophone conflict continued to take high civilian toll, as human rights organisation denounced widespread human rights violations.

Tit-for-tat attacks by army and separatists continued in Anglophone regions. Armed Anglophone separatists 1 and 4 July killed three soldiers in Bamenda city and Belo town, both North West (NW) region. In response, govt forces launched spate of attacks, killing two women in Mejang village (NW) 5 July, three separatist combatants in Mbonge town (South West) 12 July, and at least five young men in Bamenda’s Nacho neighbourhood 14 July. Unidentified gunmen wearing military uniforms 16 July shot ten civilians dead in same neighbourhood; military and NW governor Adolphe Lele Lafrique next day blamed “terrorists”, while prominent separatist armed group, Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), denied responsibility.

ADF hardened their stance, threatening to target anyone working with govt. ADF leader Ayaba Cho Lucas 12 July vowed to seize, sell or destroy properties of “collaborators and enablers of Cameroon government’s activities in the Anglophone regions”, notably ruling party members and traditional rulers who cooperate with Yaoundé. Separatists 29 July declared ghost town in Bamenda city to disrupt funeral of opposition leader Ni John Fru Ndi for his stance in favour of united Cameroon.

Rights group denounced widespread human rights violations in North West. NGO Amnesty International 4 July published extensive report documenting human rights violations – killings, kidnappings and gender-based violence – committed by security forces, associated militias and armed separatists in North West region since 2020. Report also accuses govt of instrumentalising Fulani Mbororo community militias against Anglophone rebels, exposing community to reprisals by separatists, and of systematic crackdown on people denouncing violations.

In other important developments. Far North region in July recorded lull in jihadist violence after security forces in June reinforced their positions; lull also coincided with resumption of clashes between Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province in neighbouring Nigeria (see Nigeria). Anglophone cocoa producers in July staged street protests in Mamfe city (SW) to protest Nigeria exports ban imposed in June by Yaoundé in bid to curb smuggling.

Central African Republic

Central Africans voted on new constitution abolishing presidential term limits, while rebel groups stepped up attacks on govt forces in attempt to derail vote.

President Touadéra-sponsored constitutional referendum held 30 July. Touadéra 10 July unveiled proposed new constitution removing two-term limit for presidents, thus paving the way for his third-term bid; draft constitution also creates position of VP appointed by president and bars Central Africans of foreign origin or holding another citizenship from running for president. Opposition coalition Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC) voiced discontent but failed to mobilise large numbers, with less than 1,000 people protesting 14 July in capital Bangui. Opposition leader Anicet Georges Dologuélé late July criticised absence of level playing field, citing state control of key voting institutions, absence of electoral register and short campaign timeframe, and BRDC called for boycott of referendum. Vote 30 July proceeded without major incidents.

Armed groups intensified attacks in lead-up to referendum. Rebel Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) 3-4 July killed at least seven soldiers in ambush 25km from Abba town (Nana-Mambéré prefecture) and attack on checkpoint near Sam-Ouandja town (Haute-Kotto prefecture); 11 July launched another raid on checkpoint 30km from Nana-Bakassa town (Ouham prefecture), killing one soldier. In response, security forces 2-12 July arrested at least 70 people during search operations in Bambari city (Ouaka prefecture) and Bangui. UN peacekeeping force (MINUSCA) 10 July killed 15 suspected CPC fighters and lost one Rwandan peacekeeper during operation in Sam-Ouandja town.

Wagner’s mutiny fuelled speculations about paramilitary group’s future in CAR. Approximately 600 Russian paramilitary Wagner Group operatives 6 July left Bangui heading for Russia, fuelling speculations about group’s future in CAR following Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in Russia in June. Wagner spokesperson in CAR, Alexander Ivanov, 7 July said group will remain in country. CAR’s presidency next day confirmed “it is not a definitive departure but a rotation”, and hundreds of Wagner forces mid-July reportedly landed in Bangui. Meanwhile, UN Security Council 27 July relaxed arms embargo on CAR, lifting restrictions on supply, sale and transfer of arms to govt forces; Bangui criticised decision, demanding total lifting of embargo.

Chad

Interim President Déby moved to consolidate control over armed forces and authorities scheduled constitutional referendum for December, while communal violence persisted.

Déby appeared to set the stage for possible presidential candidacy. In apparent attempt to secure better control of armed forces, Interim President Gen. Déby throughout June and July retired at least 100 generals and promoted similar number of younger officers close to him to rank of general. In Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique, African Union Commission Chairperson (and former Chadian FM) Moussa Faki 17 July said military leaders of transition should not stand for election, reiterated need to hand over power to civilians. Authorities 17 July scheduled constitutional referendum for 17 December, while civil society continued to accused transitional govt of trying to impose unitary state.

Transitional authorities advanced reconciliation agenda. As part of transition’s national reconciliation agenda, govt late June-early July set up national commission in charge of disarming politico-military groups and reintegrating their personnel into national army, and another one tasked with national reconciliation and social cohesion. Déby 17 July pardoned 110 individuals sentenced to jail terms for alleged involvement in 20 October 2022 protests.

Intercommunal violence persisted. Clashes between Arab and Moubi communities 1-3 July left at least seven civilians dead in and around Kouka and Iregué localities in Mangalmé department, Guéra region.

Sudanese exodus continued to strain Chad’s humanitarian capacity. UN Deputy Sec Gen Amina Mohammed 18-19 July visited Chad, met with Déby and PM Saleh Kebzabo and reiterated call on international community to increase support for Sudanese refugees in Chad. World Food Programme 11 July announced scaling up its response on Chad-Sudan border to support surge of people fleeing from Sudan, as UN refugee agency 23 July counted over 329,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad.

Côte d’Ivoire

Political class continued to gear up for September 2023 regional and municipal elections.

Prominent opposition parties struggled to agree on joint candidacies. Electoral commission 19 July extended deadline to submit candidacies for regional and municipal elections until 23 July at request of Henri Konan Bédié’s Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and Laurent Gbagbo’s African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI). PPA-CI 18 July announced alliance with PDCI in 24 regions (out of around 30). Notably, VP of PPA-CI Stéphane Kipré 17 July joined list of PDCI official Alphonse Djédjé Mady in Haut-Sassandra region. Parties also filed joint candidacies in 158 out of 201 municipalities, but negotiations failed in key constituencies in economic capital Abidjan, including in Yopougon commune, where PDCI instead reached alliance with Simone Gbagbo’s party. Meanwhile, President Ouattara 13 July insisted that members of ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) who were not officially endorsed by party apparatus should not run as independents.

Hurdles persisted for heavyweights seeking political comeback. After electoral commission late June rejected Gbagbo’s request to be reinstated on electoral roll, PPA-CI did not appeal decision by 1 July deadline, meaning Gbagbo will remain unable to participate in September elections. Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique 4 July confirmed that exiled former PM Guillaume Soro is facing Paris-based judiciary investigation for alleged murder of ex-rebel leader Ibrahim Coulibaly in 2011; Soro, who remains under 2021 life sentence in Côte d’Ivoire for allegedly plotting coup against President Ouattara in 2019, unlikely to be allowed to return home in time to run for president in 2025.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Tensions escalated further ahead of general elections set for December, while civilians continued to bear the brunt of violence in eastern provinces.

Pre-electoral tensions turned violent. Unidentified gunman 13 July killed Chérubin Okende, MP and spokesman of Moïse Katumbi’s opposition party, Together for the Republic, in capital Kinshasa. Small anti-govt protests same day broke out and President Tshisekedi urged judiciary to “shed light on this case”. Adding to turmoil, electoral commission 10 July dismissed all opposition’s demands ahead of general elections set for December, including independent audit of electoral register. In response, opposition leader Martin Fayulu 12 July vowed to block “fraudulent” elections. Electoral commission 23 July closed registration of candidacies for legislative elections, with Fayulu and former President Joseph Kabila’s parties choosing to remain out of the race.

M23 ceasefire remained fragile in North Kivu province. Local sources said M23 armed group 5-16 July killed at least 11 civilians in Bukombo village and another eight in Bungushu village, both Rutshuru territory. Congolese military 27 July claimed to have pushed back incursion by Rwandan army north of North Kivu’s capital Goma. Rwandan army next day rejected accusations, accused Kinshasa of seeking pretext to launch attack on Rwandan territory. European Union 28 July sanctioned nine Congolese and Rwandan individuals responsible for serious human rights violations and/or for fuelling armed conflict in eastern DR Congo, including several armed group members and a Rwandan military officer.

Other armed groups continued to terrorise civilians in East. In Ituri province, association of various ethnic Lendu militias CODECO 3 July raided Pabon village, Mahagi territory, killing two; Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 12 July killed at least 16 people in Eloke-Nord and Apesiko villages, Mambasa territory. In North Kivu province, ADF next day killed two including one army officer in Mapobu village, Beni territory. Following 16 June school attack in Uganda, Ugandan and DR Congo forces stepped up operations against ADF cell in Mwalika Valley, Beni territory (North Kivu), reportedly killing 16 militants, including several leaders, by mid-July.

In other important developments. As conflict between Yaka and Teke communities persisted in western provinces, armed forces 3 July reportedly arrested 50 Yaka “Mobondo” militiamen.

Eritrea

Eritrean forces’ continued presence in Ethiopia’s Tigray region hindered peace process; President Isaias attended summits in Egypt and Russia amid efforts to boost international standing.

Eritrean forces maintained strategic positions in Tigray. Coalition of regional and international civil society organisations 10 July published report warning that peace deal in Ethiopia’s Tigray region is “marred by significant gaps” (see Ethiopia), including continued presence of Eritrean troops who were supposed to withdraw under terms of accord. Though Asmara mostly withdrew its forces in Feb 2023, it has maintained strategic positions in region and could still disrupt peace process, especially if Amhara-controlled Western Tigray is returned to Tigray’s administration.

Asmara’s efforts to bolster its international standing continued. In bid to play more active role in regional affairs, President Isaias 13 July attended Sudan’s Neighbouring States Summit in Egypt’s capital, Cairo, to discuss possible solutions to Sudan crisis. Summit ended with plan to establish ministerial mechanism, aimed at facilitating comprehensive peace agreement. Isaias 28 July met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on sidelines of Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg; leaders reportedly held “extensive discussions on bilateral ties and international matters of mutual importance”, including war in Ukraine.

Ethiopia

Violence in Oromia continued unabated, Amhara Fano militia stepped up attacks on govt forces, and Tigray's top commander announced demobilisation of over 50,000 troops.

Clashes between insurgents and govt forces persisted in Oromia region. Fighting raged in Oromia between govt forces and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) following failed talks in May, with sides stepping up operations in bid to strengthen their respective negotiating positions should talks resume. Hostilities notably occurred in West Hararghe and Arsi zones, where OLA operations have been rare. Month also saw OLA, as well as unaffiliated bandits, increase kidnappings for ransom.

Violence intensified in Amhara region. Discontent with federal govt in Amhara simmered as clashes between, on one side, Fano militia and defected Amhara paramilitaries and, on the other, federal and regional forces late July escalated in North Shewa, North Wollo and Gondar zones; notably, Fano gunmen 26 July ambushed army in Gondar. Month saw spike in assassinations of local officials, likely perpetrated by Fano: notably, gunmen 3 July shot police chief and his deputy in Dejen District (East Gojam Zone); gunmen 14 July killed police commander of Debre Berhan town (North Shewa).

Tigray-Amhara tensions persisted over territorial dispute, Tigray demobilised over 50,000 troops. PM Abiy 6 July pressed Tigray and Amhara to resolve territorial disputes through peaceful consultations (Western and parts of Southern Tigray have been under Amhara’s administration since Nov 2020); Amhara regional authorities next day announced plans for referendum to settle issue but offered few details, such as who would organise vote or be eligible to cast a ballot. Tigray official 13 July reportedly said holding referendum while parts of region remain under Amhara’s control would be illegal. Meanwhile, Tigray’s top commander Tadesse Worede 26 July announced demobilisation of over 50,000 Tigray forces and urged federal govt to ensure withdrawal of Amhara and Eritrean forces.

In other important developments. Authorities in Gambella region 20 July imposed curfew after ethnic Anuak militias killed scores, mostly Nuer community members, in Gambella city. Ethiopia and Egypt 13 July agreed to seek final deal on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam within four months (see Nile Waters).

Guinea

Tensions between transitional authorities and political parties remained elevated following failure of mediation process.

Truce between opposition and transitional authorities remained fragile. Dixinn court of first instance 3 July claimed to not have jurisdiction over slander and abuse of authority case brought against Justice Minister Charles Wright by National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC) protest movement leaders; latter same day brought case before Supreme Court. Meanwhile, authorities continued to harass opposition. Security forces 4 July prevented FNDC head of mobilisation, Billo Bah, from travelling abroad. Cellou Dalein Diallo’s Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) opposition party faced destabilisation attempt as Ousmane Gaoual Diallo, expelled from UFDG in June 2022 after joining Col. Doumbouya’s govt, geared up for UFDG presidency candidacy.

Tensions persisted between ECOWAS and transitional authorities. In interview with Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique published 7 July, outgoing chairman of West African regional body ECOWAS, Guinea-Bissau President Sissoco Embaló, said Guinean transition was taking too long. ECOWAS 9 July held summit in Guinea-Bissau, lamented transitional authorities in West Africa’s “very limited” collaboration with ECOWAS mediators, reaffirmed need to restore constitutional order; heads of state same day elected Nigerian President Tinubu, who has previously come out as strong opponent of military coups, as new ECOWAS chairman.

In other important developments. Trial of 28 September 2009 massacre, in which govt forces killed over 150 demonstrators and raped over 100 women while Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara was heading country, 10 July resumed after 6-week suspension. Junta 30 July expressed support for Niger coup leaders.

Kenya

Crackdown on anti-govt protests left over 20 people dead as tensions spiked over tax hikes; spate of Al-Shabaab attacks continued.

Nationwide protests turned deadly. Opposition-led protests resumed across country to denounce rising cost of living after govt late June raised fuel and energy taxes. Police 7, 12, and 19 July cracked down on protesters in several cities and towns, leaving over 20 people dead and arresting over 300, including nine senior opposition figures. Opposition leader Raila Odinga 25 July denounced “unprecedented police violence” and said opposition would file charges for “police atrocities” against govt at International Criminal Court. President Ruto and Odinga 28 July met in Mombasa city; govt and opposition politicians next day announced they would set up joint committee to resolve differences.

Inter-communal clashes erupted in western counties amid protests. Amid opposition-led protests, clashes 12 July erupted between Ruto’s Kalenjin community and Odinga’s Luo community in disputed Sondu town, located along border between Kericho and Kisumu counties; violence killed three and left dozens injured.

Al-Shabaab attacks continued along Somalia border. Amid spate of Al-Shabaab attacks in eastern counties since May, Interior Minister Kithure Kindiki 5 July announced delay in planned reopening of border with Somalia. Al-Shabaab militants same day ambushed police at Ogorwen location in Mandera county, reportedly leaving six officers dead; 23 militants also killed. Security forces vehicle 10 July hit explosive device in Fafi area, Garissa county, with two dead. Suspected Al-Shabaab militants 14 July killed two police officers and one teacher in raid on Wargadud police camp in Mandera county.

Mali

In likely attempt to assert power, Interim leader Col. Goïta conducted major cabinet reshuffle, while new constitution entered into force; violence remained elevated in central and northern regions.

President reshuffled cabinet, sidelining prominent figures of the transition. Interim President Col. Goïta 1 July carried out govt reshuffle, bringing 13 new ministers into govt. Reshuffle saw Goïta loyalists replace several ministers loyal to PM Choguel Maïga, and 2015 peace agreement signatory groups lose two out of four ministries; reshuffle also strengthened Goïta at the expense of four other colonels at the heart of power since May 2021 coup, including defence minister, Col. Sadio Camara.

IS Sahel faced resistance from signatory armed groups, rival jihadists in north. Presumed Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) militants 6 July attacked UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) convoy near Ouatagouna town, Gao region, killing three civilians and wounding 14 people, including three peacekeepers. Also in Gao, al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 8-9 July engaged IS Sahel fighters in Hourara, Tandadjdadjorane and Fitili villages, reportedly taking over some bases. 2015 peace accord signatory, Movement for the Salvation of Azawad, 11 July killed around ten civilians suspected of collusion with IS Sahel in Inazole village, Ménaka region.

Violence remained high in centre as govt sustained offensive against jihadists. In Mopti region (centre), govt forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group early July conducted air and group operation against JNIM in Sévéri village, killing at least seven militants. Also in Mopti, JNIM 2 July killed 28 ethnic Dogon Dan Na Ambassagou militiamen in Nouh-Bozo and Bangassi villages. In Ségou region, army 12 July allegedly killed at least 20 JNIM militants as they tried to ambush supply convoy in Sokolo area; and JNIM 27 July reportedly killed at least 12 civilians in Tiouga village.

In other important developments. Constitutional Court 21 July endorsed constitutional referendum, and Goïta next day promulgated new constitution. MINUSMA 3 July presented plan for mission’s withdrawal to FM Abdoulaye Diop; MINUSMA-govt joint working groups tasked with carrying out withdrawal by 31 Dec set up 11 July. Bamako 31 July expressed support for coup leaders in Niger (see Niger).

Mozambique

Islamic State militants launched significant attacks on security forces in coastal areas, prompting govt to step up counter-insurgency operations; Southern African regional force’s mandate extended by another year.

Islamic State insurgents increased pressure on security forces in coastal districts. Suspected Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) combatants 30 June-1 July launched attacks in border area between Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia districts, notably killing at least ten special unit soldiers in Cobre village; 6 July ambushed Rapid Intervention Unit convoy near Mbau town, Mocímboa da Praia district, killing seven police officers and looting weapons; and 18 July attacked military position in Cobre village, Macomia district, killing unknown number of soldiers. Violence continued to impact civilians despite ISMP’s apparent drive to avoid casualties; militants 16 July robbed and beheaded two fishermen in Litamanda village, Macomia district.

Govt forces redoubled counter-insurgency efforts in Macomia. Govt forces supported by soldiers from Rwanda and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM) in July stepped up counter-insurgency drive launched in June along Macomia coast. Military prevented some traders and civilians from entering district with large amount of goods amid reports ISMP militants have been resupplying in district; restrictions may escalate tensions between troops and civilians, particularly in areas affected by food insecurity.

Southern African bloc renewed mission’s mandate. During extraordinary Troika summit, Southern African Development Community 11 July renewed SAMIM’s mandate for additional year; assessment circulated during summit proposed mission’s complete withdrawal by July 2024 or July 2025, while stressing work still needed to empower Mozambican forces to replace foreign military personnel in areas reclaimed from insurgents.

Election preparations continued. Ahead of municipal elections scheduled for 11 Oct, 23 political parties, coalitions, and citizens groups registered by 14 July deadline; registration of candidates opened 20 July. Main opposition party RENAMO 25 July said it was open to coalitions with other parties for local elections, but reported no formal contact underway.

Niger

Presidential guards deposed President Bazoum, extending coup belt and resulting instability sweeping West Africa.

Presidential guards staged coup overthrowing Bazoum. Presidential guards 26 July sealed off presidential palace in capital Niamey and detained President Bazoum. Putschists 26-27 July suspended constitution, dissolved govt and state institutions and closed borders, claiming “continued degradation of the security situation” and “poor economic and social governance” pushed them to act. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Abdou Sidikou Issa, 27 July said military would not intervene against coup leaders, purportedly to avoid bloodbath in Niamey, de facto backing putschists. Head of Presidential Guard, Gen. Abderrahmane Tchiani, 28 July appeared on state TV and declared himself head of new ruling junta, National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP). Thousands of pro-junta protesters 30 July marched in Niamey waving Russian flags and stormed French embassy, drawing tear gas from French security. CNSP 31 July detained head of Bazoum’s party and four ministers. Coup prompted international condemnation. Notably, West Africa’s regional bloc ECOWAS 26 July condemned “attempt to seize power by force” and called on putschists to free Bazoum “immediately and without any condition”; 30 July imposed sanctions, including national assets freeze, and threatened force if coup leaders fail to reinstate ousted Bazoum within a week.

Low-level insecurity persisted in Tillabery region (south west). Al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 4 July killed three civilians in Ourogo village, Say department. Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) fighters 7 July killed one gendarme and wounded another in Ayorou department. JNIM 14 July ambushed transport convoy under military escort near Niakatire locality, Torodi department, killing one gendarme and four civilians, and wounding 19 others; two militants also killed. Meanwhile, reports around 10 July emerged that Nigerien and French forces 6-7 July captured two high-level IS Sahel leaders; observers 12 July however claimed reports were case of mistaken identity.

Nigeria

Jihadists and criminal groups killed dozens in North East and North West, herder-farmer violence flared in North Central states, while security forces fought separatists enforcing sit-at-home order in South East.

Jihadist violence persisted in Borno state, North East zone. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 25 July killed 32 civilians, including 25 herders, in two attacks in Gudumbali forest and Gubio area. Meanwhile, ISWAP 5 July killed scores of Boko Haram members in Sambisa Forest near Bama area. Counter-insurgency operations continued, with air force 5 July bombing ISWAP gathering near Marte town and 15 July launching airstrikes on ISWAP camps in southern islands of Lake Chad. Troops 20 July also repelled ISWAP attack on army post near Monguno town. Jihadist attacks continued, however.

Jihadist activity reported in North West zone amid persistent criminal violence. In Zamfara state, gunmen 10 July killed four police officers on Gusau-Sokoto road in Bungudu area, and 24 July killed at least 29 persons, including seven soldiers, in Maru area. Troops throughout month engaged suspected criminals at several locations, notably in Zamfara’s Maru area and Kaduna state’s Kagarko area. MP from Sokoto state, Sani Yakubu, 12 July said jihadists from Niger, Mali and Libya had joined forces with local criminals and taken over Tangaza area.

Herders-farmer violence continued in North Central zone. In Benue state, assailants 7-8 July killed 33 people in attacks on three villages in Ukum area; residents blamed Fulani herders, while Benue governor said some killings related to communal feuds and banditry. In Plateau state, gunmen 1-8 July killed at least 16 villagers of Mangu area; residents blamed attacks on Fulani armed groups hired by herders.

South East zone saw uptick in separatist violence. Gunmen 3-10 July enforced stay-at-home order in South East zone to press demands for release of outlawed separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leader Nnamdi Kanu, leading to shootings and confrontations with security forces. Notably, police 7 July killed four gunmen near Awkunanaw town, Enugu state, and gunmen next day killed two people in Owerri North area, Imo state.

Nile Waters

Egyptian and Ethiopian leaders agreed to resume talks on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

On sidelines of Sudan’s Neighbouring States Summit in Egypt’s capital, Cairo (see Sudan), Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi 13 July agreed to restart GERD talks, with aim of reaching final deal on filling and operation of dam within four months. Pact came after Ethiopia promised to ensure Egypt and Sudan receive sufficient water flows during fourth annual filling, which may last until Sept; war-torn Sudan’s role in forthcoming talks not yet clear.

Rwanda

Kinshasa accused Rwandan army of attacking Congolese border guards, and European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on Rwandan military officer for fuelling conflict in eastern DR Congo.

Congolese military 27 July claimed to have pushed back incursion by Rwandan army into North Kivu (see DR Congo). Rwandan army next day rejected accusations, accused Kinshasa of seeking pretext to launch attack on Rwandan territory. Meanwhile, European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell 7 July said EU “firmly condemns Rwanda’s support to M23 and Rwanda’s military presence in eastern DRC” and “reiterates its urgent demand that Rwanda withdraws its troops from eastern DRC, ceases immediately all support to M23”. EU 28 July sanctioned nine Congolese and Rwandan individuals responsible for serious human rights violations and/or for fuelling armed conflict in eastern DR Congo, including a Rwandan military officer and several armed group members.

Senegal

Political climate eased as President Sall decided not to stand for re-election, but detention of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko rekindled tensions.

Incumbent president renounced third candidacy. President Sall 3 July announced he will not run for third term in Feb 2024 election. International community immediately hailed decision, with U.S. Sec State Anthony Blinken welcoming “example for the region”, and UN Sec Gen António Guterres praising “demonstration of statesmanship and leadership”.

Authorities arrested opposition leader, sparking deadly protests. Opposition leader Ousmane Sonko 6 July denounced legal actions taken against him, including two-year prison sentence for “corrupting the youth”, as unjust, and warned of “indescribable chaos” if his presidential candidacy is prevented. Authorities 24 July lifted security detail set up around Sonko’s home in capital Dakar since late May, with govt next day saying risk to public order had faded. Police 28 July arrested Sonko on accusations of plotting an insurrection, and Sonko 30 July announced starting hunger strike. Authorities next day formally charged him with “fomenting an insurrection”, dissolved his party and restricted Internet access. Protests also 31 July broke out in Sonko’s southern city of Ziguinchor, with clashes between police and protesters leaving two people dead. Meanwhile, security forces 11 July arrested Sonko’s close ally, MP Birame Souleye Diop, on charges of “offenses against the head of state”; Diop released from police custody 19 July, but case ongoing.

Somalia

Al-Shabaab continued to launch significant attacks amid stalled govt offensive and drawdown of AU troops, while tensions persisted at regional level with unclear consequences on counter-insurgency drive.

Al-Shabaab conducted several deadly attacks. Al-Shabaab militants early July repeatedly crossed Shabelle river to launch incursions between Bulo Burte and Beledweyene cities in Hiraan region (Hirshabelle state, centre). In attempt to pressure South West state authorities to stop detaining those who travel to Al-Shabaab-held areas, group 11-21 July laid siege to Baidoa city (Bay region), causing food and fuel shortages. Al-Shabaab attacked bases handed over in June by African Union mission (ATMIS) troops to Somali forces. Notably, militants 13 July briefly captured Geriley base in Gedo region (Jubaland state, south), and 19 July targeted Arbacow base in Lower Shabelle region (South West state), but did not overrun it. Al-Shabaab 24 July killed at least 20 soldiers in suicide attack on military training centre in capital Mogadishu. Second phase of govt’s offensive in July remained on hold with small-scale operations mainly in Galmudug state’s Galgaduud region (centre) and Jubaland state’s Lower Juba region (south).

Govt sought greater acceptance of political reforms plan. In effort to obtain greater support for decisions agreed by federal govt and member states in May, notably shift to presidential system, President Mohamud 12-13 July held consultations with senior opposition politicians; participants did not reach full agreement on key issues including election harmonisation and timelines, and Somalia’s governance model.

Political tensions persisted in several regions. Standoff continued between Hirshabelle state President Ali Guudlaawe and Ali Jeyte, who proclaimed new Hiraan state after Guudlaawe in June sacked him as regional governor of Hiraan; Jeyte 22 July said he had fallen out with Guudlaawe over approach to Al-Shabaab. Following election-related violence in Puntland state in June, Puntland parliament 25 July passed constitutional amendments that some opposition leaders opposed, notably allowing for direct election of president and VP. In contrast, Gedo region showed signs of de-escalation. Jubaland state officials early July travelled to Gedo for talks with regional authorities, and Ahmed Buulle 26 July pledged to hand over office to governor appointed in June by Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe.

Somaliland

Fighting between govt forces and Dhulbahante clan militias continued in Las Anod, and electoral authorities announced election roadmap despite opposition.

On-and-off clashes continued around Las Anod town, Sool region. Fighting between Somaliland forces and Dhulbahante militiamen 8 July damaged Las Anod hospital, injuring staff; NGO Doctors Without Border 24 July announced withdrawal of services from hospital. Heaving fighting and artillery exchange also reported mid-July and around 29 July on outskirts of town. Dhulbahante clan 6 July replaced 33-member committee tasked with governing SSC-Khatumo region with new 45-member grouping. Delegation of Somali traditional elders attempting to mediate in conflict mid-July left Somaliland after three-month mission without concrete results.

Electoral commission set election dates despite opposition. Electoral commission 17 July scheduled political parties election for Dec 2023 and presidential vote for Nov 2024, which means one and two-year delay respectively; opposition parties previously demanded presidential vote be held before political parties election, and rejected full two-year extension of Bihi’s term. House of Representatives 23 July elected Yasin Haji Mohamud ‘Faratoon’ as new speaker after previous speaker defected to Dhulbahante in June. Somaliland forces late July clashed with newfound militia group upset over electoral process in Gacan Libaax mountains (Togdheer region).

South Sudan

President Kiir announced candidacy in 2024 presidential election amid chorus of international and local voices warning that country lacks conducive environment for free and fair poll.

Govt began election campaigning. Ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM-IG) pushed forward with preparations for presidential election scheduled for Dec 2024 amid hopes it will provide international legitimacy and end sanctions regimes. President Kiir 4 July confirmed election would take place and announced he would run for president at rally in Wau city, Bahr el Ghazal state.

Array of actors raised concerns about elections. International and local actors raised concerns about lack of political will to hold competitive elections as well as lacklustre implementation of revitalised peace deal (R-ARCSS). Notably, head of UN mission in South Sudan 6 July said country is “not yet ready” for “free, fair and credible elections”. Leader of R-ARCSS signatory party National Democratic Movement 9 July said credible elections “will not be possible…under the current conditions and (given) status of implementation of the R-ARCSS”. Prominent members of VP Machar’s Sudan’s People Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) also voiced concern, as did holdout opposition leader of National Salvation Front Thomas Cirillo on 10 July. Several other holdout opposition leaders and civil society organisations 13 July issued statement accusing govt of organising “sham election”. SPLM-IO deputy chairman 23 July reiterated party “is ready for elections that are free, fair and credible, not sham elections”. SPLM-IG pressed ahead despite warnings, though one SPLM-IG official 10 July claimed party is discussing further extension of transitional period.

Govt and opposition forces clashed in Greater Upper Nile region. SPLM-IG and SPLA-IO 1 July clashed in Wunkur county, located in disputed territory between SPLM-IG-controlled Ruweng Administrative Area and SPLA-IO-controlled Panyikang county (Greater Upper Nile). SPLA-IO area commander in Longechuk county in Upper Nile 2 July confirmed defection to govt.

Sudan war fuelled more displacement and raised food prices. As of 26 July, over 193,000 people had crossed into South Sudan from Sudan since April. Conflict continued disrupting food supplies along border, causing food scarcity and high prices in north.

Sudan

Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) gained upper hand in Khartoum amid heavy fighting with army, Darfur witnessed high levels of ethnic targeting, and diplomatic disarray hindered peace efforts.

RSF entrenched its superior position in capital Khartoum as war intensified. Fighting continued to escalate between army under Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Burhan and RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” as conflict 24 July turned 100 days old. RSF gained upper hand in capital Khartoum and sister city Bahri, seizing control of strategic sites as army suffered significant battlefield losses. Notably, RSF 15 July repelled major army offensive trying to break its two-month siege of army headquarters in Bahri. Paramilitary’s momentum prompted speculation it could soon win war for Khartoum.

Darfur region saw high levels of ethnic targeting. Amid fighting between army and RSF in various areas of Darfur, South and West Darfur states witnessed numerous attacks on civilians, notably perpetrated by RSF and affiliated tribal militias on members of other ethnic groups. In West Darfur, epicentre of ethnic conflict involving Arab Rizeigat (from which most RSF personnel come) and non-Arab Masalit tribes, UN 13 July reported bodies of at least 87 Masalit had been discovered in mass grave; International Criminal Court same day launched investigation of alleged war crimes in Darfur. In South Darfur, RSF 18 July seized control of Kaas town, displacing thousands.

Fighting continued in Kordofan states and spilled into Blue Nile state. After settling into uneasy stalemate, hostilities between army and RSF 20 July resumed in North Kordofan state capital, El Obeid. In South Kordofan state, rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North throughout July clashed with army, reportedly taking control of several towns and pushing into Blue Nile, where sides notably fought around al-Kurmuk locality.

Competing mediation tracks failed to yield results. Various, uncoordinated diplomatic initiatives continued throughout month, producing little. Notably, regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development 10 July convened talks, calling for end to war, while Egypt 13 July hosted leaders from Sudan’s neighbouring countries, announcing its own initiative with the same goal. Meanwhile, army conveyed several messages hinting at interest in talks, while Hemedti 28 July said he would reach peace deal with army “in 72 hours” if it replaces leadership.

Uganda

UK embassy issued terror alert as authorities tried to downplay security risks following major Islamist militia attack in June.

Govt sought to shape anti-terror narrative. Security agencies deployed heavily in and around capital Kampala after UK embassy in Uganda 2 July issued terror alert. Meanwhile, govt played down risk posed by Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) after group 16 June launched deadly attack in western Uganda. Notably, President Museveni 13 July referred to Uganda as “island of peace” where no terror group could survive, while acknowledging intelligence gathering failures; also accused former DR Congo President Kabila of having turned his country into ADF’s safe heaven, which Kabila’s spokesperson 18 July called “simply ridiculous”. Following 16 June attack, Ugandan and DR Congo militaries stepped up operations against ADF cell in Mwalika Valley, Beni territory (North Kivu), reportedly killing 16 militants, including several leaders by mid-July.

Museveni faced allegations of crimes against humanity. International media including The New York Times and The Guardian 11-12 July revealed accusations of crimes against humanity against 26 Ugandan officials, including President Museveni, his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba, and seven other high-level officials; testimonies of 215 people containing detailed allegations of torture were reportedly submitted in May to International Criminal Court (ICC) in support of opposition leader Bobi Wine’s complaint over troubled 2021 elections. Museveni’s entourage 12 July said accusers were “peddling wrong information” in order to tarnish his reputation.

In other important developments. In Karamoja sub-region, suspected ethnic Jie gunmen 3 July killed four, including two soldiers. Internal and state affairs minister 5 July said Museveni’s deadline for Kenyan Turkana herders to leave Uganda or face expulsion extended to September.

Zimbabwe

Ahead of general elections set for 23 August, opposition candidates continued to face restrictions, and President Mnangagwa enacted bill critics say will be used to prohibit criticism of govt.

Govt and opposition remained at loggerheads weeks before elections. Police 7 July banned main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) rally scheduled for 9 July in capital Harare, citing lack of suitable facilities; ban upheld in court 9 July after CCC contested decision. High Court 12 July barred former ruling party official and late President Mugabe loyalist, Saviour Kasukuwere, from running for president, saying he has lived outside of country for over 18 months, and Supreme Court 28 July confirmed his disqualification; Kasukuwere’s camp denounced attempt by ruling party to exclude him from race. Elisabeth Valerio 19 July won appeal against electoral commission’s decision to bar her from running for president, becoming only female candidate in presidential election. EU observer mission 22 July arrived in country.

Controversial “patriotic bill” signed into law. President Mnangagwa 14 July enacted Criminal Law Code Amendment Bill criminalising “wilfully damaging the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe”, de facto prohibiting criticism of govt. Opposition, lawyers, and human rights groups continued to oppose bill, saying it may be used to curtail freedoms ahead of August votes. Notably, NGO Amnesty International 15 July denounced “brutal assault on civil space”

Asia

Afghanistan

Countrywide violence remained at low ebb as UN warned of worsening humanitarian crisis, Taliban imposed new restrictions on women, and tensions grew with Pakistan.

Shia religious commemoration passed without Islamic State attacks. Amid Shia religious commemoration of Ashura, during which Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) targeted Shia Hazaras in past, interim authorities 18 July announced restrictions on large gatherings ostensibly as precaution against ISKP attacks. While ISKP did not claim attacks during July, British media 11 July reported arrest of two British brothers planning to travel to Afghanistan to join ISKP and Iran 21 July claimed senior Islamic State leaders from Iraq, Syria and Libya had moved to Afghanistan; Taliban rejected claim.

UN sounded alarm over humanitarian crises. UN early July stated that critical funding gaps were threatening country’s humanitarian program; World Food Programme had stopped giving assistance to 8m food-insecure Afghans and additional 1.4m new and expecting mothers, toddlers and pre-schoolers are no longer receiving food. Additionally, estimated 7.6m people will lack access to life-saving health care. Acting FM Amir Khan Muttaqi 8 July dismissed claims country is facing economic crisis as “propaganda”.

Taliban imposed new draconian restrictions on women. Minister for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice 2 July announced that approximately 12,000 beauty salons would be closed countrywide, which will cost 60,000 women their jobs. As authorities late July began enforcing ban, dozens of women who work in salons protested decree in capital Kabul, prompting security forces to disperse crowd with water cannons and firing in air. Afghan Examination Authority 19 July barred women from annual university entrance exams.

Militant attacks in Pakistan strained Taliban-Pakistan relations. Following deadly attacks on military installations in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province mid-July (see Pakistan), senior Pakistani officials criticised Taliban for harbouring Pakistani Taliban (TTP). Taliban Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoub 21 July stated TTP relocated to Afghanistan during U.S. “occupation” and prior to Taliban takeover, Pakistan had never accused U.S.-backed Afghan govt of complicity in TTP activities. Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan 19 July met with Taliban FM.

Bangladesh

Anti-govt rallies ahead of 2024 elections turned violent, deadly power struggle persisted in Rohingya camps, and ethnic militant group agreed to ceasefire in Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Tensions between govt and opposition turned violent. Ahead of polls slated for Jan 2024, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 12 July gathered approximately 50,000 supporters in capital Dhaka, demanding govt’s resignation and caretaker govt to oversee elections. Ruling Awami League same day held rally in Dhaka, reiterating PM Sheikh Hasina would oversee polls. BNP and Awami League 18-19 July held rallies in Dhaka and other cities, resulting in clashes that killed one BNP supporter and injured hundreds in Lakshmipur city; police claimed BNP supporters attacked officers and filed charges against 8,000 countrywide. Opposition accused police of arresting more than 500 supporters before “grand rally” in Dhaka on 28 July. Police 29 July violently clashed in Dhaka with BNP supporters. During Dhaka by-election, Awami League supporters 17 July allegedly attacked independent candidate as police stood by, fuelling opposition claims that free elections under govt are impossible. Twelve Western countries 19 July condemned violence against candidate; Dhaka 26 July summoned their ambassadors in protest. Police 20 July denied Jamaat-e-Islami permission to hold rally in Sylhet, citing threat of violence; police 28 July detained 21 Jamaat supporters in Chattogram.

Deadly feuding between armed groups continued in Rohingya camps. Clashes between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation spiked. Ahead of visit by International Criminal Court prosecutor 6 July, ARSA allegedly killed sub-mahji facilitating meetings; Rohingya Solidarity Organisation next morning allegedly killed at least five ARSA members in retaliation. Camp violence has killed at least 48 Rohingya refugees in 2023, up from 40 in 2022. After UN coordinator 18 July raised security concerns, home affairs minister said govt was considering sending army to camps. Despite recent increases in U.S., EU, UK and Australian funding, Joint Response Plan remained chronically under-funded; health NGOs have warned of scabies outbreak.

Local authorities in Chittagong Hill Tracts struck truce with militants. Ethnic insurgent group Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) 19 July agreed to ceasefire after negotiations with Bandarban District Council, with further talks likely; KNF emerged in mid-2022 and has killed at least five soldiers in recent months.

Cambodia

Ruling party won national election that excluded opposition and leader Hun Sen announced resignation after 38 years in power.

PM Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) claimed “landslide” victory in national elections held 23 July. U.S. same day called polls “neither free nor fair” and EU next day criticised elections that were held in “restricted political and civic space” and “excluded important sectors of the opposition”; Election Commission in May had ruled that main opposition Candlelight Party could not partake in polls on “concocted administrative grounds”, according to Human Rights Watch. Hun Sen 26 July announced resignation as PM after almost four decades in power and intention to hand position to his son Hun Manet on 10 August, but said he would continue as head of ruling party.

China/Japan

China maintained maritime presence in East China Sea and conducted drills with Russia, as Japan and NATO deepened ties.

Military activity continued in East China Sea. As of 25 July, Japan had spotted 98 Chinese vessels in its contiguous zone over course of month, detecting six vessels in its territorial sea over just two days. Chinese flotilla comprising five warships 16 July set off to join Russian naval and air forces in drill in Sea of Japan aimed at “safeguarding the security of strategic waterways”, according to China’s defence ministry; China and Russia 23 July completed joint naval drill Northern/Interaction 2023 in Sea of Japan. Following four-year hiatus due to coronavirus pandemic, exchange program between Japanese and Chinese military personnel 16 July resumed. At NATO summit in Lithuania on 12 July, NATO and Japan announced new partnership program intending to advance cooperation in areas such as cyber-security and to increase NATO’s engagement in Indo-Pacific region. Chinese embassy in Japan 24 July said NATO’s plan to expand into region violates UN rules and urged Tokyo to avoid actions that jeopardise trust.

China protested Japan’s activities at nuclear plant. China announced its opposition to Japan releasing treated water from its Fukushima nuclear plant as both China and Hong Kong placed restrictions on seafood imports from Japan; Japan has cited International Atomic Energy Agency assessment that its activities are consistent with international safety standards and that treated water will have negligible radiological impact on people and environment.

India

Manipur state in far north east remained restive amid mounting evidence of widespread sexual violence, while tensions with China persisted over disputed Himalayan border.

Evidence of widespread sexual violence in Manipur sparked national outrage. Video 19 July went viral showing mob of Meitei men parading and sexually assaulting two naked Kuki women on 4 May – one day after ethnic clashes erupted; families of assaulted women said they had filed case in May but no action had been taken. Internet shutdown had prevented evidence from surfacing but Manipur’s chief minister 20 July said there were “hundreds of such cases” of sexual violence. Responding to shocking video, PM Modi 20 July finally addressed situation in Manipur but veered into vague political rhetoric. Meanwhile, region remained restive: Meitei men 6 July shot dead elderly Kuki woman, while radical Meitei outfit Arambai Tenggol 7 July allegedly killed and mutilated woman from Maring Naga community; following latter’s killing, police arrested nine Meitei men, likely to prevent Naga tribes – which have largely remained on sidelines of unrest – from becoming involved.

Relations with China remained fraught amid high-level meeting. In third meeting since March, FM S. Jaishankar 14 July met Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on sidelines of East Asia Summit in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta; Jaishankar called for troop disengagement along two remaining friction points on Line of Actual Control, while Wang Yi hoped to find solution “acceptable to both sides”; two sides agreed to hold military commander talks soon. Meanwhile, councillor from Ladakh’s Chushul area 10 July alleged Chinese troops had erected four tents in eastern Ladakh’s “buffer zone” and 12 July removed them following Indian army’s objections.

India boosted defence ties with France and U.S. PM Modi 13-14 July visited France and finalised several arms deals, including purchase of 26 Rafale Marine fighter jets. U.S. 20 July said it was working with India on co-producing advanced weaponry to address China’s “coercion and harassment”.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

India approved land allotment scheme in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), Supreme Court addressed case challenging autonomy revocation, and security operations against militants continued.

India and Pakistan exchanged stern rhetoric. India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh 26 July asserted “We can go to any extreme to maintain the honour and dignity of the country”, and referenced “crossing the [Line of Contact]”; Pakistan same day replied India’s practices of “stoking hyper-nationalism and reaping electoral gains need to end”.

Local politicians challenged central govt plan to allot land to landless people. Federally run authorities of J&K 3 July approved plan to give 1,360 sq ft of land to each person identified under landless scheme; former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti 5 July alleged govt wanted to “settle outsiders” and “import slums”, citing 2021 census that showed J&K’s homeless population was only 19,045; govt clarified only 2,711 people on 2018-2019 list would receive land, but Mufti’s party maintained govt’s figures showing spike in homelessness were inflated. Given that land remains highly contentious issue in region, allotment policy could have far-reaching implications, such as legitimising militancy.

Supreme Court prepared to hear Article 370 case. Supreme Court 11 July announced that from 2 August it would hear petitions in case challenging federal govt’s 2019 decision to revoke special semi-autonomous status of J&K known as Article 370 and bifurcate J&K into two federally administered Union Territories. Govt 10 July filed affidavit claiming J&K has witnessed “unprecedented era of peace, progress and prosperity” since 2019; court, however, said filing would have “no bearing on the constitutional challenge” regarding revocation.

Govt continued anti-militant operations. Security forces 10 July foiled infiltration attempt from Pakistan and killed two militants in Rajouri district. Security forces 12 July arrested five Lashkar-e-Tayyeba associates in Budgam district. Militants 13 and 18 July killed five migrant labourers in Shopian and Anantnag districts. Militants 18 July killed one forest guard in Pulwama district. Security forces same day killed four militants attempting to infiltrate Poonch district; numerous infiltration attempts may indicate militants seeking to take advantage of inclement weather and annual Hindu pilgrimage to Amarnath cave that diverted security forces’ attention.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea successfully tested solid-fuelled inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) for second time and threatened to down U.S. spy jets, while U.S. serviceman defected to north.

North Korea launched solid-fuelled ICBM. Pyongyang 12 July launched its three-stage solid-fuelled Hwasong-18 ICBM for second time after first launch in April; missile, which marked most lofted North Korean ICBM flight test to date and one with longest flight time at 74 minutes, fell into sea east of Japanese territory. Justifying launch, Pyongyang cited various frustrations related to U.S. and South Korea, including Washington Declaration announced in April, Nuclear Consultative Group and deployment of U.S. strategic assets to peninsula. North Korea 24 July fired two short-range ballistic missiles into waters off eastern coast.

North Korea threatened to down U.S. spy planes. Kim Jong-un’s sister Yo-jong in vitriolic statement 10 July warned that North Korea would shoot down U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that violate country’s claimed exclusive economic zone, following earlier statement published by defence ministry. Both statements accused U.S. of “crossing the Korean Maritime Military Demarcation Line”, referring to inter-Korean maritime border, “and invading [DPRK’s] economic zone from the sea”; Kim’s statement asserted U.S. had violated North’s Exclusive Economic Zone on 10 July, entering periphery of 200-nautical mile zone in far south east; U.S. denied allegations.

U.S. serviceman fled across border to North Korea. Private Second-Class Travis King, 23-year-old U.S. serviceman, 18 July fled across inter-Korean border during tour of Korean War truce village of Panmunjom, marking first defection to North Korea by member of U.S. military in decades. North Korea did not comment on case during July.

Chinese and Russian delegations visited North Korea. On anniversary of North’s “victory” in Korean War on 27 July, Russian delegation led by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chinese delegation led by Politburo member Li Hongzhong visited North Korea, marking first high-level visits to Pyongyang from any country since outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic; trips also signalled Beijing and Moscow’s implacable support for North Korea.

Myanmar

Regime troops battled resistance forces, junta extended state of emergency and delayed election, and Thai FM visited deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi in first contact since her 2021 detention.

Clashes continued in several parts of country between military and ethnic armed groups and post-coup resistance forces. In south east, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and its allies continued to target roads and bridges. Following late June attack on bridge between Mon State’s Thaton township and Bago region’s Kyaukkyi township that killed four regime officials, KNLA and People’s Defence Forces 6 July blew up 20m bridge from Kyaikto town to Kyaiktiyo Pagoda. In Kachin state (north), following mounting tensions amid growing military deployments in area, fighting early July erupted in area close to Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) headquarters, displacing around 500; military helicopter 8 July attacked KIO position as sides clashed for several days along main road from state capital Myitkyina to Chinese border. In Shan state (north), KIO launched offensive on Kutkai township, clashing with regime for first time in five months. In Yangon, regime security forces 7 July shot two men arrested on suspicion of involvement in killing of pro-junta singer; activists alleged soldiers executed them.

Regime hinted elections delay until 2025 before extending state of emergency. Junta immigration and population minister Myint Kyaing 2 July said 2024 census and national ID cards are required for voter lists, suggesting national election will only take place after Oct 2024 census sometime in 2025; junta 31 July extended state of emergency by six months.

Regime granted first meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, and discussed border unrest with India. Thailand’s FM Don Pramudwinai 11 July announced he met deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyitaw prison two days earlier. Statement by regional bloc ASEAN ahead of 14 July meeting said some members considered Don’s efforts “positive development”, implying others do not. Senior Indian officials 30 June-1 July met regime counterparts in Naypyitaw to discuss crime and unrest along shared border amid allegations that Kukis in India’s Manipur state have received support from Chin brethren in Myanmar (see India).

Pakistan

Govt maintained intense pressure on former PM Imran Khan as elections approached, while Islamic State killed dozens in suicide attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa amid spate of militant assaults.

Imran Khan faced raft of allegations and court cases. Islamabad High Court 4 July ruled that case alleging Khan had concealed details of gifts received during his term as PM was “inadmissible” but Supreme Court 26 July rejected Khan’s plea to halt criminal proceedings. Supreme Court Registrar 10 July rejected petition to dissolve Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party following 9 May unrest; reports continued that govt was contemplating trying Khan and other PTI leaders in military courts for alleged roles in May unrest. Prosecutor 21 July told Anti-Terrorism Court Lahore that Khan was “guilty of inciting attacks” on military installations on 9 May, per Punjab police investigation; judge extended Khan’s pre-arrest bail until 8 August. In further blow to Khan, 57 members of PTI 17 July left to form new party ahead of elections. Interior minister 20 July warned Khan could be arrested if he did not cooperate with investigations into alleged use of diplomatic channels for political purposes; defence minister 21 July said Khan could be charged with treason and disqualified from election. Supreme Court 24 July barred authorities from arresting Khan until 9 August in case pertaining to killing of lawyer.

Deadly militant attacks roiled provinces bordering Afghanistan. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bajaur district, Islamic State suicide bomber 30 July detonated explosives at political rally of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party, killing at least 54 people and wounding 200. Elsewhere in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 20 July shot dead two police officers in Peshawar’s Regi Model Town area Two TTP suicide bombers 20 July attacked govt compound in province’s Bara neighbourhood, killing four police officers. In Balochistan province, TTP 2 July killed four security personnel after storming highway checkpoint in Zhob district. Militants belonging to newly established Tehreek-e Jihad Pakistan 12 July assaulted military base in Zhob, killing nine soldiers. Amid surge in attacks, Pakistan’s army 14 July expressed concern about militant safe havens in Afghanistan, vowing “effective response” (see Afghanistan).

Philippines

Political and criminal violence continued in south, while military battled communist rebels.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In Jolo town, Sulu province, police 3 July busted gang that allegedly peddled illegal drugs and gave part of its earnings to Abu Sayyaf Group. Unidentified gunmen 12 July ambushed former mayor of Rajah Buayan municipality and her father in Lambayong town, Sultan Kudarat. Gun attack 13 July killed retired police officer and wounded his wife and brother-in-law in Isabela City, Basilan province. In Maguindanao, military 13 July seized camp of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters unit in village of Salman, Ampatuan town, Maguindanao del Sur province.

Clashes continued between military and Communist militants. Hostilities between military and communist New People’s Army in Luzon Island in north (Bicol), Mindanao Island in south (Bukidnon, Caraga), and Visayas Islands in centre, especially Negros Occidental, killed at least eight combatants and civilians and injured one.

Marawi rehabilitation continued. Marawi Compensation Board 4 July began accepting compensation claims from families who lost properties and family members during 2017 Marawi siege; board chairperson said it has so far received around 12,000 claims for July and August.

South China Sea

Philippines protested China’s “dangerous” maritime harassment in South China Sea (SCS) as U.S. and EU showed support for Manila, while Beijing and ASEAN discussed code of conduct.

Tensions persisted between China and Philippines. Philippine Coast Guard 6 July accused Chinese coast guard of “dangerous manoeuvres”, as Philippine ships were “constantly followed, harassed and obstructed by the significantly larger Chinese coast guard vessels” near Second Thomas Shoal. In response to Chinese activities, Philippine Coast Guard 7 July said it will intensify patrols in Iroquois Reef, while military 13 July said it will deploy more assets to Kalayaan island group, eastern part of Spratly archipelago. China announced large no-sail zone for military exercises 29 July-2 August, spanning area including Paracel Islands and Macclesfield Bank. U.S. Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group 4 July transited SCS after conducting port visit to Vietnam 25 June.

Manila received diplomatic support for position in SCS dispute. Philippines 12 July marked seventh anniversary of its legal victory over China on South China Sea Arbitration at the Hague Tribunal, as FM Enrique Manalo said Tribunal’s decision affirmed correctness of Philippines taking “the path of principle, the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes”; U.S. and EU reaffirmed their support and stressed that ruling is legally binding. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 31 July declared readiness “to strengthen the cooperation with the Philippines on maritime security in the region”, following meeting with President Marcos, Jr. in Manila.

Beijing and regional bloc inched toward code of conduct. China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 13 July completed second reading of code of conduct for SCS at ASEAN Regional Forum. Joint working group had missed 2022 deadline to reach agreement but agreed to attempt to conclude accord within three years.

Sri Lanka

Govt hoped to show commitment to inter-ethnic reconciliation with new policies, which Tamil leaders, families of disappeared and rights groups criticised; govt pursued economic reforms.

Govt unveiled policies purportedly to resolve country’s ethnic conflict. Ahead of President Wickremesinghe’s official visit to India 20-21 July, govt announced series of mostly repackaged policies designed to demonstrate its commitment to inter-ethnic reconciliation and lasting political solution to ethnic conflict. In meeting with Tamil parliamentarians on 18 July, Wickremesinghe presented 15-page document listing policies on land, detainees, missing persons, reparations and development initiatives for Northern and Eastern provinces; govt also included plan to strengthen provincial powers, established in Thirteenth Amendment that was drafted in 1987. Tamil leaders, who have almost universally criticised Thirteenth Amendment as inadequate, 18 July rejected proposal, which fell short of full implementation. Discussions at all-party meeting convened by president 26 July indicated lack of parliamentary consensus for his plans. Meanwhile, govt held series of meetings on proposed National Unity and Reconciliation Commission; families of forcibly disappeared and human rights organisations denounced plan as designed to win international support without addressing underlying factors that generated civil war. Sinhala nationalist activists 23 July disrupted peaceful commemoration of 40th anniversary of anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo, which riot police later violently dispersed.

Parliament endorsed govt’s debt plan and economic reforms. Parliament 1 July approved govt’s Domestic Debt Restructuring plan, designed to complement and encourage debt restructuring with international creditors that is needed to meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) target for debt reduction; plan has generated widespread criticism for effectively imposing losses on workers’ retirement funds while leaving banks and their shareholders untouched. In brief visit 28 July, French President Emmanuel Macron reiterated support for expedited debt restructuring and economic recovery, a message echoed by Japanese FM Hayashi Yoshimasa during 29 July meeting with Wickremesinghe. Further progress was made in achieving reforms required by IMF’s bailout plan as parliament 19 July passed anti-corruption bill and bill to guarantee independence of Central Bank.

Taiwan Strait

China maintained military activities around island and vowed stern response as presidential candidate of Taiwan’s ruling party planned U.S. visit in August, raising prospect of heightened tensions.

China continued military activity as Taiwan held military drills. As of 26 July, Taiwan during month had spotted 411 Chinese military aircraft entering its air defence identification zone (ADIZ), of which at least 156 either crossed unofficial maritime demarcation “median line” or were detected in south-western ADIZ; Taiwan detected 162 Chinese navy vessels in surrounding waters throughout month. Notably, China 21-22 July sent 37 aircraft and seven navy vessels around Taiwan. Earlier, Taiwan 3-4 July test fired anti-tank and Stinger missiles. China 12-14 July conducted large-scale exercises with fighter jets, bombers and warships south and south west of island; during drill, U.S. Navy patrol plane flew through Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s army 13 July deployed armoured vehicles, drones and Javelin anti-tank missiles while rehearsing for anti-landing drill scheduled for 27 July in Bali, New Taipei – beach vulnerable to attack by China. Taiwan 24-27 July held its annual Han Kuang military exercises. U.S. House of Representatives 14 July passed National Defense Authorization Act 2024, $876.8bn bill that includes provisions for U.S. to “help Taiwan meet its self-defense needs.”

Beijing warned of strong reaction to U.S. visit by ruling party official. Beijing lodged formal protest with Washington over ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s presidential candidate William Lai Ching-te’s planned stopover in U.S. in August en route to Paraguay, vowing “strong and resolute” action in response to “U.S. indulging and supporting Taiwan independence separatists”. In response, U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken cautioned Beijing against using transit as “pretext for provocative action”; China’s warnings raise prospect of increased military activity.

Taiwan’s opposition articulated interpretation of “1992 consensus”. Kuomintang presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih 4 July affirmed his support for version of “1992 consensus” echoing party’s long-held position of “one China, different interpretations”; he stated opposition to both “one country, two systems” and President Tsai Ing-wen’s “stigmatisation” of consensus. William Lai Ching-te same day proposed four “pillars” of peace, beginning with Taiwan continuing to build up its defence capabilities.

Thailand

Parliament blocked election-winning Move Forward Party (MFP) from leading next govt, sparking protests in capital Bangkok as prospect of MFP’s dissolution grew; insecurity persisted in deep south.

MFP failed to win parliamentary majority amid pressure from establishment. MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat 13 July fell short in bid to become Thailand’s 30th PM, securing 324 votes in lower house but support of only thirteen senators. As MFP sought to amend Article 112 of Criminal Code, or lèse-majesté law, to reduce penalties and permit only palace to lodge complaints, Constitutional Court 12 July accepted petition that claimed amendment was tantamount to attempt to overthrow democratic system with king as head of state. Election Commission 12 July referred to Constitutional Court case alleging Pita violated election law by running for office when he was aware that he was ineligible, which could result in up to three years’ imprisonment. Pita 15 July said he would step aside and allow coalition partner Pheu Thai to take lead in forming next govt if he failed to win second round of voting. During second round on 19 July, parliamentarians voted that Pita could not be renominated because of regulation that prohibits resubmission of failed motion in same session; Constitutional Court same day suspended Pita from parliamentary duties while it decided election law case. MFP supporters 19 July gathered in Bangkok to signal displeasure with Constitutional Court, Election Commission and senate; further protests of hundreds occurred at various Bangkok locations over following days. Constitutional Court 25 July accepted petition to rule on constitutionality of second vote.

Insecurity persisted in deep south. Fourth Region Army commander Lt Gen Santi Sakuntanark 1 July said army planned to reduce troop numbers in four southernmost provinces and lift state of emergency over next four years. In Pattani province, dozens of rangers and police 5 July surrounded suspected insurgents in Khok Pho district but suspects opened fire, killing assistant village chief; returning fire, security forces killed one suspected insurgent. In Yala province, IED attack on ranger patrol 15 July killed one ranger and wounded two others in Bannang Sata district.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Yerevan and Baku continued to engage in high-level dialogue under U.S., EU and Russian auspices, as sides traded blame for border clashes.

International efforts to advance talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan persisted. Following June meeting in Washington, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders 15 July convened in Brussels for talks mediated by European Council President Charles Michel. Michel stated EU’s readiness to help finance railroad construction in region; he also reiterated need to unblock Lachin road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia amid deteriorating humanitarian situation and noted possibility of sending aid from Azerbaijan-controlled Agdam region into enclave, saying “both options [are] important … to ensure the needs of the population are met” (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 25 July held talks with Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs in Moscow, but meeting produced no tangible results.

Violent incidents occurred along border with Azerbaijan. Baku and Yerevan between 9 and 19 July reported multiple clashes along shared border, trading blame for incidents; clashes 11 July wounded one Azerbaijani soldier, 12 July injured two Armenian soldiers. Meanwhile, EU 18 July permitted third states to contribute to EU Civilian Mission along Armenian side of border with Azerbaijan; Canada 21 July announced plans to deploy two experts.

Border commissions reconvened after lengthy pause. Armenian and Azerbaijani border commissions 12 July convened at state border to resume delimitation and demarcation process following prolonged pause. Countries, however, continued to disagree on which maps to use for defining border and meeting concluded without breakthrough.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Lachin blockade continued to aggravate humanitarian suffering, tensions between Baku and de facto authorities ran high, and Armenia-Azerbaijan talks continued amid international pressure.

Humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) deteriorated. NK residents continued to face severe shortages of food, electricity and medical supplies due to Azerbaijan’s blockade of Lachin corridor connecting NK with Armenia. Azerbaijan 11 July suspended International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) deliveries after contracted drivers attempted to smuggle cigarettes and mobile phones into enclave; ICRC same day acknowledged wrongdoing and humanitarian operations restarted 14 July. ICRC 25 July said it was again unable to deliver aid and warned of humanitarian consequences. Situation worsened after Azerbaijani forces 29 July arrested NK resident, Vagif Khachatryan, whom ICRC was evacuating for urgent medical treatment in Armenia; all medical evacuations were halted and had not resumed by end of month. Yerevan and Stepanakert 29 July said move violated international law but Baku justified arrest, accusing Khachatryan of genocide and ethnic cleansing during first NK war.

Baku and Stepanakert traded blame for multiple incidents throughout July. Baku and de facto authorities throughout month traded blame for clashes along line of contact, while Baku accused de facto forces of attempting to install fortifications. De facto authorities throughout month claimed Azerbaijani forces attacked farmers working near front. More clashes occurred between Armenia and Azerbaijan along border (see Armenia and Azerbaijan).

Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to engage in high-level dialogue. Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders 15 July convened in Brussels for talks mediated by European Council President Charles Michel (see Armenia and Azerbaijan). Michel reiterated need to unblock Lachin road and noted possibility of sending aid to enclave from Azerbaijan-controlled Agdam region, saying “both options [are] important … to ensure the needs of the population are met”; EU High Representative Joseph Borrell 26 July warned that Agdam route “should not be seen as an alternative to the reopening of Lachin” after Baku earlier that day began blocking humanitarian convoy from Yerevan on Lachin, arguing aid should be delivered via Agdam. Meanwhile, Russia 25 July held talks with Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs in Moscow; meeting produced no tangible results.

Azerbaijan

Baku and Yerevan continued to engage in high-level dialogue under U.S., EU and Russian auspices, as sides traded blame for border clashes.

International efforts to advance talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia persisted. Following June meeting in Washington, Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders 15 July convened in Brussels for talks mediated by European Council President Charles Michel. Michel stated EU’s readiness to help finance railroad construction in region; he also reiterated need to unblock Lachin road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia amid deteriorating humanitarian situation and noted possibility of sending aid from Azerbaijan-controlled Agdam region into enclave, saying “both options [are] important … to ensure the needs of the population are met” (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 25 July held talks with Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs in Moscow, but meeting produced no tangible results.

Violent incidents occurred along border with Armenia. Baku and Yerevan between 9 and 19 July reported multiple clashes along shared border, trading blame for incidents; clashes 11 July wounded one Azerbaijani soldier, 12 July injured two Armenian soldiers. Meanwhile, EU 18 July permitted third states to contribute to EU Civilian Mission along Armenian side of border with Azerbaijan; Canada 21 July announced plans to deploy two experts.

Border commissions reconvened after lengthy pause. Azerbaijani and Armenian border commissions 12 July convened at state border to resume delimitation and demarcation process following prolonged pause. Countries, however, continued to disagree on which maps to use for defining border and meeting concluded without breakthrough.

Authorities arrested prominent opposition politician. Turkish media 23 July reported arrest of opposition politician Gubad Ibadoglu and his wife Irada Bayramova in Baku for alleged links to Turkish group that Ankara calls the “Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation”. Court in Baku next day placed Ibadoglu in pre-trial detention for three months on charges of involvement in “preparation, acquisition or sale of counterfeit money or securities by an organised group”, same day released Bayramova.

Belarus

Wagner mercenaries travelled to Belarus following failed insurrection in Russia and conducted military exercises with army; crackdown on dissent continued.

Minsk conducted military exercises with Wagner mercenaries. Following Russian paramilitary Wagner Group’s short-lived mutiny in June and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s subsequent announcement that mercenaries could move to Belarus, State Border Guard Service of Ukraine 22 July claimed approximately 5,000 Wagner fighters were now in Belarus. Video published 19 July showed Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin addressing combatants, in which he announced Wagner would stay in Belarus only temporarily and promised to make Belarusian army “the second army of the world”. Defence ministry 20 July reported army was conducting exercises with Wagner at Brestski training range near Polish border. Polish interior minister 27 July said Poland, Latvia and Lithuania were prepared to close border with Belarus should they face “the threat of provocations” from Wagner; Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki 29 July expressed concern about movement of Wagner troops toward border.

Clampdown on dissent continued. President Lukashenka 1 July signed law allowing authorities to ban foreign media from Belarus in event of “unfriendly actions” by states. Minsk court 5 July sentenced Eduard Babaryka, son of former presidential hopeful Viktar Babaryka, to eight years in prison for “organising mass riots” and “inciting hatred.” Minsk court 19 July started trial of journalist Zmitser Bayarovich and his wife, Valeria, for protesting 2020 election results. Court 26 July sentenced journalist Pavel Mazheika to six years in prison for “extremist activity”.

In another important development. Russian news agency 25 July reported Belarus applied to join BRICS bloc of emerging economies, which includes Russia, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, in May.

Bosnia And Herzegovina

U.S. sanctioned four Bosnian Serb officials for undermining Dayton Peace Agreement.

U.S. 31 July sanctioned four Bosnian Serb officials for “encouraging” passage of law allowing self-governing entity Republika Srpska to ignore decisions made by country’s Constitutional Court. U.S. said in statement that “move threatens the stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, “the hard-won peace underpinned by the Dayton Peace Agreement” and “the country’s future trajectory”.

Cyprus

As UN continued efforts to find common ground, Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leadership voiced support for differing solution models.

UN continued engagement to foster dialogue. UN Sec Gen António Guterres 5 July asserted that positive shift in Greece-Türkiye relations was opportunity for settlement in Cyprus. UN 7 July adopted two reports, namely Secretary General’s Report on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, and Secretary General’s Report on UN Mission in Cyprus. In former, Guterres stated “the absence of substantive dialogue continues to deepen the difference of views on the way forward”. In latter, Guterres urged parties to return to negotiations, adding that further economic integration between two sides was needed; he also called upon Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to cease antagonistic rhetoric. Meanwhile, Republic of Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar 18 July visited anthropological laboratory of Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, agreed to meet again at UN General Assembly in Sept. In his 20 July visit to north of island, Turkish President Erdoğan attended opening ceremony of new terminal at Ercan/Tymbou airport, declaring days of airport being used for international flights were “not far off”.

Parties articulated alternative visions of solution. In response to UN Security Council press statement 10 July that articulated “goal of returning to formal negotiations based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation”, “TRNC” 12 July said statement was “unfortunate and unrealistic” and asserted its support for two-state solution; Türkiye next day voiced support for “TRNC”’s position, adding that Turkish Cypriots no longer sought outdated solution model, referring to federation. Republic of Cyprus and Greece during month, however, rejected two-state formula: notably, Republic of Cyprus Defence Minister Michalis Giorgallas 2 July said that Turkish narrative for two state solution cannot be part of any discussion in new negotiations, while Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 31 July said “any partitionist thoughts of two states is completely off any agenda”.

Georgia

Prospects for NATO and EU membership looked uncertain amid stagnant reforms, and 58th round of Geneva talks concluded without new agreements.

NATO summit yielded little for prospective Georgian membership. Leaders of NATO alliance 11-12 July met in Lithuanian capital Vilnius for second summit since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO 11 July reaffirmed Bucharest Agreement promising Georgia membership. Unlike Ukraine, however, which was offered post-war fast track to membership, Tbilisi walked away empty-handed, triggering frustration among opposition. Ruling Georgian Dream party’s pro-Russian rhetoric and failure to enact reforms may explain NATO’s changing position.

Violent disruption at LGBTQ+ event further jeopardised Georgia’s EU ambitions. Thousands of protesters, many with far-right ties, 8 July violently disrupted Tbilisi Pride festival. Organisers, who were forced to cancel event, accused govt of coordinating attack with far right. EU Delegation to Georgia same day expressed disappointment “that security and freedom of assembly could not be ensured” while Czech ambassador to Georgia said events indicated country was not doing enough to secure candidate status.

Protests broke out at Batumi port following arrival of Russian cruise ship. Cruise ship carrying some 800 mostly Russian tourists 27 July arrived in Black Sea port of Batumi from Russian port of Sochi. Protests same day erupted at port amid reports of passengers voicing support for 2008 Russo-Georgian War, forcing cruise to leave ahead of schedule; ship 31 July met fresh protests upon its return to Batumi.

Latest round of Geneva International Discussions took place. 58th round of Geneva International Discussions – multilateral forum to address security and humanitarian consequences of 2008 Russo-Georgian War – 11-12 July took place. Talks yielded no new announcements, though participants reaffirmed their commitment to process; next round scheduled for December.

Kosovo

Pristina promised steps to reduce tensions in Serb-majority northern municipalities, and PM Kurti announced acquisition of Turkish combat drones.

Govt agreed to reduce police presence at northern municipal buildings and hold elections. Amid stepped-up pressure from European Union (EU) on Pristina to de-escalate tensions in Serb-majority northern municipalities, which soared after govt late May installed newly-elected ethnic Albanian mayors, EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčác 10 July met with Deputy PM Bislimi in Slovakian capital, Bratislava. Following meeting, Pristina 11 July announced reduction of police presence around municipal buildings in north by 25% and expressed support for “the holding of new elections”; EU High Representative Josep Borrell 12 July welcomed news but said EU expected further de-escalatory steps. In meeting with Serb President Alexsandar Vučić, NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg 19 July urged Belgrade and Pristina to “prevent escalation and engage in the EU-facilitated dialogue”; Vučić same day requested “a more significant role for [NATO-led force] Kosovo Force (KFOR) in easing tensions”. Chief negotiators for Kosovo and Serbia 19 July met separately in Brussels with Lajčác, who reportedly saw “need for additional coordination” before trilateral meeting occurs.

Serbia condemned Kosovo’s acquisition of Turkish drones. PM Kurti 16 July confirmed purchase of Turkish-made Bayraktar drones, saying security spending is making Kosovo safer; KFOR next day reiterated its “primary authority over the airspace above Kosovo”. Serbian Defence Minister Milos Vucevic 21 July accused Kosovo of acquiring “offensive weapons”, including drones, and warned that Belgrade is “carefully watching what is happening”.

Kyrgyzstan

European Parliament condemned crackdown on media and freedom of expression, and U.S. imposed sanctions on several Kyrgyz firms for evading Russian sanctions.

European parliament spotlighted human rights breaches. European Parliament 13 July adopted resolution on rights situation in Kyrgyzstan amid “alarming deterioration in democratic standards and human rights”. Resolution urged authorities to “respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular those related to media and expression”.

U.S. sanctioned Kyrgyz firms for evading sanctions on Russia. U.S. Treasury 20 July imposed measures against four Kyrgyz firms, along with dozens of Russian companies, for circumventing sanctions on Russia. According to U.S., these Kyrgyz entities have exported “electronics components and other technology to Russia since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine”. Earlier that day, Bishkek denied helping Moscow evade sanctions but admitted to “possible involvement of private companies” and said it was investigating matter.

Moldova

Murder of breakaway Transnistria’s most prominent opposition politician fuelled speculation, and Chişinău announced plans to expel 45 Russian diplomatic staff.

Prominent opposition politician in breakaway Transnistria region found dead. Leader of opposition Communist party Oleg Khorzhan was found dead 16 July at his home in de facto capital, Tiraspol. De facto authorities 17 July said they believed he was killed during a robbery as safe inside house was emptied, but activists and opposition politicians claimed his death was politically motivated – Khorzhan had been critical of Transnistria’s administration and served 4.5-year prison sentence for “inciting civil strife”. Moldovan national police 17 July opened investigation, saying it was taking “all appropriate investigative measures regarding the crime of murder”; Moldova’s Bureau for Reintegration, charged with govt policy on Transnistria, same day called on Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe to assist with investigation. Transnistria’s de facto interior ministry 24 July announced suspect in murder case, Andrei Duminica, who denied involvement.

Authorities announced expulsion of 45 Russian diplomatic staff. Amid growing fears of Russian destabilisation efforts in Moldova, Chişinău 26 July announced it will expel 45 Russian diplomats and embassy staff by 15 Aug due to “ongoing tensions and unfriendly actions”. Announcement followed media report published 24 July claiming spying technology had been installed on Russian embassy rooftop. Moscow 26 July said move “would not go unanswered”.

Russia (Internal)

Kremlin clamped down on senior military officers following Wagner insurrection, Parliament passed raft of measures to strengthen mobilisation efforts, and Moscow withdrew from Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Authorities detained high-ranking officers in wake of Wagner mutiny. News outlet The Wall Street Journal 13 July reported that at least 13 high-ranking officers were detained following paramilitary Wagner Group’s short-lived mutiny in June, including Gen. Sergei Surovikin and Col. Gen. Mikhail Mizintsev. Paper also said Kremlin suspended or dismissed about 15 other officers. In further sign of cracks in security establishment, Maj. Gen. Ivan Popov 12 July announced he had been fired after criticising high command’s management of Ukraine war. Meanwhile, video published 19 July showed Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin addressing combatants in Belarus (see Belarus), saying mercenaries will remain in Belarus only temporarily before heading to Africa, though hinting they could eventually return to Ukraine.

Lawmakers extended eligibility for military service and approved creation of paramilitaries. State Duma 18 July approved bill raising age limit for reservists, 20 July increased fines for non-appearance at military enlistment office on demand and 25 July raised maximum age for military conscription from 27 to 30. Upper House of Parliament 28 July approved law allowing governors to create regional paramilitary units to assist security forces during mobilisation, wartime or periods of martial law; president will decide when to form or disband such units.

Fresh drones struck capital. Kremlin 24 July accused Kyiv of fresh drone attack on Moscow and promised retaliatory measures; two drones 30 July attacked govt complex, also in capital.

Moscow scuttled Black Sea grain deal. Russia 17 July withdrew from Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allowed safe passage for Ukrainian grain exports (see Ukraine). President Putin 19 July said Moscow could return to deal if Western states fulfil their obligations, including by unblocking Russian assets related to agriculture and reopening Togliatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline. During Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg 27-28 July, representatives from five African countries publicly called for resumption of agreement; Putin 29 July pledged to ship 25-50,000 tonnes of grain free of charge to poorest countries in Africa within 3-4 months, but stopped short of promising return to initiative.

Tajikistan

Authorities declared two news websites extremist.

Prosecutor-General’s Office 19 July announced that Supreme Court mid-June had declared as extremist Pamir Daily News, an outlet covering developments in restive Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), and banned publication. Outlet same day published statement accusing authorities of “trying to completely drown out the news from GBAO”, while Reporters Without Borders 21 July said move was “designed to cut this troubled region off from the rest of the world”. Prosecutor-General’s Office 26 July announced Supreme Court had also labelled New Tajikistan 2 website – created by banned opposition movement Group 24 – “extremist”.

Türkiye

Security forces struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), primarily in northern Iraq and northern Syria, while govt invested diplomatic capital in improving ties with Greece, Egypt and Gulf states.

Military continued operations against PKK. Hostilities remained concentrated in northern Iraq and northern Syria. Notably in Iraq, clashes with PKK 9 July killed two Turkish soldiers, while forces claimed to “neutralise” (arrest or kill) several high-ranking PKK members, including alleged PKK mastermind of 2019 assassination of Turkish diplomat on 5 July, PKK’s special forces chief on 13 July, member of PKK’s regional administrative council on 16 July. Violence within Türkiye remained limited, as military carried out operations in rural areas of Şırnak and Hakkari provinces. Interior ministry 26 July said security forces had apprehended two PKK members in Istanbul allegedly plotting “sensational attack”.

Dialogue with Greece regained forward momentum. Having concluded respective elections, Ankara and Athens reiterated willingness to cooperate. Greek FM Giorgos Gerapetritis 4 July announced readiness to start talks on resolving long-standing issues in Aegean dispute. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler and Greek counterpart Nikos Dendias next day held phone call in which both sides agreed on restarting contacts for confidence-building measures. President Erdoğan and Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 11-12 July agreed to foster “positive momentum”, pledged to “activate multiple channels of communication” and to schedule High-Level Cooperation Council meeting in Greece this year. In response to wildfires on Greek island Rhodes, Türkiye 21 July sent three firefighting aircraft.

Govt sought to mend fences across region and beyond. Türkiye and Egypt 4 July realised pledges to reinstate ambassadorial representation. During Gulf visit, Erdoğan 17-21 July signed trade, investment and security deals which notably included record-breaking defence deal with Saudi Arabia, and issued declaration with Qatar and United Arab Emirates to enhance bilateral relations. Russian President Putin 8 July cancelled state visit to Türkiye, citing Erdoğan’s decisions during visit by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to release prisoners of Ukraine war and cooperate with Kyiv on strategic industries. During NATO Summit, govt agreed to back Sweden’s membership.

Crackdown on Islamic State (ISIS) persisted. Security forces during July detained at least 107 individuals with alleged links to ISIS.

Ukraine

In major blow to Ukrainian economy and global food security, Moscow withdrew from Black Sea Grain Initiative before launching flurry of attacks on ports and grain facilities; Kyiv’s counteroffensive advanced slowly.

Russia scuttled Black Sea grain deal. Moscow, which had long threatened to quit Black Sea Grain Initiative ensuring safe passage for Ukrainian grain exports, 17 July accused West of failing to fulfil its obligations under deal (see Russia) and announced its withdrawal. Ukrainian aquatic drones earlier that day struck Kerch bridge connecting Moscow-annexed Crimea with Russia, but Kremlin stated there was no link between this attack and its decision to quit deal. Wheat prices subsequently spiked as Russia 18 July began targeting ports and grain facilities on Odesa region’s Black Sea coast and along Danube river in bid to throttle agricultural exports, which are pillar of Ukrainian economy. Speaking to UN Security Council, UN humanitarian chief Martin Griffiths 21 July said high grain prices threaten to push millions into hunger.

Ukrainian counteroffensive moved slowly as Russia mounted offensive in Kharkiv. Counteroffensive made incremental progress as Ukrainian forces struggled to break through complex Russian fortifications and large minefields. Troops focused their probing attacks on four sections of southern front that stretches across Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, making progress in Donetsk around Bakhmut city and 27 July recapturing Staromaiorske village on southern front. Meanwhile, Russian forces mid-July mounted ground offensive in north east of Kharkiv region, making small advances as Moscow sought to regain lost positions and divert Ukrainian forces from south and east.

Delivery of U.S. cluster munitions sparked controversy. First batch of cluster bombs 13 July arrived in Ukraine after Washington 7 July greenlighted delivery. Decision triggered fierce debate as cluster bombs’ indiscriminate nature and lingering danger from unexploded bomblets pose serious risk to civilians. Ukraine and U.S. defended decision, saying controversial weapon would compensate for lack of more precise ammunition.

NATO summit produced mixed results for Ukraine. During NATO summit in Lithuanian capital Vilnius 11-12 July, alliance pledged continued military aid to Ukraine but deferred membership prospects with carefully worded statement promising Kyiv an invitation “when allies agree and conditions are met”.

Uzbekistan

President Mirzioyev won landslide victory in snap election observers said “lacked genuine competition”.

President Mirziyoev 9 July won re-election in snap poll, securing over 87% of ballots in vote that saw almost 80% turnout. Mirziyoev ran against three largely unknown candidates, prompting criticism from observers. Notably, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 10 July released statement saying “election was technically well prepared but lacked genuine competition”. Poll followed number of constitutional amendments introduced by Mirziyoyev that, among other things, reset his presidential term count and extend term from five to seven years. NGO Human Rights Watch 7 July said election formed part of “a choreographed plan to consolidate power” and that govt had “gone into reverse with its reform agenda”.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Govt’s “total peace” policy advanced as ceasefire with ELN gradually took hold and is due to take full effect in August, lasting 180 days in longest bilateral ceasefire ever concluded with guerrilla group.

Bilateral ceasefire with National Liberation Army (ELN) advanced. Govt and ELN 6 July ordered their forces to end offensive activities as sides gradually implemented June ceasefire agreement, set to take full effect 3 Aug and then last for 180 days; if successful, agreement will be longest bilateral ceasefire ever concluded with guerrilla group. Parties 14-15 July released two documents detailing protocols and monitoring mechanisms for full ceasefire, though civil society and grassroots groups criticised lack of explicit civilian protections. In lead up to cessation of offensive activities, ELN conducted several operations that raised concerns about its interpretation of agreement: group 3 July kidnapped soldier and her two children in Arauca department (north west), releasing them four days later; ELN’s Western Front 4-13 July held armed strike in Chocó department (Pacific coast), limiting citizens’ movements and prohibiting shops from opening.

Petro administration agreed to open talks with FARC dissident faction. Govt 8 July agreed to formal peace negotiations with dissident faction of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor Central. First stage of dialogue will aim to re-establish confidence after several months of communication breakdown, followed by official talks with 12 govt negotiators and six insurgents; attorney general 28 July lifted arrest warrants of militants who will form negotiating team. Govt did not renew ceasefires with several groups that ended 30 June, including Segunda Marquetalia dissident group and Sierra Nevada Self Defense Forces. Meanwhile, President Petro 23 July named former paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso, currently incarcerated in U.S., as a “gestor de paz”, a role that would allow him to serve as intermediary between govt and armed and criminal groups, notably Gulf Clan.

Oct local election cycle began. Individuals running for mayor, councillor or departmental legislator in Oct polls had to register candidacy by end of July. Official campaign begins in Aug amid concerns elections may escalate political tensions in conflict-affected regions as armed and criminal groups seek to assert influence, either by threatening or implicitly supporting candidates.

Ecuador

Govt imposed emergency measures following assassination of mayor and fresh spate of gang violence in Ecuador’s prisons, prompting violent backlash from criminal groups.

In port city of Guayaquil, clashes 22 July erupted between rival gangs in Litoral prison and continued for several days, leaving 31 inmates dead and 14 injured. Meanwhile, inmates from 13 prisons across country 24 July went on hunger strike, demanding better food and sanitary conditions, with some taking guards hostage. As unrest soared, President Lasso 25 July declared 60-day state of emergency throughout Ecuador’s jails and authorised deployment of 2,700 soldiers to wrest back control of Litoral prison. Authorities 25 July announced armed forces had re-established “total control” of Litoral and all prison hostages were released following day. Emergency declaration triggered violent backlash from criminal groups: notably, gunmen in Guayaquil city 25 July looted store and burned bus; and in Esmeraldas city inmates took 15 prison guards and two other staffers hostage while armed assailants attacked police unit. Only two days before, Lasso 24 July had declared another emergency in Manabí and Los Ríos provinces, as well as Durán city, after gunman 23 July killed mayor of Manta city (Manabí) in shooting that left one other woman dead and four wounded. Violence prompted key presidential contenders in upcoming Aug election to promise tougher security policies amid escalating criminal gang violence.

El Salvador

Ruling party named President Bukele as their candidate for 2024 presidential poll, and Congress voted to allow mass trials for alleged gang members.

Political parties held primaries to select candidates for Feb 2024 general election. Ruling party Nuevas Ideas 9 July nominated Bukele and VP Félix Ulloa as presidential and vice presidential candidates in Feb 2024 poll despite constitutional ban on consecutive presidential re-election; should Salvadorans vote for Nuevas Ideas, Bukele will be able to further consolidate power at all levels of govt. Two main opposition parties – conservative ARENA and leftist FMLN – 16 July announced Joel Sánchez and Manuel Flores as their respective candidates, with Hilcia Bonilla and Werner Marroquin as running mates.

Congress passed legislation enabling mass trials for alleged gang members. Legislative Assembly 12 July approved state of exception’s sixteenth extension. Congress 26 July passed bill allowing courts to try alleged gang members in mass trials and increasing sentences for gang leaders from 45 to 60 years; up to 900 people can now be tried simultaneously if they hail from same region or are accused of belonging to same criminal group. Civil society and international bodies continued to raise concerns about human rights abuses under state of exception. Notably, a coalition of human rights groups 14 July denounced govt for third time at Inter-American Commission of Human Rights over arrest of innocent people and deaths of inmates; govt denied allegations.

Guatemala

Judicial and other interference in presidential poll sparked political crisis and protests in capital, as external actors decried efforts to alter electoral process.

Electoral turmoil erupted following first round of presidential vote. After surprise June election result, in which voters selected Bernardo Arévalo of centre-left Movimiento Semilla to take on front runner Sandra Torres of right-wing Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza party in Aug runoff, Constitutional Court (CC) 1 July suspended release of official results after several political parties, including ruling Vamos, claimed vote count was fraudulent. Recount concluded 6 July with minimal variation and Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) 12 July confirmed candidacy of Torres and Arévalo in presidential runoff; Public Prosecutor’s Office (which is accused of corruption and acting in incumbent president’s interest) next day raided TSE’s Registry of Citizens office amid escalating tensions between the two.

Attempt to block Arévalo’s candidacy deepened crisis. Shortly before TSE certified results, a judge (at behest of Attorney General’s Office) 12 July suspended legal status of Movimiento Semilla over alleged irregularities in how party was created; legal experts claimed electoral law establishes that no party can be banned during electoral process. CC 13 July suspended decision to disqualify Movimiento Semilla, allowing Arévalo’s candidacy in runoff, but Public Prosecutor’s office continued investigations into party. Police 21 July raided Movimiento Semilla’s headquarters amid widespread domestic and international criticism. Arévalo 30 July denounced “campaign of fear”.

Efforts to reverse result sparked protests and international condemnation. Hundreds demonstrated throughout month, predominantly in capital, against efforts to change election results. External actors also criticised efforts to alter electoral process: notably, European Union 13 July said it was “deeply concerned by the continuing efforts to tamper with these election results”; Organization of American States’ observation mission 19 July said some parties and actors had abused “legal instruments” and put “country’s democratic stability” at risk; UN Sec-Gen 22 July urged authorities to “guarantee free expression of the will of electors”; and U.S. 24 July said “we are deeply concerned by ongoing efforts to interfere with the elections in Guatemala”.

Haiti

Rival gangs struck fragile truce as violence expanded beyond capital, Kenya offered to lead multinational security force, and international actors urged compromise to resolve political crisis.

Rival gangs struck truce amid widespread violence. Leaders of rival G9 and G-pèp gang coalitions 1 July agreed truce in Cité Soleil commune of capital Port-au-Prince; local observers expressed doubts about pact’s durability as gangs did not commit to disarmament. UN 3 July said murders and abductions rose for fifth consecutive year, with homicides Jan-June 2023 up 67.5% on same period in 2022; report also said civilian self-defence groups, including Bwa Kale movement, killed at least 224 alleged gang members late April-late June (though movement’s strength has since waned). Armed assailants 23 July attacked Liancourt town (Artibonite), burning down houses and building of local broadcaster as gang violence continued to expand beyond capital.

Kenya offered to lead multinational force. Kenya 29 July said it would consider leading multinational force with contribution of 1,000 police officers to support Haitian National Police (HNP), pending UN approval. Offer came amid growing calls for such a force. Most notably, CARICOM (body of Caribbean nations) heads of state 7 July stressed need to create a “humanitarian and security stabilization corridor under the mandate of a UN Security Council Resolution”; UN Security Council 14 July extended UN mission’s mandate for one year and encouraged countries to provide support to HNP, including through deployment of specialised force.

International actors continued pushing for dialogue to resolve political crisis. UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 1 July urged all actors involved in political negotiations to make the concessions “necessary for the restoration of democratic institutions” during visit to Haiti, while U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in 5 July meeting with acting PM Ariel Henry stressed urgency of achieving political consensus. CARICOM delegation 12-15 July convened Haitian politicians and civil society leaders for talks aimed at resolving crisis; meeting produced no agreement but delegation 18 July claimed progress toward reducing number of parties in dialogue and refining agenda for negotiations.

Humanitarian situation remained dire. World Food Programme 17 July said it was forced to cut number of people receiving emergency food aid in Haiti by 25% due to lack of funds.

Honduras

Castro administration enforced more punitive policies in response to latest wave of violence; UN experts arrived amid stepped-up anti-corruption efforts.

Govt renewed state of emergency amid growing criticism. Govt continued to pursue tough security measures after June deadly prison riot and mass killings, with military police placed in charge of penitentiary system, deployment of soldiers in hotspots and restrictions on movement; in Cortés department (north west), night-time curfew in San Pedro Sula city began 4 July following similar measures late June in nearby Choloma city. Govt 5 July extended state of emergency for additional 45 days, prompting criticism. Notably, president of Union of Small Enterprises 5 July said curfews put 25,000 jobs at risk, while UN human rights office 7 July said militarisation of public security was detrimental to fundamental rights, drawing particular attention to reports of violence perpetrated by military police against prison inmates.

Momentum for creation of anti-corruption commission grew. Team of UN experts 9 July arrived to provide technical assistance for establishment of International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity (CICIH); mission will remain in country for six months. Civil society groups continued to urge govt to approve reforms established by UN before CICIH starts operating. In significant step, Congress 12 July repealed decrees known as “Impunity Pacts”, which granted its members protection from prosecution for corruption.

Mexico

Criminal violence remained rampant, while President López Obrador’s attacks on opposition front runner in 2024 presidential poll prompted condemnation from electoral authorities.

Criminal groups stepped up attacks on state forces, increasingly using explosives. Gunmen 3 July shot at interior minister of Tamaulipas state (north) on main road, though official was unharmed. Criminal group Los Ardillos 10 July orchestrated thousands-strong protest in Chilpancingo city, Guerrero state (south west), over arrest of two of its members; protesters blocked main roads, forced their way into state legislature and took 13 police officers and officials hostage, released them following day. Several improvised explosive devices (IED) in Tlajomulco de Zúñiga city, Jalisco state (centre), 11 July killed four police officers and two civilians; Jalisco Cartel dominant in state has increasingly used IEDs in neighbouring Michoacán.

Attacks on journalists and disappearances continued. Police 8 July found body of Luis Martín Sánchez Iñiguez, local correspondent for La Jornada newspaper, in Huachines town, Nayarit state (west); unidentified armed group 15 July killed reporter Nelson Matus in Acapulco town, Guerrero. Meanwhile, civil society organisations from Caborca and Pitiquito municipalities reported 1-2 July clashes between Sinaloa Cartel and rival Caborca group resulted in at least 15 disappearances and three deaths; collective known as Madres Buscadoras, which searches for disappeared, 4 July said it had uncovered clandestine graves containing dozens of bodies in Tlajomulco de Zúñiga; another search collective 14-15 July found bodies in graves in Reynosa city, Tamaulipas; UN 27 July accused army of obstructing investigation into 2014 disappearance of students from Ayotzinapa teacher’s college.

López Obrador railed against key contender in 2024 presidential election. President López Obrador’s continued criticism of opposition candidate Xóchitl Gálvez in daily press conferences prompted National Electoral Institute 13 July to issue order prohibiting him from commenting on electoral matters. López Obrador next day accused electoral authorities of trying to “silence” him and reiterated claims he had gathered information about public contracts awarded to Gálvez, saying he would seek judicial investigation.

Nicaragua

Crackdown on Catholic Church continued, and opposition stepped up efforts to unify against Ortega regime.

Govt’s religious persecution persisted. Govt 4 July revoked legal status of Fundación Fraternidad Pobres de Jesucristo and expelled nuns in charge of convent from country. Authorities 10 July arrested Fernando Israel Zamora Silva, chancellor of Siuna diocese, in capital Managua. Govt 27 July revoked legal status of 18 organisations, including several religious groups. Meanwhile, Church officials 5 July said Bishop Rolando Álvarez, sentenced in Feb 2023 to 26 years in prison for treason, remained incarcerated despite reports of his release.

Opposition sought to unify. Following exiled opposition’s late June establishment of Monteverde Group, comprised of different opposition factions to consolidate united anti-Ortega front, group 9 July announced five official spokespersons including former presidential candidates Juan Sebastián Chamorro, Félix Maradiaga and Medardo Mairena.

In other important developments. UN human rights office 7 July condemned 2 and 5 July killings of two Indigenous people on Bosawas nature reserve along Atlantic coast; both victims were park wardens in protected area rife with settlers looking to clear land for farms and illegal mining and logging. International Court of Justice 13 July dismissed Nicaragua’s case in dispute with Colombia over maritime borders and economic rights over area of Caribbean Sea.

Peru

Large anti-govt protests took place in Lima and other departments across country.

Amid simmering political tensions, notably since former President Pedro Castillo’s arrest in Dec 2022, tens of thousands 19 July marched in capital Lima and other departments, while others blocked highways around provincial towns, namely in Puno and Cusco; protests were largely peaceful, though riot police in Lima fired tear gas at protesters attempting to enter Congress carrying rocks and bottles. Protesters were calling for President Boluarte’s resignation, as well as closure of Congress, early general elections, work on a new constitution and Castillo’s release, signalling widespread distrust with country’s main democratic institutions. Fresh protests took place 29 July, which marks Independence Day, with police briefly clashing with protesters and attacking at least three journalists. During the Independence Day speech in Lima, Boluarte called for a great “national reconciliation” and urged Congress to delegate legislative powers to executive for 120 days to tackle crime with greater efficiency.

Venezuela

As Maduro govt further harmed prospects for competitive 2024 poll, international actors stepped up efforts to reach deal on improving electoral conditions in return for sanctions relief.

Trend toward unfair presidential vote in 2024 persisted. International actors continued to condemn govt’s late June announcement that opposition front runner María Corina Machado is barred from candidacy in 2024 presidential election; U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 6 July said Caracas could take number of steps toward free and fair vote but that Machado’s disqualification “sends the opposite message”. In another worrying move, National Assembly president and chief govt negotiator Jorge Rodríguez 13 July said there would be no European Union (EU) electoral observation mission during polls; decision significant as EU observers’ presence was key condition for opposition’s participation in 2021 regional and local elections. Opposition Voluntad Popular party 27 July said govt confiscated passport of its candidate Freddy Superlano as he attempted to travel to Colombia.

Efforts to push through U.S.-Venezuela deal on electoral conditions ramped up. Amid growing concern about competitiveness of elections, several meetings between govt, opposition and international actors in July raised hopes of a deal that would see govt improve electoral conditions; in return, Washington would ease sanctions and provide guarantees for transfer of Venezuelan assets frozen abroad to UN-managed fund to finance improvements in public services. Opposition’s chief negotiator Gerardo Blyde 10-13 July visited U.S. to discuss deal; French President Emmanuel Macron 17 July organised meeting between Blyde and VP Delcy Rodríguez on sidelines of EU-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) summit in Brussels, attended by presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia; post-meeting statement highlighted need for negotiated solution and confirmed broad details of U.S.-Venezuela deal to improve electoral conditions.

In another important development. Former head of military intelligence Hugo Carvajal 19 July arrived in U.S. to face drug charges after being extradited from Spain; Washington accuses Carvajal of trafficking along with other senior officials, including President Maduro.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Ruling party remained plagued by divisions, and tensions with Morocco remained elevated.

Internal divisions continued to plague ruling party. Amid disagreements within ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) over support for President Tebboune’s candidacy in 2024 presidential election, 11th party congress remained unscheduled. Meanwhile, power struggle between FLN’s sec gen, Abou El Fadl Baadji, and president of FLN parliamentary group, Latifi Ahmed Salah, continued. After removing Salah from his role in June, Baadji 10 July took him to FLN’s disciplinary committee for “insubordination, transgression and political deviation” as he refused to cede duties.

Israel recognised Western Sahara as part of Morocco, drawing Algeria’s ire. At Non-Aligned Movement summit held in Azerbaijan, Algeria’s permanent representative to UN, Ambassador Amar Bendjama, 5 July called for decolonisation of Western Sahara. Moroccan counterpart, Ambassador Omar Hilal, retorted that Western Sahara was “an agenda of adversity, hostility and destabilisation” for Algiers. Meanwhile, Algiers 20 July denounced Israel’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara as “blatant violation of international law” (see Western Sahara). Moroccan King Mohammed VI 29 July welcomed Israel’s move while calling for “return to normality” with Algeria and “opening of borders between the two neighbouring, sister countries and peoples”.

In other important developments. After Tebboune 17-21 July visited China to gain support for membership to BRICS bloc of emerging economies, Algiers 21 July applied to join alliance, also submitted request to become shareholder member of BRICS Bank with $1.5bn. Algiers 24 July said it had summoned Danish and Swedish envoys to condemn recent desecrations of Koran in Copenhagen and Stockholm.

Egypt

Amid significant economic, social and political challenges, Cairo turned to foreign policy, restoring full diplomatic ties with Türkiye and agreeing to resume talks with Ethiopia on GERD.

Successful privatisation round not enough to quell Gulf and IMF wariness. PM Mustafa Madbouly 11 July announced Egypt had sold assets worth $1.9bn, including $1.65bn in foreign currency; Gulf investors played limited role, signalling continued wariness toward purchasing Egyptian assets. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 13 July welcomed sales as important step consistent with reform program, however reiterated call on Cairo to implement structural reforms to improve long-term economic sustainability.

Repression of critics continued to mar national dialogue initiative. National dialogue coordinator Diaa Rashwan 12 July announced that Board of Trustees would meet same day to finalise proposals before submitting them to President Sisi for approval. Journalist Khaled Dawood and human rights lawyers Ahmed Ragheb and Naged El-Bori, 18 July froze participation to dialogue to protest sentencing of researcher Patrick George Zaki to three years in prison on charges of “disseminating false news”. Board of Trustees same day urged Sisi not to enforce verdict, and Sisi 19 July pardoned Zaki.

Cairo restored full diplomatic relations with Türkyie, resumed talks with Ethiopia. Cairo and Ankara 4 July exchanged ambassadors for first time since 2013, with Cairo appointing Amr el-Hamamy as ambassador to Türkiye, and Salih Mutlu Sen becoming Türkiye’s ambassador to Egypt. Outstanding issues, such as stance on Libya and fate of Muslim Brotherhood leaders living in Türkiye, remained unresolved. Sisi and Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed 13 July met for first time since 2019, agreed to resume negotiations on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) with aim of reaching final deal on filling and operation of dam within four months (see Nile Waters). Egypt 13 July hosted leaders from Sudan’s neighbouring countries, announced initiative to end conflict (see Sudan).

In other important developments. In North Sinai, group of detainees 30 July reportedly seized weapons inside police facility in el-Arish city and killed four security forces, while wounding several others.

Iran

Purported diplomatic momentum toward U.S.-Iran de-escalatory understanding showed no sign of progress, while maritime tensions picked up.

Amid stalled diplomacy, U.S. criticised Iran’s weapons transfers to Russia. UN Security Council 6 July convened its semi-annual meeting on implementation of Resolution 2231 during which U.S. placed marked emphasis on Iran’s military cooperation with Russia, describing transfer of UAVs used in Ukraine as “a flagrant violation” of 2231’s restrictions, while UK, France and Germany underscored their joint concerns over continued expansion of Iranian nuclear activity. News late June reported U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley is on leave reportedly pending investigation into handling of classified information, which could deepen already-fraught political debate in Washington over diplomatic engagement of Iran.

Maritime incidents continued as U.S. bolstered regional military posture. U.S. military 5 July reported disrupting “two attempted commercial tanker seizures by the Iranian navy” in international waters, one of which involved “multiple, long bursts from both small arms and crew-served weapons” by Iranian ship against Bahamian-flagged Richmond Voyager. Iranian sources claimed that Richmond Voyager had struck Iranian ship, injuring five, and was subject to “a court order to seize it”; Chevron denied any such incident. U.S. Navy next day reported that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces had detained tanker, assessing that incident may have been smuggling-related. Indonesian authorities 11 July confirmed seizure of Iran-flagged tanker on suspicion of unauthorised ship-to-ship transfer in North Natuna Sea. U.S. defence official 14 July announced deployment of F-16 fighters as part of effort “to deter Iran from going after oil tankers”, while U.S. guided-missile destroyer and F-35 fighters entered region mid-July; Pentagon 20 July additionally announced deployment of Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit to region.

In other important developments. U.S. 18 July approved 120-day sanctions waiver allowing Iraq’s payments for Iranian electricity supplies to be carried out through third-party banks, with qualification that funds be used for humanitarian purposes (see Iraq).

Iraq

Tensions rose between Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement and rival Shiite Coordination Framework, protestors torched Swedish embassy over Quran burning, and pro-Iran groups demanded U.S. waivers.

Tensions between Sadrists and rivals mounted. Israel 5 July claimed Kataib Hezbollah (member of framework) in March kidnapped Russian-Israeli academic Elizabeth Tsurkov while conducting research partly on al-Sadr’s movement; Kataib Hezbollah denied allegation. Pro-Iran groups affiliated with framework interpreted Tsurkov’s meetings with Sadrists as Israeli attempt to infiltrate movement. Sadrist supporters 15-16 July attacked offices of Shia parties, including Dawa party, Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, in Basra, Najaf and capital Baghdad after alleged defamation of Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr.

Quran burnings sparked unrest, straining ties with Sweden and Denmark. Protestors, mostly from Sadrist movement, overnight 19-20 July ransacked Swedish embassy in capital Baghdad after Sweden permitted demonstrators to burn Quran in front of Iraqi embassy in Stockholm. Govt 20 July expelled Swedish ambassador, withdrew ambassador to Sweden and threatened to sever diplomatic ties. Hundreds 22 July attempted to storm Baghdad’s Green Zone to reach Danish embassy after Quran burning previous day in Danish capital Copenhagen; demonstrators same day set fire to Danish Refugee Council headquarters in Basra governorate.

Pro-Iran factions demanded U.S. waivers. PM al-Sudani 11 July announced deal to exchange Iraqi oil for Iranian gas. Group of pro-Iran “resistance factions” 14 July protested outside U.S. embassy to demand waivers, amid faltering support for unilateral moratorium on attacks on U.S. forces. U.S. 18 July signed 120-day waiver allowing Iraq to pay for Iranian electricity through non-Iraqi banks.

In other important developments. Türkiye continued targeting Kurdistan Workers’ Party in north (see Türkiye). President Rashid 3 July revoked special decree granted to head of Chaldean Church, provoking protests among Christian community. In first visit to Syrian capital Damascus since 2011, al-Sudani 16 July held talks on security cooperation with Syrian President Assad. In Kurdistan region, militant 7 July allegedly shot dead two members of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in Sulaymaniyah province; explosion 23 July killed former member of Kurdistan Democratic Party-linked intelligence agency in Dohuk city.

Israel/Palestine

Israeli forces conducted largest raid on Jenin refugee camp since Second Intifada, parliament passed govt’s judicial overhaul despite massive protests, and tensions flared with Hizbollah.

Israeli forces killed a dozen Palestinians in Jenin raid amid West Bank volatility. Deadly violence continued across West Bank and Israel, killing at least 27 Palestinians and one Israeli during July. Notably, Israeli forces 3-5 July raided Jenin, claiming to target “terrorist infrastructure”, killing 12 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier (by friendly fire), injuring over 140, and displacing 500 families. In response, Gaza militants 5 July fired five rockets at Israel, prompting Israeli airstrikes in Gaza. Palestinian 4 July conducted car-ramming and stabbing attack in Tel Aviv, injuring at least seven before being killed. Hamas militant 6 July killed Israeli soldier near Kedumim settlement before being shot dead. Israeli forces 25 July killed three Palestinians in Nablus city and 27 July killed teenager during raid in Qalqilya. Israeli cabinet 9 July voted for economic measures to prevent Palestinian Authority’s (PA) collapse; Israeli forces 30 July again raided Jenin, arresting two Hamas members, indicating that Israel’s goal of having PA operate successfully there had so far failed.

Knesset passed bill limiting Supreme Court’s judicial authority. Knesset 24 July passed bill to remove Supreme Court’s ability to block govt decisions deemed “unreasonable”, while opposition boycotted vote and anti-govt protests and strikes against bill intensified, with thousands of military reservists threatening to boycott duty. Supreme Court 26 July said it would hear appeal against bill in Sept.

Israel and Hizbollah exchanged fire. After media late June reported Hizbollah had erected two tents housing armed militants in disputed Shebaa Farms area, Israel 6 July struck southern Lebanon with around 15 artillery shells in response to alleged rocket fire from Lebanon into northern Israel (see Lebanon). Adding to tensions, Israel early July began constructing fence around northern half of Ghajar town, located in occupied Lebanese territory, prompting Hizbollah’s condemnation.

In other important developments. Syrian state media 2, 19 July reported Israeli airstrikes on Homs and capital Damascus (see Syria). PM Netanyahu 17 July recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara (see Western Sahara).

Lebanon

Tensions picked up between Israel and Hizbollah as sides exchanged fire, economic crisis and presidential vacuum persisted, and deadly clashes erupted between militants in southern refugee camp. 

Mutual antagonism continued between Hizbollah and Israel. Following uptick in tensions late June when Israeli media reported Hizbollah had erected two tents housing armed militants in disputed Shebaa Farms area, Lebanese state media 5 July claimed that Israeli forces had breached border three separate times while carrying out construction work. Israel next day struck southern Lebanon with around 15 artillery shells in response to alleged rocket fire from Lebanon into northern Israel. Lebanese security source 12 July claimed that Israeli forces had lobbed three grenade-like explosives across border, wounding three Hizbollah operatives, while Israel said that it had used stun grenades. Meanwhile, Israel early July began constructing fence around northern half of Ghajar town, located in occupied Lebanese territory, prompting condemnation by Hizbollah as well as Lebanon’s caretaker govt. Tensions underscore risk that incident could trigger larger confrontation.

Economic crisis continued. Hardship remained severe despite period of relative stability for Lebanese Lira, due to continued intervention of Lebanese Central Bank and likely influx of hard currency during tourist season. Difficult economic conditions, however, continued to foment protest and public unrest. Several students 10 July reportedly attacked Education Minister’s convoy, blaming him for public-school year heavily disrupted by teacher strikes. Depositors on four occasions 10-20 July entered banks and forcibly withdrew their savings.

Presidential vacuum entered its ninth consecutive month. Parliament in July did not hold presidential election session, reflecting prevailing deadlock between various political factions. Concerns arose that vacuum could engulf Central Bank, given incumbent governor Riyadh Salameh’s term ended 31 July; several parties, including Christian Free Patriotic Movement, argue that caretaker cabinet cannot appoint new governor. Bank’s four deputy governors 6 July stated that they would collectively resign if govt failed to appoint Salameh’s replacement.

Militant factions clashed in southern refugee camp. Islamist militants 30 July shot dead Palestinian military general from Fatah and three escorts, sparking days of heavy clashes between factions in Ein el-Hilweh, country’s largest refugee camp near Sidon city, that killed at least eleven.

Libya

Parliament approved roadmap for selection of new unity govt before elections, drawing UN’s ire, and oil revenue distribution took centre stage.

Parliament adopted controversial plan to appoint new unity govt. East-based House of Representatives (HoR) 25 July approved roadmap paving the way for appointment of supposed unity govt before presidential and parliamentary elections; HoR presented plan as part and parcel of broader roadmap agreed to in June by HoR and Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) representatives forming UN-backed “6+6” committee. UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 26 July criticised “unilateral” initiative going counter to UN-backed efforts to enable elections as soon as possible, and warned it could “inflict serious negative consequences for Libya and trigger further instability and violence”. In response, HoR accused UN of misleading public opinion when describing decision as “unilateral”.

Rival factions set up joint committee on oil revenue distribution. Head of east-based govt, Osama Hamad, HoR chairman Aguila Saleh, and eastern strongman Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar late June-early July made separate calls for “fairer” redistribution of oil revenues, threatening to close off oil production should Tripoli fail to put portion of oil revenues at direct disposal of eastern authorities. In response, Tripoli-based Presidency Council Chairman Mohamed Menfi around 6 July agreed to form committee tasked with “distributing oil revenues” and including representatives from eastern and western Libya. UN, EU and most western embassies in following days welcomed decision.

Struggle for control of Central Bank led to kidnapping, oil field closure. Gunmen 11 July kidnapped former finance minister and prominent figure from eastern Libya, Farj Bou Matari, at Tripoli airport. Tribesmen close to Haftar 13 July shut down oil production at El Feel and El Sharara oil fields to protest Matari’s abduction, who was released 15 July. Tripoli-based oil ministry next day said production had resumed at oil sites. Kidnapping likely linked to claims that Bou Matari early July enjoyed tentative backing of rival assemblies, HSC and HoR, to replace Siddiq al-Kebir as Central Bank governor.

Saudi Arabia

Arabia Tensions with United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued to surface, while govt engaged Iran.

Rising tensions with UAE came to light. The Wall Street Journal 18 July reported that Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) during off-record press conference in Dec 2022 said UAE “stabbed us in the back” and that he would “take punitive steps” after sending list of demands to UAE; the news surfaced during period of rising Saudi-UAE economic competition and tensions over key issues, including Yemen and oil policy.

Riyadh continued diplomacy with Iran. Oil minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman 5 July reportedly discussed bilateral relations with Iranian counterpart on sidelines of OPEC conference in Austrian capital Vienna. State media 4 July cited foreign ministry affirming Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s exclusive claim to Durra gas field in Gulf maritime “Divided Area” and called on Iran to negotiate demarcation of area’s eastern border.

In other important developments. UN human rights experts 7 July called for release of two Saudi women jailed for critical tweets. Saudi Arabia 18 July agreed to purchase Turkish drones in biggest defence contract in Turkish history (see Türkiye).

Syria

New insurgent group emerged in Idlib amid hostilities between regime and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Russia blocked cross-border aid, and clashes between Turkish-backed and Kurdish militants continued.

New militant faction emerged in Idlib as hostilities persisted. After “Revolutionary Shield Company” late June emerged in Idlib province, claiming to fight HTS “criminality”, group 14 July executed man accused of being HTS member outside Idlib city and 17 July searched vehicles on M4 highway; attacks come after nearly four years of relative stability in Idlib. Meanwhile, regime continued shelling throughout July, including civilian homes in Jisr al-Shoughur 9 July and “double-tap” attack killing rescue worker in Aleppo province 11 July. HTS 7 July conducted first raid since April, targeting regime position in Latakia, and 10 July shelled regime base in Jurin, Hama, killing one. Unknown group, likely HTS, 19 July conducted drone attack on Russian base in Hmemeim, Latakia.

Russian veto on cross-border aid compounded humanitarian crisis in north-west. Russia 11 July vetoed renewal of UN Security Council authorisation for cross-border aid in north-west, where 3mn have been without aid since 10 July. Govt 13 July said it would allow aid through Bab al-Hawa crossing providing UN does not communicate with “terrorist organisations”, referring to de-facto authorities in northwest.

Turkish-backed and Kurdish forces continued hostilities, particularly in northern Aleppo. In northern Aleppo, controlled by Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA), car bomb 9 July killed five civilians in Shawa village. Turkish IED 9 July killed three in Manbij city, including senior commander of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-affiliated Manbij Military Council. People’s Defence Units (YPG) forces 10 July raided TFSA position near Afrin city, killing at least five. SDF forces same day shelled Turkish base near Azaz, north Aleppo. Militants affiliated with YPG 29 July attacked TFSA positions in Afrin; Turkish drones next day struck YPG and regime positions nearby in response.

In other important developments. Alleged Israeli airstrikes 2 July targeted Homs city; 19 July struck near capital Damascus. U.S. airstrike 7 July killed alleged ISIS leader in al-Bab city, Aleppo governorate. Middle East Eye 12 July reported U.S. plans to assassinate leaders of Iran-linked resistance factions.

Tunisia

Security forces expelled Sub-Saharan migrants to desert areas while European Union reached migration control deal with Tunis.

Authorities expelled Sub-Saharan migrants to border areas amid spike in tensions. Clashes between Tunisians and Sub-Saharan migrants 3 July left one Tunisian man dead in coastal city of Sfax. As disturbances went on for several days, with local rights activists reporting beatings and arbitrary detentions of migrants by locals, authorities allegedly expelled around 1,200 sub-Saharans from Sfax and took them further south to remote areas near borders with Libya and Algeria. NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) 6 July said migrants left “with little food and no medical assistance” at Tunisia-Libya border. Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique 12 July reported death of two migrants in Haouza area near Algeria, and Libyan authorities late July announced finding several bodies of migrants on border with Tunisia. UN experts 18 July urged authorities to “halt any further deportations”, saying “collective expulsions are prohibited under international law”, and reiterated concern about “reports of racist hate speech in the country”.

EU, Tunisia signed partnership largely focused on migration control. European Commission President Ursula von Der Leyen and President Saïed 16 July signed partnership agreement, with European Union (EU) allocating €105mn to Tunisia to reinforce border management and speed up repatriation of irregular Tunisian migrants. HRW 19 July urged EU to suspend migration control funding to Tunisian security forces, citing latter’s “serious abuses” against Sub-Saharan migrants.

In other important developments. Tunis Court of Appeal 13 July released political opponents Chaïma Issa and Lazhar Akremi, who had been detained since Feb as part of crackdown on govt critics; next day banned them from traveling abroad and appearing in public following prosecutor’s office’s request. On two-year anniversary of Saïed’s power grab, over 300 people 25 July rallied in capital Tunis to denounce crackdown on fundamental freedoms and demand release of political prisoners.

Western Sahara

In new diplomatic victory, Morocco secured Israel’s recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Israel recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Israel 17 July recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, also announced appointment of military attaché in Rabat liaison office, which suggests impending full upgrade of diplomatic relations. Algiers 20 July criticised move as “blatant violation of international law” that “can in no way legitimise sovereignty over occupied Sahara lands” (see Algeria). Moroccan King Mohammed VI 29 July welcomed Israel’s decision while calling for “return to normality” with Algeria and “opening of borders between the two neighbouring, sister countries and peoples”.

EU-Morocco fishing deal expired. Fishing protocol to EU-Morocco association agreement 17 July expired and was not renewed pending EU Court of Justice’s final decision on legality of including Western Sahara in protocol; expiration leaves European trawlers without license to fish in Moroccan and Western Saharan waters.

Yemen

Negotiations between Huthis and Saudi Arabia remained stalled, Southern Transitional Council (STC) mobilised forces in Hadramawt amid mounting tensions, and economic crisis sparked protests.

Huthi-Saudi talks made no progress. Negotiations remained at impasse over use of oil revenues for civil and military salary payments and Riyadh’s insistence on its role as mediator in conflict. Huthi delegation 9 July completed Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia and reportedly met Saudi officials in Saudi capital Riyadh. Meanwhile, Huthis targeted forces in al-Dhale, southern al-Bayda, and Taiz governorates to pressure Riyadh. In UN Security Council briefing, UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 10 July highlighted need for de-escalation of economic hostilities and concern over military posturing and parades; President of Huthi Revolutionary Committee Mohammed al-Huthi same day accused UN of perpetuating conflict and called for lifting of sanctions. Security Council 10 July renewed mandate for UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) until 14 July 2024.

STC mobilised supporters amid tensions with Saudi-aligned forces in Hadramawt. STC 7 July held annual rally in Hadramawt governorate, expressing discontent at newly-formed Saudi-led Hadramawt National Council (HNC); STC 7 July mobilised protests for Southern Homeland Day and reiterated calls to evict Islah-aligned First Military Region from Hadramawt. STC same day accused First Military Region of shooting protestors at tribal leader’s residence in Seiyun city. STC leader Ayderous al-Zubaidi 9 July threatened to “blow up the situation in Hadramawt”; Saudi-Emirati rivalry has intensified tensions, with Riyadh utilising HNC to diversify its influence in Hadramawt and weaken UAE-backed STC.

Economic hardship sparked protests. Protests 11-12 July erupted in Aden, Lahij, Taiz and Hadramawt governorates over electricity shortages and currency devaluation, as Riyal 11 July reached low of 1,500 to U.S. dollar for first time since April 2022; STC blamed govt ineptitude. Head of Presidential Leadership Council Rashad al-Alimi 12 July met Saudi officials in Riyadh to secure financial assistance and emphasised importance of resuming oil exports from Hadramawt and Shebwa governorates.

In other important developments. Replacement ship 16 July arrived in Yemen to begin unloading oil from stranded tanker FSO Safer. Unknown gunman 21 July killed World Food Programme worker in Turbah town, Taiz governorate.

Africa

Angola

Spike in fuel prices sparked demonstrations that left five people dead.

Govt 2 June scrapped fuel subsidies, prompting gasoline price to almost double. In response, taxi drivers 5 June held protest in Huambo province. Police responded with live ammunition, killing five people including 12-year-old. NGO Human Rights Watch next day condemned disproportionate use of force, called for impartial investigations and prosecutions. President Lourenco 8 June fired economic coordination minister and replaced him with central bank governor. Unrest continued with thousands 17 June protesting fuel price hike in several cities, including in capital Luanda and Benguela and Namibe cities; police fired tear gas, with several people reportedly wounded and at least 87 detained.

Burkina Faso

Amid heavy fighting between security forces and jihadist militants, abuses against civilians continued as transitional govt pursued all-military approach to insecurity.

Jihadists inflicted heavy losses on security forces. Govt forces and civilian army auxiliaries (VDPs) late May conducted wide-ranging operations against al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province in North region’s Yatenga province, Boucle du Mouhoun region’s Nayala province, and Centre-West region’s Sanguié province. In Centre-East region, suspected jihadists 5 June killed 14 VDPs and four soldiers in Sawengua area, Boulgou province, reportedly prompting airborne counter-attack. In Centre-North region, unidentified jihadists 26 June ambushed supply convoy in Namsiguia village, Bam province, killing at least 31 soldiers and three VDPs, while govt claimed to have killed around 40 assailants; jihadists same day reportedly killed 33 VDPs in Noaka village, Sanmatenga province, with VDPs claiming to have killed 50 jihadists.

State-sponsored militias conducted multiple abuses against civilians. In Centre-East region, suspected VDPs 3 June abducted 19 Fulani civilians from bus near Yargatenga commune, Koulpélogo province, and soldiers and VDPs 6 June killed traditional chief and two other people they accused of collaborating with JNIM in Sawengua village, Boulgou province. In East region, VDPs 10 June abducted at least four people from medical centre in Kompienga province before killing them.

Transitional President Capt. Traoré conducted partial cabinet reshuffle. Traoré 25 June proceeded to partial reshuffle of govt, with departure of four ministers, including those in charge of security and justice; other key ministries including defence, finance and foreign affairs did not change hands.

Govt took further steps to re-align away from traditional Western partners. Traoré 12 June received delegation from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) alliance of major emerging economies. FM Olivia Ragnaghnewendé Rouamba next day signed memorandum of understanding with BRICS delegation, defining priority areas of cooperation, largely related to development. Meanwhile, transitional govt 18 June congratulated Malian authorities on decision to revoke consent for UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA), lauding step as “conforming to the strategic vision of the Malian state” and “affirmation of sovereignty” (see Mali).

Burundi

Govt suspended main opposition party as authorities stepped up attempts to silence dissent ahead of 2025 legislative elections.

Govt suspended main opposition party. Interior Minister Martin Niteretse 2 June banned main opposition party National Congress for Freedom (CNL) from any activities, citing “irregularities” during congresses held in March and April, which saw several party executives opposed to CNL President Agathon Rwasa ousted. Rwasa and other party officials in following days denounced “attempt to weaken the CNL ahead of the 2025 legislative elections”. Authorities 10-17 June arrested at least 16 CNL activists and party officials on spurious charges. Meanwhile, ruling-party youth militia Imbonerakure 4 June reportedly lynched CNL activist Gabriel Ndayishimiye in Gitega province, and 7 June launched census of population by political affiliation in Kayogoro commune, Makamba province, with CNL denouncing manoeuvre aimed at dissuading locals from openly supporting CNL.

In other important developments. Burundi 14-28 June participated in East African Community’s military exercise aiming to foster cooperation among military, police and civilian components of seven EAC member states.

Cameroon

Anglophone separatist movement appeared increasingly divided as conflict with govt forces showed no sign of abating; authorities took steps to stem uptick in jihadist violence in Far North.

Violence continued in Anglophone North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions. Anglophone separatist militants 6-7 June ambushed army patrol in Ekondo Titi town, Ndian division (SW) and detonated explosive device on military reinforcement team, leaving two soldiers and one assailant dead; 8 June shot and killed gendarmerie commander in Bamenda city, Mezam division (NW); 16 June killed police officer in Bamenda city (NW); and 25 June killed soldier near Kumba city, Meme division (SW). Soldiers 15-17 June raided Big Babanki village, Mezam, to dislodge suspected separatists, reportedly killing about dozen people including civilians; 24 June reportedly raided Ekona village, Fako division (SW), leaving five people dead.

Splits widened within Anglophone separatist movement. After resigning in April as Deputy Defence Chief of separatist armed group Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), prominent separatist figure Capo Daniel mid-June challenged ADF head Ayaba Cho, accusing him of power-mongering, corruption, and failure to provide adequate political leadership.

Govt redoubled efforts to stem jihadist violence amid uptick in attacks in Far North. After Boko Haram in May intensified attacks, military in Far North region 31 May requested further support from Chad and Nigeria to enhance border protection, and additional military resources from Yaoundé; governor of Far North region same day urged local chiefs and community leaders to reactivate militias to assist govt forces in fighting militants, and army 2 June announced construction of two additional army bases in Far North. Attacks continued, however. In Mayo-Sava division, suspected Boko Haram militants 2 June killed vigilante group leader in Amchidé town, 5 June killed one soldier in Kerawa town, and 11 June killed one civilian and abducted two children in Kassa village. In Mayo-Tsanaga division, army overnight 3-4 June repelled Boko Haram attack on Goldavi military post, killing four militants. Suspected Islamic State West Africa Province militants 17 June reportedly kidnapped six women in Bargaram village, Logone-et-Chari division, for failing to pay taxes levied by group.

Central African Republic

President Touadéra faced renewed pushback from opposition for scheduling constitutional referendum, while rebel violence continued countrywide.

Scheduling of constitutional referendum rekindled political tensions. Opposition and civil society groups early June condemned Touadéra’s late May move to schedule constitutional referendum for 30 July as manoeuvre to stay in power. Notably, opposition leader Alexandre Ferdinand N’Guendet, who briefly served as transitional president in 2014, 1 June reportedly threatened to march on capital Bangui, calling on army to rally behind him to overthrow Touadéra. Army generals 6 June rejected call, and public prosecutor 12 June launched investigation into N’Guendet’s actions. Opposition party Resistance and Transition Council 3 June urged citizens to rise up against Touadéra. UN human rights expert in CAR, Yao Agbetse, 16 June warned referendum could “result in further human rights violations” and urged authorities to prevent surge of hate speech and violence before, during and after vote. Meanwhile, Touadéra 9 June appointed Evariste Ngamana, ruling party spokesperson and parliament’s first VP, as head of referendum campaign, sidelining party’s executive secretary and Parliament Speaker Simplice Mathieu Sarandji, who has spoken out against constitutional reform.

Rebel violence continued across country. Govt forces and rebel Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) 5 June clashed in Baoro town (Nana-Mambéré prefecture), leaving three civilians injured. CPC fighters 8 June ambushed govt forces near Kadjama village (Ouham prefecture), killing three and capturing one; 13 June attacked army and Russian paramilitary Wagner position in Makoundji Wali village (Ouham-Pendé prefecture), with unknown casualties. Govt forces and Wagner 11 June captured senior CPC official during operation in Bria town (Haute-Kotto prefecture), after CPC fighters surrounded Bria and spread rumours of major attack. Self-defence militia Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé 20 June clashed with Union for Peace in CAR (a member of CPC) rebels in Mboki town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture), leaving unknown number dead.

Chadian army continued military operations in CAR. Chadian military 3 June killed a dozen alleged CAR-based Chadian rebels near Ngolongosso locality (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture).

Chad

Govt forces and rebel groups engaged in week-long fighting in northern region in worst episode of rebel violence since 2021 offensive.

Rebel violence resurged in Tibesti region in north. Rebel groups National Front for Democracy and Justice in Chad (FNDJT) and Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR), both of which took part in 2022 Doha dialogue but refused to sign ensuing peace deal with transitional govt, 31 May-6 June clashed with armed forces in Tibesti. Army 7 June said fighting left 23 rebels dead, while eight soldiers suffered injuries; rebels 6 June claimed 15 soldiers killed, later announced death of one FNDJT senior commander.

Suspected criminal violence affected eastern regions. In Guéra region, unidentified assailants 3 June killed four civilians in attack on agricultural project team near Iregué locality (Mangalmé department); mob 15 June attacked Mangalmé prison and lynched two alleged perpetrators. In Sila region, unidentified gunmen 7 June killed two security personnel in Hadjer Marfain locality (Kimiti department), while dispute over local chief’s succession 14 June reportedly left two dead and 30 injured in Djourouf Al Ahmar department.

Fallout from Sudan conflict increased risk of tribal clashes along border. Security services 11 June arrested Allamine Adoudou, Chad’s former ambassador to Egypt and prominent opposition leader, over comments supporting Chadian Arab tribesmen fighting alongside Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. Lt. Gen. Shams al-Din Kabbashi, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Sudanese Armed Forces, 9 June accused RSF of recruiting mercenaries from Arab tribes notably in Chad. NGO Doctors without Borders 16 June said over 600 war-wounded Sudanese in last three days arrived in Adré town in Ouaddaï region (east). UN human rights representative late June said 120,000 Sudanese refugees have arrived to Chad since 15 April, warned UN camps in country only had capacity for 90,000.

In other important developments. Council of Ministers 2 June and National Transitional Council 27 June approved preliminary draft constitution ahead of constitutional referendum due in Nov. Several political and civil society opposition groups immediately said proposed text, which retains unitary state, contradicts recommendations of Inclusive National Dialogue, according to which form of the state was to be decided by referendum.

Côte d’Ivoire

Ahead of September local elections, voter roll continued to spark controversy; govt pursued efforts to monitor refugee influx from Burkina Faso amid fears of jihadist infiltration.

Opposition heavyweights criticised electoral list. Henri Konan Bédié’s Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and Laurent Gbagbo’s African People’s Party - Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) 1 June held joint press conference, alleged irregularities on voter roll including presence of deceased voters, and called for extension of appeal period. Gbagbo 8 June filed appeal at electoral commission’s office in Abidjan city to be reinstated on election roll to vote in municipal and regional elections due 2 Sept; PPA-CI 30 June said electoral commission had rejected appeal.

Ad-hoc political alliances faced challenges. PPA-CI and PDCI continued to discuss circumstantial electoral alliances for local elections; disagreements however persisted over designation of common candidates in some districts, notably in Gbagbo stronghold of Yopougon in Abidjan suburb. Paris-based weekly news magazine Jeune Afrique 12 June reported ruling party Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace did not withdraw its candidate in Moronou region where president of Ivorian Popular Front party, Pascal Affi N’Guessan, is seeking re-election, despite partnership agreement signed in May.

Govt took further steps to manage refugee influx from Burkina Faso. UN High Commissioner for Refugees representative in Côte d’Ivoire 19 June announced two “transit sites” for Burkinabe refugees will be operational by late June in porous border departments of Ouangolodougou (north) and Bouna (north east); Ivorian authorities hope sites will allow for better monitoring of refugee influx amid concerns that some jihadist militants might be hiding among displaced people in order to infiltrate country.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Political tensions escalated ahead of December general elections, and M23-related violence resumed, jeopardising fragile ceasefire observed on the ground since April.

Political climate sharply deteriorated. Military intelligence 5 June accused opposition leader Moïse Katumbi’s right-hand man, Salomon Kalonda – detained in May – of collusion with Rwanda and M23 rebels, and 8 June searched Kalonda and Katumbi’s homes in capital Kinshasa and Lubumbashi city. Moves fuelled concern among opposition parties that President Tshisekedi may use M23 crisis to repress rivals ahead of December general elections. Opposition and civil society continued to strongly criticise electoral process. Former President Kabila 16 June denounced those “organising chaotic elections that will set the country ablaze”, while opposition heavyweight Martin Fayulu 19 June threatened election boycott if voter list is not redone. After National Episcopal Conference 22 June condemned democratic backsliding, Tshisekedi 25 June accused Catholic Church of intimidation.

Clashes resumed between M23 rebellion and local armed groups allied to army. Following lull in M23-related violence in North Kivu province since April, M23 rebels 8, 26 June clashed with ethnic Hutu militia in Bwito chiefdom, Rutshuru territory, and 15 June captured Kasura, Butale and Lwama villages in Bashali chiefdom, Masisi territory, after clashes with ethnic Hutu and Hunde militias; renewed fighting reported in Masisi 17-21 June. Meanwhile, Angola 3 and 27 June hosted regional summits to help resolve conflict (see Rwanda).

Deadly attacks by ethnic and Islamist militias continued. Association of various ethnic Lendu militias, Cooperative for the Development of the Congo, 11-12 June rampaged through Lala displacement camp in Djugu territory of Ituri province, killing 46 civilians, mostly ethnic Hema. Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 2-9 June killed at least 24 people in Beni territory, North Kivu. ADF 16 June also launched deadly cross-border attack into Uganda (see Uganda), and 25 June killed several people in Manya locality, Mambasa territory, Ituri.

Conflict between Yaka and Teke communities continued in west. Ethnic Yaka “Mobondo” militiamen 6 June beheaded ethnic Teke village chief in Maluku commune, Kinshasa, and 26 June killed at least 20 people, mostly from Teke ethnic group, in ambush in Kwamouth territory, Mai-Ndombe province.

Eritrea

Asmara re-joined regional bloc in sustained effort to bolster international standing; President Isaias continued seeking closer ties with Russia.

Eritrea sought to bolster regional standing. Eritrea 12 June formally rejoined regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) after 16-year hiatus. Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel same day said IGAD should play leading role in resolving Sudan crisis. High-level delegation led by FM Osman Saleh 13 June participated in 14th IGAD regular meeting in Djibouti.

President Isaias completed first official visit to Russia. President Isaias late May-early June made first official visit to Russia, held talks with President Putin on strengthening bilateral ties and agreed to participate in second Russia-Africa Summit in July. In interview with state-controlled TV channel Russia Today, Isaias 5 June supported Russia’s “right to defend itself” against “hegemonic forces … led by Washington” that have “declared war against humanity”, calling for “global solidarity” to forge new world order.

Ethiopia

Deadly violence persisted in Oromia region, Tigray peace process remained on track despite challenges, and unrest simmered in Amhara region amid rising opposition to federal govt.

Insecurity remained rampant in Oromia, exacting heavy toll on civilians. Hostilities between Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and military continued at high intensity; month also saw clashes between Amhara Fano militia and govt forces. Meanwhile, armed groups stepped up attacks on civilians. Notably, OLA 6 June attacked bus near Bule Hora town (West Guji Zone), killing two; Fano militia 8-9 June killed at least three in Agemsa town (East Wollega); UN humanitarian agency 14 June reported deteriorating humanitarian situation following attacks on civilians in parts of Horo Guduru Wollega and East Wollega zones. Kidnappings also continued; notably, gunmen 24 June abducted around 50 people in Ali Doro area (North Shewa Zone), demanding ransom.

Tigray peace process saw mixed progress. NGO Human Rights Watch 1 June reported Amhara forces in disputed Western Tigray continued ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans after Nov 2022 truce. Amhara residents of Western Tigray 4 June demonstrated, demanding govt address status of ethnic Amharas living there. U.S. Horn of Africa envoy 7 June met with federal and Tigray leaders, and African Union (AU) officials, later confirmed parties agreed to extend AU ceasefire monitoring and verification team’s mandate until Dec 2023. Tigray Interim President Getachew Reda 11 June visited Amhara’s capital Bahir Dar for first time since Tigray war ended, pledged to continue work toward “sustainable peace” during talks with Amhara’s president.

Fano militia clashed with federal forces in Amhara. Amid rising discontent with federal govt in Amhara region, sporadic fighting occurred during month between federal forces and Amhara nationalist Fano militia, notably leaving six dead on 10 June in Awi Zone. Other Amhara nationalist factions feeling isolated as federal govt strengthens relations with Tigray may resort to low-grade armed rebellion.

In other important developments. U.S. development agency 8 June suspended food aid to Ethiopia after uncovering “widespread and coordinated campaign” to divert assistance; World Food Program next day followed suit. Addis Ababa 29 June requested to join BRICS bloc of emerging economies that includes Russia, Brazil, China, India and South Africa.

Guinea

Opposition coalition put demonstrations on hold, but political tensions persisted as transitional authorities launched consultations on constitutional reform.

Opposition suspended demonstrations, court acquitted key opposition leaders. Large opposition and civil society coalition Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG) 31 May put demonstrations on hold for June, citing preparations for Eid al-Adha celebrations. Dixinn court 13 June cleared three leaders of civil society platform National Front for the Defence of the Constitution – including Oumar Sylla, alias Foniké Mengué – of all charges levelled against them in mid-2022, including participating in an illegal gathering; public prosecutor immediately appealed acquittal, which was one of FVG’s main preconditions to resume negotiations with govt.

Transitional authorities moved forward with constitutional reform initiative. Transitional legislature 15 May-2 June organised constitutional consultations, calling upon institutions and political entities to discuss guiding principles of future constitution and present recommendations; armed forces suggested limiting number of political parties to three, while FVG boycotted initiative.

Tensions with ECOWAS remained latent. Transitional authorities postponed talks on conduct of transition scheduled for 18-21 June with West African regional bloc (ECOWAS) mediator for Guinea, former Beninese President Thomas Boni Yayi, citing higher agenda priorities. African Union Chairperson Azali Assoumani 23-25 June visited Guinea, met with transitional president, Lt. Col. Doumbouya; leaders likely discussed tensions between Conakry and ECOWAS on conduct of transition.

Kenya

President Ruto enacted new finance bill, adding to tensions with opposition; under pressure in Somalia, Al-Shabaab stepped up incursions into Kenya.

President signed controversial finance bill into law despite opposition. Police 6 June fired teargas to disperse hundreds of people demonstrated against proposed Finance Bill 2023 in capital Nairobi. Lawmakers 21 June approved bill, which doubles fuel tax and introduces new housing levy, and Ruto 26 June signed it into law. Move added to tensions between govt and opposition. In protest, opposition leader Raila Odinga 27 June called for tax boycott and vowed to hold street protests from 7 July; Odinga’s coalition Azimio la Umoja same day also announced leaving bi-partisan talks with govt on selection of election commissioners. High Court 30 June suspended implementation of Finance Act 2023 pending hearing and determination of lawsuit sponsored by opposition senator.

Al-Shabaab attacks spiked along Somali border. As offensive against Al-Shabaab continued in Somalia, group 2 June reportedly attacked police vehicle with rocket-propelled grenade along Lelele-Takaba road in Mandera county, killing two officers and injuring five others. Al-Shabaab claimed explosive device attack 7 June killed four soldiers on Mararani-Kiunga road in Lamu county, while another explosive device attack 13 June reportedly killed eight police officers near Bodhei town along Lamu-Garissa county border. Suspected Al-Shabaab militants 24 June killed five civilians in Juhudi and Salama villages in Lamu county, raising death toll in such cross-border attacks to at least 30 in past month.

Violence over cattle and land resources continued in north. Suspected cattle raiders 3 June injured two people in Kamurion village along West Pokot-Turkana county border; 9 June attacked Lolmolog village in Samburu county, injuring four and stealing hundreds of cattle. Attacks also increased in Meru County, possibly reflecting security operations’ success in pushing raiders south. Notably, armed men likely coming from Samburu 12-13 June attacked Njaruine village, killing five and stealing over 100 cattle.

Mali

UN Security Council ended UN mission at Bamako’s request, while Mali voters approved new Constitution in referendum, and jihadist violence continued in centre and north.

UN mission set to leave Mali after authorities revoked consent. Ahead of UN Security Council’s vote on renewal of UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA)’s mandate, FM Abdoulaye Diop 16 June requested MINUSMA’s departure “without delay”, citing “crisis of confidence” between authorities and decade-old mission. Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), which gathers northern armed groups signatory to 2015 peace agreement, 21 June said departure of UN mission “without a credible alternative” would strike “fatal blow” to peace deal. UN Security Council 30 June terminated MINUSMA’s mandate, with mission to cease operations, transfer tasks and withdraw personnel by 31 December.

Voters approved new Constitution in referendum. Mali 18 June held constitutional referendum on new constitution strengthening presidential powers, providing amnesty for coup perpetrators, and potentially paving the way for Transitional President Col. Goïta to run in presidential election scheduled for Feb 2024. CSP members did not allow vote to proceed in Kidal town (north) under their control, while Malian civil society-led election observation mission 18 June said around 80 polling stations remained closed in Mopti region (centre) due to insecurity. Electoral authority in following days claimed turnout was 38% and 23 June said new constitution approved with 97% of vote. United Front Against the Referendum, made up of 21 political parties and civil society organisations, in following days denounced massive fraud and filed appeals to Constitutional Court.

Jihadist violence continued in centre and north. In Mopti (centre), Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) militants 3 June killed 15 pastoralists at Teberemt village, and al-Qaeda affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 6 June killed at least 10 Dan Na Ambassagou militiamen in ambush in Korn’Ga village. In north, JNIM and IS Sahel militants 3 June clashed in Tatakarat area, Gao region, leaving eight IS Sahel militants dead; JNIM militants next day ambushed IS Sahel unit in Timatalwayene area, Timbuktu region, killing ten. Also in Timbuktu, JNIM 9 June attacked MINUSMA patrol, killing one UN peacekeeper.

Mozambique

Insurgent activity persisted at lower intensity in northern Cabo Delgado province; preparations for October municipal elections moved forward.

Islamic State militants remained active mostly in coastal Macomia district. Graves containing bodies of three individuals who went missing in early May in Chitoio village, Macomia district, discovered 5 June. Suspected Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) militants sighted 7 June around coastal village of Pequeue in Macomia. Meanwhile, security forces mid-June reportedly reduced escorts on N380 road between Macomia district headquarters and Mucojo town. ISMP militants continued to engage communities peacefully in certain coastal areas, while also warning civilians against cooperation with security forces. Notably, militants 5 June searched bus near Ilala village along Macomia coast but let the passengers go unharmed, and 21 June reportedly entered Kalugo village in Mocímboa da Praia district, bought food and clothing before leaving.

Authorities appeared set to step up counter-insurgency operations in Macomia. Military 19 June reportedly ordered residents of several villages along Macomia coast to evacuate to make way for govt, Rwandan and Southern African forces operations, and 21 June blocked all travel to Mucojo town from Macomia town. Soldiers’ indiscipline continued to fuel distrust. Notably, security forces 9 June killed schoolteacher in Pamunda neighbourhood of Mocímboa da Praia district.

Ahead of October municipal elections, voter registration closed. Voter registration for municipal elections scheduled for 11 October concluded 3 June, amid accusations that as many as 1.5mn people, particularly in opposition-leaning areas in central and northern Mozambique, had been unable to register. In Cabo Delgado, however, more people than expected registered, notably in Pemba, Mocímboa da Praia, Ibo, Chiure, and Balama municipalities, which host villagers displaced by conflict.

Niger

Low-level jihadist violence persisted notably in south east, and reports emerged of Arab tribesmen from Niger fighting in Sudan.

Sporadic violence from Boko Haram factions continued in Diffa region (south east). Suspected members of JAS faction of Boko Haram 9 June killed three Nigerian youths in Bosso department. Military vehicle 16 June hit explosive device likely planted by Islamic State West Africa Province militants near Chetima Wangou locality, Diffa department, leaving seven soldiers dead.

Mediation efforts made headway in Tillabery region (south west). Military around 3 June killed five suspected militants of Islamic State Sahel Province or al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and arrested another eight in Tera department. Arab, Fulani, Djerma and Tuareg communities of Ouallam department 4 June signed peace agreement in Tondikiwindi village, committing to resolving differences peacefully and “forgive past acts”; deal was supported by national peacebuilding body Haute autorité à la consolidation de la paix, testifying to Niger’s multidimensional approach to insecurity relative to its neighbours.

In other important developments. In Agadez region (north), suspected bandits 9 June attacked Tchibarakaten gold mining site in Iferouane area; army repelled attack, killing three assailants and detaining another. Lt. Gen. Shams al-Din Kabbashi, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Sudanese Armed Forces, 9 June accused rival Rapid Support Forces of recruiting mercenaries from Arab tribes notably in Niger.

Nigeria

New president took steps to address economic and security crises, while jihadist, criminal and herder-farmer violence continued unabated in several states.

President Tinubu reaffirmed focus on security, economy. Tinubu 19 June replaced all service and intelligence chiefs, ensuring that new appointments reflect country’s “federal character” as required by constitution. Tinubu during first few weeks in office also took significant steps toward reforming economy, notably scrapping fuel subsidy, which prompted major price increase. Main labour union announced indefinite strike from 7 June to protest move and soaring inflation, but put it on hold after govt 5 June engaged them in negotiations. After Tinubu 9 June suspended central bank chief, Godwin Emefiele, central bank mid-June ended years-long policy of operating multiple exchange rates.

Islamist insurgents launched bold attack in Borno state in North East. Air force 6 June bombed enclave believed to be camp of notable Boko Haram leader, Ali Ngulde, in Gwoza area, reportedly killing number of insurgents but missing Ngulde; 8 June allegedly struck Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) convoy in Damboa area, killing unconfirmed number. However, suspected Boko Haram 15 and 22 June killed at least 23 civilians and abducted others in Jere and Mafa areas, suggesting that some units are still lurking in forests around state capital Maiduguri. Suspected ISWAP 30 June fired rocket-propelled grenade at Damboa town after failing to invade community, killing five people. Boko Haram and ISWAP 23 June clashed between Gajiganna and Gajiram towns in Nganzai area, with unconfirmed fatalities.

Criminal violence continued unabated in North West and North Central. In Sokoto state, gunmen around 3 June killed over 100 people in villages of Tangaza area of Sokoto state, Maradun area of Zamfara, and Katsina-Ala area of Benue state. In Niger state, armed individuals 7 June killed at least 25 farmers and abducted unconfirmed number of residents in Rafi area. Military 1-15 June reportedly killed 38 members of armed groups, mostly in Kaduna and Zamfara states.

Herder-farmer violence continued to run high in North Central. Violence arising from herder-farmer tensions 11-27 June left over 60 people dead in Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Mangu areas of Plateau state.

Rwanda

Regional leaders discussed situation in eastern DR Congo, and UN annual report heavily criticised Rwanda’s role in DR Congo.

Regional peace efforts continued. Regional leaders 3 June met in Angola’s capital Luanda for extraordinary summit of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to discuss eastern DR Congo and Sudan. Participants notably urged M23 armed group to accelerate withdrawal from North Kivu province and “condemned any attempt by the M23 [and others] to revive hostilities in occupied areas”. DR Congo President Félix Tshisekedi attended, while PM Edouard Ngirente represented Rwanda in place of President Kagame. Angola 27 June also hosted first quadripartite summit of ICGLR, Southern African Development Community, East African Community and Economic Community of Central African States under African Union auspices; participants pledged better coordination of peace initiatives in eastern DR Congo.

UN report condemned Rwanda’s intervention in DR Congo. In annual report published 20 June, UN Group of Experts on DR Congo reported “evidence of direct interventions by the Rwanda Defence Force on Democratic Republic of the Congo territory, either to reinforce M23 combatants or to conduct military operations”. U.S. 19 June welcomed report and reiterated call for Rwanda to “immediately remove Rwandan Defense Force troops from Congolese territory” and “cease support for the UN- and U.S.-sanctioned M23 armed group”.

Senegal

Deadly protests erupted after court sentenced opposition leader to prison.

Court in capital Dakar 1 June sentenced opposition leader Ousmane Sonko to two years in prison for “corrupting the youth”, de facto disqualifying him from Feb 2024 presidential election; court however acquitted him of rape. Sonko’s supporters immediately denounced ruling as politically motivated, and 1-2 June staged protests notably in Dakar’s suburbs and Sonko’s hometown of Ziguinchor (Casamance region), with clashes reported between police and protesters. Govt 2 June deployed army in Dakar, and 4 June shut down mobile internet access, citing need to combat “subversive messages in a context of public disorder in certain localities”. Govt same day said clashes left 16 protesters dead, while NGO Amnesty International 9 June reported 23 fatalities, and Sonko’s party 20 June counted 30. Calm quickly returned but situation remained volatile until month’s end, with Sonko under de facto house arrest in Dakar pending transfer to jail, and President Sall expected to announce in early June whether or not he will run for third term in 2024.

Sierra Leone

Tensions flared as country went to polls for general elections.

Security forces 21 June clashed with opposition All People’s Congress (APC) supporters in capital Freetown as they gathered to protest “discrepancies in the electoral process”; APC same day said police killed one protester, while police denied firing shots but confirmed arresting 66 people. After elections 24 June proceeded without major incidents, APC said security forces 25 June fired tear gas and live ammunition into their headquarters in Freetown, leaving one person dead; police acknowledged firing tear gas at APC supporters who allegedly harassed passers-by near party headquarters and claimed victory. As APC presidential candidate Samura Kamara called early counts showing incumbent President Bio in lead “daylight robbery”, election commission 27 June declared Bio as winner of presidential election with 56.17% of votes; Kamara immediately rejected results, deeming them “not credible”. European election observers 28 June reported “statistical inconsistencies” in election results and urged election commission to “promptly publish disaggregated results data per polling station to allow for public scrutiny of the results”.

Somalia

Al-Shabaab continued to launch major attacks amid stalled govt offensive, political tensions turned deadly in Puntland state and spiked in Gedo and Hiraan regions, while AU began troops drawdown.

Al-Shabaab conducted series of major attacks. As govt’s anti-Al-Shabaab offensive remained stalled, militants 7 June launched assault on outpost of Ethiopian forces in Dolow town, Jubaland state (south); 9 June laid seven-hour siege to Pearl Beach hotel in capital Mogadishu, killing at least nine; twin bombs 21 June killed multiple trainees in army recruitment centre in Bardhere city, Jubaland; and 25 June fired mortars at Halane base housing AU and UN personnel in Mogadishu, causing no casualties.

Violence left at least two dozen dead in Puntland state. As opposition groups continued to accuse Puntland President Said Deni of seeking to extend his term, gunmen loyal to opposition 20 June tried to disrupt parliamentary debate on changes to electoral system in state capital Garowe; clashes with security forces left at least 26 people dead. Traditional elders next day helped negotiate pause in fighting.

Political tensions spiked in Hiraan and Gedo regions. Hirshabelle state President Ali Guudlaawe 17 June replaced Hiraan regional governor Ali Jeyte, prompting immediate protests from Jeyte’s supporters, notably among his Hawadle clan, in regional capital Beledweyne. Jeyte 18 June said Hiraan is “severing ties” with Hirshabelle administration, and around 24 June proclaimed himself president of “new” Hiraan state, rejected talks with federal govt, and banned all flights into and out of Hiraan. Meanwhile, in bid to replace Gedo regional officials close to former federal President Farmajo, Jubaland state President Ahmed Madobe 7 June named Abdullahi Abdi Jama as new Gedo governor. Local elites however opposed move, with officials in Garbaharey city 13 June denying permission for plane carrying Abdi Jama to land until 27 June.

African Union (AU) mission began drawdown of troops. AU mission (ATMIS), due to exit Somalia by December 2024, 30 June completed first stage of withdrawal with 2,000 of almost 20,000 total troops leaving and several bases transferred to Somali army.

Somaliland

Las Anod crisis continued amid fighting between govt forces and local clan militias and defection of high-ranking officials.

Fighting between security forces and local clan militias continued. After lull in violence between Somaliland forces and Dhulbahante clan militias in early to mid-June, fighting picked up with several clashes and mortar exchanges reported 24-27 June in and around Las Anod town. President Bihi 25 June reiterated commitment to defend territorial integrity but expressed willingness to engage in negotiations with Dhulbahante elders.

Senior officials switched sides. Deputy commander of army, Lt. Gen. Suleiman Barre Gesood, early June defected and reportedly joined Dhulbahante forces. House of Representatives speaker, Abdirisaq Khalif, 12 June resigned, said President Bihi’s govt and security forces responsible for violence around Las Anod. Move came days after Attorney General filed lawsuit against Khalif, accusing him of absenteeism and undermining unity of Somaliland.

In other important developments. Electoral authorities 21 June completed distribution of voter cards; election timeline remained elusive, however, with opposition and govt divided over whether presidential vote or so-called political parties election should be held first.

South Sudan

Militia forces integrated into army, and intercommunal tensions escalated amid displacement crisis from Sudan where conflict threatens oil exports.

Agwalek militia integrated into army and defections weakened opposition. President Kiir and leader of ethnic Shilluk Agwalek militia, Johnson Olony, 7 June held long-awaited meeting in capital Juba, agreed to officially integrate Agwalek combatants into national armed forces. Leaders of two largest rebel groups not to have signed revitalised peace agreement – South Sudan United Front/Army deputy chief of staff, Dickson Gatluak, 11 June and National Salvation Front’s commander, Kenyi Warrior, 18 June – defected to govt, which could disincentivise Juba from reconvening Rome talks with armed groups outside of 2018 deal.

Sudan conflict enflamed intercommunal violence and threatened vital oil pipeline. UN refugee agency 26 June reported around 117,000 had crossed border from Sudan, mostly returnees, since 15 April. Humanitarian organisations continued to relocate thousands to areas of origin and areas adjacent to existing Protection of Civilians (PoC) camp in Malakal city (Upper Nile state), where intercommunal tensions have been high for months due to fighting between Nuer and Shilluk Agwalek ethnic militia. Empowered by President Kiir’s recognition of Olony, armed Shilluk 8 June clashed with Nuer groups in PoC camp, killing over 20, injuring dozens and raising doubts about UN mission’s (UNMISS) ability to protect camp. Meanwhile, Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces mid-June reportedly threatened to blow up only oil pipeline through Sudan if South Sudan does not stop paying transit fees to Sudanese army; move would prevent South Sudan’s oil export through Port Sudan, with catastrophic economic consequences.

Violence persisted in several states. Clashes during cattle raid between Nuer youth of Panyijiar County and Dinka youth of Rumbek Central County 1 June killed eight in Lakes State. Local official said youth from Unity State 3 June killed 19 in cattle-related attack in Tonj North county, Warrap State. Misseriya tribesmen from Sudan’s Kordofan states 10-15 June killed ten in Warn Ayen area of Aweil East County in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state. UNMISS 16 June revealed number of violent incidents targeting civilians Jan-March 2023 grew by 12% compared to same time period in 2022.

Sudan

Conflict between Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and army escalated as mediation efforts failed, with fighting drawing in other armed groups and Darfur witnessing worst violence since civil war.

Fighting intensified in Khartoum and Kordofan states, drawing in rebel group. Army continued aerial bombardment of RSF-controlled areas of capital Khartoum, including residential and commercial neighbourhoods; notably, air attack 17 June killed at least 17. In North Kordofan state, where RSF and army fought over state capital El-Obeid, RSF 3 June reportedly killed over 50 civilians in al-Humaira village. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) 8 June reportedly mobilised in South Kordofan state, raising fears conflict could spread southward. Army 21 June accused SPLM-N of attacking army unit in South Kordofan’s capital Kadugli; SPLM-N and RSF same day reportedly attacked army in al-Dalanj city. In first reported fighting in Blue Nile state, residents 26 June said SPLM-N attacked Kurmuk city.

Ethnic conflict escalated in Darfur. Violence in June killed or displaced thousands in Darfur as conflict took on ethnic dimension involving Arab Rizeigat and non-Arab Masalit tribes. RSF 14 June allegedly killed West Darfur state governor after he accused RSF of genocide. In North Darfur state, fighting 2-3 June reportedly killed over 40 civilians in Kutum town, with renewed clashes reported 22 June in state capital Al Fashir. Clashes 20-25 June reportedly escalated in South Darfur’s state capital Nyala, killing at least 25. Violence risks drawing in other tribal militias including from neighbouring Chad.

Conflict raised risk of state failure. Hostilities led to breakdown of governance, law and order, and economic collapse. Meanwhile, UN agencies 2 June reported increasingly “desperate” situation for civilians as rainy season started, which could complicate relief efforts.

Various mediation tracks struggled to gain traction. U.S. and Saudi Arabia-brokered 72-hour ceasefire 20 Jun broke down; U.S. next day adjourned Jeddah talks, saying format was “not succeeding”. Warring parties 26-27 June announced ceasefires for Eid al-Adha holiday, but fighting continued. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) leaders 12 June met in Djibouti, adopting roadmap for conflict’s resolution; army 15 June opposed Kenya taking lead, jeopardising track. African Union’s late May roadmap for peace failed to make progress. Competing mediation tracks risk hindering efforts to resolve crisis.

Uganda

Uganda suffered deadliest attack in years as Islamist militia launched raid on school near Congolese border, killing dozens.

Deadly attack on school undermined faith in security forces. Armed assailants overnight 16-17 June raided secondary school in Mpondwe town near border with DR Congo, killing at least 44 people, mostly children, and abducting several others. Authorities immediately blamed attack on Islamic State-linked Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) militia based in eastern DR Congo and deployed reinforcements to border area; security forces 18-20 June rescued three kidnapped students and arrested at least 20 people, including school director and head teacher, for alleged collaboration with ADF. As lack of timely intervention despite presence of police and army posts in school’s direct vicinity raised concern, opposition figures including Abdallah Kiwanuka 21 June called for repatriation of Ugandan troops deployed abroad to improve security at home. Meanwhile, after deadly raid on Ugandan contingent of African Union transition mission in Somalia in late May, reports emerged of low troop morale and frustration over ageing equipment and pay gaps.

Random shootings by security personnel continued. Following last month’s spat of gun violence, security guards 4-6 June shot at least three people, leaving one dead and two injured.

In other important developments. After President Museveni late May enacted law punishing homosexuality with death penalty in some cases, rights groups early June urged World Bank to suspend loans to Uganda, and U.S. 16 June announced visa restrictions on individuals “undermining the democratic process” in Uganda.

Zimbabwe

Tensions simmered ahead of general elections scheduled for August as authorities continued to harass opposition and advanced bill curtailing political freedoms.

Opposition protested bill curtailing political freedoms. Both houses of parliament 31 May-7 June passed Criminal Law Code Amendment Bill criminalising “willfully damaging the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe”. In response, main opposition party Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) described bill as “dangerous and unconstitutional”, said it was designed to punish citizens, civil society organisations and political adversaries of ruling ZANU-PF party ahead of general elections due in August. NGO Amnesty International 9 June denounced “disturbing crackdown on Zimbabweans’ rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association”, and called on President Mnangagwa not to sign bill into law.

Authorities continued to stifle dissent. Security forces 2 June detained five CCC activists, including one candidate for upcoming elections, following altercation with suspected ruling ZANU-PF party supporters at voter registration centre in Midlands region; all five remanded in custody next day on various charges including assault. Authorities 12 June charged 39 CCC supporters with political violence for allegedly attacking ZANU-PF office in Nyatsime locality, just south of capital Harare in Mashonaland East region.

Final list of presidential candidates disclosed. Electoral authority 22 June said 11 candidates will run for presidency in August, including Mnangagwa, CCC leader Nelson Chamisa, and exiled former ruling party official Saviour Kasukuwere.

Asia

Afghanistan

Islamic State killed senior Taliban official in north, satellite imagery revealed dramatic reduction in opium production, and UN slashed aid budget amid Taliban’s draconian restrictions on women.

Islamic State’s local branch conducted deadly attacks on Taliban in north. While violence countrywide remained at historic lows, Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) continued to menace Taliban. After two-month hiatus in attacks, ISKP 6 June carried out vehicle-borne IED strike in Badakhshan province (north), killing provincial deputy governor; ISKP suicide attack 8 June struck funeral procession of deputy governor, killing another senior Taliban member. Attacks in Badakhshan indicate ISKP may have capitalised on ethnic grievances and Taliban’s crackdown on Islamists to build network in province. Taliban 3 June reportedly killed senior ISKP commander in unspecified eastern province.

Signs emerged of Taliban’s crackdown on opium production. Private satellite imagery and analysis published 6 June indicated 99% reduction in poppy crops in main opium cultivation areas of country, such as Helmand province (south), leading to projections of 80% decline in national production of drug. If confirmed, it would mark most significant reduction of poppy cultivation in world history. Switch to alternative water-intensive crops, however, could contribute to water shortages and exacerbate disputes with neighbouring countries, while economic status of tens of thousands of labourers who previously relied on poppy cultivation remains unclear.

UN cut aid budget for country and UN rapporteur accused Taliban of “gender apartheid”. UN and humanitarian agencies 5 June revised Afghanistan’s aid plan for 2023 from $4.6bn down to $3.2bn, citing “changing operating context” following Taliban restrictions on female aid workers. UN special rapporteur for Afghanistan mid-June published report accusing Taliban government of “widespread and systematic discrimination” against women and alleging Taliban “may be responsible for gender apartheid”. In annual report, World Bank same day ranked Afghanistan among bottom 11 economies based on laws that affect women’s economic opportunity.

Tensions cooled with Iran. Following water dispute and border escalation in May, Iranian envoy 17 June stated Taliban permitted Iranian experts to visit Kajaki dam, signalling renewed dialogue.

Bangladesh

Tensions persisted between ruling Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), while violence and insecurity continued in Rohingya camps and Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Tensions remained elevated between govt and opposition ahead of 2024 election. BNP 6 June announced sit-ins at electricity offices across country to protest recent power outages. Awami League supporters 8 June attacked BNP members in Pabna city, injuring ten. BNP plans to step up demonstrations in July following Islamic Eid holiday. PM Sheikh Hasina 13 June cautioned her party members that “development and the country will be destroyed” if Awami League loses power. Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami 10 June held large rally in Dhaka – its first political gathering in decade – echoing BNP’s call for caretaker government to oversee election. BNP sec gen 19 June asserted that there would be no elections without caretaker govt; law minister 21 June stated that constitution did not include provisions for caretaker govt. Ahead of city polls in Rajshahi on 21 June that Awami League candidate won by large margin, clashes between rival supporters 18-19 June injured over 30.

Rohingya refugees demanded repatriation as violence in camps persisted. Tens of thousands of Rohingya refugees 8 June attended rally, which may have been backed or instigated by Bangladeshi authorities, in favour of repatriation to Myanmar. UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrew 8 June blamed authorities for using “deceptive and coercive measures” to convince refugees to return. In Cox’s Bazar camps, security forces 11 June arrested member of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) accused of six murders. Security forces 17 June accused ARSA of killing Rohingya leader. Police 19 June stated Rohingya man died following gunfight between ARSA and rival Rohingya Solidarity Organisation.

Chittagong Hill Tracts remained restive. Military 1 June raided Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) camp in Bandarban’s Ruma Upazila, killing soldier, while improvised explosive that army blamed on KNF 16 June killed soldier in Ruma; six soldiers have been killed in region in last six months. Following recent spike in violence, ethnic minority leaders 6 June held rally in Mymensingh to mark 25-year anniversary of peace treaty and to demand its full implementation.

China/Japan

China maintained maritime presence in East China Sea as Japan conducted military exercises with partners and allies.

Military activity intensified in East China Sea. As of 26 June, Japan had spotted 92 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone and detected eight vessels within Japan’s territorial sea. Japan, U.S., Australia and Canada 3 June held three-day joint exercise for first time in East China Sea, which involved five vessels, including Japanese destroyer JS Shiranui. China and Russia 6 June conducted joint aerial patrol over Sea of Japan and East China Sea, marking sixth such joint patrol this year; aircraft reportedly entered South Korea’s air defence identification zone, prompting Japan and South Korea to scramble fighter jets in response. Japan’s military and coast guard 22 June rehearsed joint response to armed attack for first time, in line with new guidelines for cooperation. China 13 June held military exercises in East China Sea.

Chinese President Xi referenced southern Japanese islands. During visit to China National Archives of Publications and Culture, Chinese President Xi 4 June made rare mention of China’s historical connection to Japan’s Ryukyu Islands (located close to Taiwan), which observers suggested could be intended as subtle warning to Japan to roll back its increasingly forward position on Taiwan Strait issue (see Taiwan Strait).

India

Violence and signs of instability continued in Manipur state after deadly escalation in May, while Maoist violence in centre and tensions with China persisted.

Manipur state remained restive. Following ethnic violence that erupted in Manipur state bordering Myanmar in north east in May – which killed at least 98 people, injured over 300 and displaced some 37,000 – insecurity, violence and instability continued across region, albeit at reduced intensity. Notably, improvised explosive device in Bishnupur district 22 June injured three people, while unknown gunmen same day injured two soldiers in Imphal West district. Security forces 23 June intercepted group of militants who fired automatic weapons in Imphal East district. Police 24 June said arsonists torched private property of Manipur minister in Imphal East district and previous day fired tear gas to prevent mob from setting ablaze property in same district belonging to another minister. Army 26 June said women activists accompanying armed rioters were blocking routes used by forces. Shooting 29 June killed two on outskirts of state capital Imphal. Several local organisations called on federal govt to dismiss regional govt, which is run by ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, and impose direct rule. Amid opposition criticism of state and local govt’s handling of crisis, Congress party Rahul Gandhi 29 June commenced two-day visit to region.

Maoist violence persisted. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), security forces 12 June killed Maoist woman in Kanker district; suspected Maoists 20 June killed policeman on leave in Bijapur district, taking Maoist-related police casualties in state to 19 in 2023.

Border crisis continued with China. FM S. Jaishankar 8 June said India and China “are deploying very close to each other, and this proximity can escalate tensions towards violence, as we witnessed in Galwan”.

PM Narendra Modi visited U.S. Modi 21 June commenced three-day state visit to U.S. which notably produced memorandum on joint production of fighter jet engines for Indian aircraft; U.S. and India jointly called on Pakistan “to ensure that no territory under its control is used for launching terrorist attacks”; Pakistan called remarks “unwarranted, one-sided and misleading”. White House 26 June criticised online harassment campaign against U.S. reporter who asked Modi about govt’s human rights record at joint press conference with President Biden.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Tensions persisted between India and Pakistan as insecurity continued in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), which marked five years without elected government.

Hostile rhetoric continued between India and Pakistan. Answering questions about Pakistan at press briefing, Indian FM S. Jaishankar 8 June said India would not tolerate “cross-border terrorism from Pakistan” and “Pakistan knows what it needs to do” to move bilateral relations forward; regarding objections from Pakistan to new map installed at Indian parliament, Jaishankar retorted “We don’t have hope in Pakistan for understanding [this matter]”. Joint statement late June with U.S. following Indian PM Narendra Modi’s state visit called on Pakistan to prevent terrorist attacks (see India). Indian border security forces 5 and 10 June allegedly shot down drones carrying drugs into Punjab province from Pakistan.

Militant attacks and security operations continued J&K. Security forces 1 June shot dead alleged Pakistani intruder in Jammu’s Samba district and next day killed militant in Rajouri district’s forest. Security forces 13 June killed two militants in Kupwara district. Security forces 14 June foiled infiltration attempt in Jammu’s Poonch sector. Security forces 16 June shot dead five alleged foreign militants near Line of Control in Kupwara district and 27 June killed an alleged Al Badr militant in Kulgam district. In major infiltration attempt, security forces 16 June killed five militants allegedly trying to infiltrate Kupwara district. Pakistan 24 June claimed Indian security forces killed two civilians in Sattwal sector along Line of Control. General Officer Commanding of Chinar Corps 1 June said there was no Afghan Taliban infiltration into Kashmir; his remarks addressed concerns about Taliban or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) weaponry left in Afghanistan following Taliban’s takeover in 2021.

J&K marked five years without elected state govt. Region 19 June reached five-year anniversary since state govt was dissolved following collapse of ruling coalition’s majority in state assembly; five years marks longest spell of central rule in J&K since peak of militancy in region in period 1990-96. National Conference party leader Omar Abdullah 19 June wrote, “Democracy ends where J&K begins”, while People’s Democratic Party of Kashmir 20 June called it “death anniversary”.

Korean Peninsula

After failed satellite launch, North Korea fired short-range missiles as U.S. and South Korea concluded major live-fire drills; Pyongyang commemorated Korean War’s start with anti-U.S. rally.

North Korea responded to U.S.-South Korea exercises with missile launches. U.S. and South Korea mid-June concluded fifth and final round of large-scale live-fire drills near border to mark 70th anniversary of alliance, which North Korea responded to 15 June with two short-range ballistic missiles that landed in waters inside Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone; launches came just over two weeks after Pyongyang conducted failed satellite launch. In first visit of its kind in years, nuclear powered submarine USS Michigan 16 June arrived at South Korea’s south-eastern port of Busan. U.S. and South Korea late June held aerial drills involving bombers and fighter jets.

North Korea marked anniversary of Korean War’s outbreak. Some 120,000 people and ruling-party officials 25 June attended major rally at Pyongyang’s May Day Stadium to mark “day of struggle against U.S. imperialism”, otherwise known as anniversary of outbreak of Korean War. As is customary, smaller events were held countrywide. Maintaining 73-year-old illusion that North Korea did not start 1950-53 war, state media directed antipathy toward “U.S. imperialists’ war of aggression” and said country sought “strongest absolute weapon” in order to “punish the U.S. imperialists”.

Pyongyang returned hawkish figure to front-line politics. In signal that it intends to deepen its hard line toward South Korea, North Korea 19 June returned veteran conservative Kim Yong-chol to front-line politics at plenum of ruling Korean Workers’ Party, appointing him alternate member of Politburo and advisor to United Front Department (counterpart of South Korea’s Ministry of Unification); decision to restore infamous Kim, who is believed to have been behind attacks on South Korean targets in 2010 that arguably brought peninsula to brink of war, follows South Korea’s decision in May to appoint hardliner general to presidential committee charged with reforming military.

Myanmar

Deadly hostilities between military and resistance forces continued countrywide, regime curtailed relief operations following cyclone and Thailand sought high-level engagement with regime.

Countrywide clashes continued between military and ethnic armed groups. In Sagaing region (north west), military 4 June raided People’s Defence Forces (PDF) camp in Budalin township and allegedly executed three detained fighters. Regime forces 5 June used 18 people from nine villages in Kawlin township as human shields, leaving at least nine dead. Around 80 soldiers 7 June raided PDF camp in Monywa township. Three resistance groups 9 June raided police station in Salingyi township, claiming to have killed eleven officers. After fighting escalated between regime and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in May, KNLA and resistance forces 1 June staged attack on bridge in Thaton township linking Mon and Kayin states, reportedly inflicting heavy casualties. In Bago region (south east), KNLA and allies 6 June destroyed major bridge in Kyaukkyi township. Assailants 7 June shot dead army major and village administrator in Kyauktaga township. Meanwhile, conflict intensified in Chin state (north west) as regime forces sought to clear resistance groups from strategic locations.

Regime pursued peace talks with select armed groups. Regime peace negotiators 1-2 June met representatives of three ethnic armed groups (Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army - MNDAA, which collectively make up Three Brothers Alliance) for first time since coup, with Chinese facilitation; no concrete progress was made and fighting erupted in Laukkaing townships with MNDAA during talks.

Junta closely controlled relief following Cyclone. Amid aftermath of 14 May cyclone that was strongest ever to make landfall on Myanmar coast, regime 8 June rejected UN aid distribution plan and rescinded existing travel authorisations; acting UN resident coordinator 12 June described restrictions as “devastating setback”. Consequently, only small amount of aid reached 1.6m affected people.

Thailand sought to boost engagement with junta. Thai FM 19 June hosted meeting of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) FMs with ultimate aim to “fully re-engage Myanmar at the leaders’ level”, to which only Myanmar and Laos sent respective FMs; ASEAN chair Indonesia criticised Thai initiative, reflecting lack of consensus within regional bloc.

Pakistan

Crackdown on former PM Imran Khan’s party deepened Khan’s isolation, insecurity persisted in provinces bordering Afghanistan and govt secured international funding amid debt default fears.

Military-led crackdown intensified on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). After large numbers of senior PTI leaders exited party following 9 May street unrest and authorities continued to detain many others, several journalists deemed sympathetic to PTI were disappeared during month, while others were detained and charged with crimes such as sedition and mutiny against state. Military 7 June called for “noose of law” to be tightened for masterminds of “politically driven rebellion”, and reiterated intention to try civilians in military courts. Supreme Court 22 June began hearing several petitions challenging military trials of civilians. .Military spokesman 26 June announced dismissal of at least three senior officers, including lieutenant general, and disciplinary action against 15 other officers, including three major generals, for failure to protect military installations on 9 May. Khan’s isolation deepened as he faced charges that could result in disqualification from public office and his former close confidant 8 June launched Istekham-i-Pakistan Party with backing of almost 100 former PTI leaders, in likely bid to damage PTI’s electoral chances ahead of polls.

Security operations and militant attacks continued in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. Pakistani Taliban 8 June claimed killing of two police constables in Swat district’s Mingora city. Militants same day killed police constable in Lakki Marwat district. Gun battle in North Waziristan district 9-10 June killed three soldiers. Security forces 28 June killed three Islamic State militants in Bajur district. In Balochistan province, militant attack along border with Iran 1 June killed two soldiers; Baluch Liberation Army suicide bomber 24 June killed police officer in Turbat city.

Govt secured International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal. PM Shehbaz Sharif 9 June presented 2023-24 budget to parliament providing tax exemptions for several sectors, including IT and agriculture. Moody’s Investor Services 14 June warned that Pakistan could fail to revive IMF program by looming expiration on 30 June, heightening risks of sovereign default. In effort to secure “standby arrangement” with IMF, govt removed subsidies and tax exemptions and reduced expenditures with revised budget passed by parliament on 25 June. IMF 30 June announced staff- level agreement with govt for $3bn fund.

Philippines

Clashes in south continued between security forces and Islamist militants amid intra-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighting, while military battled communist rebels.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In Basilian province, security forces 6 June rescued Indonesian child from custody of Abu Sayyaf Group commander in Sumisip municipality; army 7 June killed two Abu Sayyaf fighters in Sumisip hinterlands. Military and unnamed armed group 18 June skirmished in Ungkaya Pukan town. In Marawi city, joint police-military operation 14 June killed Abu Zakaria, Islamic State’s emir in Philippines and leader of remnants of Maute Group – local branch of Islamic State-inspired militants in Lanao region. Ambush same day killed two police officers in Shariff Aguak town, Maguindanao del Sur province, which authorities blamed on Islamic State-linked militants. Elsewhere in Maguindanao del Sur, police-military raid 18 June killed seven persons in Datu Paglas town in operation aimed at members of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters; MILF claimed victims were its members. Members of MILF’s 105 and 118 Base Commands 20 June clashed in Datu Saudi town, marking fourth such round of fighting between groups this year. Militant surrenders continued: notably, in Sulu province, member of Abu Sayyaf and Egyptian militant 13 June surrendered.

Deadly clashes continued between military and communist rebels. Military operations and militant ambushes by communist New People’s Army in Mindanao in south and Visayas Islands in centre killed at least 13 combatants and civilians and injured four during June.

South China Sea

Claimant states and interested parties conducted range of military exercises.

Military activity in region occurred at high intensity. Indonesia 5-7 June held multilateral naval exercises off South Sulawesi involving 36 nations, including both U.S. and China. Vietnam 8 June demanded Taiwan cancel live-fire drills near Taiwan-occupied Itu Aba Island, citing direct violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty over Spratly archipelago. U.S., Japan, France and Canada 9 June concluded integrated sea exercises near Philippine Sea; in response, China reportedly deployed reconnaissance aircraft to monitor activities. Chinese naval ship Qi Jiguang 14 June arrived in Philippine capital Manila for four-day good-will visit. Japan, U.S. and Philippines 16 June announced plans to stage regular joint exercises in South and East China Seas, aiming to produce formal strategy document by end of year; Japan also reaffirmed support to enhance Philippines’ military capabilities through official security assistance announced in April. U.S. aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan 25-30 June docked at Vietnam’s port city of Danang, in third such visit by U.S. carrier since 1975.

In other important developments. Malaysia and Philippines 13 June signed agreements to end 18-year maritime border disputes in parts of Straits of Malacca and Sulawesi Sea. Philippine and Indian FMs 29 June urged China to abide by international law in South China Sea, most notably including 2016 ruling at Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which found that China’s declared “nine-dash line” has no legal basis.

Sri Lanka

Tentative signs emerged of economic improvement, UN Human Rights Council reviewed govt’s accountability progress, and tensions surfaced in Tamil-majority Northern Province.

Economic and humanitarian suffering eased slightly. Figures late month showed inflation in June fell to 12% from 25.2% in April. With rupee’s value rising, Central Bank 1 June cut interest rates by 2.5%. UN and World Food Programme assessed that number of citizens who were “moderately acute food insecure” fell from 6.2m to 3.9m. Following brief visit, International Monetary Fund deputy managing director 2 June announced “economic recovery remains challenging” notwithstanding “tentative signs of improvement”. World Bank 28 June approved $700mn in budgetary and welfare support. Main opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) 29 June announced it would vote against the govt's proposals for domestic debt restructuring, made public same day.

Human Rights Council continued accountability oversight as govt pledged further progress. In oral update to 53rd session of UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR) on 21 June, Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif called on authorities to “directly acknowledge past violations and undertake credible investigations and prosecutions, alongside other accountability measures”, with “the international community play[ing] a complementary role”. Ahead of meeting, President Wickremesinghe 8 June reviewed “progress of initiatives” on govt’s “Reconciliation Action Plan”. Justice Minister 18 June signalled Truth and Reconciliation Commission draft will be circulated in July. Eight prominent international human rights and rule of law NGOs 16 June strongly criticised “ongoing violations of fair trial rights” of lawyer and human rights defender Hejaaz Hizbullah, who was arrested in 2020 under Prevention of Terrorism Act.

Inter-communal tensions rose in Tamil-majority Northern Province. Tensions rose to dangerous levels over disputed area in Northern Province where Buddhist stupa – known as Kurundi Vihara – has recently been built with military assistance and against court orders, reportedly blocking access to long-standing Hindu pilgrimage site. Prominent Buddhist nationalist organisations 21 June gathered “in defence of” Kurundi Vihara. Police 7 June arrested Tamil legislator and Tamil National People’s Front Leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam at his Colombo residence on charges of “obstructing police duties” following altercation on 2 June with plainclothes police in Jaffna, in Northern Province.

Taiwan Strait

China maintained military activities around Taiwan amid near-collision incident with U.S. and Canadian ships, while U.S. ruled out Taiwan independence during high-level talks in Beijing.

China continued aerial and maritime activities. As of 27 June, Taiwan had spotted 298 Chinese military aircraft entering its air defence identification zone (ADIZ), of which at least 84 either crossed unofficial “median line” or were detected in south- western ADIZ; notably, Taiwan 8 June detected 37 Chinese planes in its ADIZ, one day after China conducted joint air patrols with Russia in Sea of Japan and East China Sea (see China/Japan); 11 Chinese aircraft 30 June crossed median line as U.S. congressional delegation visited capital Taipei. Taiwan sighted 138 Chinese naval vessels in surrounding waters; Chinese aircraft carrier group led by Shandong 21 June transited strait. In worrying incident, as Canadian HCMS Montreal and USS Chung-Hoon 3 June conducted joint “freedom of navigation” transit through Taiwan Strait, Chinese warship made course to cut across bow of USS Chung-Hoon, risking collision; Montreal’s commander called move unprofessional, while Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu said move aimed to prevent operations being used “to exercise hegemony of navigation”.

U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken visited China and discussed Taiwan. In first visit by U.S. sec of state to China in five years and becoming highest-ranking Biden administration official to visit, Blinken 18-19 June met with China’s FM Qin Gang, State Councillor Wang Yi and President Xi Jinping; U.S. called talks “candid, substantive and constructive” as Blinken assured his Chinese counterpart that U.S. does not support Taiwan’s independence, while China urged U.S. to fulfil its promise. Taiwan and U.S. 1 June signed initial agreement under U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade. U.S. House Armed Services Committee 14 June said it is exploring possibility of joint weapons production with Taiwan.

China hosted annual non-political conference. Beijing 16 June held 15th Straits Forum in Fujian province, which saw participation of 5,000 people from various backgrounds, including Andrew Hsia, vice chairman of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang party; in letter to forum, President Xi urged people from both sides of Taiwan Strait to work together to “safeguard the overall interests of the Chinese nation”.

Thailand

Election winner Move Forward Party faced legal and political hurdles in quest to form govt, while deadly attacks continued in deep south amid controversial student-led independence vote.

Move Forward leader battled for political survival. Following general election in May, uncertainty shrouded process for election-winning Move Forward Party and its leader Pita Limjareonrat to form new govt amid investigations into Pita by Election Commission and senate. Election Commission 9 June tossed out petition lodged 10 May by Palang Pracharath Party member alleging Pita was ineligible to run in election because he owned shares in media company, but announced it would investigate further; if convicted, Pita could face up to ten years in jail and 20-year ban from politics. Pita 6 June declared he had earlier transferred shares in defunct media company. Senate 23 June announced investigation of Pita’s assets. Aside from legal complications, Move Forward and its eight-party coalition, which command 312 seats, face political challenge of securing 376 seats in joint sitting with 250- member senate to form govt; election commission 19 June endorsed all 500 newly elected MPs, paving way for first session of new parliament in early July.

In deep south, violence continued as student group held independence referendum. In Pattani province, IED attack 5 June wounded one army officer and civilian in Saiburi district; militants 10 June killed police officer in Khok Po district; militants 17 June assaulted police base in Muang district; IED attack 21 June wounded three defence volunteers and soldier in Raman district. In Narathiwat province, gunmen 17 June ambushed four villages in Chanae district, killing one. In Yala province, IED attack 15 June wounded four police officers and civilian in Raman district. Meanwhile, student group at Prince of Songkla University in Pattani province 7 June simulated referendum on Pattani independence during seminar that included two speakers from Move Forward’s coalition. National Security Council secretary general 9 June informed PM Prayuth Chan-ocha about event and announced investigation, describing call for public referendum as “illegal”. Commander of Fourth Army Area 12 June called proposal for referendum unconstitutional and threat to nation’s territorial integrity.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Yerevan continued high-level talks with Baku, as exchanges of fire along border and in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) caused injuries.

Leaders reached impasse during talks in Moldova, FMs met in Washington. PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev 1 June held meeting with European Council President Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Moldova’s capital Chişinău; participants agreed to attend follow-up meeting in Brussels on 21 July but achieved little else. During meeting with members of Armenian community in Moldova, Pashinyan 1 June indicated willingness for an enclave exchange on condition sides use mutually agreed-upon map to draw border. U.S. 27-29 June hosted fresh negotiations between FMs of both Azerbaijan and Armenia, with U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 29 June saying sides made “further progress” toward peace agreement but that “hard work” remains to be done.

Clashes with Azerbaijan continued along border and in NK. Armenia 14 June claimed Azerbaijani gunfire injured two Indian nationals in Yeraskh village in Ararat region on border; Azerbaijan same day denied accusation and blamed Armenian troops for “intensive fire” in Sadarak district of Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave on 13-14 June. In NK, Azerbaijan 15 June claimed gunfire from Armenian territory injured soldier in Lachin corridor connecting NK with Armenia, prompting Baku to tighten its blockade of corridor (see Nagorno-Karabakh); Armenia claimed one of its soldiers was injured when Azerbaijani forces sought to advance into its territory.

In other important developments. Pashinyan 3 June visited Turkish capital Ankara to attend inauguration ceremony of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, marking first visit to Türkiye by Armenian leader in over decade; leaders 28 June called for “confidence-building measures” to continue during phone call. After EU 21 June approved 11th sanctions package against Russia, Deputy FM Mnatsakan Safaryan same day expressed concern, claiming sanctions “make it unbearable for Armenia economy-wise and security-wise”.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Azerbaijan’s blockade of Lachin corridor continued to fuel tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) as sides exchanged fire across territory.

Tensions ran high amid Baku’s restrictions along Lachin corridor. Russian Foreign Ministry 14 June urged Azerbaijan to “completely unblock” Lachin corridor connecting NK to Armenia and “not to hold Karabakh’s population hostage”. Azerbaijan 15 June reported injury of solider at its border checkpoint on Lachin road after shots were allegedly fired from Armenian territory; Armenia same day reported injury of its soldier in same incident, alleging Azerbaijanis sought to advance into Armenian territory to plant flag. Following incident, Azerbaijan closed all traffic on Lachin road; de facto NK authorities 16 June accused Azerbaijan of fully shutting corridor for food and medical supplies, including for “all humanitarian transport”, while International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) same day confirmed inability to pass with medical patients. EU 23 June said “near total blockage” of corridor “directly threatens the livelihoods of the local population”. Azerbaijan 25 June restored passage through Lachin checkpoint, allowing ICRC to go into Armenia with 31 patients. Reopening came days ahead of scheduled talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Washington. Risk of military escalation remains elevated notwithstanding dialogue (see Armenia and Azerbaijan).

Azerbaijani and de facto armed forces exchanged fire. Azerbaijan reported several clashes in NK during June, including in Fuzuli, Agdam, Shusha and Khojaly regions, and accused “illegal Armenian armed detachments” (military forces reporting to de facto NK authorities) of seeking to construct fortifications. De facto NK authorities 22 June reported an injury from clashes in Martakert region and rejected accusations of building fortifications. Azerbaijan 27 June accused de facto NK authorities of “wounding” one soldier; Armenia and de facto NK authorities next day returned accusation, alleging Baku’s forces killed four de facto NK soldiers near Martakert region. De facto NK parliament same day called on Armenia to cease Washington dialogue, but negotiations continued.

Azerbaijan

Baku continued high-level talks with Yerevan, as exchanges of fire along border and in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) caused injuries.

Leaders reached impasse during talks in Moldova, FMs met in Washington. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan and President Aliyev 1 June held meeting with European Council President Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Moldova’s capital Chişinău; participants agreed to attend follow-up meeting in Brussels on 21 July but achieved little else. During meeting with members of Armenian community in Moldova, Pashinyan 1 June indicated willingness for an enclave exchange on condition sides use mutually agreed-upon map to draw border. U.S. 27-29 June hosted fresh negotiations between FMs of both Azerbaijan and Armenia, with U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 29 June saying sides made “further progress” toward peace agreement but that “hard work” remains to be done.

Clashes with Armenia continued along border and in NK. Armenia 14 June claimed Azerbaijani gunfire injured two Indian nationals in Yeraskh village in Armenia’s Ararat region on border; Azerbaijan same day denied accusation and blamed Armenian troops for “intensive fire” in Sadarak district of Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave on 13-14 June. In NK, Azerbaijan 15 June claimed gunfire from Armenian territory injured soldier on Lachin corridor connecting NK with Armenia, prompting Baku to tighten its blockade of corridor (see Nagorno-Karabakh); Armenia claimed one of its soldiers was injured when Azerbaijani forces sought to advance into its territory.

In another important development. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 13 June visited Azerbaijan to discuss further military and political cooperation, as well as to express readiness to open Turkish general consulate in Shusha city, reclaimed by Baku in 2020 war.

Belarus

Authorities continued to stifle dissent, Russian nuclear weapons started arriving, and prospect of Wagner presence in Belarus following mutiny prompted concern among its western neighbours.

Repression of independent media and opposition continued. Vyasna Human Rights Centre 2 June reported court had sentenced union activist Alyaksandr Kandratsyuk to over three years in prison for insulting President Lukashenka, discrediting country and inciting hatred. Court 6 June sentenced activist Yana Pinchuk to 12 years in prison on multiple charges, including creating extremist group. Police 12 June arrested eight journalists in south-eastern Svetlahorsk city on extremism charges. Court in Minsk 21 June sentenced 15 people to between two and 21 years in prison; sentenced three others in absentia. Other trials continued amid clampdown.

First deployment of Russian nuclear weapons arrived in Belarus. Following Russia’s March announcement to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, Lukashenka 13 June declared country had already received some, which Russian President Vladimir Putin 16 June confirmed, adding that deployment would be completed by end of summer.

Prospect of Wagner exiles in Belarus raised fears among western neighbours. Moscow 24 June announced Lukashenka had brokered talks to end short-lived mutiny in Russia launched by paramilitary Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin (see Russia), who Lukashenka 27 June confirmed was in Belarus. Putin 26 June said Wagner mercenaries can either go to Belarus or sign contract with Ministry of Defence, raising fears among Belarus’ western neighbours of possible Wagner “infiltration” into their countries. Reports 26 June claimed base, which would accommodate up to 8,000 Wagner troops, was already under construction in Mogilev region. Polish officials 28 June announced plans to strengthen eastern border, deputy Polish FM 29 June said Poland “expects” EU to help fund these measures.

Bosnia And Herzegovina

Lawmakers in Republika Srpska voted to reject state-level court rulings amid growing fears of secession.

Bosnian Serb lawmakers voted to reject top court rulings. National Assembly of self-governing entity Republika Srpska (RS) 27 June voted to suspend rulings by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional court. Serb leader Milorad Dodik, who had long threatened to withdraw from state institutions, 23 June initiated vote after court 19 June changed rules to allow it to convene sessions and make decisions without judges from RS (same rules apply for Bosniak or Croat judges), a move Dodik dismissed as “unconstitutional”. National Assembly’s decision prompted widespread condemnation amid fears RS is moving toward secession. Notably, House of Representatives Speaker Denis Zvizdic 27 June called decision “a direct attack” on constitution and “the beginning of secession”; other govts, notably U.S., same day denounced “reckless attack on the Dayton Peace Agreement”, while EU 28 June said decision is “without legal basis” and marks “clear departure from the expectations that accompanied the granting of EU candidate status”.

RS National Assembly voted to no longer recognise rulings of high representative. RS lawmakers 21 June amended laws allowing entity to no longer recognise decisions made by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s High Representative, Christian Schmidt, international overseer who enjoys broad powers over local authorities. Schmidt 19 June had warned them not to take such measures, saying “they will be sailing in heavy waters”.

Cyprus

Republic of Cyprus continued push to reignite reunification talks with European Union (EU) involvement, while Turkish President Erdoğan reiterated support for two states.

Greek Cypriot leaders sought return to 2017 dialogue, as Türkiye reiterated position. Republic of Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides 7 June expressed readiness to meet with “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) leader Ersin Tatar “even tomorrow” to discuss reunification talks. President of House of Representatives in Republic of Cyprus Annita Demetriou 13 June underscored “the Greek Cypriot side will continue to exert every effort for the resumption of negotiations from where they stopped in Crans Montana [in 2017]”. During his first foreign trip following his re-election, Erdoğan 12 June met Tatar in “TRNC” and reiterated support for two-state solution, adding “Cyprus does not have another 50 years to lose” and urging international community to recognise “TRNC”. In his address to EU parliament next day, Christodoulides continued efforts to involve EU and asserted “EU has every interest and obligation to actively contribute to the final settlement of the Cyprus problem”. European Council 25 June pledged to continue to have “active role” in supporting peace process; Republic of Cyprus FM Constantinos Kombos welcomed inclusion of reference. UN Special Representative Colin Stewart 26 June met Tatar, describing “positive exchange of opinions”.

In other important developments. Spain and Poland suspended their participation on first day of 5-16 June military exercises with Türkiye and “TRNC”-dubbed Anatolian Phoenix naval drills following protest by Republic of Cyprus. News on social media 7 June reported Greek Cypriot man had allegedly attacked Turkish Cypriot woman in holiday resort Ayia Napa in Republic of Cyprus; “TRNC” 5 June denounced “racist attack” and called for justice.

Georgia

UN General Assembly adopted Georgia’s resolution on rights of internally displaced people and refugees from breakaway regions, while EU welcomed govt’s positive political steps.

Georgia won overwhelming support for UN resolution on breakaway regions. In notable triumph for Georgian diplomacy that underscored Moscow’s growing isolation on global stage, Georgia 8 June secured support of 100 countries for UN General Assembly resolution that, while not legally binding, asserts rights of internally displaced persons and refugees from breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to their homes, emphasising importance of protecting their property rights and condemning any instances of “forced demographic changes”; similar vote in 2008 had secured only 14 votes in favour. Russia, which 8 June said resolution undermined “normalisation in the region”, voted against it alongside nine other states, including Belarus, Syria and Nicaragua; Russian-backed de facto authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 15 June claimed resolution was “another act of repeated political farce”.

Govt took steps aligned with EU accession path. PM Garibashvili 21 June announced he had “clearly confirmed” to European and U.S. partners that ruling Georgian Dream party would not renew attempts to adopt foreign influence bill, which triggered widespread domestic opposition and tensions with Western countries in March. EU 22 June welcomed announcement; it also praised Georgian Dream’s 21 June decision not to pass controversial de-oligarchisation law, and 22 June pardoning of former minister Nika Gvaramia, whom authorities had accused of abuse of power.

Kosovo

Tensions continued to spiral in Serb-majority northern municipalities as European Union (EU) and U.S. ratcheted up pressure on Pristina and Belgrade to defuse situation.

Situation deteriorated further in northern Kosovo. Following protests late May in four northern Serb-majority municipalities, which broke out after authorities seized municipal buildings and installed newly elected ethnic Albanian mayors, protests and violent clashes continued. Notably, Kosovo Serbs 13 June targeted police with stones following arrest of an individual accused of organising attack on NATO forces 29 May. Month also saw increase in explosions and other attacks, primarily targeting govt institutions: notably, two bombs 19 June exploded near police station in Zvečan town. Meanwhile, PM Kurti 14 June announced Serbian armed forces had detained three Kosovo police officers, fuelling tensions further, though Serbia 26 June released them. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 23 June expressed alarm at reports of extrajudicial arrests of Kosovo Serbs and subsequent “heavy rhetoric from Serbia”, warning escalation is “becoming dangerous”.

Month saw flurry of EU and U.S. diplomatic activity aimed at defusing tensions. International actors urged de-escalation between Kosovo and Serbia, with particular pressure exerted on Pristina to suspend police operations in north and have mayors temporarily perform duties “in premises out of the municipal buildings”. EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák and U.S. Special Envoy Gabriel Escobar 5 June also reiterated calls for fresh polls to elect new mayors in northern municipalities during talks with Kurti, who 12 June sent Borrell five-point plan to calm tensions. Borrell 14 June warned Kurti’s plan had failed to address “key elements that triggered the current crisis”, 22 June hosted series of crisis management meetings with Serb President Aleksandar Vučić and Kurti, without immediate breakthrough. EU 28 June warned Kosovo it is preparing number of punitive measures, which are “temporary and reversible” if sufficient steps are taken to de-escalate situation; Kurti 29 June announced willingness to “decrease Kosova Police presence” and “organise early elections”.

Kyrgyzstan

Human rights group warned draft law on “foreign representatives” threatened civic space; EU and Central Asian leaders sought to strengthen regional cooperation.

Draft law on “foreign representatives” raised concerns. NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) 9 June called on parliament to reject “highly repressive draft law”, which would require organisations to register as “foreign representatives” if they receive funding from abroad and engage in political activity. Noting similarities to Russia’s controversial 2012 “foreign agents” law, HRW warned law “could have a chilling effect on the country’s civil society”.

High-level EU-Central Asia meeting took place in Kyrgyzstan. Following China-Central Asia summit late May, European Council President Charles Michel 2 June gathered with Kazakh, Kyrgz, Tajik and Uzbek leaders, alongside representative from Turkmenistan, in Kyrgz town of Cholpon-Ata for high-level meeting. In joint press communiqué, leaders reaffirmed importance of deepening ties and used opportunity to express “continued commitment to uphold the UN Charter, particularly the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty [and] territorial integrity of all countries”; they also discussed climate change, emphasising need to continue dialogue on “open water-energy cooperation in Central Asia”.

Moldova

Court dissolved opposition Shor Party, which spearheaded months of anti-govt protests.

Constitutional Court of Moldova 19 June declared “unconstitutional” opposition Shor Party, which pro-EU govt had accused of illegal funding and destabilising activities in favour of, and with support of, Russia. Court ruled party “was acting contrary to the principles of the rule of law and posed a threat to the sovereignty and independence of the country”. Party’s exiled leader Ilan Shor 26 June announced new political bloc to replace Shor.

Russia (Internal)

In most serious challenge ever to Putin’s grip on power, Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin spearheaded insurrection, advancing within 200km of capital before abruptly aborting mission.

Wagner leader left Russia after short-lived mutiny rocked country. Amid months of escalating tensions between military leaders and head of paramilitary Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin, most recently over attempts to bring Wagner forces under military command structure, Prigozhin 23 June claimed defence ministry had killed around 30 Wagner fighters at a camp in Ukraine and vowed to topple military leadership. In dramatic escalation that raised questions about stability of Putin’s rule, Wagner forces 23-24 June entered southern Rostov-on-Don city, seizing control of key sites before advancing toward capital Moscow in armoured convoys, passing through Voronezh city. Putin 24 June decried Prigozhin’s “betrayal” and vowed to punish those involved as Wagner mercenaries shot down six helicopters and military airplane, killing 13. As Prigozhin’s forces entered Moscow region, he abruptly called off rebellion and reportedly went into exile following negotiations allegedly brokered by Belarussian leader Aleksandr Lukashenka (see Belarus). Kremlin same day said it would not prosecute Wagner members or Prigozhin; Putin 26 June said Wagner mercenaries can either go to Belarus or sign contract with Ministry of Defence.

Attacks on Belgorod persisted. Ukrainian shelling and attacks by Ukraine-aligned Russian combatants continued to target southern Belgorod region. Notably, combatants 1 June shelled Shebekinsky town, prompting evacuations from there and other vulnerable districts. Putin 13 June suggested he could order troops to seize more land in Ukraine to create “sanitary zone” protecting Russia from attack. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu 20 June accused Kyiv of plans to strike Russia with U.S.-made HIMARS and UK-made Storm Shadow Missiles, warning this would be considered “full-fledged [Western] involvement” and promising “retaliation”. Meanwhile, Putin 16 June announced first tactical nuclear weapons had arrived in Belarus (see Belarus).

Crackdown on dissent continued. Anti-war activist Anatoly Berezikov 14 June died in detention centre in Rostov-on-Don; his lawyer hinted death could be result of torture. Trial against imprisoned opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who faces extremism charges, 19 June began behind closed doors. Authorities 21, 28 June declared World Wildlife Fund and news outlet Novaya Gazeta Europa, respectively, “undesirable”.

Tajikistan

EU and Central Asian leaders sought to strengthen regional cooperation.

Following China-Central Asia summit late May, European Council President Charles Michel 2 June gathered with Kazakh, Kyrgz, Tajik and Uzbek leaders, alongside representative from Turkmenistan, in Kyrgz town of Cholpon-Ata for high-level meeting. In joint press communiqué, leaders reaffirmed importance of deepening ties and used opportunity to express “continued commitment to uphold the UN Charter, particularly the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty [and] territorial integrity of all countries”; they also discussed climate change, emphasising need to continue dialogue on “open water-energy cooperation in Central Asia”.

Türkiye

Hostilities intensified most notably in Syria after Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) ended four-month unilateral ceasefire, raising spectre of further escalation.

Attacks rose between Türkiye and PKK and its affiliates. PKK 10 June terminated unilateral ceasefire announced in Feb following devastating earthquakes, citing ongoing Turkish operations against group’s members in northern Syria and northern Iraq. Following termination, rate of violence increased, particularly in northern Syria, with risks of further escalation looming (see Syria and Iraq). Notably, PKK-linked People’s Defence Units (YPG) 12 June allegedly launched cross-border rocket attacks into Türkiye’s Kilis province from Syria; in response, Turkish forces next day struck YPG positions. Amid attacks on Turkish bases in Syria, Turkish forces 14 June struck Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian regime positions in Tel Rifaat and Manbij areas, killing at least eight Syrian soldiers, over dozen SDF/YPG fighters and several civilians. In northern Iraq, PKK blamed Türkiye for killing of PKK member in Sulaymaniyah 9 June; IED explosion 12 June killed two Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq.

Security forces continued crackdown on Islamic State (ISIS). Turkish security forces during June detained at least 90 individuals with alleged links to ISIS. Notably, security forces in Istanbul 10 June detained former Mosul “judge” of group, and 23 June arrested foreign national allegedly plotting attack on Turkish soil.

Ties with Greece remained on even keel. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 7 June said he will work to settle outstanding disputes, including Aegean maritime zones, with President Erdoğan; Mitsotakis 13 June clarified discussion on demilitarised status of eastern Aegean islands was out of question. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler 15 June met Greek counterpart on sidelines of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conference; Erdogan and Mitsotakis will meet on the sidelines of NATO summit in July. After boat carrying migrants 14 June capsized near Greek island Morea, killing at least 79 with hundreds missing, Ankara 16 June called for “fair burden sharing” in refugee problem.

In other important developments. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan 3 June attended Erdoğan’s inauguration ceremony in capital Ankara. Erdoğan 15 June called for new “civilian constitution”. Sweden and Ankara held talks on former’s NATO membership bid; Sweden 1 June formally promulgated revised terrorism laws.

Ukraine

Collapse of Kakhovka dam killed dozens, displaced thousands and raised fears of lasting ecological damage; Kyiv launched long-awaited counteroffensive, achieving modest gains as hostilities escalated.

Dam in Kherson collapsed, causing humanitarian and ecological crisis. Nova Kakhovka dam in Kherson region 6 June collapsed, causing catastrophic flooding on lower reaches of Dnipro River, whose right bank Ukraine controls and whose left bank Russia controls. Reservoir upstream from dam largely emptied. Kyiv and Moscow traded blame for incident, with Ukraine’s envoy to UN 6 June claiming it was “impossible to blow [dam] up from the outside by shelling”; media outlet The New York Times 16 June suggested large detonation from within Russian-controlled dam caused collapse. Flood killed at least 52 people, displaced tens of thousands and destroyed homes and farmland. Dam’s destruction will likely have lasting ecological consequences, including water contamination and destruction of irrigation systems, and will affect safety of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

Ukrainian counteroffensive advanced slowly but steadily. Ukraine’s long-anticipated counteroffensive began early June without announcement as its forces shifted from deep strikes into Russian rear to probing attacks on Russian fortifications in east and south. President Zelenskyy 10 June confirmed offensive had begun, while military same day published footage of its soldiers in two liberated settlements on boundary between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, where Ukrainian forces subsequently liberated six more villages. Ukrainian forces 19 June confirmed liberation of Piatykhatky village (Zaporizhzhia), 26 June captured Rivnopil village and gained ground around Bakhmut city (Donetsk). Fighting likely to intensify in coming weeks, with risk of high casualties, as Ukrainian forces advance toward Russia’s main defence lines. Russian airstrikes continued, notably killing 12 at restaurant in Kramatorsk city 27 June.

Kyiv and Moscow showed little interest in African peace plan. Delegation of leaders from seven African countries led by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa 16 June visited Ukraine, presenting ten-point peace plan. Zelenskyy later said launching talks “while the occupier is on our land is to freeze the war [and to] freeze pain and suffering”. Delegation 17 June travelled to Russia, where President Putin portrayed their propositions as misguided.

Uzbekistan

Legal proceedings over Karakalpakstan unrest continued; EU and Central Asian leaders sought to strengthen regional cooperation.

Supreme Court upheld lengthy prison term for Karakalpak activist. Supreme Court 6 June rejected leading Karakalpak activist’s appeal of 16-year prison sentence for role in July 2022 protests in autonomous Karakalpak region, during which 21 people were killed. Court gave 14 other defendants reduced sentences or suspended prison terms.

High-level EU-Central Asia meeting took place in Kyrgyzstan. Following China-Central Asia summit late May, European Council President Charles Michel 2 June gathered with Kazakh, Kyrgz, Tajik and Uzbek leaders, alongside representative from Turkmenistan, in Kyrgz town of Cholpon-Ata for high-level meeting. In joint press communiqué, leaders reaffirmed importance of deepening ties and used opportunity to express “continued commitment to uphold the UN Charter, particularly the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty [and] territorial integrity of all countries”; they also discussed climate change, emphasising need to continue dialogue on “open water-energy cooperation in Central Asia”.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Govt and National Liberation Army (ELN) signed ceasefire agreement, FARC dissident violence persisted, and political scandal rocked Petro’s administration.

Govt and ELN struck ceasefire agreement. Govt and ELN negotiators 9 June announced ceasefire agreement, which will take hold gradually over two-month period and then last for 180 days, with 3 Aug intended start date. Sides will discuss accord with respective forces until 6 July, and then conduct further bilateral talks to clarify ceasefire conditions until Aug implementation. Protocols announced so far include commitments to uphold humanitarian law, end offensive and intelligence operations on both sides, and ban attempts to demobilise ELN. Agreement marked important advance in President Petro’s “total peace” efforts and, if successful, will be longest bilateral ceasefire ever concluded with guerrilla group. Deal remains fragile, however, with disputes emerging around prohibitions on kidnapping and extortion.

Armed group violence continued to plague communities. Joint military and indigenous guard team 9 June found four children lost for 40 days in jungle following plane crash; reports suggested children were fleeing forced recruitment by dissident faction of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor, though group 14 June denied allegation. Estado Mayor stepped up intimidation of political leaders ahead of Oct local elections, 18 June releasing pamphlet threatening mayor of Tulúa, Valle de Cauca department (west); issue raised concern about freedom of campaign for local election, which formally began 29 June. Meanwhile, clashes between ELN and Gulf Clan starting early June displaced well over 100 families and confined 800 more in Chocó department (north west).

Petro removed two key allies embroiled in political scandal. President Petro 2 June removed two of his closest allies, Ambassador to Venezuela Armando Benedetti and Chief of Staff Laura Sarabia, from govt after right-wing magazine Semana published reports accusing both of ordering illegal polygraph of domestic worker and wiretapping; in days following, leaked audio messages appeared to show Benedetti discussing irregular financing during presidential campaign. Crisis galvanised opposition to govt and will likely weaken its support in congress, which 5 June halted debates of proposed social reforms to allow investigation into allegations. Benedetti was reinstated as ambassador 23 June until 19 July.

El Salvador

President Bukele slashed size of Congress and number of municipalities, raising fears govt is consolidating power ahead of 2024 polls; authorities put pressure on former officials accused of corruption.

Govt enacted number of administrative-political reforms. During State of the Union address on 1 June, President Bukele announced reorganisation of govt: reduction of municipalities from 262 to 44; reduction of legislative assembly from 84 seats to 60; and “war on corruption”. Following speech, govt 7 June passed law slimming Congress down to 60 deputies, 14 June reduced number of municipalities to 44. Opposition politicians warned move concentrates power in hands of ruling party Nuevas Ideas ahead of Feb 2024 presidential, legislative and local elections; Nuevas Ideas 26 June announced Bukele had registered to run for re-election, despite constitutional ban on consecutive presidential re-election. Meanwhile, Legislative Assembly 14 June approved state of exception’s fifteenth extension amid human rights concerns.

Judicial proceedings against former officials accused of corruption continued. Attorney General 6 June charged former President Alfredo Cristiani in connection with 1989 massacre of six Jesuit priests and two women. National Civilian Police director 6 June announced politicians and journalists involved in 2012 “gang truce” talks will face judicial proceedings. Attorney General 17 June announced money laundering charges against former Defence Minister David Munguía Payes, sentenced in May to 18 years in prison for having conducted truce negotiations with criminal groups in 2012.

Guatemala

In polls marred by controversy over banned candidates and violence, voters sent surprise contestant from centre-left and early frontrunner into August presidential runoff.

Tensions ran high in lead up to polls that produced no clear winner. Guatemalans 25 June cast ballots to choose new president and vice president, as well as 160 congressional deputies and hundreds of local mayors. In surprise presidential result, centre-left Bernardo Arévalo finished second with 12% of vote; he will face frontrunner Sandra Torres of Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza party, who won 15% of vote, in 20 Aug runoff. Tensions ran high ahead of elections amid widespread perception that political and business elites manipulated judicial system to bar politicians who could threaten their interests from running for office; judicial authorities prevented more than 1,200 candidates for president, vice president, mayor and congress from running. EU election monitoring mission 25 June said elections took place amid “serious deterioration of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, together with severe restrictions on freedoms of expression and of the press”.

Election-related violence spiked. Cabal Party presidential candidate Edmond Mulet 14 June said shooting took place at party headquarters in El Tejar town, Chimaltenango department (centre), and that six Cabal leaders had been murdered since June 2022. Unidentified gunmen 17 June killed National Unity of Hope party candidate Erlindo Rodriguez Samayoa in Concepción las Minas municipality, Chiquimula department (east). Think-tank Diálogos 21 June reported 15 people involved in election campaigns – including drivers and volunteers – were killed Jan- June 2023, while observer NGO 25 June reported 57 incidents of electoral violence.

Haiti

Self-defence groups continued operations to tackle dire gang violence, regional bloc facilitated talks between acting PM Henry and opposition groups, and international actors boosted support for police.

Civilian efforts to confront gangs continued. Self-defence movement known as Bwa Kale continued anti-gang operations in capital Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas, helping curb criminal activities in some places. In Artibonite department, civilians allied with Jean-Denis gang to oust its rival Gran Grif gang; notably, civilians escorted by group 8 June burned several houses where Gran Grif members were staying. Violence continued elsewhere. Notably, armed men reportedly from Kraze Barye gang carried out several assaults in Tabarre neighbourhood of capital, including 7 June attacking private residence of former senator, 9 June setting fire to another senator’s house and 13 June ransacking Jamaican consulate, leading to suspension of consular services. Kraze Barye gang 13 June abducted journalist in Tabarre, released her hours later before 20 June kidnapping her husband, former head of Haiti’s provisional electoral council; dozens of other kidnappings reported.

Dialogue between govt and opposition resumed without major breakthrough. CARICOM, body of Caribbean nations, 11-13 June convened Haitian politicians and civil society leaders in Jamaica for talks aimed at resolving political crisis; High Transitional Council (HTC) members did not attend. Though rekindling dialogue marked positive step, sides made little progress toward creating more inclusive transitional govt. Most major opposition forces called for presidential council during transitional period; acting PM Henry, however, said he is willing only to add more members to HTC. Henry 14 June said dialogue would continue in Port-au-Prince.

International partners stepped up support to Haitian National Police (HNP). U.S. VP Kamala Harris 8 June announced Washington would set up investigative unit with HNP to facilitate investigation and prosecution of transnational crimes; French police 13 June arrived in Port-au-Prince to train special police units; and Canadian FM Mélanie Joly 15 June announced launch of Ottawa-led “joint security coordination cell” based in Dominican Republic to work with HNP, though Dominican Republic denied agreeing to proposal. Henry’s calls for multinational force continued, reiterated by UN official 28 June following country visit, saying “the survival of an entire nation is at stake”.

Honduras

Fighting broke out between rival gangs at women’s prison, leaving dozens dead and triggering military takeover; anti- corruption efforts continued.

Armed forces seized control of prisons following deadly riot. Riot 20 June at women’s prison in Tamara town, Francisco Morazán department (centre), left at least 46 people dead; reports said prisoners belonging to Barrio 18 gang attacked cell block housing rival MS-13 gang, burning, hacking and shooting victims. President Castro said riot was planned by gangs with “knowledge and acquiescence of security authorities” and fired security minister, replacing him with National Police head Gustavo Sánchez. In step away from promises to put civilian police in charge of penal system, govt same day placed all prisons under control of military for one year. Meanwhile, violence continued throughout country despite state of emergency, due to end or be extended on 5 July. Notably, unidentified gunmen 15 June killed environmental activist in Tocoa, Colón department (north); govt 25 June announced night-time curfews in Choloma and San Pedro Sula cities, both Cortés department (north west), following spate of violent incidents that killed 22 people previous day.

Anti-corruption efforts continued despite concerns. Govt and UN 16 June extended memorandum of understanding, aimed at supporting establishment of International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity (CICIH), until Dec 2023. Despite progress, experts and politicians continued to stress CICIH would prove futile unless Congress repeals decrees granting members of Congress immunity.

In another important development. After cutting diplomatic relations with Taiwan and formally establishing relations with China in March 2023, govt 11 June opened embassy in Chinese capital Beijing during Castro’s 9-14 June state visit.

Mexico

Criminal violence displaced thousands as rival groups vied for territory, authorities brought charges against soldiers accused of extrajudicial killing and ruling party began preparations for 2024 presidential poll.

Rampant insecurity displaced thousands. After 1,500 security forces late May deployed to Chiapas state (south) amid fighting between groups associated with Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels, National Guard 1 June said situation was under control; activists, however, continued to warn that Chiapas is on brink of civil war as hostilities displaced hundreds. In Michoacán state (west), fighting from 9 June onward between Jalisco and Knights Templar criminal groups over territory in Apatzingán municipality displaced at least 1,000; gunmen 29 June killed former self- defence group leader Hipólita Mora in La Ruana town, with reports Jalisco cartel may be responsible. In Sinaloa state (west), supposed Sinaloa cartel members 11 June killed two soldiers during confrontation in Culiacán municipality. Insecurity expected to escalate as 2024 elections edge closer.

Soldiers accused of extrajudicial killing in Tamaulipas. Ministry of Defence 10 June announced charges against 16 soldiers after media outlets 6 June released video showing soldiers apparently extrajudicially killing five alleged unarmed gang members in Nuevo Laredo city, Tamaulipas state (north) in May. López Obrador 7 June said “apparent execution” and other such cases would no longer go unpunished under his govt. Govt 26 June announced arrest of former head of federal anti- kidnapping unit over 2014 disappearance of 43 students from Ayotzinapa teacher’s college.

Election preparations heated up. Ruling MORENA party 11 June approved rules for process to select candidate for June 2024 presidential election. Six candidates have registered for participation and left their current posts for campaign 19 June-16 Aug; vote will take place 28 Aug-3 Sept. In what many considered test ahead of presidential poll, MORENA’s candidate 4 June won governorship of State of Mexico (centre), which opposition PRI had controlled for 94 years; PRI defeated MORENA in Coahuila state (north). Meanwhile, Supreme Court 22 June overturned key part of MORENA’s sweeping electoral bill.

Nicaragua

Govt crackdown continued, notably targeting figures within Catholic Church; President Ortega strengthened ties with Iran.

Several figures from Catholic Church fled country, fearing persecution. Amid crackdown on Catholic Church, presbyters Luis Masís Velásquez and Bayardo Antonio Rugama from Diocese of Bluefields 12 June fled country to avoid imprisonment. U.S. senators 8 June introduced bill to extend sanctions on Nicaragua until end of 2028, which includes proscriptions against those responsible for violations against religious believers. UN human rights office 21 June warned “persecution of members of the Catholic church has intensified” in recent months.

Broader govt crackdown continued. VP Murillo 2 June announced “citizen security” scheme whereby police are authorised to enter people’s homes, which critics denounced as a surveillance program. Ortega govt 9 June confiscated assets belonging to the 222 political prisoners exiled in Feb. After revoking legal status of Red Cross in May, Parliament 1-2 June approved creation of White Cross organisation, transferring all Red Cross assets to state and bringing new organisation under Ministry of Health’s administration.

In other important developments. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi 13 June visited President Ortega in capital Managua, where both criticised U.S. sanctions. Parliament 15 June authorised entry of Russian, Cuban, U.S., Mexican and Venezuelan troops, ships and aircraft into country; govt said their presence is aimed at strengthening aid deliveries and combating organised crime.

Venezuela

In major blow to prospects for competitive 2024 presidential poll, govt announced opposition frontrunner is barred from holding public office for 15 years, meaning she is unable to participate in election; govt also moved to replace national electoral council.

Key opposition figure banned from running in presidential election. 14 candidates officially registered by 24 June deadline to enter race for opposition primary election, scheduled for Oct to select single candidate for 2024 presidential election. Yet in worrying challenge to free elections in Venezuela, govt-controlled Comptroller General’s Office 30 June said sanction imposed against frontrunner María Corina Machado in 2015 prevents her from holding public office for 15 years, meaning she is banned from running in presidential election. In rare show of unity, opposition candidates immediately rejected Machado’s disqualification, as did other govts such as Colombia and U.S., who said ban “deprives the Venezuelan people of basic political rights”.

Govt kickstarted process to appoint new electoral council. Govt-controlled National Assembly 15 June voted to replace National Electoral Council’s (CNE) 15-member board (five principal members and ten substitutes), claiming they had resigned en masse, even though the two independent principals did not step down until 19, 20 June. Despite its pro-govt majority, reports suggested govt did not trust CNE to do its bidding unconditionally in 2024 presidential poll. Legislators same day formed commission, most of whose 11 members belong to ruling party, to appoint new CNE. NGO Human Rights Watch 22 June said govt’s decision “increases concerns for the prospect of free and fair presidential election” in 2024. In response, opposition Unitary Platform’s National Primary Commission 16 June said it would not seek CNE assistance for primary election; commission had wanted assistance with voting centres and use of official polling machines to expand scale of vote and help bolster credibility of election outcome.

In other important developments. UN refugee agency 14 June announced Venezuelan asylum applications had increased 186% in 2022 to 264,000. International Criminal Court 27 June ruled prosecutors can resume investigation into potential crimes against humanity in Venezuela after concluding govt’s enquiry was insufficient; prosecutor had paused initial investigation in April 2022, deferring to govt request to conduct its own probe.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Political parties started to position themselves ahead of 2024 presidential election, while media crackdown continued.

Political manoeuvring started ahead of 2024 presidential election. Opposition party Front of Socialist Forces 2 June called on opposition to join forces “beyond ideological divisions” to overcome political apathy and restrictions of political freedoms. Nine pro-govt political groups, including ruling National Liberation Front, National Democratic Rally and El-Bina el-Watani movement, 4 June reciprocated with joint initiative to strengthen “national cohesion” amid “growing risks” facing Algeria.

Media crackdown continued. Algiers Court of Appeal 18 June lengthened prominent journalist Ihsane El-Kadi’s prison sentence from five to seven years – with two years suspended – for allegedly receiving foreign funding for political propaganda with an aim to harm state security.

In other important developments. UN General Assembly 6 June elected Algeria as non-permanent member of UN Security Council for two-year term starting 1 Jan 2024. President Tebboune next day outlined Algiers’ priorities within Security Council, including supporting Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination and Palestinian cause. Tebboune 13-15 June visited Russia, agreed with President Putin to deepen bilateral strategic partnership.

Egypt

IMF continued to pressure Cairo to privatise state assets and allow flexibility in its currency; govt stiffened entry requirements for Sudanese refugees.

Divergence persisted between Egypt and IMF on economic reform program. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 11 June confirmed that review of Egypt’s economic reform program did not take place in March as initially planned due to slow pace of reforms and, as a result, second tranche of $3bn loan package was not disbursed. Central Bank of Egypt same day said annual inflation rate in May rose to 32.7%, from 30.6% in April, highlighting that prices have not yet declined since January devaluation. President Sisi 14 June signalled refusal to let Egyptian pound float and allow for further devaluation, citing impact on livelihoods. National dialogue proceeded with meetings three days a week.

Egyptian border guard shot three Israeli soldiers dead. Egyptian border guard 3 June entered Israel through Nitzana border crossing and fatally attacked three Israeli soldiers; assailant’s family denied allegations of religious radicalisation, but acknowledged his resentment toward Israel after Israeli forces reportedly killed one of his colleagues. Israel subsequently gave its soldiers authorisation to shoot at any suspicious Egyptian soldier; incident unlikely to undermine bilateral security cooperation, however.

Egypt, Türkiye moved forward with normalisation of relations. FM Sameh Shoukry 3 June travelled to Türkiye to attend Turkish President Erdoğan’s inauguration ceremony, days after Egyptian presidency announced that Sisi and Erdoğan had agreed to immediately exchange ambassadors as part of diplomatic relations upgrade.

Cairo stiffened entry requirements for Sudanese. As thousands of people fleeing fighting in Sudan remained stranded at Sudan-Egypt border with no valid travel documents, Cairo 10 June required all Sudanese to obtain electronic visas to enter Egypt, reversing longstanding visa exemption for women, children and elderly men.

Iran

Reports of indirect talks between U.S. and Iran suggested diplomatic momentum toward limited de-escalation understanding, while Tehran avoided censure at nuclear watchdog meeting.

U.S.-Iran engagement raised spectre of de-escalation. Iranian and U.S. officials mid-month confirmed in media reports that sides had held indirect talks in May in Oman likely aimed at de-escalatory understandings that could see prisoner swap and measure of nuclear restraint by Tehran in return for release of some frozen assets for humanitarian transactions; U.S. 13 June confirmed recent allocation of $2.7bn from Iraq-held Iranian funds but otherwise tempered expectations of major breakthrough.

Tehran avoided censure at nuclear watchdog meeting. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi 5 June told IAEA’s Board of Governors that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles had “risen by over a quarter in three months”; Grossi said Tehran had “provided a possible explanation” for presence of depleted uranium particles at ‘Marivan’” – one of three locations subject to agency probe into past nuclear activities at undeclared sites – and declared “the agency has no further questions” regarding origin of particles enriched up to 83.7 per cent. Consequently, U.S. and/or European allies did not introduce censure motion but nonetheless criticised Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 11 June backed engagement on safeguards with IAEA while emphasising that nuclear “infrastructures [should] remain untouched”.

West continued steady stream of sanctions. U.S. 1 June sanctioned six individuals/entities linked to “terrorist plots” targeting “former U.S. government officials”, among others. U.S. next day designated four persons/entities linked to “censorship of the Internet”. U.S. Treasury Department 6 June blacklisted 13 persons and entities linked to “Iran's ballistic missile development”. EU 23 June sanctioned four Iranian entities linked to “manufacturing of UAVs and their provision to Russia” and 26 June designated seven Iranian officials over human rights concerns.

Maritime tensions persisted amid Iranian-Saudi normalisation. U.S. and UK naval forces 4 June reported “Iranian fast attack boats harassed [a] commercial ship” transiting Strait of Hormuz. Iran 6 June reopened its embassy in Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia). FM Amirabdollahian 19-22 June discussed idea of “regional cooperation forum” touring Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and UAE.

Iraq

Parliament passed budget to expand public employment and resolve oil spat with Erbil, Türkiye struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in north and Islamic State (ISIS) maintained low-level insurgency.

Parliament passed controversial federal budget. Against International Monetary Fund’s advice for tighter fiscal policy, parliament 12 June passed record-large budget, which relies almost exclusively on hydrocarbon exports and adds 700,000 new public employees in response to youth-led protests over unemployment. Notably, budget outlined new revenue-sharing mechanism for oil exports between federal govt and Kurdistan Regional Govt (KRG) that resolves a main sticking point between pair; arrangement guarantees Erbil 12.7% share of federal expenditures and increases its allocation of public salaries and pensions; KRG’s allocated budget is estimated to increase by 30%. Govt 19 June met Turkish energy delegation in capital Baghdad to discuss resumption of oil exports after Ankara paused them following international arbitration ruling. Over 50 MPs in Kurdistan regional parliament late June resigned in protest of Supreme Court’s ruling in May that assembly’s decision taken in Oct to delay elections by year was unconstitutional.

Türkiye struck PKK, which ended unilateral ceasefire in Türkiye. Suspected Turkish drone 1 June hit house in Sinjar district, injuring two PKK-affiliated fighters. After unidentified gunmen 9 June shot dead PKK member in Sulaymaniyah, PKK blamed Turkish intelligence and 10 June declared end to four-month unilateral ceasefire in Türkiye, citing operations against its members (see Türkiye and Syria). Turkish forces 26 June said it “neutralised” four PKK members in north.

Low-scale ISIS insurgency continued. ISIS attack 11 June killed three soldiers and injured four others in Wadi al-Naft, Kirkuk governorate. Iraqi forces conducted antiISIS operations throughout month; notably, 2 June killed four suspected ISIS militants in Diyala governorate. Defence Ministry 17 June announced killing four suspected militants in airstrike in Tarmiya district, north of Baghdad. Israeli jets 24 June killed suspected ISIS militants in Al-Rafi’i in Kirkuk governorate.

In other important developments. Govt 20 June announced first local provincial elections since 2013 will be held 18 Dec. Clashes between two rival Iranian Kurdish dissident groups 22 June killed two fighters in Zirgwez, Sulaymaniyah governorate.

Israel/Palestine

Deadly Israeli military raids and armed Palestinian resistance continued in West Bank amid growing settler violence, while Israel expanded annexation policies and returned to judicial overhaul.

Israeli forces and Palestinian militants clashed heavily in West Bank. Israeli forces conducted over 500 raids that killed at least 19 Palestinians (bringing total killed this year to at least 165). Notably, rare house demolition by Israeli forces in Ramallah 7-8 June triggered clashes that injured at least 35. Underscoring dynamic in which growing Israeli raids in northern West Bank to address Israel-induced security vacuum in absence of Palestinian Authority (PA) has kindled greater Palestinian armed resistance, Israeli raid in Jenin 19 June sparked large-scale gunfight, killing seven Palestinians and wounding seven Israeli soldiers, as Israeli helicopters opened fire in first such engagement since Second Intifada; Israeli media reported remote-controlled IED may indicate Iranian support, while Netanyahu govt and settler leadership mulled extensive military operation. Israeli drone 21 June killed three in Jenin refugee camp. Militants in Jenin 26 June attempted to fire two rockets. Meanwhile, amid expanding settler violence, two Palestinian gunmen 20 June killed four Israeli settlers near Eli settlement outpost; around 400 settlers next day stormed Turmus Ayya village, killing a Palestinian.

Israel advanced de facto annexation and restarted judicial overhaul debate. Cabinet 18 June gave far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, also minister in Defence Ministry, authority to bypass approval process to build settlements. Govt 18 June moved forward plans to authorise constructing over 4,500 new settlement units in West Bank. After freezing judicial overhaul in March, Knesset 25 June began debating bill to limit Supreme Court’s power; amid protests, PM Netanyahu 29 June claimed he dropped clause enabling parliament to overturn court’s rulings.

Violent crime flared in Israel, rare attack on Egyptian border killed three. Clashes reportedly linked to organised crime 8 June killed five in Arab-majority town Yafa an-Naseriyye in northern Israel; violent crime has killed over 100 Palestinian citizens of Israel in 2023 and risks further exacerbating existing tensions. In first deadly exchange along border in over decade, Egyptian police officer 3 June infiltrated Israel and shot dead three Israeli border guards (see Egypt).

Lebanon

Hardship from economic crisis continued to bite, fuelling protests and disorder, while presidential vacuum persisted with no end in sight and tensions surfaced between Hizbollah and Israel.

Difficult economic conditions continued to foment protest and public unrest. Public school teachers 3 June called week-long strike over their devalued wages and working conditions. Employees of state electricity provider Electricite du Liban 13- 23 June held limited strike in relation to delayed salary payments. Demonstrators 15 June vandalised four separate banks in capital Beirut’s Sin El Fil neighbourhood to protest lack of access to their deposits. During June, internet services cut intermittently in some areas as state telecommunications infrastructure operator struggled to secure enough fuel to power its plants. Meanwhile, UN’s International Organisation for Migration 13 June confirmed that in 2022 “an increasing number of deadly incidents took place after boats departed from Lebanon, destined for Greece and Italy”, recording at least 174 deaths.

Presidential vacuum entered its eighth consecutive month. Parliament 14 June convened to hold first presidential election session since Jan but again failed to elect new head of state; opposition’s preferred candidate Jihad Azour secured 59 of 128 votes (short of 86 required to win) in first round before MPs aligned with Shiite parties Hizbollah and Amal Movement frustrated quorum in second vote, where only 65 votes are needed. Political parties scaled up incendiary rhetoric around vote: referring to Azour, Shiite parties 11 June asserted they “would not accept a candidate imposed by Tel Aviv”, while Maronite Patriarch Bechara Al Rahi accused Shiite parties of making mockery of democracy by obstructing second round. Parliament 19 June convened for ordinary session strictly limited to approving temporary benefits for public employees and retirees; Free Patriotic Movement party attended session, again relaxing its previous stance of opposition to non-electoral sessions.

Tensions persisted between Hizbollah and Israel. Israeli media 21 June reported that Hizbollah operatives had allegedly maintained at least two tents in disputed Shebaa Farms area for several weeks. Hizbollah 26 June claimed it downed Israeli drone that entered Lebanese airspace near Zibqin town in south.

Libya

Political deadlock persisted despite headlines suggesting that rival factions reached agreement on election laws while selection of new interim govt remained controversial.

Stakeholders sent contradictory signals on elections and new govt. Following series of meetings in Moroccan town of Bouznika, members of 6+6 joint committee – composed of House of Representatives (HoR) and rival Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) representatives – early June announced agreement on legal framework for presidential and parliamentary elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh and head of HSC Khaled Meshri 6-7 June travelled to Morocco but failed to sign off on electoral legislation as points of contentions persisted, notably on whether military officers can run for president. Meanwhile, amid competing plans aimed at appointing new interim govt before elections take place, eastern forces commander Khalifa Haftar 16 June congratulated outcome of Morocco talks and called for formation of “technocratic” govt to oversee election preparation, suggesting that he may now favour parliament-led selection process, rather than keeping Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba in office as part of power-sharing deal. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN Envoy to Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 20 June said failure to reach agreement among major stakeholders on eligibility criteria for presidential election, linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, and formation of new unified govt could “trigger a new crisis”.

Tripoli conducted fresh strikes in west. Dabaiba 1 June insisted drones strikes carried out late May in western Libya targeted sites used by “criminal gangs” for human trafficking, drug and fuel smuggling, denying HoR claims that strikes were aimed at “settling political scores”; Dabaiba also denied Turkish involvement in strikes. Forces loyal to Dabaiba 7-8 June conducted fresh strikes near Zuwara city, reportedly targeting fuel smuggling site.

Tensions over control of oil wealth threatened to escalate. Eastern-based PM Osama Hammad 24 June threatened to impose blockade on oil and gas facilities to prevent exports in protest at alleged unfair distribution of oil revenues by Tripoli-based authorities; 26 June said he discussed mater with Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation Chairman Farhat Bengdara.

In other important developments. Drone strikes 29 June reportedly hit Al-Kharruba airbase used by Russian paramilitary group Wagner; Tripoli-based authorities denied responsibility.

Saudi Arabia

Reconciliation with Iran continued, while dialogue with Yemen’s Huthis remained stalled and tensions surfaced with United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Iran reopened embassy in Riyadh. Three months after signing China-brokered reconciliation deal, Iran 6 June reopened embassy in Riyadh to end seven-year diplomatic absence. Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan 17 June visited Iranian capital Tehran and described discussions as “positive and clear”; Saudi embassy in Iran has yet to open. Iranian navy commander 3 June claimed Iran would form naval alliance with India, Pakistan and Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.

Talks remained deadlocked with Huthis, friction with UAE became visible. Although dialogue with Huthis remained stalled, first direct flight between Yemen and Saudi Arabia since 2016 17 June arrived in Jeddah city and Huthi media 21 June reported Saudi Arabia and Huthis exchanged bodies of fighters (see Yemen). Tensions between Saudi Arabia and UAE behind scenes intensified over differences in approaches to Yemen and Sudan crises, with Riyadh accusing Abu Dhabi of undermining conflict resolution efforts.

In other important developments. Saudi Arabia 4 June announced voluntary unilateral oil production cuts in July. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 6-8 June visited Saudi Arabia for meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Riyadh 11-12 June hosted Arab-China business conference.

Syria

Deadly fighting escalated between Türkiye and Kurdish militants in north, while Russia and regime forces stepped up attacks in north west; Islamic State (ISIS) killed regime general in centre.

Hostilities surged between Türkiye and Kurdish forces in north. Kurdistan Workers’ Party 10 June terminated four-month unilateral ceasefire, citing Turkish operations in Syria and Iraq (see Türkiye and Iraq). Turkish drone strike 10 June killed senior People’s Protection Units (YPG) commander in Tel Rifaat, Aleppo province; YPGlinked forces next day shelled Turkish base east of Azaz, prompting Turkish forces to retaliate with counter-battery fire. IED 12 June killed Russian soldier in Tel Rifaat. YPG-linked Afrin Liberation Forces 13 June shelled Turkish base near Kafr Jannah, west of Azaz; Turkish forces 14 June struck Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian regime positions in Tel Rifaat and Manbij areas, killing at least eight Syrian soldiers, over dozen SDF/YPG fighters and several civilians. Turkish drone 14 June killed commander of Syrian branch of Turkish Marxist-Leninist Communist Party and 20 June killed PYD co-chair of Qamishli canton near Qamishli. Attacks on both sides somewhat subsided late June.

Russia and regime forces increased attacks in north west. Russia steadily increased number of airstrikes on opposition-held Idlib to levels not witnessed since late 2021 after dominant rebel group Hei’at Tahir al-Sham (HTS) late May killed senior Russian officer. Notably, Russian warplanes 19 June carried out around 10 attacks near Idlib city and 23-27 June killed at least nine civilians across Idlib, Latakia and Aleppo provinces, causing displacement and aggravating humanitarian crisis. Large contingents of regime forces 19 June deployed to northern Aleppo, while regime stepped up artillery strikes; suspected HTS forces 22-23 June conducted four drone strikes in regime-held cities of Salhab, Qardaha and Deir Shamal. Russian airstrike 27 June reportedly hit HTS military post in Idlib’s Jabal al-Zawiya area, killing at least six militants.

ISIS continued intermittent attacks, Israel struck Damascus. ISIS struck mostly in eastern Homs, Deir al-Zour and Quneitra provinces; notably, IED attack 13 June killed regime general in Homs city – first attack in city since 2017. Syrian state media reported Israeli missiles 14 June injured Syrian soldier in capital Damascus.

Tunisia

Authorities continued to silence dissent, and European Union (EU) proposed financial assistance while urging Tunis to tighten border control.

Opposition protested continued harassment of govt critics. Islamist-inspired AnNahda party 12 June confirmed three imprisoned party leaders on hunger strike to protest “detention conditions and non-respect of fundamental rights”; one of them, Sahbi Atig, early June reportedly spent several days in intensive care due to deteriorating health. Hundreds of main opposition coalition National Salvation Front supporters 18 June protested in capital Tunis to demand release of President Saïed’s opponents, including coalition’s co-founder Jaouhar Ben Mbarek and AnNahda leader Rached Ghannouchi. Authorities 20 June detained prominent journalist Zied Heni near Tunis for allegedly “insulting the head of state”, released him on bail two days later.

EU offered financial aid to Tunis to boost economy, tighten border control. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 11 June visited Tunis along with Italian PM Giorgia Meloni and Dutch PM Mark Rutte, said EU may loan over €1bn to help Tunisia boost its battered economy and tighten border control. Ahead of meeting, Saïed 10 June said Tunisia would not accept to act as other countries’ border guard. German and French Interior Ministers Nancy Faeser and Gérald Darmanin 19 June met with Saïed in Tunis to discuss migration and security issues; France announced nearly €26mn in aid to combat irregular migration. Families of jailed judges and politicians late June accused EU of whitewashing Saïed’s authoritarianism in hope he can stem migration to Europe.

Anti-migrant sentiment persisted, notably in Sfax. In joint statement, human rights and other organisations 2 June condemned violence against sub-Saharan migrants and urged authorities to protect migrants and combat discrimination. Tensions continued to run high in coastal city of Sfax, a hub for migrant crossings to Europe. Notably, clashes 17-18 June reportedly broke out between Sfax residents and migrants, causing property damage, while hundreds 25 June demonstrated in Sfax against presence of irregular migrants.

Western Sahara

Attack reported in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara for first time since ceasefire collapsed in Nov 2020.

Bombing reportedly damaged phosphate facility in Western Sahara. NGO Western Sahara Resource Watch late May reported explosion in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara destroyed section of conveyor belt transporting phosphates from mine to export facility; neither Morocco nor Polisario Front independent movement commented on incident which, if confirmed, would be first attack in Moroccocontrolled Western Sahara since ceasefire collapsed in 2020 and highlight unexpected vulnerability of Morocco’s security apparatus.

Israel pledged to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. During visit to Morocco, Israeli Parliament Speaker Amir Ohana 8 June said Israel will soon support Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara; move could lead to full upgrade of Israeli-Moroccan ties, with countries’ respective missions, now designated as liaison offices, becoming embassies, and free trade agreement in medium term.

Yemen

Negotiations between Huthis and Saudi Arabia remained stalled despite flurry of diplomatic activity and confidence-building steps, while rival forces jostled for control in southern provinces.

Huthi-Saudi talks remained deadlocked despite steps to ease tensions. In attempt to increase pressure on Huthis, Saudi Arabia 5 June held talks on Yemen with Chinese officials and 7 June with U.S. officials. Other diplomatic efforts continued at high intensity: notably, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg 4-5 June travelled to Saudi Arabia and Oman, and Presidential Leadership Council leader Rashad al-Alimi 8 June met U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken in Saudi capital Riyadh. Negotiations, however, remained stuck over various Huthi demands, including salary payments and increasing flights from Sanaa airport. In positive steps, national carrier Yemenia Airways 8 June announced doubling flight schedule to six, with first direct flight since 2016 between Yemen and Saudi Arabia 17 June arriving in Saudi Arabian city Jeddah; Huthi media 21 June reported Saudi Arabia and Huthis exchanged bodies of fighters. Huthis officials issued weekly warnings of return to hostilities and Huthi redeployments along front underscored potential of renewed war. Meanwhile, UN 16-18 June convened talks between govt and Huthis in Jordanian capital Amman, where Huthis reportedly agreed to negotiate release of prominent political prisoner and Islah member Mohammed Qahran.

Regional actors manoeuvred their affiliated forces in south. Following Riyadh’s request, Al-Alimi’s Nation Shield Forces 6 June deployed from Saudi border toward Aden province, signalling intent to counteract United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) influence in south; STC next day reportedly sent reinforcements to Aden. In Hadramawt province, after STC took steps to solidify its influence with UAE support in recent months, Saudi Arabia invited several prominent Hadrami leaders to Riyadh for discussions regarding future of region, underscoring tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi; participants of discussions 21 June established Hadramawt National Council.

In other important developments. Huthis continued to economically undermine govt, notably by importing cooking gas through Hodeida port to break govt’s monopoly in Marib. Clashes between suspected al-Qaeda militants and UAE-backed pro-govt Shebwa Defence Forces 10 June reportedly killed three in Shebwa province.

Africa

Benin

Northern departments continued to face sporadic jihadist attacks on military and civilian targets.

Suspected combatants from al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 1 May killed around 15 civilians and kidnapped another 12 in Kérou commune, Atakora department, and next day killed three civilians and kidnapped one more in Banikoara commune, Alibori department. In rare public statement on insecurity, govt 3 May announced investigation into both incidents. Soldiers 12 May killed one suspected JNIM militant and seized weapons following firefight in Matéri commune, Atakora department.

Burkina Faso

Amid rampant violence, civic space continued to shrink as transitional military govt further mobilised society against jihadists, while hinting at election delay.

Rampant jihadist violence continued to affect most regions. Spate of suspected jihadist attacks in Boucle du Mouhoun region (west) took heavy toll on civilians, killing at least 53 in Mouhoun province 11 and 28 May; another 13 in Kossi province 14 May; and 14 in Banwa province 19 May. Also in Boucle du Mouhoun, suspected jihadists 27 May attacked armoured convoy in Bourasso department (Kossi province), with around 20 dead, most of them army auxiliaries (VDPs). In North region, suspected jihadists 18 May attacked several villages in Yatenga province, killing 12 VDPs and 16 civilians; 31 May ambushed food convoy escorted by troops in Loroum province, killing two civilians while army reportedly shot 50 assailants dead. In East region’s Kompienga province, presumed jihadists 21 May killed 15 civilians on outskirts of provincial capital Kompienga; army reportedly retaliated, killing dozens. In Centre-East region, suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 15 and 17 May killed around 20 civilians in Koulpélogo province.

Security forces continued counter-insurgency operations. Army and VDPs 18 May launched assault on presumed JNIM positions in Gnagna forest (Gnagna province, East region), killing around 30 militants; same day raided other JNIM positions near Bittou town (Boulgou province, Centre-East region), killing over 20.

Authorities ramped up repression of dissent and adopted national security law. Security forces 5-11 May arrested four members of civil society on various charges. Transitional legislature 9 May adopted new national security law further formalising govt’s strategy of mobilising society in struggle against jihadists; law notably provides for private security companies to support govt forces. In address to transitional legislature, interim PM Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela 30 May ruled out negotiations with jihadists, and suggested security situation could delay country’s return to civilian rule beyond July 2024. As late-April killing of at least 146 civilians by suspected army elements in Karma village (North region) sparked international condemnation, interim President Capt. Traoré 4 May denounced actions of “coalition against Burkina Faso”.

Burundi

Dissenters continued to suffer violence and harassment, anti-Kigali rebels staged attack near Rwandan border, and Burundi hosted regional peace summit on DR Congo.

Persecution of govt critics continued. Provincial security forces 4-9 May arrested and reportedly tortured three members of main opposition party, National Congress for Freedom (CNL), in Bubanza province, allegedly on ruling party Sec Gen Révérien Ndikuriyo’s orders to track down “troublesome elements”. Provincial authorities 5 May detained three CNL activists in Gitega province, releasing them three days later. Violence by ruling party youth militia, Imbonerakure, also continued. Notably, Imbonerakure 5 May macheted to death local CNL leader in Ruyigi province. Meanwhile, appeals court in Bujumbura city 2 May upheld ten-year prison term for journalist Floriane Irangabiye for “undermining the integrity of the national territory”.

Rebel activity persisted near Rwandan border. In Cibitoke province, anti-Kigali National Liberation Forces rebels 14 May reportedly ambushed members of Imbonerakure in Mabayi commune, killing two and injuring four before military pushed them back into Kibira forest.

In other important developments. Authorities early May indicted former PM Alain-Guillaume Bunyoni, who was detained in April, for “undermining the internal security of the state, undermining the proper functioning of the national economy and illegal enrichment”. Bunyoni’s arrest puts an end to long-running power struggle between him and President Ndayishimiye, both of whom come from ruling party’s old guard, and comes in context of increased pressure from International Monetary Fund to sort out country’s highly corrupt foreign currency exchange sector, in which Bunyoni was thought to have a big hand. Burundi 6 May hosted summit of Regional Oversight Mechanism of Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for DR Congo and Great Lakes region in bid to revitalise peace and cooperation initiatives; Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Kenyan President William Ruto both failed to attend (see Rwanda).

Cameroon

Anglophone separatists escalated violence around Cameroon’s National Day, notably launching rare attack in Francophone region near economic capital Douala; ethnic conflict erupted in south, and Boko Haram stepped up attacks in Far North.

Separatist militias escalated attacks leaving heavy toll on military. Anglophone separatist rebels 1 May crossed border from Anglophone South West region (SW) into Francophone Littoral region, attacked military post at Matouke village, Moungo division, less than 40km from economic capital Douala, killing five soldiers and one civilian. In retaliation, govt forces same day reportedly killed six civilians and arrested 14 people in nearby Maumu village, Fako division (SW). Explosive device 16 May killed at least three soldiers in Mabonji locality, Meme division (SW). As Cameroon celebrated National Day – which commemorates date in 1972 when referendum abrogated two-state federation, ushering in unitary state – armed separatists 20 May abducted about 30 women in Kedjom-Keku (Big Babanki) village, Mezam division in North West region (NW), after they protested taxes levied by separatists; all women released 23 May. Govt forces 21 and 28 May fought off ambushes in Otu village, Manyu division (SW) and Bambalang village, Ngo-Ketunjia division (NW) respectively, killing at least four separatists. Explosive device 31 May reportedly killed five soldiers in Mbengwi town (NW).

Ethnic tensions turned violent in South region. Govt mid-May sounded alarm on unprecedented levels of hate speech, pledged tough sentences. Violent unrest around 24 May erupted in Sangmelima town, Dja-et-Lobo division in Francophone South region, between members of local Bulu community and members of Bamoun and Bamileke communities from Francophone West region, leaving unclear number of casualties; army intervened to quell tensions.

Boko Haram (BH) conducted several deadly attacks in Far North region. BH militants 4 May killed two civilians in twin raids on Goldavi locality, Mayo-Tsanaga division, and Wilda locality, Mayo-Sava division, also stealing cattle and provisions. BH 21 May attacked Mozogo village, Mayo-Tsanaga; security forces killed two militants and lost a local vigilante. Suspected BH militants 29 May killed two customs officers, one police officer and one civilian in Mora town, Mayo-Sava. One soldier and two BH militants killed same day in clash in Ziguague town, Logone-et-Chari division.

Central African Republic

Rebel offensive continued, and N’Djamena pursued armed groups in CAR’s border region amid growing mistrust between neighbours over cross-border rebel activity.

Rebel groups clashed with govt forces in north east and north west. Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) rebels 5 May attacked army position and seized strategic town of Tiringoulou (Vakaga prefecture), killing three soldiers; counter-offensive by govt forces and UN mission (MINUSCA) 7 May forced them to withdraw. UN humanitarian agency in CAR 26 May condemned attacks on humanitarian workers and other civilians after unidentified assailants 24 May reportedly ambushed aid convoy on way back from Am-Dafok village (also Vakaga), killing driver. CPC elements 15 May ambushed armed forces near Bossangoa town (Ouham prefecture), killing four soldiers.

CAR and Chad launched joint operation against cross-border rebel activity. Following reports that Chadian rebels have established rear bases in CAR’s north, N’Djamena 16 May said two countries 14 May launched joint operation in CAR’s north-western Ouham-Pendé prefecture, killing dozen rebels and arresting 23 (see Chad). Meanwhile, alleged French support for late April inauguration of border military post near Chadian town of Goré (Logone Oriental province) fed suspicion in Bangui that France is backing CAR’s rebels based in southern Chad (see Chad). Further feeding mistrust, unidentified military aircraft 3 May crashed in Ouham-Pendé.

Self-defence militia accused UN mission of inaction against rebels in south east. Self-defence militia Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé 7-9 May clashed with Union for Peace in Central African Republic (UPC) rebels in Mboki town (Haut-Mbomou prefecture), losing at least 19 militiamen. Militia later blamed MINUSCA for not taking preventive measures despite indications rebels were preparing assault.

In other important developments. Security forces and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group elements 27 April-4 May conducted raids in Bangui’s Muslim neighbourhood PK5, reportedly arrested ten individuals on allegations of illegal weapons possession and trafficking, demanding payments for their release. PK5 retail traders 5 May shut down shops in protest at “arbitrary” detentions. President Touadéra 30 May announced constitutional referendum will be held 30 July.

Chad

As intercommunal violence spiralled out of control in south, leaving dozens dead, N’Djamena launched military operation across border to chase rebels based in Central African Republic (CAR).

Intercommunal violence surged in south near border with CAR. Several deadly incidents of intercommunal conflict reported in Logone Oriental province. Notably, suspected herders early May killed at least 17 people in Don town, Nya Pendé department; and unidentified gunmen 17 and 19 May launched attacks in Andoum area, Monts de Lam department, killing between 35 and 40 civilians, burning houses and stealing livestock. In neighbouring Mandoul province, suspected herders 25 May raided Bara 2 village, Barh Sara department, killing at least nine farmers; attack reportedly took place after dispute with local farmer left one herder seriously injured. Authorities in April and May accused Chadian rebels based in CAR of fuelling violence in southern provinces (see Central African Republic).

Army launched operation against rebels based in CAR. N’Djamena late April announced inauguration, with support of French military, of military post near Goré town along border with CAR, with a view to better monitoring new security dynamics on frontier, including Chadian rebels’ activities in northern CAR. Despite growing mistrust over cross-border rebel activity, N’Djamena 11 May announced bilateral cooperation agreement between Logone Oriental province and CAR’s north-western Ouham-Pendé prefecture to combat Chadian rebels based in CAR, and 16 May said Chad and CAR 14 May launched joint military operation in Ouham-Pendé, killing dozen rebels and arresting 23.

In other important developments. Interim President Mahamat Déby 24 May pardoned 67 people sentenced to prison for participating in bloody 20 Oct 2022 protests, which called for return to civilian rule, along with 11 others who had been sentenced for alleged involvement in foiled Dec 2022 “coup”. UN refugee agency late May said 90,000 refugees had arrived in Chad from Sudan since conflict started in mid-April, called for international aid in delivering life-saving assistance.

Côte d’Ivoire

Amid ongoing preparations for regional and municipal elections due in September, former President Gbagbo’s absence from electoral list sparked outcry from his party.

Main political parties discussed ad hoc electoral alliances. Ahead of regional and municipal votes scheduled for 2 Sept, ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) and former PM Pascal Affi N’Guessan’s Ivorian Popular Front 2 May signed partnership agreement in economic capital Abidjan, pledging to promote peaceful politics and avoid electoral violence; N’Guessan said partnership did not amount to “electoral agreement”. Media outlets including RFI 4 May reported nascent talks between former President Laurent Gbagbo’s Parti des peuples africains – Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) and former President Henri-Konan Bédié’s Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire with a view to fielding common candidates in certain regions or municipalities to better challenge RHDP’s favourable position.

Gbagbo and others remained absent from electoral list. Electoral commission 20 May published electoral list, confirming that Gbagbo will not be able to vote in Sept elections; Gbagbo has been stripped of his civic and political rights since his 2018 condemnation for robbery of Central Bank of West African States in 2011, despite presidential pardon granted in 2022. PPA-CI immediately denounced “unacceptable provocation” and “casus belli”, and 30 May condemned “irregularities and fraud” on electoral list, notably presence of deceased voters. Prominent politicians and former Gbagbo associates Charles Blé Goudé and Guillaume Soro also remained absent from electoral list.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Amid mounting discontent with East African force, President Tshisekedi secured deployment of Southern African troops to help quell M23 rebellion in North Kivu; intercommunal conflict spread further in western provinces.

Southern Africa’s regional bloc pledged troops for eastern DR Congo. As Tshisekedi stepped up criticism of East African Community (EAC) force’s approach to tackling M23 rebellion, Southern African Development Community 8 May approved troop deployment to eastern provinces. Tshisekedi next day threatened to expel EAC force, accusing it of taking weak stance vis-à-vis M23 and even colluding with rebels in some instances. EAC 11 May denounced Tshisekedi’s criticism as “not fair”, and 31 May approved extension of force’s mandate until Sept. Kinshasa late May reported movements of Rwandan army and M23 rebels in North Kivu province, warned of imminent offensive on Goma city.

Amid fragile M23 calm, other armed group attacks continued unabated in east. Local CMC-Nyatura militia 3-4 May killed 13 people in attack on Kizimba site for internally displaced persons in Rutshuru territory, North Kivu. Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces in May launched repeated raids in North Kivu’s Beni territory, killing at least 34 people, and 18 May killed another 13 in Irumu territory, Ituri province. Unidentified assailants, possibly CODECO or Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri local militias, 12 May killed at least 47 people in several villages of Djugu territory, Ituri. Local Maï Maï Kabido militia 18 and 28 May killed at least five eco-guards in and near Virunga national park in Lubero and Rutshuru territories (both North Kivu).

Intercommunal violence spread further in west. Conflict between Yaka and Teke communities, triggered by land dispute, continued to spread beyond Mai-Ndombe province’s Kwamouth territory. Notably, local militias 11-13 May clashed with security forces and other militias, leaving at least 16 people dead in Nguma and Mongata villages (Kinshasa province), as well as Batshongo village (Kwango province).

Police cracked down on protesters in Kinshasa. Ahead of general elections expected in Dec, opposition demonstrators 20 May took to streets in Kinshasa to denounce alleged voter registration irregularities, prolonged insecurity and cost-of-living crisis. Security forces responded forcefully, with opposition claiming dozens injured. UN 23 May said police used “disproportionate” force.

Eritrea

Eritrea’s efforts to bolster its international standing continued as President Isaias spoke out on Sudan conflict and strengthened ties with China, Russia.

President Isaias sought influence in addressing Sudan crisis. In 1 May interview with state media, President Isaias discussed conflict in Sudan, urging “an immediate end” to fighting and emphasising potential mediating role of neighbouring countries, including Eritrea; also advocated for Intergovernmental Authority on Development regional bloc to play support role. During meeting with Sudanese ambassador 12 May, Isaias denied allegations Asmara is cooperating with United Arab Emirates to provide sanctuary for fighters from Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

Eritrea bolstered relations with China and Russia. President Isaias 14 May arrived in China for four-day state visit at invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping as countries sought to “enrich their strategic partnership”. Leaders held talks on bilateral cooperation, regional stability and global issues, with Xi saying China “is ready to work with Eritrea to advance mutually beneficial cooperation”. Isaias 30 May arrived in Russian capital Moscow for four-day official visit at invitation of Russian President Putin, who 31 May announced sides would soon sign various cooperation agreements.

Ethiopia

Violence in Oromia intensified after govt-OLA talks failed to produce agreement, federal-Tigray relations faced setback, and security operations in Amhara drew criticism from human rights body.

Govt-OLA talks ended without agreement amid uncompromising stances. Peace talks between govt and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) that began 25 April in Tanzania ended 3 May without agreement as sides failed to reach consensus on key political issues: OLA demanded greater political role in Oromia region, proposing power-sharing arrangement via transitional administration until next election; govt rejected proposition, which would threaten power of Oromo ruling elites, instead insisting on rebels’ disarmament. OLA 17 May accused govt of launching “all-out offensive” after talks concluded, with fighting reported in East and West Shewa Zones (centre), Horo Guduru, East and West Wollega Zones (west), and parts of southern Oromia.

Authorities refused to restore TPLF’s political party status. National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) 13 May denied Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF) request to restore its political party status, cancelled Jan 2021 after outbreak of war, citing lack of legal provision for status restoration; NEBE said TPLF can submit re-registration request, meaning legally it would become new political party. TPLF and Tigray’s Interim Regional Administration that TPLF controls said board’s decision endangers peace and urged authorities to reinstate TPLF’s “pre-war status”. Thousands of displaced Tigrayans 23 May protested in major cities in Tigray, demanding withdrawal of outside (Eritrea, Amhara) forces to allow their return home. Meanwhile, World Food Programme and U.S. international development agency 3 May said food aid to Tigray was being diverted and sold on local market, suspended deliveries.

Security forces accused of abuses during operations in Amhara. Tensions eased in Amhara region following April violence, which broke out over govt plans to integrate regional paramilitaries into federal security structures, though suspicion of federal govt as it improves relations with TPLF and engages with OLA persisted. Meanwhile, concerns emerged about “law enforcement campaign” launched late April in Amhara after assassination of key figure from ruling Prosperity Party; notably, Ethiopian Human Rights Commission 9 May accused security forces of “arbitrary arrests, inappropriate treatments of people in custody [and] disproportionate use of force”.

Guinea

Changes in military leadership revealed tensions at highest levels of govt, and deadly protests erupted following failure of mediation process between transitional military authorities and opposition.

President Doumbouya took steps to fend off challenges to his rule. President Lt. Col. Doumbouya 9 May sacked top junta figure Gen. Sadiba Coulibaly as armed forces chief of staff, allegedly over disagreements on conduct of transition to civilian rule. Interim President Lt. Col. Doumbouya late April also sacked head of military intelligence, Lt. Col. Ismaël Keïta, citing “serious misconduct”, and disbanded battalion in charge of presidential security (which defended former President Condé during 2021 putsch), suggesting he may fear challenges from officers outside ruling junta.

New round of opposition demonstrations turned violent as mediation failed. Opposition coalition Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG) – notably including opposition leader Cellou Dallein Diallo’s movement, former President Condé’s Rally of the Guinean People, and political wing of National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC) protest movement – 8 May refused to attend new round of talks with govt under auspices of religious mediators. Govt took part, proposed to grant conditional release to three imprisoned FNDC leaders, including Oumar Sylla (alias Foniké Mengué), if they committed to suspend militant activities, which FNDC leaders rejected. FVG supporters 10 May took to streets in capital Conakry, clashed with police; FVG said seven demonstrators shot dead and 32 injured, while authorities claimed three people killed. Small-scale demonstrations same day also took place in Nzerekore town in south east, and in central town of Dabola. In apparent sign of appeasement, authorities later same day released three FNDC leaders without condition until their trial, but renewed protests 11 May took place in Conakry. Situation remained tense through late May, with authorities 17-18 May deploying army in Conakry as FVG called for new demonstrations.

Kenya

Talks between govt and opposition stalled; Al-Shabaab resumed attacks along Somalia border after months of low-level activity; and clashes over land and cattle continued in north.

Bipartisan talks stalled after making limited progress. Opposition Azimio La Umoja coalition 2 May resumed countrywide anti-govt protests; next day called off demonstrations planned for 4 May, saying govt had agreed to key demand to review formation of new electoral commission. President Ruto 13 May met with Azimio leader Raila Odinga, ushering in ten-day détente. Azimio 23 May however suspended talks to consult with colleagues, next day gave govt six-day ultimatum to yield on four points of contention – including acting to lower cost of living and launching audit of Aug 2022 election servers – or else consider talks dead. As ultimatum lapsed, Azimio reiterated demands, also urged govt to withdraw controversial 2023 finance bill, which expands tax base amid growing debt pressure.

Al-Shabaab staged attacks as Kenya announced reopening of border with Somalia. Explosive devices allegedly planted by Al-Shabaab 1 and 14 May injured nine people in Burta Ashaqa village, Mandera county. Kenya and Somalia 15 May announced reopening by mid-August of three border crossings, which Kenya closed in 2011 in bid to prevent Al-Shabaab attacks; move signals thawing relations and emergence of trade as key agenda item between neighbouring countries, but raises risk of Al-Shabaab seeking refuge in Kenya as Somali govt presses its offensive against group.

Violence over resources continued in north despite above-average rainfall. Most of Kenya – except south and south-eastern regions – received above-average rainfall during March-May season, providing welcome relief. Clashes over land and cattle however continued. Notably, armed men 6 May killed police officer and stole 200 cattle in Samburu county.

In other important developments. Amid protests over insecurity in Isebania town, Migori county, demonstrators 25 May reportedly attempted to overrun police station; police shot four dead.

Mali

Authorities scheduled constitutional referendum for June amid mixed reactions, and UN report on 2022 Moura massacre prompted sharp response from Bamako, contributing to tense climate facing UN mission.

Malians to vote on new constitution in June. Military govt 5 May announced 18 June for constitutional referendum, originally scheduled for 19 March. New constitution expected to pass fairly easily despite concerns from some segments of society that it could open door for military junta members to run in presidential election expected in Feb 2024. Notably, Appel du 20 février coalition of political parties and civil society organisations 7 May claimed transitional authorities do not have mandate to adopt new constitution and lack sufficient territorial control to hold credible vote.

UN released long-awaited report on Moura massacre, heightening tension. UN Human Rights Office 12 May released report on March 2022 massacre in Moura village, Mopti region, concluding that Malian military and unspecified “foreign elements” killed about 500 civilians. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk same day said exactions could amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Bamako 13 May condemned “biased” and “fictious” report, claiming only “terrorists” were killed in Moura; also opened judicial inquiry against UN fact-finding mission over alleged “military conspiracy” and “espionage”.

IS Sahel maintained position in north, JNIM launched attacks in west. Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) 9 May ambushed and killed two members of 2015 Algiers peace agreement signatory armed group Movement for the Salvation of Azawad near Intadeyni village, Ménaka region (north east). In relatively uncommon attacks in Kayes region (west), suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 8 May ambushed troops near Kita town, 130km from capital Bamako, leaving six soldiers dead; 14 May reportedly attacked customs post in Melgué town, with unknown number of casualties.

Tensions between Bamako and signatory armed groups declined. National Reconciliation Minister Col. Ismaël Wagué 12 May met with representatives of coalition of formerly separatist armed groups signatory to Algiers Accord, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), in Kidal city; parties likely talked about modalities for holding constitutional referendum in CMA-held territory, as CMA has previously come out against new constitution.

Mozambique

End of holy month of Ramadan and rainy season coincided with resurgence of Islamist militant attacks in northern province. 

Violence resurged in Cabo Delgado after weeks-long lull. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) from late April stepped up activity in Cabo Delgado province (north), mostly along Messalo river. Notably in Macomia district, suspected ISMP and Local Forces (militia allied with govt) around 5 May clashed near Litandacua village, with at least two Local Forces injured; suspected ISMP 14 May launched assault on base of Southern African Development Community mission in Macomia town but were repelled; presence of militants also reported around 26 May near Novo Cabo Delgado and Litandacua villages. In Muidumbe district, govt soldiers and Local Forces 3 May engaged suspected ISMP in Mandela village, reportedly killing six. Militants were sighted again in Nangade district, where they have not been seen since Feb, prompting residents who had recently returned home to move back to Nangade district headquarters. Notably, suspected ISMP 19 May briefly abducted 12 civilians in Nkonga village, warning them not to collaborate with security forces; police 24 May ambushed suspected ISMP militants near Ngangolo village, killing five, while police lost two officers.

TotalEnergies published report on Cabo Delgado, key step to restart LNG project. TotalEnergies 23 May released long-awaited report on humanitarian situation in northern province, which will inform deliberations about resuming Mozambique LNG project; report highlighted improvement, particularly with return of displaced persons to Palma and Mocímboa da Praia towns.

Civil society expressed concern over municipal election process. Ahead of municipal elections scheduled for 11 Oct, More Integrity consortium of seven local civil society organisations 16 May called for extension of voter registration period, saying irregularities and equipment breakdowns threaten integrity of registration. National Electoral Commission 19 May announced extension of opening hours for voter registration but refused to extend registration period, citing budgetary constraints. Meanwhile, ruling party Frelimo 3 May submitted draft amendment to change constitution and postpone country’s first district elections scheduled for 2024 as part of 2018 deal on decentralisation and demobilisation of armed wing of main opposition party Renamo; Renamo immediately protested move.

Niger

President Bazoum maintained hard-line approach toward critics of French military presence, and deadly violence persisted in region bordering Burkina Faso.

Govt arrested critics of security partnership with France. Govt 2 May accused civil society group Union Committee Tillabery for Peace, Security and Social Cohesion of “sowing disorder” after group late April accused French forces of seeking to destabilise Niger and demanded their departure; police same day detained group’s leader Amadou Arouna Maïga.

Tillabéry region (south west) saw jihadist and intercommunal violence. In Gotheye department, military convoy 7 May hit explosive device likely planted by al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims near Samira Hill gold mine, leaving seven soldiers dead. Suspected Islamic State Sahel Province militants 3-13 May attacked villages in Tillabery’s Téra department, killing at least eight people. Meanwhile, in Tillabery department, clashes late April-early May erupted between sedentary Djerma and nomadic Fulani communities in Dessa, Kandadji and Ayorou communes, leaving at least ten people dead and up to 18,000 displaced, who mid-May returned home.

Security operations continued along Nigerian border in south east. Military 10 May announced intercepting 1,400 Boko Haram militants since March as they fled into Diffa region following clashes with rival Islamic State faction in Nigeria’s Borno state; 30 combatants also killed during operations. Military 29 May said joint operation with Nigerian army 6-28 May left 55 Islamic State West Africa Province militants dead in Niger-Nigeria border regions, including several senior commanders.

Nigeria

Bola Tinubu sworn in as president, while violence continued countrywide after brief lull during election period.

New president sworn as election results remained challenged. Following election marred by continuing legal challenges, Bola Ahmed Tinubu 29 May took office as president; during inauguration ceremony, Tinubu identified security as his administration’s “top priority”, promised reform of security agencies and greater investment in “training, equipment, pay and firepower” of security personnel.

Criminal violence, notably kidnapping for ransom, continued unabated in North West Zone. Numerous kidnapping incidents reported in Kaduna state. Notably, armed groups 7 May abducted 40 worshippers at church in Madala village, Chikun area, and 12 May kidnapped 22 villagers of Kagarko area. In Niger state, gunmen 9-12 May raided several villages in Paikoro and Rijau areas, kidnapping scores. In Zamfara state, gunmen 24 May killed 20 farmers in Maradun area, while at least 26 people were killed 30 May in three separate incidents in Maru area.

Herder-farmer conflict flared in North Central Zone, insecurity mounted in Abuja. In Plateau state, spate of attacks in villages of Mangu area 15-17 May left at least 125 residents dead and forced over 20,000 to flee; local authorities blamed violence on herders. Amid mounting insecurity in Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, security forces 7 May rescued 134 persons, mostly kidnapped in Abaji, Kuje and Kwali areas. Gunmen 14 May stormed housing estate in Kuje area and kidnapped at least 15 people.

Jihadist and communal violence persisted in North East Zone. Military reported continuing gains against Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province, with 26 combatants killed and 511 fighters and their families surrendering to troops 4-18 May. However, vehicles of Multinational Joint Task Force 14 May set off explosive devices in Arege area in Borno state, with three soldiers killed.

Separatist and other violence continued to plague South East Zone. South East also saw first attack on diplomatic personnel and assets, as gunmen 17 May ambushed convoy of vehicles conveying U.S. embassy staff to flood response project in Anambra state, killing seven people and kidnapping another three; police 18 May blamed attack on Indigenous People of Biafra separatist group, which condemned incident.

Rwanda

President Kagame failed to attend regional peace summit on eastern DR Congo crisis; despite heightened bilateral tensions, Kigali and Kinshasa revived agreement on refugee repatriation.

Regional peace summit proceeded without Kagame. President Kagame 6 May failed to attend 11th summit of Regional Oversight Mechanism of Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for DR Congo and Great Lakes region, with PM Edouard Ngirente representing Rwanda. Participants called for “restraint, de-escalation … and pursuit of dialogue” between Kigali and Kinshasa amid heightened bilateral tensions since resurgence in March 2022 of M23 movement in eastern DR Congo (see Burundi).

Kigali and Kinshasa made headway on voluntary repatriation of refugees. During meeting in Switzerland, Rwanda, DR Congo and UN Refugee Agency 15 May signed joint statement committing to resuming facilitation of sustainable return and reintegration pathways for Congolese refugees in Rwanda and Rwandan refugees in DR Congo, in line with 2010 Tripartite Agreement on voluntary repatriation. Parties to hold follow-up technical meeting in Kenya in June to define practicalities. 

Senegal

Political tensions continued to mount as court sentenced opposition leader Ousmane Sonko in libel case while rape trial opened, sparking deadly protests.

Clashes between opposition supporters and police left several dead. Court of appeal 8 May extended prominent opposition leader Ousmane Sonko’s suspended prison sentence in libel case from two to six months, which could prevent him from running in presidential vote scheduled for Feb 2024. Sonko 8-9 May called on supporters to “stand up and fight with all available means” and 12 May filed appeal at Court of Cassation. On eve of Sonko’s trial in separate rape case, pro-Sonko protesters 15 May clashed with police in Ziguinchor city, Sonko’s stronghold in Casamance region (south), and capital Dakar; interior ministry next day said clashes left two civilians dead. Prosecutor 24 May asked court to find Sonko guilty of rape and sentence him to ten-year jail term. Sonko same day called on supporters to join him for march of defiance to Dakar, which 26 May left Ziguinchor. Security forces 28 May stopped caravan and escorted Sonko to his house in Dakar. Pro-Sonko supporters next day clashed with police in Dakar, and Sonko 30 May reiterated call for civil disobedience.

Opposition to President Sall’s potential third term bid persisted. Coalition of civil society and political parties (F24 coalition) 12 May demonstrated in Dakar against Sall’s potential third term bid, with no incidents reported. Upon Sall’s invitation, govt and various political and civil society actors 31 May convened for national dialogue talks.

Govt forces clashed with separatists in Casamance region. Local media 10 May reported army clashed with faction of separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) during combing operation near Sindian village in northern Casamance, leaving five soldiers injured. Meanwhile, two other MFDC factions 13 May officially laid down arms during ceremony with state representatives in Bignona department as part of ongoing peace process.

Somalia

As military operations against Al-Shabaab reached standstill, group launched major attack on African Union (AU) military base, leaving large number dead; Puntland state conducted local elections amid tensions and violence.

Al-Shabaab conducted largest attack on AU mission in a year. In Lower Shabelle region (South West state), Al-Shabaab 26 May targeted Buulo Mareer base manned by Ugandan contingent of AU Transition Mission; group claimed 137 soldiers killed, while Ugandan military source said Uganda lost “under 100” troops.

Govt struggled to get offensive off ground in south and sustain gains in centre. Mogadishu failed to make significant progress against Al-Shabaab militants in country’s south, illustrating difficulty in getting military offensive’s second phase off ground. As level of external military assistance remained unclear, govt and Kenyan officials 12 May met to discuss Nairobi’s pledge of support for southern offensive. Recurring clan conflict in centre distracted clans from fight with Al-Shabaab, threatening consolidation of gains made during offensive’s first phase. Notably in Hirshabelle state’s Hiraan region, clan conflict in May erupted between Hawadle and Gaaljecel clans, around Beledweyne city, and between Hawadle and Ayr clans around Mataban town.

Local vote held in Puntland despite rising tensions and violence. Group of Puntland opposition leaders mid-May called for postponement of 25 May local council elections, saying they are part of plot by Puntland President Said Deni to extend his term. Puntland forces and militia 16 May clashed near Garowe airport reportedly over delivery of electoral materials, leaving three dead. Puntland’s attorney general next day ordered arrest of four opposition politicians for alleged role in fighting. Govt and opposition 23 May reached agreement that saw arrest warrants withdrawn and election proceed peacefully in all but three districts. Puntland-Mogadishu relations remained tense. PM Abdi Barre 8 May complained Puntland’s non-participation in National Consultative Council (NCC) meetings between federal govt and member states threatens progress on debt relief, while Deni next day accused Mogadishu of “attempting to destabilise” Puntland by backing opposition.

In other important developments. NCC 28 May announced restructuring of political system, including direct elections every five years and abolishment of premiership; moves, which will require constitutional amendment, were criticised by some opposition and regional politicians as unconstitutional.

Somaliland

Fighting between govt forces and Dhulbahante clan militias spread in Sool region; as parties recruit new fighters, conflict could morph into confrontation between clan families and ripple into other parts of Somaliland.

Govt and local clan militias clashed north of Las Anod. Govt forces and Dhulbahante fighters 16-17 May clashed heavily around Dhabansaar and Samakab villages, north of Sool region’s capital Las Anod, as field of conflict widened; warring parties fought for control of road connecting Las Anod to Burco town, with reports that militias from wider Harti clan joined the fray in support of Dhulbahante. Recruitment of new fighters risks fuelling confrontations between clan families and widening conflict beyond Sool. Meanwhile, in attempt to woo Dhulbahante voters living on Somalia side of border in lead-up to 25 May local elections in Puntland state (see Somalia), Puntland President Said Deni 10 May pledged commitment to “liberating” Las Anod from Somaliland forces, raising concern of more substantial backing for Dhulbahante militias.

Violence also flared elsewhere. Protesters clashed with security forces in various locations in lead-up to 18 May Independence Day, including 8 May in Borama city, Awdal region (west), where local clan members have long complained about marginalisation. Communal clashes between two Isaaq sub-clans 15 May left two dead in Togdheer region’s capital Burco (centre); President Bihi and opposition leader Abdirahman Irro (who hail from respective sub-clans) in following days reportedly travelled to Burco to lead reconciliation efforts.

South Sudan

Influx of people fleeing Sudan put pressure on scarce resources in Upper Nile state, raising ethnic tensions; militia leader returned to Juba.

South Sudan struggled to cope with refugee influx from Sudan. As of 23 May, over 73,000 refugees and returnees had reportedly crossed into South Sudan, mostly through Renk county (Upper Nile State), from Sudan where fighting continued (see Sudan). With new arrivals, dire humanitarian situation in Upper Nile deteriorated amid lack of food, clean water and sanitation, raising ethnic tensions. Notably, brawl between two groups of displaced South Sudanese over water in Renk county 15 May killed one; fighting 28 May erupted at water point in Malakal town between Nuer and Shilluk communities. Situation could worsen, especially with coming rainy season. Meanwhile, President Kiir spearheaded Intergovernmental Authority on Development regional bloc’s mediation efforts between Sudan’s warring parties. Sudanese army 8 May sent envoy to capital Juba, paramilitary Rapid Support Forces 17 May reciprocated; fighting continued despite efforts.

Militia leader returned to Juba, more opposition figures defected to govt. After peace agreement with govt in Jan 2022 and months of subsequent negotiations, Shilluk Agwalek militia leader Gen. Johnson Olony 14 May arrived in Juba; unclear whether return will de-escalate tensions in Upper Nile, where Olony was reportedly mobilising for attack on areas along White Nile controlled by VP Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO). Govt 14 May announced dozens of high-ranking SPLA-IO members from Machar’s strongholds in Jonglei and Unity states joined ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement; around two dozen members of Simon Gatwech’s SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction same day joined govt.

Violence persisted in several states. In disputed Abyei region between Sudan and South Sudan, unknown assailants 20 May killed five in Hafir el-Silik area. In Jonglei State, armed group 23 May looted World Food Programme trucks outside UN compound in Bor county.

In other important developments. Legislative assembly 9 May ratified UN convention prohibiting use, production and stockpiling of cluster munitions. UN Security Council 26 May extended sanctions on South Sudan, including arms embargo, for another year.

Sudan

Fighting between army and paramilitary force escalated in Khartoum and Darfur, where growing involvement of tribal militias and armed groups raises risk of all-out civil war; various mediation initiatives failed to halt violence.

Hostilities intensified in and around Khartoum. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fought over strategic sites in capital Khartoum and sister cities Omdurman and Bahri as conflict escalated; SAF pounded cities with heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, while RSF used guerrilla warfare and ground-to-air missiles. Fighting also continued in North Kordofan state capital El Obeid, but subsided in Kassala, Red Sea, Gedaref and Blue Nile states. Both forces faced internal challenges: SAF’s inability to defeat RSF created discontent within its ranks, raising fears of mutiny; RSF’s reputation worsened further, with its leaders unable to prevent troops from looting and vandalising property as reports of rape also emerged.

Fighting surged in Darfur, fuelling intercommunal tensions. RSF intensified attacks in Darfur region as it sought control of major cities, possibly to strengthen negotiating position. Conflict aggravated intercommunal tensions, especially between Rezigat and Masalit groups, leading to frequent clashes. Notably, intercommunal violence 12-13 May in West Darfur state capital el-Geneina killed at least 280 people and displaced thousands. Reports late May emerged of armed militias laying siege to Zalengei town, Central Darfur state. Governor of Darfur and leader of Sudan Liberation Army/Movement Minni Minnawi 28 May called on Darfuris to arm themselves in light of region’s growing lawlessness. Continued hostilities risk entangling more tribal groups, including from neighbouring countries, making risk of all-out civil war in Darfur very high.

SAF and RSF held talks in Jeddah amid competing mediation tracks. Despite AU attempts to ensure coordinated mediation process, stakeholders initiated several and at times competing negotiating tracks. Most notably, South Sudan spearheaded Intergovernmental Authority on Development regional bloc’s mediation efforts (see South Sudan), while U.S.-Saudi-brokered talks 6 May began in Saudi Arabian city Jeddah. Both tracks produced agreements, but with little change on the ground, civilians continued to bear brunt, with well over 800 killed and 1.4mn displaced as of 29 May amid escalating humanitarian crisis.

Tanzania

Dodoma announced decision to revive constitutional review process.

President Suluhu Hassan 6 May gave go-ahead to revive constitution-writing process, which had stalled in 2015, in line with recommendation made in Sept 2022 by govt-backed task force on democratic reform.

Uganda

Assassination of minister by bodyguard headlined month of multiple killings involving security personnel.

Spate of shootings put spotlight on gun violence and weak weapons control system. Bodyguard 2 May shot and killed Labour Minister Charles Okello Engola at his home in capital Kampala. Also in Kampala, unidentified assailants 6 May shot influential vlogger Ibrahim Tusubira (alias Isma Olaxes) dead. Several other incidents of fatal gun violence involving police or private security guards reported in May throughout country. Meanwhile, authorities in Kayunga district said they were investigating 15 May robbery in which four gunmen in army uniforms set up illegal roadblocks near police station and robbed travellers.

Cattle-related violence in Karamoja sub-region remained on govt’s agenda. Military around 11 May deployed additional troops in Karamoja sub-region bordering Kenya and South Sudan, where army continues disarmament exercise in bid to contain cattle thefts and herder-farmer violence. Following recent instances of cross-border violence, President Museveni 19 May inked executive order banning armed Kenyan Turkanas from entering Uganda and asking Turkanas both to return all “stolen” cattle to Uganda and to surrender those alleged to have killed Ugandan geologists in March within six months; pastoralists from Kenya’s Turkana county often cross into Uganda’s Karamoja sub-region during dry spell in search of water and pasture.

In other important developments. Civil society activists 22-28 May held online campaign to highlight brutality and corruption in police and other law enforcement agencies, as well as to expose service provision weaknesses in roads and health sectors. House committee 23 May presented recommendations on iron sheets corruption scandal, calling for three of 15 top officials suspected of involvement to be put on trial. Museveni 29 May enacted repressive anti-LGTB+ law, sparking widespread condemnation. Notably, U.S. President Biden same day decried move as “tragic violation” of human rights.

Zimbabwe

Clampdown on govt critics in run-up to general elections sparked outcry, and Constitutional Court rejected bid to postpone vote now scheduled for 23 August.

Conviction of high-profile opposition figure sparked outcry. Court in capital Harare 3 May sentenced prominent lawmaker from main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), Job Sikhala, to pay $600 fine for obstruction of justice or else serve six months in prison; Sikhala remained in custody awaiting trial on other charges, including inciting violence. CCC leader Nelson Chamisa next day condemned “unjust and unfair” verdict, demanded immediate release of Sikhala and “all political prisoners”. European Union delegation in Zimbabwe 3 May called on country’s judiciary to protect fundamental rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and NGO Amnesty International also next day said sentence was “further evidence of an escalating crackdown on peaceful dissent”. In response, ruling party Zanu-PF around 7 May said Zimbabwe’s judicial system is free of political interference.

Election preparations went ahead despite challenges from opposition. Constitutional Court 8 May dismissed application by Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai opposition party leader Douglas Mwonzora seeking postponement of general elections on grounds that electoral commission’s constituency delimitation report is null and void; Mwonzora same day decried ruling as politically motivated. After electoral commission 27-31 May made voter roll available for public inspection, CCC signalled “serious anomalies” including registered voters missing or misplaced in list. President Mnangagwa 31 May scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections for 23 August.

Asia

Afghanistan

Taliban claimed they killed deputy leader of Islamic State’s local branch, while border clashes erupted between Taliban and Iranian forces, killing at least three.

Violence countrywide remained low despite Taliban crackdown on Islamic State. Hostilities remained at low ebb compared to past 18 months. Notably, Taliban 8 May announced that they had killed deputy head of Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) in recent operation; announcement followed U.S. statement 25 April that ISKP’s mastermind behind August 2021 attack at Kabul Airport had been killed, reportedly by Taliban. After suffering loss of several leaders in recent months, ISKP may go further underground to rebuild capabilities. Taliban suppressed other insurgents: reports 12 May emerged that former Afghan governor of Bamyan province (centre), Muhammad Tahir Zuhair, who had joined Mawlawi Mehdi’s rebellion against Taliban, had surrendered.

Taliban and Iran traded barbs over water dispute and exchanged fire at border. Amid water shortages on both sides of Iran-Afghan border, FMs 17 May discussed flow of Helmand river to Iran. Iran’s President Raisi next day urged Kabul to take seriously Iran’s concerns and abide by 1973 water agreement; in response, Taliban voiced commitment to 1973 deal and criticised Raisi’s statements as “harmful” to bilateral ties. Skirmishing with heavy weapons at border post between Nimroz province (south west) and Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province 27 May killed at least two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter; such fatalities along border are unusual, and no link with water dispute was confirmed.

Taliban’s emir reportedly met Qatar’s PM, UN criticised Taliban’s harsh justice. Reuters 31 May reported that Qatar’s PM held talks with Taliban’s Supreme Leader on 12 May in Kandahar city, which if confirmed marks first such meeting between Taliban emir and foreign leader. Taliban-run Supreme Court 4 May announced that courts had handed down 175 judgements of qisas (death penalty) and 37 stonings since returning to power. UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 7 May published report calling Taliban’s use of corporal punishment violation of peremptory norms of international law and urged death penalty moratorium. Meanwhile, Minister of Interior Siraj Haqqani 11 May stated that Taliban govt should not be so exclusive that only people from “one madrasah” see themselves being represented.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) vowed to step up protests to unseat govt, violence and cyclone struck Rohingya refugee camps, and armed attacks continued in Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Tensions remained elevated between govt and opposition. After opposition BNP late April announced it would step up protests with aim of creating mass movement by Islamic holiday Eid-ul-Adha in late June/early July, BNP activists 17 May held march in capital Dhaka at which senior member declared “popular uprising to remove this government”; police arrested hundreds of BNP members following marches in major cities 23-28 May. Govt pressed ahead with 11 charges against BNP leader Khaleda Zia. Ahead of general election in Jan 2024, head of the Election Commission 15 May warned it would be difficult to hold “impartial election” if govt “lacks political will”. U.S. 24 May announced new policy to impose visa restrictions on individuals and family members “if they are responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh”.

Violence continued in Rohingya refugee camps, where cyclone made landfall. In Ukhiya camps, gunfight between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and rival group 8 May injured three; armed assailant 11 May shot dead man; security forces 15 May shot dead Rohingya man during raid on “criminals”. Delegation of around 20 Rohingya and officials 5 May visited Myanmar’s Rakhine State aimed at facilitating voluntary repatriation; Myanmar delegation 25 May visited Cox’s Bazar to discuss repatriation with refugees. World Food Programme late month revealed plans to cut rations for second time this year, from $10 to $8 per day; govt said it would cause malnutrition and could force Rohingya into criminality to survive. Meanwhile, Cyclone Mocha 14 May made landfall in Cox’s Bazar, damaging or destroying estimated 10,000 Rohingya shelters as well as community facilities (see Myanmar).

Insecurity persisted in Chittagong Hill Tracts. Authorities 8 May found three members of Bawm minority group dead in Bandarban district, following reports of gunfire. Authorities 14 May found member of armed group United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) shot dead in Rangamati. Militant ambush 16 May killed two army soldiers on boundary of Bandarban and Bilaichari districts near Myanmar border; security forces blamed Kuki-Chin National Army.

China/Japan

Amid Chinese maritime presence in East China Sea, Japan lodged protests and resorted to new hotline; G7 expressed concern over region, while Tokyo strengthened defence ties to Europe.

Japan protested and used military hotline amid China’s maritime activity. As of 28 May, Japan spotted 98 Chinese vessels in its contiguous zone and 12 ships inside its territorial sea. Notably, Japan 11 May lodged diplomatic protests with Beijing over Chinese intrusions around Japan-controlled and disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea, as two Chinese coast guard ships passed within 12-mile limit and remained in waters for some 35 hours in 13th such incident in 2023; Chinese navy flotilla same day sailed through Miyako Strait and waters between Japan’s Okinawa Islands. Japan 16 May for first time used military hotline established with China in March to discuss East China Sea. Tokyo 8 May announced that Japanese forces will deploy surface-to-air guided PAC-3 missiles at its base on Miyako Island in Okinawa Prefecture, citing North Korean ballistic missile threats (see Korean Peninsula); given proximity to Taiwan, however, observers questioned if deployment is also aimed at countering threat of China’s missiles.

G7 voiced concerns over East China Sea, Japan courted ties with NATO and UK. During G7 summit in Japan, leaders in joint communique 20 May said they “remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas” and “strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion.” After reports early month revealed NATO intended to open liaison office in Japan and pair will upgrade cooperation ahead of NATO summit in July, China 4 May said alliance’s “eastward foray” will “inevitably undermine regional peace and stability”. UK and Japan 18 May signed “Hiroshima Accord”, described as “enhanced global strategic partnership” aimed at strengthening cooperation in broad range of areas, including defence.

India

Ethnic clashes in north east killed scores and displaced tens of thousands, stoking dormant separatist insurgency.

Ethnic violence erupted in Manipur, killing at least 80. In Manipur state bordering Myanmar in India’s north east, thousands of members of Kuki-Zomi tribe 3 May protested in Churachandpur district against possible extension of their state-recognised identity-linked benefits to ethnic majority Hindu Meitei community, which demands tribal status in part to acquire land in hills populated by Kuki-Zomi tribes. Violence broke out between Kuki and Meitei people, which killed at least 80, displaced 35,000 (including hundreds that fled into Myanmar) and destroyed thousands of homes, properties and churches; unrest prompted govt to deploy thousands of troops. Fresh rounds of rioting and arson 21 May erupted, with govt extending internet ban until 26 May. In worrying sign, Kuki insurgent groups – which signed ceasefire agreement with govt in 2008 – demanded separate administrative entity within India, amid uptick in militant violence: suspected militants 24 May shot dead resident in Bishnupur district; clashes late month continued between security forces and militants amid reports of several civilian deaths and claims from Manipur’s chief minister that security forces had killed some 40 Kuki militants.

India-China relations remained tense amid G20 boycott. China 23 May boycotted G20 working group meeting on tourism hosted by govt in Kashmir’s summer capital Srinagar, citing opposition to “holding any kind of G20 meetings in disputed territory” (see India-Pakistan). Indian FM S. Jaishankar 27 May stated India faced “very complicated challenge” from China, particularly in border regions.

Maoist violence persisted. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), Maoists 21 May shot and injured two security forces personnel during security operation in Dantewada district. In capital New Delhi, security forces same day arrested head of People’s Liberation Front of India, Maoist outfit active in Jharkhand state (east). In Telangana state (south), security forces 22 May arrested five Maoist supporters and five Maoist militia members in Kothagudem district.

In other important developments. Ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 13 May lost election in Karnataka state (south) to opposition Congress party, boosting latter’s confidence ahead of national elections in 2024. Delhi High Court 22 May issued summons to BBC in defamation case for documentary made on PM Modi.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Relations between New Delhi and Islamabad remained acrimonious as India hosted G20 meeting in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), where deadly violence persisted.

India and Pakistan exchanged criticism amid G20 meeting in Srinagar. In first visit by Pakistani FM since 2016, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari 4 May arrived in India for Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Council but did not hold bilateral meetings with his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar. In their respective addresses to conference, Jaishankar said neglecting menace of terrorism would be “detrimental to our society and interests”, while Bhutto-Zardari warned against “weaponising terrorism for diplomatic point scoring”. Zardari-Bhutto 5 May stated Pakistan is open to dialogue but needs India to “create a conducive environment for talks”, citing India’s decision to revoke J&K’s special autonomy status in 2019 as making engagement “difficult”. In response, Jaishankar said only topic of discussion with Pakistan on Kashmir is about when they would “give up their occupation of Pakistan[-administered] Kashmir.” India 22-24 May hosted G20 working group meeting on tourism in Srinagar, summer capital of Indian-administered Kashmir; Pakistan condemned meeting being held in disputed territory, accusing India of instrumentalising its G20 presidency for political purposes, while China, Türkiye, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Oman also skipped it.

Security operations and militant attacks continued in J&K. Notably, security forces 3 May killed two militants in alleged infiltration attempt in Kupwara district; 4 May killed two Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militants in Baramulla district and claimed to foil plot to attack G20 meeting. Gunfight during security operation near Kashmir’s Line of Control against militants of People’s Anti-Fascist Front (considered to be offshoot of Jaish-e-Mohammad) 5 May killed five Indian security personnel. Security forces 20 May shot dead alleged Pakistani intruder in Poonch district and alleged militant in Mendhar sector. Govt 3 May expanded immunity against arrest to all “armed forces of the Union of India” deployed in J&K and Ladakh.

Indonesia

Separatist fighters in Papua region threatened to kill kidnapped pilot.

Members of West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) – military wing of Free Papua Organisation – 26 May threatened to kill captured New Zealand pilot Philip Mehrtens unless outside powers engage in dialogue on Papua’s independence within two months; Mehrtens was taken hostage by group in Feb in remote, mountainous regency of Nduga, Papua province.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea began attempts to launch satellite as U.S. and South Korea started large-scale drills in run-up to alliance anniversary, raising tensions and risk of miscalculation in June.

Pyongyang attempted satellite launch, U.S. and South Korea began largest ever live drills. Pyongyang 28 May announced plans for launch of military reconnaissance satellite between 31 May and 11 June, one of leader Kim Jong-un’s five military priorities announced in Jan 2021; Japan’s defence ministry warned it would take “destructive measures” if ballistic or other missiles used for launch “land in our territory”. In Pyongyang’s first launch attempt 31 May, rocket crashed off west coast; Pyongyang vowed second attempt. Concurrently, U.S. and South Korean forces 25 May began largest-ever live-fire drills close to North Korean border, commencing period of military exercises extending into June to mark 70th anniversary of alliance. Heightened activity on peninsula in June could lead to misconceptions about each side’s intentions that raises risk of clashes, potentially in form of cross-border skirmishes or between vessels in West Sea.

South Korea and Japan strengthened rapprochement. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida 7 May held summit in South Korean capital Seoul, reciprocating Yoon’s ground-breaking trip to Japan in mid-March; Kishida remarked that his “heart aches” over treatment of Koreans during colonial period but stopped short of full apology. Pair subsequently advanced military plan in which radar and command-and-control systems used by Japanese and U.S. forces in Japan would be connected to South Korean military and U.S. Forces Korea via U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; goal of linkage is to provide more effective trilateral monitoring of regional military activities and eliminate surveillance blind spots.

South Korea agreed to supply Ukraine, North Korea inched toward reopening China border. Wall Street Journal 25 May reported South Korea had agreed to supply hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds to Ukraine via U.S. After Chinese companies with experience shipping cargo to North Korea by truck were issued so-called “river crossing passes” in April, May witnessed abnormal levels of maintenance of North Korean aircraft used for international routes, potentially signalling Pyongyang’s intent to soon reopen Chinese border to human traffic for first time since pandemic.

Myanmar

Deadly clashes continued between military and resistance forces, regime released over 2,000 prisoners, and cyclone wreaked devastation and killed hundreds of Rohingya in coastal areas.

Countrywide clashes continued between military and ethnic armed groups. In southern Shan State (east), military 5-6 May bombed Pekon township after Karenni Nationalities Defence Force and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) 26 April killed some 20 regime soldiers. Unidentified gunmen 7 May attacked regional bloc ASEAN’s diplomatic convoy comprising Indonesian and Singaporean diplomats carrying supplies for Hsi Hseng township displacement camp. In Chin State (north west), Chin National Army 1 May clashed with military on Hakha-Gangaw road, Magway region, killing several soldiers. Chinland Defence Force in Matupi town 5 May ambushed military base, killing two officers; military 9 May launched airstrike on group’s headquarters in Hakha township, killing two. In Kayin State (south east), Karen National Liberation Army Brigade 5 on 2 May attacked military post in War Thot Kho village, killing seven soldiers and guards.

Regime released prisoners, urged resistance fighters to disarm. Regime 3 May released 2,153 political prisoners and commuted 38 death sentences to life imprisonment, timed to coincide with Chinese FM Qin Gang’s first visit to capital Nay Pyi Taw since Feb 2021 coup. Regime 9 May invited members of “terrorist groups” and “illegal organisations” to “return to the legal fold”. Regime-controlled election commission continued to prepare for elections, approving re-registration of nine ethnic minority parties; no election date has been set.

ASEAN reasserted Five-Point Consensus to manage crisis. ASEAN leaders 11 May jointly stated Five-Point Consensus remained “main reference” and for first time backed Indonesia’s approach of engaging all stakeholders. Statement also supported efforts to repatriate Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh: delegation of 20 Rohingya refugees 5 May held “go and see” visit to Rakhine State (see Bangladesh).

Severe cyclone made landfall, hundreds fled conflict in India’s north east. Cyclone Mocha 14 May became strongest ever to make landfall on Myanmar-Bangladesh coast; hitting near Sittwe, it killed at least 400, primarily Rohingya, in coastal areas or camps, and devastated lowland areas and livelihoods of 1.6mn people. Meanwhile, ethnic conflict flared in India’s Manipur state, killing scores and forcing some 300 Indians to flee into Sagaing region (see India).

Nepal

Refugee scandal embroiled mainstream parties, while PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal undertook first visit to India since taking office.

Refugee scandal rocked major parties. Following arrests made by police, Kathmandu District Attorney’s Office 24 May filed charges against three senior politicians – former deputy PM, former home minister and former home secretary, all members of ruling Nepali Congress or opposition Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) – and 27 others for their alleged involvement in issuing fraudulent documents to Nepali nationals to enter U.S. as Bhutanese refugees. Speculation grew that Nepali Congress may threaten to quit ruling coalition after it had reportedly unsuccessfully lobbied against arrests of senior officials.

PM Dahal visited India. In his first foreign visit since becoming PM, Pushpa Kamal Dahal 31 May arrived in India’s capital New Delhi for four-day state visit, signalling continued importance of bilateral ties. U.S. State Department’s 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom issued 15 May claimed that religious groups associated with India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party had lobbied Nepali politicians in favour of restoring Hinduism as official state religion; Nepal’s foreign ministry 28 May sent “diplomatic note” to U.S. embassy regarding report.

Pakistan

Arrest of former PM Imran Khan triggered deadly unrest, widening breach with govt and straining Khan’s relations with military; militant attacks continued in provinces bordering Afghanistan.

Street clashes between Khan’s supporters and security forces killed nine and injured hundreds. Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 3 May informed Supreme Court that dialogue with govt on election dates had failed. Khan 6 May announced mass protests and alleged Major General Faisal Naseer was responsible for two assassination attempts against him. While at Islamabad High Court, paramilitary rangers 9 May arrested Khan for failing to join investigation on corruption charges, prompting enraged Khan supporters to take to streets in several cities and attack police and paramilitary personnel, govt buildings and military sites, including corps commander’s house in Lahore and army headquarters in Rawalpindi. Govt deployed troops in Islamabad, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and military 10 May warned of severe retaliation against “group that wants to push Pakistan into a civil war”; police arrested most of PTI leadership. Violence – which killed nine and injured almost 300 – 11 May subsided as Supreme Court invalidated Khan’s arrest and Islamabad High Court granted him bail. PTI next day renewed calls for nationwide protests, as Khan blamed army chief Asim Munir for his “abduction” and “organised conspiracy” against PTI. Military 15 May decided to try civilians involved in attacks on its sites through military courts, prompting widespread opposition. Defence minister 24 May said govt may ban PTI.

Deadly militant attacks persisted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s North Waziristan, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 4 May claimed attack that killed six soldiers; shooting at school in Kurram district same day killed six Shia Turi Bangash tribe members; TTP militants 23 May attacked energy facility in Hangu district, killing six security guards. In Balochistan province, militants 12 May killed two soldiers in attack on police camp in Saifullah district; operation to clear site next day left six soldiers, six militants and civilian dead.

Relations with Afghan Taliban remained strained. After govt raised concerns about cross-border militancy, Afghan Taliban’s FM 8 May said Islamabad and TTP should “find a solution to these problems on their own”.

Philippines

Insecurity continued in south amid clan violence and militant surrenders, while deadly fighting persisted between military and Communist rebels.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsomoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Gunfight 2 May erupted between two clans from different villages in Malabang town, Lanao del Sur province, injuring three civilians and one police officer. In Maguindanao del Sur, unidentified gunmen 15 May ambushed National Irrigation Administration employee and his daughter in Shariff Aguak town; gunman 29 May shot former village councillor of Damasulay in Paglat town. Meanwhile, militant surrenders continued. Six Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) members 3 May surrendered in Sultan Kudarat town, Maguindanao del Norte province. Police 13 May formally received 50 BIFF members – including those who surrendered previously – in Parang town, Maguindanao del Norte. Two Abu Sayyaf group members 19 May surrendered to 18th Infantry Battalion in Al-Barka town, Basilan province.

Deadly clashes continued between military and communist rebels. Military operations and some militant ambushes by communist New People’s Army (NPA) in Mindanao Island in south, Visayas Islands in centre and Luzon Island in north killed at least 20 combatants and civilians. VP Sara Duterte 10 May assumed post as head of National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict, interagency govt body tackling insurgency.

Marawi’s rehabilitation continued. Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development 18 May said Task Force Bangon Marawi was set to complete all remaining rehabilitation projects by end of 2023; 500 permanent shelters are slated to be turned over to some of 15,000 displaced families. Marawi Compensation Board 23 May signed implementing guidelines on procedure for compensating war victims for loss of properties during Marawi conflict.

South China Sea

Philippines strengthened ties with U.S. and Japan amid tensions among claimant states at various flashpoints in South China Sea (SCS).

Philippines affirmed close cooperation with U.S. and Japan. Marking first visit by Philippine leader to U.S. in ten years, President Marcos, Jr. 1 May met U.S. President Biden in Washington; Biden affirmed “ironclad” commitment to defence of Philippines, including in disputed SCS, while Marcos, Jr. said it was “only natural” for Manila to be close to its sole treaty ally amid “most complicated geopolitical situation in the world”. Philippine military chief Andres Centino 18 May visited Balabac airbase, Palawan, to assure troops of provision of more resources and manpower; site is one of four granted to U.S. under bilateral Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement announced in April. Philippine FM Enrique Manalo and Japanese counterpart Hayashi Yoshimasa 16 May agreed to work together closely on SCS issues as well as against “economic coercion”. U.S. 30 May condemned China for “unnecessarily aggressive manoeuvre” against one of its aircraft operating in SCS.

Tensions surfaced among Philippines, Vietnam and China over competing claims. Philippines 14 May placed five navigational buoys bearing national flag within its Exclusive Economic Zone to assert sovereignty over disputed Spratly Islands; Vietnam, which also claims features, 18 May criticised move. China 24 May placed three buoys in Irving Reef, Whitsun Reef and Gaven Reef in Spratlys Islands. Vietnamese and Chinese vessels 14 May confronted each other at disputed Vanguard Bank area of SCS – claimed by China under its “nine-dash-line” – following Vietnamese notice of expanded oil-drilling operations in area. Meanwhile, on diplomatic front, Chinese and regional bloc ASEAN negotiating parties 17 May struck agreement to complete SCS Code of Conduct second reading this year. G7 leaders 20 May expressed “serious concerns” over situation in SCS, criticising “China’s expansive maritime claims” and its “militarisation activities in the region”.

Sri Lanka

Govt continued engagement with international lenders for economic recovery and promoted initiative to end ethnic conflict, as country marked 14 years since end of civil war.

Dialogue with International Monetary Fund (IMF) and creditors continued. After parliament late April approved in non-binding resolution govt’s agreement with IMF for $3bn fund, senior IMF staff 15-23 May held meetings to review progress, praising govt for having “already started implementing many of the challenging policy actions” but forecasting 3% contraction in economy this year. Members of Paris Club of bilateral donors 9 May held their first formal debt-restructuring negotiations co-chaired by Japan, France and India, which was attended by 26 nations, including Chinese govt observer.

Amid widespread scepticism, govt pursued initiatives to address decades-old ethnic conflict. President Wickremesinghe 1 May reiterated his determination “to address the ethnic problem”, adding, “I hope to reach a mutually agreeable solution by the end of this year”. After meeting Wickremesinghe, Tamil leaders 15 May expressed disappointment at lack of progress on devolution of power and failure to call long-overdue elections for provincial councils, with one parliamentarian describing talks as “nothing but a time-wasting tactic”. Cabinet 29 May approved proposal for Truth-Seeking Commission, drawing on experience of South Africa’s truth commission. Following series of controversies – including arrest of prominent comedian – over statements allegedly insulting Buddhism, Wickremesinghe 29 May ordered police to establish special police unit to “investigate into and act on persons or groups that disrupt religious harmony”.

Activists commemorated 14th anniversary of civil war’s end. Organisers mid-May held events across north and east to mark end of civil war on 18 May and remember tens of thousands of Tamil civilians believed to have been killed in final months of conflict. Sinhala nationalist activists 18 May violently disrupted low-key, multi-ethnic and multi-religious ceremony in capital Colombo to commemorate all those killed in war. In response to Canadian PM Justin Trudeau’s “Statement on Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day” on 18 May, foreign ministry summoned Canadian high commissioner to condemn Trudeau’s “arbitrary and erroneous” remarks.

Taiwan Strait

China maintained military activities around Taiwan, G7 leaders expressed importance of stability in strait, and Taiwan’s presidential candidates ruled out independence ahead of 2024 vote.

China continued aerial and maritime presence, Taiwan held military exercises. As of 29 May, Taiwan detected 348 Chinese military aircraft in its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), of which at least 124 crossed unofficial demarcation “median line” or entered south west region; Taiwan recorded 156 sightings of Chinese naval vessels in surrounding waters. Notably, Chinese reconnaissance drone accompanied by transport aircraft 3 May made round-island loop, several days after Chinese combat drone took similar path. Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong 27 May passed through Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s parliament 2 May passed law to allow officers of Coast Guard Administration to decide whether to fire cannons in emergency situations. Taiwan 15 May began annual series of tabletop military exercises, simulating responses to potential Chinese invasion.

G7 leaders acknowledged Taiwan, U.S. continued military support. During meeting in Japan, G7 leaders 20 May reaffirmed “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” and stated no change in members’ positions on Taiwan, including “one China policies”; Beijing same day said G7 should oppose “Taiwan independence”. U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee 16 May passed Taiwan International Solidarity Act, which aims to counter Chinese interference in Taiwan’s participation in international organisations. Taiwan Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng 7 May announced talks with U.S. on priority list of weapons under possible $500mn emergency grant; U.S. 16 May confirmed it will soon provide “significant additional security assistance”.

Taiwan’s main parties ruled out independence ahead of elections next year. Ahead of Jan 2024 elections, VP and ruling Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate William Lai 16 May asserted there is no need to publicly declare Taiwan’s independence as island is implicitly not part of People’s Republic of China, and formal declaration could cause more cross-strait tension. Opposition Kuomintang party 17 May nominated Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi as its presidential candidate; Hou 8 May said he opposes “one country, two systems” and will uphold Taiwan’s own democratic values, while emphasising Taiwan’s independence “has no legal basis under the Constitution”.

Thailand

Progressive opposition Move Forward Party won resounding election victory and began uncertain process of forming govt, while deadly violence continued at high levels in deep south.

Move Forward set about forming next govt. Progressive Move Forward Party (MFP) 14 May won 151 seats – including 32 of 33 Bangkok constituencies – in general election; main opposition Pheu Thai Party won 141 seats, while outgoing PM Prayuth Chan-ocha’s United Thai Nation Party and Deputy PM Prawit Wongsuwon’s Palang Pracharat Party won 36 and 40 seats, respectively. MFP leader Pita Limjareonrat quickly assembled eight-party coalition comprising 313 MPs, short of 376 required in joint sitting of upper and lower houses for majority. MFP and partners 22 May released 23-point agenda, which includes drafting new constitution, ending military conscription and abolishing monopolies; MFP’s pledge to reform lèse-majesté law was absent, likely reflecting need to win over members of 250-member junta-appointed Senate in vote for next govt, likely to take place in Aug at earliest. In meantime, MFP faces hurdles to form govt, including 10 May petition of Election Commission to investigate Pita over alleged illegal holding of shares in media company and possibility that prospective coalition partner Pheu Thai could form its own coalition that includes parties from incumbent govt; prospect of establishment preventing Move Forward from forming govt raises likelihood of mass protests and potential conflict.

Militants in deep south continued violent attacks following escalation in April. In Pattani province, roadside IED 3 May targeted police vehicle in Thung Yang Daeng district, injuring four police officers. Militants 11 May carried out arson attacks in some 30 locations across Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces, targeting mobile phone towers and electricity pylons. In Yala, IED 12 May killed one ranger and wounded three in Bannang Sata district; militants 16 May ambushed police vehicle in Muang district, wounding two police officers. Gunmen 22 May shot and killed Volunteer Defence Corps volunteer in Than To district, Yala. On political front, election winner MFP’s 22 May declaration included pledge to “collaborate on the process of building sustainable peace in the southern border provinces”.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

After long pause, high-level talks with Azerbaijan resumed as fatal clashes erupted along border.

U.S., EU and Russia facilitated parallel negotiations between Yerevan and Baku. Amid fears of major violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan after latter in late April installed checkpoint along Lachin road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) with Armenia, FMs 1 May met in U.S. capital Washington for talks. Key issues discussed included future of Armenians in NK, state border and resumption of transport links. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 4 May said parties “made tangible progress” and were “within reach of an agreement”; FMs 19 May held second meeting in Russian capital Moscow. PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev, meanwhile, 14 May met in Brussels, agreed to resume work on border delimitation agreement and made progress on transport routes. Leaders 25 May met Russian President Putin in Moscow, who said on “principal issues, there is an agreement”, though Aliyev and Pashinyan exchanged harsh words regarding Lachin. Meanwhile, Pashinyan 22 May told news conference that “Azerbaijan’s territory includes Nagorno-Karabakh”, but called for special arrangements to protect rights and security of ethnic Armenians living in enclave (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Sides traded blame for cross-border shelling. Armenia 11, 12 May blamed Azerbaijan for attack on its forces at tensest part of state border between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region, reporting one casualty and several injured; Azerbaijan blamed Armenia for escalation, reporting two casualties. Armenia 17 May said Azerbaijani gunfire killed a serviceman at same section of border. Baku 26 May reported detention of two Armenian soldiers who had crossed into Azerbaijan’s Zangelan district, allegedly to mount “sabotage” operations; Armenia denied accusation and said Azerbaijan abducted soldiers. Detentions came after leaders recommitted to releasing soldiers found on their territory during mid-May European Union meeting.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Tensions ran high in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) amid Azerbaijan’s blockade of Lachin corridor, which aggravated humanitarian crisis and heightened fears of ethnic cleansing; clashes occurred along line of contact.

Checkpoint on Lachin corridor faced fierce opposition amid humanitarian crisis. After Azerbaijan late April installed checkpoint on Lachin road connecting Armenia to NK, Azerbaijani-backed protesters ended months-long rally, which had hampered NK residents’ access to basic necessities. Azerbaijani military consolidated blockade, however, leading to even fewer crossings and reduced transportation of goods. De facto NK authorities early May said reinforced checkpoint caused “acute humanitarian crisis”. Armenia 22 May urged UN Security Council to ensure unimpeded humanitarian access to NK by “sending an international mission”. Meanwhile, thousands 9 May protested in de facto capital Stepanakert, chanting “No to ethnic cleansing”, amid fears checkpoint could be precursor to such acts.

Azerbaijani leader urged de facto officials to dissolve parliament in NK. Amid resumption of talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan (see Armenia and Azerbaijan), Armenian PM Pashinyan 22 May said “Azerbaijan’s territory includes Nagorno-Karabakh”, while still calling for special arrangements to protect rights and security of ethnic Armenians living in enclave. De facto President Arayik Harutyunyan 23 May called possible Armenian recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over NK “unacceptable and inadmissible”. Azerbaijani President Aliyev 28 May said NK population should “obey the laws of Azerbaijan” and called for dissolution of parliament, warning Baku was capable of launching “operation” in region immediately; de facto authorities 29 May decried statement, while Armenian foreign ministry said Aliyev was threatening “the people of Nagorno-Karabakh with ethnic cleansing”.

De facto armed forces and Azerbaijan traded blame for unrest in northern NK. Azerbaijan 12 May reported de facto NK armed forces fired on Azerbaijani army; de facto defence ministry same day denied allegations. De facto authorities 18, 21 May accused Azerbaijan of violating ceasefire “in the northern & eastern directions” of NK contact line, attacking civilians.

Azerbaijan

After long pause, high-level talks with Armenia resumed as fatal clashes erupted along border.

U.S., EU and Russia facilitated parallel negotiations between Yerevan and Baku. Amid fears of major violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan after latter in late April installed checkpoint along Lachin road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) with Armenia, FMs 1 May met in U.S. capital Washington for talks. Key issues discussed included future of Armenians in NK, state border and resumption of transport links. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 4 May said parties “made tangible progress” and were “within reach of an agreement”; FMs 19 May held second meeting in Russian capital Moscow. President Aliyev and Armenian PM Pashinyan, meanwhile, 14 May met in Brussels, agreed to resume work on border delimitation agreement and made progress on transport routes. Leaders 25 May met Russian President Putin in Moscow, who said on “principal issues, there is an agreement”, though Aliyev and Pashinyan exchanged harsh words regarding Lachin. Meanwhile, Pashinyan 22 May told news conference that “Azerbaijan’s territory includes Nagorno-Karabakh”, but called for special arrangements to protect rights and security of ethnic Armenians living in enclave (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Sides traded blame for cross-border shelling. Armenia 11, 12 May blamed Azerbaijan for attack on its forces at tensest part of state border between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region, reporting one casualty and several injured; Azerbaijan blamed Armenia for escalation, reporting two casualties. Armenia 17 May said Azerbaijani gunfire killed a serviceman at same section of border. Baku 26 May reported detention of two Armenian soldiers who had crossed into Azerbaijan’s Zangelan district, allegedly to mount “sabotage” operations; Armenia denied accusation and said Azerbaijan abducted soldiers. Detentions came after leaders recommitted to releasing soldiers found on their territory during mid-May European Union meeting.

Israeli president visited Baku. Amid Azerbaijan-Iran tensions, which escalated after Baku late March opened embassy in Israel’s capital Tel Aviv, Israeli President Herzog 30 May met with Aliyev in Baku; sides hailed deepening ties and promised further cooperation.

Belarus

International actors denounced govt crackdown, president dismissed rumours of poor health, and Minsk signed agreement with Moscow to deploy nuclear warheads in Belarus.

Foreign actors expressed solidarity with political prisoners held in Belarus. On eve of International Day of Solidarity with Political Prisoners in Belarus, U.S. 20 May condemned govt for “unjustly holding over 1,500 political prisoners”, called for their “immediate” release. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 21 May said authorities had made 40,000 politically motivated arrests since Aug 2020 amid “regime’s intensified repression”; other govts and civil society organisations also decried crackdown, which continued unabated.

Rumours of Lukashenko’s ill health circulated. During President Lukashenko’s 9 May trip to Russia, rumours began circulating about his poor health. Exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya 15 May urged public and international community “to be prepared for every scenario”. Lukashenko 23 May appeared in public, dismissing talk he was seriously ill, but rumours he had been hospitalised 27 May flared once more.

Minsk and Moscow moved ahead with plan to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus. Russian and Belarusian defence ministers 25 May met in capital Minsk, signed documents defining procedure for keeping Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in storage facility on Belarusian territory; Moscow said it retained control of nuclear weapons and decision to use them.

Cyprus

Tensions surfaced over Republic of Cyprus military drills with partner countries and property in contested Varosha/Maraş area, amid Republic of Cyprus initiative for greater EU involvement.

Republic of Cyprus held military drills with partner countries. Republic of Cyprus National Guard and Israel 7-11 May conducted military exercises involving jets and helicopters in divided capital Nicosia’s Flight Information Region – part of which is de facto controlled by “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) – and 23 May held similar drills with UK; “TRNC” described operations as “provocation”. Republic of Cyprus 15-18 May held military drills with Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, U.S. and UK during which U.S. destroyer docked at Limassol port, which “TRNC” said “demonstrated once again that [U.S.] is not observing the delicate balance” on island. Republic of Cyprus and France 28 May held aerial exercises off Limassol’s coast.

Ghost resort Varosha/Maraş and energy exploration stoked concern. In response to reports of potentially unlawful property purchases by Turkish Cypriot entrepreneur in fenced-off ghost town Varosha/Maraş in “TRNC”, Republic of Cyprus House of Representatives president 8 May denounced Türkiye’s policy on town to UN Security Council members, European Union (EU) member states and Middle Eastern countries. Meanwhile, Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 1 May reiterated support for Turkish Cypriots’ energy rights after Republic of Cyprus late April announced drilling preparations in zone that allegedly overlaps with area licenced by Turkish Petroleum Corporation.

Republic of Cyprus sought France’s involvement, deepened ties with Israel. In meeting with French President Macron on 3 May, Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides said Republic of Cyprus expects France’s support in breaking deadlock; “TRNC” next day dismissed Christodoulides’ initiative for EU involvement and urged Paris to cease arms sales to Republic of Cyprus. UN Special Representative in Cyprus Colin Stewart 15-16 May met separately with Christodoulides and “TRNC” leader Ersin Tatar, said “a very important period” will begin after elections in Türkiye and Greece that could see progress on Cyprus issue. Republic of Cyprus and Israeli defence ministers 5 May discussed “strategic partnership” and Republic of Cyprus energy minister 15 May announced possible natural gas pipeline between two countries.

Georgia

Russia cancelled visa requirements for Georgians and resumed flights to capital Tbilisi amid internal and external opposition.

Russia cancelled visa regime and resumed direct flights to Georgia. Russian President Putin 10 May abolished visa requirement for Georgian citizens, imposed early 2000s when Georgia accepted refugees and fighters fleeing war in Chechnya, and lifted ban on direct flights. One Russian airline 19 May resumed flights to capital Tbilisi, more expected early June; starting 20 May, Georgian Airways launched direct daily flights to Russia.

West and opposition criticised resumption of flights, govt remained defiant. President Zourabichvili 16 May labelled decision to cancel visa requirements and resume flights “a Russian provocation” while opposition 19 May gathered around 200 protesters at airport to oppose flight; U.S. State Dept 22 May warned “companies in Georgian airports could be at risk [of] sanctions”; and EU 29 May said decision contradicts position of member states. Breakaways Abkhazia and South Ossetia mid-May also raised concerns. PM Garibashvili 24 May defended decision.

Govt claimed progress on EU candidate status reforms. As Brussels finalised report concerning Georgia’s progress on reforms needed to earn candidate status, FM 9 May claimed authorities had adopted most recommendations, with “around 20% still to deliver”.

Kosovo

Protests following elections in Serb-majority northern municipalities turned violent, while tensions simmered with Belgrade over these municipalities’ political status.

Clashes broke out in north following April’s municipal elections. After tense municipal elections in April boycotted by most Kosovo Serbs, newly elected mayors in northern municipalities 26 May attempted to enter municipal buildings amid increased police presence. Small groups of Kosovo Serbs sought to block new mayors from buildings in three communes; in Zvecan town, police intervened, leading to clashes with protesters. Serbian President Vučić same day placed army on high alert and ordered “urgent movement [of troops] to Kosovo border”. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 26 May criticised police’s use of force, which “unnecessarily escalated tensions”, while European Union (EU) urged “everyone” to de-escalate. Unrest continued, however, and NATO-led force KFOR 29 May moved to disperse Serb protesters, leading to clashes that left dozens injured, including NATO troops; NATO next day announced deployment of additional forces. Tensions began to ease end May.

Frictions with Belgrade over political status of northern Serbs persisted. PM Kurti 2 May met with Vučić in Brussels as dialogue on agreement to normalise relations, mediated by EU High Representative Josep Borrell and EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák, continued. Sides discussed draft statute proposed by Kosovo Serbs to establish “Association/Community” of Serb municipalities in north, which would enable them to form self-governing association. Kurti said he could not accept draft, fearing arrangement would result either in northern municipalities’ secession or internal fracturing reminiscent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska; Borrell same day emphasised draft statute was “a starting point”.

Kyrgyzstan

NGO said Kyrgyz, Tajik forces committed “apparent war crimes” during 2022 border conflict; China sought closer ties with Central Asian countries during “milestone” summit.

Kyrgyz and Tajik forces accused of “apparent war crimes”. NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2 May published report detailing attacks on civilians by Kyrgyz and Tajik forces during border conflict in Sept 2022; HRW said several of these violations “likely amount to war crimes” and urged both sides to investigate potential abuses and hold perpetrators to account.

Central Asian leaders attended China summit following Russia trip. Leaders from all five Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – 9 May travelled to Russian capital Moscow for Russia’s Victory Day parade, which marks Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Chinese President Xi Jinping 18-19 May hosted Central Asian leaders in north-western Xian city for “milestone” China-Central Asia Summit. In sign of Beijing’s growing influence in region, Xi unveiled ambitious development plan that includes building infrastructure, boosting trade and strengthening security networks.

Russia (Internal)

Ukraine-aligned Russian combatants staged cross-border incursion, while large-scale drone attack targeted capital; more subversive activities and attacks on Russian territory expected as Ukraine war continues.

Cross-border raid from Ukraine sparked violence, multiple drones struck capital. Governor of Belgorod region (which borders Ukraine) 22 May said Ukrainian “sabotage group” had infiltrated region, announced “counter-terrorist operation”. Authorities evacuated villages coming under fire as attackers reportedly took control of several locations. Defence ministry 23 May said Russian troops used “airstrikes, artillery fire and active action” to repel invaders. Two groups that claimed responsibility reportedly are comprised mostly of far-right Russian nationals tied to Ukrainian military intelligence, which may have coordinated attack; Kyiv denied involvement. More subversive activities expected in coming weeks and months as Ukraine war continues. Meanwhile, presumably Ukrainian shelling of Russia rose sharply, mostly affecting Belgorod but increasingly targeting capital, Moscow. Series of drone strikes 30 May marked most significant attack on Moscow since full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Wagner Group’s feud with top military brass escalated. Head of paramilitary Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin 5 May threatened to withdraw from Ukrainian city of Bakhmut amid ammunition shortages, 9 May claimed defence ministry had threatened to qualify move as treason. Politician and former commander Viktor Sobolev 15 May branded Wagner “an illegal armed formation”; three Wagner mercenaries next day threatened to rape Sobolev. Prigozhin 31 May called on prosecutors to investigate possible “crimes” committed by senior defence officials before and during Ukraine war.

Western states imposed sanctions, finance ministry recorded huge deficit. During Japan summit, G7 leaders 19 May promised more measures against Russia and those who support its war effort; several Western countries and Russia same day imposed tit-for-tat sanctions. Meanwhile, finance ministry 10 May recorded 3.4tn ruble deficit in first four months of 2023; in same period in 2022, authorities recorded 1.2tn deficit.

Repression of dissent continued. Court in Moscow 5 May ordered two-month pre-trial detention for two artists accused of “justifying terrorism” in play about Russian women who joined Islamic State. Authorities 19 May designated environmental organisation Greenpeace “undesirable”. Authorities 23 May extended pre-trial detention of U.S. journalist Evan Gershkovich by three months.

Tajikistan

Govt repatriated more women and children from Syria, NGO said Kyrgyz, Tajik forces committed “apparent war crimes” during 2022 border conflict, and China sought closer ties with Central Asian countries during “milestone” summit.

Authorities repatriated over 100 women and children from Syria. Govt 21 May repatriated 109 women and children from detention camps in north-eastern Syria, where suspected Islamic State militants and their relatives are being held.

Tajik and Kyrgyz forces accused of “apparent war crimes”. NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2 May published report detailing attacks on civilians by Tajik and Kyrgyz forces during border conflict in Sept 2022; HRW said several of these violations “likely amount to war crimes” and urged both sides to investigate potential abuses and hold perpetrators to account.

Central Asian leaders attended China summit following Russia trip. Leaders from all five Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – 9 May travelled to Russian capital Moscow for Russia’s Victory Day parade, which marks Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Chinese President Xi Jinping 18-19 May hosted Central Asian leaders in north-western Xian city for “milestone” China-Central Asia Summit. In sign of Beijing’s growing influence in region, Xi unveiled ambitious development plan that includes building infrastructure, boosting trade and strengthening security networks.

Türkiye

President Erdoğan prevailed in runoff election, military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliates in Türkiye, Iraq and Syria, and Ankara pursued normalisation with Syria and Egypt.

President Erdoğan won runoff election. In 14 May parliamentary and presidential elections, ruling People’s Alliance secured parliamentary majority, but neither incumbent president nor main opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu surpassed 50% threshold for presidency. In runoff 28 May, Erdoğan secured presidency with 52%. International election observers called initial poll “mostly peaceful”; unidentified group 7 May attacked Istanbul Mayor and vice-presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu in Erzurum province, injuring 17.

Operations continued against PKK in Türkiye and affiliates abroad. In Türkiye, govt claimed security operation in rural areas of Şırnak province 16 May killed three PKK members, three soldiers and village guard; security forces 22 May detained 23 alleged PKK members suspected of starting forest fires in Mersin and Antalya provinces. In northern Iraq, Turkish intelligence 4 May claimed to have killed PKK’s so-called training officer Ahmet Gümüş and 8 May captured high-ranking PKK member Azime Dursun at Erbil airport; security authorities in Iraq’s Kurdistan region claimed Turkish drone 23 May killed three members of Sinjar Resistance Units (see Iraq). In Syria, Syrian Democratic Forces 5 May said Turkish drone killed two members in Hasakah province (see Syria).

Security forces cracked down on Islamic State (ISIS). Security forces detained at least 127 individuals countrywide with alleged links to ISIS. In northern Syria, ISIS chief Abul-Hassan al-Qurayshi 1 May reportedly detonated suicide vest, killing himself, during Turkish operation to capture him; security forces 10 May captured group’s so-called Türkiye emir, Şahap Variş, in Syria.

Amid engagement with Syria and Egypt, rapprochement with Greece slowed. Turkish and Syrian FMs 10 May held first meeting since 2011 in Russian capital Moscow alongside Russian and Iranian counterparts; FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stressed need for cooperation on terrorism and return of Syrian refugees. Egypt 29 May announced agreement with Ankara on “immediate start of upgrading diplomatic relations and exchanging ambassadors”. Meanwhile, rapprochement with Greece slowed amid elections in both countries.

Ukraine

Moscow pummelled Ukrainian cities with drones and missiles as attacks and subversive activities on Russian soil escalated; Zelenskyy secured further military assistance and stepped up diplomatic efforts toward non-Western leaders.

Russia intensified airstrikes but faced sharp escalation of attacks on its territory. Moscow scaled up airstrikes on Ukrainian cities, firing Iranian-made drones as well as cruise and ballistic missiles simultaneously from different directions in increasingly complex attacks. Dense air defence prevented mass casualties, though falling debris caused several fatalities, injuries and damages to infrastructure, including to Kyiv-based Patriot air defence system. Head of military intelligence 29 May promised to respond; multiple drones, presumably Ukrainian, next day struck Russian capital amid rise in subversive activities and attacks on Russian soil, particularly affecting its border regions (see Russia). Meanwhile, Russian President Putin 20 May claimed victory in Bakhmut city after nearly eight-month battle; Ukraine 21 May insisted its forces retained small foothold inside city and were advancing along city’s flanks. Paramilitary Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin 22 May vowed to withdraw Wagner units from Bakhmut by 1 June, 23 May said 20,000 fighters killed in fighting. Meanwhile, top Ukrainian commander 29 May said counteroffensive due to start soon.

Zelenskyy secured more military aid, sought support of non-Western states. President Zelenskyy mid-May toured number of Western capitals, securing military assistance from Germany, France and UK. U.S. 19 May said it would allow other countries to supply Ukraine with advanced fighter jets, including U.S.-made F-16s, said U.S. air force would help train pilots; Russian FM 27 May warned fighter jets represented “unacceptable escalation”. Zelenskyy stepped up diplomatic activity toward non-Western leaders to win support for goal of expelling all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, 19 May attending Arab League Summit in Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah city, 20 May meeting with Indian PM Modi. Meanwhile, Turkish President Erdoğan 17 May announced 60-day Black Sea Grain deal extension.

In other important developments. Authorities 16 May arrested high court judge on suspicion of accepting bribes from exiled oligarch awaiting extradition. Govt 9 May introduced bill that would lower age by which men must have registered with conscription offices from 27 to 25, widening recruitment pool for army.

Uzbekistan

Snap election announced after Uzbeks voted overwhelmingly in favour of constitutional reforms; China sought closer ties with Central Asian countries during “milestone” summit.

President announced snap election following constitutional referendum. Central Election Commission 1 May announced that 30 April referendum on President Mirziyoev’s proposed constitutional amendments had passed with over 90% of voters approving reforms. In 1 May statement, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe said referendum “was technically well prepared and widely promoted as intending to enhance various rights and freedoms” but took place “in an environment short of genuine political pluralism and competition”. Mirziyoev 8 May announced snap election in July, which he is widely expected to win, saying he requires new mandate to implement reforms.

Central Asian leaders attended China summit following Russia trip. Leaders from all five Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – 9 May travelled to Russian capital Moscow for Russia’s Victory Day parade, which marks Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Chinese President Xi Jinping 18-19 May hosted Central Asian leaders in north-western Xian city for “milestone” China-Central Asia Summit. In sign of Beijing’s growing influence in region, Xi unveiled ambitious development plan that includes building infrastructure, boosting trade and strengthening security networks.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Govt attempts at dialogue with armed groups faced more obstacles as violence continued; governing coalition in Congress began to collapse.

Govt-ELN talks continued, peace efforts with FARC dissidents faced headwinds. Third round of talks between govt and National Liberation Army (ELN) began 2 May in Cuba’s capital Havana amid hope for ceasefire. ELN 15 May paused talks after President Petro 12 May questioned group’s political agenda, given its reliance on illicit economies; talks resumed 17 May, parties 25 May extended negotiations until 8 June. In other “total peace” efforts, dissident faction of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) known as FARC-EP Estado Mayor 16 May raised concerns about govt’s compliance with bilateral ceasefire, alleging military violations in Nariño department (Pacific coast) and along Venezuelan border. Petro 21 May partially suspended ceasefire with group in four southern and central departments following murder of four minors from Indigenous community in Putamayo department (south). In retaliation, FARC-EP Estado Mayor 27 May vowed to prevent candidates from campaigning in Oct local elections in territory it controls.

Confinement and other violence intended to establish social control continued. Communities in Nariño and Choco departments along Pacific Coast continued to experience confinement and displacement amid clashes among various armed groups. Indigenous community in Silvia, Cauca department, early May reported FARC dissidents forcibly closed schools and attempted to recruit children. In Sucre and Bolivar departments along Atlantic coast, teachers early May reported receiving threatening pamphlet from criminal group Gulf Clan, demanding portion of their salaries.

Petro hinted at approach toward drug policy reform. Petro 13 May elaborated on still-developing drug policy reform amid fall in price of coca, suggesting govt will expand crop substitution programs that began after 2016 peace agreement, seek agreements with coca-growing communities not included in programs and promote alternative uses for coca leaf plant.

Ruling coalition fractured. Govt mid-May lost congressional majority after U Party declared itself independent, fracturing Petro’s fragile governing coalition; local elections in Oct could limit scope for his political reform and “total peace” plans.

Ecuador

President Lasso dissolved congress to avoid impeachment and will rule by decree until August elections; violent crime continued.

Lasso dismissed legislature and called snap elections. With impeachment vote impending in Congress over corruption allegations, President Lasso 17 May invoked constitution’s “mutual death” clause, dissolving Congress and calling snap elections; Lasso will now rule by decree until poll takes place in Aug; unclear whether he will run for re-election. Amid concern president’s unprecedented use of “mutual death” clause could spark unrest, soldiers 17 May surrounded National Assembly, with head of Armed Forces’ Joint Command warning security forces would “act firmly” if violence broke out. Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, which spearheaded 2019 and 2022 “national strikes”, 17 May condemned Lasso’s move as “a dictatorship scenario” but refrained from calling protests.

Several mass shootings left 13 dead amid rising drug-related violence. Unknown gunmen 14 May killed seven in Quevedo city, Los Rios, one of Ecuador’s most violent provinces; in Montañita tourist town along Pacific coast, gunmen 20 May killed six. Meanwhile, officials 8 May reported that Junior Roldán, a leader of criminal gang Los Choneros, one of Ecuador’s largest, was killed in neighbouring Colombia; Roldán’s demise represents significant loss for gang.

El Salvador

Authorities renewed state of exception as crackdown on gangs continued, and court handed down lengthy prison sentence to former president for ties to gangs.

Security forces fenced off community after suspected gang members killed officer. As Legislative Assembly 16 May approved state of exception’s 14th extension, presumed gang members same day killed officer in Nueva Conception municipality (Chalatenango department); authorities 17 May deployed 500 police and 5,000 soldiers to area and installed fence around perimeter, making Nueva Conception fifth municipality to be cordoned off since President Bukele late 2022 announced phase 5 of Territorial Control Plan, intended to “extract every last terrorist from the communities of El Salvador”. Meanwhile, NGO Cristosal 29 May said at least 153 people had died in custody since state of exception began in March 2022.

Court sentenced former president for illicit association with gangs. Trial proceeded against former President Mauricio Funes and former Justice and Security Minister David Munguía Payés, accused of “illicit association” and “breach of duties” during 2012-2014 gang truce, notably making “pact” with gangs. Former director of State Intelligence Service José Ricardo Perdomo 3 May testified that Funes knew of “irregular conditions” inside prisons, such as mediators entering without registering, deactivation of cell phone signals and gang leaders’ transfer to other prison facilities with lower security measures. Court 29 May sentenced Funes and Munguía to 14 and 18 years in prison, respectively.

Guatemala

Authorities restricted participation of popular candidates in June general elections.

Authorities banned opposition politicians in lead up to key polls. Ahead of 25 June general elections, which include votes for presidency, Congress and local municipalities, court 26 May blocked candidacy of presidential frontrunner Carlos Pineda of Prosperidad Ciudadana party over “administrative issues”. Decision is latest in serious of court rulings banning popular candidates from participating in polls, including Indigenous leader Thelma Cabrera of People’s Liberation Movement and Roberto Arzú of Podemos party, both in Feb. Organization of American States, which in March expressed concern about exclusion of hundreds of candidates, and European Union plan to send election observation missions.

Media space grew more restricted. Independent news outlet elPeriódico, which for 27 years reported on corruption, impunity and trafficking dynamics, 15 May ceased production; NGO Committee to Protect Journalists 15 May said closure was result of govt’s “judicial and financial harassment”. Founding president of publication imprisoned on various charges in case observers say was riddled with irregularities.

Haiti

Civilian self-defence groups expanded anti-gang operations, lynching suspected gang members and fuelling fears of increasingly brutal retaliatory attacks to quell uprising.

Civilians escalated attacks on suspected gang members. Civilian self-defence movement known as Bwa Kale (“peeled wood”) that emerged late April quickly spread through parts of capital Port-au-Prince and beyond as civilians used improvised weapons to hunt down and kill suspected gang members. Fears of escalating violence grew: acting PM Henry 1 May called on vigilantes to “calm down” and hand over suspected members to police; UN human rights office 9 May reported at least 164 killings of suspected gang members in April; and former police chief and current Representative to Organization of American States Léon Charles 13 May said vigilantes are not viable medium- or long-term solution to gang violence, cautioning against extrajudicial executions. Director of National Police Frantz Elbé, however, same day praised his forces for increased operations against gangs and noted civilians’ important supporting role.

Gangs pressed ahead with operations and retaliatory actions. Despite threat of self-defence groups and stepped-up security operations, gang offensives continued in several areas, including north and east of Port-au-Prince. In Onaville town, Canaan gang 14 May reportedly killed ten people attempting to return home after being displaced in April. Gang operating in Titanyen town 17 May ambushed two armoured police vehicles. Gangs also responded to joint police-Bwa Kale efforts; notably Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras gangs early May intensified joint operations in Artibonite department (north) following late April police raid, supported by civilians, against Kokorat San Ras.

Talks on international intervention continued without breakthrough. Scepticism among international actors about scaling up security assistance in Haiti persisted. Notably, Canadian congressional committee 5 May urged Ottawa to make clear it would “not participate in direct engagement in military operations”. UN Sec-Gen Guterres and Jamaican PM Holness 15 May called on Haitian political actors to reach agreement in order to ease reluctance of international actors to send security mission, saying Haiti posed threat to region.

Honduras

Authorities extended state of exception amid mounting scepticism of measure and high levels of violence; efforts to install anti-corruption body continued at slow pace.

Insecurity persisted, notably targeting women, LGBT+ community and journalists. Despite growing opposition to state of exception, govt 20 May extended measure until 5 July as director of police continued to tout impact. Violence continued, however, with 957 murders recorded in 2023 and extortion still prevalent. Number of recent reports illustrated that women, LGBT+ people and journalists particularly targeted: newspaper Proceso 9 May reported 130 femicides 6 Dec-30 April; LGBT+ organisation Cattrachas 7 May said 194 members of community killed 2017-2022, with convictions in only 13 cases; human rights commissioner 2 May said 97 journalists killed since 2001.

Anti-corruption efforts progressed slowly. UN and govt 4 May announced impending arrival of international experts to help install International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity (CICIH); preparations still under way by end of month. Congress continued to block legal reforms required in memorandum of understanding with UN, which could overshadow progress to establish CICIH; among opponents is opposition National Party, which 2 May accused govt of moulding CICIH procedures in ruling Libre party’s interests.

Mexico

Supreme Court struck down parts of govt electoral reform, criminal violence continued, and U.S. ended pandemic-era border policy.

Court invalidated parts of govt electoral reform. Supreme Court 8 May declared unconstitutional parts of govt’s Plan B electoral reform that, among other things, would reduce budget and power of country’s election authority; court said ruling Morena party had pushed plan through without due legislative process, such as proper debate. President López Obrador afterward accused court of undermining separation of powers and of serving elite interests, 17 May called for judges to be appointed by popular vote. Meanwhile, media outlet Latinus 2 May claimed associates of López Obrador’s sons had received public contracts worth $20mn and positions within federal institutions without fulfilling legal requirements; López Obrador 4 May denied allegations.

Criminal violence continued. In central-eastern Hidalgo state, unknown assailants 14 May killed six in Atotonilco de Tula municipality, area contested by rival criminal groups; in central-eastern Puebla state, unknown gunmen 23 May shot dead journalist Marco Aurelio Ramírez in Tehuacán municipality. In central San Luis Potosí state, presumed Gulf Cartel members 15 May kidnapped 50 migrants near Matehuala city and demanded ransom. In north-eastern Tamaulipas state, shootout between Gulf Cartel and opposing groups, including Jalisco cartel, 15-16 May left at least 19 dead in Méndez municipality. Also in Tamaulipas, shootout between security forces and members of local criminal group 29 May left ten dead on road connecting Nuevo León and Laredo cities. In north-western Sinaloa state, security forces 13 May arrested Héctor Elías Flores Aceves, Sinaloa cartel’s lieutenant in Quintana Roo state, in Guamúchil municipality.

U.S. ended controversial pandemic-era border policy. U.S. 11 May ended Trump-era Title 42 provision that allowed U.S. authorities to turn away undocumented migrants at U.S.-Mexico border by citing pandemic-related concerns. Under new policy, U.S. can expel migrants who arrive irregularly; FM Marcelo Ebrard next day said Mexico would limit number of daily deportations from U.S. to 1,000.

Nicaragua

Authorities apprehended dozens of critics, while crackdown on NGOs and Catholic Church persisted.

Authorities arrested and immediately prosecuted dozens of opponents. Authorities 3 May arrested 57 people, most of them govt critics, and arraigned them in “express hearings” at courts in capital, Managua. Govt-aligned judges charged them with “conspiracy to undermine national integrity” and “propagation of false news”, next day ordered their conditional release: they are now required to sign in with their local police station every day. Police 12-14 May carried out another “night hunt”, detaining and hastily prosecuting 18 regime opponents. Meanwhile, seven civil society organisations 24 May demanded immediate release of all political prisoners.

Crackdown on NGOs and Catholic Church continued. Govt 3 May cancelled legal status of 20 NGOs, including eight that requested voluntary dissolution. National Assembly 10 May revoked legal status of local Red Cross Branch, accusing it of violating its own rules on political neutrality during 2018 protests; 19 May revoked legal status of 26 more NGOs, bringing total number banned since April 2018 to nearly 3,500. Meanwhile, govt 18 May closed private Catholic university of Archdiocese in Managua, bringing number closed since Dec 21 to 25. Police 20, 22 May arrested two priests in Nueva Segovia and Estelí departments; 23 May arrested priest from Matagalpa Diocese (north) for “committing acts to undermine the nation’s independence and integrity”.

Venezuela

Opposition issued regulations for primary vote in Oct, govt introduced new law to protect foreign assets, and Brazil’s president held talks with Maduro.

Electoral commission published regulations for opposition primaries. Independent commission charged by opposition coalition Unitary Platform with organising primary election in October to choose presidential candidate for 2024 poll 7 May published regulations for process. These include online procedure enabling Venezuelans abroad to vote, provided they are already registered to vote in Venezuela. Commission plans to set up polling stations in 80 cities in 31 countries, where voting will be manual; it has yet to decide whether to ask govt-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) for assistance in facilitating automated process in Venezuela using official polling stations, amid fears CNE involvement would compromise election’s integrity and deter many people from voting.

Govt introduced legislation to protect foreign assets. U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 1 May decided to no longer protect Venezuelan state-owned oil refiner Citgo, based in U.S. and managed by opposition, from negotiations over its future, potentially paving way for sale of Citgo shares to pay off creditors; President Maduro same day condemned move. Govt 16 May introduced draft legislation threatening lengthy prison sentences and confiscation of assets for anyone “directly or indirectly” involved in what it terms “theft” of Venezuelan assets abroad; Maduro 22 May signed bill into law.

Brazil’s leader launched efforts to bolster ties with Maduro. Brazilian President “Lula” da Silva 29 May held talks with Maduro in Brazil’s capital in push to strengthen relations. Lula called for free elections in Venezuela, condemned U.S. sanctions and invited Maduro to fight against narrative of anti-democracy and authoritarianism “built against Venezuela”. Chilean President Boric and Uruguay’s President Luis Lacalle Pou criticised Lula’s choice of words, highlighting Maduro’s responsibility in Venezuela’s crisis. Meanwhile, exiled opposition leader Juan Guaidó 14 May announced tour of European capitals to urge govts against normalising relations with Maduro.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Under international spotlight for increasing press freedom violations, authorities rekindled anti-Islamist rhetoric.

Algiers rekindled anti-Islamist rhetoric. Former leader of outlawed Islamist party Islamic Salvation Front, Ali Belhaj, 1 May announced he was placed under judicial supervision after he spoke to London-based Al-Magharibia TV, which is financed by Islamist movement Rachad (classified as a terrorist organisation by Algiers). In editorial, army’s official magazine El Djeich 8 May emphasised army’s commitment to combat alleged “despicable attempts” by violent extremists to plunge country back into terror. Military 10 May reportedly detained four suspected Islamist militants in Tissemsilt region (south west of capital Algiers) during operation which left army officer dead.

EU parliament condemned crackdown on media freedom. European Parliament 11 May adopted resolution calling for “immediate release” of all those detained in Algeria for exercising their right to freedom of expression, including prominent journalist Ihsane El-Kadi – who was sentenced in April to five years in prison on charges of receiving foreign funding for political propaganda and to harm state security; resolution also urged govt to bring laws limiting freedom of expression in line with international human rights standards. Algiers in following days rejected resolution as “blatant interference”.

In other important developments. Authorities 23 May arrested prominent member of Hirak protest movement Karim Tabbou in Algiers on undisclosed charges; Tabbou released two days later under judicial supervision.

Bahrain

Govt advanced ties with Qatar and returned its ambassador to Lebanon, while authorities summoned senior Shiite cleric.

Govt continued normalisation with Qatar and returned ambassador to Lebanon. In sign that normalisation proceeds after pair announced resumption of formal relations in April, Bahrain 15 May announced it was resuming flights to and from Qatar starting 25 May. Govt 20 May said it would restore diplomatic representation at ambassador level in Lebanon, after Gulf countries supported Saudi Arabia in withdrawing ambassadors in Oct 2021 following critical comments made by Lebanon’s then-information minister about Riyadh’s role in war in Yemen.

Authorities detained senior cleric. Police 22 May summoned for interrogation senior Shiite cleric Muhammad Sanqour, as interior ministry accused him of “repeated inflammatory speeches” and “publicly inciting hatred”; during Friday prayers, Sanqour reportedly raised concern about treatment of prisoners. Videos on social media same day showed dozens of protesters expressing solidarity with Sanqour in front of his house. Authorities 25 May released Sanqour.

Egypt

Scepticism persisted about Cairo’s ability to make economic reforms and avoid default, while national dialogue kicked off amid harassment of regime critics.

Cairo made limited progress on asset sales. After long stalemate, govt from late April made limited progress in selling state-owned assets, key step in securing foreign revenues and meeting external debt liabilities. Notably, finance ministry 14 May announced sale of 9.5% stake of state-owned Telecom Egypt, which raised around $120mn; how much went to foreign investors remained unclear. Meanwhile, rating agency Fitch 5 May downgraded Egypt’s long-term foreign-currency issuer default rating from B+ to B. Finance Minister Mohamed Maait 9-10 May addressed parliament on 2023-2024 draft budget, which allocates 56% of total spending to debt servicing and anticipates that new borrowing will represent 49% of total revenues, suggesting that Cairo expects to meet almost all of its current foreign liabilities through borrowing.

National dialogue kicked off amid opposition mistrust. National dialogue between govt and opposition representatives 14 May began after months-long preparations. Some opposition parties, including Socialist Popular Alliance Party, boycotted dialogue, citing authorities’ failure to meet preconditions, particularly release of political prisoners. Meanwhile, crackdown on dissent continued. Notably, prominent critic of President Sisi, Ahmed Tantawi, who fled country in 2022, delayed return planned for 6 May after authorities 5 May detained several of his relatives and supporters on terrorism-related charges; Tantawi 11 May eventually arrived in Egypt after release of two family members, vowed to run for president in 2024.

Conflict in Sudan led to border chaos. Thousands of people fleeing conflict in Sudan in May reportedly remained stranded for days at Sudan-Egypt border. Sisi 27 May said Egypt has received 150,000 Sudanese citizens since 15 April.

Iran

Govt sought to avoid censure vote ahead of nuclear watchdog meeting in June, while maritime tensions continued and West condemned govt’s support for Russia and execution of dual national.

Iran claimed progress on nuclear concerns ahead of key meeting in June. With International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting set for 5 June, Iranian media 30 May reported progress between govt and UN watchdog over safeguards concerns; IAEA did not confirm claims, while its forthcoming quarterly report could determine prospect of U.S. and European states introducing censure resolution at meeting. Israeli military’s chief of staff 23 May said Iran’s uranium enrichment is more advanced than ever, warning “there are possible negative developments on the horizon that could lead to action”. Iran 25 May successfully test-launched ballistic missile with potential 2,000km range.

Maritime tensions persisted. After U.S. late April reported that Iran’s navy had seized Marshall Islands-flagged tanker in Gulf of Oman, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 3 May detained another tanker sailing from Dubai to Fujairah in Strait of Hormuz. U.S. 12 May announced that it would increase presence of ships and aircraft with allies in Strait of Hormuz, adding that its Fifth Fleet would deepen cooperation with two parallel maritime security initiatives operating in area.

U.S. condemned Iran’s support for Russia. U.S. 15 May indicated that it would “continue to impose costs” on those involved in sending equipment to Russia and 19 May sanctioned four entities linked to Iran-Russia maritime transfers. Canada 3 May designated ten Iranian individuals and entities, four connected to drone manufacturer and six over human rights concerns. European Union (EU) 22 May adopted eighth set of designations over human rights violations since anti-govt protests began in Sept 2022.

Iran executed dual national and three citizens, sparking condemnation. Authorities 6 May executed Habib Chaab, dual Swedish-Iranian national who had been sentenced to death on charges of involvement with separatist group, triggering condemnation from Sweden, U.S. and EU. Authorities 19 May executed three men sentenced to death in connection with their alleged involvement in killing three security personnel in Isfahan city during nationwide protests in Nov 2022.

Iraq

Tensions eased between rival Kurdish parties following months-long feud, dispute between Erbil and Baghdad stalled federal budget, and violence broke out in centre and south.

Rival Kurdish factions struck accord, as Türkiye continued strikes. U.S. delegation 3-4 May visited Erbil and Sulaymaniyah cities with aim of “bridging divisions”. Kurdistan PM and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masrour Barzani 8 May met Kurdistan Deputy PM and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Qubad Talabani for first time since tensions between parties spiked over assassination of intelligence officer in Oct 2022 that KDP blamed on PUK; leaders agreed to stop verbal attacks in media ahead of Nov regional elections. PUK 14 May ended its six-month boycott of regional govt’s cabinet meetings. In Ninewa governorate, Turkish drone strike 16 May killed three PKK-affiliated Sinjar Re-sistance Units (YBS) fighters in Khanasor town and 23 May killed three in Khalaf village.

Erbil accused Baghdad of breaking oil deal, delaying federal budget. Federal parliament’s finance committee 25 May made series of amendments to draft 2023 budget articles related to Kurdistan’s oil revenue; Erbil next day condemned amendments as “unconstitutional” and contrary to previous agreement struck with federal govt. Dispute indefinitely postponed parliamentary vote on three-year budget bill scheduled for 27 May, as talks to resolve differences continued.

Centre and south witnessed violence, amid low-scale Islamic State (ISIS) insurgency. In Salah al-Din governorate, fighting between families 1 May reportedly killed three, including police colonel and Popular Mobilisation Forces member, in Albu Nassif village. In Dhi Qar governorate, security forces 20 May reportedly intervened in exchange of gunfire between Al-Awwad and Al-Sayed Taher clans in Al-Shatrah district. Meanwhile, army 5 May said it killed three alleged ISIS members in Wadi al-Shay in Kirkuk governorate. Alleged ISIS gunmen 21 May killed two in Tarmiya district, Salah al-Din governorate.

In other important developments. Protesters 1, 5 May filled Tahrir Square in capital Baghdad, demanding higher public-sector salaries. Demonstrators demanding employment 21 May clashed with security forces in Dhi Qar governorate, leaving 32 injured. Iran 13 May summoned Iraq’s ambassador to protest presence of “terrorist” groups, likely Kurdish, in Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

Israel/Palestine

Largest escalation since Aug 2022 erupted in Gaza between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), while deadly violence persisted across West Bank and Israel pursued pro-settler agenda.

Israel launched five-day operation in Gaza. PIJ member Khader Adnan 2 May died in Israeli prison after nearly three-month hunger strike. In response, PIJ same day fired 104 rockets from Gaza into Israel; Israel same day launched airstrikes on Gaza, killing one, before sides 3 May agreed to ceasefire. Israel 9-13 May launched Operation Shield and Arrow in Gaza, killing at least 33 Palestinians, including at least 18 PIJ members, and injuring nearly 200 civilians; notably, Israeli airstrikes 9 May killed three PIJ commanders and at least 12 civilians, including children. PIJ fired over 1,000 rockets, 11 May killed Israeli in Rehovot city. Israel and PIJ 13 May agreed to Egypt-brokered ceasefire. During escalation, Hamas reluctantly supported PIJ but refrained from engaging directly in conflict.

Deadly violence and volatility continued in West Bank and Jerusalem. Israeli forces conducted over 500 raids in West Bank during month, killing at least 19 Palestinians and arresting over 100 amid near-daily gun battles and settler attacks. Notably, Israeli forces 4 May killed at least three Hamas-affiliated gunmen in Nablus. Palestinian militants 30 May killed Israeli in drive-by shooting near Hermesh settlement. Israelis 18 May marched through Jerusalem’s Old City to mark Jerusalem Day, as some assaulted Palestinians. Far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir 21 May entered Al-Aqsa compound, declaring Israel “in charge”.

Israel advanced pro-settler policies. Far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich 18 May announced plan to double number of settlers in West Bank; army same day signed order allowing Israelis entry into Homesh outpost, paving way for formal settlement. Govt stalled court-ordered eviction of Palestinians living in Khan al-Ahmar amid international pressure but advanced plans to begin construction in E1 zone, which would break up Palestinian territorial contiguity in West Bank. Govt 24 May passed two-year budget, cementing pro-settler agenda. Meanwhile, protests against judicial overhaul continued.

Israel continued strikes in Syria. Notably, Israeli army 24 May said it retaliated against shots fired from Syria at Israeli surveillance drone (see Syria).

Lebanon

Central Bank and govt unveiled new measures likely to compound economic hardship for citizens, while presidential vacuum continued with no end in sight.

Economic crisis continued. Central Bank 7 May announced it would not renew scheme authorising so-called Sayrafa (Exchange) platform, policy tool bank uses to inject U.S. dollars into circulation, in attempt to slow down devaluation of national currency; exchange nevertheless remained operational amid signs of another sharp currency devaluation looming. Finance ministry 12 May announced that it would raise “customs dollar” – exchange rate used to calculate duty payable on imported goods – to 86,000 LBP to $1, up from 60,000 LBP, in effect making VAT payable on imported goods four to six times higher than official rate; move will worsen inflation and put further financial strain on households.

Executive vacuum showed few signs of breakthrough. Presidential vacuum entered seventh consecutive month as parliament in May held no election session, reflecting deadlock. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri 10 May publicly called for new president to be elected before 15 June, indicating that authorities will need to appoint new Central Bank governor when incumbent Riad Salameh’s term ends on 31 July. Suleiman Frangieh – preferred presidential candidate of Shiite parties Hizbollah and Amal – 11 May met with Saudi ambassador to Lebanon; observers argued that Frangieh’s candidacy must overcome opposition from Lebanon’s main Christian parties and perhaps from Riyadh, too. While Frangieh’s backers claimed that meeting indicated Saudi openness to his candidacy, his opponents claimed that Riyadh’s position had not materially changed.

Lebanon failed to hold municipal elections. After parliament in April extended mandates of municipalities and local public officials, due to expire on 31 May, Constitutional Council 30 May dismissed three appeals against mandate extension, citing need to prevent Lebanon’s local institutions from operating in legal vacuum. Postponement of elections will likely contribute to degradation of municipalities and essential services they provide, as elected council members resign, emigrate or pass away. Around 10% of municipalities countrywide are already officially defunct.

Libya

Violence broke out in west as efforts to form new executive heightened political tensions, all the while undermining UN moves to organise elections in late 2023.

Eastern-based PM Bashagha dismissed amid negotiations for unified executive. Eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) 16 May suspended PM Bashagha as head of HoR-backed govt citing allegations of financial irregularities, and appointed finance minister and close ally of eastern army commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Osama Hammad, as interim PM. Haftar’s sons and heads of militias close to rival Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba in May met in Egypt’s capital Cairo to forge deal on new unity govt that would leave Dabaiba in place, while conceding some ministries to Haftar affiliates; some MPs are opposed to this plan, however, and want Dabaiba removed. Meanwhile, as part of UN-backed efforts to hold presidential and legislative elections by year’s end, 6+6 joint committee – composed of HoR and rival Tripoli-based High State Council representatives – 23 May announced breakthrough on number of issues related to elections but conditioned further steps on agreement on new govt.

Political tensions fuelled violence between armed groups in Zawiya city. Clashes between rival militias who battle for influence and control of trafficking routes 21-24 April left at least four civilians dead in Zawiya city (west). Renewed clashes 11 May erupted, reportedly leaving two people dead. Precarious calm in following days prevailed following mediation by notables and community leaders, but tensions rose again after Tripoli-based govt 25 May ordered drone strikes on militia-held buildings in Zawiya, targeting factions close to MPs who want to dislodge Dabaiba. Fresh drone strikes in Maya port outside Zawiya 29 May killed two and wounded nephew of HoR MP Ali Bouzriba; HoR immediately condemned attack, and armed group close to Bouzriba same day closed off gas pipeline to local electricity plant in retaliation.

Concerns persisted over fallout of conflict in Sudan. State-owned National Oil Corporation 1 May denied media reports that it delivered oil from Sarir refinery to Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, however locals claimed fuel smuggling from south-eastern Libya toward Sudanese border continued.

Saudi Arabia

Kingdom reestablished ties with Syria and welcomed President Assad back into Arab fold, while continuing rapprochement with Iran.

Riyadh resumed relations with Damascus, continued normalisation with Iran. After Arab League 7 May readmitted Syria, Saudi Arabia 9 May announced it would reopen diplomatic mission in Syrian capital Damascus and next day invited Syrian President Assad to Arab League summit in capital Riyadh. Assad 18 May arrived in Jeddah and next day attended Arab League summit after 12-year suspension (see Syria). Meanwhile, Iranian foreign ministry 1 May announced initial diplomatic activities had resumed at Iranian embassy in Riyadh. Iranian FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian 10 May said Saudi Arabia previous day named new ambas-sador to Tehran and Iran would appoint ambassador to Riyadh “soon”, as 10 May deadline passed without officially reopening embassies and appointing ambassadors. Iranian finance minister 11 May led economic delegation to Jeddah in first visit by Iranian official since March agreement to resume ties. Saudi Arabia and Canada 24 May agreed to restore full diplomatic relations after five years.

In other important developments. Negotiations with Huthis in Yemen stalled (see Yemen). Jeddah hosted joint U.S.-Saudi-led talks beginning 6 May between Sudan’s warring parties (see Sudan). In sign of improving ties, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan 7 May met Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman in Jeddah to discuss “strategic relations” and “significant progress” in Yemen war. Amnesty International 16 May said number of executions in Saudi Arabia in 2022 was highest recorded in 30 years.

Syria

Arab League readmitted Syria after 12-year suspension, Islamic State (ISIS) claimed first attack in capital Damascus since Sept 2021, and Jordan’s first airstrikes since 2015 killed drug kingpin and family.

Arab League welcomed President Assad’s return. Arab League 7 May reinstated Syria’s membership, following 12-year suspension, after Damascus promised to end captagon trafficking. Syria and Saudi Arabia 9 May announced they would each reopen diplomatic mission in the other’s capital. Assad 18 May arrived in Jeddah in first visit to Saudi Arabia since start of war and next day attended Arab League summit, amid reports of limited refugee return policy being hammered out at gathering. Meanwhile, Turkish, Russian, Syrian and Iranian FMs 10 May met in Russian capital Moscow in highest-level talks since 2011 war.

ISIS activity slowed despite deadly attack in Damascus. ISIS activity in central Syria decreased following high-intensity attacks during truffle harvesting season; regime stepped up anti-ISIS operations in Suwayda province but ceased major operations in eastern Homs. ISIS 10 May claimed IED attack in Damascus, however, killing two police officers, and in first killing of senior officer in a year, ISIS 17 May killed army colonel and several others in Raqqa province.

Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) killed Russian colonel in north west. Idlib’s dominant rebel group HTS continued harassing regime forces along north-western front with near-daily lethal sniper attacks, while regime conducted deadly artillery strikes, mainly in Idlib’s Jabal al-Zawiyah area. HTS 26 May struck regime headquarters along Latakia front, killing Russian colonel – highest-ranking Russian officer killed by rebel forces since 2016; Russia responded with bombing runs in southern Idlib, first such attacks in six months.

Jordan, Israel, Türkiye and U.S. launched airstrikes. In its first-ever airstrikes on regime-affiliated positions, Jordan 8 May bombed abandoned drug facility in southern Deraa province and killed drug kingpin and his seven-member family in Suwayda province. Israeli missiles 1 May targeted Aleppo airport, killing one soldier (see Israel-Palestine). Türkiye continued drone strikes targeting Kurdistan Workers’ Party (see Türkiye). U.S. military 3 May launched airstrike, killing man reportedly mistakenly identified as al-Qaeda member in Idlib province.

Tunisia

Attack at Jewish pilgrimage site left several dead, while renewed violence erupted against sub-Saharan migrants; court sentenced most prominent opposition leader to prison.

Gunman killed four in attack on El Ghriba synagogue. National guard member 9 May opened fire upon worshippers attending annual Jewish pilgrimage at El Ghriba synagogue on Djerba island, killing two security personnel, two civilians and wounding a dozen others before security forces shot him dead; assailant earlier same day also killed colleague. Interior Minister Kamel Fekih 11 May said targeting of synagogue was premeditated, but referred to it as a “criminal” rather than terrorist act, meaning regular judiciary will carry out investigation.

Violence against migrants turned deadly. Armed individuals around 22 May attacked 19 sub-Saharan migrants near Sfax city, killing Beninese man and injuring at least four others; authorities in following days arrested three Tunisian nationals in relation to case and opened judicial enquiry. Over 20 rights organisations 29 May condemned “context of uninterrupted speeches of incitement, hatred and racism against migrants from sub-Saharan Africa” since President Saïed in Feb linked migrants to violence and criminality.

Judicial harassment of govt critics continued unabated. Authorities 6 May arrested Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party official Sahbi Atig, notably on allegations of money laundering and illegal possession of currency. Anti-terrorism court in capital Tunis 15 May sentenced Saïed’s most prominent critic, An-Nahda president and founder Rached Ghannouchi (who has been in preventive detention since April), to one year in prison on terrorism-related charges. Appeals court in Tunis 16 May increased prison sentence for journalist Khalifa Guesmi from one to five years on charges of disclosing national security information. Journalists 18 May held sit-in protest near Tunisian Journalists’ Union headquarters in Tunis to denounce “one of the heaviest sentences in the Tunisian media’s history” and “dramatic escalation in the persecution of the media and journalists”.

Western Sahara

U.S. govt held meetings with Moroccan and Algerian officials on Western Sahara, highlighting Washington’s efforts to inject momentum into UN attempts to resume peace talks.

U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken and Moroccan FM Nasser Bourita 14 May held phone conversation on Western Sahara and other matters. Call readout mentioned U.S. support for UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura’s efforts to intensify “UN process on Western Sahara toward an enduring and dignified political solution”; readout however lacked usual reference to Washington’s support for Rabat’s autonomy plan as U.S. pressures Morocco to soften its position and resume talks with Polisario Front independence movement. U.S. Ambassador to Algeria Elizabeth Moore Aubin mid-May met with Algerian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Sec Gen Amar Belani in Algiers; Algerian foreign affairs ministry said two sides agreed on “importance of supporting” UN envoy’s efforts to resume negotiations over Western Sahara.

Yemen

Hopes of breakthrough deal between Saudi Arabia and Huthis dwindled, while southern separatists demanded independent state and factions jockeyed for control of Hadramawt province.

Huthi-Saudi talks stalled. After Saudi diplomatic visit in April raised expectation of breakthrough, Huthis refused to sign Saudi-proposed roadmap or deal with Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and refused to provide guarantees to enter intra-Yemen talks; Huthis reportedly demanded Riyadh pay reparations for war. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 2-3 May visited capital Sanaa and held “constructive” meeting with Huthi leaders; 3 May travelled to Aden for “fruitful” discussion with PLC head al-Alimi. Grundberg 17 May briefed UN Security Council, noting “clear determination on all sides to make progress” toward peace deal despite violence along front lines, particularly in al-Jawf, Marib, Taiz and Saada governorates.

Southern Transitional Council (STC) made bid for leadership in south. In attempt to build consensus among southern groups on secession and position itself as main force in south ahead of anticipated intra-Yemeni talks, STC 4-8 May convened Southern National Consultative Meeting, which 8 May produced “national charter” calling for “restoration of the state of the south”; several important groups, notably Hadramawt Inclusive Conference and National Conference for the People of the South, refused to attend, stating opposition to STC’s expansionist agenda. STC 8 May announced council’s restructuring, including creation of legislative body of 392 members. STC President and PLC Vice President Ayderous al-Zubaidi 9 May appointed three new STC vice presidents.

Tensions persisted in Hadramawt, UN proceeded to salvage FSO Safer. Amid STC threats to take over Wadi Hadramawt – northern valley of Hadramawt controlled by Saudi-aligned Islah forces – Saudi-led delegation 5-6 May met Hadramawt and Shebwa governors as part of Saudi strategy to challenge STC’s power and deploy Nation’s Shield Forces headed by al-Alimi. PLC 22 May met Saudi defence minister in Riyadh, where council members criticised STC’s moves in Hadramawt. UN 4 May fell short of funding target to salvage stranded oil tanker FSO Safer but planned to begin rescue operation.

Africa

Benin

Northern departments suffered several attacks attributed to jihadist groups despite authorities’ efforts to contain violence.

Attacks targeted civilians and military along Burkina Faso and Niger borders. Unidentified armed individuals 2 April killed four fishermen in Matéri commune, Atakora department near border with Burkina Faso. Unidentified gunmen overnight 3-4 April attempted to abduct civilians and steal cattle at Fulani camp near Porga commune (also Atakora); army intervened and reportedly forced assailants to flee, but some sources claim three civilians killed. Unidentified armed individuals overnight 15-16 April reportedly attacked military camp near Malanville city at Niger border in Alibori department; death toll unknown. Govt 12 April announced special recruitment of 5,000 soldiers to be deployed in northern areas affected by jihadist incursions.

Rwanda committed to providing military assistance to counter jihadist threat. President Talon 15 April met with his Rwandan counterpart, President Paul Kagame, in economic capital Cotonou; two leaders signed agreement for Rwandan military help in securing Benin’s borders, with Talon saying cooperation could include anything from “monitoring, coaching and training” missions to “joint deployment” of troops.

Burkina Faso

Amid sustained fighting between govt forces and jihadist groups countrywide, both sides conducted large-scale massacres of civilians, while govt continued to restrict fundamental freedoms as part of total war strategy.

Govt forces and jihadists carried out massacres of civilians. In North region, suspected soldiers around 20 April raided Karma and nearby villages in Yatenga province, reportedly killing at least 136 civilians. Both govt forces and jihadists launched suspected retaliatory attacks on civilians in Sahel region’s Séno province: military 4-6 April allegedly killed seven civilians in Dori town; and suspected Islamic State Sahel Province combatants overnight 6-7 April stormed Kourakou and Tondobi villages, leaving 31 and 13 civilians dead, respectively.

Fighting between govt forces and jihadists continued. As part of more offensive approach against jihadists, military in March-April reportedly conducted major operation against al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) positions notably in Sahel, North, Centre-North and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, with unclear results. Meanwhile in North region, JNIM combatants 15 April attacked military detachment and civilian auxiliaries (VDPs) near Aorema village, close to Ouahigouya town in Yatenga province, reportedly leaving at least eight soldiers and 32 VDPs dead; govt reported 50 assailants also killed. In Centre-East region, JNIM 10 April ambushed security forces near Zambanega village, Boulgou province; eight soldiers, three VDPs and ten militants reportedly killed. In East region, suspected jihadists 27 April killed 33 soldiers in attack on military detachment near Ouagarou town in Gnagna province, reportedly losing 40 of their own.

Authorities continued to restrict civic space as part of total war on jihadists. Among other measures aimed at boosting country’s military capabilities, interim president, Capt. Traoré, 7 April announced new civilian “watch and development committees” at local level, reportedly responsible for alerting authorities about any suspicious movements and acting for development of their communities; 13 April declared “general mobilisation”, giving authorities wide legal latitude to restrict rights and freedoms if deemed necessary to combat insecurity. Meanwhile, authorities 1 April expelled Burkina Faso correspondents for French newspapers Le Monde and Libération; move came after Libération confirmed video showing men executing children in military barracks as authentic.

Burundi

Politically motivated violence continued, while relations with Rwanda improved further.

Political opposition continued to face harassment and violence. Locals 6 April discovered lifeless body of main opposition party National Congress for Freedom (CNL) activist, Gilbert Ndacayisaba, in Ngozi province (north); witnesses claimed Ndacayisaba had been under pressure from ruling party’s youth militia Imbonerakure to join their ranks. CNL was also subject to bureaucratic obstruction: party congress scheduled for 14 April was postponed after govt refused permission due to administrative error.

Burundi’s relations with Rwanda thawed further. Ruling party 2 April sent high-level delegation to Kigali to attend 35th anniversary celebration of Rwandan President Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF); visit marked new step toward reconciliation following series of high-level bilateral talks (see Rwanda).

In other important developments. Security forces 18 April discovered three bodies reportedly tied together in Cibitoke province (north west); locals said bodies might be those of anti-Kigali rebels from National Liberation Forces. Also in Cibitoke, locals 22 April found two bodies wearing army uniforms. Authorities 21 April detained former PM Alain Guillaume Bunyoni (2020-2022) on accusations of “undermining state security”; NGO Amnesty International 26 April welcomed “opportunity for the Burundian authorities to ensure accountability for serious human rights violations”, however expressed concern over “lack of transparency” around detention.

Cameroon

Amid sustained fighting between army and separatists, local authorities in Anglophone regions warned of renewed herder-farmer tensions; jihadist violence increased in Far North region.

Anglophone separatists and govt forces continued to engage in clashes. In North-West region (NW), army 4 April ambushed and killed three armed separatists in Bafut commune (Mezam division); separatist militia 27 April detonated IEDs in Bamenda city, with unknown number of casualties. In South West region (SW), suspected separatist combatants 5 April killed two soldiers in Mamfe city (Manyu division); govt forces 18 April killed two separatist fighters and arrested eight civilians suspected of working with separatists during raid in Mamfe.

Tensions between Nigerian pastoralists and Cameroonian farmers rose again. In NW, armed men 1-2 April abducted about 25 people and destroyed properties in Ako town (Donga-Mantung division) near border with Nigeria’s Taraba state; local officials blamed attack on Fulani herders from Nigeria, who have crossed border into Cameroon and clashed with local farmers in the past. Local authorities in neighbouring SW region had in March warned of similar incursions in Akwaya town (Manyu division).

Jihadists stepped up attacks in Far North region. Boko Haram militants overnight 5-6 April clashed with army and vigilantes in Malika and Kerawa localities (both Mayo-Sava division), leaving two militants dead; 16 April attacked Zeleved military post (Mayo-Tsanaga division), killing at least one soldier and displacing hundreds of civilians; 18 April killed at least one civilian and set houses ablaze in Mozogo town (Mayo-Tsanaga) before being pushed back by military. IED planted by Boko Haram 24 April killed six soldiers in Tchébé-Tchébé village (Mayo-Tsanaga).

Senate elections cemented one-party rule, media freedom remained under threat. After ruling party in March won all 70 Senate seats open for election, Biya 31 March appointed another 30 senators, with only five from opposition parties, meaning ruling party now holds 95% of Senate seats. Meanwhile, Cameroon Journalists’ Trade Union 8 April accused Maroua city (Far North region) mayor of threatening to kill journalists investigating corruption in road construction projects.

Central African Republic

Amid persistent rebel violence, conflict in Sudan started affecting border region; emergence of self-defence militia increased risk of intercommunal tensions in south east.

Rebels sustained offensive notably in west and north east. In west, 3R rebel group, a member of Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), 4 April wounded three soldiers and seven Russian paramilitaries in Bossemptélé town (Ouham-Pendé prefecture). CPC fighters 7 April killed three soldiers and wounded another in ambush near Boda town, confirming rebels’ redeployment in Lobaye prefecture where they have not been present since 2021. In north-eastern Vakaga prefecture, CPC rebels 1 April wounded two artisanal miners 60km from Ouanda-Djallé town, while armed forces 16 April lost five soldiers in clash with pastoralists near Sikikédé locality. In neighbouring Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, CPC 11 April killed two soldiers near border with Chad.

Conflict in Sudan affected dynamics in border region. After conflict erupted in neighbouring Sudan between Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Vakaga prefecture (located along border) recorded increased presence of Sudanese militiamen. Notably, about 40 RSF fighters 25 April reportedly crossed into CAR near Amdafock village. Conflict hampered RSF’s capacity to protect border, offering greater latitude to CPC rebels smuggling weapons and men into CAR going forward. Meanwhile, 500 people fleeing violence in Sudan 26 April arrived in Amdafock.

New self-defence militia launched first attack against govt forces in south east. In Haut-Mbomou prefecture (south east), Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé militia, newly created to protect Zandé ethnic group (the majority locally) from Union for Peace (UPC) rebels, launched first attack on armed forces positions in Obo town, leading to population displacement. Intercommunal tensions could intensify in area, as Zandé militia is hostile to Muslim traders and Fulani herders it perceives as affiliated with UPC. Militia 22-23 April reportedly engaged in fighting with South Sudanese soldiers near Bambouti, leaving unknown number of people dead.

International NGO denounced democratic regression. NGO Human Rights Watch 4 April warned of “potential for human rights violations and the narrowing of democratic space and free expression” as President Touadéra continues to push for constitutional change that would let him run for third term in 2025.

Chad

Conflict in neighbouring Sudan sparked concern of regional destabilisation, and intercommunal violence resurged in southern regions.

Violent power struggle in Sudan raised risk of heightened instability in Chad. After fighting 15 April erupted in neighbouring Sudan between Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, Chad same day closed shared border in attempt to reduce risk of movement of rebel groups and militias that might support either side. Defence ministry 19 April however announced 320 Sudanese soldiers had fled into Chad, while UN refugee agency around 21 April reported up to 20,000 people had found refuge in Chad since conflict started in Sudan. Influx raised concern about humanitarian crisis as World Food Programme 14 April announced it would from May onward not be able to feed hundreds of thousands of refugees already in Chad.

Intercommunal violence flared in country’s south. Suspected herders 8 April attacked Kagbé village (Mandoul region), leaving two people killed and six injured. Clashes between Fulani herders and Kodo farmers around 18 April left at least 22 people dead in several villages of Monts de Lam department (Logone Oriental region).

Govt entered diplomatic spat with Germany. Authorities 7 April expelled German ambassador to N’Djamena, citing latter’s “discourteous attitude” and actions “incompatible with diplomatic practice”; expulsion reportedly followed ambassador’s comments condemning authorities’ decision to allow interim president, Mahamat Déby, to run for permanent office in next election. In response, Germany 11 April expelled Chadian ambassador, and European Union next day condemned N’Djamena’s “hostile gesture”.

In other important developments. French media outlet RFI 15 April said committee in charge of organising constitutional referendum was expecting to hold vote on 19 Nov, though report cast doubt on timeline’s feasibility. Cabinet 24 April adopted electoral bill relating to organisation of referendum.

Côte d’Ivoire

Authorities set date for local and regional elections, widely seen as warm-up for 2025 presidential election; govt took new steps to counter growing jihadist threat.

Political heavyweights continued to mobilise supporters in run-up to elections. In likely popularity test ahead of 2025 presidential election, former President Gbagbo 1 April met with youth representatives of his party in economic capital Abidjan. Authorities 19 April scheduled municipal and regional elections for 2 Sept. Several parties in following days disclosed lists of candidates, with President Ouattara’s Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace selecting 11 members of govt among 31 candidates for regional elections.

Jihadist expansion from Sahel region remained major concern. Ivorian and Burkinabe legislative branch presidents, respectively Adama Bictogo and Ousmane Bougouma, 4 April met on margins of continental conference of French-speaking Parliamentary Assembly in Abidjan to discuss security cooperation, confirming renewed dialogue between neighbours; Bougouma expressed “high expectations” regarding Ivorian support to Ouagadougou in fighting jihadists. Meanwhile, Ivorian National Security Council 12 April announced creation of two “transit sites” for Burkinabé refugees in border departments of Ouangolodougou (north) and Bouna (north east); initiative will allow security services to monitor influx and conduct identity checks as authorities fear militants could infiltrate country among displaced people.

Democratic Republic of Congo

ADF and CODECO attacks surged in eastern provinces, while full deployment of regional force coincided with lull in fighting between govt forces and M23 rebels in North Kivu.

ADF and CODECO attacks killed scores of civilians in Ituri and North-Kivu. UN humanitarian office 18 April said “persistent attacks” by armed groups in Ituri province’s Djugu, Irumu and Mambasa territories had killed around 150 civilians since early April. Most notably, Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 2-3 April killed 30 civilians in several attacks on border between Mambasa and Irumu, while CODECO coalition of mostly Lendu militias 13-14 April killed nearly 50 people in Banyali-Kilo sector, Djugu. Meanwhile in neighbouring North Kivu province, ADF 7-20 April killed at least 30 people and took multiple hostages in Beni and Lubero territories.

M23 continued to vacate positions as ECA force completed deployment. North Kivu experienced fragile lull in fighting between M23 rebels and govt forces as East African Community regional force early April completed deployment (see Uganda). Notably, Ugandan contingent late March-early April took control of Bunagana border town, Rutshuru city, and Kiwanja town after M23 withdrawal. Claims of M23 attacks on civilians however resurfaced. Local authorities in Rutshuru territory 26 April claimed M23 in previous days killed 60 civilians in Bwito area. Kenya 27 April replaced regional force commander amid rising tensions with Kinshasa over force’s mandate.

Tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali remained elevated. After President Tshisekedi 13 April excluded direct negotiations with M23, group same day responded that “there will also be no cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation until there is direct political dialogue”. Kagame 15 April blamed M23 crisis on colonial era border delineation, saying “a big part of Rwanda was left outside in eastern Congo and southwestern Uganda”. In response, Kinshasa blamed Kagame for “all the problems” in eastern provinces over last 20 years (see Rwanda).

In other important developments. Ahead of general elections scheduled for Dec 2023, prominent opposition presidential candidates 14 April pledged to work together and scheduled march for 13 May in capital Kinshasa to protest “chaotic electoral process”. Voter registration 25 April closed countrywide; election commission however mentioned possibility of additional registration drives in conflict-ridden territories.

Eritrea

Military delegation travelled to Ethiopia amid stepped-up regional engagement.

High-level delegation visited Ethiopia as Asmara sought to consolidate ties. Military delegation led by National Security Agency chief Abraha Kassa 3-5 April visited Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa. Possibly seeking to demonstrate strong bilateral ties following Ethiopia’s peace deal in Tigray, Minister of Information Yemane Gebremeskel 5 April said Ethiopian military chief Birhanu Jula praised Eritrea’s support during Tigray war, saying it “can never be compensated”, while Abraha Kassa 5 April said Eritrea’s “aspirations” are for “durable peace” in Ethiopia. Trust-building visit could presage further Eritrean troop withdrawals from Tigray region, provided Asmara is satisfied with progress on disarmament of Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

Engagement with other regional actors continued. Delegation led by FM Osman Saleh and Presidential Adviser Yemane Gebreab 3 April arrived in South Sudanese capital, Juba, meeting with country’s President Salva Kiir. Sides reportedly focused on bilateral ties and regional developments amid worrying deterioration in Sudan (see Sudan), as well as Eritrea’s interest in promoting “peace and reconciliation among the people of South Sudan”. Same delegation 11 April met with Kenyan President William Ruto in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi.

Ethiopia

Violence spiked in Amhara over federal decision to dissolve regional paramilitaries, govt and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) held peace talks, and Tigray-federal relations continued to improve.

Plans to disband regional paramilitary sparked deadly violence in Amhara region. Federal govt 6 April announced decision to dissolve regional special forces and integrate them into national army and police. Many in Amhara viewed move as threat to region amid concerns that PM Abiy allying with Oromo nationalists and strengthening ties with Tigray is isolating Amhara. Some special forces refused to comply with order, instead allying with Amhara nationalist militia known as Fano and clashing with federal soldiers in number of zones. Demonstrations also erupted, spreading throughout region, as protesters blocked roads, burned tires and chanted slogans against Abiy and ruling Prosperity Party. Abiy 9 April vowed to press ahead with plan as govt deployed troops, imposed curfew and cut off mobile internet services in parts of Amhara. Dozens were killed in unrest, which began to subside mid-April. Unidentified gunmen 27 April assassinated Girma Yeshitila, head of Prosperity Party’s Amhara branch, together with his entourage in North Shewa Zone; federal govt next day launched “decisive measures” to counter “extremist forces”.

Govt-OLA peace talks got under way in Tanzania. In positive step toward ending long-running OLA insurgency, PM Abiy 23 April announced peace talks with group starting 25 April in Tanzania; OLA same day confirmed news, saying federal govt had accepted its demands for third-party mediator. Fighting between security forces and OLA continued, however, and OLA continued kidnapping civilians.

Tigray’s leader named new cabinet as federal-Tigray relations improved further. Newly appointed leader of Tigray region’s Interim Regional Administration, Getachew Reda, 5 April unveiled 27-member cabinet to lead political transition. Cabinet is dominated by TPLF members, while military controls four posts; opposition Baytona for Greater Tigray Party took two positions amid frustration among Tigray opposition parties with excessive TPLF control. Meanwhile, Federal Ministry of Education delegation 6-7 April visited Tigray to discuss reopening region’s universities. National Rehabilitation Commission head Teshome Toga 14 April visited regional capital, Mekelle, to evaluate progress on disarmament. Prosperity Party VP Adem Farah 27 April led delegation to Mekelle.

Guinea

No breakthrough in talks between transitional authorities and opposition parties; meanwhile, protests erupted against power shortages.

Fragile talks proceeded between govt and opposition parties. Following first round of talks in March as part of mediation led by religious leaders, PM Bernard Goumou and Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG) – large opposition coalition including outlawed National Front for the Defence of the Constitution, opposition leader Cellou Dallein Diallo’s party and deposed President Condé’s Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) – in April held several rounds of talks in capital Conakry but failed to make tangible progress to ease political crisis. FVG continued to demand release of detained opposition figures, lifting of protest ban and new national dialogue supervised by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while Goumou reportedly failed to secure strong support for talks from key officials linked to military govt. Collapse of talks could lead FVG to call for renewed street protests.

Spontaneous protests erupted over power shortages. Youths protesting power cuts late March-early April occupied roundabouts and clashed with police in several neighbourhoods of Kankan city – both an RPG stronghold and interim president Col. Doumbouya’s birthplace. Govt 2 April sent security reinforcements to restore order, and 5 April suspended governor of Kankan region. Court in Kankan 13 April sentenced 15 protesters to jail terms on charges of “participating in non-authorised gathering” and “destruction of public buildings”. Situation eased in following days, but Kankan and other cities could see new violence amid recurrent power shortages.

Kenya

Major points of contention persisted between govt and opposition despite positive steps toward de-escalating tensions; resource conflict fuelled by drought continued in northern counties.

Opposition entered fragile talks with govt but called for new protests. Opposition leader Raila Odinga 2 March suspended anti-govt protests after President Ruto same day agreed to form bipartisan committee to review selection process for election commissioners. Country’s top prosecutor next day dropped charges of unlawful assembly levelled in March at several opposition lawmakers; govt however refused to engage on other opposition demands, including cost of living and audit of Aug 2022 election servers. In attempt to increase pressure, Odinga 13 April announced protests would resume after holy month of Ramadan, and 23 April scheduled protest for 2 May. Bilateral talks 20 April kicked off but Odinga’s coalition 25 April suspended participation amid disagreement over composition of negotiating delegations and topics to be discussed.

Violence over cattle and land resources continued in north amid historic drought. Cattle theft and banditry continued in Rift Valley despite military operation. Notably, raiders believed to be from Turkana county 6 April killed five people and injured another in Lami Nyeusi village in West Pokot county, also stealing goats.

In other important developments. President Ruto’s senior economic adviser David Ndii 8 April suggested govt might need to take further austerity measures to avoid debt default and stabilise economy; govt is struggling to pay public servants’ salaries and basic imports as debt service consumes over 60% of govt revenue. Ruto 4-5 April visited Rwandan capital Kigali for talks on eastern Democratic Republic of Congo with Rwandan counterpart Kagame (see DR Congo). Intergovernmental Authority on Development regional bloc 16 April appointed Ruto to mediate conflict in Sudan, along with South Sudanese and Djibouti counterparts (see Sudan).

Mali

Tensions continued to mount between transitional govt and coalition of northern armed groups signatory to 2015 Algiers peace accord, and Islamic State gained further ground in Ménaka region.

Relations between govt and Algiers Accord signatory groups deteriorated further. Army aircraft 5 April flew over Kidal city (Kidal region in north), headquarters of coalition of former rebel groups Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA); CMA responded with warning shots, and same day denounced ceasefire “violation” and “grave provocation”. In effort to reboot peace process, accord’s international mediation mechanism (led by Algeria) 9 April proposed meetings with interim govt 17 April, and with govt and signatory groups 24 April, which Bamako declined. Further stoking tensions, armed forces reported arresting on 23 April 12 “terrorists” in rare operation in Ménaka region (also north); CMA however claimed detainees were coalition members. Algerian FM Ahmed Attaf 27 April visited Bamako, held talks with interim president, Col. Goïta; in joint statement, leaders committed to reviving 2015 deal.

Islamic State pursued advance in Ménaka, violence continued in centre. Following weeks-long fighting with al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), Islamic State Sahel Province 11 April took control of Tidermène town (Ménaka), in effect encircling regional capital Ménaka and driving displacement. In Mopti region (centre), govt forces and allied Russia’s paramilitary Wagner Group elements 1 April reportedly killed nine civilians in Kourkanda-Peulh village; military claimed eight of those killed were jihadists. Suspected JNIM combatants 22 April launched suicide attacks in Sévaré town (also Mopti), leaving 10 civilians dead and over 60 wounded; military reportedly killed 28 assailants.

Tensions with UN resurfaced ahead of UN mission in Mali’s mandate renewal. UN Security Council members at 12 April meeting expressed concern about frozen peace process with northern armed groups and possible presidential election delay after Malian authorities in March indefinitely postponed constitutional referendum; ahead of vote on UN mission (MINUSMA)’s mandate renewal in June, UNSG Special Representative for Mali El-Ghassim Wane also urged Bamako to lift restrictions on MINUSMA operations. Meanwhile, as disinformation campaign sought to attribute 22 April attack to MINUSMA, angry mob 23 April assaulted and wounded two MINUSMA staff in Sévaré.

Mozambique

Relative calm persisted in northern Cabo Delgado province during rainy season and holy month of Ramadan; govt legalised local militia to help fight jihadists.

Islamic State insurgents staged limited number of attacks in Cabo Delgado. In first fatal attack since mid-March, Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) 15 April assaulted two positions of govt forces and Local Forces (militias fighting alongside govt) around Miangalewa village in Muidumbe district; at least one Local Forces member was killed, despite Rwandan forces’ intervention. Attacks took place days after group of displaced people returned to Miangalewa, suggesting that holding territory and sustaining return of residents in Muidumbe will be significant challenge. Insurgents had been sighted in area in days prior to attack. Notably, Local Forces patrol 13 April encountered group of insurgents outside Litapata village, killing five; insurgents next day raided nearby Mandava village. Meanwhile, reports in April continued to emerge indicating that insurgent groups – sometimes numbering as many as 50 – are present along coast and trying to establish good relations with villagers, notably 19 April in Nazimoja village south of Mocímboa da Praia district capital, and around 20 April near Quiterajo and Ntoni villages (Macomia district); with new strategy, militants could secure durable support from communities, as national security forces are feared and distrusted.

Govt formalised relations with local militia fighting insurgents in Cabo Delgado. Council of Ministers 5 April approved decree providing legal authority to and regulating functioning of Local Forces in Cabo Delgado to help push back insurgents; step concludes legalisation process after parliament in late 2022 passed law recognising militia as govt-linked force. NGO Human Rights Watch 26 April expressed concern over partnership with “untrained and seemingly uncontrollable militia”, urged govt to prevent violations of international humanitarian laws.

Renamo called for exclusion of Mocímboa da Praia from municipal elections. Main opposition party Renamo continued to press electoral authorities to exclude Mocímboa da Praia district from municipal elections set for 11 Oct as voter registration 20 April started. With voting expected to be limited to municipal area of Mocímboa da Praia town due to security risks in rest of district, Renamo claims concentration of govt security forces in town could influence voter behaviour in ruling party’s favour.

Niger

President Bazoum reshuffled military leadership as small-scale jihadist violence persisted, notably in south east; high-level visits showcased Niger’s new role as Western countries’ preferred partner in the Sahel.

Low-level violence continued in Diffa region and returned to Agadez region. In likely effort to place men closer to him in command of military, Bazoum 1 April named new army chief of staff, while defence minister 13 April named new chief of gendarmerie. Meanwhile in Diffa region (south east), IEDs likely planted by Boko Haram faction Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 9-15 April killed several soldiers and one civilian in Diffa and Bosso departments. Also in Diffa, rival Boko Haram faction (JAS) 15-17 April abducted at least three civilians in N’Guigmi department. In rare attack in northern Agadez region, unidentified gunmen 9 April ambushed gold convoy under military protection near Arlit town, leaving five soldiers dead and another five wounded.

Court sentenced civil society leader to prison. Court in capital Niamey 14 April sentenced coordinator of opposition coalition M62, Abdoulaye Seydou, to nine months in prison for “disseminating information that could disturb public order” after he accused armed forces of killing civilians.

High-level visits from Western actors continued. German defence minister and economic cooperation minister 12 April met with Nigerien counterparts in capital Niamey, said Niger would be “the focus of our future military engagement in the Sahel” as Berlin plans to withdraw from UN mission in Mali by May 2024. German parliament 28 April approved deployment of up to 60 troops to Niger as part of planned EU training mission.

Nigeria

Surges in criminal, herder-farmer and communal violence left hundreds of people dead across country, with particularly heavy toll among civilians.

North West, North Central saw resurgence of deadly attacks, with over 300 killed. In Benue state, armed groups 3-7 and 25 April launched multiple attacks on civilians in Apa, Guma and Otukpo areas, killing at least 149 people. Armed groups also conducted deadly raids in Kaduna state, with at least 41 people killed 12 and 15 April in Zango Kataf area. Meanwhile in Niger state, vigilantes around 13 April killed about 50 bandits in Kainji National Park. In Nasarawa state, herder-farmer violence 18 April left twelve people dead in Kokona area. In Plateau state, armed groups 22-26 April killed 13 people in Barkin-Ladi, Jos South and Riyom areas. Armed group 30 April killed 40 people, including six security operatives in Danko-Wasagu area, Kebbi state.

North East recorded persistent jihadist threat and significant communal violence. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 13 April killed ten people in Dogsa village, Yobe state; Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies same day warned ISWAP had started weaponising drones with a view to using them for attacks in Lake Chad basin. Troops 17-20 April killed 35 Boko Haram (JAS) fighters in Sambisa forest, Borno state. Meanwhile in Taraba state, clashes between Fulani and Kuteb ethnic groups in Ardo-Kola, Takum and Ussa areas 31 March-4 April left at least 32 people dead.

Kidnapping for ransom surged across country. In Zamfara state, gunmen 7 April kidnapped about 85 people, mostly children and women, in Tsafe area; 28 April released most of them after ransom payment. In Nasarawa state, gunmen same day abducted former deputy governor, Onje Gye-Wado, in Wamba area, releasing him few days later allegedly after ransom payment. In Rivers state, gunmen 17 April abducted senior lawyer and former Bar Association chairman Okey Wali in state capital Port Harcourt; released him two weeks later in unknown circumstances. Armed groups 25 April abducted at least 29 people in Federal Capital Territory.

Violence associated with Biafra agitation groups persisted in South East. Gunmen 6 and 21 April killed at least six policemen in Aboh Mbaise and Ngor Okpala area, Imo state. Separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra denied responsibility.

Rwanda

Tensions with DR Congo continued to run high, while Kigali offered military support to help Benin counter jihadist threat.

Kigali and Kinshasa continued to trade blame for conflict in eastern DR Congo. President Kagame 15 April blamed M23 crisis on colonial era border delineation, stating that “a big part of Rwanda was left outside in eastern Congo and southwestern Uganda”; also defended M23 rebels stating “these people continue to be denied their rights in Congo” and “the Congo problem, the regional problem, or the Rwanda problem is not M23”. In response, Kinshasa denounced “new provocation”, saying Kagame was responsible for “all the problems” in the east over last 20 years and “must never forget that [DR Congo] will defend every inch of territory”. Earlier in month, Kagame and Kenyan President Ruto 4 April pledged “to find a lasting solution to the conflict” in eastern DR Congo during Ruto’s visit to Rwanda (see DR Congo).

In other important developments. Kagame re-elected 2 April as chairman of ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Burundi’s ruling party delegation same day attended RPF’s 35th anniversary ceremony in capital Kigali, confirming improved relations between neighbours (see Burundi). During visit to Benin, Kagame 15 April met with Beninese President Talon; two leaders signed agreement for Rwandan military help in securing Benin’s borders (see Benin).

Somalia

Following announcement of phase two of offensive against al-Shabaab, central regions continued to be main theatre of operations; humanitarian situation remained dire amid extreme weather events and conflict.

Second phase of offensive against Al-Shabaab got off to slow start. After President Mohamud in March announced second phase of anti-Al-Shabaab offensive, progress in April remained limited in southern regions. In South West state, security forces 17 April recaptured several small villages north of Baidoa city in Bay region, including Adegeow and Tarabow. In Jubaland state, preparations continued with President Ahmed Madobe 10 April visiting recently recovered town of Janay Abdalle. Focus of operations remained country’s centre. In Galmudug state’s Galgaduud region, govt forces 7 April recaptured Galcad town and 15 April took control of Bud Bud village, which Al-Shabaab had controlled for over six years; reports suggested govt may aim to retake Ceel Buur, insurgents’ last remaining major city in area, and establish new front in western Hiraan region (Hirshabelle state). Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab continued to challenge govt’s efforts to project its authority. In Galgaduud, militants 19 April launched raid on military base near Bud Bud, and 22 April attacked Masagawaay village causing unconfirmed number of casualties.

Govt continued efforts to secure regional support for offensive’s second phase. After Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti in Feb agreed to support Somali forces in fighting Al-Shabaab, govt early April held second “front-line states” summit, with deliberations focused on detailing plans for joint regional offensive. Countries contributing to AU transition mission 27 April agreed on procedures for drawdown of 2,000 troops by 30 June as part of mission’s coordinated exit by Dec 2024.

UN Sec Gen highlighted humanitarian crisis amid prolonged drought. UN Sec Gen António Guterres 11-12 April visited Mogadishu and camp for internally displaced persons in Baidoa city (South West state), called for increased support for 2023 humanitarian response plan for Somalia as country grapples with effects of extreme weather events and conflict. Current rainy season expected to see below average rainfall for unprecedented sixth consecutive time, while flooding in Gedo and Bay regions (both south) between mid-March and mid-April displaced 140,000.

Somaliland

Fighting continued between govt forces and local clan militias in Las Anod, while mediators tried in vain to resolve standoff.

Fighting between govt forces and local clan militias continued. Renewed heavy fighting reported early April on outskirts of Las Anod town, Sool region, between Somaliland forces and Dhulbahante militias. After authorities late March said they will go on offensive in Las Anod, local reports in April suggested both sides attempting to recruit reinforcements. Meanwhile, Dhulbahante committee in Las Anod 10 April announced suspending traffic between Sool, Sanaag and Cayn region and Somaliland from 15 April; move would isolate Las Anod from major port of Berbera and impede traffic between Somaliland and Somalia.

Mediation efforts to resolve dispute made little progress. Over a dozen international partners 15 April held virtual call with Somaliland President Muse Bihi but failed to secure pledge to withdraw forces from Las Anod. Clan elders from southern Somalia, who had travelled to Garowe city (Somalia’s Puntland state) and Las Anod in March, 25 April arrived in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa for consultations.

Appointment of envoys hinted at resumption of Somalia-Somaliland talks. Somalia President Mohamud 1 April appointed former Galmudug state president and federal interior minister, Abdikarim Hussein Guled, as special envoy for Somaliland to “ensure the unity and solidarity of the Somali people”. Bihi around 18 April reciprocated by naming former Somaliland FM Edna Adan as envoy to stalled Somaliland-Somalia talks.

South Sudan

South Sudan felt effects of Sudan crisis as economy suffered, refugee flows increased and Sudanese fighters crossed border; violence persisted and opposition forces formed new alliance.

Outbreak of fierce fighting in neighbouring Sudan had immediate knock-on effects. Fighting that erupted 15 April in Sudan (see Sudan) had significant implications for its southern neighbour. On economic front, conflicting reports emerged that clashes in Port Sudan between Sudan’s army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) damaged port and oil pipelines, threatening oil exports that make up 85% of South Sudanese govt’s revenue; South Sudanese pound, meanwhile, 15-22 April lost almost 10% of its value compared to USD. On security front, group of dislodged RSF fighters 19 April entered Renk county, Upper Nile state, prompting army same day to issue ultimatum for group to disarm or leave; incident demonstrated risk of conflict spillover. On humanitarian front, authorities in Renk county 24 April reported 10,000 refugees had crossed border as Sudanese fled fighting. Meanwhile, Intergovernmental Authority on Development 16 April appointed President Kiir, along with Kenyan and Djiboutian counterparts, to mediate conflict in Sudan.

Violence persisted in several states. In Jonglei state, armed youths 3 April reportedly killed two and stole 2,000 head of cattle in separate incidents in Wickol and Padiek areas; unknown gunmen 27 April attacked World Food Programme convoy. In Abyei Administrative Area, govt official 9 April reported alleged rebels loyal to Gen Stephen Buay Rolnyang, leader of South Sudan People’s Movement-Army, 7 April killed 11 Nuer youth in Rumamer county. In Central Equatoria state, unknown assailants 11 April killed four in Mangalla Payam area.

In other important developments. Armed groups and opposition entities not party to 2018 revitalised peace agreement 12 April signed Memorandum of Understanding in Sudanese capital Khartoum, forming new alliance dubbed South Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance; in statement issued same day, actors cited “need for united opposition” to “change the regime in Juba”. Meanwhile, Juba 2-3 April deployed around 345 additional soldiers to Democratic Republic of Congo as part of East African regional force’s fight with M23 rebel group.

Sudan

Fighting erupted between army and paramilitary force, killing hundreds and triggering humanitarian crisis; conflict could slide into all-out war, drawing in new actors and spilling into neighbouring countries.

Deadly fighting broke out between rival security forces. Longstanding power struggle between Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who leads Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo, who controls paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), 15 April descended into violent clashes in capital Khartoum, derailing transition toward restored civilian rule. Hostilities came amid rising tensions over negotiations to merge RSF into army, notably regarding timeline and leadership structure of integrated force. Fighting spread across country, notably to North, Central, West and South Darfur, North Kordofan, Kassala, Gedarif, Red Sea states. Army seized control of number of cities, including Kassala and Port Sudan in east, while RSF had upper hand in Darfur. In most other places, particularly Khartoum, momentum swung back and forth.

Fighting precipitated humanitarian crisis. Hostilities killed hundreds of civilians while millions in Khartoum remained trapped amid food, water and electricity shortages. Dozens of hospitals across Sudan shuttered due to fighting and dwindling supplies, while looting and vandalism were widespread. World Food Programme 16 April suspended operations after three employees were killed in North Darfur. As of 28 April, UN refugee agency estimated over 50,000 people had fled to neighbouring countries.

Mediation efforts failed to halt fighting. International actors called for end to hostilities, while Intergovernmental Authority on Development 16 April appointed Kenyan, South Sudanese and Djibouti presidents to broker ceasefire. Successive attempts to enforce humanitarian truces 18, 19, 21 April failed as foreign govts scrambled to evacuate citizens. U.S. and Saudi Arabia brokered 72-hour ceasefire starting 25 April, extended several times. With sides fighting on despite ceasefires, however, conflict risks descending into protracted civil war that draws in other armed groups and communal militias; in West Darfur state, there were indications tribal militias were already being drawn in. Risk of spillover into neighbouring countries or involvement of regional players also high, particularly due to presence of cross-border militias.

Uganda

Far-reaching iron sheets corruption case resulted in arrest of govt officials; military reported progress against armed groups in eastern DR Congo.

Iron sheets corruption case continued to engulf govt. Authorities 4-18 April detained and charged Karamoja affairs minister, Mary Goretti Kitutu, her deputy Agnes Nandutu, and finance minister, Amos Lugoloobi, for allegedly diverting iron sheets that were part of $10mn relief package originally intended for locals in Karamoja sub-region. President Museveni 3 April pledged to “take political action” against govt officials found guilty of “theft”.

Authorities cracked down on Kenyan herders, causing tension with Nairobi. Ugandan forces 8 April conducted raid against Kenyan nationals suspected to be holding guns in Moroto district; Kenya claimed seven killed while Uganda confirmed one death and six injuries. Additionally, Ugandan military court around 12 April sentenced 32 Kenyan herders to 20-year prison terms for illegally possessing firearms; pastoralists from Kenya’s Turkana county often cross to Uganda during dry spell in search of water and pasture. Turkana officials 13 April protested sentence, saying there was “no fairness and justice for our people”.

Ugandan forces reported gains against M23 and ADF in eastern DR Congo. Ugandan forces 10 April said they had recovered three towns vacated by M23 rebels in Rutshuru territory since 1,000-strong contingent of East African Community regional force late March deployed to North Kivu (see DR Congo). Meanwhile, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, Gen. Wilson Mbasu Mbadi, 6 April hailed achievements made by Uganda-DR Congo joint operations against Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern DR Congo, saying “ADF is now scattered in smaller groups” and “can no longer come together”.

In other important developments. DR Congo nationals allegedly led by local chief from Ituri province’s Mahagi territory around 20 April entered Zombo district and claimed three Ugandan villages; Zombo and Mahadi officials in following days held talks, agreed to respect border demarcations.

Zimbabwe

Calls for postponement of upcoming general elections persisted, and authorities continued to criminalise dissent.

Controversy over constituency delimitation report cast doubt on 2023 vote. Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) party leader Douglas Mwonzora (opposition) 3 April said electoral commission’s constituency delimitation report would produce “unfair and un-credible elections”; statement comes after MDC-T in March filed Constitutional Court application seeking postponement of general elections scheduled for summer. Local advocacy group Election Resource Centre 12 April said suspending elections would threaten country’s democracy, and constitution provides that old boundaries apply if new delimitation report is completed less than six months before elections or deemed unconstitutional. President Mnangagwa 19 April vowed to proclaim election date in late May. Ruling party Zanu-PF second secretary Kembo Mohadi 20 April said party had reached agreements with traditional leaders to secure votes. Main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) deputy spokesperson Gift “Ostallos” Siziba few days later expressed concern about vote buying and exploitation of traditional leaders.

Opposition continued to face judicial harassment. Court 5 April sentenced CCC lawmaker and spokesperson, Fadzayi Mahere, to pay fine on charges of “communicating falsehoods”; however acquitted her of “promoting and inciting public violence”. NGO Amnesty International next day said sentence showed “escalating assault on freedom of expression”, 18 April lamented “rapidly shrinking civic space”, including criminalisation of dissent and targeting of political activists and human rights defenders. Mahere 26 April filed appeal. Court in Harare 28 April sentenced Transform Zimbabwe opposition party activist Jacob Ngarivhume to four years in prison (including one suspended) for “inciting public violence” in 2020.

Asia

Afghanistan

Taliban battled Islamic State’s local branch and resistance groups, humanitarian appeal faced funding shortfall amid threat of famine, and Taliban pursued regional engagement.

Taliban continued crackdown on Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and raids on resistance groups. After Taliban late March allegedly killed ISKP’s number two and group conducted suicide bombing in capital Kabul, Taliban 1 April announced it had imprisoned approximately 1,700 ISKP fighters and killed over 1,100 since its takeover in 2021. U.S. officials 25 April announced that Taliban had killed ISKP mastermind behind 2021 Kabul airport bombing, which claimed lives of estimated 170 Afghans and 13 American troops. Taliban security forces 11 April announced killing of two top Afghanistan Freedom Front commanders in raid in Parwan province (north). National Resistance Front (NRF) spokesman 8 April announced his resignation, hinting at group’s fragmentation. NRF leader Ahmad Massoud 24 April attended anti-Taliban leaders meeting in Austrian capital Vienna.

UN sounded alarm of famine amid serious lack of funding. World Food Programme during month reiterated warning that country is at highest risk of famine in quarter century and its food distributions will dramatically decrease in coming months before ceasing altogether in June unless new funds are pledged. Prospect of additional funding, however, diminished after Taliban authorities 5 April banned UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan from employing Afghan women, effectively extending NGO ban on female employment; UN warned that unless ban is lifted, it might be unable to continue operations, and UN Security Council 27 April unanimously condemned ban. Meanwhile, Ministry of Finance 9 April announced it had generated approximately $2.2bn in revenue in last fiscal year, increase of 37% from previous year, likely due to rise in exports.

Taliban remained active on diplomatic front amid tensions with Pakistan. Russia 3 April reopened its consulate in Balkh province (north). Taliban 16 April claimed Kazakhstan was ready to accept Taliban diplomats following meeting with Kazakhstan’s Deputy PM in Kabul. Taliban FM Amir Khan Muttaqi 13 April attended Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighbours in Uzbekistan’s Samarkand city, where China, Iran, Pakistan and Russia expressed concern over rising security threats in Afghanistan. Pakistani defence minister 13 April warned Pakistan would target Pakistani Taliban hideouts inside Afghanistan (see Pakistan).

Bangladesh

Violent clashes continued between govt and opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) supporters, while insecurity persisted in Rohingya refugee camps and Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Violence continued as BNP continued countrywide anti-govt campaign. BNP Sec-Gen 8 April urged Awami League govt to resign if it “wants to avoid conflicts”; in response, FM AK Abdul Momen ruled out dialogue ahead of Jan 2024 election. BNP continued anti-govt protests during month, notably staging sit-ins in 13 cities and around 650 other locations on 8 April to highlight ten-point demands, which include govt resignation and parliament’s dissolution; police and Awami League supporters same day clashed with protesters in Natore district, injuring scores. Suspected Awami League student supporters 7 April ransacked BNP office south of capital Dhaka. Assailants 13 April hacked to death BNP official in Chapainawabganj district in northwest. Dhaka court 13 April finalised corruption charges against BNP acting chairman Tarique Rahman and his wife. Following series of fires in Dhaka markets, PM Sheikh Hasina 15 April requested authorities investigate potential BNP involvement in attempt to “cripple the economy”.

Insecurity and food aid concerns persisted in Rohingya refugee camps. Security forces 11 and 14 April killed two Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) local commanders in Ukhiya camps. Residents blamed ARSA for 15 April killing of camp leader in Ukhiya. Border Guards 25 April announced record 22kg seizure of crystal methamphetamine in Cox’s Bazar area from Myanmar. Myanmar authorities 3 April said only 56,000 of 87,000 Rohingya who Bangladesh had proposed for repatriation had previously lived in Myanmar, heightening concerns Naypyitaw is unwilling to take back significant proportion of estimated 1.2mn Rohingya in Bangladesh. Washington 11 April announced $23.8mn in urgent aid to Rohingya refugees, amid World Food Programme’s funding shortfall.

Deadly clashes erupted between armed groups in Chittagong Hill Tracts. Authorities 7 April found bodies of eight members of Bawm ethnic minority – a Kuki-Chin subgroup – in Rawangchhari area; Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) claimed seven were its members and blamed rival group for deaths, as police believed victims were killed in gunfight previous day that forced 250 people to flee. KNF and United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) 25 April reportedly clashed in Bandarban district.

China/Japan

China continued maritime presence in Japan’s territorial waters as sides held talks in Tokyo, where both aired grievances and pledged to establish hotline.

Chinese maritime presence continued, Japan protested China’s satellite launch. As of 27 April, Japan detected 103 Chinese vessels inside Japan’s contiguous zone during month, while 11 vessels were detected within Japan’s territorial sea. Japan 19 April protested China’s “extremely regrettable” actions to launch weather satellite despite risk of falling debris in East China Sea and for announcing no-fly zones in area.

Tokyo and Beijing held maritime talks. Japan and China 10 April held first in-person maritime talks in Japanese capital Tokyo since 2019. Japan underlined importance of peace in Taiwan Strait, urged Beijing to stop its coastguard ships entering Japanese waters, expressed concerns about Beijing’s military activity near Japan and its coordination with Russia, and protested against China’s construction of two new structures in East China Sea discovered last year. For their part, Chinese officials criticised Japan’s recent “negative moves” regarding East and South China Seas, disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and Taiwan Strait and demanded Tokyo stop “all words and deeds” that violate China’s territorial sovereignty, undermine its maritime rights and interests, and meddle in Taiwan issue. In positive step, China and Japan made progress on setting up hotline to resolve maritime disputes; China pledged to speed up its use while Japanese media reports suggested hotline could begin operating as early as spring this year.

In other important developments. In joint statement, G7 18 April expressed concerns over situation of East and South China seas, and urged China to abstain from threats, coercion, intimidation, or use of force; China reacted harshly, accusing G7 of interfering in its internal affairs and issued demarche to Japan, which hosted G7 summit.

India

Tensions with China remained elevated over border dispute, while Maoists conducted deadly attack in centre.

Border dispute with China remained prominent as Beijing named disputed areas. China’s civil affairs ministry 2 April issued list of “standardised” names for 11 locations in areas claimed and administered by India as part of Arunachal Pradesh state (north east), marking Beijing’s third attempt since 2017 to rename places under Indian administration and control; govt 4 April rejected move “outright”. Home Minister Amit Shah 10 April visited Arunachal Pradesh to launch $585mn development scheme to bolster security of disputed border, in response to Chinese initiatives to develop villages along Line of Actual Control (LAC). After meeting Indian counterpart in New Delhi, Chinese defence minister 27 April remarked border was “stable overall”, while Indian statement said Beijing had eroded “entire basis” of relations.

Maoist violence continued in centre. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), Maoists 18 April attacked Legislative Assembly member in Bijapur district, who escaped unhurt; earlier same day, security forces killed Maoist and captured two during operation in Bijapur forests. Maoist IED 26 April killed ten security forces personnel and one civilian in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district. In Jharkhand state (east), Maoists declared 14-15 April shutdown after security forces killed five Maoists in Chatra district 3 April. Police 18 April arrested member of pro-Maoist organisation People’s Liberation Front of India from Jharkhand.

In other important developments. At 17 April India-Russia business dialogue in capital New Delhi and amid bilateral free trade agreement talks, FM S. Jaishankar said relations with Russia remained steady and suggested ties could expand further, reiterating that “we share a commitment to a multi-polar world” and “multi-polar Asia”.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Pakistan protested India’s plans to host G20 meeting in May in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), while militants conducted deadliest attack since 2021, raising prospect of further attacks around summit.

Tensions persisted between New Delhi and Islamabad ahead of G20 meeting. Pakistan 11 April expressed “strong indignation” over India’s plans to host G20 summit in J&K’s capital Srinagar on 10-12 May, claiming India hoped to divert attention from its suppression of Kashmiris and accusing India of “self-serving measures to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir”; militants may seek to stage attacks before or during summit of tourism ministers to garner international attention and spoil govt’s ambition to demonstrate its claimed success in restoring peace and order in valley. In response to comments by former J&K governor Satya Pal Malik on 15 April that Feb 2019 Pulwama suicide attack was result of intelligence failures, Pakistani foreign ministry next day said “his disclosures demonstrate how the Indian leadership has habitually used the bogey of terrorism from Pakistan to advance false victimhood narrative and the Hindutva agenda clearly for domestic political gains”; remarks came as opposition lawmakers questioned status of inquiry into attack. Indian border security forces 9 April exchanged fire with Pakistani intruders, claiming to have killed one and arrested two in Poonch district near Line of Control.

Insecurity persisted in J&K as militants staged deadly attack. In deadliest attack since Oct 2021, militants 20 April assaulted army truck in southern Rajouri sector of Kashmir, killing five soldiers and wounding one; attack, for which militants appeared to use NATO ammunition left behind in Afghanistan, cast shadow over G20 meeting next month. Earlier, security forces claimed to have arrested Laskhar-e-Tayyaba sympathiser in Bandipore district on 5 April and two Laskhar-e-Tayyaba militants in Baramulla district on 11 April.

Indonesia

Separatist fighters in Papua region killed four Indonesian soldiers amid operation to liberate kidnapped New Zealand pilot.

Separatists launched deadly ambush on soldiers in Papua. Members of West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) – military wing of Free Papua Organisation – 16 April claimed ambush killed nine soldiers in remote, mountainous regency of Nduga, Papua province, where group in Feb kidnapped New Zealand pilot Philip Mehrtens. Indonesian armed forces 20 April confirmed that separatist attack on 36 military personnel searching for Mehrtens had killed four soldiers and wounded five, with one unaccounted for. Amnesty International 18 April expressed concern that military had raised operational status in Nduga to “combat alert”, citing heightened safety risks for civilians and pilot; Amnesty noted that “the potential for human rights violations with fatalities is also getting bigger”. In video released by TPNPB in late April, Mehrtens confirmed “I’m still alive – I am healthy”; TPNPB urged New Zealand to mediate and demanded security forces cease operations in region.

Security forces killed suspected jihadists in shootout in Sumatra. Counter-terrorism police 12 April killed two suspected militants of outlawed al-Qaeda-linked group Jemaah Islamiyah in gunfire exchange in Lampung province in southern Sumatra Island, part of broader crackdown on group amid reports that it is training and recruiting new members.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea claimed successful solid fuel missile test and hinted at satellite launch, U.S. and South Korea boosted alliance with new accord, and Yellow Sea incident highlighted maritime tensions.

North Korea continued missile tests and indicated impending satellite launch. North Korea 13 April successfully carried out what it said was its first-ever flight test of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-18, marking potentially significant milestone in regime’s efforts to shield country’s missile forces from pre-emptive attack. Meanwhile, leader Kim Jong Un 18 April reaffirmed Pyongyang’s intention to launch what country calls “military reconnaissance satellite” in coming months, which is one of Kim’s five military priorities announced in Jan 2021. Kim’s remarks implied that satellite launch could be timed to coincide with U.S.-South Korea military drills in June marking 70th anniversary of alliance; statement followed North Korean claim on 5 March that it had developed powerful rocket engine that could guarantee successful satellite launch but satellite imagery suggested that construction work continues at main North Korean rocket launch site Sohae, likely ruling out imminent launch.

U.S. and South Korea boosted alliance with “Washington Declaration”. In first state visit to U.S., President Yoon met President Biden in Washington where pair 26 April unveiled new steps to bolster their alliance as 70th anniversary approaches: sides established new group to consult on nuclear planning akin to NATO mechanism, Biden reaffirmed commitment to extended deterrence and agreed to deploy nuclear submarine to south, and sides pledged to expand training and exercises; Yoon reaffirmed country's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation following comments earlier this year suggesting interest in seeking nuclear weapons. In response to G7 statement on 18 April that called for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear capabilities, North Korean FM Choi Son Hui 21 April insisted on permanence and non-negotiability of country’s nuclear deterrent.

South Korea responded to North Korean maritime incursion. South Korean navy vessel 15 April broadcast warnings and fired ten warning shots as North Korean patrol boat that crossed Northern Limit Line – de facto maritime border that Pyongyang refuses to recognise – near South Korea’s Baengnyeong Island in Yellow Sea, before North’s vessel retreated.

Myanmar

Regime launched deadly airstrikes as ethnic armed groups and resistance forces staged ambushes in north and southeast; authorities agreed to possible small-scale Rohingya repatriation and sentenced activists.

In north, regime airstrikes killed scores amid resistance ambushes. Continuing series of deadly airstrikes in late March, military 10 April bombed school in Chin National Defence Force (CNDF)-controlled Falam township, killing at least 11. Military next day conducted devastating air attacks during resistance ceremony in Kanbalu township, Sagaing region, killing at least 170, mostly civilians; UN human rights chief Volker Türk reiterated regime violations “may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes”. Meanwhile, armed groups in Chin state stepped up lethal ambushes on military convoys: notably, Chin National Front 2 April attacked convoy between Falam and Hakha townships, inflicting casualties.

In southeast, heavy fighting resurged along Asian Highway, displacing thousands. People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and allied groups, including Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), late March began ambushes on regime outposts and along highway connecting to Thailand, claiming to have killed dozens of regime forces. Notably, KNLA-PDF “Cobra Column” 3-4 April inflicted heavy casualties in ambush on military truck and police station in Myawaddy. Fighting spread northward, as KNLA and resistance 5 April destroyed two Kayin State Border Guard outposts near Shwe Kokko town; clashes over subsequent week inflicted heavy casualties and forced 4,000 people to flee into Thailand.

Regime agreed to possible small-scale Rohingya repatriation, courts sentenced activists. Following months of negotiations, State Administration Council 3 April declared Myanmar would accept 1,100 Rohingya Muslim refugees and 30o Hindu refugees from Bangladesh; regime confirmed only 56,000 out of 87,000 refugees on list sent by Bangladesh (see Bangladesh). Meanwhile, court 6 April sentenced activist Wai Moe Naing to 34 years imprisonment and next day sentenced Kachin National Consultative Assembly leader Reverend Hkalam Samson to six years in prison.

Regime cemented ties to China and Russia. Senior Chinese official Wang Ning 2 April oversaw signing of agriculture, health and energy agreements with regime in capital Naypyitaw. Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing 3 April conferred honorary Thiri Pyanchi title on Russia’s deputy defence minister.

Pakistan

Constitutional crisis over Punjab election dispute fuelled tensions between govt and Supreme Court, while security forces ramped up operations against militants in north west.

Tensions mounted between govt and Supreme Court over Punjab polls. Supreme Court 4 April fixed Punjab provincial polls for 14 May, ruling that Election Commission’s decision last month to delay vote until 8 Oct was “unconstitutional”; former PM Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party welcomed ruling, while PM Sharif called it “mockery” of constitution and rejected order to prepare for polls. National Assembly during month repeatedly rejected govt bill to allocate election funds. Compounding dispute, President Alvi (PTI member) 9 April rejected govt bill to limit Supreme Court chief justice’s powers; parliament next day, however, adopted bill but before it was enacted into law on 21 April, Supreme Court headed by chief justice 13 April halted bill – marking first time in Pakistan’s legislative history that court blocked law yet to be enacted. Parliament 14 April passed another bill granting right of appeal in specific cases. Further deepening controversy, defence ministry 18 April urged court to permit nationwide elections on 8 Oct; Supreme Court next day dismissed request and warned govt of “serious consequences” if funds and security were not provided. Court 20 April asked major parties to reach consensus within week on date for nationwide elections but backed down on deadline 27 April after National Assembly speaker 26 April denounced judicial interference. PM Sharif 27 April won vote of confidence, strengthening govt’s position as negotiations same day began with PTI on election date.

Govt ramped up military operations against militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. National Security Council 7 April reportedly agreed to launch “all-out comprehensive operation” against “terrorism”. Notably, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, two military operations 5 and 15 April killed 18 militants in South Waziristan, leaving three soldiers dead. Gun battle with militants 9 April killed soldier in North Waziristan. Militants 23 April killed senior ex-army officer in Lakki Marwat district.

Relations remained strained with Kabul. Defence minister 12 April criticised Kabul’s failure in “stopping the use of their territory in attacks on Pakistan”, warning of resorting to “some measures wherever [terrorists] are”.

Philippines

Sporadic violence and militant surrenders continued in south, while fighting persisted between Communist militants and military.

Insecurity persisted in Bangsomoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and adjacent areas. Police 12 April conducted law enforcement operation in Tulunan town, Cotabato province, killing five private militia members. In Sultan Kudarat province, IED 17 April wounded seven passengers in Isulan municipality bus terminal; armed forces same day said blast site evidence showed explosives were consistent with those used by Mindanao-based and Islamic State-inspired group Dawlah Islamiyah. Security forces 19 April killed one Dawlah Islamiyah member in Pagayawan town, Lanao del Sur province. Unidentified gunman 17 April killed Datu Salibo town councillor Demson Silongan. Two Moro Islamic Liberation Front commanders from 118 Base Command 19 April clashed in Dabenayan village, killing two civilians. Unidentified assailants same day killed Maguindanao Electric Cooperative manager in Datu Odin Sinsuat town, Maguindanao del Norte. Militant surrenders continued; notably, two Abu Sayyaf Group members 12 April surrendered to military in Zamboanga City.

Clashes continued between Communist rebels and military. Military operations and some militant ambushes by communist New People’s Army (NPA) in Mindanao Island in south, Visayas Islands in centre and Luzon Island in north killed at least 21 combatants and civilians; military in April claimed it had dismantled two of four remaining Communist fronts in Samar Island, rebels’ last bastion. Communist Party of the Philippines 20 April confirmed deaths of party leaders Benito Tiamzon and Wilma Austria-Tiamzon in Aug 2022 in Samar Island, Visayas; party disputed military report that both were killed in boat explosion during encounter with military forces, alleging couple was tortured, killed, and dumped on boat that later detonated.

South China Sea

U.S. and Philippines expanded defence cooperation and conducted largest-ever joint military drills, while tensions continued between Manila and Beijing.

U.S. and Philippines deepened defence ties amid large-scale exercises. Philippines 3 April announced location of four additional sites accessible to U.S. forces under Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement; three sites are situated in north, facing Taiwan. Announcement prompted local concern, as Cagayan provincial governor said U.S. presence could make areas a “magnet for an attack in case a war erupts”. U.S. and Philippines 11-28 April held 38th annual Balikatan exercises in largest-ever iteration and 11 April agreed to complete roadmap on delivery of U.S. defence assistance over next 5-10 years, and to finalise plans for combined maritime activities, including joint sails in SCS; pair also expressed concern over China’s land reclamation activities in Spratly Islands. USS Milius 10 April entered within 12 nautical miles of China-controlled Mischief Reef in Spratly Islands; U.S. Nimitz Carrier Strike Group 17 April operated in SCS en route to Thailand. Earlier, Japan 5 April revealed new guidelines to strengthen militaries of “like-minded countries”, with Philippines set to be among first beneficiaries, amid reports of possible U.S.-Japan-Philippines security framework.

Tensions persisted between Manila and Beijing amid regional diplomacy. China’s ambassador to Philippines 14 April said Philippines should oppose “Taiwan independence” rather than expanding U.S. access; Marcos 22 April met Chinese FM Qin Gang and pledged to “establish more lines of communication”. Philippine Coast Guard late month claimed more than 100 Chinese vessels were spotted nearby 18-24 April, and 28 April reported near collision between its patrol vessels and Chinese navy ship. Following his first official trip to China, Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim 3 April said Beijing expressed concern over Malaysian energy activities in SCS and next day stated Malaysia is prepared to negotiate with Beijing over dispute, prompting domestic political backlash. Malaysian foreign ministry 8 April clarified govt’s commitment to its own “sovereign rights and interests” in SCS. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 15 April met Vietnamese leader Nguyen Phu Trong in Vietnamese capital Hanoi in visit aimed at bolstering ties.

Sri Lanka

Govt engaged international lenders on economic recovery amid strikes against austerity, while govt’s new “anti-terrorism” powers provoked widespread opposition.

Govt discussed plans for economic recovery with international stakeholders. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 10-16 April held annual meetings in Washington, U.S., where govt and Central Bank officials met wide range of international lenders and development agencies. Finance ministers of Japan, India and France 13 April announced formation of committee of bilateral creditor govts to pursue debt restructuring negotiations with Sri Lanka; Japan said negotiation platform was open to all creditors and expressed hope China – Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral creditor – would join amid concern over its absence. Private bondholders met officials on reworking over $12bn in outstanding bonds.

Parliament approved IMF recovery plans amid strike action. Parliament 26-28 April debated and approved non-binding resolution to support implementation of IMF’s Extended Fund Facility; largest opposition party abstained. In response to possible strike action by teachers, President Wickremesinghe 19 April threatened to use emergency powers to declare education essential service, where strikes are banned, and initiate legal action against teachers; Wickremesinghe 17 April declared power, fuel, postal and health as essential public services.

Govt paused controversial Anti-Terrorism Act, following strong domestic and international reaction. Govt postponed bill’s introduction and promised consultation on legislation that would establish exceptionally broad definition of terrorism and grant executive and security agencies unprecedented powers of arrest and proscription; bill has been denounced as attack on democratic rights by international and national human rights groups and faced reported diplomatic backlash from Western govts. Tamil political parties 25 April organised one-day general strike in Tamil areas to protest bill as well as “Sinhalisation” of Muslim and Tamil-majority areas in north and east, amid increasing allegations of govt-supported land grabs.

In other important developments. U.S. State Dept 26 April sanctioned former navy commander W. Karannagoda for his alleged role in abduction and murder of 11 Tamil and Muslim men in final years of civil war. Country 21 April commemorated fourth anniversary of Easter Sunday suicide bombings amid widespread protests and senior Catholic officials criticising perceived lack of justice and proper investigation.

Taiwan Strait

China launched three-day military drills in response to meeting between President Tsai and U.S. House Speaker, fuelling temporary uptick in tensions.

China launched military drills as President Tsai met Speaker McCarthy. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen 5 April met with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, where both reaffirmed strong partnership between countries. In response, China 8-10 April held military exercises around Taiwan; notably, Taiwan 10 April recorded 91 Chinese military aircraft and 12 naval ships around island, with record high 54 aircraft crossing unofficial demarcation “median line”. China’s reaction was relatively muted in comparison to military drills held in response to Speaker Pelosi’s visit in Aug 2022. Chinese military activity continued during month: as of 28 April, Taiwan detected 548 Chinese military aircraft in its air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and recorded 148 sightings of Chinese vessels in surrounding waters. French Navy frigate 8-10 April and U.S. guided missile destroyer 16 April transited Taiwan Strait; U.S. Navy P8-A Poseidon patrol plane 28 April flew through strait.

China protested U.S. support for Taiwan, Europe debated its role. China 14 April announced sanctions on U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee chair Michael McCaul for his recent visit to Taiwan. Beijing 19 April opposed Taiwan’s purchase of 400 Harpoon missiles from U.S. Following his state visit to China 5-8 April, French President Macron triggered controversy with remarks that France and Europe should not be drawn into conflict over Taiwan by U.S.; German FM Annalena Baerbock 13 April said conflict over Taiwan will have disastrous consequences and Europe cannot afford to be indifferent.

Former Taiwanese president concluded historic China visit, Taiwan's election campaigning picked up speed. Former Taiwanese President and opposition party Kuomintang member Ma Ying-Jeou 27 March-7 April visited China, becoming first former or current Taiwanese leader to visit mainland China since civil war; trip highlighted different approaches of Taiwan’s two main political parties with regards to cross-strait relations ahead of presidential election slated for Jan 2024. Meanwhile, Foxconn founder Terry Gou 18 April announced bid to become Kuomintang’s presidential candidate, while current Taiwan VP William Lai was officially confirmed as ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate.

Thailand

Militants in deep south stepped up attacks, casting shadow over dialogue process; meanwhile, country geared up for May general election that could oust establishment parties.

Security deteriorated in deep south amid surge in militant attacks. Militants escalated violence, including with platoon-strength assaults on defence outposts rarely attempted in recent years. In Yala province, some 20 insurgents 9 April attacked security outpost in Muang district with pipe bombs, grenades and small arms. In Narathiwat province, motorcycle gunmen 9 April killed Muslim defence volunteer in Tak Bai district; militants 13 April attacked security outpost in Sungai Padi district with pipe bombs and assault rifles, wounding three police officers. In Pattani province, IED attack 19 April wounded eight police officers in two-vehicle patrol in Saiburi district. Militants 14 April conducted near-simultaneous attacks in six locations across Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, including: IED explosion on bridge in Muang; assault on security outpost in Reusoh district, Narathiwat; drive-by shooting on security outpost at Wat Chang railway station in Khok Pho district, Pattani; pipe bomb strike on ranger outpost in Raman district, Yala; and small arms assault on police at Cho Airong railway station, Narathiwat. Escalation comes after main separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) had advised Malaysian facilitator, following sixth round of Peace Dialogue Process in Feb, that it was suspending participation in dialogue until new Thai govt enters office after May general election.

Preparation for May elections continued. Ahead of 14 May general election, main opposition party Pheu Thai and progressive Future Forward Party led public opinion polls, dampening prospects for establishment parties led by incumbent leaders PM Prayuth Chan-ocha and Deputy PM Prawit Wongsuwan; convincing victory for opposition parties will complicate efforts by establishment parties to form new govt to preserve political status quo.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Tensions with Azerbaijan continued to escalate as fresh fighting along border left seven dead; international efforts to restart stalled peace talks persisted.

Border skirmish killed seven, Azerbaijani soldiers detained after entering Armenia. Baku and Yerevan 11 April reported that renewed fighting on Armenian side of border close to Lachin road killed four Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers, with sides exchanging blame for incident; EU 12 April deplored “armed clashes”. Azerbaijani foreign ministry 13 April said Armenia had captured two Azerbaijani soldiers who entered Armenian territory and claimed video circulating on social media showed one soldier (who allegedly praised Azerbaijani troops for beheading Armenians and was later charged with killing Armenian citizen) was subjected to “torture and inhumane treatment” by civilians. EU 13 April, U.S. and UK embassies 14 April criticised “unacceptable” treatment; ombudsman 17 April denied mistreatment. Prosecutor’s office 11, 14 April charged soldiers with border trespassing and weapons smuggling, 17 April charged one with killing Armenian citizen. Meanwhile, tensions spiked over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) after Azerbaijan installed checkpoint along Lachin Corridor (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Foreign actors, notably U.S., worked hard to restart direct peace talks. U.S. officials 17 April travelled to Azerbaijani capital Baku, 18 April met Armenian officials in capital Yerevan as U.S. ramped up efforts to prompt resumption of negotiations; FMs late April arrived in U.S. for talks beginning 1 May. Meanwhile, PM Pashinyan 18 April restated Yerevan’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and readiness to sign peace treaty, while emphasizing that both sides need to recognise other’s territorial integrity “without ambiguities” for durable peace; Azerbaijani President Aliyev same day reiterated demand that Armenia recognises that “Karabakh is Azerbaijan”, and said Armenians in NK should accept “Azerbaijani citizenship or find another place to live”.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Azerbaijan installed checkpoint along Lachin corridor, prompting condemnation from Yerevan Moscow and others for breaching 2020 ceasefire deal; tensions could escalate further over uncertainty wrought by checkpoint despite talks in U.S.

Azerbaijan set up checkpoint on Lachin corridor, violating 2020 ceasefire deal. In move fuelling already heightened tensions, Azerbaijan 23 April announced it had installed “border checkpoint” along Lachin corridor connecting Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabkah (NK) with Armenia. Reiterating past allegations (to which Armenian and de facto authorities have proposed independent monitoring), Baku said checkpoint aims to stop “rotation of personnel of Armenian armed forces that continue to be illegally stationed in the territory of Azerbaijan, the transfer of weapons and ammunition, entrance of terrorists, as well as illicit trafficking of natural resources”. Checkpoint violates 2020 ceasefire agreement, which delegated responsibility for Lachin road to Russian peacekeepers. Azerbaijani-backed protesters, who had blocked road since Dec 2022, 28 April ended rally and Azerbaijani forces reportedly began asserting control over that section of road while allegedly continuing to hamper humanitarian deliveries into NK.

Ceasefire deal signatories and international actors condemned Baku’s actions. Armenia 23 April condemned move and urged Russia – third signatory to 2020 ceasefire deal alongside Armenia and Azerbaijan – to ensure “withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces” from corridor’s “entire security zone”; Azerbaijan same day rejected demand as interference in its “internal affairs”. Russia 24 April condemned move and expressed “extreme concern” about increase in ceasefire violations. Other international actors, including U.S., France and EU, also condemned Baku, saying move could undermine peace efforts.

Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs arrived in U.S. for talks. Armenian and Azerbaijani FM’s late April arrived in U.S. capital Washington for talks beginning 1 May; tensions could escalate should dialogue fail to yield tangible results. Meanwhile, amid disagreement over place and format of direct negotiations between Stepanakert and Baku, de facto authorities 11 April proposed Russian-mediated talks take place at headquarters of Russian peacekeepers in NK; Azerbaijan had not responded by end of April.

Azerbaijan

Tensions with Armenia continued to escalate as fresh fighting along border left seven dead, international efforts to restart stalled peace talks persisted, and relations with Iran remained strained.

Border skirmish killed seven, Azerbaijani soldiers detained after entering Armenia. Baku and Yerevan 11 April reported that renewed fighting on Armenian side of border close to Lachin road killed four Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers, with sides exchanging blame for incident; EU 12 April deplored “armed clashes”. Foreign ministry 13 April said Armenia had captured two Azerbaijani soldiers who entered Armenian territory and claimed video circulating on social media showed one soldier (who allegedly praised Azerbaijani troops for beheading Armenians and was later charged with killing Armenian citizen) was subjected to “torture and inhumane treatment” by Armenian civilians. EU 13 April, U.S. and UK embassies 14 April criticised “unacceptable” treatment; Armenian ombudsman 17 April denied mistreatment. Armenian prosecutor’s office 11, 14 April charged soldiers with border trespassing and weapons smuggling, 17 April charged one with killing Armenian citizen. Meanwhile, tensions spiked over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) after Azerbaijan installed checkpoint along Lachin Corridor (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Foreign actors, notably U.S., worked hard to restart direct peace talks. U.S. officials 17 April travelled to capital Baku, 18 April met Armenian officials in their capital Yerevan as U.S. ramped up efforts to prompt resumption of negotiations; FMs late April arrived in U.S. for talks beginning 1 May. Meanwhile, Armenian PM Pashinyan 18 April restated Yerevan’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and readiness to sign peace treaty, while emphasizing that both sides need to recognise other’s territorial integrity “without ambiguities” for durable peace; President Aliyev same day reiterated demand that Armenia recognises that “Karabakh is Azerbaijan”, and said Armenians in NK should accept “Azerbaijani citizenship or find another place to live”.

Tensions with Iran ran high. After Baku late March opened embassy in Israel’s capital Tel Aviv, Iranian Parliament 5 April issued statement criticising move. Authorities 6 April arrested six individuals suspected of working for “Iran’s secret service” to “overthrow” state, same day expelled four Iranian diplomats. Azerbaijani and Iranian FMs 7-8 April discussed disagreements and need to resolve them through dialogue, though situation remained tense.

Belarus

Crackdown on opposition continued, and army conducted military exercises.

Exiled opposition leader called for access to political prisoners amid crackdown. Court in capital Minsk 7 April sentenced opposition politician and 2020 presidential candidate Valer Tsapkala to 17 years in prison in absentia. Another presidential candidate, Viktar Babaryka, sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment in 2021, was reportedly hospitalised late April; EU 27 April expressed concern, pointing to “traces of beatings”, while exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanousvkaya demanded diplomats be given access to political prisoners “to assess the conditions in which they are kept”.

Belarus held military exercises and asked Russia for security guarantees. Defence ministry 5 April announced three-day “tactical exercise” at Polish and Ukrainian borders, 19-22 April conducted further exercises to strengthen air defence, 22 April announced forces had completed training on Russian tactical nuclear missile systems. President Lukashenko 10 April asked Russia for security guarantees amid heightened tensions with West. Meanwhile, Canada 11 April expanded sanctions to include National Bank and eight other banks in Belarus due to its support for “Russia’s illegal invasion” of Ukraine.

Cyprus

Republic of Cyprus pursued initiative to expand EU involvement to reignite talks, while Turkish Cypriots expressed strong opposition; sides continued dialogue under UN auspices.

Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides advanced proposal for active EU role. After Christodoulides visited Belgian capital Brussels in March to propose greater EU involvement in Cyprus issue, Greek Cypriot FM Kombos 2 April explained country is expecting Turkish Cypriots to make next move. Christodoulides 22 April said “everything depends on how Turkey will act” following elections in May (see Türkiye), adding that Ankara’s post-earthquake steps toward rapprochement with West and regional countries, if continued, would pave way for diplomacy over Cyprus. Meanwhile, Christodoulides 5 April visited Egypt to hold talks with President Sisi on Cyprus issue, bilateral ties and energy, signalling country’s desire to enhance regional engagement.

Turkish Cypriots voiced opposition to Christodoulides’ initiative. After foreign ministry of “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in March voiced opposition to EU involvement given bloc’s “partial attitude”, de facto FM Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu 5 April said “TRNC” would review diplomatic status of EU’s office in north as well as relations with bloc given EU has not recognised “TRNC”. After Republic of Cyprus and U.S. late March signed partnership deal for cooperation on maritime security and other issues, “TRNC” 1 April condemned deal, saying it served to strengthen armament of Republic of Cyprus. “TRNC” 8 April condemned U.S. for anchoring attack submarine in Republic of Cyprus; Türkiye next day reiterated calls for U.S. to reconsider policies that disrupt balance on island. “TRNC” 27 April condemned Greek Cypriot navigation advisory for drilling preparations in contested economic zone in eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, “TRNC” 1 April deepened cooperation with Türkiye by signing $500mn Financial and Economic Protocol, which includes financial aid as well as funds for new schools, health facilities and national disaster centre.

Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots continued UN-facilitated dialogue. Under auspices of UN peacekeeping force, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators 11 April met as part of regular dialogue related to bicommunal Technical Committees and issues of shared concern; negotiators 27 April discussed future settlement prospects and Technical Committees.

Georgia

Geneva International Discussions (GID) took place after months-long pause with no sign of diplomatic breakthrough; U.S. sanctioned judges for corruption.

“Tough” conversations occurred during 57th round of Geneva Discussions. After several postponements, Geneva 4-5 April hosted 57th round of GIDs – multilateral forum to address security and humanitarian consequences of 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Co-chairs 5 April reported that participants were unable to reach “common understanding” during talks and that Russian, de facto Abkhaz and de facto South Ossetian participants walked out when Tbilisi raised issue of return of internally displaced people and refugees; Tbilisi refused to compromise on proposals from Moscow and breakaways regarding agreement on non-use of force. EU Special Representative for South Caucasus Toivo Klaar 5 April and Georgia’s deputy foreign minister 6 April admitted dialogue was “tough”. Still, participants reiterated commitment to process; next round planned for “mid-July”. Despite troubled Geneva talks, meeting of Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (structure aimed at defusing tensions in South Ossetian conflict zone) 27 April took place; participants notably praised de facto authorities for opening two crossing points along South Ossetian administrative boundary line for Orthodox Easter festivities.

Govt condemned U.S. for sanctioning judges. U.S. 5 April sanctioned four Georgian judges for “significant corruption” that undermined “faith” in judicial system. Chairman of ruling party Georgian Dream Irakli Kobakhidze same day criticised move and accused U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken of seeking to “stigmatise” judiciary; PM Gharibashvili 10 April expressed his “full support” for judiciary. Opposition 6 April called for investigation into “clan rule” within judiciary, ruling coalition 19 April prevented initiative.

Kosovo

Belgrade and Pristina established Monitoring Committee as normalisation efforts proceeded, local elections in north saw meagre turnout, and trial against former president kicked off in The Hague.

EU-mediated dialogue on normalising relations with Serbia advanced. Kosovo and Serbia 18 April created Joint Monitoring Committee to oversee “implementation” of March agreement on normalising relations and its Implementation Annex. Meanwhile, Council of Europe Ministers’ Committee 24 April forwarded Kosovo’s application for Council membership to Parliamentary Assembly, which Kosovo leaders hailed as “historic step”.

Kosovo Serbs boycotted municipal elections. Largest Kosovo Serb party Serbian List 21 April urged Serb community to boycott “undemocratic” elections, held 23 April in four Serb-dominated northern municipalities. Under 4% of eligible citizens voted, leading to victories for ruling Vetëvendosje party and opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo. VP of Serbian List, Milan Radoičić, same day warned that Serbs “would never allow” officials elected with such low turnout to govern in northern municipalities. EU 24 April said low turnout “shows that this process is not and cannot be considered business as usual”.

Trial against former President Hashim Thaçi and three others began. Kosovo Specialist Court in The Hague, which has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Kosovo 1998-2000, 3 April commenced trial of Thaçi and three other former Kosovo Liberation Army leaders for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes; all have pleaded “not guilty”. Thousands 2 April protested in capital Pristina in support of Thaçi.

Kyrgyzstan

Authorities brought more charges against activists detained over border deal opposition; Russia planned to increase combat readiness of military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Authorities charged imprisoned activists for attempting to seize power. Court in Bishkek 12 April ruled that five activists, detained Oct 2022 for protesting border deal that hands ownership of Kempir-Abad reservoir to Uzbekistan, should be placed under house arrest. Lawyers of activists 26 April said activists faced new charges, namely attempts to seize power.

Russia announced plans to boost combat readiness of military base in Kyrgyzstan. Speaking at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in India, Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu 28 April announced plans to increase combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, saying U.S. efforts to strengthen its presence there triggered move.

Moldova

Authorities barred Russian delegation from entering Moldova, and EU launched civilian mission to help Chișinău counter foreign interference.

Amid mounting concern about Russian destabilisation efforts in Moldova, Russian delegation led by Tatarstan region’s governor Rustam Minnikhanov 17 April arrived in capital Chișinău to attend forum in autonomous Gagauzia region ahead of local polls on 30 April. Authorities, however, prevented him from disembarking aircraft, accusing delegation of seeking to bolster support for pro-Russian candidate. Minnikhanov same day claimed authorities had designated him persona non grata; border police rejected claim while urging Russian officials to “refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of our country”. Russian foreign ministry that evening condemned move. Two days later, foreign ministry 19 April summoned Russian Ambassador Oleg Vasnetsov, informing him of decision to expel Russian Embassy employee for “inappropriate behaviour” at airport after authorities barred Minnikhanov’s entry; Vasnetsov same day condemned “unfriendly moves against our country”. PM Recean 27 April compiled “blacklist” of Russians banned from entering Moldova, including Russian President Putin. Meanwhile, EU 24 April approved launch of new civilian mission to help Moldova “protect its security, territorial integrity and sovereignty” amid “continued Russian attempts to destabilise” country.

Russia (Internal)

Govt sought to clamp down on draft-dodgers with new conscription law, repression of dissent continued, and Ukraine launched more drone strikes in Russian borderlands.

Govt tightened conscription legislation. President Putin 14 April signed new legislation providing for digital register of all Russian citizens eligible for military service, which could help authorities expedite mobilisation activities and prevent conscripts from fleeing abroad. Specifically, law allows authorities, previously required to deliver in-person notices to those eligible for military service, to issue electronic draft orders; it also bans citizens from leaving country when they receive such order. Those who fail to appear at registration office within 20 days without valid reason could face new restrictions related to banking, selling property, driving and registering vehicles. Meanwhile, defence ministry 1 April launched regular spring conscription; 30 April announced it had replaced deputy defence minister Mikhail Mizintsev with Alexei Kuzmenkov.

Crackdown on opposition continued. In harshest judgement for opposition activist since Putin came to power, Moscow court 17 April handed politician Vladimir Kara-Murza 25-year prison sentence for spreading disinformation about army and treason; State Duma next day approved amendments allowing life sentences for treason. Imprisoned opposition leader Alexey Navalny 26 April said military tribunal opened “terrorism” case against him, which could see him imprisoned for up to 30 years. Authorities throughout month declared several foreign NGOs “undesirable organisations” and “foreign agents”.

Pro-war blogger assassinated, Ukraine launched more attacks into Russia. In Saint Petersburg city, explosion in cafe owned by paramilitary Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin 2 April killed war correspondent known as Vladlen Tatarsky; authorities next day arrested Russian citizen and accused Ukrainian special services of planning “terrorist attack”. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drones 4, 18 April hit military offices in Bryansk region; 17 April struck two power stations in Belgorod region. In Moscow region, authorities 24 April found drone containing explosives.

Defence minister announced plans to boost combat readiness of Central Asian bases. Speaking at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu 28 April announced plans to increase combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, saying U.S. efforts to strengthen its presence there triggered move.

Tajikistan

Security forces killed two militants near Afghan border, govt deepened ties with Azerbaijan, and Russia planned to boost combat readiness of military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Militants killed near Afghan border. State Committee for National Security 26 April reported that security forces had killed two suspected militants belonging to “international terrorist organisation” in Vanj district near border with Afghanistan.

Azerbaijani and Tajik leaders sought closer ties. Azerbaijani President Aliyev 5 April arrived in capital Dushanbe for two-day state visit, meeting with President Rahmon. Sides struck number of agreements aimed at strengthening bilateral relations through deeper economic cooperation.

Russia announced plans to boost combat readiness of military base in Tajikistan. Speaking at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in India, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu 28 April announced plans to increase combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, saying U.S. efforts to strengthen its presence there triggered move.

Türkiye

Military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliates, country prepared for May elections, and positive atmosphere persisted with Greece amid Ankara’s regional normalisation drive.

Military continued operations against PKK and affiliates. After PKK late March renewed commitment to unilateral ceasefire until 14 May elections, military conducted operations in Van, Iğdır, Şırnak and Diyarbakır provinces as well as northern Syria and Iraq. Notably, police 25 April detained 110 individuals in 21 provinces, including politicians, journalists and artists, allegedly affiliated with PKK. In northern Iraq, Suleimaniya officials 7 April claimed Türkiye carried out drone strike near airport, allegedly targeting Syrian Democratic Forces commander Mazloum Abdi’s convoy (see Iraq). In northern Syria, Turkish defence minister 17 April announced army killed ten People’s Defence Units (YPG)/PKK militants in Aleppo after alleged YPG/PKK attack previous day injured four Turkish soldiers (see Syria).

Authorities prepared for May elections, continued crackdown on Islamic State (ISIS). Amid heightened political tensions ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 14 May, unknown perpetrators 31 March and 6 April fired shots at opposition party offices in Istanbul and 21 April at ruling AKP office in Adana city. Meanwhile, security forces detained at least 141 individuals with alleged ISIS links.

Atmosphere of good-will persisted with Greece. Greek and Turkish defence ministers 4 April met in Hatay province to discuss earthquake response, aid and future relations. Greece 8 April announced gradual closure of Camp Lavrion – refugee camp that Ankara had described as “PKK training camp”. Greek FM Nicos Dendias 17 April said sides should discuss “sharing potentially profitable energy projects instead of fighting over them.”

Govt continued regional normalisation efforts. Deputy FMs of Russia, Türkiye, Syria and Iran 3-4 April met in Russian capital Moscow to advance Turkish-Syrian rapprochement; defence ministers and intelligence chiefs of four countries 25 April resumed talks in Moscow on security in Syria, Ankara-Damascus normalisation and Syrian refugees in Türkiye. FM Çavuşoğlu 25 April said Turkish forces will not withdraw from Syria unless terrorist threats are eliminated. Egyptian and Turkish FMs 13 April agreed to reopen embassies and organise presidential summit.

Ukraine

As expectations for long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive grew, fresh Russian shelling killed and injured dozens; Moscow may deploy long-range weapons in the coming weeks, causing more civilian suffering.

Russia shelled Ukrainian cities, further high-casuality attacks possible. Russian army and air force ramped up efforts to capture Bakhmut city alongside paramilitary Wagner Group fighters, gaining ground from Ukrainian forces. Wagner’s head Yevgeny Prigozhin 29 April threatened to withdraw his troops from city unless Moscow sends more ammunition. Meanwhile, expectations for Ukrainian counteroffensive grew, though leaked classified U.S. documents revealed scepticism among U.S. officials about offensive’s chances of success. Reports 22 April emerged that Ukraine was establishing forward positions on Russian-held left bank of Dnipro River near Kherson (south).Fresh Russian shelling across Ukrainian cities late April killed and injured dozens. Russia may use more long-range weapons in coming weeks to undermine Ukrainian morale.

President Zelenskyy requested air defence assistance. Ahead of 21 April Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at Germany’s Ramstein Air Base, President Zelenskyy called for air defence assistance amid fears depleted air defence munitions could facilitate Russian sorties into Ukrainian-held territory and intensified use of bombers over Ukrainian cities; meeting yielded no major announcements. Netherlands and Denmark 20 April announced they would send 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.

More evidence of Wagner atrocities in Ukraine emerged. Russian human rights group Gulagu 12 April interviewed escaped Wagner mercenary Andrei Medvedev, who attributed brutal video purportedly showing beheading of Ukrainian prisoner of war to Wagner. Two former Russian convicts who fought with Wagner 17 April admitted to killing civilians near Bakhmut; Wagner’s head Evgeniy Prigozhin denied claims.

In other important developments. During China visit, Brazilian President Lula 14 April proposed peace model in which Russia returns all Ukrainian territory aside from Crimea, a non-starter for Kyiv; Lula criticised Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, though his remarks suggesting both countries bore responsibility for conflict drew criticism from West. Chinese President Xi 26 April spoke to Zelenskyy for first time since invasion. Meanwhile, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 15-17 April introduced grain bans from Ukraine, saying cheaper Ukrainian agricultural imports had lowered prices for local farmers.

Uzbekistan

Uzbeks voted on proposed constitutional amendments.

After lawmakers mid-March backed referendum on constitutional amendments proposed by President Mirziyoev, which among other things would allow him to seek third term in office and extend presidential term from five to seven years, Uzbeks 30 April began voting, amid expectations referendum will endorse proposals.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Petro administration’s total peace policy saw progress and setbacks as govt and FARC dissident group geared up for negotiations in May and deadly attack on security forces complicated talks with ELN.

ELN-govt talks faced setbacks, outreach to FARC dissident group progressed. Efforts to advance peace with National Liberation Army (ELN) faced challenges following late March attack that killed nine soldiers. ELN 3 April issued pamphlet justifying attack and promising more strikes until sides agreed to ceasefire, 10 April left explosives and threatening pamphlets in five major cities, including capital Bogotá and Medellín (Antioquia department). New round of talks will begin 2 May in Cuba’s capital Havana. Govt outreach to dissident faction of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) known as FARC-EP saw progress, with ceasefire monitoring mechanism 24 April activating and talks due to start mid-May. Dissidents mid-April released pamphlet alleging govt had violated ceasefire, however, raising doubts about agreement’s durability.

Gulf Clan claimed it held discussions with authorities, criminal groups clashed in Buenaventura. After govt suspended ceasefire with criminal group Gulf Clan in March, group 13 April released communiqué claiming it held discussions with govt in presence of foreign diplomats but that it rejects draft law, presented in Feb, intended to make judicial concessions in return for collective criminal demobilisation. Meanwhile, fragile truce in port city of Buenaventura (Valle de Cauca department) – considered early success of govt’s “total peace” policy – showed signs of strain early April. Two negotiators for Los Shotas criminal group, in talks with rival Los Espartanos, disappeared; clashes resumed early April, triggering displacement. Though peace commissioner’s office 11 April said it was working to calm tensions, incident raised concerns about sustainability of ceasefires between illegal armed groups.

Govt hosted international conference on Venezuela. President Petro 25 April hosted international conference in capital Bogotá on Venezuela, aimed at reigniting talks between Venezuelan govt and opposition (see Venezuela).

Ecuador

Govt declared terrorism a security threat amid surge of gang violence, enabling military deployment to confront these groups without instituting state of exception.

Govt implemented new measures to tackle rising criminal gang violence. Around 30 gunmen 11 April entered port of Esmeraldas city, opening fire and killing nine fishermen; Interior Minister Juan Zapata next day said attack was likely in retaliation for fishermen paying “protection money” to rival gang. In port city of Guayaquil, Ecuador’s murder capital, armed attack 30 April killed ten people; National Police Commander William Villaroel said authorities “believe that this has to do with a struggle between organised criminal groups over the fight for territorial control”. Authorities 28 April declared terrorism a threat to Ecuador’s security, enabling military to launch special operations to confront organised crime groups without declaring state of exception.

Spate of violent incidents occurred in Guayaquil prison. In latest wave of gang violence also plaguing Ecuador’s jails, prison guards 12 April found six inmates hanged in Litoral penitentiary, located in Guayaquil. One day later, four assailants killed three prison guards during hit-and-run operation. Clashes between incarcerated gang members 14 April killed 12 and wounded three. President Lasso 25 April appointed new national security adviser and replaced secretary of public and state security.

El Salvador

Authorities renewed state of exception for 13th time as concerns about human rights violations persisted; U.S. arrested key MS-13 leader on terrorism charges.

State of exception extended amid continued concern over human rights violations. Legislative assembly 12 April once again approved state of exception’s extension, while Justice and Public Security Minister Gustavo Villatoro 17 April said authorities had arrested 67,467 people for gang affiliation since introducing measure. Complaints of human rights violations continued. Notably, NGO Amnesty International 3 April published statement accusing authorities of “systematically” committing human rights violations; five local civil society organisations 11 April submitted report to UN regarding extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in El Salvador’s prisons. Meanwhile, trade union representatives 18 April condemned arrest of at least 16 trade unionists since Jan 2023 under state of exception framework; moves signal measure’s expanding use against political actors, which may increase as elections edge closer.

MS-13 leader arrested on terrorism charges. U.S. 18 April arrested MS-13 gang leader Jose Wilfredo Ayala-Alcantara, also known as “Indio de Hollywood”, upon his arrival in Texas state after Mexico deported him. He and 12 associates already in U.S. custody were detained on terrorism charges and now await trial; President Bukele’s administration had previously released some of these leaders from Salvadoran prisons.

Haiti

Mob killed suspected gang members amid spiralling gang violence and concomitant rise of self-defence groups, govt efforts to organise elections continued, and UN ramped up aid.

Local populations mobilised as gang violence soared. Gangs continued to target police and civilians, expanding their territory in capital Port-au-Prince and Artibonite department. Notably, in Port-au-Prince’s Pétionville commune, Kraze Baryè group 5 April set fire to police station, Ti Makak gang 9 April killed three policemen; in Croix-des-Bouquets commune, 400 Mawozo gang 16 April killed one police officer. Two journalists also killed during month. UN 24 April said insecurity had “reached levels comparable to countries in armed conflict” and reiterated calls for multinational security mission. Following UN report late March about worrying emergence of self-defence groups, Canaan gang 5 April attacked Onaville town, allegedly targeting locals who had formed surveillance brigade; residents in Port-au-Prince 24 April burned to death 13 suspected gang members in what police described as “a lynching”; scores of men 25 April reportedly patrolled capital’s Canape Vert neighbourhood, armed with machetes, saying “we are planning to fight and keep our neighbourhoods clean of [gangs]”.

Govt pushed ahead with election planning. Interim govt moved forward with steps toward organising elections, but continued to forgo talks with political parties that refuse to join coalition, as stipulated in 21 December Accord – agreement between acting PM Henry and several opposition forces. Notably, Henry 12 April asked representatives from various sectors to designate potential candidates for Electoral Council, charged with organising vote; National Association of Haitian Media 24 April declined Henry’s invitation to nominate two candidates for Electoral Council, arguing that organising elections amid so much violence is unrealistic.

In other important developments. UN 13 April presented $720mn annual aid plan for Haiti, largest since 2010 earthquake, amid dire humanitarian situation. Dominican Republic President Abidaner 16 April issued decree preventing entry of 39 Haitians linked to gangs. Meanwhile, several media outlets early April reported that leaked classified U.S. documents indicated Russian paramilitary Wagner Group late Feb planned to assess potential contract with govt to fight gangs; Washington Post 10 April reported that officials denied local authorities had met with Wagner representatives.

Honduras

Wave of violent incidents prompted govt assessment of prison conditions; NGO said Honduras and its neighbours faced “extreme” levels of violence.

Eruption of prison riots prompted govt to assess prison conditions. Riots 8 April broke out in four prisons, including in capital Tegucigalpa and Tamara National Penitentiary, injuring twelve inmates and killing one. Some reports suggested riots were motivated by poor conditions, including increased prison population, lack of food and limited hygiene supplies. Castro 11 April asked Undersecretary of Security Julissa Villanueva to create intervention plan for prisons, who 18 April set out ten key points intervention will address, including obtaining and digitising number of inmates, vetting prison staff, and separating sentenced inmates from pre-trial detainees. Following day, shooting at prison in Ilama municipality, Santa Barbara department wounded seven prisoners.

NGO decried region’s “war-like” levels of violence. State of exception continued after President Castro late March renewed measure for additional six months, despite uncertainty within govt about its impact. Meanwhile, head of NGO Norwegian Refugee Council 24 April said Honduras and other Central American countries are experiencing “war-like” levels of violence. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 28 April expressed concern about high levels of violence, with criminals notably targeting women and environmentalists.

Mexico

Supreme Court ruled National Guard’s militarisation unconstitutional, criminal violence persisted, and Lopez Obrador protested U.S. “interference” in efforts to tackle fentanyl trafficking.

Mexico’s top court ruled law shifting National Guard to army unconstitutional. Supreme Court 18 April declared President López Obrador’s 2022 transfer of National Guard to Ministry of Defence unconstitutional, saying 2019 constitutional reform defined National Guard as “civilian police body”; in plenary session two days later, Court gave govt until 1 Jan 2024 to reintegrate National Guard into Ministry of Public Security. López Obrador 19 April said ruling was politically motivated and vowed to present new constitutional reform in Sept 2024 allowing National Guard to operate under Ministry of Defence’s command. Meanwhile, López Obrador 28 April backed proposal introduced day prior by Senate leader Alejandro Armenta to scrap Institute for Access to Information and Data Protection, responsible for processing public information requests.

Criminal violence continued, individuals detained over fire at migration centre. In Zacatecas state, shootout between security forces and alleged members of local criminal group 11 April left eight criminals dead in Pánuco municipality. In central Michoacán state, shootout between army and local criminal group 24 April left one soldier and six civilians dead in Ciudad Hidalgo municipality. In central Jalisco state, authorities 30 April arrested Rodrigo Páex Quintero, nephew of Sinaloa Cartel founder Caro Quintero. Meanwhile, authorities 16 April detained head of National Migratory Institute in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua state, in connection with fire at detention centre 27 March that killed 40 migrants; authorities 25 April charged head of immigration agency Francisco Garduño over incident.

28 Sinaloa cartel members indicted in U.S. fentanyl investigation. U.S. Justice Department 14 April announced indictments against 28 alleged members of Sinaloa Cartel’s Chapitos faction, which is accused of fentanyl production and trafficking into U.S. U.S. said its Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had infiltrated group without Mexican authorities’ knowledge, despite 2020 law prohibiting foreign agents from operating on Mexican soil without govt’s approval; López Obrador 17 April condemned DEA’s “abusive and prepotent interference”.

Nicaragua

Repression of Catholic Church intensified around Easter celebrations, and opposition leaders called for unity to challenge regime.

Govt crackdown continued. Authorities continued to persecute Catholic Church and its practitioners. Notably, police 3 April harassed youths trying to conduct religious procession in Nindirí municipality, Masaya department. Govt 11 April confiscated monastery of Trappist nuns in San Pedro de Lóvago municipality, Chontales department. Govt next day ordered expulsion of three nuns belonging to Dominican Congregation of the Annunciation, who ran nursing home and school in Rivas department. Civil society organisation Monitoreo Azul y Blanco 10 April denounced 71 cases of religious persecution during Easter week (1-9 April). Meanwhile, govt 24 April closed three private universities, bringing number closed since Dec 2021 to 24. Human rights group Nunca Más 28 April revealed that since 2018 protests, at least 158 people detained have been subjected to torture, 113 of whom were victims of sexual violence by prison guards and police officers.

Opposition leaders acknowledged need for unity to defeat regime. Exiled opposition politicians Violeta Granera, Felix Maradiaga, Ana Margarita Vijil and Lesther Aleman 16 April participated in televised discussion of much-needed changes to opposition’s strategy. Notably, they acknowledged need for “unity in action,” vowing to set aside differences in order to counter regime more effectively.

Venezuela

Colombia hosted international summit to reactivate talks between govt and opposition, and Maduro floated prospect of early presidential poll without proposals to improve election conditions.

Conference on Venezuela took place in Colombia. Colombian President Petro 25 April hosted international conference on Venezuela in Colombian capital Bogotá, aimed at prompting resumption of talks between Maduro govt and opposition. Representatives from 19 countries and EU attended. Petro did not invite Venezuelan parties, though his govt 17, 22 April held meetings with President Maduro and representatives of opposition alliance Unitary Platform; both endorsed initiative. U.S. President Biden 20 April also expressed cautious support during meeting with Petro in U.S. capital Washington, while insisting that only substantial steps to restore democracy would lead to lifting of sanctions.

Participants urged sides to resume talks and improve electoral conditions. Following conference, Colombian FM 25 April said participants had agreed on need for return to Mexico City negotiating process and steps toward free elections in return for gradual lifting of U.S. sanctions. Maduro same day reiterated his support for dialogue but conditioned on release of some $3bn in Venezuelan state assets held abroad and lifting of sanctions; President of National Assembly Jorge Rodríguez same day also demanded that International Criminal Court suspend its investigation into alleged crimes against humanity in Venezuela and that U.S. release businessman and close govt ally Alex Saab.

Maduro dangled prospect of early polls amid concern about election conditions. At rally to celebrate 21st anniversary of Hugo Chávez’s return to power following coup, Maduro 13 April once again insisted that presidential election slated for 2024 could be brought forward to 2023, but has yet to announce timetable, adding to uncertainty regarding electoral process. Meanwhile, govt-controlled National Electoral Council 18 April announced it would not grant requests from opposition’s primary election Commission regarding conditions for October primary, which commission has been tasked with organising. In particular, council refused to eliminate use of fingerprinting machines, which are likely to reduce voter turnout and exacerbate divisions within opposition over Electoral Council’s involvement.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Amid repression of free speech, three parties set up opposition committee; Algiers stepped up anti-Morocco rhetoric.

Three opposition parties set up joint committee. In unprecedented initiative since end of Hirak protest movement in 2021, three leftist parties (Rally for Culture and Democracy, Workers’ Party, and Union for Change and Progress) 12 April met to discuss country’s political situation, announced setting up joint committee to reflect on way forward, saying Algeria “is going through a pivotal period for its future in a situation of global upheaval”. Workers’ Party and Union for Change and Progress few days earlier had jointly denounced “marginalisation” of political parties and “criminalisation” of trade unions.

Media crackdown continued. Algiers court 2 April sentenced prominent journalist Ihsane El-Kadi to five years in prison – with two years suspended – for “receiving foreign funding” with an aim to harm state security. NGO Amnesty International next day condemned “latest escalation in crackdown on media”. Parliament 13 April approved law further curbing press freedom, notably by tightening media ownership rules and allowing courts to compel journalists to reveal their sources.

Authorities stepped up anti-Morocco rhetoric. In interview with Qatar-based media outlet Al Jazeera published 5 April, President Tebboune for first time accused “neighbouring country” of orchestrating kidnapping and murder in April 2012 of seven Algerian diplomats stationed at consulate in Gao city, northern Mali. Interior Minister Brahim Merad 13 April accused Morocco of political destabilisation, saying “Algeria is being targeted through drugs and is facing a war from its western neighbour”; 15 April urged citizens and members of civil society to take action “in order to defeat these destructive attempts”.

Bahrain

Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced plans to restore diplomatic ties with Qatar, concluding process to end almost six-year intra-Gulf rift.

Bahrain and UAE announced plans to re-establish formal relations with Qatar. Bahrain and Qatar 13 April revealed intention to restore diplomatic ties after pair held second round of dialogue at Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretariat in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. Shortly afterward, UAE and Qatari officials 18 April told reporters both countries were working to reopen embassies and restore ties; Bahrain and UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, severed ties with Qatar and imposed blockade in June 2017, marking beginning of tense intra-Gulf confrontation lasting until 2021. While announcements mark full resumption of ties between Qatar and all former blockading states, signalling entire GCC’s intent to turn page after 2017-2021 rift, tensions and friction points continue to plague intra-GCC relations, including economic competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE as well as disputes between UAE and Qatar over latter’s alleged ties to Islamists in region.

Egypt

Economic crisis remained major threat to country’s stability; conflict in neighbouring Sudan fuelled fears of regional destabilisation.

Doubts persisted about Cairo’s commitment to reform programme. Ahead of first review of country’s $3bn rescue package, International Monetary Fund in April continued to pressure Cairo to privatise certain state assets and allow flexibility in Egyptian pound to help absorb external shocks and rebuild foreign currency reserves. Authorities in April did not announce any new sales of govt-owned assets to Gulf investors that could ease foreign currency and funding crisis. Amid rampant inflation, foreign investors also complained about central bank’s hesitant monetary policy, calling for steeper interest rate hikes.

Long-awaited national dialogue set to begin in May. Authorities late March-early April said National Dialogue, which was first called by President Sisi in April 2022, will kick off 3 May. Representatives of human rights groups set to participate in dialogue 9 April met with National Dialogue General Coordinator Diaa Rashwan, urged authorities to open civic space; attendees also called for extension of 12 April deadline for NGOs to regularise their status under 2019 NGO law, which govt next day rejected.

Detention of soldiers in Sudan sparked rumours of Cairo’s involvement in conflict. As conflict broke out in neighbouring Sudan (see Sudan), paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) 15 April captured group of Egyptian soldiers in Merowe town, located between capital Khartoum and Egyptian border. Sisi, who has close ties with Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s army, 17 April denied any involvement in Sudanese conflict, saying Egyptian soldiers were on Sudanese soil to carry out military drills with their Sudanese counterparts. The Wall Street Journal 19 April however alleged Cairo had sent warplanes and pilots to back Sudanese military. RSF around 20 April allowed Egyptian soldiers to return home. Govt 27 April said 16,000 people had crossed into Egypt since fighting broke out; thousands more people reportedly stranded late April at Sudan-Egypt border with little humanitarian assistance.

Iran

Efforts to revive nuclear accord showed no sign of progress, Tehran and Arab Gulf states continued normalisation, and hostilities in Levant and underscored looming conflict risks.

Holding pattern continued on nuclear talks as Western sanctions increased. Diplomatic track in April showed little sign of progress. U.S., E3 and other G7 members 18 April noted “a diplomatic solution remains our preferred solution” and described 2015 deal as “useful reference”, which underscored that 2015 agreement is in all likelihood not revivable. Meanwhile, West continued issuing Iran-related sanctions. U.S. 19 April blacklisted seven individuals and entities allegedly part of “a sanctions evasion network” supporting Iran’s drone and military programmes. In parallel to EU and UK sanctions, U.S. 24 April designated five Iranian authorities and entities, in addition to imposing visa restrictions on eleven more officials, over human rights violations. Washington 27 April sanctioned five Iranian officials and entity for “wrongful detention of U.S. nationals”.

Momentum continued toward de-escalation in Gulf. Following 10 March Saudi-Iranian normalisation deal, sides continued to improve ties. Tehran 4 April announced appointment of Reza Ameri, foreign ministry veteran, as ambassador to United Arab Emirates – filling position that had been vacant since 2016. FM Hossein Amirabdollahian 6 April met his Saudi counterpart in Chinese capital Beijing for first bilateral meeting in seven years; sides underscored intention to reopen diplomatic facilities by 9 May and subsequently exchanged visits by delegations.

Escalation in Levant and tensions at sea spotlighted risks. Following deadly hostilities in north-eastern Syria between U.S. forces and Iran-aligned groups late March, Tehran 3 April claimed that it had “never been involved, directly or indirectly, in any attacks against the U.S. military forces in Syria and Iraq”. Meanwhile, Israeli military 2 April downed alleged Iranian drone from Syria and early April launched multiple strikes in Syria, amid multi-front escalation (see Israel-Palestine, Lebanon and Syria); hostilities underscore risk that region remains potential theatre for future multi-actor escalation involving Iran-backed forces. In maritime domain, Iran’s navy 27 April seized Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker in Gulf of Oman; U.S. reportedly had seized China-bound Iranian oil shipment.

Iraq

Türkiye continued strikes in Kurdistan region amid intra-Kurdish tensions, rifts surfaced between armed Shiite factions in capital Baghdad, and deadly tribal clashes flared in south.

Türkiye continued strikes in Kurdistan, highlighting inter-party tensions. After Türkiye 3 April asserted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) infiltrated Suleimaniya international airport security, Suleimaniya officials 7 April claimed Türkiye carried out drone strike near airport, allegedly targeting Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi’s convoy that was accompanied by three U.S. personnel. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-led regional govt same day accused Suleimaniya authorities – dominated by rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – of provoking attack, while PUK party leader Bafel Talabani indirectly accused KDP of providing Türkiye with intelligence. Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 11 April vowed to continue operations in Suleimaniya, alleging PKK controls city. Alleged Turkish drone 15 April killed two near Penjwen town, Suleimaniya governorate.

Friction persisted between Shiite armed groups, intercommunal violence flared in south. Highlighting potential for violent infighting within Shiite paramilitary coalition Popular Mobilisation forces, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia Saraya al-Salam 9 April paraded weapons through Baghdad’s Dora district in response to dispute with Kataib Hizbollah over local property. Meanwhile in Dhi Qar governorate in south, following months of tensions between al-Rumaid and al-Omar clans in al-Islah district, protests over water scarcity and related demand for dismissal of district commissioner (member of al-Rumaid clan) 13 April escalated into armed clashes between groups, killing four and injuring dozen. Security sources 19 April reported clashes between Atab and Hatem tribes in Dhi Qar’s al-Nasr district, following killing of tribal leader.

Low-level Islamic State (ISIS) insurgency continued, Baghdad and Erbil inked oil deal. Security forces 7 April killed five alleged ISIS members in Diyala governorate. Suspected ISIS members 18 April killed two in al-Mudadiya district, Diyala governorate. Following International Chamber of Commerce ruling in March on Kurdistan’s oil exports to Türkiye that marked win for federal govt in years-long dispute, Baghdad and Erbil 4 April signed temporary agreement, likely solidifying Baghdad’s sole control over Türkiye-Iraq pipeline on Iraqi side.

Israel/Palestine

Israeli brutality at Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque triggered multi-front rocket attacks, raising spectre of major escalation, while deadly violence continued across West Bank and Israel.

Israeli raids on Al-Aqsa Mosque triggered rockets from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Israeli police raids and brutality against Palestinian worshippers at Al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan triggered rocket fire from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, which may mark beginning of tumultuous period as mutual deterrence between Hizbollah and Israel erodes and shadow war with Iran moves further into light. Israeli police 1 April shot dead Palestinian at entrance of Al-Aqsa. Israeli forces 4-6 April violently raided mosque, injuring at least 18 Palestinians and arresting 450. In response, Palestinian militants in Gaza 5 and 6 April fired rockets into Israel, which responded with airstrikes. In major escalation, militants in Lebanon 6 April fired 34 rockets into Israel in heaviest rocket fire since 2006 war (see Lebanon); Israel blamed Hamas, which denied role, and 7 April struck alleged Hamas targets in southern Lebanon and Gaza. On Syrian front, Israel 2 April shot down alleged Iranian drone that entered Israel and Israeli airstrikes 2, 4, 8, 9, 29 April struck Syria: notably, alleged Palestinian Islamic Jihad rockets fired from Syria 8 April targeted Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and Israel next day struck suspected launch sites (see Syria). Defence Minister Yoav Gallant 16 April accused Iran of waging “multi-front war of attrition”.

Deadly violence and extreme volatility continued in West Bank and Israel. Israel security forces conducted over 421 raids in West Bank and East Jerusalem during month, killing at least 14 Palestinians and arresting 630 amid near-daily gun battles. Israel settler attacks persisted unabated and Palestinians continued attacks: notably, Palestinian gunman 7 April killed three Israeli-British settlers in Jordan Valley; Palestinian minor from Nablus 19 April shot two Israelis in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah.

In other important developments. Demonstrations against judicial reform in Israel continued. Govt 2 April authorised controversial “national guard” to deal with Palestinian unrest in Israel. Israeli forces 15 April attacked orthodox Christians attending Holy Fire ceremony in Jerusalem, limiting their access to site. Senior Hamas delegation 18 April travelled to Saudi Arabia.

Lebanon

Armed groups and Israel exchanged fire in most significant cross-border escalation since 2006 war; economic hardship continued and parliament postponed May municipal elections.

Cross-border hostilities flared amid Israeli raids in Jerusalem. Amid Israeli police brutality against Palestinian worshippers at Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque (see Israel-Palestine), militants in southern Lebanon 6 April fired 34 rockets into northern Israel in largest cross-border barrage since 2006 war, causing minor injuries and property damage; Israel blamed attack on Palestinian militant group Hamas and next day responded with early morning airstrikes in southern Lebanon and Gaza against alleged Hamas infrastructure. While calm subsequently returned, hostilities highlighted that Israeli actions at Muslim holy sites could trigger direct confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah or associated armed groups, echoing earlier warnings by Hizbollah and Hamas representatives in Lebanon.

Economic crisis continued amid worsening living conditions. Following dramatic collapse of Lebanese lira in late March, Central Bank intervention stabilised currency around 100,000 to $1 in April; another sharp devaluation remains likely given low foreign currency reserves. Ministry of Finance 4 April confirmed that govt had spent almost two thirds of $1.13bn worth of Special Drawing Rights from International Monetary Fund – one of its few remaining foreign currency sources. Living conditions continued to erode amid high fuel prices, shortages of essential imported products and public unrest. Notably, state electricity provider 3 April reported collapse of three electricity transmission towers in northern Bekaa due to theft of steel, jeopardising region’s electricity supply.

Presidential vacuum continued as parliament postponed municipal elections. Presidential vacuum entered sixth consecutive month as parliament in April held no election session. Underscoring prevailing deadlock, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea 1 April reiterated his party would block any candidate from Hizbollah’s axis. Caretaker cabinet 18 April convened to authorise public-sector wage and benefit increases, medication imports, and sanitation contracts. In first parliamentary session not aimed at electing president since vacuum began, MPs 18 April extended mandate of municipalities and local public officials for additional 12 months, in effect postponing municipal elections due by 31 May. Critics see decision as step toward indefinitely delaying long-overdue polls, eroding increasingly important institution.

Libya

Efforts to unify country’s rival factions behind electoral roadmap remained in stalemate, making presidential and parliamentary elections in 2023 increasingly elusive; concern grew over potential fallout of Sudanese conflict.

Political process remained stalled. East-based House of Representatives (HoR) 2 April published in official gazette series of amendments to 2021 laws on presidential and parliamentary elections. Amendments provide for ineligibility for president of dual nationals, but otherwise do not significantly differ from original laws, suggesting their main purpose may be to show Libyans, UN and international partners that parliament is actively working toward elections as means of fending off a UN-backed alternative mechanism. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 18 April said he had offered UN technical assistance to HoR-High State Council committee working on electoral laws, made no mention of his previously announced proposal to create High-Level Panel for Elections that would take over drafting of election laws.

UN gathered rival military coalitions’ leaders on Libyan soil for first time in years. Bathily 26 March in capital Tripoli and 8 April in Benghazi city hosted meetings between commanders of rival military coalitions; another meeting between rival chiefs of staff held 14 April in Benghazi without participation of UN envoy. Bathily early April also toured Libya’s neighbouring states of Chad, Niger and Sudan to discuss repatriation from Libya of foreign fighters.

Potential fallout of conflict in neighbouring Sudan sparked concern. After conflict between Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) 15 April broke out in Sudan, credible media reports, including from The Wall Street Journal 19 April, alleged eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces delivered weapons to RSF, which Haftar denied; some reports claimed weapons delivered via airlift, but local sources alleged weapons hauled overland. Matter could fuel tensions between Haftar and its Egyptian ally, which supports Sudanese army (see Egypt). Amid growing concern about potential spillover of fighting into southern Libya, where Sudanese militiamen are present, Haftar forces 24 April closed border with Sudan and reportedly sent military reinforcements to southern town of Kufra.

Qatar

Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced plans to restore diplomatic ties with Qatar, concluding process to end almost six-year intra-Gulf rift.

Bahrain and UAE announced plans to re-establish formal relations with Qatar. Bahrain and Qatar 13 April revealed intention to restore diplomatic ties after pair held second round of dialogue at Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretariat in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. Shortly after, UAE and Qatari officials 18 April told reporters both countries were working to reopen embassies and restore ties; Bahrain and UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, severed ties with Qatar and imposed blockade in June 2017, marking beginning of tense intra-Gulf confrontation lasting until 2021. While announcements mark full resumption of ties between Qatar and all former blockading states, signalling entire GCC’s intent to turn page after 2017-2021 rift, tensions and friction points continue to plague intra-GCC relations, including economic competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE as well as disputes between UAE and Qatar over latter’s alleged ties to Islamists in region.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh continued normalisation process with Iran, intensified engagement with Syria and maintained peace efforts in Yemen.

Saudi-Iranian rapprochement progressed and Riyadh stepped up engagement with Damascus. Following breakthrough deal in March, Saudi and Iranian FMs 6 April met in Chinese capital Beijing for first bilateral meeting in seven years. Saudi Arabia 8 April and Iran 12 April sent delegations to prepare opening of respective embassies by May deadline (see Iran). Meanwhile, Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan 12 April met Syrian counterpart in Jeddah and next day announced steps toward reopening embassies and resuming flights. Saudi Arabia 15 April hosted Gulf Cooperation Council, Egyptian, Iraqi and Jordanian FMs in Jeddah to discuss potential Syrian attendance at Arab League summit in May, without reaching agreement. In first visit since beginning of Syrian conflict, Saudi FM 18 April met Syrian President Assad in Damascus (see Syria).

Riyadh continued peace efforts in Yemen, U.S.-Saudi ties displayed strains. Riyadh 8 April sent first delegation to Yemen since start of military intervention in 2015 and mid-month participated in prisoner swap, as negotiations appeared to make progress (see Yemen). Saudi Arabia and other OPEC+ members 2 April announced further cuts in oil production, against U.S. wishes; CIA chief William Burns early April travelled to Saudi Arabia to meet Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and intelligence officials to reportedly express that U.S. was “blindsided” by Saudi decisions to resume ties with Iran and Syria.

Syria

Damascus intensified normalisation with Arab states, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) attacked regime in northwest, and Islamic State (ISIS) launched near-daily attacks in centre as Türkiye killed group’s global leader.

Syria and Arab states pursued normalisation. Syrian FM Faisal Mekdad visited several Arab countries for first time since start of war in 2011. Mekdad 1 April met Egyptian counterpart in Egyptian capital Cairo and 12 April met Saudi FM in Saudi Arabian city Jeddah, next day announcing move toward reopening embassies and resuming flights. Syria and Tunisia 12 April re-established diplomatic ties; Mekdad 18 April met Tunisian President Saied in Tunis. Mekdad 15 April met Algerian counterpart in Algeria. Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan 18 April met President Assad in capital Damascus, amid discussion of Syrian participation in May Arab League meeting. Meanwhile, Syrian, Turkish, Russian and Iranian officials 4 April met in Russian capital Moscow to foster Turkish-Syrian rapprochement (see Türkiye).

HTS targeted regime forces along north-western front. Idlib’s dominant group HTS and allied factions conducted raids on regime positions in north west, while al-Qaeda-leaning Ansar al-Islam for first time in several years conducted two raids 7 and 14 April. Notably, HTS and allies began regularly using anti-tank guided missiles for first time since March 2020.

ISIS continued attacks, Turkish operation killed group’s chief. ISIS cells launched near-daily attacks on civilians in centre, killing dozens during April, and engaged in battles with regime and Russian Wagner Group forces. U.S.-led coalition airstrike 3 April killed senior ISIS leader in Idlib and coalition 8 and 17 April conducted raids to capture two ISIS leaders in north east and Aleppo province. Turkish President Erdogan 30 April announced killing of suspected ISIS global leader in Aleppo.

Israel launched airstrikes and Türkiye struck Kurdish forces. Israel 2, 4, 8, 9, 29 April launched airstrikes amid multi-front escalation (see Israel-Palestine). Turkish defence minister 17 April announced “neutralisation” of ten People’s Defense Units/Kurdish Workers’ Party (YPG/PKK) militants in northern Aleppo after alleged YPG/PKK attack previous day injured four Turkish soldiers. Turkish drone strikes 14 April killed two senior YPG/PKK commanders in Qamishli.

Tunisia

Authorities detained Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party leader Rached Ghannouchi, while President Saïed cast doubt on IMF bailout.

Amid opposition protests, authorities arrested most prominent opposition leader. Hundreds 9 April joined protest led by opposition coalition National Salvation Front in capital Tunis to demand release of over 20 opposition activists detained since Feb. Authorities 17 April arrested Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party leader and former parliament speaker, Rached Ghannouchi, charged him with “conspiracy against the state”; move came few days after Ghannouchi said efforts to “eradicate” Islamist opposition threatened to unleash civil war. Interior ministry 17 April also banned An-Nahda from holding meetings, and police in following days raided and shut down its headquarters in Tunis as well as several regional offices, raising spectre of formal ban on party. After U.S., EU, France, Türkiye and others condemned Ghannouchi’s detention, govt 19 April said “Tunisian justice will not yield to pressure”.

Saïed’s absence from public stage fuelled rumours of power vacuum. Saïed’s 12-day absence reportedly caused by minor heart attack late March-early April sparked concern about succession as 2022 constitution provides that head of constitutional council, which has never been installed, takes over presidency in case of permanent power vacuum.

Saïed cast doubt on International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package. In clearest rejection to date of terms of stalled $1.9bn bailout package, Saïed 6 April said he would not accept IMF’s “diktats”. EU Commission 27 April said EU financial assistance would be conditioned to deal with IMF.

United Arab Emirates

United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain announced plans to restore diplomatic ties with Qatar, concluding process to end almost six-year intra-Gulf rift.

UAE and Bahrain announced plans to re-establish formal relations with Qatar. Bahrain and Qatar 13 April revealed intention to restore diplomatic ties after pair held second round of dialogue at Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretariat in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. Shortly after, UAE and Qatari officials 18 April told reporters both countries were working to reopen embassies and restore ties; Bahrain and UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, severed ties with Qatar and imposed blockade in June 2017, marking beginning of tense intra-Gulf confrontation lasting until 2021. While announcements mark full resumption of ties between Qatar and all former blockading states, signalling entire GCC’s intent to turn page after 2017-2021 rift, tensions and friction points continue to plague intra-GCC relations, including economic competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE as well as disputes between UAE and Qatar over latter’s alleged ties to Islamists in region. Meanwhile, Iran 4 April announced appointment of ambassador to UAE – filling position that had been vacant since 2016.

Western Sahara

For first time in months, ground convoy completed resupply of UN mission in Polisario-controlled territory.

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) 5-7 April resupplied two sites hosting peacekeepers east of sand berm after Polisario Front independence movement provided safe passage to ground convoy coming from Morocco-controlled Western Sahara. Meanwhile, UN envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, 3-10 April conducted consultations with Algeria, France, Mauritania, Russia, Spain, UK and U.S. ahead of UN Security Council closed-door session on Western Sahara on 19 April; resumption of negotiations between Morocco and Polisario remained elusive.

Yemen

First Saudi diplomatic visit to Yemen in eight years and prisoner swap injected momentum into peace talks, raising hope for comprehensive agreement in May to halt hostilities.

Peace process picked up speed amid Saudi-Huthi talks and prisoner swap. Saudi Arabia 3 April invited Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) members to Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh to discuss negotiations with Huthis, where it presented draft agreement that reportedly included six-month nationwide ceasefire, end to transport restrictions, release of detainees and payment of salaries to civil and military employees in both Huthi and govt-controlled areas. Saudi-led coalition 6 April announced lifting of most restrictions on commercial ships docking in southern ports, including Aden, for first time in eight years. Saudi and Omani delegations 8 April met Huthi leaders in Sanaa to discuss renewal of ceasefire that lapsed in Oct 2022, in first official Saudi diplomatic mission to Yemeni capital since kingdom launched military campaign in March 2015; draft agreement was reportedly modified to include declaration of cessation of war instead of truce, roadmap for humanitarian aid and economic arrangements, and steps toward comprehensive political solution; parties also discussed departure of foreign forces. Although stumbling block remained over Saudi Arabia’s status as mediator or conflict party, Huthi chief negotiator 14 April said negotiations were “serious and positive”. In key confidence-building measure, Huthis, govt and Saudi Arabia 14-16 April concluded swap of 887 detainees; Saudi Arabia 17 April unilaterally released 104 detainees. UN Envoy Hans Grundberg 17 April described talks as best opportunity for peace in eight years.

Parties clashed in Marib, Shebwa and Lahij governorates. Huthi forces and Saudi-backed Salafi group, Saba Axis, clashed along front lines in Marib governorate. Huthis, Giants Brigade and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated Shebwa Defence Forces clashed along border between Shebwa and al-Bayda.

Saudi-led coalition sought to ease tensions in south. Coalition continued meetings with pro-govt and Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated officials to ease tensions, particularly over Wadi Hadramawt area where STC forces seek to replace Islah-affiliated troops. STC President and PLC member Aydrous al-Zubaidi 1 April announced plan for STC to integrate new south-ern components, consolidating STC as chief representative on southern issue.

Africa

Benin

Sporadic jihadist violence continued in north while govt met with allies to discuss security cooperation.

Suspected jihadist violence persisted along borders with Burkina Faso and Niger. In Atakora department, army 5-6 March intervened to repel suspected jihadist attack in Nouari village, Matéri commune; incident reportedly left one civilian killed and another injured. In Alibori department, suspected jihadists overnight 14-15 March killed one civilian in Mamassy-Peulh village, Karimama commune, near border with Niger. Security forces overnight 28-29 March reportedly ambushed suspected jihadists in Kandi commune (also Alibori), with ensuing clashes leaving three militants and one soldier dead. Authorities 7 March extended curfew already in place in Matéri and Cobly communes since Feb to seven other communes in Alibori and Atakora departments.

Govt discussed cooperation with allies to contain jihadist threat. Paris-based news outlet Africa Intelligence 2 March reported that negotiations to deploy Rwandan contingent in Benin have been put on hold. U.S. Under Sec State for Arms Control and International Security, Bonnie Jenkins, 7-9 March met with high-ranking govt and military officials in capital Cotonou to discuss strengthening capacity of Beninese armed forces. President Talon 13 March met with Nigerien President Bazoum in Cotonou; counterparts reportedly discussed joint security issues (see Niger).

Burkina Faso

As levels of jihadist violence remained high across country, civil society accused govt forces of serious abuses on civilians.

Jihadist violence remained widespread, taking heavy toll on civilians. In North region, suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 2 March killed 12 civilians in Aorema village (Yatenga province); 13 March allegedly killed 16 civilians in Hargo village (Loroum province). In neighbouring Sahel region, suspected Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) 4 March killed at least ten civilians in Bani town (Seno province). In Centre-North region, govt forces 12 March killed at least 20 suspected JNIM militants who attacked food convoy and military escort between Kongoussi and Bourzanga towns (Bam province); and attack by unidentified jihadists 22 March left four soldiers, ten civilians auxiliaries (VDPs) and around 20 jihadists dead in Zorkoum locality (Sanmatenga province). In Boucle du Mouhoun region (west), suspected JNIM ambush on govt forces and VDPs 4 March left 20 militants, 11 govt and allied forces and one civilian dead in Zaba village (Nayala province). In Centre-East region, suspected JNIM fighters 13 March attacked Toabin village (Boulgou province), killing around ten civilians and forcing villagers to flee. Authorities imposed 30-day state of emergency in 22 provinces from 30 March.

Army faced new allegations of abuses on civilians. Armed forces 9 March said operations to recapture territory lost to jihadists in North, Centre-North and East regions in recent days left 112 militants and 11 soldiers dead. Allegations of civilian deaths however cast doubt on official toll. Notably, local NGO Collective against Impunity and Stigmatisation of Communities (CISC) 10 March alleged armed forces and VDPs 8 March killed at least 20 villagers in ethnic Fulani village of Toessin-Foulbè (Bam province, Centre-North). Local human rights organisations including CISC accused authorities of arbitrarily arresting and forcibly recruiting civil society representatives into volunteer forces, notably Boukaré Ouédraogo on 22 March.

Ouagadougou took new steps against French media. Authorities 27 March suspended France 24 broadcasts after news channel interviewed head of al-Qaeda in North Africa; 31 March summoned correspondents from French dailies Le Monde and Libération, gave them 24 hours to leave.

Burundi

Security forces and ruling party affiliates continued to harass civil society, and Gitega deployed troops to DR Congo as part of East African Community regional force.

Imbonerakure attacked opposition and civilians. Security forces 5-6 March detained at least 15 members of main opposition party National Congress for Freedom (CNL) after brawl with ruling party’s youth militia Imbonerakure in Bujumbura province. Suspected Imbonerakure 8-11 March allegedly repeatedly attacked home of CNL member Elysée Kabura in Giharo commune, Rutana province, forcing him to go into hiding; and overnight 11-12 March reportedly stabbed two civilians in Buringa village, Bubanza province. Meanwhile, NGOs Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 14 March urged authorities to “immediately release” five human rights defenders detained since Feb on charges including undermining state security, denounced “worsening climate for independent civil society in Burundi”.

Burundian troops joined regional force in eastern DR Congo. Approximately 100 Burundian soldiers 5-16 March arrived in eastern DR Congo’s North Kivu province as part of East African Community (EAC) regional force to help stem advance of M23 rebellion. Burundian forces around 23 March reportedly took over several villages in Masisi territory after M23 withdrew in compliance with timetable adopted by EAC in Feb (see DR Congo). Meanwhile in DR Congo’s South Kivu province, where Burundian forces are deployed as part of bilateral agreement, Burundian rebel group National Liberation Forces 5-6 March reportedly ambushed Burundian soldiers in Uvira territory, with unknown casualties.

Diplomatic relations between Burundi and Rwanda continued to improve. High-level delegation 5 March travelled to Kigali, met with Rwandan President Kagame; officials likely discussed situation in eastern DR Congo and extradition from Rwanda of individuals suspected of involvement in 2015 coup attempt against then-President Nkurunziza; deployment of Burundian troops to fight M23 in DR Congo could however hamper Burundi-Rwanda rapprochement (see Rwanda).

Cameroon

Canadian-facilitated initiative to settle Anglophone conflict remained stalled as clashes between govt forces and separatists continued; jihadist violence spiked in Far North.

Anglophone separatists continued to look for more united anti-govt front. Five prominent separatist movements 5 March announced All Ambazonia Conference to take place 6-10 July “to achieve a defining path for the liberation of homeland”; move is part of Anglophone separatists’ efforts to pursue new, more united anti-govt approach since President Biya pulled out of Canadian-facilitated peace initiative in Jan.

Violence continued in Anglophone North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions. Armed separatists 1 March kidnapped two police officers near Lysoka village, Fako division (SW), releasing them two days later following mediation by local civil society. Gunfire reported 11-12 March in several towns as separatists imposed lockdown in Anglophone regions to disrupt 12 March indirect Senate elections and govt forces deployed to secure voting. Armed separatists 14 March attacked govt checkpoint in Muea neighbourhood of SW regional capital Buea, killing at least two officers; 15 March killed university lecturer at his home in NW regional capital Bamenda; 28 March shot down army helicopter in Ntumbaw village, Donga-Mantung division (NW), killing at least one soldier.

Jihadists stepped up violence against soldiers in Far North region. Army 13 March repelled Boko Haram (JAS faction) attack on Sanda Wadjiri village, Mayo-Sava division; 14 March killed three members of Boko Haram splinter group, Islamic State West Africa Province, in Gassama locality, Logone-et-Chari division. Suspected JAS militants 18-19 March launched several attacks on civilians in Mayo-Tsanaga division, killing unconfirmed number. Landmine explosion 21 March killed at least one soldier and injured several others between Amchidé and Kolofata towns (Mayo-Sava).

In other important developments. After 12 March indirect Senate elections, Constitutional Council 23 March rejected all appeals and confirmed ruling party won all 70 seats in upper house; Biya to appoint 30 more senators in April, cementing his political control.

Central African Republic

Violence remained pervasive as rebels continued deadly offensive against govt forces in hinterland; tussle for influence intensified between Russia and Western countries.

Rebels continued to step up attacks in hinterland. Suspected Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) rebels 15 March targeted army position in Wawa village, Ouaka prefecture, leaving at least three civilians dead; 17 March briefly intercepted Archbishop of Bangui Cardinal Dieudonné Nzapalaïnga’s convoy near Ouadda locality, Haute-Kotto prefecture. Unidentified gunmen 19 March attacked Chinese-operated mining site in Chingbolo village (Ouaka), killing nine Chinese nationals; CPC immediately denied attack and accused Russian paramilitary Wagner Group of responsibility. Clashes between army and CPC rebels 23 March left at least three soldiers dead near Kadjama village (Ouham prefecture). Meanwhile, humanitarian workers faced increased insecurity. Notably, Russian forces 5 March briefly detained humanitarian workers after intercepting their convoy in Ouaka’s capital Bambari; 3R rebel group, CPC member, 10 March raided humanitarian convoy and stole their equipment near Bozoum town (Ouham-Pendé prefecture).

U.S. efforts to counter Russian influence came under spotlight. FM Sylvie Baïpo-Temon late Feb-early March denied rumours of negotiations between President Touadéra and U.S. for withdrawal of Wagner forces from country; statement came after French news outlet Le Monde 20 Feb alleged U.S. in Dec 2022 offered to train armed forces, increase humanitarian aid and boost support for UN mission in Central African Republic (CAR) in return for Wagner troops’ departure. Meanwhile, former president and exiled CPC leader, François Bozizé, 3 March left neighbouring Chad for Guinea-Bissau following U.S.-sponsored negotiations; move could be Washington’s first demonstration of good-will to CAR and could help ease tensions between Bangui and N’Djamena.

In other important developments. Unidentified gunmen overnight 5-6 March set storage yard of French-owned local brewery MOCAF on fire in capital Bangui; European source reportedly identified suspects appearing on video footages of attack as Wagner paramilitaries, while pro-Russian medias accused “mercenaries ... paid by France”. Amid series of public-sector strikes, demonstration of schoolteachers 7 March turned violent in Bangui, with mobs reportedly attacking private school buildings. Sudan 9 March reopened border with CAR after two-month closure.

Chad

Interim President Déby pardoned hundreds of rebels and opposition protesters in first peace gesture in months, but inclusive transition to civilian rule remained elusive; deadly herder-farmer violence erupted, and new armed group claimed attack in north.

Hundreds of rebels, opposition protesters granted presidential pardon. N’Djamena’s court of appeal 21 March sentenced over 400 members of Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) rebel group, notably group leader Mahamat Mahdi Ali, to life imprisonment over death in April 2021 of Chad’s long-time leader Idriss Déby. Interim President Mahamat Déby around 25 March pardoned 380 of them, not including Mahamat Mahdi Ali and others who had been sentenced in absentia. Déby 27 March also pardoned 259 protesters jailed for alleged involvement in anti-govt demonstrations held 20 Oct 2022, which were brutally suppressed by security forces; several opposition supporters however remained behind bars.

International actors sought to revive dialogue between govt, rebels and opposition. Catholic organisation Sant’Egidio 6-8 March gathered representatives of 18 rebel groups that did not sign August 2022 Doha agreement with transitional authorities (including FACT) in Italian capital Rome; rebels stated willingness to engage in inclusive negotiations with transitional authorities under “neutral and impartial” mediation. Meanwhile, Economic Community of Central African States delegation 7-11 March visited Chad, met with opposition and civil society representatives, including Wakit Tama coalition, as part of its facilitation of transition.

Deadly intercommunal violence erupted in country’s centre. Moubi farmers and Arab herders 27 Feb-4 March clashed in and around Mangalmé locality, Guéra region, with at least 14 people dead. Fighting between herders and farmers from Boudouma, Boura and Mada communities 13 March left at least 12 people dead in Mamdi village, Lac region.

In other important developments. Previously unknown armed group claimed attack on army position in Wadi-Marou, Tibesti region, 26 March killed two soldiers. Constitutional drafting committee 9 March handed preliminary draft to transitional constitution PM Saleh Kebzabo. Several international media outlets from late Feb reported that U.S. warned Interim President Déby of Russian paramilitary Wagner Group’s plan to work with Chadian rebels to overthrow transitional govt.

Côte d’Ivoire

Political tensions flared between President Ouattara and former President Gbagbo; govt donated military equipment to Burkina Faso to help contain jihadist advance.

Legal proceedings against opposition militants rekindled political tensions. Court in economic capital Abidjan 9 March sentenced 26 supporters of Laurent Gbagbo’s African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) to two years in prison for “disturbing public order”; militants were detained late Feb during gathering in Abidjan to protest investigation targeting PPA-CI Sec Gen Damana Pickass. PPA-CI 10 March condemned “arbitrary decision”, which was “likely to jeopardize the national reconciliation process”. Appeal court in Abidjan 22 March commuted sentence to suspended prison terms, resulting in all 26 supporters’ release few days later.

Henri-Konan Bédié’s party held extraordinary congress amid internal rifts. During extraordinary congress in Abidjan, Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) 30 March named historical leader, former President Bédié, as sole candidate for PDCI presidency at next party congress in June. Bédié same day urged party members to unite to win 2025 presidential election, amid calls from within party for 88-year-old leader to withdraw and series of defections of PDCI officials to ruling party. In presence of Gbagbo, Bédié also suggested that alliances could be forged with other parties.

Govt boosted cooperation with Burkina Faso to contain jihadist expansion. Govt around 18 March donated around $3.5mn worth of military equipment to neighbouring Burkina Faso. French news outlet Jeune Afrique 20 March reported Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire were planning to hold joint military operation along shared border, which reopened in Feb after years-long closure due to Covid-19. Meanwhile, army 1-15 March took part in U.S. annual counter-terrorism training for African forces staged in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Fighting between M23 rebels and govt forces continued in North Kivu province despite regional troop deployment; President Tshisekedi conducted major cabinet reshuffle ahead of elections.

Regional powers boosted military presence in North Kivu amid M23 fighting. Angolan President Lourenço 3 March announced ceasefire between M23 and Congolese forces to take effect 7 March. Fighting 6-13 March however erupted notably around Sake town (Masisi territory). As ceasefire collapsed, Lourenço 11 March announced troop deployment to North Kivu, which Angola’s parliament 18 March approved. Renewed fighting reported same day between Congolese troops and M23 in Bihambwe village near mining town of Rubaya (also Masisi). Burundian, Ugandan and South Sudanese forces in March arrived in North Kivu as part of East African Community (EAC) regional force to supervise planned pullback of M23 (see Burundi, Uganda). Rebels during month reportedly withdrew from some localities, including Mweso (Masisi), but 30 March still held strategic positions, missing EAC deadline for full withdrawal.

Other armed groups launched deadly attacks on civilians in east. In North Kivu’s Beni territory, suspected Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 8-9 March attacked Mukondi and Mausa villages, killing nearly 40 civilians; 12 and 14 March killed 36 civilians in Kirindera and Mabuku villages. ADF 18-19 March also launched first-ever attack in Lubero territory, killing at least nine civilians in Nguli village. In Ituri province, attacks by suspected CODECO militia in five villages of Mahagi territory 18 March reportedly left over 30 people dead, and CODECO 26 March executed 17 hostages in Djugu territory.

Cabinet reshuffle brought political heavyweights into govt. Months away from general elections due in Dec, Tshisekedi 23 March reshuffled govt, notably appointing his former Chief of Staff Vital Kamerhe as economy minister and former VP Jean-Pierre Bemba as defence minister.

Delays in election preparations sparked tensions. After Tshisekedi 4 March suggested that violence in eastern provinces could delay elections, opposition leader Martin Fayulu 6 March urged him to leave power by 23 Jan 2024, if need be to make way for caretaker govt. Electoral commission 15 March announced 15-day extension to 1 April of voter registration in electoral zone covering east, where millions of voters are facing disenfranchisement.

Eritrea

U.S. accused Ethiopian, Eritrean and Tigray forces of war crimes in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, Asmara worked to forge new alliances, and UN condemned Eritrea’s “dire” human rights situation.

U.S. accused Eritrea of crimes against humanity in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict. Following two-day trip to Ethiopia, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 20 March announced U.S. had determined that members of Ethiopian federal, Eritrean, Amhara and Tigray forces committed war crimes in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, and that members of Ethiopian federal, Eritrean and Amhara forces committed crimes against humanity (see Ethiopia); Asmara next day dismissed “unsubstantiated and defamatory accusations”.

Asmara continued to seek new alliances. President Isaias 28 Feb-1 March visited Saudi Arabia, 1 March held talks with Saudi Crown Prince and PM Mohammed bin Salman on “spectrum” of bilateral issues. Isaias 13 March received vice chair of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, in capital Asmara. Somali President Mohamud 13-14 March visited Eritrea for third time since coming to power in May 2022. Stepped-up diplomatic efforts signalled Isaias’ resolve to prevent Eritrea’s isolation following Tigray peace deal in Ethiopia.

UN spotlighted “dire” human rights situation. UN human rights body 6 March accused Eritrea of committing serious human rights abuses against citizens with “complete impunity”, including military servitude, forced conscriptions, forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and killings.

Ethiopia

Tigray’s peace process made significant headway as federal and Tigray took further steps to strengthen relations; prospects for peace talks in Oromia improved.

Authorities removed TPLF’s terrorist designation and dropped charges against its leaders. At conference in Tigray regional capital Mekelle, Tigray leaders 1-4 March agreed on composition of Interim Regional Administration (IRA), still to be formed; three opposition parties boycotted conference, accusing Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of monopolising power. TPLF 17 March selected peace deal’s chief negotiator, Getachew Reda, to head IRA; PM Abiy 23 March formally appointed Reda to head IRA, who next day said he would prioritise Tigray’s economic recovery and restoring lost territory. Federal parliament 22 March removed TPLF’s terrorist designation, marking major step toward consolidating peace since delisting is in effect a prerequisite for IRA’s formation. Federal govt 30 March dropped criminal charges against TPLF political and military leaders. Following two-day trip to Ethiopia 15-16 March, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 20 March announced U.S. had determined that all sides committed “war crimes” during Tigray conflict and that federal, Eritrean and Amhara forces committed crimes against humanity; federal govt next day warned U.S. against “divisive approach”.

Abiy announced committee to negotiate with Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Conflict between OLA and security forces continued in Oromia region throughout March, with fighting occurring in West and East Wollega Zones, North and East Shewa Zones, and Kamashi and Metekel Zones in Benishangul-Gumuz region. Yet Abiy 28 March renewed hope for peace talks by announcing formation of committee to negotiate with OLA, which same day reported that there are “positive signs peace talks… will take place”.

Oromo-Amhara tensions deepened. In sign of rising tensions between Oromia and Amhara regions, Oromia authorities late Feb-early March restricted transport from Amhara region to federal capital Addis Ababa, which is located in Oromia but is self-governing; Amhara President Yilikal Kefale 6 March declared blockade “unconstitutional”. Addis Ababa’s Oromo Mayor Adanech Abebe 14 March accused individuals of “flocking to the capital from some regional states with the intention of overthrowing the legally elected government”, implying regional authorities enforced blockade amid security concerns; National Movement of Amhara party same day condemned remark as “genocidal incitement”.

Guinea

Religious figures launched new mediation initiative between interim govt and opposition; relations with ECOWAS remained tense.

Govt and opposition engaged in fragile talks as part of new mediation initiative. Govt’s General Secretary for Religious Affairs Karamo Diawara, Grand Imam of Conakry Mamadou Saliou Camara and other religious figures 5-6 March met with representatives of Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG) – large opposition coalition including outlawed National Front for the Defence of the Constitution, former President Condé’s Rally of the Guinean People and Cellou Dalein Diallo’s Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea – as part of new effort to foster dialogue with transitional govt. FVG 8 March postponed anti-govt demonstration planned for 9 March to “give negotiations a chance”. Authorities 11 March briefly detained two FVG members, including prominent civil society activist Abdoul Sacko, in capital Conakry on undisclosed charges. FVG 13 March met with PM Bernard Goumou and requested end of legal proceedings against Sacko as pre-condition for negotiations. Authorities next day ended legal proceedings against Sacko, prompting FVG to suspend demonstration scheduled for 20 March. FVG around 25 March designated six representatives to discuss prerequisites for dialogue with govt.

Govt at loggerheads with ECOWAS over detention of former ministers. Paris-based news outlet Africa Intelligence 17 March revealed series of communications 28 Feb-13 March between West African regional bloc ECOWAS’s court of justice and Conakry over continued detention of three Condé-era ministers, including former PM Ibrahima Kassory Fofana, who were arrested in April 2022 for alleged financial fraud; regional court reportedly requested defence case statement outlining officials’ situation. All three former ministers 15 March refused to appear before Economic and Financial Offenses Court in Conakry, denouncing “targeted and repressive witch hunt”; court postponed audience to 20 March, then to April.

Kenya

Anti-govt demonstrations turned deadly as violent confrontations erupted between protesters and security forces; amid record drought, deadly cattle raids continued in north.

Several dead amid violence during opposition protests. Opposition Azimio la Umoja coalition leader and runner-up in 2022 presidential election, Raila Odinga, 9 March announced countrywide protests against 2022 presidential election results and high cost of living. Demonstrations 20 March led to violent confrontations; security forces shot one protester dead in third-largest city Kisumu, tear-gassed Odinga’s convoy in capital Nairobi, and arrested over 200 people across country, including at least four opposition lawmakers. Renewed demonstrations 27 March turned violent again as security forces reportedly shot one protester dead in Kisumu, while violence in Kibera, Nairobi’s largest informal settlement, reportedly left two people dead; unidentified individuals same day stormed former President Kenyatta’s land in northern Nairobi. Thousands 30 March joined new opposition-led protests, with some protesters throwing stones while police responded with tear gas in Nairobi; offices of President Ruto’s party United Democratic Alliance were set on fire in Siaya town; police said one officer killed during protests.

President Ruto continued to consolidate power despite criticism. Odinga 12 March asked Ruto to dissolve newly formed panel selecting incoming electoral commissioners, accusing it of bias in favour of ruling Kenya Kwanza coalition. In controversial move, Ruto 16 March brought number of Chief Administration Secretary (CAS) positions within govt from 23 to 50; 22 March appointed new CAS, including allies who lost out in last elections; High Court 24 March however stopped CAS from assuming office pending lawsuit by Law Society of Kenya and local NGO Katiba Institute.

Amid historic drought, violence over cattle and land resources continued in north. Suspected cattle raiders 1 March killed three people in Kargi area, Marsabit county; 4 March killed four in Lolmolog village, Samburu county; 7 March shot two people dead in Elgeyo-Marakwet county; 11 March attacked Lorogon village, Turkana county, reportedly leaving at least four people injured.

Mali

Authorities postponed constitutional referendum, missing first deadline on timetable to return to constitutional rule; jihadist violence and army operations took heavy toll on civilians.

Bamako postponed constitutional referendum, cracked down on critics. Transitional govt 10 March announced constitutional referendum originally due 19 March would be “slightly” delayed, notably to install subdivisions of election management body in all regions, as recommended during 2021 national dialogue; however reaffirmed commitment to holding presidential election in Feb 2024 as agreed with regional body ECOWAS. Meanwhile, security forces 13 March arrested radio and television host and civil society activist Ras Bath two days after he described death in custody of former PM Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga in 2022 as “assassination”; 15 March detained influencer “Rose Vie Chère” on charges including “inciting rebellion” days after she denounced “failure” of interim authorities.

Govt accused northern armed groups of degrading Algiers peace agreement. In letter to Algeria dated 24 Feb and leaked 1 March, Malian authorities denounced “flagrant violations” of 2015 Algiers peace agreement by signatory armed groups, notably coalition of former rebel groups Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), accusing them of collaborating with jihadist groups. CMA did not officially respond to allegations.

Jihadist violence persisted in north. In Ménaka region, Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) and al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 1 March clashed near Agare Mbaou locality; each group claimed killing dozens of rivals. In Gao region, presumed JNIM elements 9 March killed eight civilians near Wabaria village; IS-Sahel 14 March launched attacks in Anchawadi commune, leaving eight civilians and four pro-govt militiamen dead. Over 400 vehicles belonging to signatory armed groups 7 March reportedly gathered near Anefis town, Kidal region, likely in preparation for operations against IS-Sahel.

Abuses against civilians continued amid military operations in centre. In Mopti region, Malian and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group forces 6 March reportedly killed five civilians and arrested at least a dozen during operation in Sossobe-Togoro village; Malian air force 7 March carried out airstrikes allegedly targeting ethnic Fulani hamlets between Kilimpo and Koko villages, reportedly leaving a dozen civilians dead.

Mozambique

As heavy rains and floods hindered Islamist insurgents’ attacks and military operations, militants continued to engage with locals in attempt to win hearts and minds.

Rainy season slowed insurgent attacks and military operations. Heavy rains and floods in March rendered many roads unusable, with traffic effectively cut off between population centres of Mocímboa da Praia, Mueda, Muidumbe, and Palma. Among few reported security incidents, serious clash 13 March erupted Xitaxi village, Muidumbe district, leaving four Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) insurgents killed and two Mozambican soldiers injured; insurgents 21 March abducted two fishermen in Quiterajo locality, Macomia district. Local militia Força Local continued to support troops from Mozambique and Southern African Development Community Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM) in fighting ISMP. Seven insurgents 1 March surrendered to Força Local in Ngangolo village (Nangade district); clashes between insurgents and Força Local 4 and 14 March left several people dead in Mitope village (Mocímboa da Praia district); Força Local 6 March captured at least three insurgents in Mandava village and 24 March exchanged gunfire with insurgents around villages of Namacule and Mandava (Muidumbe district), with unknown casualties.

Militants continued to engage more peacefully with Cabo Delgado’s population. In apparent bid to gain popular support and ensure durable presence, ISMP insurgents attempted to establish cordial relations with locals and purchased supplies 6-12 March in Marere area (Mocimboa da Praia), 13 and 24 March in Pangane, Mucojo, Rueia and Ningaia villages (Macomia).

TotalEnergies likely to resume operations in coming months. Major contractor on French energy company TotalEnergies-led liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, Saipem, late Feb said it expects that work will restart in July. Recruitment agencies in capital Maputo in Feb also reportedly began contacting former TotalEnergies staff about returning to work. Amid fears that resumption of $20bn project could focus attention of security forces to the detriment of other districts and civilians in Cabo Delgado, report by local NGO Observatorio do Meio Rural 6 March highlighted attempts at economic recovery in Cabo Delgado have disproportionately favoured inland Christians and Makondes, while coastal Muslims and Mwanis continue to face neglect.

Niger

Security forces conducted large-scale counter-insurgency operations, and Niamey continued to strengthen security cooperation with regional and international partners.

Govt forces stepped up operations against jihadists in Diffa, Tillabery regions. In Diffa region (south east), armed forces around 11 March reportedly killed about 30 suspected Boko Haram (JAS faction) combatants near Nigerian border in Diffa department, and arrested 960 militants and family members; week of 13-19 March reportedly killed around 20 and arrested 83 suspected combatants of Boko Haram splinter group Islamic State West Africa Province in N’Guigmi department. Also in Diffa, suspected JAS elements 11 March killed nine civilians abducted two days prior near Toumour village (Bosso department). In Tillabery region (south west), presumed Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) 1 March killed one civilian in Ayorou commune (Tillabery department); al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims 4 March attacked police station in Makalondi village (Torodi department), killing one civilian; govt 24 March reported that combined air-ground operation previous week killed 79 jihadist militants (likely IS-Sahel) in Banibangou area and across border in Mali’s Hamakat area.

Authorities pursued regional and international diplomacy. In sign of possible rapprochement between Niamey and Bamako, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Salifou Mody 9 March met with Malian Interim President Col. Goïta in Mali’s capital Bamako; Gen. Mody reportedly asked Mali to allow Nigerien forces to pursue jihadists into Mali. Niger’s National Security Council same day announced closure of land border with Mali’s Ménaka region in attempt to hamper cross-border militancy. President Bazoum 13 March travelled to Benin and 20 March to Togo to discuss security and economic cooperation with his counterparts. Meanwhile, in first-ever visit to Niger by top U.S. diplomat, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 16 March met with Bazoum in capital Niamey.

Nigeria

Opposition turned to court to challenge election of ruling party’s Bola Tinubu as president, while violent incidents marred governorship elections; jihadist, criminal and separatist violence continued.

Tinubu won presidency with record-low votes, violence marred governorship elections. Electoral Commission 1 March declared ruling All Progressive Congress’s Bola Tinubu winner of presidential election with 36% of votes, followed by Peoples Democratic Party’s Atiku Abubakar (28%) and Labour Party’s Peter Obi (24 %). Obi 20 March and Abubakar next day challenged result at presidential election petition tribunal. If confirmed, Tinubu would be Nigeria’s first president to take office with less than 50% of votes cast and after losing main political and economic centres, Abuja, Lagos and Kano. Meanwhile, violent incidents during governorship elections, 18 March left at least 29 people dead; thugs attacked polling stations and destroyed election material, in some cases stopping people from casting votes, especially in Lagos and Rivers states.

Jihadists remained active in North East. In Borno state, suspected Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) 8 March attacked Mukdolo village, Ngala area, killing around 29 fishermen. Military said troops 9-23 March killed 35 jihadists and freed 200 captives, while 1,506 jihadists and their families surrendered in Borno. Meanwhile, ISWAP around 1 March reportedly killed scores of rival Boko Haram (BH) fighters in Konduga area.

Criminal and other attacks continued in North West and North Central. In Zamfara state, police 10 March rescued 14 abducted people in Munhaye forest, Tsafe area. In Kaduna state, unidentified gunmen 11-14 March killed at least 37 people in two separate attacks in Zangon Kataf area. In Niger state, unidentified gunmen 14 March abducted about 60 people in Paikoro area, later killing at least five; military around 30 March launched air and ground operation against suspected cattle raiders in Mariga area, with unknown casualties.

Biafra agitation and other violence continued at lower intensity in South East. In Anambra, Enugu and Imo states, unidentified gunmen 4-27 March attacked police and civil defence corps, killing at least six. Security forces 9-30 March killed at least 15 and arrested 32 suspected members of outlawed separatist group, Indigenous People of Biafra/Eastern Security Network in South East.

Rwanda

Govt forces killed Congolese soldier along shared border; Kinshasa urged Paris to pursue sanctions against Rwanda in pursuit of durable M23 ceasefire in eastern DR Congo.

Rwandan and Congolese troops exchanged fire along shared border. Kigali 3 March said military killed Congolese soldier after he allegedly crossed border into Rwanda’s Rubavu district and shot at Rwandan soldiers; also said several other Congolese soldiers fired at Rwandan army position.

Congolese president discussed sanctions on Rwanda with French counterpart. Congolese President Tshisekedi 4 March pressured visiting French President Macron to pursue sanctions against Rwanda for its military support to M23 rebels; Macron said “there may be sanctions” following ongoing peace negotiation efforts if Rwanda and other actors “do not respect their commitments”. France’s UN Ambassador Nicolas de Rivière 7 March also said “incursions by the regular Rwandan army in North Kivu” are “clearly established” and “unacceptable”.

Diplomatic tensions between Burundi and Rwanda continued to ease. High-level Burundian delegation 5 March met with President Kagame in capital Kigali; officials reportedly discussed situation in eastern DR Congo and extradition from Rwanda of several individuals suspected of involvement in 2015 coup attempt against then-Burundian President Nkurunziza. Governors of Rwanda’s Western and Southern provinces 17 March met with governor of Burundi’s Citiboke province in Rwanda’s Kamembe town to discuss reopening of Ruhwa and Bweyeye border crossings (see Burundi).

Somalia

Govt continued preparations for expansion of military operations against Al-Shabaab further south.

President Mohamud announced second phase of offensive against Al-Shabaab. National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh Ali 1 March said Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti will deploy troops to Somalia within two months to assist efforts against Al-Shabaab. Mohamud 26 March announced official start of second phase of anti-Al-Shabaab offensive, concentrating on southern Jubaland and South West states. Govt’s efforts to reduce Al-Shabaab’s footprint in central Somalia continued at slower pace. Notably, govt forces 25 March reportedly cleared Run Nirgood district, Middle Shabelle region (Hirshabelle state), and 29 March secured several villages in El Dheere district, Galguduud region (Galmudug state).

Al-Shabaab launched multiple attacks, demonstrating continued resistance. In Jubaland, militants 7 March briefly took control of Janay Abdalle military base in Lower Juba region, using vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIEDs); 14 March launched VBIED attack targeting govt officials in Bardheere town, Gedo region, leaving several dead and injuring Gedo Governor Ahmed Bulle Gared; 29 March launched complex attack and allegedly overran army base in Kismayo district, Lower Juba. In Hirshabelle, Al-Shabaab 21 March launched suicide VBIED attack targeting local fighter base in Adan Yabal district, Middle Shabelle region, and 29 March stormed Bardhere military base, Hiraan region.

National Consultative Council took place in absence of Puntland leader. President Mohamud and federal state leaders 16 March gathered in Baidoa city for National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting marred by absence of Puntland state leader Said Deni (who suspended ties with Mogadishu in Jan). Leaders notably agreed to discuss, at next NCC in May, electoral model and timelines for next elections; all states aside from Puntland have added one year to their term, and both houses of federal parliament early March appointed committees to examine motion supporting constitutional amendment for one-year term extension of MPs and president, which opposition strongly opposes.

Drought continued to drive hunger, displacement. UN and Somali govt report released 20 March estimated that 135 people currently die each day in Somalia due to drought, with 18,100 to 34,000 drought-related deaths in first six months of 2023.

Somaliland

Ethiopian-led consultations failed to end fighting between govt forces and local clan militias in Las Anod town; conflict ratcheted up political tensions.

Conflict between Somaliland govt and Dhulbahante militias persisted. Las Anod mayor 2 March said violence in town had killed over 200 people on all sides since early Feb. Dhulbahante clan militias from late Feb pushed Somaliland forces to positions further outside Las Anod in Sool region, leading to drop in mortar shelling of town. In attempt to mediate between parties, delegation from Ethiopia early March visited both Somalia’s Garowe city to discuss with Dhulbahante elders and Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa to meet with Somaliland govt officials. Efforts floundered, however, as Dhulbahante continued to insist Somaliland withdraw its forces to areas outside of their clan homeland, which President Bihi rejected. Renewed fighting reported 18 and 25 March in Las Anod amid reports suggesting both sides are working on securing additional forces.

Las Anod crisis ratcheted up tensions in Hargeisa. Increasing number of politicians distanced themselves from Bihi’s military approach to Las Anod crisis. Notably, two Dhulbahante clan members, Abdirisaq Ibrahim Mohamed “Attash” (founder of Waberi political association and former telecommunications minister) and Saleban Essa Ahmed “Xaglatoosiye” (head of another nascent political association), around 7 March announced their withdrawal from Somaliland politics and called for Somaliland forces to leave Las Anod. Vice chairman of Waddani opposition party, Ahmed Omar Haji Hamarje, 12 March accused Bihi of using Las Anod conflict to delay elections originally scheduled for Nov 2022. Somaliland’s VP Abdirahman Abdilahi Ismail mid-March accused House Speaker Abdirisaq Khalif, who has long voiced opposition to govt’s approach to Las Anod crisis, of having “crossed the line” by allegedly supporting secessionism.

South Sudan

Tensions between President Kiir and VP Machar escalated after Kiir fired ministers, violence persisted, and UN extended mission mandate.

Kiir fired defence and interior ministers, triggering political crisis. In hugely provocative move aimed at undercutting VP Machar, President Kiir 3 March sacked Defence Minister Angelina Teny, Machar’s wife, and Interior Minister Mahmoud Solomon; Kiir same day removed defence ministry from Machar’s portfolio, replacing it with interior ministry. Opposition next day condemned move, saying it violated 2018 peace agreement. Kiir and Machar 10 March held meeting in capital Juba that ended in deadlock. In another breach of peace deal, Kiir 29 March appointed member of his own party, Chol Thon Balok, as defence minister. Still, immediate return to major conflict remains unlikely. Meanwhile, Rome peace talks between govt and holdout opposition groups 20 March resumed, but sides failed to agree on agenda and 24 March adjourned talks until May.

Kiir moved to consolidate control over political base and security forces. Kiir 3 March reorganised cabinet in Warrap state, removing leaders close to potential rival Akol Koor Kuch, director of Internal Bureau of the National Security Services; 8 March fired FM and Warrap politician Mayiik Ayii Deng. Kiir 13 March reconfigured South Sudan People’s Defence Forces leadership to ward off threats to his rule, elevating commanders close to his inner circle with ties to Sudan’s military regime.

Violence persisted in several states. In Jonglei state, unknown gunmen 16 March killed at least 15 civilians at Thiep fishing site between Ulang and Akobo counties. In Western Bahr al-Ghazal state, leftover mortar shell 16 March exploded, killing at least ten in Jur River county. In Jonglei state, unknown assailants 17 March ambushed over 100 humanitarian trucks, killing two. In Upper Nile state, unknown assailant 26 March detonated hand grenade, killing one in Malakal town.

UN extended mission mandate. UN Special Envoy for South Sudan Nicholas Haysom 6 March called 2023 “make or break” year for South Sudan with “fast-closing window of opportunity” to create conditions for 2024 elections. Security Council 15 March renewed mandate of UN Mission in South Sudan for one year, with increased emphasis on civilian protection.

Sudan

Civilians announced ambitious timeline for transition to civilian rule, “Phase II” negotiations continued at slow pace, and tensions between military leaders reached worrying heights.

Civilian leaders announced ambitious timeline for transition. Civilian groups that signed Dec 2022 Framework Agreement, as well as military and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), 19 March convened in capital Khartoum, along with Trilateral Mechanism led by UN Mission in Sudan, African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Civilian leaders announced ambitious timeline to sign final agreement on political transition by 1 April, adopt transitional constitution 6 April and form civilian transitional govt 11 April; they also formed 11-member committee composed of nine pro-democracy leaders, one army representative and one RSF representative to draft final agreement on political transition by 27 March, but committee missed deadline, indicating (along with other signs, such as stalled “Phase II” negotiations, see below) that political impasse could drag on.

“Phase II” negotiations dragged on. “Phase II” consultations among civilian groups on outstanding issues, including transitional justice and security sector reform, continued. Notably, Trilateral Mechanism 11-18 March organised workshops on transitional justice in South Kordofan state, Darfur region and Khartoum. Key stakeholders who reject Framework Agreement, including FFC-Democratic Bloc, Democratic Unionist Party and traditional leaders such as Beja chief Sayed Tirik, continued to boycott process, hampering progress.

Tensions between Burhan and Hemedti spiked. Longstanding tensions between army chief and de facto head of state Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Sovereign Council deputy and RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” escalated, fanning fears of civil war as leaders early March mobilised respective forces in and around Khartoum. Hemedti 7 March criticised military leaders for clinging to power, deepening crisis. Burhan and Hemedti 11 March met in Khartoum, agreeing to de-escalate tensions and establish joint committee to oversee security throughout country.

In other important developments. Sudan 9 March opened border with Central African Republic after two-month closure. According to UN humanitarian agency, tribal clashes 23 March erupted in West Darfur state, killing six and forcing 30,000 to flee to neighbouring Chad.

Tanzania

Relations between opposition and ruling party continued to improve.

Former lawmaker from main opposition party Chadema, Godbless Lema, 1 March returned from two-year exile in Canada. President Suluhu Hassan 8 March pledged to restore competitive politics and review constitution in address at Chadema gathering celebrating International Women’s Day. U.S. VP Kamala Harris 29-31 March visited Tanzania, praised Hassan’s steps to strengthen democracy.

Uganda

President Museveni faced mounting pressure amid series of corruption scandals involving govt officials; Ugandan troops joined regional force in eastern DR Congo.

Corruption allegations continued to cripple Museveni’s cabinet. Parliamentary committee investigating alleged mismanagement of National Social Security Fund 1 March recommended “immediate” resignation of Gender, Labour and Social Development Minister Betty Amongi for abuse of office; parliament 9 March adopted recommendation. During cabinet meeting, Museveni 6 March reportedly requested explanations on allegations, which emerged in Feb, that several ministers and other officials diverted govt-funded relief items destined for residents of Karamoja region; police 13 March announced criminal probe, while ruling party’s de facto ally Democratic Party next day called for dismissal of govt officials involved in scandal. In possible attempt to divert public attention, parliament 21 March nearly unanimously passed bill entrenching criminalisation of same-sex conduct. UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk and U.S. Sec State Anthony Blinken next day condemned discriminatory bill undermining human rights.

Museveni’s son announced bid for leadership in 2026. Museveni’s son Lt-Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba 15 March said on Twitter that he was “tired of waiting” for old guard to retire and “will stand for the presidency in 2026”; later deleted posts. Kainerugaba 27 March said he “will be retiring” from army “this year”; armed forces personnel are barred from engaging in politics.

Troops arrived in eastern DR Congo as part of regional force. About 1,000 Ugandan soldiers 31 March arrived in North Kivu province’s Bunagana town as part of East African Community regional force to supervise planned pull-back of M23 rebels; troops due to deploy to several locations in Rutshuru territory. Ugandan troops also remained active elsewhere in North Kivu as part of bilateral agreement: joint DR Congo-Uganda operation 25 March reportedly killed 22 members of Islamic State-affiliated militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), while Ugandan military raid 29 March killed senior ADF commander.

Zimbabwe

Ahead of general elections due this summer, courts dismissed legal challenges to electoral process and paved the way for high-profile trial of opposition leader.

Courts dismissed cases over electronic voters’ roll, constituency delimitation report. Harare High Court 7 March dismissed main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) legislator Allan Markham’s case demanding release of electronic voters’ roll to the public ahead of general elections due in July or August; Markham later in month filed appeal at Supreme Court. Civil society group Team Pachedu in March repeatedly warned of possible mayhem in next elections due to irregularities in electoral commission’s constituency delimitation report, notably erroneous demarcation of wards. Constitutional Court 20 March dismissed application by ruling party Zanu-PF member Tonderai Chidawa to nullify constituency delimitation report. Political party Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) late March also filed Constitutional Court application seeking postponement of elections by six months to make time for revision of delimitation report. Voter registration concluded 26 March.

Ruling party held chaotic primary elections. Zanu-PF 25 March held primaries to select members who will represent party in upcoming general elections; voting extended to 26 March as some candidates’ names were missing from registers, while ballots were not delivered in some areas. In run-up to vote, skirmishes between supporters of rival candidates 20 March left several Zanu-PF activists injured in Chegutu West constituency, Mashonaland West province.

Prominent opposition lawmaker remained behind bars. Court in capital Harare 16 March refused to dismiss case against prominent CCC lawmaker, Job Sikhala, paving the way for high-profile trial in run-up to general elections; Sikhala has been held in custody since June 2022 on accusations of inciting public violence.

Asia

Afghanistan

Islamic State’s local branch killed Balkh governor in highest-profile attack since Taliban takeover, while Taliban emir exercised his authority with series of edicts.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) resumed deadly attacks. With advent of warmer weather, violence appeared to rise as ISKP broke its weeks-long hiatus in attacks, killing head of water supply department in Herat province on 8 March. In highest-profile killing since Taliban’s takeover in Aug 2021, ISKP next day conducted suicide bombing inside complex of governor of Balkh province (north), Daud Muzamil, killing Muzamil, who was considered one of emir’s close allies and who had previously served as first deputy interior minister. In response to attack, Taliban forces launched several raids against ISKP cells, including in Balkh province. ISKP 27 March conducted suicide attack in capital Kabul, killing six. U.S. Central Command’s General Michael Kurilla 16 March told U.S. Congress that ISKP set its sights on Western targets and could launch attack in under six months. Meanwhile, Afghanistan Freedom Front, which claimed several assaults in south in recent months, continued its activities and claimed attacks in capital Kabul and Takhar province (north).

Emir sought curb on cannabis production, corruption and nepotism. Emir 18 March issued edict banning cultivation of cannabis plants countrywide; cultivation of cannabis plants has recently spiked despite Taliban narcotics ban. Emir same day issued two more edicts to combat corruption and nepotism, including that all relatives of senior Taliban leaders who were appointed due to familial relations be removed from their posts. Emir continued to appoint several provincial ulema councils, which have no formal role and acts as conduit between govt and residents of province, marking one of few attempts by authorities to increase provincial decision-making.

Economic and humanitarian crises persisted countrywide. UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Roza Otunbayeva 8 March briefed UN Security Council, stating that two-thirds of population (28mn people) will need humanitarian assistance this year to survive; assistance will cost $4.62bn – single largest country appeal ever – but it is unlikely that target will be met. UN Security Council 16 March renewed UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s mandate for another year.

Bangladesh

Govt and opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) supporters clashed as Islamist groups attacked minority Ahmadiyas, while arson and violence ravaged Rohingya refugee camps.

Govt and opposition supporters clashed amid sectarian attacks. Violence 11 March broke out between student wings of ruling Awami League and opposition BNP in Moulvibazar district. Forty eminent individuals, including Hilary Clinton and Ban Ki-moon, 8 March urged govt to cease “unfair” attacks against Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus amid investigations by authorities into his businesses. Meanwhile, approximately 7,000-8,000 activists of several Islamist groups, including Islamic Movement, 3-4 March attacked some 8,000 members of minority Muslim Ahmadiya community and their properties during annual three-day gathering in Panchagar district, killing two and injuring at least 50; many ultra-Orthodox groups consider Ahmadiyas non-Muslims.

Arson destroyed thousands of shelters in Cox’s Bazar refugee camp. Fire 5 March broke out in Ukhiya Rohingya refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, destroying 2,664 shelters, damaging 90 facilities related to health and education, and leaving almost 16,000 refugees without shelter. After several Rohingya leaders alleged that fire was result of sabotage amid feuding between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation over control of camps, authorities 12 March concluded fire was indeed intentional. Meanwhile, attacks continued in Ukhiya camp: shootings killed camp leader 7 March and volunteer 15 March, and young man was hacked to death 16 March. Myanmar’s regime took small step toward possibly repatriating 1,000 Rohingya refugees (see Myanmar); Human Rights Watch 31 March warned conditions are not “conducive to voluntary, safe, or dignified returns”.

Militant attacks and counter-terror operations continued in Bandarband district. Kuku-Chin National Front (KNF) separatists 11 March shot and injured construction workers in Bandarband. KNF militants next day shot army officer dead and injured two others in Rowangchhari sub-district. Paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion 13 March arrested nine militants of Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya in Bandarband. In Chittagong district, police 9 March arrested militant of Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh armed group on the run for 17 years in Feni city.

China/Japan

China continued maritime presence in Japan’s territorial waters, while Tokyo bolstered its defence posture and enhanced cooperation with allies and partners.

Chinese maritime presence continued, including near disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. As of 23 March, Japan detected 85 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone, with eight vessels venturing inside Japan’s territorial sea 15-17 March. Japan 18 March spotted two Chinese Coast Guard vessels around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, lingering for 16 hours; Tokyo condemned Beijing for violating waters around islands, while China described it as routine to safeguard its sovereignty. Russia 3 March claimed it fired Kalibr cruise missile during submarine drill in Sea of Japan that struck land target over 1,000km away.

Japan strengthened defence posture, bolstering Okinawa base. Japan 16 March deployed Ground Self-Defense Force units, including missile squads, to newly established garrison at Ishigaki Island in Okinawa, near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan. Okinawa authorities 17 March conducted first-ever tabletop exercise on evacuating more than 100,000 people from Japanese islands near Taiwan. Meanwhile, Tokyo 4 March announced plan to introduce new homegrown missile capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide weapons by 2027. Media reports early March suggested Japan was considering sending drones instead of manned jets to intercept foreign aircraft approaching its sovereign airspace.

Japan continued alliance-building efforts, held summit with South Korea. FMs of “Quad” (U.S., Australia, India and Japan) 3 March pledged to address maritime challenges in South and East China Seas. U.S., Canada, India, Japan and South Korea 16 March staged “Sea Dragon” joint anti-submarine exercises. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol 16-17 March visited Japan for bilateral summit, bringing curtain down on extended period of bilateral friction in recent years; Japanese PM Kishida called it “major step towards normalizing relations” (see Korean Peninsula). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz 18 March visited Japanese capital Tokyo aiming to strengthen economic and defence ties. Japan’s PM Fumino Kishida 20 March visited India to coordinate Japan’s G7 presidency and India’s G20 presidency; pair 17 Feb-2 March conducted joint exercises in Japan’s Shiga region.

India

Govt discussed disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, authorities arrested over 100 Sikhs in search for separatist leader, and Maoist violence continued.

Govt discussed LAC dispute with China on sidelines of G20. FM S. Jaishankar 2 March held bilateral talks with Chinese counterpart Qin Gang at G20 gathering in capital New Delhi; following meeting, S. Jaishankar said talks “focused on addressing current challenges […] especially peace and tranquillity in the border areas”, while China said both sides should “work for the regular management of border areas at an early date.” S. Jaishankar 18 March said situation at disputed border remains “very fragile”. Indian army chief Gen. Manoj Pande 27 March said Chinese transgressions along LAC remain “potential trigger” for escalation.

Govt launched major security operations against Sikh separatist leader. Security forces 18 March deployed thousands of paramilitary personnel to Punjab state (north) as part of search operation to arrest leader of outlawed separatist Khalistan movement, Amritpal Singh, who since 2022 has revived calls to establish independent state for Sikhs; police accuse Singh of attempted murder and creating discord in Punjab. Authorities 18-22 March blocked internet access state-wide and arrested around 154 alleged Singh supporters.

Maoist violence persisted in centre and east. In Odisha state (east), Maoists 17 March killed man in Nabarangpur district. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), Maoists 19 March set ablaze around 14 construction vehicles in Kanker district; security forces 21 March killed one Maoist in clashes in Bijapur district; explosive device 27 March killed army officer in Bijapur district; Maoists 28 March killed two villagers in Narayanpur and Sukma districts.

In other important developments. Manipur state (north east) govt 10 March withdrew from 2008 ceasefire agreement with two militant outfits – Kuki National Army and Zoumi Revolutionary Front – citing recent protests and violence. Govt hosted top leaders from Germany, Italy, Australia, Japan and U.S. during month. Court in Gujarat state 23 March sentenced opposition Congress party’s leader Rahul Gandhi to two years in prison for alleged defamation; hundreds of Congress party supporters 27 March took to streets in capital New Delhi to protest ruling.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Tensions persisted between India and Pakistan, security operations continued in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Hindu Pandits suspended months-long relocation campaign.

Tensions persisted between New Delhi and Islamabad. In its annual 2022 report released 13 March, India’s foreign ministry said “Pakistan continues to sponsor cross border terrorism” against India and “restrict normal trade, connectivity and people-to-people exchanges”; report also claimed no decrease in cross-border terrorism, infiltration and illegal smuggling across Kashmir’s Line of Control and international boundary. Indian security forces 10-11 March intercepted two drones, claiming one was carrying arms to Punjab state’s Gurdaspur district and other was carrying drugs to Punjab state’s Amritsar district. UN high commissioner for human rights 7 March noted “worrying human rights situation in Kashmir”; India’s UN ambassador rejected “unwarranted and factually inaccurate portrayal”, rejecting body’s oversight in “an internal affair”.

Security operations persisted in J&K. Security forces 7 March arrested two suspected The Resistance Front (TRF) associates in Baramulla district. Security forces 12 March claimed to have recovered arms, drugs and bomb in Nowshera sector of Jammu’s Rajouri district, and sophisticated weapons, including rockets, in Handwara district; forces next day located cache of arms in Anantang district. Security forces 14 March arrested alleged Lashkar-e-Tayyaba associate in Sopore district, and next day another suspected TRF associate in Baramulla district.

Kashmiri Pandits suspended relocation campaign, opposition parties called for elections. Kashmiri Pandit employees, who had been agitating for over 300 days demanding relocation to Jammu region following targeted attacks on community, 4 March suspended their protest; protester told media, “We were choked financially and our families suffered a lot”. Security forces 1 March killed militant allegedly responsible for late Feb attack that killed Pandit man in Pulwama district. Meanwhile, former chief minister and National Conference President Farooq Abdullah 16 March led delegation of 13 opposition parties in New Delhi and submitted memorandum to Election Commission calling for early Assembly elections in J&K.

Korean Peninsula

U.S. and South Korea held large-scale military drills as North Korea continued missile tests and hinted at upcoming provocative satellite launch, while Seoul and Tokyo improved relations.

U.S.-South Korea conducted military exercises as Pyongyang launched missiles. U.S. and South Korea 13 March commenced 11-day Freedom Shield military exercise on scale last seen in 2018, ushering in moment of relatively high risk due to competing military activities on peninsula. During drills, North Korea conducted three separate missile launches, including intercontinental ballistic missile (Hwasong-17) on lofted trajectory into East Sea on 16 March; missile did not cross Japanese territory. Other missiles launched included multiple long-range cruise missiles on 22 March.

North Korea hinted at satellite launch and unveiled purported warhead casings. North Korea 5 March indicated that it had developed powerful rocket engine that, it claims, now guarantees that it can launch satellites successfully. Comments may pave way for North Korea to use one of its most powerful ballistic missiles to launch satellite on or around 15 April to mark anniversary of birth of national founder Kim Il-sung; military reconnaissance satellite launch is one of five main military priorities announced by leader Kim Jong-un in Jan 2021 for 2021-2026 period. North Korea 28 March for first time released images of purported tactical nuclear warhead casings, suggesting regime has – or wishes to project – confidence that it can master miniaturisation and produce such weapons at scale.

South Korea and Japan revived partnership. South Korea 6 March announced plan to compensate small number of remaining victims of Japanese wartime forced labour by funding compensation through donations from firms that received investment capital from reparations obtained from Japan in 1960s. While deal effectively resolves longstanding thorn in relations, issue proved extremely contentious among liberals and youth in South Korea. President Yoon Suk-yeol 16-17 March visited Japan for bilateral summit, bringing curtain down on extended period of bilateral friction in recent years; Japanese PM Kishida called it “major step towards normalizing relations”.

Myanmar

Military continued alleged abuses against civilians and resistance, while regime disbanded political parties ahead of possible election and took step toward small-scale Rohingya repatriation.

Military faced allegations of abuses and civilian massacres. Daily accusations surfaced against military, particularly in Dry Zone region. Notably, National Unity Govt 6 March highlighted alleged atrocities committed by military late Feb, such as beheading of two teenage boys and massacre of at least 14 people, including several women who were first sexually abused. In Shan State, regime 11 March raided Nam Neint village in southern Pinlaung township following clashes since 24 Feb, torching homes and launching airstrikes to counter attempted resistance offensive; soldiers reportedly massacred 21-28 people. Regime spokesperson Zaw Min Tun denied civilian killings. Concurrent reports of abuses, albeit fewer, by resistance groups surfaced.

Regime disbanded National League for Democracy (NLD) and dozens of other parties. Ahead of possibly elections that regime appears intent on holding between Nov and Jan, eight new political parties as of 26 March applied to register under new Political Party Registration law, with 44 existing parties applying to remain registered; of eight parties that won more than single seat in 2020, only four have re-registered. Regime 28 March disbanded NLD and 39 other parties after not registering; NLD 3 March expelled four senior members for “disrespecting the public’s will” and “cooperating with the dictator” amid intra-party divisions over whether to contest election or support armed struggle against regime.

Regime took small step toward possibly repatriating Rohingya refugees. Regime 8 March brought ambassadors from China, India, Bangladesh and regional bloc ASEAN to Sittwe and Maungdaw reception facilities in northern Rakhine State in pilot project aiming to repatriate some 1,000 Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh.

China stepped up diplomatic overtures, U.S. imposed sanctions. Chinese Special Envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun 6 March met leader Min Aung Hlaing to discuss regime’s negotiations with ethnic armed groups and other issues. Chinese Ambassador Chen Hai next day met Union Election Commission in capital Naypyitaw to discuss election preparations. Meanwhile, U.S. 2 March sanctioned three Myanmar entities for providing surveillance technology to regime.

Nepal

Senior Nepali Congress leader won presidential election, while protests by Indigenous communities over renaming dispute roiled easternmost province.

Nepali Congress leader won presidential poll. In presidential election decided by federal and provincial lawmakers, senior Nepali Congress leader Ram Chandra Paudel with support of Maoist-led ruling alliance 9 March secured comfortable victory over candidate nominated by opposition Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), winning more than 64 per cent of votes; lawmakers 17 March elected Ram Sahaya Yadav, leader of ruling alliance member Janata Samajbadi Party, vice president. PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal 31 March reshuffled his cabinet for seventh time in three months, giving leaders from five new parties ministerial portfolios; several key ministries, including foreign affairs, remain vacant due to disagreements among ruling parties.

Official renaming of Province 1 sparked protests by Indigenous communities. Provincial Assembly members of Nepal’s easternmost province (known as Province 1) 1 March decided to rename region Koshi Province, becoming last of Nepal’s seven provinces to adopt official name since provincial system was set up under 2015 constitution. In doing so, Assembly effectively rejected proposals to name province after Indigenous communities residing in region’s hilly districts, which prompted activists of Limbu, Rai and Sherpa communities to hold street protests and shutdowns throughout month; notably, clashes between riot police and protesters in Sunsari district 24 March killed one demonstrator, further fuelling tensions.

Pakistan

Standoff between govt and former PM Imran Khan escalated as unrest roiled capital Islamabad and Lahore, and Election Commission postponed Punjab polls.

Delayed Punjab polls and tensions between Khan and authorities raised threat of further violence. After Supreme Court 1 March ruled that elections in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces should be held within 90 days, President Alvi 3 March announced polls in Punjab for 30 April. Govt warned, however, that local polls could disrupt general elections schedule; civilian and military agencies 10-14 March ruled out role in securing polls, citing militant threats and lack of personnel. Election Commission 22 March delayed Punjab polls till 8 Oct, citing security concerns. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa governor 24 March informed elections body that his province’s polls should also be delayed to same date. Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 26 March asked Supreme Court to overrule Election Commission’s order; any court decision against elections body could fuel political tensions and have constitutional implications. Meanwhile, amid mounting tensions, police acting on warrant 6 and 13 March sought to arrest Khan at his residence in Lahore, but Khan’s supporters prevented entry and clashed with police, injuring over 60 officers. Khan 18 March attended Islamabad court alongside 4,000 PTI activists, who fought with police, leaving over 50 officers injured; unrest forced judge to adjourn case. Khan 19 March claimed he narrowly avoided assassination outside court. Khan 25 March addressed large-scale rally in Lahore, accusing govt of attempting to stop his return to power.

Pakistan Taliban continued attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistani Taliban targeted police escorting census teams, killing one officer in Dera Islmail district 9 March. Group 13 March killed two officers in attacks in Tank and Lakki Marwat district. Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 14 March highlighted challenges for polls, including “inconclusive reconciliation process” with Pakistani Taliban. In Balochistan province, Islamic State’s regional franchise 6 March killed nine police officers in Bolan district.

Govt deepened cooperation with U.S. Following counter-terrorism dialogue in Islamabad 6-7 March, foreign ministry said govt and U.S. would enhance collaboration to counter regional threats.

Philippines

Govt launched security operation against Islamist militants in south, as deadly hostilities continued with Communist militants.

In south, military launched operations against militants amid ongoing surrenders. Insecurity persisted in Bangsomoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Suspected Bangsamoro Islamic Liberation Front (BIFF) militants 22 March shot and killed two soldiers in Mamasapano town, Maguindanao del Sur province. Govt forces next day commenced operation against Moro armed fighters allegedly linked to Islamic State faction under Almoben Silud on boundary of Maguindanao del Sur and Cotabato provinces, killing two militants and injuring four as of 24 March. Meanwhile, in Sulu province, more than 20 Abu Sayyaf Group fighters and sympathisers 5 March surrendered to military in Indanan town; six more 15 March surrendered in Patikul town. Seven BIFF members same day surrendered in Buayan village, Datu Piang town, Maguindanao del Sur.

Clashes between military and communist rebels led to school closures. Military operations and some militant ambushes by communist New People’s Army (NPA) in Mindanao Island in south, Visayas Islands in centre and Luzon Island in north killed at least 15 combatants and civilians and wounded eight; NPA operations may be linked to group’s anniversary on 29 March. Notably, clash 22 March saw suspension of in-person school classes in four towns in Masbate province.

Marawi authorities announced infrastructure plan. Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development 20 March said at least 18 structures worth 200mn pesos were set to be established in Marawi City, including health centre and transport terminal, as part of reconstruction efforts five years after conflict.

South China Sea

Maritime tensions persisted as China asserted presence in disputed waters, U.S. and Philippines held joint drills and negotiations resumed between Beijing and regional bloc ASEAN.

Chinese vessels maintained presence in disputed waters. Over 40 alleged Chinese maritime militia, naval and coast guard vessels 4-7 March lingered in vicinity of Philippine-administered Thitu/Pag-asa Island, with vessels lingering in area thereafter. Media reports early March said Philippines had intensified patrols in area and increased efforts to document and publicise assertive Chinese behaviour; Manilla late Feb said it was discussing joint coast guard patrols with U.S. in South China Sea (SCS). Beijing and Philippines 23 March held in-person consultations in Manilla to discuss range of issues. Meanwhile, Chinese research vessel Haiyang Dizhi 4 15 March lingered in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for over 17 hours; local think-tank South China Sea Chronicle Initiative claimed Chinese vessels had been operating within Vietnam’s EEZ. U.S. navy vessel USS Milius 23 March sailed near Paracel Islands; China claimed it warned away warship but U.S. denied that account.

Philippines and U.S. conducted exercises, AUKUS unveiled plans. Manilla and Washington 13 March began three-week “Salaknib” joint exercises involving over 3,000 Philippine and U.S. soldiers, ahead of largest ever “Balikatan” joint drills set for 11-28 April involving 17,600 participants. Meanwhile, Australia, UK and U.S. – as part of trilateral security pact AUKUS – 13 March announced pathway for Australia to acquire up to eight nuclear-powered submarines in coming decades.

ASEAN-China negotiations resumed. Member states of regional bloc ASEAN and China 8-10 March met to negotiate SCS Code of Conduct, setting aim to conduct security hotline exercise this year to prevent accidental collisions. Japan 13 March launched hotline with ASEAN member states to communicate on security issues.

Sri Lanka

International Monetary Fund (IMF) authorised bailout loan, granting govt access to international lines of credit, while postponement of local polls continued to fuel political tensions.

IMF approved bailout loan amid strikes and protests over hardship. Executive Board of IMF 20 March formally approved Extended Fund Facility bailout package, paving way for release of first of nine tranches totalling $3bn, and additional lending from World Bank, Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors; decision followed debt-restructuring assurance given by China on 6 March. President Wickremesinghe 22 March presented agreement to parliament and discussed difficult debt-restructuring negotiations. Austerity policies mandated in part by IMF continued to provoke strikes and protest during month. Notably, public sector staff at hospitals, banks and ports 1 March walked out in protest of newly enacted income tax hikes amid soaring living costs. Nationwide strike reportedly backed by opposition National People’s Power took place 15 March.

Dispute over local polls’ postponement prompted opposition. After local polls initially scheduled for 9 March were postponed last month due to govt’s refusal to provide funds, Supreme Court 3 March issued restraining order preventing treasury chief and Wickremesinghe in his capacity as finance minister from “withholding funds allocated in the 2023 budget for the purpose of conducting local government polls”; multiple court challenges followed as govt failed to comply with Supreme Court’s order. Bar Association of Sri Lanka 11 March expressed “grave concern” over undermining judiciary’s independence. Responding to protests against postponement last month, Core Group members of UN Human Rights Council 7 March expressed “concerns over heavy-handed responses to peaceful protests”.

Govt unveiled alternative to controversial prevention of terrorism act. Govt 22 March published “Anti-Terrorism Act” – long-awaited draft law designed to replace much-criticised Prevention of Terrorism Act – that was quickly condemned by local and international human rights organisations for over-broad definition of terrorism and expanded executive powers of detention and proscription. FM Ali Sabry and Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe 21-25 March undertook “fact-finding” visit to South Africa to study country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, amid rising expectations govt will initiate its own process in coming months.

Taiwan Strait

China continued aerial and maritime activity around island, while Taiwan’s President Tsai visited U.S. as Beijing vowed retaliation over possible meeting with U.S. House Speaker.

China continued military activities in Taiwan Strait. As of 26 March, Taiwan detected 316 Chinese military aircraft entering its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), of which at least 117 crossed unofficial demarcation “median line” or were detected in south west ADIZ; Taiwan detected 92 Chinese naval vessels in surrounding waters. Taiwan’s defence minister 6 March warned of China’s potential “sudden entry” into areas close to island amid rising tensions. Taiwan 8 March said it suspected Chinese ships of cutting internet cables to outlying Matsu Island.

President Tsai’s stopover in U.S. prompted Beijing’s warnings. Tsai 29 March arrived in U.S., en route to Guatemala and Belize, and is expected to meet U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in early April; Beijing late March threatened “serious confrontation” and to “fight back” if meeting goes ahead, raising prospect of China increasing military or economic pressure on Taiwan. Earlier, U.S. 3 March approved package for Taiwan worth $619mn related to F-16 fighter jets. Taiwan 7 March announced $236mn deal with U.S. arms company to refurbish Taiwan’s tank fleet and 18 March $47.1mn deal with U.S. related to Apache helicopters. U.S. House of Representatives’s Committee on Foreign Affairs 1 March approved bill supporting Taiwan’s inclusion in International Civil Aviation Organization; U.S. Congress 10 March introduced bill for U.S. to lend or lease material support for Taiwan’s national defence.

Beijing emphasised peaceful cross-strait relations, Honduras sought ties with China. Chinese leader Xi Jinping 13 March said peaceful development of cross-strait relations will be actively promoted and vowed to oppose all external interference and Taiwan’s separatist activities. Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou 27 March began visit to China, making him first former or sitting president to visit mainland. Meanwhile, Honduras – one of 14 states that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan – 16 March announced it will seek official ties with Beijing, ending recognition of Taiwan. Separately, Taiwan’s Election Commission 10 March set general election for 13 Jan 2024.

Thailand

Activists ended two month-long hunger strike, king dissolved parliament ahead of May election, while insecurity persisted in deep south.

Activists concluded hunger strike, as country prepared for May election. Activists Tantawan Tuatulanon and Orawan Phuphong 10 March ended 52-day hunger strike that demanded release of suspects detained on lèse-majesté charges and to reform lèse-majesté and sedition laws. Meanwhile, Royal Gazette 20 March announced King Maha Vajiralongkorn had endorsed decree to dissolve parliament; Election Commission next day announced 14 May as date of next general election.

Militant attacks persisted in deep south. In Narathiwat province, militants 2 March threw grenades and fired small arms at army outpost in Si Sakhon district, with no casualties; 50kg IED – twice as large as devices typically used by militants – next day targeted four-vehicle convoy some 800m from outpost, killing two officers and wounding one. In Pattani province, assailants 8 March torched two vehicles belonging to emergency medical services provider in Yaring district. Woman 11 March found IED beneath her mother’s vehicle in Mayo district; police officers removed device with no casualties.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

Tensions with Azerbaijan ran high as sides exchanged blame for attacks along border; peace talks remained stalled amid increasingly hostile rhetoric.

Armenia and Azerbaijan reported number of incidents along border. Azerbaijan 9 March claimed Armenian troops 8-9 March fired at its forces stationed along border in order to provoke reaction and create “a false opinion” about Azerbaijani forces among representatives of EU civilian mission. Azerbaijan 20 March also reported one soldier injured at border, suggesting Armenia was “abusing the presence” of the EU mission “to increase tensions in the region and cover up its military provocations”; Armenia same day rejected “disinformation”. Armenia 22 March announced “enemy fire” had “lethally wounded” serviceman at Yeraskh town near Azerbaijani exclave Nakhichevan. Meanwhile, tensions escalated in Nagorno-Karabakh (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Sides made no progress on diplomatic front and ramped up aggressive rhetoric. No in-person meetings occurred in March, and although sides continued exchanging draft peace treaty, their increasingly hostile public statements suggested little progress on diplomatic front. Notably, PM Pashinyan 14 March confirmed receiving Azerbaijan’s reaction to Armenia’s draft agreement, but claimed Baku was using it to try and “form territorial claims” in Armenia and “obtain a mandate for genocide or ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh”; Pashinyan then warned that “the danger of a new escalation is very high”. Azerbaijani President Aliyev 18 March responded that “Armenia must accept our conditions […], sign a peace treaty with us and carry out [border] delimitation” if it is “to live comfortably”.

Foreign mediation produced no breakthrough. EU Special Representative for South Caucasus Toivo Klaar and U.S. Senior Adviser for Caucasus Negotiations Louis Bono 5, 6 March visited Azerbaijan’s capital Baku to advance peace process. FM Mirzoyan 20 March met with Russian FM Lavrov, who same day said date for trilateral meeting would be decided “in the near future”. European Council President Charles Michel 25 March called Pashinyan and Aliyev separately to advance “Brussels process”.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Tensions soared in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) as sides reported multiple incidents along front line and Russia accused Azerbaijan of violating 2020 ceasefire agreement.

Multiple attacks occurred, Azerbaijan accused of violating ceasefire deal. Amid elevated tensions over blockade of Lachin corridor, serious incident 5 March occurred between Azerbaijani soldiers and de facto police, leaving five dead. De facto authorities said Azerbaijani soldiers had fired at police car first, which Russian peacekeepers corroborated; Baku said Russia had “distorted the facts”, claiming its soldiers had attempted to search vehicle suspected of transporting weapons from Armenia to NK via alternative road and were fired upon from NK positions. Tensions further escalated after Azerbaijan 25 March announced its forces had cut off alternative roads to prevent transport of “manpower [and] military equipment” into NK; Russia’s defence ministry same day said Azerbaijan had violated 2020 ceasefire deal. De facto authorities 30 March reported that Azerbaijani troops had blocked road used to transport humanitarian supplies to NK. Elsewhere, Russian peacekeepers and de facto authorities reported attacks on farmers near military positions in conflict zone, while Armenia and Azerbaijan reported incidents along border (see Armenia and Azerbaijan).

Talks between Stepanakert and Baku failed to resolve Lachin blockade. De facto authorities and Azerbaijan 1 March met to discuss issues “exclusively of a humanitarian nature”, which led to fixes on pipeline supplying gas from Armenia to NK via Azerbaijani-controlled territory. Talks, however, failed to produce steps toward Lachin corridor’s unblocking. Azerbaijan 13 March proposed third meeting take place in Baku; Stepanakert next day rejected proposal, requesting “same venue as on 1 March” and insisting on “an internationally recognised and established format”, which Baku refused.

Yerevan and Baku made no progress on talks and ramped up aggressive rhetoric. Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged draft peace treaty, but no in-person meeting occurred in March and sides made harsh public statements (see Armenia and Azerbaijan). Most notably, Azerbaijani President Aliyev 18 March urged Armenia to “accept our conditions [and] officially recognize Karabakh as the territory of Azerbaijan and carry out delimitation work according to our conditions. Only under these circumstances can they live comfortably”.

Azerbaijan

Tensions with Armenia ran high as sides exchanged blame for attacks along border; peace talks remained stalled amid increasingly hostile rhetoric.

Armenia and Azerbaijan reported number of attacks along border. Azerbaijan 9 March claimed Armenian troops 8-9 March fired at its forces stationed along border in order to provoke reaction and create “a false opinion” about Azerbaijani forces among representatives of EU civilian mission. Azerbaijan 20 March also reported one soldier injured at border, suggesting Armenia was “abusing the presence” of the EU mission “to increase tensions in the region and cover up its military provocations”; Armenia same day rejected “disinformation”. Armenia 22 March announced “enemy fire” had “lethally wounded” serviceman at Yeraskh town near exclave Nakhichevan. Meanwhile, tensions escalated in Nagorno-Karabakh (see Nagorno-Karabakh).

Sides made no progress on diplomatic front and ramped up aggressive rhetoric. No in-person meetings occurred in March, and although sides continued exchanging draft peace treaty, their increasingly hostile public statements suggested little progress on diplomatic front. Notably, Armenian PM Pashinyan 14 March confirmed receiving Azerbaijan’s reaction to Armenia’s draft agreement, but claimed Baku was using it to try and “form territorial claims” in Armenia and “obtain a mandate for genocide or ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh”; Pashinyan then warned that “the danger of a new escalation is very high”. President Aliyev 18 March responded that “Armenia must accept our conditions […], sign a peace treaty with us and carry out [border] delimitation” if it is “to live comfortably”.

Foreign mediation produced no breakthrough. EU Special Representative for South Caucasus Toivo Klaar and U.S. Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Louis Bono 5, 6 March visited capital Baku to advance peace process. Armenian FM Mirzoyan 20 March met with Russian FM Lavrov, who same day said date for trilateral meeting would be decided “in the near future”. European Council President Charles Michel 25 March called Pashinyan and Aliyev separately to advance “Brussels process”.

Relations with Iran remained strained. Baku 11 March summoned Iranian ambassador over alleged violation of its airspace by Iranian military aircraft.

Belarus

Crackdown on opposition continued, Russia announced plans to store nuclear weapons in Belarus, and President Lukashenko called for ceasefire in Ukraine.

Court handed down heavy prison sentences to opposition figures. Court in Minsk 6 March sentenced in absentia opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and four associates to between 12 and 18 years in prison for treason and conspiracy to seize power; European Parliament 15 March condemned “show trials”. President Lukashenko 7 March announced authorities had arrested “terrorist” and over 20 accomplices involved in 26 Feb drone attack on Russian military aircraft near capital Minsk, and accused Ukraine and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency of training detainee.

Russia announced plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Russian President Putin 25 March announced he will station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, likening move to U.S. deploying nuclear arsenal in Europe and stating it would not violate “international obligations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” as Belarus would not control the weapons; Lukashenko 31 March said Moscow’s plans would help “safeguard” country, which he claimed was under threat from West. In same speech, he also called for ceasefire in Ukraine and urged Russia and Ukraine to start negotiations “without preconditions”.

Cyprus

Republic of Cyprus sought to kickstart moribund dialogue with Turkish Cypriots via greater European Union (EU) involvement, as sides reiterated long-held positions.

Republic of Cyprus began efforts to reignite talks, seeking federation solution. Following his election in Feb, Republic of Cyprus President Christodoulides 22 March travelled to Belgian capital Brussels for European Council Summit where he presented his proposal for more active EU involvement in Cyprus issue to presidents of three main EU institutions and UN Sec-Gen António Guterres. Christodoulides next day remarked that talks should resume “from where they left off in Crans-Montana” and announced that Republic of Cyprus and EU agreed to lay groundwork for resuming dialogue immediately after 14 May Turkish elections (see Türkiye). Earlier, Republic of Cyprus FM Constantinos Kombos 9 March remarked that state “will never accept a divisionary solution or a two-state solution”, and drew attention to Turkish activity in ghost resort town Varosha/Maraş, warning “any development other than the transfer of Varosha under UN administration” would be illegal. Republic of Cyprus Defence Minister Michalis Giorgallas 12 March said Türkiye’s “persistence and expansionist aspirations” are holding back resolution and urged Ankara to demonstrate “required will” for talks. Meanwhile, Christodoulides 10 March pledged to increase military spending to 2% of GDP, citing need to “bolster deterrent capabilities”; pledge followed end of U.S. arms embargo in Sept 2022.

Turkish Cypriots reiterated desire for two-state solution. “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) leader Ersin Tatar 6 March reiterated aim of two-state solution, asserting “TRNC will never accept an agreement that would make the Turkish Cypriot people a minority”. Tatar 15 March stated that he would “never accept the EU becoming involved in the Cyprus issue”. Earlier, Tatar 1 March announced nearly 5,000 Turkish earthquake victims had arrived in “TRNC”, prompting concern among Greek Cypriots about increased population of settlers in north.

Georgia

Ruling party withdrew controversial “foreign agents” law following days of large-scale protests; de facto authorities in Abkhazia and Russian officials blamed West for fomenting unrest.

Major protests prompted ruling party to drop foreign agents law. Parliament deliberations early March about controversial foreign agent’s bill, backed by ruling Georgian Dream party, triggered unrest in capital Tbilisi. Notably, demonstrators 2, 6 March took to streets to protest bill, which would oblige NGOs and media outlets receiving over 20% of funding from abroad to register as “agents of foreign influence”. Despite unrest, ruling party pressed ahead to pass legislation, with parliament 7 March adopting law in first reading. Thousands of Georgians same day spontaneously gathered in front of parliament to protest, leading to violent confrontations with riot police, who used water cannons and tear gas to disperse protesters. Second, larger protest 8 March also ended in violent dispersal and police detained over 130 people. European Union and U.S. same day urged authorities to respect right to protest and expressed concern about draft law. Ruling party 9 March withdrew bill and police released all those detained during protest.

Breakaway Abkhazia organised drills in response to protests. De facto officials in breakaway Abkhazia and Russian officials 9-10 March accused Western countries of instigating coup in Georgia, aimed at creating “a second front against Russia”. De facto leadership of Abkhazia 12-14 March organised military drills along line of separation, citing need for more training in face of “changing geopolitical situation in the region”. De facto Abkhaz leader Aslan Bzhania 21 March raised “combat readiness” of de facto armed forces, alleging more protests “are being prepared” in Georgia in April. Abkhazia and Russia 24 March held “defensive” joint military exercise. Meanwhile, EU Special Representative Toivo Klaar 16-17 March travelled to Abkhazia, where de facto leadership declared readiness to participate in Geneva International Dialogue planned for early April.

Kosovo

European Union (EU) announced Kosovo and Serbia had struck deal to normalise relations, but sides stopped short of signing final agreement.

Despite progress, Kosovo and Serbia failed to sign final deal on normalisation. After tacitly approving EU proposal on normalising relations late Feb, PM Kurti and Serb President Vučic 18 March reached verbal agreement on implementing annex, which provides further details on path to normalising relations and outlines plans for Joint Monitoring Committee. EU High Representative Josep Borrell also noted that Kosovo had agreed to begin negotiations to ensure “self-management for the Serbian communities in Kosovo”. Sides, however, failed to sign final deal; Borrell 18 March also admitted parties had not accepted “a more ambitious text” but that agreement nonetheless “will become an integral part of their respective EU paths”. U.S. 20 March hailed “historic” and “legally binding” agreement. Deal saw some opposition. Notably, leader of largest opposition party, Democratic Party of Kosovo, 20 March criticised Kurti for accepting agreement that maintains “frozen conflict with Serbia for years to come”, while Serb demonstrators 5, 17, 24 March protested deal in Serb capital Belgrade.

In other important developments. EU 10 March approved visa-free travel for Kosovar citizens. Serbian List – largest political party of Serbs in Kosovo – 21 March reconfirmed non-participation in local elections scheduled for April.

Kyrgyzstan

Calls to release activists detained over border demarcation disagreement continued.

Relatives of over 20 politicians and activists who were detained late Oct for protesting border demarcation agreement with Uzbekistan 17 March held protest in capital Bishkek; protesters demanded detainees’ immediate release among other things, including judicial reforms and clampdown on corruption. Echoing their demands, NGO Human Rights Watch 20 March called for immediate release of activists, raising concerns about conditions in pre-trial detention facilities.

Moldova

Authorities accused Russian-backed actors of plot to incite unrest during anti-govt protest; leadership in Transnistria accused Ukraine of planning terrorist attack.

Thousands participated in opposition-led protest. Some 4,500 anti-govt protesters 12 March gathered in capital Chișinău, organised by populist opposition Sor Party, to denounce rising cost of living; sporadic, small-scale clashes broke out and police detained over 50 people on public order violations. Head of police Viorel Cernauteanu same day said they had foiled plot devised by Russian-backed actors to cause mass unrest at protest and detained seven people. Accusations came amid mounting concern about Russian destabilisation efforts in Moldova; notably, U.S. 10 March said Russia “is pursuing options to weaken the Moldovan government probably with the eventual goal of seeing a more Russian-friendly administration in the capital”.

Authorities in Transnistria accused Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack. Security services in breakaway region of Transnistria 9 March claimed they had thwarted Ukrainian plot to kill local officials and civilians in main town of Tiraspol; Ukraine same day dismissed allegations as “a provocation orchestrated by the Kremlin”. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 28 March accused Ukraine of preparing to “intervene in Transnistria, including with the use of force”.

Russia (Internal)

Authorities arrested U.S. journalist on espionage charges in worrying escalation of Russia’s media crackdown; rumours swirled of forthcoming mobilisation.

Authorities arrested foreign journalist as crackdown continued. In worrying sign for foreign journalists working in Russia, security services 30 March detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, a U.S. citizen, on suspicion of espionage, first such case since Cold War; court same day ordered his pre-trial detention until 29 May. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken condemned “Kremlin’s continued attempts to intimidate, repress and punish journalists and civil society voices”; U.S. same day urged its citizens to immediately leave country. Meanwhile, President Putin 18 March tightened punishment for “discrediting” or spreading misinformation (“fakes”) about volunteer forces – such as Wagner Group; criminal code already prohibits “fakes” about Russian army. Court in Tula region 28 March sentenced single father to two years in prison for “discrediting” Russian army and placed his daughter in orphanage. Authorities throughout month declared several foreign NGOs and think tanks “undesirable organisation[s]”, 20 March ordered liquidation of Moscow-based SOVA think-tank.

Prospect of second mobilisation loomed. Authorities in at least 43 regions summoned individuals military deems subject for mobilisation to military offices throughout month, citing need to update contact information, digitise personal data and conduct military training, fuelling speculation authorities could announce second mobilisation for Ukraine war.

International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrant for Putin. ICC 17 March issued arrest warrant for President Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for “war crime of unlawful deportation” of children from occupied territories in Ukraine to Russia. Kremlin same day called decision “outrageous” and noted that Russia does not recognise court’s jurisdiction. Russian Investigative Committee 20 March opened criminal case against ICC prosecutor and three judges.

In other important developments. Russia and Ukraine 18 March agreed to extend UN-brokered Black Sea grain deal by 60 days. Chinese President Xi Jinping 20 March arrived in capital Moscow for three-day visit, during which leaders reaffirmed close ties and readiness to promote “multipolar world”. Putin 25 March announced plans to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus (see Belarus).

Russia/U.S.

Frosty U.S.-Russia relations deteriorated as sides traded accusations over downing of U.S. drone and Russia detained U.S. journalist.

U.S. accused Russia of downing drone. U.S. military’s European Command 14 March said Russian fighter jet struck propeller of U.S. military surveillance drone, forcing U.S. to down drone in international waters; U.S. immediately summoned Russia’s Ambassador Anatoly Antonov over incident. Russia same day denied accusations its fighter jet made contact with drone, insisting it had entered area near Russia-occupied Crimea, declared “off-limits” by Moscow, causing Russian military to scramble fighters to intercept it and that, “as a result of sharp manoeuver”, drone crashed. U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin 15 March held phone call with Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu to discuss incident and avert further escalation. Austin said collision was part of “pattern of aggressive, risky and unsafe actions by Russian pilots” and that U.S. will “continue to fly […] wherever international law allows”; Shoigu reportedly said such actions, which violate Russia’s flight restrictions, risked further escalating situation and that Russia will “continue to respond proportionately to all provocations”. Shortly after incident, Russia reportedly sent ships to recover wreckages of drone.

Russian authorities arrested U.S. journalist. In worrying sign for foreign journalists working in Russia, security services 30 March detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, a U.S. citizen, on suspicion of espionage, first such case since Cold War; court same day ordered his pre-trial detention until 29 May. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 30 March condemned “Kremlin’s continued attempts to intimidate, repress and punish journalists and civil society voices”. U.S. same day urged its citizens to immediately leave country.

Tajikistan

Court charged journalist with calling for changes to constitutional order; Russian PM promised deeper bilateral ties with Tajikistan during two-day trip to capital Dushanbe.

Journalist charged with calling for changes to constitutional order. Authorities 6 March arrested journalist Khurshed Fozilov in Panjakent city, 13 March charged him with “public calls to change the constitutional structure by force”; Fozilov next day rejected charges.

Russian PM sought to deepen ties and boost economic cooperation. President Rahmon 2 March met with Russian PM Mikhail Mishustin in Dushanbe, where Rahmon expressed readiness to continue developing Russian-Tajik relations. Mishustin next day met with his Tajik counterpart Kokhir Rasulzoda to discuss opportunities to strengthen cooperation in trade, energy, industrial production, transport and culture.

Türkiye

Military targeted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) after group had pledged in Feb to halt military actions in Türkiye, parties prepared for May elections, and tensions eased with Greece.

Military continued operations against PKK. After PKK pledged to “stop military actions in Türkiye” in Feb following earthquakes, Turkish security forces claimed to have killed and captured numerous PKK militants during March in Mardin, Tunceli, Şırnak, Şanlıurfa and Konya provinces. In northern Iraq, Turkish drone strike 1 March killed another PKK-linked senior militant and his guard near Sinjar (see Iraq).

Parties prepared for elections in May. Authorities set parliamentary and presidential elections for 14 May. Six-party opposition alliance 6 March named Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as its joint presidential candidate, while second biggest opposition alliance, formed by six left-wing parties, decided not to field candidate, tacitly supporting Kılıçdaroğlu. Constitutional Court 9 March unfroze funds of pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP); fearing ban from politics as authorities pursue closure case against it, HDP decided to enter election under “Green Left Party”.

Atmosphere of good-will persisted between govt and Greece. Amid increased diplomatic contact between Ankara and Athens following earthquakes, Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis 13 March observed “de-escalation and a more positive attitude and behaviour” after “a long period of unacceptable provocation”. Greek and Turkish defence ministers 9 March held call, reiterating commitment to positive atmosphere. After meeting FM Cavusoglu 20 March, Greek FM Nikos Dendias announced Türkiye will support Greece’s bid to become non-permanent member of UN Security Council in 2025-2026, while Greece will support Türkiye’s bid for post of secretary general of International Maritime Organisation. Govt and Greece 22 March held fourth meeting for Positive Agenda in Ankara, announcing progress on 25 agenda topics.

In other important developments. Death toll of devastating earthquakes 23 March rose above 50,000, as damage likely exceeded $100bn. Security forces during month detained around 100 individuals with alleged links to Islamic State. In sign of thawing ties, FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 18 March visited Egyptian capital Cairo in first such visit in decade. Parliament 30 March ratified Finland’s NATO membership.

Ukraine

Poland and Slovakia pledged fighter jets as battle for Bakhmut wore on, new revelations about Nord Stream pipeline blasts emerged, and UN presented evidence of war crimes.

Russian advance into Bakhmut ground on, missile barrage killed scores. Russian forces and paramilitary Wagner Group fighters continued to slowly encroach on embattled town of Bakhmut; Ukraine still controls around one third of town, which President Zelenskyy 6 March vowed to keep defending. Russia 9 March carried out its biggest air raid in months, killing at least nine and disrupting power supplies. In occupied Melitopol city (Zaporizhzhia region), car bomb 14 March killed Russian-installed official amid ongoing partisan attacks; Ukrainian forces 29 March reportedly shelled city, damaging electricity supply. Defence Ministry 21 March said explosion in Russian-annexed Crimea destroyed Russian missiles, but did not claim responsibility; Russia claimed attack targeted civilians. Meanwhile, media outlet The New York Times 7 March revealed pro-Ukrainian nationals may have blown up Nord Stream pipelines in Sept 2022; German news site t-online 26 March presented evidence pointing to Russian culpability.

Kyiv secured more Western military support. News website Axios 15 March reported that Israel approved export of its drone jamming system to Ukraine; Poland and Slovakia 16, 17 March respectively became first NATO countries to pledge fighter jets; European Union 20 March approved €2bn plan to boost ammunition deliveries; Japan’s PM Kishida 21 March visited Kyiv and pledged $30mn in non-lethal military aid. 18 Leopard 2 tanks 29 March arrived in Ukraine from Germany.

Independent commission found evidence of war crimes. UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine 16 March presented evidence of Russian war crimes, and said that attacks on critical infrastructure and use of torture may amount to crimes against humanity; it documented two incidents by Ukrainian army that qualify as war crimes. International Criminal Court 17 March issued arrest warrant for Russian President Putin for “unlawful deportation” of children from occupied territories in Ukraine to Russia (see Russia).

Zelenskyy ordered priests and monks to clear pilgrimage site. Authorities 10 March ordered monks and priests of Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to vacate Kyiv Cave Monastery by end of March, citing church’s ties to Moscow.

Uzbekistan

Lawmakers voted in favour of April referendum on new constitution; prosecutors handed down lengthy sentences to 39 Karakalpak activists.

Lawmakers backed referendum on constitutional amendments. Months after President Mirziyoyev first proposed constitutional amendments that, among other things, allow him to seek third term in office, lawmakers 10 March overwhelmingly backed proposed amendments and voted in favour of referendum, provisionally set for 30 April; Senate 15 March approved bill and confirmed date of referendum.

Authorities handed down more sentences to Karakalpak activists. Court in Bukhara city 17 March sentenced 39 Karakalpak activists to between five and 11 years in prison for their participation in July 2022 protests in autonomous Karakalpakstan region, which broke out in response to govt’s proposed constitutional amendment that would have ended region’s right to seek independence.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Following dialogue with govt, National Liberation Army (ELN) killed nine soldiers in setback to talks, and Petro suspended ceasefire with Gulf Clan amid accusations it took advantage of miners’ protests to carry out attacks.

Weeks after concluding second round of talks with govt, ELN killed nine soldiers. Govt and ELN 10 March concluded second round of peace talks with announcement of new, six-point agenda. Points agreed upon include building participatory civic process, end to armed conflict, reparations for victims and structural reforms to reduce poverty. Document also outlined roles of guarantor states as well as observers, UN and Catholic Church. Next round of dialogue scheduled for mid-April in Cuba. However, govt 29 March reported that ELN had killed nine soldiers in Norte de Santander province; President Petro same day condemned violence while chief govt negotiator said priority at talks must now be to broker ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. Meanwhile, Petro 13 March announced govt’s readiness to begin negotiations with dissident faction of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) known as FARC-EP; statement followed attorney general’s decision earlier that day to lift arrest warrants for 18 of 19 FARC-EP commanders, an action Petro had requested to facilitate talks.

Govt suspended ceasefire with Gulf Clan. Criminal group Gulf Clan 6 March announced it had hired lawyer to represent group in talks with govt. Yet mining strikes in north-western Antioquia and Córdoba departments complicated govt’s formal outreach plans. Small-scale miners 2 March went on strike and blocked roads in several municipalities. Situation quickly escalated amid accusations Gulf Clan had compelled rural residents to join protests, and then used those mobilisations as smokescreen for attacks. Gulf Clan 11 March issued pamphlet stating they “neither supported nor incentivised” strike, though another pamphlet dated 13 March demanded all local businesses and miners support strikes. Petro same day accused group of violating ceasefire, saying talks were therefore impossible, 19 March suspended ceasefire with Gulf Clan.

In other important developments. Petro 28 March announced govt will host international conference in capital Bogotá to support dialogue between “Venezuelan opposition, civil society […] and the Venezuelan government”.

El Salvador

One year after govt first imposed 30-day state of exception, authorities renewed measure for 12th time amid widespread support; Legislative Assembly lifted electoral reform ban.

One-year anniversary of state of exception passed. 27 March marked one year since govt first imposed state of exception for 30 days to tackle gang violence. Twelve days prior, legislative assembly 15 March approved measure’s 12th extension. Justice and Public Security Minister Gustavo Villatoro 27 March said authorities had arrested 66,417 people for gang affiliation since measure took effect. Complaints about human rights violations persisted. Notably, UN human rights office 28 March said 90 people have died in custody since March 2022, adding that “there is only limited information on how investigations of those deaths are proceeding”. Despite human rights concerns, state of exception continued to enjoy wide popular support and President Bukele maintained high approval ratings.

Authorities repealed ban on reforms to electoral processes. Legislative Assembly 15 March lifted ban on enacting changes to electoral system one year before elections. Opposition politician Claudia Ortiz condemned move, arguing measure will allow govt to modify rules up to one day before polls are held, which indicates ruling party may seek to make changes ahead of next presidential election in Feb 2024; Ortiz accused Bukele of seeking to “concentrate more power”.

Haiti

Soaring gang violence killed hundreds and displaced 160,000 in capital Port-au-Prince, though international assistance remained limited.

Violent turf wars killed over 200 and displaced 160,000 people. Fighting between rival gangs affiliated with G9 and G-Pèp coalitions, which erupted 28 Feb in downtown neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, grew fiercer throughout early March. NGO Doctors Without Borders 8 March announced temporary closure of their Cité Soleil centre due to “intolerable risks” wrought by gang violence, which kept spreading to new areas. UN humanitarian agency 21 March said clashes between gangs in first two weeks of March left at least 208 dead and 101 kidnapped and that, as of mid-March, at least 160,000 people have been displaced. PM Henry 17 March called on Haitian armed forces – which have played limited security support role – to fight gangs alongside Haitian National Police (HNP), arguing that special police units are no longer sufficient to tackle “national security problem”. Around 15 NGOs 27 March urged govt to declare state of emergency in areas most affected by violence.

UN reiterated appeal for multinational security mission. International partners remained reluctant to lead security mission, instead offering to help strengthen HNP. Notably, Canada’s Defence Minister Anita Anand 2 March announced arrival of Navy ships to patrol Haitian waters; Caribbean Community 6 March pledged support for police efforts to address insecurity. Head of UN mission to Haiti 15 March said assistance was insufficient and again appealed for deployment of international force to tackle violence, which UN human rights agency 21 March reiterated. Following meeting between U.S. President Biden and Canadian PM Trudeau, Canada 24 March pledged additional $100mn to assist HNP; Biden said foreign military force “is not off the table” but “is not in play at the moment”. European Union High Representative Josep Borrell 27 March expressed support for “international intervention”.

PM Henry advanced “21 December Accord” agenda. Despite continued opposition to 21 December Accord – political agreement between Henry and some members of opposition forces – Henry pressed ahead with agenda, 7 March installing eight judges to country’s highest court, who will select members of Electoral Council to organise elections. Meanwhile, head of recently inaugurated High Council for Transition, Mirlande Manigat, 7 March said council faced budget constraints.

Honduras

Govt expressed doubt about state of exception’s utility amid continued violence and established diplomatic relations with China.

Although police claimed decrease in homicides, violence continued. Amid state of exception, extended in Feb until April to tackle extortion but which so far has yielded few results, former President Porfirio Lobo 5 March called for “Bukele-style” policy to improve outcomes, referring to El Salvador’s heavy-handed tactics to tackle gangs. National police 17 March published graph showing decrease in homicides, allegedly due to measure. Violent incidents continued, however. Notably, unknown assailants 4 March killed six in Comayagüela city; armed men 6 March killed nine in Comayagua city. President Castro 7 March lashed out at high-ranking security officials, criticising their failure to prevent violence despite state of exception, signalling govt’s uncertainty about whether to rely on measure to tackle insecurity.

Govt established diplomatic ties with China. Castro 14 March instructed FM Reina to establish diplomatic relations with China, citing, among other things, hope for more aid; Taiwan same day warned that Honduras could fall into China’s debt trap, disguised as selfless aid. Honduras 25 March formally established diplomatic ties with China and severed them with Taiwan.

In other important developments. U.S. court 28 March sentenced Herlinda Bobadilla, leader of Montes Bobadilla trafficking clan, to 20 years in prison on drug trafficking charges.

Mexico

Senate set up commission to monitor military’s public security role amid accusations of misconduct, violence persisted at high levels, and President López Obrador sparred with U.S. lawmakers.

Lawmakers established commission to oversee military’s role in public security. Senate 15 March formed commission tasked with monitoring armed forces’ participation in public security tasks. Action comes after evidence of military wrongdoing surfaced. Notably, several media outlets 7 March published leaked military intelligence documents showing security forces illegally spied on human rights activists using Pegasus spyware; President López Obrador 10 March rejected accusations of espionage and spoke instead of “intelligence activities”. Interior ministry’s sub-secretary for human rights 15 March said five men killed late Feb by soldiers in Nuevo Laredo city, Tamaulipas state, were “executed”. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 24 March temporarily suspended parts of López Obrador’s electoral reform bill, including planned cuts to National Electoral Institute’s budget.

Criminal violence remained rampant, fire at migrant detention centre killed scores. In central Tamaulipas state, suspected members of Gulf Cartel 3 March kidnapped four U.S. citizens and killed two of them in Matamoros city; cartel 9 March handed over five men allegedly responsible and publicly apologised. In San Luis Potosí state, also in centre, shootout between security forces and members of local criminal group 9 March left one soldier and six criminals dead in Villa de Ramos municipality. Authorities 7-10 March reported disappearance of eight women in Celaya town. In central Mexico state, shootout between police and alleged members of Jalisco cartel 17 March left three police officers and one cartel member dead. In Ciudad Juárez city, fire 27 March in migrant detention centre killed 39; authorities 30 March arrested five for alleged role in incident.

López Obrador clashed with U.S. senators over calls for military action. Former U.S. Attorney General Bill Barr 2 March published op-ed in news outlet The Wall Street Journal calling for U.S. military action in Mexico, while U.S. Republican senators 8 March called for designation of Mexican criminal groups as foreign terrorist organisations, among other heavy-handed measures. López Obrador 9, 13 March condemned calls for foreign intervention and pointed out that U.S. bears some responsibility for violence in Mexico due to high demand for drugs.

Nicaragua

Govt crackdown on civil society and religious institutions persisted, and Ortega suspended diplomatic relations with Vatican.

Govt continued to crackdown on NGOs, business associations and universities. President Ortega 6 March revoked legal status of 18 business associations for “non-compliance with the law and lack of transparency”. Govt next day closed two private universities linked to Catholic Church and ordered seizure of assets, saying universities “obstructed the control and supervision of the General Directorate for the Registration and Control of Non-Profit Organisations”; authorities 14 March closed two more, bringing number of universities closed since Dec 2021 to 21. Interior ministry 8 March cancelled legal status of 20 NGOs, citing failure to comply with legislation, 15 March cancelled 22 more, bringing total number banned since Dec 2018 to 3,348.

Authorities severed diplomatic ties with Vatican. In move cementing Ortega regime’s anti-Catholic stance, govt 12 March suspended diplomatic relations with Vatican; move comes after Pope Francis 10 March described regime as “gross dictatorship” following Feb sentencing of Bishop Rolando Álvarez to more than 26 years in prison. Vatican 18 March said it had closed its embassy in Nicaragua. Meanwhile, Chilean President Boric 25 March criticised Ortega’s “family dictatorship” for revoking citizenship of dozens of political prisoners mid-Feb.

Venezuela

Several candidates announced bids for opposition primaries as debate about involving govt-controlled Electoral Council continued; corruption case revealed factional fighting in ruling party.

Opposition parties ramped up their campaigns ahead of Oct primaries. After winning landslide victory in Primero Justicia party’s internal elections late Feb, Henrique Capriles 10 March launched candidacy for opposition primaries scheduled for Oct 2023 in bid to become opposition’s candidate in 2024 presidential race; Capriles is barred from standing for elected office and it is unclear what would become of his candidacy should he win primaries. Another leading contender, Maria Corina Machado, also barred from running for office, has already begun campaigning on a stridently anti-socialist ticket. Notably, Machado 5 March said public companies, including state-owned oil company PDVSA, should be privatised; Capriles 1o March criticised Machado’s comments. Meanwhile, Popular Will, party of ousted opposition leader Juan Guaidó, 7 March announced it had selected Guaidó to run in Oct.

Disagreements around involving National Electoral Council in primaries persisted. Independent Commission set up by opposition coalition Unitary Platform to organise primaries 8 March began talks with govt-controlled National Electoral Council to clarify what technical assistance council could provide. Some continued to oppose council’s involvement, arguing state participation would limit number of people willing to vote and facilitate govt interference, but Commission sources told Crisis Group turnout could be cut in half without official polling stations.

Factional fighting within ruling party surfaced. Battles within ruling party came to light when authorities 17-19 March arrested around two dozen people, half of them officials reportedly linked to Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami. Arrests appear linked to disappearance of at least $3bn in oil revenues, which VP Delcy Rodríguez and her brother Jorge Rodríguez, president of National Assembly and govt’s chief negotiator, reportedly blame on Aissami, who is head of rival chavista faction. Aissami 20 March tendered his resignation, Maduro next day appointed PDVSA President Pedro Tellechea as oil minister.

In other important developments. Colombian President Petro 28 March announced govt will host international conference in Colombia’s capital Bogotá to support dialogue between “Venezuelan opposition, civil society […] and the Venezuelan government”.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

President Tebboune conducted major cabinet reshuffle ahead of 2024 presidential election.

FM and other govt heavyweights sacked in reshuffle. Tebboune 16 March conducted cabinet reshuffle affecting 11 ministerial portfolios, notably dismissing FM Ramtane Lamamra, Finance Minister Brahim Djamel Kessali and Trade Minister Kamel Rezig. Col. Mahrez Djeribi 11 March also replaced Gen. Abdelaziz Nouiouet Chouiter as head of Algeria’s most influential security agency, Central Direction of Army Security.

Authorities discussed military and economic cooperation with partners. U.S. Under-Sec State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Bonnie Denise Jenkins 5-7 March visited Algeria and met with Tebboune, as Algeria plans to spend around $21bn in 2023 to purchase weapons and other military equipment. European Union (EU) foreign policy chief Josep Borrell 12-13 March met with Tebboune and PM Aïmene Benabderrahmane in capital Algiers to discuss 2005 association agreement between Algeria and EU, energy issues, and relations between Algeria and Spain. Tebboune 16 March met with head of Russia’s upper house of parliament, Valentina Matvienko, in Algiers; Matvienko invited him to visit Russia and meet with President Putin. Meanwhile, Algeria’s ambassador to France, recalled home in Feb after Algiers accused Paris of orchestrating “exfiltration” of binational civil society activist Amira Bouraoui, 29 March returned to his post.

Tensions with Morocco remained high over Western Sahara. During military visit in Tamanrasset province (south), Army Chief of Staff Saïd Chengriha 15 March said army “is ready to cut the hand of those who want to undermine Algeria’s sovereignty”; comments came after director of Moroccan Royal Archives, Bahija Simou, late Feb said Morocco’s sovereignty extends over Western Sahara but also Eastern Sahara (which is part of Algeria). Tebboune in interview with Al Jazeera news channel 21 March said Algeria’s relations with Morocco have reached “the point of no return” (see Western Sahara).

Egypt

Economic tensions built up again, security outlook in Sinai Peninsula continued to improve, and govt took new steps toward reconciliation with Türkiye.

Inflation climbed to record highs and pressure on exchange rate increased. President Sisi 2 March announced package of measures, including state wage and pension raises to help alleviate economic pressures, which could spark tensions especially as Muslim holy month of Ramadan started 23 March. Central Bank 30 March raised key interest rates by 2% in attempt to curb rocketing inflation, as annual inflation rose to 31.9% in Feb, highest in five years, with food prices rising most steeply. Value of Egyptian pound relative to U.S. dollar in March continued to decline on black market while official exchange rate remained stable at EGP30 to $1, possibly indicating that Central Bank has gone back to managing value of pound despite International Monetary Fund’s request that it switch to flexible exchange rate.

Human rights situation remained dire, lull in violence continued in Sinai Peninsula. Special Court (Emergency State Security Court) 5 March sentenced 31 members of NGO Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms to lengthy prison terms on terrorism-related charges. UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk 7 March expressed “fair trial concerns”. NGO Human Rights Watch 13 March said crackdown on opposition extends beyond Egypt’s borders, alleging authorities systematically refuse to provide or renew identity documents to dissidents, journalists and activists abroad. Amid few incidents in Sinai Peninsula, army unit and Islamic State-affiliated Sinai Province militants 7 March exchanged fire near al-Tur town, South Sinai, wounding one soldier.

Progress continued toward reconciliation with Türkiye. FM Sameh Shoukry 18 March met with Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in capital Cairo, marking new phase in gradual reconciliation between Egypt and Türkiye; Shoukry and Çavuşoğlu said relations would be normalised “at the appropriate time”, and announced President Sisi and Turkish President Erdoğan would meet after Turkish elections in May.

Iran

Engagement with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) forestalled international censure, govt and Saudi Arabia announced breakthrough normalisation deal, and tensions with U.S. flared in Syria.

Iran avoided censure at IAEA’s Board of Governors, Western sanctions mounted. Ahead of first Board of Governors meeting in 2023, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi 3-4 March visited capital Tehran for meetings with senior officials and President Raisi amid heightening concerns over longstanding safeguards issues as well as recent discovery of uranium particles enriched to near-weapons grade and undeclared modifications at Fordow facility; visit produced joint statement on increased cooperation. U.S. and E3 (France, UK and Germany) did not introduce censure resolution during board meeting on 7 March, but underscored serious concern of Tehran’s nuclear activity. Meanwhile, U.S. 2 March expanded its sanctions against Iranian petroleum and petrochemical export companies. European Union 7 March sanctioned Iranian prison over human rights concerns. UK next day sanctioned govt institution The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil in Iran, as U.S. issued its tenth round of human rights-related sanctions since protests began in Sept.

Tehran and Riyadh announced breakthrough agreement. Following undisclosed talks in Chinese capital Beijing, Iran and Saudi Arabia 10 March announced deal to restore diplomatic relations seven years after they were severed, and following nearly two years of intermittent dialogue (see Saudi Arabia). Deal could mark constructive shift in de-escalating regional tensions, but may prove transitory unless Iran and West address nuclear standoff, hostages in Iran and Tehran’s military support for Russia.

Iran-U.S. tensions surged in Syria. Alleged Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated groups 23 March launched drone attack on base near Syria’s Hasakah city, killing U.S. contractor and injuring six U.S. troops; in retaliation, U.S. conducted airstrikes on alleged IRGC-affiliated groups, killing several militants (see Syria); President Biden asserted that “the U.S. does not … seek conflict with Iran” but would “forcefully” protect its people. Earlier, UK 2 March announced Royal Navy and U.S. 23 Feb interdicted vessel from Iran in Gulf of Oman carrying anti-tank guided missiles and medium-range ballistic missile components, likely intended for Huthis in Yemen.

Iraq

Govt approved first draft budget in three years as parliament advanced electoral reform, while low-scale violence persisted in north and Islamic State (ISIS) continued its insurgency.

Govt approved budget and parliament pursued electoral reform. Council of Ministers 13 March approved 2023-2025 federal budget for parliament ratification, which expands public employment but fails to address structural causes of poor economic and financial situation and lack of govt services. Parliament 20-25 March passed 15 articles of new draft electoral law for Nov 2023 provincial council and parliamentary elections; new law reintroduces voting along party lists, turns each governorate into single electoral constituency, and raises minimum age for candidates to 30, which marks major setback for emerging parties and reform-minded independent candidates; Sadrist movement expressed opposition. Meanwhile, PM Sudani 13 March announced agreement with Kurdistan Regional Government to deposit Kurdistan’s oil revenues in bank account under federal govt’s supervision.

Türkiye targeted Kurdish militants and intercommunal violence flared in north. Turkish drone 1 March hit vehicle in Sinjar, Ninewa governorate, killing two Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) fighters. Following months of tit-for-tat attacks between Shiite Dulaimi and Sunni Azzawi tribes in Diyala governorate, militants 6 March attacked al-Haziniyah village, reportedly killing at least five members of local leader Sheikh Mustafa al-Tamimi’s tribe; PM Sudani 8 March visited governorate and deployed military reinforcements. Two helicopters 15 March crashed in Chamanke region, Duhok governorate, killing nine Syrian Democratic Forces members on knowledge-sharing trip.

Low-scale ISIS insurgency and anti-ISIS operations continued. Military 12 March announced security forces killed 22 alleged ISIS members in Anbar governorate. Alleged ISIS militants 8 March killed one in attack on security forces in Tuzkhormatu district, Kirkuk governorate.

In other important developments. Court 3 March issued warrants to freeze assets of former Finance Minister Ali Allawi and three senior aides to former PM Kadhimi for alleged facilitation of tax misappropriation. Govt and Iran 19 March signed border agreement aimed at securing frontier between Iran and Iraq’s Kurdish region.

Israel/Palestine

Escalation loomed during Ramadan as deadly violence continued across West Bank amid unabated Israeli raids and growing Palestinian armed resistance; Israel’s domestic crisis sharpened.

West Bank hostilities killed two dozen Palestinians and one Israeli. Deadly Israeli raids and settler attacks killed at least 27 Palestinians during March, while Palestinian attacks killed one Israeli. Notably, Israeli forces 7 March killed six Palestinians in Jenin; 9 March killed three Islamic Jihad affiliates in Jenin; Hamas gunman same day opened fire in Tel Aviv, killing one Israeli. Far-right Israeli govt continued incendiary rhetoric: Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich 1 March called for erasure of West Bank village Huwara and 20 March denied existence of Palestinian people; govt late Feb handed Smotrich authority to effectively govern West Bank, marking step toward de jure annexation as it implies occupation forces are no longer temporary or military. Knesset 20 March passed amendment to resettle four illegal settlements in West Bank evacuated in 2005, drawing U.S. rebuke. Huwara continued to be major flashpoint, witnessing unabated settler violence, Israeli military presence and repeated Palestinian shooting attacks, including shooting that injured two soldiers 25 March. Israel and Palestinian Authority (PA) 19 March participated in U.S.-sponsored security meeting with Egypt and Jordan in effort to de-escalate violence, which could see upsurge during Muslim and Jewish holidays.

Israel faced unprecedented constitutional crisis, destabilising coalition govt. Amid anti-govt protests by hundreds of thousands and threats by security and intelligence reserve forces to refuse duty, Knesset 13-14 March advanced bills on judicial overhaul and making it harder to remove PM. PM Netanyahu 26 March fired Defence Minister Yoav Gallant after Gallant called for suspension of judicial overhaul, spurring further protests; Netanyahu next day froze overhaul plans for one month.

Suspected Hizbollah attack raised spectre of escalation. In rare incident, explosive device 13 March wounded civilian in Megiddo Junction, northern Israel; Israeli military same day killed suspect and pointed finger at Hizbollah and/or Palestinian factions in Lebanon, which may seek to test Israel as it faces multiple crises. Meanwhile, Gaza-based militants reportedly 8 and 18 March launched rockets. Israel continued strikes in Syria, including against Palestinian Al-Quds Brigades (see Syria).

Lebanon

Economic crisis worsened as currency spiral continued, while deadlock persisted over presidential vacuum without end in sight.

Economic plight continued to worsen. Lebanese lira 14 March crossed threshold of 100,000 to $1 at parallel exchange range and 21 March dropped to 140,000, prompting Central Bank to announce injection of U.S. dollars that stabilised rate around 100,000. Increasingly devalued currency continued to contribute to worsening living conditions. Supermarkets 1 March began pricing goods in U.S. dollars, fuel prices continued to rise, while citizens increasingly struggled to purchase other essential imported products. State electricity provider EDL 13 March reported that 2,000 customers per day were applying to unsubscribe from public grid after sharp tariff hikes. Deteriorating conditions continued to cause unrest and security incidents as depositors demanded access to savings trapped inside illiquid banks: security guard 3 March shot and wounded depositor in capital Beirut; security forces 22 March used tear gas against protestors outside parliament. Despite calls on 5 March by several public teachers’ unions to end strike ongoing since Dec, many unions refused to return to work and demanded inflation-indexed salaries.

Double executive (president and cabinet) continued without end in sight. Presidential vacuum prevailing since 1 Nov continued as parliament in March held no presidential election sessions, reflecting deadlock. Leaders of Shiite parties Amal and Hizbollah 2 and 6 March respectively put forward Suleiman Frangieh as their preferred presidential candidate, leading House Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri to declare his preparedness to convene electoral session when opposing camp nominates “a candidate or two”. Christian party Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea, however, swiftly threatened to block Frangieh’s election by helping to frustrate quorum, alleging that Frangieh would unduly represent interests of Hizbollah and its allies. Free Patriotic Movement party also rejected Frangieh. Meanwhile, cabinet 27 March held meeting to discuss confusion over daylight savings time. France 18 March reportedly sought to convince Saudi Arabia – which retains influence over LF and Sunni MPs – to support proposal to elect Frangieh as president alongside new PM supported by opposition; Saudi Arabia, however, appeared unwilling to strongarm its close ally LF.

Libya

UN initiative to provide constitutional framework for elections struggled to gain traction.

UN envoy’s plan for elections failed to secure endorsement. Special Representative of UN Sec-Gen for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 11 March said legislative bodies, House of Representatives (HoR) and High State Council (HSC), had agreed to form joint committee of six members each to draft electoral laws; also said presidential and legislative elections could be held by year’s end if clear roadmap and electoral laws are in place by June. Statement appeared to give centre stage to legislative bodies’ initiative to provide legal framework for elections, suggesting Bathily has backtracked on his recent proposal to establish High-Level Panel for Elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh 13 March reiterated opposition to Bathily’s proposal, confirmed HoR is on track with its own roadmap and intends to appoint new interim govt once election laws are finalised; issue of new executive to replace Tripoli-based govt of PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba is major point of departure from Bathily’s plan. UN Security Council 16 March adopted presidential statement on Libya, stating that Council “recognises the continued role of the HoR and HSC” to securing legal basis for elections, while downplaying Bathily’s initiative.

Efforts to unify divided military institutions inched forward. Bathily 16 March hosted meeting of 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) – which brings together representatives of armed forces from eastern and western Libya – in Tunisia’s capital Tunis to discuss way forward in security track and reunification of military institutions; renewed commitment to create initial joint force (one unit) to be deployed in central Libya. Military leaders from both east-based Libyan National Army (LNA) and Tripoli-based military coalition, including some JMC members, 26 March met in capital Tripoli under UN auspices, committed to continue to work toward unification of military.

National oil company chairman allegedly under U.S. scrutiny. Allegations in March surfaced among Libyan businessmen that chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, Farhat Bengdara, is under U.S. scrutiny for his alleged role in allocating funds to cover expenses of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s LNA forces, part of which might have bankrolled sanctioned Russian paramilitary Wagner Group.

Saudi Arabia

In breakthrough China-brokered agreement, Riyadh and Tehran agreed to restore diplomatic relations after seven years of severed ties.

Saudi Arabia and Iran announced deal to reinstate diplomatic relations. After China 6-10 March hosted secret Saudi-Iranian talks in its capital Beijing, parties 10 March issued joint statement outlining plan to resume diplomatic relations and reopening of embassies within two months; while details of agreement remained unclear, it could mark constructive shift in de-escalating regional tensions among Gulf rivals and signals Riyadh’s desire to diversify global relationships as China’s regional clout grows (see Iran). Iranian official 19 March said King Salman invited Iranian President Raisi to country, while Iranian FM Amirabdollahian same day said he would meet Saudi counterpart “in the near future”.

Riyadh signalled openness to normalisation with Syria. FM Prince Faisal bin Farhan 7 March said engagement with Damascus was necessary to address Syria’s humanitarian crisis; United Arab Emirates 19 March hosted Syrian President Assad for second time since March 2022. Saudi media 23 March reported Riyadh was in talks with Damascus to reestablish consular relations.

Syria

Regime and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) resumed hostilities in north west, tensions flared between U.S. and Iran-backed forces in east, and President Assad sought to end diplomatic isolation.

In north west, cross-line tit-for-tat attacks returned and Turkish-backed militants killed Kurdish civilians. After weeks-long hiatus following earthquake, Idlib’s dominant faction HTS in March resumed raids and sniping operations on regime positions in north west, including in Idlib province 16 March and in Latakia province next day; regime had stepped up shelling of Idlib province following earthquakes. HTS and regime 23 March clashed in northern Aleppo province, killing 10 from both sides. Turkish-backed militants 20 March killed several Kurds during Kurdish new year celebrations near Jinderis town, Aleppo province; thousands next day protested in Jinderis.

U.S. and Iran-backed forces clashed in east and Islamic State (ISIS) continued attacks in centre. Alleged Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated groups 23 March launched drone attack on base near Hasakah city, killing U.S. contractor and injuring six U.S. troops; in retaliation, U.S. conducted airstrikes on alleged IRGC-affiliated groups, killing several militants (see Iran). Further attacks next day targeted coalition forces, wounding U.S. service member. Meanwhile, suspected ISIS cells in March increased activity in centre, conducting at least 30 attacks that killed dozens. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and International Coalition continued anti-ISIS operations in north east.

Regime continued normalisation drive as Syrian-Turkish rapprochement stalled. President Assad 15 March met Russian President Putin. Assad 19 March visited United Arab Emirates and met President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Saudi media 23 March reported Riyadh was in talks with Damascus to reestablish consular relations (see Saudi Arabia). Assad 16 March ruled out meeting Turkish President Erdoğan until Ankara announces timetable for withdrawal from Syria; reports late month indicated possible meeting between Iran, Türkiye, Syria and Russia in early April.

In other important developments. Israeli airstrikes 7, 22 March reportedly hit Aleppo airport and 30-31 March struck Damascus; alleged Israeli rockets 12 March hit Hama and Tartus provinces. World Food Programme 15 March said situation in Syria is “worse than ever” with over half of population lacking food.

Tunisia

Opposition protested President Saïed’s increasingly authoritarian drift, while violence against African migrants caused international outcry.

Saïed continued to assert control over public institutions. Saïed 8 March vowed to dissolve municipal councils elected in 2018 and replace them with “special councils” to be elected under new rules. New parliament 13 March held first session in absence of independent and foreign journalists, who were barred from attending, and elected former president of Bar Association Brahim Bouderbala as speaker; opposition coalition National Salvation Front (NSF) same day said it did not recognise legitimacy of parliament elected with 11.3% turnout. Interior Minister Taoufik Charfeddine 17 March resigned, citing family reasons; Saïed same day replaced him with hardline supporter, Tunis Governor Kamal Feki.

Opposition protested wave of arrests targeting govt critics. As part of campaign of arrests launched in Feb, authorities 2 March detained leader of Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party Habib Ellouze, allegedly on terrorism charges. Main workers’ union UGTT 4 March rallied thousands of protesters in capital Tunis to denounce politically motivated detentions and rising cost of living as well as to urge Saïed to accept UGTT’s dialogue initiative. NSF next day also protested wave of arrests and Saïed’s power grab; 27 March started open sit-in in Tunis to demand release of all political detainees.

International institutions condemned attacks on sub-Saharan Africans. After Saïed’s comments linking migration and crime in Feb triggered violent attacks on sub-Saharan African in Tunisia, several countries including Guinea, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire early March began repatriation of nationals who submitted voluntary return applications. World Bank early March suspended partnership framework with Tunisia for 2023-2027 “until further notice”, deeming Saïed’s remarks “completely unacceptable”, while U.S. State Dept 6 March expressed “deep concern” about reports of arbitrary arrests and violence against migrants.

Western Sahara

UN envoy held consultations with parties to Western Sahara conflict ahead of Security Council meeting due in April.

Preparations under way for next UN Security Council meeting on Western Sahara. UN 28 March said UN Sec-Gen’s envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, invited representatives of Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Polisario Front independence movement “to informal bilateral consultations” “to continue seeking mutually agreeable formulas to advance the political process” ahead of Security Council meeting on Western Sahara scheduled for 20 April.

Tensions continued to run high between Morocco and Algeria. After director of Moroccan Royal Archives, Bahija Simou, late Feb said Morocco’s sovereignty extends over Western Sahara but also Eastern Sahara (which is part of Algeria), Algeria’s Army Chief of Staff Saïd Chengriha 15 March said army “is ready to cut the hand of those who want to undermine Algeria’s sovereignty”. Algeria’s President Tebboune in interview with Al Jazeera news channel 21 March said Algeria’s relations with Morocco have reached “the point of no return” (see Algeria).

Yemen

Huthis escalated hostilities in Marib and Shebwa governorates, ending months-long de facto truce and overshadowing prisoner exchange deal with govt as well as Iran-Saudi agreement.

Huthis launched attacks in Marib and Shebwa. Huthis launched assaults on govt-aligned forces 20 March in Marib’s Harib district and 26 March in mountain range connecting to Merkhah Al Ulya district in southern Shebwa, leading to deadly clashes, displacing hundreds and ending de facto truce in last six months as govt warned of possible return to all-out fighting; Huthi offensive seemingly sought to break stalemate in ongoing backchannel talks with Riyadh and dampened hopes for Saudi-Iran détente. Huthis 25 March conducted drone attack on Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan, killing one. Huthis same day announced restrictions on humanitarian flights arriving in capital Sanaa, citing alleged Saudi prohibition on commercial flights.

Diplomatic efforts bore fruit before escalation. Following 10 March Saudi-Iran deal to restore ties (see Saudi Arabia and Iran), Saudi officials reportedly revealed deal included Iranian commitment to halt weapons shipments to Huthis; govt, Huthis and Southern Transitional Council (STC) cautiously welcomed agreement, fuelling hopes of reducing risk of new Huthi offensive; longstanding grievances of local factions, however, remained unaddressed. Meanwhile, Huthi-Saudi talks continued and, in parallel, govt and Huthi delegations 20 March reached deal to exchange 887 detainees in UN-facilitated talks in Switzerland.

Rift between STC and Riyadh continued, govt made overtures to Islah. STC official criticised deployment of Saudi-backed army National Shield Forces in STC-controlled areas, which threatens STC’s grip in south. STC 9 March voiced concern over Saudi-Huthi talks, warning against any deal that goes beyond UN-led process. Separately, Presidential Leadership Council member and leader of Joint Resistance Forces Tareq Saleh 2 March travelled to Islah-stronghold Taiz city and shook hands with rival and Islah military leader Abdo Farhan Mekhlafi, likely signalling attempts to secure pockets of influence in event of Saudi-Huthi settlement.

In other important developments. In first maritime incident in Red Sea this year, unidentified assailants 17 March attacked ship with machine-gun fire. Huthis doubled down on efforts to remove restrictions at Hodeida port, which could jeopardise govt revenues.

Africa

Benin

Sporadic jihadist violence persisted in north despite govt’s efforts to strengthen military power.

Suspected jihadist attacks continued in northern Atakora department. Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 3 Feb attacked army position in Kerou commune, causing no confirmed casualties. Hundreds of residents around 4 Feb fled Niéhoun-Daloga village in Matéri commune after unidentified armed group late Jan reportedly gave them ultimatum to leave. Unidentified gunmen 21 Feb clashed with security forces near Daloga village, also in Matéri commune, reportedly leaving one soldier and at least two assailants dead. Meanwhile, hundreds of refugees arrived in northern Benin following 10 Feb deadly jihadist attack in Togo (see Togo).

Govt acquired new military equipment to help contain jihadist threat. As part of largely militarised response to jihadist violence, authorities 3 Feb acquired two attack helicopters and 9 Feb 50 new military trucks. Troops 19 Feb reportedly began patrolling border with Burkina Faso to prevent jihadist incursion.

Burkina Faso

Military suffered highest death toll from back-to-back jihadist attacks since 2015; govt worked to strengthen ties with other military regimes in West Africa.

Back-to-back jihadist attacks against military left scores dead. In Sahel region’s Oudalan province, alleged Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-Sahel) 17 Feb ambushed military convoy between Oursi and Déou localities, leaving at least 51 and as many as 80 soldiers dead. IS-Sahel 20 Feb attacked military detachment camp in Tin Akoff town, also Oudalan, and later took control of town, killing dozens of soldiers, volunteers fighting alongside security forces (VDPs) and civilians. Similar large-scale attacks significantly contributed to former Presidents Kaboré and Damiba’s fall. Earlier in month in Sahel region’s Seno province, IS-Sahel 4 Feb killed 22 civilians and three police officers in Bani town. In Centre-North region’s Namentenga province, alleged al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) fighters 7 Feb killed seven gendarmes and one VDP in Boala village. In East region’s Tapoa province, unidentified jihadists 26 Feb killed as yet unknown number in Partiaga town.

Armed forces and VDPs faced new allegations of abuses in East region. VDPs 1 Feb reportedly killed seven civilians suspected of cooperating with JNIM in Ganyela village (Gourma province). Local NGO Collectif contre l’impunité et la stigmatisation des communautés alleged military same day killed at least 30 civilians in Piega, Sakoani and Kankangou localities (Tapoa province). After Nigeria 6 Feb said unidentified gunmen killed at least 15 Nigerian pilgrims near Boudieri village (Tapoa province), rumours of Burkinabé forces’ involvement circulated online; FM Olivia Rouamba same day denied allegations and announced investigation.

Authorities deepened cooperation with military regimes in Mali and Guinea. PM Apollinaire Kyélem de Tambèla 1 Feb met with Malian Interim President Col. Goïta in Mali’s capital Bamako to discuss bilateral security cooperation and allegedly also potential partnership with Russia; Kyélem de Tambèla reportedly proposed formation of federation between Mali and Burkina Faso. Malian PM Choguel Maïga 23-26 Feb visited capital Ouagadougou to sign counter-terrorism cooperation agreement. Meanwhile, FM Rouamba 9 Feb met with Malian and Guinean counterparts in capital Ouagadougou, announced “joint initiatives” against West African regional bloc ECOWAS sanctions (see Guinea and Mali).  

Burundi

Human rights record received mixed reviews from local and international actors, and relations with Rwanda warmed up.

National and international bodies recorded modest human rights improvement. Local NGO Burundi Human Rights Initiative 1 Feb published report covering state of human rights in country in 2022, noting modest progress but highlighting continued impunity for ruling party’s youth militia, Imbonerakure. During three-day visit to Burundi, European Union Special Representative for Human Rights Eamon Gilmore 2-4 Feb held meetings with President Ndayishimiye, govt ministers and civil society; welcomed “progress” in human rights record, but said “challenges” remain, particularly regarding rule of law and women’s rights, and called on country to collaborate with UN special rapporteur for Burundi. Meanwhile, police 14 Feb arrested five human rights activists en route to Ugandan capital Kampala on accusations of financing terrorism.

Ruling party figure proposed removal of ethnic quotas. Senate President Emmanuel Sinzohagera 6 Feb called for repeal of ethnic balance quotas in public sector employment provided in 2018 constitution and Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation; move, if taken, could legitimise exclusion of Tutsi minority and may become issue in view of 2025 legislative elections, though Hutus already hold almost all positions in public sector.

In other important developments. Rwandan President Kagame 4 Feb visited Burundi for first time since 2012 to attend extraordinary East African Community heads of state summit in Bujumbura city, held bilateral talks with Ndayishimiye on sidelines of summit. FM Albert Shingiro 9 Feb said encounter represented progress in normalising ties, though reiterated call on Rwanda to hand over suspects of 2015 coup attempt. Meanwhile, Congolese civil society mid-Feb questioned mission of Burundian forces in South Kivu province, particularly their presence around gold mine in Luhwindja chiefdom, Mwenga territory, citing absence of armed group activity in area.

Cameroon

Tensions between govt and Anglophone separatists remained high amid stalled peace initiative, and jihadist violence persisted in Far North.

Future of Canada-led facilitation of Anglophone crisis remained uncertain. After President Biya late Jan denied asking any country to organise peace talks with Anglophone separatists, and announced massive drive to recruit 9,500 soldiers, Ottawa launched diplomatic effort to change his stance. Meanwhile, separatist leaders, who are divided into distinct militia factions, late Jan-early Feb started discussing possibility of more united anti-govt front.

Both parties intensified military activities in North West (NW), South West (SW). After army 31 Jan killed separatist group Ambazonia Defence Forces commander “General Transporter” Ayuk Ndifon Defcam, group early Feb announced stepping up attacks and use of IEDs against military. Govt forces 7 Feb clashed with separatist combatants in Baba 1 village, Ngo-Ketunjia division (NW), with at least five killed on each side. Ahead of 11 Feb National Youth Day marking 1961 plebiscite in which British Southern Cameroons (current NW and SW) voted to join independent Republic of Cameroon, unidentified gunmen 10 Feb attacked Cameroon Development Corporation plantation workers near Tiko town, Fako division (SW), killing five and wounding at least 40. During annual Mount Cameroon Race of Hope in South West capital Buea, three roadside bombs 25 Feb exploded, wounding 19 people.

Jihadist attacks continued in Far North region. Boko Haram 2 Feb killed five people in Koza commune, Mayo-Tsanaga division; overnight 6-7 Feb killed eight fishermen near Blaram village, Logone-et-Chari division; 26 Feb killed one vigilante in Tumbun Ali island, also Logone-et-Chari. Meanwhile, clashes between fishermen and farmers 27 Feb left three people seriously wounded in Moulva locality, Mayo-Kani division.

In other important developments. After killing of investigative journalist Martinez Zogo in Jan caused national outcry, Biya 2 Feb ordered investigation and authorities in following days detained several intelligence officials as well as businessman Jean-Pierre Amougou-Belinga in relation to case, lending credence to theory that Zogo’s murder was state crime. Biya 13 Feb celebrated 90th birthday and over 40 years in power.

Central African Republic

President Touadéra moved closer to holding constitutional referendum in 2023, rebel groups continued to step up attacks in hinterlands, and anti-French sentiment ran high.

Touadéra enacted referendum law ahead of local elections. Touadéra 6 Feb enacted referendum bill passed by parliament in Dec 2022, raising concern he will pair local elections (scheduled for July and Oct) with constitutional referendum that could allow him to run for third term in 2025. Meanwhile, UN mission in CAR 14 Feb announced agreement with govt to secure local elections.

Rebels’ advance continued in north east, use of explosives spread in north west. In Vakaga prefecture (north east), Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) rebels 14 Feb attacked army base in Sikikédé locality, leaving at least three soldiers dead, four injured and another 20 held hostage; CPC retreated with hostages after army and Russian paramilitary Wagner Group 23 Feb retook locality. North-western prefectures saw series of explosive-related incidents in Feb. Notably in Ouham-Pendé, improvised explosive devices 6 Feb killed two soldiers and one civilian near Ndim locality, and 10 Feb seriously injured five civilians near Bozoum town.

Disinformation campaign and violent attacks targeted French companies. After Wagner Group in Jan opened brewery in country, media campaign from late Jan targeted French-owned local brewery MOCAF, accusing it of financing rebel group Union for Peace in CAR; pro-govt youth platform and one minister reportedly involved in campaign. Trade ministry 2 Feb condemned violent demonstrations against MOCAF held 19-20 Jan in capital Bangui. Meanwhile, unidentified individuals 3 Feb threw grenades at two petrol stations owned by French company TotalEnergies in Bangui.

In other important developments. Touadéra and Chadian Transitional President Mahamat Idriss Déby 9 Feb met in Angola’s capital Luanda to discuss increasing activities of armed groups along shared border; leaders reportedly agreed to work together to address security issues (see Chad). UN independent expert on human rights Yao Agbetse 20 Feb accused govt forces and allies of committing “arbitrary arrests and detentions, violations of the right to life” in last quarter of 2022.

Chad

Hundreds of rebels faced trial over President Idriss Déby’s death, and interim govt launched security-oriented diplomatic push.

Trial of rebels accused of killing Chad’s long-time strongman kicked off. First audience in closed trial of 454 Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) rebels, captured in April 2021 during clashes that led to death of then-President Idriss Déby, held 13 Feb in capital N’Djamena; trial adjourned 15 Feb after security guard reportedly accidentally detonated teargas grenade. FACT leader Mahamat Mahdi Ali mid-Feb questioned trial, citing Transitional President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s pledge in Oct 2022 to free all prisoners of war.

Security challenges persisted. Security forces from late Jan to mid-Feb conducted series of weapons search operations in Ouaddaï region (east) and capital N’Djamena, allegedly amid concerns over intercommunal tensions. Search at house of influential senior army official, Gen. Tahir Erda, 14 Feb sparked outrage among ruling Zaghawa clan. Chadian governors in their annual conference held 3-4 Feb confirmed creation in Jan of new rebel group in Logone Oriental region (south west). Communications Minister Aziz Mahamat-Saleh late Feb however denied existence of any rebellion on Chadian territory.

Transitional authorities sought security cooperation with partners. Déby 2 Feb inaugurated Chad’s first embassy in Israel amid reported plans to acquire Israeli military equipment to defend Chadian borders. Déby 6 Feb met with French President Macron in Paris to discuss bilateral cooperation; 9 Feb met with Central African counterpart, President Touadéra, in Angolan capital Luanda, to discuss security issues, notably increasing activity of armed groups on CAR side of shared border (see CAR). G5 Sahel (Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania) 20 Feb held summit in N’Djamena, first since Mali pulled out in June last year, reaffirmed joint commitment to fighting terrorism in Sahel.

In other important developments. U.S. daily The Wall Street Journal 23 Feb reported U.S. warned Chadian authorities that Russian Wagner Group was working with Chadian rebels to destabilise country and oust President Déby.

Côte d’Ivoire

Political heavyweights continued to position themselves with eye toward 2023 regional and 2025 presidential elections; govt maintained efforts to contain insecurity in north.

President Ouattara strengthened position as fragmentation of opposition widened. Ouattara’s Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) continued to gather strength ahead of local and regional elections due for Oct-Nov. Two prominent Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) figures, including Chief of Staff Narcisse N’dri, 6 Feb defected to RHDP, reflecting growing internal division in Henri Konan Bédié’s PDCI. Ouattara, Bédié and former President Gbagbo 8 Feb attended Félix Houphouët-Boigny/UNESCO Peace Prize ceremony in capital Yamoussoukro; Bédié took opportunity to point out Ivorian failure “to engage in a frank dialogue” and “build sustainable peace”, in possible criticism of Ouattara’s refusal to release certain political prisoners and ensure return of exiled politicians, notably former PM and Parliament Speaker Guillaume Soro. Meanwhile, Court of Appeal in Abidjan 13 Feb confirmed life prison sentence for Soro on charge of “attempting to undermine state security”.

Govt kept up efforts to contain jihadist threat in country’s north. Paris-based news outlet Africa Intelligence 14 Feb reported Ivorian army expected delivery of 20 armoured vehicles from Turkish defence manufacturer Otokar to be used in fighting jihadists, following first delivery of armoured vehicles from Otokar in early 2022. Africa Intelligence 20 Feb also reported Ivorian govt was close to signing $60mn deal with Chinese defence company Norinco for 50 infantry fighting vehicles. Ouattara 20 Feb met in economic capital Abidjan with French Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu, who pledged to increase military support to Côte d’Ivoire as Paris adjusts strategy in region.

Democratic Republic of Congo

M23 offensive moved closer to North Kivu’s capital Goma with rebels capturing more ground in Masisi territory as fighting fuelled regional tensions despite efforts to resolve crisis; voter registration kicked off in eastern provinces.

M23 made major gains in North Kivu province’s Masisi territory. Fighting between M23 and govt forces early Feb moved to area around Sake, last major town before North Kivu’s capital Goma in Masisi territory. As clashes throughout month continued on hills around Sake, M23 captured several other localities in area, notably strategic town of Mushaki 24 Feb, and 26 Feb seized important mining town of Rubaya.

Frosty Kinshasa-Kigali relations continued to dominate regional diplomacy. Demonstrations 6 Feb erupted in Goma over frustration with UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) and East African Community (EAC) regional force’s failure to stop M23 rebels’ advance. Mob next day attacked MONUSCO convoy on its way to Goma, with eight civilians killed in skirmishes. Govt 16 Feb claimed 350 Rwandan troops had just entered North Kivu to reinforce M23 positions (see Rwanda). EAC summits 4 and 17 Feb failed to break new ground, reiterating calls for ceasefire.

Armed group violence remained widespread in North Kivu, Ituri provinces. Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 8 Feb killed 12 civilians in Konge Pwendi village, Beni territory (North Kivu), and 12 Feb killed another 12 in two villages of Irumu territory (Ituri). Congolese and Ugandan joint operations nonetheless recorded modest successes against ADF, including 5 Feb killing four ADF members attacking civilian convoy in Irumu territory. Meanwhile, CODECO ethnic militia carried out several attacks in Ituri, notably killing 21 people across several villages of Djugu territory 12 Feb. Rival “Zaire” ethnic militia 5 Feb attacked Dyambu village, also Djugu, killing 11 people.

Voter registration kicked off in conflict-ridden eastern provinces. Ahead of general elections scheduled for Dec, voter registration 16 Feb began in conflict-ridden eastern provinces. Registration 19 Feb started in two large camps hosting displaced persons around Goma; electoral commission said those living in M23-controlled areas will be registered gradually, depending on army’s reconquest of these zones.

Eritrea

During two-day trip to Kenya, President Isaias discussed Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, strengthened ties with Nairobi and pledged to rejoin regional bloc.

Isaias spoke about war in Tigray during rare media briefing. President Isaias 8-10 Feb visited Kenya’s capital Nairobi, 9 Feb spoke to international journalists about Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict for first time since war broke out in 2020. Isaias dismissed as “fantasy” claims Eritrean soldiers committed atrocities in Tigray, sidestepping questions about accountability, significant losses and troop withdrawals from Tigray (Eritrean soldiers have mostly left region but small units remain in strategic positions in border areas). Isaias added Eritrea has “no intention of interfering” in Ethiopia’s peace process amid concerns it could act as spoiler. In separate interview conducted in Asmara, Isaias 12 Feb said it would have been “game over” for Tigray People’s Liberation Front had “Washington enablers” not saved it via peace deal.

Asmara agreed to strengthen ties with Kenya and pledged to rejoin regional bloc. During Kenya trip, President Isaias and Kenyan President Ruto pledged to strengthen bilateral ties, which have been strained since 2011 when Nairobi openly criticised Eritrea for its alleged support of Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab. Leaders abolished visa requirements for respective countries’ citizens and Kenya agreed to open its embassy in Asmara. In signs Asmara may wish to end its isolation, Isaias also said Eritrea would rejoin regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development; however, Asmara’s conditions for rejoining a bloc it views as dominated by Ethiopia remain unclear.

Ethiopia

PM Abiy met with TPLF leaders as peace process progressed, violence escalated in Oromia after Orthodox Church split, and authorities and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) hinted at interest in truce.

Tigray peace process continued to advance. Federal govt and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) continued to take concrete steps toward consolidating peace. PM Abiy 3 Feb met with TPLF leaders for first time since 2020 in southern Halala Kella resort. National Security Adviser Redwan Hussien next day announced central bank would send 5bn birr ($90mn) to Tigray to increase cash flows and upped number of daily flights to regional capital Mekelle. TPLF 12 Feb established committee to form regional interim administration. Additionally, TPLF chief negotiator Getachew Reda 6 Feb said Eritrean forces had mostly withdrawn from Tigray but that “small units” remained (see Eritrea). UN humanitarian agency 2 Feb said assistance had scaled up. Meanwhile, news agency Reuters 27 Feb claimed Addis has been “courting support” from other govts for motion to end UN-mandated inquiry into atrocities in Tigray; over 60 human rights organisations next day urged UN Human Rights Council, due to discuss allegations in March, to reject any such resolution.

Ethiopia Orthodox Church split stoked deadly intercommunal violence. After three archbishops in Oromia late Jan formed breakaway synod, accusing Holy Synod in Addis Ababa of discrimination, Abiy 1 Feb instructed his ministers not to get involved. Abiy’s remarks angered Holy Synod and its mostly Amhara supporters, who viewed him as condoning breakaway faction. Some 4 Feb protested in Oromia’s Shashemene town (West Arsi Zone); violence escalated as demonstrators clashed with Oromia regional special forces backed by breakaway faction, leaving around eight dead. Church same day called for nationwide protests, raising fears of more violence, but called them off after Church leaders 10 Feb met with Abiy. Two factions 15 Feb agreed to resolve disagreement peacefully.

Authorities and Oromo Liberation Army signalled interest in truce. While fighting in Oromia between govt forces and OLA continued, sides indicated growing interest in truce. Reports emerged of informal indirect talks between OLA and Abiy. Oromia President Shimelis Abdissa 17 Feb urged OLA to negotiate; OLA following day expressed readiness for talks but said request lacked “clarity”.

Guinea

Interim President Doumbouya defied West African regional bloc over transition-monitoring body; opposition protests resumed and turned deadly again.

Relations with ECOWAS soured amid rapprochement with Mali and Burkina Faso. FM Morissanda Kouyaté 9 Feb met with Malian and Burkinabé counterparts, Abdoulaye Diop and Olivia Rouamba, in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou; ministers pledged to deepen economic and security cooperation and called on West African regional bloc ECOWAS and African Union to lift suspensions imposed on all three countries after military coups in 2021 and 2022 (see Burkina Faso and Mali). Col. Doumbouya same day unilaterally installed committee to monitor transition back to civilian rule, largely made up of govt ministers and their close aides, overtly disregarding ECOWAS’s months-long efforts to create inclusive committee. In response, ECOWAS Mediator for Guinea Thomas Boni Yayi suspended planned visit to country in March, while regional bloc 18-19 Feb called on junta to “refrain from any unliteral action that risks undermining collaboration” and declined to lift sanctions. In sign of possible concessions, Doumbouya 21 Feb reaffirmed that junta “will not be part of the after-transition”, while PM Bernard Goumou 23 Feb asked ECOWAS to provide “the necessary support” for pursuing transition.

Security forces clashed with opposition protesters. Outlawed coalition National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC) 15-16 Feb led anti-govt demonstration in capital Conakry, demanding authorities lift nationwide ban on protests, release FNDC leaders and other prisoners detained for political reasons, and hold inclusive dialogue; clashes erupted between protesters and security forces, with FNDC 16 Feb reporting two protesters shot dead, 58 wounded and 47 detained; police said demonstrators erected roadblocks in several locations and threw stones at security vehicles, with seven security personnel injured. Govt later same day threatened to suspend opposition parties that 12 Feb supported FNDC’s call for protest, including Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea and former President Condé’s Rally of the Guinean People.

Kenya

Military launched new operation against banditry and cattle rustling in north west, and Al-Shabaab continued deadly attacks along border with Somalia.

Military deployed in north west to curb banditry and cattle rustling. In Turkana county, suspected bandits 6 Feb killed four people in Lomelo village; 10-11 Feb killed seven police officers on Kitale-Lodwar highway and Kainuk town. Govt 15 Feb deployed military to support police operations against banditry and cattle rustling in drought-affected counties of Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, Laikipia and Samburu. Violence continued in second half of month. Notably, suspected bandits 22 Feb ambushed govt forces near Kainuk town (Turkana), resulting in fierce shootout. Suspected cattle rustlers 24-25 Feb killed three, including local chief, in raids on four villages in Ikek-Sabuki area of Samburu.

Al-Shabaab continued attacks along Somali border in north east. Amid concern that offensive against Al-Shabaab in neighbouring Somalia could have pushed some fighters south, notably toward Kenya, President Ruto 1 Feb called for regional effort against Al-Shabaab at Somalia-Frontline States Summit in Somali capital Mogadishu (see Somalia). Govt 3 Feb announced plans to reopen Mandera border crossing with Somalia for first time since 2012 in bid to crack down on smuggling and improve border security. U.S. 9 Feb issued alert for potential “terror attacks” in capital Nairobi. In Garissa county, suspected Al-Shabaab roadside bombs 14 and 24 Feb killed at least five police officers along Garissa-Dadaab road.

In other important developments. Clashes between Toposa pastoralists from South Sudan and Turkana pastoralists from Kenya along shared border 6-8 Feb reportedly left over 20 dead. South Sudan 8 Feb summoned Kenyan envoy to Juba Samuel Nandwa to protest armed Kenyans’ alleged encroachment upon its territory; Kenya denied claims. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 21 Feb warned 5.4mn Kenyans likely to experience acute food insecurity from March amid worst drought in decades.

Mali

Bamako expelled UN mission’s human rights chief, tensions between interim authorities and northern armed groups reached new heights, and new reports of human rights abuses emerged amid military operations in centre.

Relations with UN mission MINUSMA deteriorated further. After civil society representative Aminata Cheick Dicko 27 Jan denounced abuses by Malian and Russian forces before UN Security Council, govt 5 Feb requested MINUSMA’s human rights chief leave country within 48 hours, citing his “partiality” in choosing Dicko for Security Council testimony.

Govt strengthened relations with Russia and military-led neighbours. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 7 Feb met with Interim President Col. Goïta in first ever visit to capital Bamako, saluted ongoing military cooperation. Burkinabé PM Kyélem de Tambèla 1 Feb travelled to Bamako to discuss bilateral security cooperation, while PM Choguel Maïga 23-26 Feb travelled to Burkinabé capital Ouagadougou, signed counter-terrorism cooperation agreement with Burkinabé counterpart. FM Diop 9 Feb met with Burkinabé and Guinean counterparts in Ouagadougou, discussed joining forces against West African regional bloc ECOWAS sanctions (see Burkina Faso and Guinea).

Northern armed groups and Bamako exchanged threats of military action. Permanent Strategic Framework bringing together signatory groups of 2015 Algiers Accord 1 Feb met with accord’s international mediation mechanism (led by Algeria), warned armed groups would “take action” if govt continues to block accord’s implementation. Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), coalition of three signatory rebel groups, 8 Feb announced merger into single entity. Member of transitional legislature 10 Feb claimed war with signatory armed groups was “inevitable”; CMA immediately denounced “belligerent” comments. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslim (JNIM) leader Iyad ag Ghaly late Jan-early Feb toured northern Mali, reportedly met with local notables including leaders of signatory armed groups to discuss cooperation against Islamic State-Sahel Province.

Army faced allegations of abuses amid ongoing operations in centre. Military 7 Feb announced operation against JNIM in Korientzé village (Mopti region) had killed 37 fighters. Locals alleged Malian and Russian Wagner forces 13 Feb killed five civilians in Soumouni village (Ségou region), whose inhabitants are believed to have reached agreement with JNIM.

Mozambique

Islamist insurgents launched series of attacks on Cabo Delgado province’s main highways during visit of TotalEnergies’ head, while also trying to garner support from residents.

Insurgent attacks persisted notably in Cabo Delgado’s central districts. In Meluco district, alleged Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) 1-4 Feb launched ambushes along N380 road connecting Cabo Delgado’s capital Pemba to province’s north, killing up to seven people near 19 de Outubro village and at least one civilian near Mitambo village. In Mueda district, ISMP 4 Feb attacked Chapa village on R698 road connecting Mueda to Montepuez towns, beheading at least two civilians and kidnapping several others. Further south in Montepuez district, ISMP same day entered Namoro village, also located along R698 road, and set several buildings on fire; 12-13 Feb raided military outpost at Nairoto village, reportedly killing five soldiers and prompting UK-based precious stone mining company Gemfields to 14 Feb evacuate staff from nearby exploration camp. As levels of violence decreased in second half of Feb, govt forces together with Rwandan troops 27 Feb captured at least ten militants after shootout in Makulo, Cabecera and Malinde villages in Mocímboa da Praia district.

Insurgents reached out to villagers in apparent change of strategy. Alleged ISMP militants 3 and 7 Feb appeared in Maculo village, Mocímboa da Praia district, called on residents to cooperate with them rather than with security forces. In Montepuez district, alleged ISMP elements around 9 Feb left handwritten note in settlement near Nairoto village, imploring villagers not to fear insurgency. Emerging trend could aim to garner support from population and secure supply lines to offset ISMP’s gradual losses since deployment of Rwandan and Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique troops in 2021.

TotalEnergies CEO in Cabo Delgado to assess resuming operations. TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné 3 Feb visited site of group’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Afungi Peninsula, Palma district, as part of determining when company will resume operations (on hold since April 2021 due to insecurity); same day met with President Nyusi in Pemba as Maputo bets on resumption of LNG project to attract other investors.

Niger

Military court sentenced several soldiers to prison for role in 2021 coup attempt, disinformation campaign targeted President Bazoum; deadly jihadist violence continued, notably in south west.

Trial of 2021 coup attempt concluded, fake news about new coup circulated online. Military court 24 Feb sentenced 27 people, mainly soldiers, to prison terms for involvement in March 2021 coup attempt during transition between former President Issoufou and President Bazoum. During trial, two mid-level officers admitted to playing role in coup plot, while many defendants claimed without evidence that coup attempt was false flag operation organised by Issoufou to eliminate dissenting officers from military. Rumours of new coup attempt throughout month circulated on social media in apparent bid to destabilise Bazoum, who has expressed vocal opposition to Mali and Burkina Faso’s military regimes and has remained committed to military cooperation with France; govt 17 Feb denied coup, denounced “malicious messages” and attempts to create “psychosis” among population.

Deadly attacks targeted civilians and govt forces, notably near Malian border. In Tahoua region (south west), suspected Islamic State-Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) combatants 1 Feb attacked displaced persons camp near Tillia village (Tchintabaraden department), which hosts Dawsahak people from Mali, leaving at least 18 dead. In Tillabery region (also south west), presumed IS-Sahel militants 10 Feb killed 17 soldiers, with another 13 wounded and 12 missing, in ambush near Intagarmey village (Banibangou department). In Maradi region (south), unidentified armed group 12 Feb attacked Oumba village (Madarounfa department), killing two civilians, wounding seven and abducting at least eight.

Nigeria

Presidential and parliamentary elections proceeded mostly peacefully despite violent incidents disrupting votes in some states; delayed result announcements raised concerns about vote rigging.

Sporadic attacks disrupted elections while delayed results spurred concerns. Voting 25 Feb proceeded peacefully in most states, though armed individuals attacked polling stations notably in Lagos and Rivers states, destroying ballot boxes and elections materials, in some cases stopping people from casting votes. In Lagos state, gunmen 25 Feb intimidated people into voting for ruling All Progressive Congress's presidential candidate Bola Tinubu. In Rivers state, youths also 25 Feb protested alleged attempts to manipulate elections; skirmishes with vigilantes left two people dead. Following vote, electoral commission delayed uploading results online, prompting concerns about rigging. Provisional tallies 27-28 Feb showed Tinubu closing in on victory, as Peoples Democratic Party and Labour Party rejected results, citing flawed process.

Violence continued in parts of the country, particularly in North West and North East. In Katsina state, clashes between cattle thieves and vigilantes 2 Feb reportedly left around 100 people killed in Bakori area, prompting thousands of residents to flee. Govt forces continued operations against jihadist groups in North East. In Borno state, army airstrikes 10 Feb killed scores of Boko Haram (BH) militants in Sambisa forest. Meanwhile, clashes between rival jihadists continued in Borno, with Islamic State West Africa Province around 9 Feb killing roughly 15 BH fighters near Gulmari village, Konduga area.

Biafra agitation and other violence persisted in South East. In Anambra state, gunmen 18-20 Feb killed at least eight police officers in spate of attacks on police stations in Idemilli North and Oyi areas. In Enugu state, gunmen 22 Feb killed Labour Party senatorial candidate Oyibo Chukwu and five others in ambush near Agbani town.

Banknotes swap caused cash shortages, sparking unrest. Following 10 Feb deadline (extended from 31 Jan) to turn in old banknotes as part of govt plan to reduce inflation and promote transparency, insufficient supply of new notes prompted protesters to attack banks and erect roadblocks in several cities. Notably, clashes 15 Feb erupted between security forces and protesters in Benin City, Edo state (South-South), with three people shot dead.

Rwanda

Kigali and Kinshasa continued to trade blame for eastern DR Congo violence amid alleged border post clash and deployment of hundreds of troops by Rwanda.

Tensions continued to run high between Kigali and Kinshasa. Rwandan military 15 Feb said its troops briefly exchanged fire with a dozen Congolese soldiers who entered neutral zone in western district of Rusizi and opened fire at Rwandan border post, condemned “act of provocation”. Congolese authorities immediately denied entering neutral zone, said clashes took place between its military and “bandits” near border with Rwanda in Bukavu city, South Kivu province. Congolese army 16 Feb accused Rwandan army of deploying 350 troops to North Kivu to reinforce M23 positions on “western axis”. President Kagame continued to deny Rwanda’s support for M23, and 22 Feb argued that Kinshasa had “crossed the red line” by collaborating with Hutu-led Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) militia. Kigali 27 Feb announced reinforcing security along border with DR Congo (DRC), claiming that Kinshasa is “bellicose” and is massing military hardware and foreign mercenaries along Rwandan border.

Regional and international efforts to resolve crisis continued. Kagame and Congolese President Tshisekedi 4 Feb met in Burundi for East African Community Summit, held first bilateral meeting since UN General Assembly in Sept 2022, but failed to break new ground on M23 issue. European Union 14 Feb blamed Rwanda and DR Congo for ignoring regional peace initiatives, urging “Rwanda to cease its support to the M23” and “DRC to cease all cooperation” with armed groups, “in particular the FDLR”.

Somalia

Govt and clan militia offensive against Al-Shabaab faced resistance in central states but started in southern Jubaland state; political tensions subsided in South West state.

Anti-Al-Shabaab offensive made slow progress in Galmudug, Hirshabelle states. Govt offensive against Al-Shabaab slowed in Galmudug state with govt forces focusing on clearing rural areas, particularly between Xaradheere and Bacadweyne towns in Mudug region. Amid heavy fighting, govt 10-11 Feb took back Doonlaye and Shabellow towns, and 14 Feb took control of Qeycad town, while other fronts in Galmudug remained largely stagnant. In Hirshabelle state, govt forces began pushing westward across Shabelle river and 23 Feb captured Shaw village. Al-Shabaab continued to put up significant resistance in Hirshabelle state, notably targeting Macawisley clan militia and govt position near Afcad village in Hiraan region and Eji village in Middle Shabelle region around 15 Feb. Al-Shabaab 21 Feb also attacked house reportedly hosting recuperating Macawisley members in Mogadishu, killing at least ten people.

Military operations against Al-Shabaab kicked off in southern state of Jubaland. Govt forces launched offensive in Jubaland with aim of clearing main road from state capital Kismayo to Afmadow town; Qunbi village recaptured 12 Feb. Group attempted to stymie operations in Jubaland: militants 11 Feb attacked Afmadow town with vehicle-born improvised explosive devices; temporarily took control of Bar Sanguni village 16 Feb. During Somalia-Frontline States Summit in capital Mogadishu, leaders from Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti 1 Feb vowed to support Somalia’s war with Al-Shabaab, as expansion of operations to Jubaland and South West states would likely involve Kenyan and Ethiopian bilateral forces.

Political tensions subsided in South West state. Conference to reconcile political elites in Baidoa in South West state, led by House Speaker Adan Madobe, 3 Feb concluded. Parties agreed to compensation following late Dec clashes between govt and opposition forces, while opposition accepted South West President Lafta-Gareen’s one-year term extension, with state-level presidential election to be held in Jan 2024. President Mohamud attended closing ceremony, stressing need to resolve political tensions in order to maintain pressure on Al-Shabaab.

Somaliland

Situation in Las Anod worsened dramatically, with clashes between Somaliland forces and local militias killing over 100; violence could escalate further in coming weeks if fighting spreads in Sool region or draws in Puntland, Somali or even Ethiopian actors.

Violence in Las Anod left over 100 dead. Conference of Dhulbahante clan representatives 5 Feb concluded in contested Sool region’s administrative capital Las Anod; participants said they did not recognise Somaliland’s administration and wanted to be part of Somalia, demanding withdrawal of Somaliland forces from wider area they inhabit in Sool region. Clashes same day broke out between Somaliland armed forces and Dhulbahante militias in Las Anod. Violence 6 Feb killed at least 34 people and wounded another 40, next day left at least 24 people dead and 53 injured. Hargeisa 7 Feb asserted fighters from neighbouring Puntland state of Somalia were fighting alongside local militias in Las Anod, which Puntland denied. Hargeisa 10 Feb announced unilateral ceasefire, which promptly broke down amid fresh fighting, and violence continued throughout month with mortar shelling in town itself. Somaliland 25-26 Feb withdrew forces from important military base in Tukaraq village east of Las Anod.

Regional and international actors called for calm. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud 7 Feb called for negotiated settlement between Somaliland administration and clan elders of Las Anod, said “solution is in our pursuit of united Somalia”. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk same day urged Somali authorities “to carry out a credible and impartial investigation into the clashes to determine who is responsible and to hold them accountable in fair trials”. UN humanitarian agency 14 Feb said violence since early Feb had displaced over 185,000 people from Las Anod.

South Sudan

Govt lifted suspension of Rome peace talks ahead of Pope’s visit, reports emerged of troop build-up in restive Upper Nile, and violence persisted in several other states.

Kiir lifted suspension of Rome peace talks ahead of papal visit. As part of his “pilgrimage of peace”, Pope Francis 3-5 Feb visited capital Juba, meeting privately with President Kiir on first day. To mark Pope’s arrival, Kiir 3 Feb formally lifted suspension of Rome peace talks with holdout opposition groups, but groups’ leaders raised doubts about govt’s intentions. Meanwhile, govt 21 Feb announced beginning of extended transitional period lasting until Feb 2025.

Reports of mobilisations in Upper Nile state emerged throughout month. Concerns grew early Feb about possible resumption of hostilities in Upper Nile state, where late 2022 fighting pitting ethnic Shilluk “Agwalek” forces under Gen. Johnson Olony against Nuer forces, predominantly backed by Gen. Simon Gatwech, killed hundreds and displaced thousands. UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 1 Feb stated it was concerned about reported build-up of Agwelek forces, who may want to regain territory lost late 2022. Officials in Jonglei state warned renewed violence could spill into Jonglei. Agwalek forces 24 Feb harassed UNMISS patrol. Situation in Upper Nile began to de-escalate late Feb, however, following Juba’s efforts to defuse tensions among local commanders.

Violence remained rampant elsewhere. Clashes between Twic Dinka from Warrap State and Ngok Dinka from Abyei Administrative Area continued, with Ngok Dinka 3 Feb attacking Twic communities, killing three; Twic Dinka 6, 13 Feb attacked Alal county in Abyei, killing dozens. In Central Equatoria state, armed Kuku youths 2 Feb attacked Bor Dinka cattle camp in Kajo Keji county, killing several herders; Dinka cattle keepers same day retaliated, killing over 20 civilians. Luacjang armed groups from Tonj East county, Warrap state, 21 Feb attacked Payam communities of Rumbek North county, Lakes state, killing at least 36. Deadly clashes between South Sudan’s Toposa and Kenya’s Turkana communities 5-8 Feb left 13 dead near Nadapal border crossing in disputed border territory Ilemi Triangle.

Sudan

“Phase II” negotiations to restore civilian rule struggled to make headway as manoeuvring by Egypt and South Sudan risked further complicating transition; Israel sought to advance normalisation.

Phase II negotiations to resolve outstanding issues and restore civilian rule stalled. Trilateral mechanism led by African Union (AU), UN mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 31 Jan-3 Feb organised workshop on controversial Juba Peace Agreement (JPA); JPA signatories, who reject December Framework Agreement, boycotted meeting; Quad – U.S., UK, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) – mid-month offered to facilitate talks amid standoff between JPA signatories and main opposition group Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FCC-CC). Meanwhile, number of tribal representatives 12-15 Feb attended conference on crisis in eastern Sudan, but some Beja chieftains boycotted meeting. FFC-CC throughout month held closed meetings on transitional justice and security sector reform to address internal divisions before negotiating with military.

Egypt hosted parallel conference rejecting Framework Agreement. In move widely viewed as attempt to increase Egypt’s role in negotiations and secure its interests in Sudan, Cairo 2-7 Feb organised parallel conference on transitional period. Egypt claimed meeting would complement trilateral mechanism, but did not invite UN, AU or IGAD. FFC-CC rejected invitation, accusing Egypt of derailing transition to civilian govt. Over 80 representatives participated, mostly from FFC-Democratic Block, National Movement Forces and Alliance of the Revolution Committees, as well as UAE, South Sudan, U.S., and Arab League. Participants rejected Framework Agreement and 7 Feb outlined new proposals for sovereign council and announced new alliance, National Democratic Forces Coordination.

South Sudan hosted parallel meeting on implementation of JPA. South Sudan 13-19 Feb hosted conference in its capital Juba to discuss JPA implementation. Sudanese military and 13 rebel groups that signed JPA attended but Juba did not invite FFC-CC, which demands amendments to JPA. Participants 19 Feb signed implementation matrix for original JPA, ignoring civilian demands for revision.

In other important developments. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Israeli FM Eli Cohen 2 Feb agreed to move toward normalising relations; scores 6 Feb protested agreement in capital Khartoum. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 8-9 Feb visited Sudan to garner support against Western sanctions levied against Russia over war in Ukraine.

Togo

Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadists launched deadliest attack in country to date, with dozens of civilians killed, suggesting group is durably implanted in northern Togo.

Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 10 Feb attacked Tola and Gningou villages, Kpendjal prefecture (Savanes region), leaving 31 civilians dead in what amounts to deadliest jihadist attack in Togo to date; in response, army next day reportedly killed around ten suspected assailants. Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks also continued in Savanes region. Notably, IED 2 Feb reportedly killed between four and 12 civilians in Enamoufali locality, also Kpendjal.

Uganda

Corruption scandals shook President Museveni’s cabinet; East African military chiefs reportedly directed Uganda to deploy troops to fight M23 in eastern DR Congo.

Museveni’s ministers faced corruption allegations. Parliament 31 Jan-17 Feb conducted investigation into allegations that Gender, Labour and Social Development Minister Betty Amongi misused $1.6mn from National Social Security Fund under her supervision. Authorities 11 Feb arrested three relatives of Karamoja Affairs Minister Mary Goretti Kitutu for allegedly selling govt-funded relief items destined for residents of north-eastern Karamoja region; Karamoja legislators 22 Feb started process to have Kitutu censured, while Parliament 27 Feb opened formal investigation into case.

Govt announced closing UN human rights office. Foreign ministry 3 Feb announced govt will not renew mandate of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights office in Uganda beyond its current term, effectively terminating body’s work, citing progress in domestic capacity to monitor rights compliance; human right activists and advocacy groups, notably Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum, in following days denounced “mockery” and accused govt of running from international scrutiny.

Army allegedly set to fight M23 rebels in DR Congo’s east. At meeting in Kenya’s capital Nairobi 9 Feb, East African Community military chiefs reportedly agreed that Uganda (as well as Burundi and South Sudan) will deploy troops in North Kivu province to fight M23 rebels alongside Kenyan forces; Uganda did not officially confirm plan, which, if implemented, could exacerbate regional rivalries. Meanwhile, Ugandan army 18 Feb reportedly handed over to Congolese military 34 civilians rescued from Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces captivity in eastern DR Congo (see DR Congo).

Zimbabwe

Political tensions remained high ahead of general elections, as new boundaries for constituencies and wards faced backlash.

Politically motivated violence continued to run high. Members of main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) and ruling Zanu-PF party 12 Feb clashed at CCC rallies in towns of Gokwe (Midlands province) and Chivi (Masvingo province); both sides traded blame for violence. Authorities 18 Feb arrested CCC councillor in Masvingo city (Masvingo province) for holding unauthorised meeting at his house. CCC leader Nelson Chamisa 26 Feb called out President Mnangagwa over banned rallies and continued persecution of party activists.

Mnangagwa gazetted constituency delimitation report despite opposition. Electoral commission 3 Feb presented final delimitation report to Mnangagwa, with commission president saying constituency and ward boundaries had been redrawn following feedback received in Jan. Opposition and civil society however said new delimitation of constituencies and wards tilts electoral playing field in favour of Zanu-PF. Notably, opposition Movement for Democratic Change 6 Feb said elections may be null and void because of massive defects in delimitation exercise, while CCC around 17 Feb said Zanu-PF was resorting to “their usual dirty tactics of violating the Constitution, political violence and electoral malpractices”. Mnangagwa 20 Feb gazetted delimitation report, setting stage for general elections in July-Aug.

Senate passed controversial amendment to Private Voluntary Organisations Act. Senate 1 Feb approved amendment bill to Private Voluntary Organisations Act meant to counter terrorism and money laundering by giving govt greater control of NGOs and other non-profits. CCC VP Tendai Biti next day warned of “unprecedented attack on human rights defenders”, while UN experts 14 Feb urged Mnangagwa to refrain from enacting bill, warning it would “severely restrict civic space and the right to freedom of association”. Mnangagwa 19 Feb said bill will protect country from “foreign interests” and vowed to sign it into law.

Asia

Afghanistan

Taliban killed Islamic State members while violence continued in south; senior Taliban officials voiced veiled criticism of leadership, signalling dissatisfaction with country’s direction.

Taliban forces claimed victories over Islamic State, violence persisted in south. Feb saw lowest levels of violent incidents countrywide since Taliban takeover in Aug 2021, notwithstanding Taliban raids on Islamic State hideouts and incidents in south. Social media accounts linked to Islamic State’s local branch (ISKP) 21 Feb claimed that Taliban security forces 14 Feb killed Ejaz Ahmad Ahangar, head of group’s Indian chapter known as Islamic State Hind. Taliban 27 Feb confirmed they had killed Qari Fateh – head of ISKP’s intelligence and operations and mastermind behind group’s recent attacks in capital Kabul – in raid in Kabul. Taliban authorities late Jan launched website aimed at countering ISKP propaganda, which criticised Taliban’s relations with China and urged Uighur militant group Turkestan Islamic Party to join ISKP. Meanwhile, in addition to Afghan Freedom Front activity, Afghanistan Liberation Movement (both composed mostly of former security members) claimed attacks in south against Taliban; notably, Afghanistan Liberation Movement gunmen 8 Feb killed Taliban judge in Helmand province. Inter-tribal grievances pitting pro-Taliban elements of Noorzai tribe against anti-Taliban rival southern tribes appear to be driving conflict.

Senior officials signalled potential disapproval of draconian policies. Several top officials offered subtle yet notable criticism of Taliban leadership. Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani 11 Feb stated govt’s responsibility was to avoid monopolising power. Deputy PM Abdul Salam Hanafi 13 Feb indirectly criticised shutdown of girls’ schooling, stating that development of country without strengthening and modernising educational institutions was “mere fantasy” and Islamic scholars ought to find solutions to people’s problems rather than declare everything prohibited. Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoob 15 Feb stated that govt leaders “must respond to the legitimate demands of the people”. Comments may signal attempted pushback against recent draconian measures reportedly spearheaded by emir.

Islamabad urged Taliban to curtail Pakistani Taliban. Senior Pakistani delegation 22 Feb met top Taliban security officials in Kabul, reportedly to urge authorities to curb Pakistani Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan amid series of deadly attacks in Pakistan (see Pakistan).

Bangladesh

Ruling Awami League continued clampdown on opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), while violence persisted in Rohingya refugee camps.

BNP held anti-govt rallies countrywide, leading to violent clashes. Calling for govt to step down and next election to be held under caretaker administration, BNP and allies 11 Feb held rallies in Narayanganj, Sirajganj, Natore, Bogra, Jamalpur, Ghazipur, Barguna and Narsingdi districts, which led to clashes with Awami League supporters that left over 100 BNP leaders and supporters injured; police arrested scores of BNP and opposition Jamaat-e-Islami supporters. Election commissioner 14 Feb announced general election to be held between late Dec and early Jan. BNP sec gen 17 Feb reiterated demands and accused police of torturing and killing opposition activists; earlier, NGO Human Rights Watch 3 Feb had called on authorities to investigate allegations of forced disappearances. Court 20 Feb upheld govt’s late Dec order shutting down BNP newspaper.

Violence in Rohingya camps continued. Assailant 16 Feb shot and injured Rohingya camp leader and armed Rohingya women same day reportedly shot dead woman; shooters 22 Feb targeted another camp leader who died next day. Govt report 15 Feb revealed ten militant and criminal groups active in Rohingya camps and said violent clashes between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army – dominant group in most camps – and rival Nabi Hossen Dakat Dal often resulted in casualties. As envoys from France, Japan, China and UN agencies visited Bhasan Char camps to monitor living conditions, World Food Programme 17 Feb said it would reduce food assistance to Rohingya refugees from $12 to $10 per person, citing funding shortfall, and warned of “immense and long-lasting” food insecurity repercussions.

Authorities arrested suspected militants. Paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) 7 Feb arrested five militants of Christian-dominated tribal group Kuki-Chin National Front, which is fighting for separate state in some Chittagong Hill Tracts regions, amid reported gunfight in Bandarband district. RAB director next day said 14 members of group, and 43 militants from aligned outfit Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, had been arrested in operation under way since Oct 2022. Authorities 21 Feb arrested Jama’atul Ansar chief in Dhaka.

China/Japan

China continued military activity in Japan’s territorial waters, while Tokyo and Beijing held high-level security talks.

China continued maritime activity in region amid Japan-U.S. military drills. As of 26 Feb, Japanese Coast Guard had spotted 86 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone. Notably, Chinese Navy survey vessel 12 Feb crossed into Japanese territorial waters from south west of Yakushima island, marking seventh entry by such a ship into seas off Kagoshima city since Nov 2021, with last sighting in Dec 2022. Tokyo 14 Feb said three unidentified flying objects spotted over its territory in Nov 2019, June 2020 and Sept 2021 are “strongly suspected” to have been Chinese spy balloons. Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force and U.S. Marine Corps 16 Feb held large-scale joint drills in south-western Japan, simulating defending and recapturing small islands, until 12 March.

Tokyo and Beijing discussed contested islands and Taiwan. In their first conversation, recently appointed Chinese FM Qin Gang and Japanese counterpart Yoshimasa Hayashi 2 Feb discussed East China Sea and Taiwan Strait; Qin expressed Beijing’s hopes Japan can stop “right-wing forces” from provoking disputes over contested islands, while Hayashi noted Japanese public opinion regarding China is “extremely severe” and also expressed “serious concern” about China’s increasing military activity near Japan and Taiwan; pair agreed to continue close communication “at all levels”. Sides 22 Feb held first high-level security talks in four years in Japanese capital Tokyo; China cited Japanese military build-up as worry, while Japan highlighted concerns about disputed islands, China’s ties to Russia and Chinese surveillance balloons.

India

Govt bolstered border presence as it held talks with China on disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC), while Maoist violence continued.

Govt shored up presence along border and continued talks with China. Amid border dispute with China, govt 15 Feb mandated seven new battalions of paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police to guard full length of 3,488km India-China border. Govt same day approved construction of Shinku La tunnel to boost connectivity between Ladakh region (location of LAC) and neighbouring Himachal Pradesh state, and allocated $580mn to boost development and tourism in villages along disputed border. Govt and Chinese officials 22 Feb held bilateral consultation mechanism meeting in Chinese capital Beijing, discussing disengagement on remaining friction points along LAC and pledging to “continue discussions through diplomatic and military channels”.

Maoist violence continued in centre and south east. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), suspected Maoists 5 Feb killed tribal leader and member of ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Bijapur district; 20 Feb killed police constable in Bijapur district and two policemen in Rajnandgaon district; 25 Feb killed three security personnel in clashes in Sukma district. In Andhra Pradesh state (south east), security forces 20 Feb arrested two Maoists in Alluri Sitaramaraju district and 22 Feb arrested local Maoist leader during clashes near border with Odisha state.

In other important developments. Tax authorities 14 Feb raided news channel BBC’s offices in New Delhi and Mumbai, in apparent retaliation for broadcasting in Jan documentary examining PM Modi’s rise and role during 2002 Gujarat anti-Muslim riot. Bajrang Dal – Hindu nationalist militant group with ties to BJP – 15 Feb allegedly kidnapped two Muslims suspected of cow smuggling in Rajasthan state’s (north west) Bharatpur district; police next day found victims’ burned bodies in neighbouring Haryana state. Meanwhile, hundreds of residents from Ladakh region – which govt split from Jammu and Kashmir state and turned into separate union territory in 2019 – 15 Feb held protest in capital New Delhi, demanding statehood and constitutional safeguards.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Acrimony persisted between India and Pakistan, while Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) witnessed insecurity, Hindu Pandits’ relocation campaign and protests of property demolitions.

India alleged Pakistani drone operations. Indian security agencies continued to claim they had intercepted drones infiltrating Indian territory from Pakistan. Notably, forces 3 Feb shot down drone in Punjab’s Amritsar sector; 10 Feb recovered arms and drugs from intercepted drone in Punjab’s Ferozepur sector and intercepted three Pakistani infiltrators in Kupwara district, killing one.

Militant attacks and security operations remained at low ebb. Amid harsh winter, militant activity remained reduced while security forces conducted arrests: 1 Feb arrested three alleged Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militants in Rajouri district and three more in Srinagar city 7 Feb; 3 Feb arrested six Jaish-e-Muhammad militant associates in Kulgam district. The Resistance Front claimed responsibility for reported 15 Feb attack in Srinagar; security forces 17 Feb arrested two militants of group in Srinagar. Security forces 18 Feb arrested three suspected Hizbul Mujahideen militant associates in Kulgam district. On fourth anniversary of Pulwama suicide attack that killed 40 security personnel, Kashmir’s senior police official 14 Feb announced four of 19 Jaish-e-Mohammad militants involved were still at large and that group has only eight local fighters in region. Media outlet Indian Express 21 Feb reported govt was considering withdrawal of army from Kashmir, to be replaced by paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force.

Hindu Pandits sought relocation, locals protested authorities’ “anti-encroachment” drive. Kashmiri Hindu Pandit govt employees continued protests, refusing to work until demands are met for transfer to Jammu from Kashmir following targeted militant attacks against them. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi early Feb urged govt “not to force Kashmiri Pandit government officials to return to the Valley amid targeted killings”. Suspected militants 26 Feb killed Kashmiri Pandit man in Pulwama district. Meanwhile, J&K authorities continued anti-encroachment efforts through demolition of properties that started in Jan, triggering mass protests in Srinagar, Bathindi and Ramban on 4 Feb, while markets 15 Feb observed shutdown in Kashmir valley; people claimed authorities have not given enough time to prove ownership.

Indonesia

Separatist fighters in Papua region kidnapped New Zealand pilot, demanding govt recognise region’s independence.

Members of West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) – military wing of Free Papua Organisation – 7 Feb took hostage New Zealand national and Susi Air pilot Philip Mehrtens in Paro District of Nduga regency, Papua region, demanding govt recognise Papua’s independence in return for his release. TPNPB 9 Feb claimed it sought to bring “ongoing state of human suffering and war in West Papua to the attention of the international media and world community” and reiterated demands, including that foreign govts cease training and arming Indonesian security forces. Reports during month suggested dialogue was under way to secure Mehrtens’ release; Chief Security Minister Mahfud MD 28 Feb said security forces had surrounded hostage takers but would refrain from action that could endanger pilot’s life.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea continued spate of provocative missile launches amid U.S.-South Korea drills, raising prospect of escalation around allied military exercises in March.

North Korea elevated threats amid frequent missile tests. Pyongyang seized upon perceived threats posed by U.S. and South Korea as pretext for planned military testing. Notably, North Korea 18 Feb launched Hwaseong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on lofted trajectory, which reached almost 6000km altitude before falling into East Sea/Sea of Japan. South Korea and U.S. 19 Feb conducted joint drills involving B1-B strategic bombers. North Korea 20 Feb launched two “tactical nuclear” 600mm rockets at targets 395km and 337km away; U.S. and ten other states same day raised missile launch two days prior at UN Security Council, though no agreement was reached on Council response. After South Korean, U.S. and Japanese Aegis-equipped destroyers 22 Feb participated in missile defence drill off peninsula’s eastern coast, Pyongyang next day fired four long-range cruise missiles on 2000km trajectories. U.S. 23 Feb said it held tabletop drill with Seoul simulating North Korea using nuclear weapon, at which North Korea expressed deep concern. North Korea 24 Feb indicated further actions to come, underscoring likelihood of period of military escalation in coming weeks, potentially around U.S.-South Korea 11-day spring military exercise that commences mid-March.

North held military parade to mark anniversary. Pyongyang 8 Feb held late-night military parade to mark founding of country’s military. Though largely aimed at domestic audiences, event allowed military to display numerous intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Row erupted over nuclear contamination claims. South Korea 24 Feb offered to test for nuclear contamination almost one thousand North Korean defector-migrants from regions near North Korea’s only nuclear test facility at Punggye-ri in remote north east; offer followed 21 Feb report by Seoul-based NGO Transitional Justice Working Group that claimed many thousands of North Koreans from towns and villages near nuclear test site may have been exposed to contaminated water.

Myanmar

Govt delayed elections as it extended state of emergency and expanded martial law, while military and resistance groups clashed heavily and regional leaders debated crisis response.

Regime extended state of emergency and imposed martial law. Amid widespread insecurity, regime 1 Feb announced six-month extension of state of emergency, beyond constitutional deadline, pushing back timeline of election to no later than 31 Jan 2024. Regime 2 Feb imposed martial law on 37 townships in eight states and regions, and another three townships on 22 Feb, bringing total number of townships under martial law to 52. Election preparations, however, continued: govt 3 Feb said voter list data from some 87% of households had been verified.

Resistance groups continued raids and battled regime forces. In Chin State, Chin National Army and Chinland Defence Force 8 Feb raided police station in Thantlang town, killing four soldiers; military next day launched airstrikes around town. In Sagaing region, resistance groups led by Homalin People’s Defence Force (PDF) early Feb overran Shwe Pyi Aye town, Homalin township, before major military offensive repelled resistance. Regime forces 4-5 Feb allegedly raided five villages in Kanbalu township, displacing 2,000 villagers. Regime 7 Feb overran resistance camps in southern Salingyi township following martial law imposition. Light Infantry Division 44 soldiers 3 Feb allegedly beheaded six PDF members and killed one civilian near Pale township. In Magway region, Pakokku District PDF Battalion 3 on 5 Feb attacked two regime vehicles on Pakokku-Yesagyo road, killing seven.

Indonesia and Malaysia urged more robust crisis response. Indonesian President Widodo 1 Feb revealed intention to send top general to Myanmar “as soon as possible” for dialogue and said regional bloc ASEAN would not be “held hostage” by crisis. ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat held 3-4 Feb concluded “inclusive national dialogue” was only way to peacefully resolve crisis. In meeting with Thai PM Prayut Chan-o-cha, Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim 9 Feb urged Thailand to take more active role, next day said crisis should “not frustrate our moves”. Meanwhile, European Union 20 Feb imposed fresh sanctions on nine regime-linked individuals and seven entities.

Nepal

Ahead of presidential election in March, coalition govt collapsed just two months into tenure as Nepali Congress and Maoists revived their alliance.

Maoists, Nepali Congress, and six other parties 24 Feb struck new pact endorsing Nepali Congress’ candidate for forthcoming 9 March presidential election. Deal contravened Dec agreement between Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) and Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist), or UML, which propelled Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” to PM. In response, UML 27 Feb announced its withdrawal from govt, following two other parties leaving governing coalition earlier in month. Senior Nepali Congress leader Ram Chandra Poudel 25 Feb filed his nomination for presidency at Election Commission, while UML put forward former House Speaker Subas Nembang. With new president to be elected via electoral college comprising federal parliament and provincial assemblies, Poudel appears set to garner sufficient support if new Maoist-Nepali Congress pact holds. Further politicisation of ceremonial head of state position could portend further political instability, as observers expressed concern over activist presidency undermining legislature.

Pakistan

Insecurity persisted amid surging militant attacks, political tensions remained high over timing of provincial polls, and relations with Taliban authorities in Afghanistan displayed rifts.

Pakistani Taliban and Baloch militants continued deadly attacks. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 17 Feb attacked police headquarters in Karachi city, financial hub and capital of Sindh province, killing four security personnel and civilian. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, police chief 17 Feb reported 62 militant attacks in Jan. In Balochistan province, attacks continued amid reports of TTP alliance with local Baloch militant groups: notably, roadside blasts 4 Feb killed soldier in Gwadar and two soldiers in Bolan district; bomb blast 10 Feb killed two soldiers in Kohlu district. Meanwhile, TTP’s Peshawar bombing fuelled political tensions: PM Sharif 1 Feb implicitly blamed former PM Imran Khan, whose govt had backed talks with TTP, as Khan in turn blamed Sharif for security failures; senior official of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 19 Feb blamed former army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa.

Constitutional-political crisis deepened over forthcoming provincial polls. Following dissolution of legislatures in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, President Alvi (PTI loyalist) 20 Feb announced elections in both would be held on 9 April; announcement came after both provincial governors refused to set dates and election commission claimed it did not have legal authority. Sharif govt strongly rejected Alvi’s declaration, emphasising his lack of constitutional jurisdiction. Supreme Court 22 Feb took up polling date controversy; ruling coalition parties 24 Feb demanded full court hearing. Meanwhile, Khan 21 Feb announced “court arrest drive” against “attack on our constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights” and “economic meltdown” amid accusations of govt intimidation and abuses; almost 100 party activists and leaders were detained.

Govt publicly urged Afghan Taliban to address terrorism. FM Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari 17 Feb confirmed “uptick in terrorist activity in Pakistan since the fall of Kabul” and warned of it spreading, citing need to convince Kabul to “take on terrorism within their borders”. High-level security delegation 22 Feb met Taliban officials in Kabul to discuss TTP sanctuaries; Islamabad said authorities agreed to collaborate, but it remained unclear if engagement can stem TTP attacks.

Philippines

Insecurity persisted in south amid attacks by Islamist groups and clan feuds, while deadly hostilities continued between govt and Communist rebels.

In south, military clashed with Islamist groups and clan feuds continued. Insecurity persisted in Bangsomoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). In Lanao del Sur province, remnants of Islamic State-linked Maute group 5 Feb ambushed Philippine Marine Corps unit in Marogong town, killing soldier and injuring three others. In Sulu province, police 5 Feb clashed with Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) fighters at Maimbung and Parang boundary while serving arrest warrant, wounding two civilians. In Sultan Kudarat province, military 18 Feb killed Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) commander “Boy Jacket”, previously involved in clashes with Moro Islamic Liberation Front and govt forces, in Tacurong city. Two ASG militants 6 Feb surrendered to military in Patikul town, Sulu province, while five BIFF members 20 Feb surrendered in Tacurong city. Meanwhile, violence stemming from clan feuds during month killed several minors in Pikit town, Cotabato province; in response to attacks, police 18 Feb suspended gun permits and imposed province-wide gun ban.

Communist insurgency killed over dozen and displaced hundreds. Military operations and some militant ambushes by communist New People’s Army (NPA) in Mindanao Island in south, Visayas Islands in centre and Luzon Island in north killed at least 18 combatants and civilians. Clashes between military and NPA in Negros Occidental province 4 Feb displaced hundreds of civilians.

South China Sea

Philippines deepened military cooperation with U.S. and Japan amid elevated tensions with China over South China Sea (SCS).

Philippines expanded partnership with U.S. and Japan. U.S. and Philippines 2 Feb signed deal permitting U.S. forces access to four military bases in Philippines, adding to five existing bases and bolstering U.S. presence on south-eastern rim of SCS; pair also agreed to restart joint maritime patrols in SCS. U.S. Nimitz Carrier Strike Group and marines 11 Feb conducted drills in SCS; Manila 15 Feb announced annual Balikatan joint exercises with U.S. will be conducted in spring on greater scale than last year. Philippine President Marcos 8-12 Feb signed seven agreements with Japanese PM Kishida, including $13bn package covering several areas related to defence; deal marks step toward completing Reciprocal Access Agreement facilitating greater military cooperation. Marcos 12 Feb also expressed interest in adopting Visiting Forces Agreement with Japan as well as revisiting potential trilateral security pact with Washington. Philippines 22 Feb discussed conducting joint patrols with Australia.

Maritime tensions persisted between Philippines and China. Two Chinese Coast Guard and two maritime militia vessels 1 Feb tailed Philippine warship near Mischief Reef. Philippine Coast Guard 6 Feb accused Chinese Coast Guard vessel of shining “military-grade laser light” at one of its boats around 20km from Second Thomas Shoal (Ayugin Shoal) in Spratly Islands under control of Philippine forces; Beijing said incident was “intrusion without permission” by Philippine Coast Guard. Marcos 14 Feb summoned Chinese ambassador to express “serious concern” over “increasing frequency and intensity of actions”. Philippine FM Enrique Manalo 20 Feb said Chinese harassment of Philippine vessels in SCS is “daily situation”. Chinese Coast Guard vessel 21 Feb issued radio challenges to Philippine Coast Guard aircraft flying over Sabina and Second Thomas Shoals inside Manila’s exclusive economic zone; around 30 Chinese vessels continued to linger in area late month.

Regional bloc ASEAN pledged to wrap up Code of Conduct negotiations. ASEAN foreign ministers during 3-4 Feb meeting vowed to complete SCS Code of Conduct negotiations with China; ASEAN chair Indonesia said it is ready to host first round of negotiations by March.

Sri Lanka

Tensions spiked as govt claimed funding shortfall, forcing indefinite postponement of local elections; police crackdown on pro-election protesters killed opposition politician and injured over dozen.

Govt invoked financial crisis, forcing election commission to postpone local polls. Ahead of local elections scheduled for 9 March, cabinet 13 Feb approved President Wickremesinghe’s proposal to limit govt expenditure on credit to five “essential” categories, which excluded election expenses. Election Commission next day was forced to suspend postal voting and 24 Feb announced vote’s indefinite postponement. Election monitoring groups, Bar Association and opposition parties condemned govt’s decision, while Wickremesinghe 23 Feb confirmed “we have no money” for elections and denied vote was ever properly scheduled. Police 20 Feb dispersed people protesting move in capital Colombo led by main opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya party; opposition National People’s Power member 26 Feb died from injuries sustained in police attack on protest previous day that injured over dozen.

Govt marked Independence Day amid dissent and widespread strife. Amid high inflation and severe recession, govt was roundly criticised for spending $500,000 on military parade to mark 75th anniversary of independence on 4 Feb; police violently dispersed Colombo sit-in protesting cost. Tamil communities in north and east same day held demonstrations demanding end to “occupation of the Tamil homeland” and began four-day march from northern city Jaffna to eastern town Batticaloa. Govt employees continued protests over income tax hikes. Further compounding hardship, Ceylon Electricity Board 15 Feb announced increase in electricity prices by average of 66%, which threatens collapse of small and medium-sized businesses. Efforts to secure financial bailout continued: notably, media reports 17 Feb claimed International Monetary Fund was considering approving bailout before China agrees to join debt restructuring deal.

Protest leader released amid UN Human Rights Council session. Authorities 1 Feb released on bail student activist and protest leader Wasantha Mudalige after five and a half months of detention under Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and other laws. UN Human Rights Council same day began scheduled Universal Periodic Review; many states praised govt for its commitment to reform and reconciliation, while U.S., UK, Canada, New Zealand and Norway urged govt to repeal PTA.

Taiwan Strait

China maintained frequent aerial and maritime activity around island, while opposition party Kuomintang (KMT) went to China, and U.S. and Taiwan exchanged visits by senior officials.

China continued military presence around island. As of 27 Feb, Taiwan detected 311 Chinese military aircraft entering its air defence identification zone (ADIZ) during month, of which at least 110 either crossed unofficial maritime demarcation known as “median line” or were detected in south-western ADIZ near strategic Bashi Channel; Taiwan reported 109 sightings of Chinese naval vessels in surrounding waters in course of month. Notably, Taiwan 1 Feb activated missile systems and scrambled jets in response to operations by 34 Chinese military aircraft and nine warships, including 20 aircraft crossing median line.

Taiwan opposition delegation visited China. Ahead of Taiwan’s presidential election in Jan 2024, main opposition party KMT’s Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia 8-17 Feb led delegation to China, meeting with newly appointed Director of Taiwan Affairs Office Song Tao and China’s top Taiwan affairs official Wang Huning; KMT said visit concerned needs of Taiwanese based in China, Chinese business regulations and developing ties with Chinese officials; Song and Wang both expressed China’s desire to enhance mutual trust and cooperation with KMT on basis of “1992 consensus”. Shanghai’s Taiwan Affairs Office officials 18-20 Feb visited Taiwan following invitation by Taipei city authorities, marking first visit by Chinese officials to Taiwan since borders reopened last Oct.

Taiwan and U.S. continued defence ties and exchanged visits by senior officials. Taiwan 8 Feb signed two contracts with U.S. worth total of $85mn to maintain its fleet of F-16 fighter jets. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase 17 Feb arrived in Taiwan, marking visit by most senior U.S. defence official since 2019. Bipartisan U.S. congressional delegation 21 Feb met President Tsai, who confirmed two countries “continue to bolster military exchanges”. Reports late month indicated U.S. looking to expand its small troop presence in Taiwan to help train Taiwanese forces. FM Joseph Wu and National Security Council Sec Gen Wellington Ku 23 Feb visited Washington for security dialogue with senior U.S. officials, including Deputy Sec State Wendy Sherman.

Thailand

Courts granted bail to several prisoners convicted of lèse-majesté as activists continued hunger strike, while insecurity persisted in deep south amid peace dialogue meetings.

Courts granted bail to protesters amid activists’ hunger strike. Activists Tantawan Tuatulanon and Orawan Phuphong 27 Feb entered 40th day of hunger strike, and fourth day carrying out their protest in front of Supreme Court, demanding release of political prisoners and revocation of lèse-majesté and sedition laws; both women were charged with variety of crimes, including lèse-majesté. Courts granted several bail requests during month: notably, court 9 Feb granted bail to Sombat Thongyoi, convicted of lèse-majesté; Supreme Court 10 Feb granted bail to Sitthichok Sethasavet, convicted of lèse-majesté; Bangkok Criminal Court 17 Feb granted bail to four people jailed following June 2022 pro-democracy protest; Ratchadaphisek Criminal Court 20 Feb granted temporary release of three activists. Meanwhile, authorities indicated that general election is expected to be held on 7 May.

Deep south peace dialogue produced new plan as insecurity persisted. Malaysia’s General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin – newly appointed facilitator of peace dialogue process between main separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and Thai govt – 3 Feb met head of Thai dialogue delegation General Wanlop Rugsanaoh in capital Bangkok. Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim 9-10 Feb visited Bangkok, where he expressed optimism about finding solution to instability in southern provinces. Sixth round of Joint Working Group-South Thailand Peace Dialogue 20 Feb commenced in Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur; Thailand and Malaysia next day issued statements that Thailand and BRN agreed on Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace with timeframe of 2023-2024. Meanwhile, in Pattani province, IEDs 2 Feb damaged two power poles in Khok Pho district; unidentified gunmen 14 Feb shot and killed retired imam in Saiburi district. In Yala Province, militants 17 Feb ambushed police officers responding to arson attacks in Bannang Sata district, killing one police officer and wounding four.

Europe & Central Asia

Armenia

International efforts to advance peace negotiations continued but with little progress, European Union (EU) launched monitoring mission, and earthquake in Türkiye opened up opportunities for cooperation.

Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged draft peace treaty, but talks between FMs did not resume. Blockade of Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) with Armenia (see Nagorno-Karabakh) continued to hinder diplomatic efforts, with no meetings in Feb between Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs, who are responsible for formal negotiations on peace treaty. Still, PM Pashinyan 16 Feb announced Yerevan had sent draft proposal of peace treaty to Baku, which Azerbaijani President Aliyev 18 Feb confirmed receiving. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 18 Feb chaired meeting with Pashinyan and Aliyev at Munich Security Conference to discuss progress on draft, among other issues. Meanwhile, Russia intensified its own mediation efforts amid growing competition with West over peace agenda. Notably, Russian Special Representative Igor Khovayev 9, 14 Feb visited Yerevan and Baku, respectively; Russian President Putin 14 Feb spoke with Aliyev; and Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 27 Feb met with Aliyev in Baku.

Armenia and Azerbaijan debated control of corridors, EU launched monitoring mission. Aliyev 18 Feb proposed establishing Azerbaijani checkpoints along Lachin corridor and creating similar Armenian checkpoints at Azerbaijan-Armenia state border along any future railway and motorway connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhichevan via Armenia; FM Ararat Mirzoyan 22 Feb rejected proposal, saying Russian peacekeepers should retain control of Lachin corridor (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Meanwhile, EU 20 Feb launched civilian monitoring mission along Armenian side of international border with Azerbaijan, aimed at contributing to border stability, building confidence and supporting efforts toward normalisation.

Ankara and Yerevan made progress on opening border following earthquake. In aftermath of devastating earthquake that hit Türkiye, Armenia 7 Feb sent rescue team, while border 11 Feb symbolically opened for first time since 1988 to allow humanitarian aid to pass through. Mirzoyan 15 Feb visited Türkiye and sides agreed to repair border bridge and work toward opening land border for diplomats and third-country nationals. Pashinyan 18 Feb expressed optimism that increased communication and collaboration could lead to more progress on political front.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Efforts to unblock Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) with Armenia failed to produce results, and Baku and de facto leadership met to discuss energy supply issues.

Lachin blockade continued throughout month. Azerbaijani govt-backed activists’ blockade of Lachin corridor, only road linking Armenian-populated NK to Armenia, continued, worsening humanitarian crisis. Diplomatic efforts failed to produce breakthrough. Armenian PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev 18 Feb met with U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken at Munich Security Conference (MSC) (see Armenia and Azerbaijan), where Blinken highlighted importance of “free and open commercial and private transit through the Lachin corridor”. However, leaders same day engaged in panel discussion on security in South Caucasus, where Aliyev denied blockades’ existence. International Court of Justice 22 Feb ordered Azerbaijan to “ensure unimpeded movement” along Lachin corridor. Pashinyan 23 Feb said decision was “extremely important” and “satisfies Armenia’s claim”, while Azerbaijan claimed Armenian authorities had misrepresented ruling; UN and EU same day released statements noting court decision and repeating calls to open road.

Armenia and Azerbaijan debated control of corridors. During MSC, President Aliyev proposed establishing Azerbaijani checkpoints along Lachin corridor and creating similar Armenian checkpoints at Azerbaijan-Armenia state border along any future railway and motorway connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhichevan via Armenia; Aliyev claimed Europe and U.S. had found proposal “logical”. Armenian FM Ararat Mirzoyan 22 Feb rejected proposal, saying Russian peacekeepers should retain control of Lachin corridor, as stipulated in 2020 ceasefire deal to end second NK war.

Baku and Stepanakert resumed meetings after dismissal of controversial de facto official. NK’s de facto leader, Araik Harutyunyan, 22 Feb dismissed Russian businessman Ruben Vardanyan as state minister, citing strategic differences in their approaches to internal and external issues; Vardanyan’s appointment in Nov 2022 had angered Baku, which claimed Moscow had sent him to NK “with a very clear agenda” and thus ruled out negotiations with him. One day after Vardanyan’s removal, Russian peacekeepers reported first talks between de facto leadership and Azerbaijani representatives on gas and electricity supply issues, which began after start of Lachin blockade.

Azerbaijan

International efforts to advance peace negotiations continued but with little progress, European Union (EU) launched monitoring mission, and relations with Iran continued to worsen.

Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged draft peace treaty, but talks between FMs did not resume. Blockade of Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) with Armenia (see Nagorno-Karabakh) continued to hinder diplomatic efforts, with no meetings in Feb between Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs, who are responsible for formal negotiations on peace treaty. Still, Armenian PM Pashinyan 16 Feb announced Yerevan had sent draft proposal of peace treaty to Baku, which President Aliyev 18 Feb confirmed receiving. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 18 Feb chaired meeting with Pashinyan and Aliyev at Munich Security Conference to discuss progress on draft, among other issues. Meanwhile, Russia intensified its own mediation efforts amid growing competition with West over peace agenda. Notably, Russian Special Representative Igor Khovayev 9, 14 Feb visited Yerevan and Baku, respectively; Russian President Putin 14 Feb spoke with Aliyev; and Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 27 Feb met with Aliyev in Baku.

Armenia and Azerbaijan debated control of corridors, EU launched monitoring mission. Aliyev 18 Feb proposed establishing Azerbaijani checkpoints along Lachin corridor and creating similar Armenian checkpoints at Azerbaijan-Armenia state border along any future railway and motorway connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhichevan via Armenia; Armenian FM Ararat Mirzoyan 22 Feb rejected proposal, saying Russian peacekeepers should retain control of Lachin corridor (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Meanwhile, EU 20 Feb launched civilian monitoring mission along Armenian side of international border with Azerbaijan, aimed at contributing to border stability, building confidence and supporting efforts toward normalisation.

Relations with Iran continued to deteriorate. Following armed attack late Jan on Azerbaijani embassy in Iran’s capital Tehran, Azerbaijan 31 Jan-1 Feb conducted “special police operations”, resulting in detention of 39 members of “Iranian spy network” and 66 members of criminal gang that trafficked drugs from Iran to Azerbaijan. Aliyev 17 Feb accused Iran explicitly for first time of orchestrating attack on embassy and called for transparent investigation and consequences for those responsible before any normalisation can occur.

Belarus

Govt stepped up aggressive rhetoric toward Ukraine, Belarusian partisans attacked Russian military aircraft near capital Minsk, and relations with Poland grew increasingly strained.

Anti-war partisans claimed responsibility for attack on Russian aircraft. President Lukashenko 16 Feb said Belarus is “ready to fight” with Russian troops in Ukraine “if even one soldier enters Belarus territory from Ukraine to kill [his] people”. Lukashenko 20 Feb announced creation of civilian paramilitary defence force “in case of aggression”. Defence ministry 21 Feb warned that “a significant grouping” of Ukrainian troops had massed near border. Senior Ukrainian official same day said Minsk had stepped up “aggressive” rhetoric but that Kyiv saw no imminent threat from its neighbour. Meanwhile, partisans 26 Feb claimed responsibility for drone attack on Russian military aircraft at Machulishchy airfield near capital Minsk; senior official 28 Feb dismissed claim as “fake… given the absence of an official reaction”.

Ties with Poland deteriorated, leaked Russian documents revealed alleged plans to take over Belarus. Court in capital Minsk 8 Feb sentenced Polish-Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut to eight years in prison for “inciting hatred”, among other charges. Poland same day condemned “politically motivated” trial, 10 Feb closed key Bobrowniki border crossing with Belarus; Minsk 20 Feb announced expulsion of three Polish diplomats in response. Meanwhile, various media outlets 21 Feb published document allegedly leaked from Russia’s presidential administration that dates back to 2021, detailing Kremlin plans to assert full control over Belarus’ politics, economy and military potential by 2030.

Repression of dissent continued. Court 10 Feb sentenced two activists to 22 years in prison for sabotaging railway lines used by Russia for transporting military equipment and troops for war in Ukraine. Court in Homel 17 Feb sentenced ten members of Workers’ Movement to between 11 and 15 years in prison for “high treason” and extremism.

Cyprus

Republic of Cyprus elected new president who pledged reunification of island and held first informal meeting with Turkish Cypriot leader.

New Republic of Cyprus president met Turkish Cypriot leader. Former FM Nikos Christodoulides 12 Feb won Greek Cypriot run-off presidential elections against left-wing contender Andreas Mavroyiannis (51.9% to 48.1%). During inauguration speech, Christodoulides remarked “my biggest concern is the end of the Turkish occupation and the reunification of our homeland”, adding “I will do everything to break the deadlock, to restart the dialogue”. In first informal meeting following his election, Christodoulides 23 Feb met Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar in UN buffer zone in Nicosia; after encounter, Tatar said formal return to talks will require recognition of Turkish Cypriot sovereignty, while Christodoulides remarked he did not hear anything unexpected.

Tensions continued between sides prior to presidential poll. Outgoing Republic of Cyprus President Anastasiades 2 Feb visited Greece, thanking Greek PM Mitsotakis for “support in containing Turkish revisionism”. Turkish FM Fuat Oktay 3 Feb referred to “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” as “Turkish Cypriot Republic”, urged UN Security Council to recognise north as having “equal international status” with Republic of Cyprus; Oktay also claimed UN peacekeeping mission has “no humanitarian, diplomatic, or legal value”. Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar 4 Feb reiterated “sovereign equality” of “Turkish Cypriot Republic”.

Georgia

Russia and breakaway regions responded harshly after co-chairs of Geneva International Discussions postponed talks; foreign agents law proposal sparked controversy.

Russia and de facto authorities continued to deny entry to co-chairs of Geneva talks. After co-chairs of Geneva International Discussions late Jan postponed planned 57th round of talks until April, Abkhazia and South Ossetia de facto authorities, as well as Russia, voiced anger at “unilateral” move and denied co-chairs entry to either breakaway regions or Moscow, despite visits scheduled for 8-9 Feb. Despite this move, co-chairs decided to proceed with their planned trip to capital Tbilisi 6-7 Feb to meet with Georgian govt.

Proposed law on foreign influence provoked harsh criticism. People’s Power movement, closely affiliated with Georgian Dream party and critical of Western policies in Georgia, during month submitted two draft laws that would oblige NGOs and media outlets that receive over 20% of their funding from abroad to register as “agents of foreign influence”; failure to fulfil this requirement, which would apply to individuals as well, would result in variety of penalties from fines to prison term of up to five years. Georgian Dream party 21 Feb announced support for draft, but U.S. 16 Feb criticised law and rejected claim it resembles U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act; Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe same day raised “several concerns”; over 60 media outlets 27 Feb released joint statement “categorically opposing” draft law; and President Salome Zourabichvili 28 Feb pledged to veto it.

In other important developments. Tbilisi City Court 6 Feb ruled against transfer of imprisoned former President Mikheil Saakashvili abroad for health reasons.

Kosovo

Kosovo and Serbia edged closer to deal on normalising relations following European Union (EU)-mediated talks in Brussels.

PM Kurti and Serb President Vučić tacitly approved EU proposal on normalising relations. Following meeting in Pristina with EU Special Representative Lajčak, PM Kurti 6 Feb accepted Franco-German proposal on normalising relations with Serbia as “good basis”. EU High Representative Josep Borrell 9 Feb confirmed inviting leaders to EU-mediated dialogue 27 Feb, 10 Feb said proposal is “the only way to solve the problems and normalise relations”. Vučić 17 Feb confirmed readiness for dialogue on condition that Kosovo Association of Serb Municipalities – which would enable Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo to form self-governing association – is discussed. Borrell 27 Feb announced sides agreed that “no more discussions are needed on the European Union proposal” and expressed readiness to “proceed with implementation”. Talks will now focus on leaked annex, which spells out timeline for reaching final deal.

International actors showed support for normalisation process ahead of talks. Turkish President Erdoğan 3 Feb expressed “support” for dialogue. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Quint ambassadors (France, Germany, Italy, UK and U.S.) 7 Feb reiterated importance of making “concrete progress” in EU-facilitated talks. European Council 9 Feb “underlined the urgent need for progress in the normalisation”. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 15 Feb said normalisation “will bring security and prosperity” to region.

Kyrgyzstan

Court extended pre-trial detention for activists protesting border delimitation agreement until April, govt agreed to host CSTO military drills and U.S. sought to deepen engagement in region.

Authorities extended pre-trial detention of imprisoned activists for second time. Court in capital Bishkek 15-17 Feb extended pre-trial detention of 26 activists and politicians, detained late Oct for protesting border delimitation agreement with Uzbekistan, until April; court first extended their pre-trial detention in Dec.

Govt repatriated 59 nationals from north-eastern Syria. Govt 16 Feb repatriated 18 women and 41 children from displaced persons camps in north-eastern Syria. U.S. 20 Feb welcomed Kyrgyz govt’s efforts to “help resolve the ongoing humanitarian and security challenges” in region, where Islamic State remains “a persistent threat”; U.S. added that repatriation remains “the only durable solution” and urged “all governments to follow Kyrgyzstan’s example and repatriate their nationals”.

In other important developments. After Armenian PM Pashinyan mid-Jan announced Armenia would not host annual military exercises for Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) military alliance, CSTO’s Chief of Staff Anatoly Sidorov 14 Feb announced Kyrgyzstan had agreed to host them instead. Meanwhile, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 28 Feb held talks with FMs from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, amid U.S. efforts to deepen engagement in region; Blinken announced $25mn of new funding to support economic growth.

Moldova

Govt resigned, and tensions with Russia escalated over alleged coup attempt, violation of Moldova’s airspace and Russian accusations of provocation in Transnistria.

Govt resigned over economic pressures and war in Ukraine. Pro-European govt 10 Feb resigned after turbulent 18 months in power marked by economic turmoil and spillover of Russia’s war in Ukraine. President Maia Sandu same day nominated pro-European National Security Adviser Dorin Recean to lead new govt, who vowed to advance on European Union integration and said govt should continue efforts for withdrawal of Russian troops from separatist Transnistria region; parliament 16 Feb approved nomination.

Allegations of Russian destabilisation efforts in Moldova mounted. Govt’s resignation announcement came amid escalation of tensions with Russia, on the rise for months over latter’s suspected role in anti-govt protests and threats to gas supplies in former Soviet republic. Ukrainian President Zelenksyy 9 Feb warned of Russian plan to “destroy” Moldova; Sandu 13 Feb provided further details of alleged plan to topple govt using Russian and Belarusian operatives. Zelenskyy 20 Feb accused Moscow of plans to seize airport in capital Chișinău for transport of soldiers and equipment to Ukraine. Further aggravating tensions, defence ministry 10 Feb announced Russian missile headed for Ukraine had violated Moldova’s airspace, prompting FM Popescu to summon Russian ambassador, Oleg Vasnetsov. Meanwhile, several thousand protesters in Chișinău 19 Feb took part in anti-govt rally organised by opposition Shor party, which has strong ties with Russia and is under investigation for illegal financing; more anti-govt protests took place 28 Feb.

Tensions over Transnistria escalated. Kremlin 20 Feb said “anti-Russian hysteria” had worsened bilateral relations and urged Moldovan authorities to be “very, very careful” regarding calls to demilitarise Transnistria. Russian President Putin next day revoked 2012 decree which, among many other things, underpins Moldova’s sovereignty in resolving future of Transnistria. Russia 23 Feb warned Kyiv could carry out “armed provocation” in Transnistria, next day said it would view any actions that threatened Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria as “an attack on the Russian Federation”. Kremlin 27 Feb accused Ukraine and other European countries of “provoking” situation in Transnistria.

Russia (Internal)

Putin suspended participation in key nuclear arms treaty, Ukrainian shelling of Russia continued, and Western states imposed more sanctions.

Putin suspended participation in key arms treaty with U.S. In state-of-the-union address delivered days before one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Putin 21 Feb announced suspension of Russia’s participation in 2010 New START Treaty (last arms control treaty in force between Russia and U.S.), which could portend end of arms control system established during Cold War and built upon since. Putin also said “the more long-range Western systems are delivered into Ukraine, the further we’ll have to push the threat from our borders”.

Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory continued. Putin 1 Feb said preventing Ukrainian strikes on Russia was “priority task”, though cross-border attacks continued. Notably, governor of Bryansk region 3 Feb said Russian air defences shot down four Ukrainian rockets in Starodubsk municipality; governor of Belgorod region 19 Feb reported child killed in Novaya Tavolzhanka village. Series of drone attacks 27-28 Feb occurred in six regions, striking oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai region. Meanwhile, founder of paramilitary Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, 20 Feb accused officials of denying his fighters sufficient ammunition for Ukraine war and admitted having uneasy relations with people “at the top”.

Persecution of war opponents persisted. Court in Barnaul city 15 Feb sentenced journalist Maria Ponomarenko to six years in prison for spreading disinformation, or “fakes”, about army. Russian Investigative Committee chairman 20 Feb said authorities had opened 152 criminal cases against individuals for “fakes” since invasion of Ukraine. Police 24 Feb reportedly detained at least 54 people in 14 cities at protests on anniversary of Ukraine war.

West and Russia imposed more tit-for-tat sanctions. Western states continued to impose sanctions throughout month; European Union 25 Feb introduced tenth sanctions package. Deputy PM Alexander Novak 10 Feb announced Russia would cut oil production by 500,000 barrels per day starting in March. Meanwhile, media outlet The Financial Times 6 Feb reported that at least 16 Iranian “ghost” ships, previously used to breach U.S. sanctions, have begun shipping Russian oil since Group of Seven imposed price cap.

Tajikistan

Authorities handed down lengthy prison sentence to Islamic State recruiter, and U.S. sought to deepen engagement in region.

Court in capital Dushanbe 16 Feb announced it had sentenced notorious Islamic State recruiter Parviz Saidrahmonov, who enlisted over 200 people in the group’s ranks, to 21 years in prison in Nov 2022 on terrorism charges. Meanwhile, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 28 Feb held talks with FMs from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, amid U.S. efforts to deepen engagement in region; Blinken announced $25mn of new funding to support economic growth.

Türkiye

Deadly earthquakes wreaked unprecedented destruction, spurring international response; Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) announced conditional ceasefire as hostilities persisted in Syria and Iraq.

Earthquakes killed tens of thousands, unleashed humanitarian crisis. In deadliest natural disaster in republic’s almost 100-year history, two major earthquakes 6 Feb rocked 11 southern provinces, killing over 40,000 people, injuring over 100,000, collapsing or damaging 100,000 buildings, and displacing up to 1.5mn people. Earthquakes galvanised international support: notably, more than 75 countries dispatched over 10,000 rescue workers and, alongside other high-level officials, NATO Sec Gen Jens Stoltenberg 15-16 Feb and U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 19-20 Feb visited affected areas. Facing public criticism over its earthquake response and allegations of malpractice in construction sector, govt 8 Feb reportedly briefly restricted access to Twitter and detained some individuals voicing criticism, while ruling party officials reportedly raised prospect of delaying May elections. Social media users and far-right politicians framed Syrian refugees as “looters” amid reports of sporadic law and order breakdown in some areas.

PKK announced unilateral ceasefire in Türkiye. Following earthquakes, one of PKK’s leaders Cemil Bayık 9 Feb announced cessation of hostilities within country, conditional on military not attacking group; month witnessed no military operations against PKK in country following announcement. Authorities 25 Feb arrested PKK militant in Konya province who was allegedly waiting for orders to carry out sensational attack. Hostilities persisted elsewhere: Turkish forces continued operations in northern Iraq, while northern Syria witnessed slight reduction in fighting, notwithstanding several drone strikes (see Iraq and Syria).

Tensions eased with Greece following disaster. Greek FM Nikos Dendias 12 Feb visited earthquake-affected areas with FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu; Dendias pledged continued support, while Çavuşoğlu said both countries should not “wait for another disaster to hit … to restore their relations”, adding that their solidarity following earthquakes will be decisive in “opening a new page” in relations.

Authorities arrested Islamic State (ISIS) suspects. Authorities detained some 95 individuals with alleged links to ISIS countrywide. Notably, police 4 Feb detained 15 suspects in Istanbul with alleged instructions to carry out attacks in city in retaliation to Quran-burning incidents in Jan.

Ukraine

One year on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, signs of new Russian offensive in embattled east began to emerge, Biden visited Kyiv, and Zelenskyy called on Western states to send fighter jets.

Stepped-up Russian activity along front line signalled new offensive. 24 Feb marked one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, amid indications of new Russian offensive to fully occupy eastern Donbas region, including increased Russian activity along front line, arrival of electronic warfare equipment, more reconnaissance activities and spike in losses of Russian soldiers. There were no major breakthroughs, however. In Donetsk region, Russian forces attempted to capture Vuhledar hilltop mining town, control of which would give them strategic advantage for operations to occupy remainder of Donetsk, but reportedly suffered major losses of troops and equipment in assault. Their troops made more progress around Bakhmut town, but suffered unsustainably high rate of attrition, while Ukrainian units retained control of main road out of town. With Russia’s land force so far unable to punch through Ukrainian defence lines, Western partners 14 Feb warned Russia could intensify airstrikes, making efforts to bolster Ukraine’s air defences a priority. Strikes on critical infrastructure continued, albeit at lower frequency.

Zelenskyy appealed for fighter jets, U.S. President Biden visited Kyiv. During 8 Feb visit to UK, President Zelenskyy urged British lawmakers to send fighter jets; UK PM Rishi Sunak responded that “nothing is off the table”. Zelenskyy’s plea came hours after UK announced it would train Ukrainian pilots to fly NATO-standard fighter jets, suggesting Western countries may be working on plan to send military aircraft. Zelenskyy 8-9 Feb also visited Paris and Brussels. Israeli FM Eli Cohen 16 Feb visited Ukraine, promising more support but refusing to condemn Russia. In strong show of support ahead of anniversary, President Biden 20 Feb made unannounced visit to Kyiv, promising more military aid and tighter sanctions on Russia before heading to Poland.

Defence minister announced new deputies. Following Jan corruption scandal that rattled defence ministry, Defence Minister Oleksiy Reznikov 14 Feb announced three new deputies as part of anti-graft efforts.

Uzbekistan

Legal proceedings over Karakalpakstan unrest continued, and U.S. sought to deepen engagement in region.

More trials following Karakalpakstan unrest took place. After authorities late Jan charged 22 Karakalpak activists with instigating deadly violence in autonomous Karakalpakstan region in July 2022, authorities 6 Feb announced that one had died while in custody; in following days, exiled activists raised concerns about prison conditions and demanded an investigation. Bukhara city regional court 6 Feb opened trial for 39 more activists for similar charges of inciting unrest in Karakalpakstan. General Prosecutor’s Office 9 Feb announced arrest of three police officers amid investigation into police misconduct during protests.

U.S. pledged deeper engagement in region. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 28 Feb held talks with FMs from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, amid U.S. efforts to deepen engagement in region; Blinken announced $25mn of new funding to support economic growth.

Latin America & Caribbean

Colombia

Petro administration’s “total peace” policy moved forward as fresh talks with ELN took place, but high levels of violence continued.

Authorities advanced peace efforts with two armed groups. Govt and National Liberation Army (ELN) 13 Feb began second round of peace talks in Mexico City, focusing on ceasefire and humanitarian access to conflict-afflicted areas. Justice Minister Néstor Osuna 22 Feb joined negotiations to address ELN concerns about conditions of imprisoned members. Delegations 25 Feb said they are working on agenda to advance process. Talks between govt and FARC-EP, dissident faction of former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), also progressed. Sides 8 Feb signed ceasefire protocols, which crucially provide for multiparty monitoring system including govt, military, FARC-EP, Catholic Church, Organization of American State’s mission in Colombia and local activists, though mechanism is not yet active. Top peace official Danilo Rueda 21 Feb said govt expects “dialogue phase” with FARC-EP to begin in “coming weeks”. Yet in apparent breach of ceasefire, front belonging to FARC-EP same day killed one soldier in Cauca department.

Govt proposed new legislation to facilitate talks with criminal groups. Following legal crisis in Jan over ceasefires and talks with criminal outfits, govt 15 Feb presented draft law to Congress intended to address dispute over legality of ceasefire and proposal to lift arrest warrants for criminal group negotiators. Law sets out possible conditions for large-scale criminal demobilisation, such as reduced prison terms and option for individuals to retain up to 6% of ill-gotten gains.

Civilians bore brunt of continued armed and criminal group violence. Confrontations among armed and criminal groups continued unabated along Pacific coast throughout Feb, hurting civilians. Notably, UN 3 Feb said over 2,100 people in Chocó department were forcibly confined amid armed group incursion in Alto Baudó municipality; 17 Feb reported multiple mass displacements 8-13 Feb along coast of Nariño department, where two rival FARC dissident fronts are battling for control. In Guaviare department, roughly 2,000 people continued to face movement restrictions amid recent arrival of FARC dissident faction Segunda Marquetalia in area under FARC-EP control.

El Salvador

Authorities extended state of exception for 11th time, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) published findings on state of economy and outlook.

State of exception renewed once again amid continued concern about human rights. Following Legislative Assembly’s 11th renewal of state of exception on 14 Feb, Minister of Justice and Public Security Gustavo Villatoro 22 Feb said 64,512 people had been arrested for gang affiliation since measure began. Concerns about human rights violations continued as state of exception’s one-year anniversary neared. Notably, online news outlet El Faro 3 Feb said measure had broken gangs’ hold on communities but also resulted in systematic violation of human rights and slide into authoritarianism. According to NGO Cristosal, as of 15 Feb there had been at least 107 in-custody deaths since March 2022. Meanwhile, authorities 24 Feb transferred 2,000 prisoners to new mega-prison of Tecoluca, which will house 40,000 prisoners; NGO Human Rights Watch 26 Feb said “packing tens of thousands of detainees is unlikely to bring security for Salvadorans in a sustainable manner”.

International Monetary Fund released statement on economic situation. Following its latest mission to El Salvador, IMF 10 Feb presented final statement amid concerns about economic situation, saying country must bring its debt “back to a sustainable path”; statement also highlighted increased vulnerabilities, including account deficit, low international reserves and high stock of short-term domestic debt.

Haiti

Security crisis compounded dire humanitarian situation, while international community continued to weigh sending specialised armed force.

Gang violence persisted at high levels, notably hampering medical care provision. Gunmen 4 Feb intercepted two buses in Liancourt commune, taking driver and 50 passengers hostage. Kraze Baryè gang same day kidnapped National Centre of Equipment Director Kineton Louis in Pétionville commune. Kokorat San Ras gang 22 Feb invaded Estère commune, forcing police out of area temporarily. Gang activities restricted provision of medical care. Notably, Gheskio medical centre 9 Feb suspended activities amid kidnapping of several staff members in capital Port-au-Prince. Albert Schweitzer hospital in Deschapelles town 15 Feb suspended operations after police officers, angered by scarce resources for tackling violence, abandoned nearby stations, enabling expanded gang activities in area. Médecins Sans Frontières 24 Feb said violence and threats “are jeopardising the safety of staff and patients… [and] threaten the continuity of our activities”. Meanwhile, police spokesman Garry Desrosiers 15 Feb announced Operation Tornado had led to 369 arrests and 16 deaths of alleged gang members since 27 Jan; National Network for Defence of Human Rights Director Pierre Espérance next day said operation had achieved little.

“21 December Accord” between PM Henry and some opposition forces advanced. Official inauguration of Transitional High Council, charged with assisting PM Henry in 2023 election preparations as per 21 December agreement, 6 Feb took place. Yet internal opposition to agreement, including among members of civil society and political groups, persisted.

Discussions to send multinational security mission yielded few results. UN human rights chief Volker Türk 10 Feb urged international community to consider deploying specialised armed force to country, as did Organization of American States. Foreign partners remained hesitant, however, particularly in absence of broad political consensus within Haiti. Notably, Canada’s Ambassador to UN Bob Rae 16 Feb stressed that Canada “believe[s] very strongly that Haitian institutions themselves have to play the leadership role”. Still, Canada stepped up intelligence activities: Canadian patrol aircraft 4-7 Feb conducted intelligence-gathering flights, while Canadian PM Justin Trudeau 16 Feb said Canada will deploy two vessels to Haitian waters, especially around Port-au-Prince, for surveillance purposes.

Honduras

Congress elected new Supreme Court magistrates, and govt extended state of emergency until April.

Lawmakers elected new Supreme Court judges. After four failed attempts, Congress 16 Feb elected 15 magistrates who will comprise Supreme Court for next seven years. As in previous elections, lawmakers voted for judges politically aligned with their own party; ruling Libre party secured six seats, National Party five and Liberal Party four. With no party able to secure majority of justices, process marked step toward creation of checks and balances. UN and international mission sent to observe selection 17 Feb praised it as step forward compared with previous processes, but expressed concerns about imposition of political quotas. Honduras’ Saviour Party, which played crucial role in President Castro’s electoral victory, 16 Feb dismissed election as “partisan-driven” amid deepening divide with govt.

Govt extended state of emergency. Head of Police Gustavo Sánchez 7 Feb said state of emergency, first imposed in Dec 2022 to tackle extortion, had reduced average number of homicides per day from nine in 2022 to seven so far in 2023. Authorities 21 Feb confirmed its extension by 45 days and expansion to 48 other municipalities across country.

U.S. prosecutors revealed details in corruption case of former president. Following first anniversary of former President Hernández’s detention, U.S. prosecutors 10 Feb said Honduras’ powerful Rosenthal family had bribed him to facilitate their money-laundering and drug-trafficking activities.

Mexico

Lawmakers passed controversial electoral reform bill, criminal violence remained high and U.S. court convicted former security secretary for accepting cartel bribes.

Lawmakers voted in favour of controversial electoral reform. National Electoral Institute (INE) 1 Feb filed constitutional challenge to govt’s “Plan B” electoral reform before Supreme Court, saying it will prevent INE from fulfilling its role as election watchdog by reducing its budget and size, softening penalties for electoral wrongdoing and allowing candidates to use public funds in election campaigns. Opposition parties PAN, PRI and PRD have also filed constitutional complaints since ruling Morena party approved reform in Dec 2022. Senate 22 Feb voted 72-50 in favour, however; thousands 26 Feb took to streets in Mexico City to protest reform.

Criminal violence, particularly targeting state officials, remained high. In central Michoacán state, soldiers 4 Feb killed two men in shootout in San Juan Parangaricutiro municipality. In north-eastern Nuevo León state, unknown gunmen 9 Feb shot dead three police officers in Salinas Victoria municipality; 66 police officers have been killed in 2023 so far, 61 per cent more than same period in 2022. In southern Quintana Roo state, authorities 11 Feb found bodies of four employees from Solidaridad municipality’s prosecutor’s office; victims had been tortured and killed in Playas del Carmen town. In north-western Baja California state, unknown gunmen 21 Feb shot dead journalist Araujo Ochoa in Encenada municipality. Meanwhile, in Tamaulipas state, security forces 26 Feb reportedly killed five unarmed civilians in Nuevo Laredo city; local human rights group next day called killings extrajudicial executions and filed complaint with Office of Attorney General.

U.S. court convicted García Luna of accepting bribes from Sinaloa cartel. U.S. court 21 Feb convicted former Public Security Secretary and war-on-drugs architect Genaro García Luna for accepting millions of dollars in bribes from Sinaloa Cartel to help shield group from capture.

Nicaragua

Govt deported and revoked nationality of hundreds of political prisoners, tightening Ortega’s grip on power; crackdown on Catholic Church continued.

Ortega deported political prisoners and revoked their citizenship. Govt 9 Feb unilaterally released 222 of country’s 257 political prisoners, same day deported them to U.S. capital Washington, saying prisoners had “undermined the independence, sovereignty and self-determination of the nation” and incited “violence, terrorism and economic destabilisation”. National Assembly same day reformed Article 21 of Political Constitution in order to revoke citizenship of those deported and other opposition members already in exile; move prevents them from returning to Nicaragua, in effect leaving Ortega without an internal opposition and tightening his hold on power.

Repression of Catholic Church continued. Court 5 Feb sentenced six religious figures to ten years in prison on conspiracy charges. Court 10 Feb sentenced Bishop Rolando Álvarez, who refused deportation to Washington, to 26 years in prison; authorities also stripped Álvarez of his Nicaraguan nationality. Authorities 25 Feb shut down Catholic radio station Radio Metro Stereo Rosa, same day banned Catholic processions during Lent and Easter week.

Relations with Iran deepened. Iranian delegation led by FM Hossien Amir-Abdollahián 1 Feb arrived in capital Managua and signed memorandum of understanding on mechanism aimed at strengthening bilateral relations.

Venezuela

Preparation for opposition primaries in October continued, but internal divisions persisted; Mexico talks remained stalled.

Opposition announced schedule for primaries amid internal disputes. Independent commission, set up by opposition coalition Unitary Platform to organise election for single candidate to run in 2024 poll, 15 Feb announced timetable for process, which will culminate in vote 22 Oct. Unresolved issues remain, however. Notably, opposition is divided over whether to request logistical support from govt-controlled National Electoral Council. Some potential candidates reject its involvement, including front runner María Corina Machado, who 15 Feb claimed it was an “instrument” President Maduro could use to sabotage process; commission’s president, Jesús María Casal, 16 Feb reiterated that eschewing use of official polling stations would vastly increase cost of election and reduce voter participation. Controversy also persisted over diaspora vote. Of around 3mn Venezuelans living abroad, just over 100,000 are registered to vote; hardliners claim they are essential to process, but govt has little incentive to register them since most are likely opposition voters, and commission has limited capacity to do so.

Mexico talks between govt and opposition remained stalled. Despite Maduro govt’s refusal to schedule another official round of talks with Unitary Platform in Mexico, informal discussions continued early month in capital Caracas. In televised comments, however, Maduro 15 Feb accused opposition of failing to fulfil its commitment under Nov humanitarian agreement to transfer frozen funds to UN for infrastructural and other projects in Venezuela, claiming govt has no motive “to sit down again with that group”. Informal talks have not resumed since.

In other important developments. U.S. 6 Feb assumed control of Venezuelan diplomatic properties in Washington and New York in response to mainstream opposition’s decision to dissolve “interim presidency” of Juan Guaidó; opposition envoys 8 Feb were denied entry. Colombian President Petro and Maduro 16 Feb met at shared border to sign trade agreement.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria

Amid rifts within army and security apparatus regarding rapprochement with West, Algerian-French relations suffered setback.

Tensions flared again between Algeria and France. Algerian-French rights activist Amira Bouraoui early Feb left Algeria for Tunisia while under house arrest and 6 Feb found refuge in France. Algiers 8 Feb accused French diplomats and other personnel of participating in Bouraoui’s “illegal and secret evacuation” from Al-gerian territory, denouncing “violation of national sovereignty”, and same day recalled Algerian ambassador to Paris for consultations. Authorities 14 Feb arrested nine people suspected of involvement in case including Algerian-Canadian senior analyst for NGO Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Raouf Farrah, who was later charged with “spreading classified information and documents” and “receiving foreign funding”.

Authorities discussed military and economic cooperation with U.S., Russia. U.S. Africa Command commander, Gen. Michael Langley, 8 Feb met with President Tebboune and army chief of staff, Gen. Saïd Chengriha, during two-day visit to Algeria to discuss opportunities for U.S.-Algerian military partnership. U.S. newspaper The Wall Street Journal 6 Feb revealed U.S. oil company Chevron in talks with Algiers about shale gas exploration in Algeria. Tebboune and Chengriha 27 Feb met with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in capital Algiers to discuss strengthening military cooperation.

Tensions with Morocco remained high over Western Sahara. During African Union (AU) summit held 18-19 Feb in Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, divisions between Morocco, on one hand, and Algeria and self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, on the other, blocked appointment of North African country representative as VP of AU bureau.

Egypt

Economic situation remained fragile, security continued to improve in Sinai Peninsula, and tensions emerged between Cairo and Riyadh.

Economy stabilised temporarily, but vulnerabilities persisted. After exchange rate devaluation last month, overall economic situation in Feb stabilised with foreign investors resuming purchase of govt treasury bills, and exchange rate remaining steady at around 30 Egyptian pounds to $1. Country remained vulnerable to shocks, however. Central Bank 2 Feb kept interest rate unchanged at 16.75%, surprising most economists and drawing criticism from foreign investors. Ratings agency Moody’s 7 Feb downgraded Egypt’s credit score from B2 to B3, pushing bonds further into junk status, expressed concern about social and political impact of adjustment.

Jihadist activity reached new low in Sinai Peninsula. Tribal sources in Sinai 9 Feb reportedly informed military that locals have noticed movements of Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated Sinai Province operatives in mountainous areas of central Sinai Peninsula. Army in following days began searching for ISIS elements. Improvised explosive device around 14 Feb wounded 12-year-old girl on outskirts of Sheikh Zuweid town in North Sinai.

Relations with Saudi Arabia deteriorated, top diplomat travelled to Türkiye. Amid tensions over delayed handover of Egypt’s Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia, several Saudi Arabian commentators and journalists late Jan-early Feb criticised Egypt’s profligate fiscal practices and inefficient economy marked by army interference with business (see Saudi Arabia). Comments came after Saudi Finance Minister Mohamed al-Jadaan in Jan announced Riyadh would change financial aid policy and require reforms in exchange for money, in likely reference to Egypt. In response, Egyptian journalist Abdel Razek Tawfiq 1 Feb lashed out at Riyadh’s perceived arrogance on Cairo24 and al-Gomhuria websites. President Sisi 9 Feb however attempted to mend ties with Riyadh, calling on Egyptians to remember support received from their “brothers”. In following days, Cairo24 and al-Gomhuria websites removed Tawfiq’s article. In first visits by top Egyptian diplomat in a decade, FM Sameh Shoukry 27 Feb travelled to Türkiye and Syria to show solidarity after devastating earthquake.

Iran

Coordinated U.S. and European efforts against govt’s crackdown and military cooperation with Russia continued apace, while nuclear standoff deepened and regional tensions remained elevated.

West continued censure amid shrinking appetite for engagement. U.S. 3 Feb sanctioned eight individuals involved with already-designated drone manufacturer as well as two Iranian navy vessels, 9 Feb targeted Iranian energy exports. New Zealand 15 Feb issued sanctions against eight persons and entities involved in drone production, and widened its travel ban against Iranian officials implicated in human rights abuses. European Union (EU) 20 Feb expanded its human rights designations by targeting additional 34 Iranian persons and entities; UK same day designated eight individuals. Marking 24 Feb anniversary of Ukraine war, UK sanctioned five individuals, U.S. announced export control measures and EU designated seven Iranian entities all related to concerns over drones. Canada 27 Feb sanctioned 12 Iranian individuals over human rights violations.

Nuclear standoff deepened ahead of nuclear watchdog meeting in March. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1 Feb expressed concern “that Iran implemented a substantial change in the design information of [Fordow Fuel enrichment plant] in relation to the production of high-enriched uranium without informing the Agency in advance”; Iran’s atomic energy chief maintained that there had been an error by IAEA’s inspectors. Adding to list of concerns, U.S. media 19 Feb revealed IAEA had detected uranium enriched to 84%; Iran’s atomic energy agency denied enriching over 60%. Senior IAEA officials 21 Feb visited Tehran for discussions; lack of progress before 6 March start of IAEA Board of Governors meeting could lead Western govts to introduce another censure resolution. CIA director 26 Feb assessed nuclear program expanding “at a worrisome pace”, though no indication of weaponisation.

Regional tensions remained elevated. After govt 1 Feb said early investigations in attack late Jan on Isfahan defence facility pointed to Israeli responsibility, reports 17 Feb emerged of apparent Iranian drone strike against commercial vessel linked to Israeli ownership week earlier; Israeli PM Netanyahu 19 Feb blamed Iran for attack and rocket fire against U.S. forces in north east Syria day earlier (see Syria).

Iraq

Protesters rallied in capital Baghdad, Turkish forces continued striking Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in north as hostilities halted in Türkiye, and security forces targeted Islamic State (ISIS).

Protesters rallied against currency devaluation and electoral law. Iraqi dinar 2 Feb reached new low at 1,750 to $1 at street exchanges, compared to official rate of 1,460; protesters next day demonstrated devaluation in Baghdad. Central Bank 7 Feb lowered exchange rate to 1,300 to $1. During visit to U.S., FM Fuad Hussein 10 Feb listed economy and endemic corruption as country’s biggest challenges. Protesters 27 Feb rallied in Baghdad against draft electoral law seen as undermining independent candidates. Meanwhile, govt continued regional security dialogue. Saudi FM Prince Faisal bin Farhan 2 Feb visited Baghdad and announced cooperation to reduce regional tensions. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 5 Feb visited Baghdad and met PM Sudani to discuss bilateral relations, counter-terrorism and Iraq’s role in regional mediation. Iranian FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian 22 Feb visited Baghdad for talks on border security and Iran-Saudi Arabia dialogue.

Turkish forces continued attacks on PKK in north. Despite unilateral ceasefire announced by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) commander in Türkiye following calamitous earthquake on 6 Feb that killed tens of thousands (see Türkiye), Turkish forces continued ground operations and airstrikes in north; notably, Turkish defence ministry 11 Feb announced “neutralising” six PKK members and Turkish strike 27 Feb reportedly killed three militants. Before earthquake, Iran-backed Islamic Resistance Ahrar al-Iraq Brigade claimed eight rockets that 1 Feb targeted Turkish military base in Ninewa governorate; Turkish forces and PKK mem-bers 2 Feb reportedly clashed in Metin mountains; Ankara 4 Feb announced “neutralising” three PKK members.

Security forces conducted anti-Islamic State operations. Army 12 Feb announced killing seven suspected ISIS members in airstrikes in Hamrin mountains in Diyala governorate. Iraqi forces 14 Feb killed three ISIS militants in Wadi Shay, Kirkuk governorate; same day killed three in Kubeisa town, Anbar governorate. Iraqi airstrikes 15 Feb reportedly killed at least 12 suspected ISIS members around capital Baghdad. Security forces 16 Feb clashed with suspected ISIS cell in Tarmiya district, Salah al-Din governorate, killing three militants and four soldiers.

Israel/Palestine

West Bank violence killed dozens of Palestinians and seven Israelis as Israeli forces conducted deadliest raid in years, Israeli settlers rampaged town and Palestinians staged attacks.

Unrest surged and tensions soared in West Bank. Israeli forces conducted daily raids into northern West Bank and expanded operations into southern West Bank, resulting in near-daily clashes with Palestinians; raids and Israeli settler attacks killed at least 31 Palestinians, while seven Israelis were killed. In deadliest raid since Second Intifada, Israeli forces 23 Feb killed 11 Palestinians and wounded over 100 in Nablus, sparking strikes, protests as well as skirmishes along Gaza-Israel frontier. Following 26 Feb shooting of two Israeli settlers in Hawara town, northern West Bank, Israeli settlers same day rampaged Hawara, burning dozens of homes with residents inside, torching vehicles and shooting dead one Palestinian, while almost 400 were injured that night. In occupied East Jerusalem, Palestinian lone-wolf attacks and Israeli house demolitions continued upward trajectory: Palestinian car ramming 10 Feb killed three Israelis. Spiralling tensions could escalate further around Ramadan and Passover. In attempt to relieve tensions, U.S. 26 Feb gathered Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian and Egyptian officials in Jordan; after summit, Israel denied announcement it would freeze settlement expansion. Meanwhile, Gaza-based factions 1 and 11 Feb fired rockets into Israel, prompting retaliatory airstrikes 2 and 13 Feb.

Israel legalised West Bank settlements and advanced controversial judicial reform. Israeli govt 12 Feb announced legalisation of nine settler outposts in West Bank and building of 10,000 new homes in existing settlements. Knesset 15 Feb passed preliminary reading of bill repealing 2005 Disengagement Law, which evacuated four settler outposts. Knesset 15 Feb passed amendment to Citizenship Law, allowing Palestinians convicted of terrorism to be stripped of Israeli citizenship/residency. Knesset 21 Feb gave preliminary approval to plans enabling govt to appoint judges amid weekly protests attended by tens of thousands in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

Israel struck normalisation deal with Sudan amid regional tensions. FM Eli Cohen 2 Feb agreed deal with Sudan aimed at normalising relations. Suspected Iranian drone 10 Feb struck Israeli-owned tanker in Arabian Sea (see Iran). Israel allegedly struck Syria (see Syria).

Lebanon

Economic crisis deepened as currency reached new record low, sparking protests, while executive vacuums continued without end in sight and Hizbollah issued warnings over U.S. policy.

Economic strife worsened amid devaluing currency, fomenting public unrest. Lebanese lira 28 Feb reached new record low value of 85,000 to $1 at parallel exchange rate; accelerated devaluation from around 40,000 in early Jan may be related to significant decrease in U.S. dollars that Central Bank injects into market at subsidised rate, from around $40mn daily in Dec to $10mn in late Feb. Fuel prices continued to rise as other essential imported products grew scarce. Economy and trade ministry 8 and 28 Feb increased prices for Arabic bread. Clashes 10 Feb erupted in both capital Beirut and Tripoli between competing networks of private electricity generators. Widespread protests 16 Feb broke out countrywide against economic conditions and depositors’ continued inability to access savings trapped inside illiquid banks, leading to road blocks and arson attack on bank branch in central Beirut.

Double executive (president and govt) vacuum continued. Presidential vacuum since 1 Nov continued with little apparent prospect of resolution. Parliament held no electoral sessions during Feb, reflecting prevailing deadlock between various political factions. France, U.S., Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt 6 Feb warned they will reconsider “all ties” with Lebanon if vacuum continues indefinitely. Meanwhile, attempts to form new govt to replace caretaker administration have practically ceased. PM Mikati 6 Feb convened cabinet meeting to authorise spending on health, education and other sectors, which most Free Patriotic Movement-aligned ministers boycotted. Ineffectual executive action could jeopardise orderly succession of key executive positions, such as head of general security who is due to retire early March and Central Bank governor, whose term expires in June; municipal elections in May could also be delayed.

Hizbollah accused U.S. of destabilising country. Hizbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah 16 Feb reiterated rhetoric blaming alleged U.S. “siege” for economic misery, warning of grave consequences – including conflict with Israel – if U.S. were to continue deliberate strategy to destabilise country and starve party’s base into submission.

Libya

Political deadlock persisted one year after Libya split into two rival govts.

East-based parliament continued to chart unilateral path out of political crisis. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) 7 Feb approved constitutional amendment that could be used as basis for elections. Amendment calls for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections to take place within 240 days of adoption of election laws by joint committee of HoR and Tripoli-based advisory High State Council (HSC) members. Tripoli-based critics of HoR, including some HSC members, accused body of seeking to buy time, notably opposing open timeline for drafting election laws and obligation to have presidential election. In another unilateral move, HoR President Aghela Saleh 16 Feb proposed formation of 45-member committee – including HoR, HSC and independent members – to decide on new executive to replace two govts now in place.

UN Libya envoy proposed new initiative to break stalemate. In briefing to UN Security Council, Special Representative for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 27 Feb criticised HoR’s constitutional amendment as “controversial”, underscoring that it does not stipulate clear roadmap, including timeline, for holding elections in 2023. Instead, Bathily proposed formation of high-level steering committee composed of representatives of political and security institutions, and other political, tribal and civil society leaders to facilitate adoption of legal framework and time-bound roadmap to enable elections in 2023.

UN welcomed coordination mechanism for withdrawal of foreign fighters. UN Support Mission to Libya 8 Feb said officials from Libya’s 5+5 Joint Military Commission – which brings together representatives of armed forces from eastern and western Libya – as well as liaison committees from Sudan and Niger, approved “coordination mechanism” for “withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters from Libya” during two-day meeting in Egypt. Mechanism unlikely to affect presence of Turkish forces alongside Tripoli govt or Russian Wagner contractors alongside eastern forces.

Energy deal with Italian company ENI sparked controversy. Opponents of Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba, including his own oil minister and HoR members, early Feb criticised as “illegal” $8bn agreement struck late Jan between National Oil Corporation and Italian state-owned oil company ENI, arguing it required HoR buy-in; investment plan notably outlines steps to increase Libya’s oil and gas export capacity.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh hosted meeting between U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), while media spat pointed to tensions with Egypt.

U.S. and GCC held meeting on counter-terrorism and security cooperation. U.S.-GCC working group 13-16 Feb held meeting in capital Riyadh that had been postponed in Oct 2022 following U.S.-Saudi tensions over oil production. Joint statement following meeting focused on threats of Islamic State (ISIS), Iran and Iran-aligned groups, while reaffirming “that diplomacy remains the preferred way to address Iran’s destabilizing policies.” Earlier, FM Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud 2 Feb visited Iraq and discussed Gulf-Iraq electricity connectivity, oil policy and regional security dialogue (see Iraq). FM Al-Saud 18 Feb reaffirmed need for new approach to Syria and dialogue with Syrian President Assad for humanitarian reasons, following deadly earthquake (see Syria).

Saudi-Egyptian media spat broke out. Saudi and Egyptian media pundits engaged in tit-for-tat verbal criticisms over deterioration of Egypt’s economy and Saudi Arabia’s decision to apply stricter conditions on lending money (see Egypt); Egyptian President al-Sisi 9 Feb denied conflict with Saudi Arabia. Spats surfaced after Saudi Arabia’s finance minister in Jan described kingdom’s new approach to providing aid to allies, moving from “direct grants and deposits without strings attached” to “working with multilateral institutions to actually say we need to see reforms”; another source of tension relates to delayed transfer of Sanafir and Tiran islands in Red Sea from Egyptian to Saudi control per 2016 deal.

Syria

Earthquake killed thousands as regime used international aid to reduce isolation, while crisis reduced both hostilities in north west and Turkish operations in north; Islamic State (ISIS) attack killed scores.

President Assad leveraged earthquake aid for soft normalisation. Earthquake 6 Feb killed over 5,900 people, predominantly in rebel-held north west. Dozens of countries, including every Arab state except Qatar, flew aid into regime-held areas. First UN aid convoy 9 Feb arrived in rebel-held north west. U.S. 9 Feb issued six-month sanctions exemption for aid. In Idlib province, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) refused to cooperate in cross-line aid from regime-controlled areas; govt 13 Feb authorised UN aid via Bab al-Salameh and Ar-rai border crossings from Türkiye. Meanwhile, Tunisian President Saied 9 Feb announced intention to strengthen ties with Syria; Jordanian FM 15 Feb and Egyptian FM 27 Feb visited capital Damascus for first time since 2011; parliamentarians from eight regional countries 26 Feb visited President Assad.

HTS raids on regime and hostilities between Turkish and Kurdish forces declined. HTS ceased cross-line attacks on regime positions in Idlib and Latakia following earthquake until 26 Feb, when it raided position in Latakia. Hostilities between Turkish forces and People’s Defence Units (YPG) witnessed slight reduction; nevertheless, YPG rocket attack 7 Feb struck Türkiye’s Kilis province, while Turkish drones 12, 16 and 22 Feb struck Kurdish targets in Hasakah and Aleppo provinces.

ISIS attack killed scores in central Syria. In largest-scale assault in central Syria since April 2021, suspected ISIS cell 17 Feb killed at least 60 civilians and police escorts near Sukhnah, Homs province. Meanwhile, U.S. forces early Feb killed alleged senior ISIS leader in eastern Deir ez-Zor province. U.S. and Syrian Democratic Forces 10 Feb killed two ISIS leaders, and 16 Feb conducted ISIS arrest raid, which left four U.S. soldiers injured. Coalition forces 18 Feb arrested ISIS member in Hasakah province.

In other important developments. Israeli airstrikes 18 Feb struck Damascus, reportedly killing five and injuring 15. U.S. 14 Feb downed Iranian drone in Deir ez-Zor province; suspected Iranian rockets 18 Feb targeted U.S. forces in Green Village base, Deir ez-Zor province.

Tunisia

President Saïed’s comments unleashed wave of violence against sub-Saharan Africans, and authorities carried out spectacular arrest campaign targeting critics and opposition figures.

Unprecedented violence targeted sub-Saharan Africans. Police mid-Feb arrested sub-Saharan African migrants across country, reportedly detaining around 300 people. President Saïed 21 Feb said influx of irregular sub-Saharan migrants aimed at changing country’s demographic make-up and must be stopped, linking migrants to violence and criminality. African Union 24 Feb expressed “deep shock and concern at the form and substance of the statement”. Incidents of mob violence against Black people in following days reportedly left dozens injured across country.

Authorities went on arrest spree of political and media figures. Security forces 11-13 Feb arrested influential businessman and former confidant of ousted President Ben Ali, Kamel Eltaïef; senior leaders of Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party, Abdelhamid Jlassi and Noureddine Bhiri; fierce opponent of Saïed, Khayam Turki; former Judges Taïeb Rached and Béchir Akremi; and general director of private radio station Mosaïque FM, Noureddine Boutar. Leaders of opposition coalition National Salvation Front, Issam Chebbi, Jahwar Ben M’Barek and Chaima Issa, also detained 22-23 Feb. Saïed 14 Feb accused those recently detained of conspiring against state security, saying “traitors who seek to fuel the social crisis” are responsible for rising prices of food commodities. Civil society and foreign partners condemned crackdown. Thousands 18 Feb joined main workers’ union UGTT for protests in eight cities across country, accusing Saïed of stifling basic freedoms including union rights. UN human rights office 14 Feb urged Tunis to “release immediately all those arbitrarily detained” including “in relation to the exercise of their rights to freedom of opinion or expression”.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue program still under discussion. As unspecified G7 countries pledged to prevent Tunisian default, IMF continued to insist on steps needed to approach IMF’s Board for approval of four-year, $1.9bn loan program.

Western Sahara

President Ghali reshuffled govt, while tensions remained high between Morocco and Algeria over status of disputed territory.

Cabinet reshuffle removed political heavyweights. President of self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Brahim Ghali, 14 Feb reshuffled cabinet, notably replacing long-time FM Mohamed Ould Salek with Mohamed Sidati, former Polisario Front independence movement representative in Paris; Ghali also appointed Sahrawi-Algerian citizen Meriem Salek Hamada as new interior minister. Bechir Mustapha Sayed, who in Jan ran against Ghali to become Polisario Front secretary general, removed from his position as presidential adviser.

Algeria and Morocco remained at loggerheads over Western Sahara’s status. Responding to written questions from MEPs, European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell 17 Feb said EU “does not have information on potential collaboration between Polisario Front and terrorist groups” in Sahel region and “has not detected any evidence” of diversion of humanitarian aid provided to Sahrawi refugees. Algerian and pro-Polisario media outlets immediately welcomed statement as evidence that Morocco’s longstanding allegations are baseless. During African Union (AU) summit held 18-19 Feb in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa, divisions between Morocco, on one hand, and Algeria and SADR, on the other, blocked appointment of North African country representative as VP of AU bureau.

Yemen

Saudi-Huthi backchannel talks displayed signs of progress, Huthis criticised UN’s role in Hodeida and Riyadh announced large deposit in Aden-based Central Bank as govt faced economic troubles.

Tentative signs of breakthrough in Huthi-Saudi negotiations emerged. Contours of deal reportedly became clear as Huthis claimed that Saudi Arabia agreed to their preconditions, including easing movement restrictions around Sanaa airport and Hodeida port and paying state employees’ salaries in Huthi-controlled areas. In positive signals, Riyadh permitted increased movement in Huthi-controlled Hodeida port and both sides toned down negative media rhetoric. Meanwhile, concurrent high-level diplomacy continued. In hope of resurrecting truce ahead of Muslim holy month of Ramadan beginning late March, UN Spe-cial Envoy Hans Grundberg’s military adviser early Feb met govt military commanders, tribal and civil society leaders to discuss possible ceasefire mechanisms. Grundberg 7 Feb met Presidential Leadership Council members al-Alimi and Abu Zara’a al-Muharrami in Aden to discuss inclusive political process; next day met Southern Transitional Council (STC)-aligned Aden governor. Grundberg and Iranian foreign ministry special adviser 9 Feb travelled separately to Oman for talks with Omani officials and Huthi chief negotiator.

Huthis grew critical of UN’s role in Hodeida. Huthis 6 Feb accused UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) of intentionally blocking cargo ships from entering Hodeida port, which UNVIM denied, and called for abolition of mechanism; criticism may reflect Huthis’ desire to diminish UN role ahead of possible lifting of Saudi Arabia’s restrictions on port. Huthis 5 Feb accused UN of delaying mission to salvage rusting oil tanker FSO Safer.

Economic outlook remained bleak, govt forces manoeuvred along front lines. Riyal in govt areas hovered around lowest rate since start of truce, while govt’s oil production remained at near-halt amid Huthi threats; Huthis sought to channel import commodities solely through Huthi-controlled Hodeida rather than govt-controlled Aden. Saudi Arabia 21 Feb announced $1bn deposit intended for Central Bank of Aden. Meanwhile, Nation Shield Forces – commanded by PLC head al-Alimi – deployed across key fault lines in Lahij, Shebwa, al-Dhale and Hadramawt governorates, which have seen friction between STC and Islah forces; move could be aimed at forestalling STC takeover in Hadramawt.

Africa

Burkina Faso

Amid rampant jihadist violence countrywide, volunteer fighters reportedly committed abuses against civilians, and authorities ordered French military contingent stationed in Burkina Faso to leave.

Jihadist violence continued to affect most regions across country. In Sahel region (north), suspected jihadists 12-13 Jan abducted dozens of women and children near Arbinda town (Soum province); authorities 20 Jan announced 66 had been released. Unidentified armed group attack 30 Jan in Falagountou town (Séno province) left at least 12 govt and allied forces, one civilian and 15 assailants dead. Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) combatants throughout month clashed with volunteer fighters allied with govt forces (VDPs) notably in Centre-East, East and Centre-North regions, with six VDPs and one civilian killed in Rakoengta locality (Bam province) 19 Jan. In Boucle du Mouhoun region (north west), suspected JNIM combatants 2-3 Jan killed at least seven civilians in Sourou and Nayala provinces; attacks by suspected jihadists 19 Jan also killed ten VDPs in Nayala province, and 12 civilians in Banwa province. Nearby in Centre-West region, unidentified assailants 26 Jan killed ten civilians in two attacks in Dassa commune (Sanguié province). In Cascades region further west, suspected JNIM militants 29-30 Jan reportedly killed 15 civilians near Linguekoro village (Comoé province).

Local NGO accused volunteer fighters of serious human rights abuses. Amid transitional authorities’ mass mobilisation of VDPs launched late 2022, civil society organisation Collectif contre l’Impunité et la Stigmatisation des Communautés 2 Jan accused VDPs of committing serious crimes and other abuses against civilians in Dec, including killings and kidnappings; authorities same day said investigation was under way into killing of 28 Fulani civilians night of 30-31 Dec in Nouna town (Kossi province, Boucle du Mouhoun region).

Tensions with France reached new heights. Ouagadougou 23 Jan announced requesting France to withdraw troops from Operation Sabre within a month; Paris 25 Jan confirmed 400-strong contingent stationed near capital Ouagadougou will leave as requested, and next day recalled Ambassador to Burkina Faso Luc Hallade for consultations.

Burundi

Military faced accusations of human rights abuses in South Kivu (DR Congo) and Cibitoke province, while ruling party’s youth militia Imbonerakure continued intimidating population.

Congolese Tutsi community accused military of attacking ethnic Tutsi in DR Congo. Burundian troops’ continued support to Congolese army against Burundian and Congolese armed groups in South Kivu (including Tutsi-led RED-Tabara rebel group opposing Burundi’s Hutu-dominated govt), fuelled fears among Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge community. Local Banyamulenge chiefs from Minembwe territory 4 Jan sent letter to Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye in his capacity as chair of East African Community, denouncing alleged ethnic cleansing of their community by Burundian and Congolese forces alongside Congolese Maï-Maï armed groups. Media outlet La Libre Afrique 19 Jan reported Burundian forces had lost 40 soldiers since deployment in South Kivu in Aug 2022.

Locals accused military of inflicting degrading treatment on local population. As military continued operations against Kinyarwanda-speaking rebels based in Kibira forest (north west). Defence Minister Alain Tribert Mutabazi 10 Jan hosted meeting with residents in Mabayi, Cibitoke province; residents accused army elements of collaborating with rebels and complained about behaviour of security forces, including their raping, beating and coercing labour from local population.

Imbonerakure continued harassing population amid general climate of impunity. Five members of ruling party youth militia Imbonerakure 3 Jan stabbed and injured individual in Birohe locality, Gitega province, allegedly due to dispute over theft of personal belongings. Meanwhile, after residents 1 and 16 Jan found dead bodies with signs of torture in Buganda and Rugombo communes, Cibitoke province, local authorities buried bodies without prior investigation.

In other important developments. During ruling CNDD-FDD party congress in capital Gitega, President Ndayishimiye 22 Jan called out corruption in state administration.

Democratic Republic of Congo

As M23 rebels’ pledge to withdraw from North Kivu province failed to materialise, Rwandan military shot at Congolese fighter jet; massacres and clashes involving ethnic militias and Islamist militants left over 100 dead in east.

M23 continued to clash with govt forces and other armed groups in North Kivu. M23 rebels 4 Jan took over Nyamilima town before withdrawing mid-Jan, seemingly to reinforce positions elsewhere; 26 Jan seized strategic Kitshanga town, 100km west of North Kivu’s capital Goma, now surrounded to the north and west by rebellion. FM Christophe Lutundula 18 Jan said M23 still occupies Kibumba town despite announcing withdrawal in Dec. As Kinshasa and Kigali continued to trade accusations of supporting rebels in eastern DRC (see Rwanda), Rwanda’s forces 24 Jan fired missile at Congolese fighter jet for allegedly violating Rwandan airspace, urging Kinshasa to “stop this aggression”. Congolese govt same day condemned “act of war”, denied airspace violation.

Other armed group violence plagued Ituri and North Kivu provinces. Clashes between rival ethnic militias CODECO and “Zaire” 8 Jan left at least 23 dead near Djugu town (Ituri), while UN 18 Jan announced discovery near Ituri’s capital Bunia of bodies of nearly 50 people killed 14-15 Jan in attacks attributed to CODECO. Another suspected CODECO raid 27 Jan took place 60km from Bunia; religious leaders reported 15 soldiers killed, while army claimed seven combatants dead. Islamist militia Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) launched spate of attacks against civilians: dozen people killed 15 Jan in bomb raid on church in Kasindi town (North Kivu); at least 24 killed overnight 22-23 Jan in Makungwe village, Beni territory (North Kivu); and at least 15 villagers killed 29 Jan in Irumu territory (Ituri).

National politics remained polarised ahead of December 2023 elections. Election Commission 22 Jan prolonged voter registration in western provinces, admitting only 37% of eligible voters had registered, and 25 Jan launched registration exercise in nine other provinces. Former President Kabila’s party boycotted exercise. Adviser of political heavyweight Moïse Katumbi (who has a non-Congolese parent) 19 Jan condemned “racist regime” after ministers from ruling party raised issue of eligibility for public office of dual nationals or nationals with parents of different nationality.

Eritrea

Significant Eritrean troop withdrawals from Ethiopia’s Tigray region occurred after progress on Tigray’s disarmament; Russian FM met with President Afwerki to boost support for war in Ukraine.

Eritrean troops withdrew from most major cities in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Ethiopia’s federal govt and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) continued to make progress on implementing peace accord (see Ethiopia). Notably, Tigray’s forces 10 Jan began handing over heavy weapons to Ethiopia’s federal military. Within days, Eritrea withdrew its troops from most major cities in Tigray. Notably, news agency Reuters 21 Jan reported that troops had left Shire (North Western Zone), while other witnesses reported their withdrawal from Adwa (Central Zone) and Axum (North Western Zone). Senior Ethiopian military officer Teshome Gemechu 28 Jan claimed “there is no other security force in the Tigray region except the Federal Defence Forces”. However, Eritrean forces reportedly retained presence in outskirts of some urban areas and in rural areas. Since it is not party to peace accord, which stipulates withdrawal of foreign and non-federal troops from Tigray concurrent with heavy weapons handover, Eritrea may retain military presence in region until TPLF’s full disarmament. Meanwhile, Tigrayan reports of Eritrean attacks on civilians and looting of properties in region continued to emerge during month.

Russian FM met with Eritrean leader in capital Asmara. President Isaias Afwerki 26 Jan met Russian FM Sergei Lavrov in Asmara during Lavrov’s tour of Africa to bolster support for war in Ukraine; Minister of Information Yemane Meskel said discussions centred on “dynamics of the war in Ukraine and enhancement of bilateral ties on sectors of energy, mining, information technology, education and health”.

Eswatini

Killing of prominent pro-democracy activist sparked domestic and international outrage.

Unidentified gunman 21 Jan shot dead human rights lawyer and prominent pro-democracy activist Thulani Maseko at his house in Manzini region. South Africa-based opposition group Swaziland Solidarity Network 22 Jan blamed killing on King Mswati III’s regime. UN human rights chief Volker Türk 23 Jan condemned “cold-blooded killing” and called for “impartial and effective” investigation, while Southern African Development Community Organ Troika Chairperson Hage Geingob 25 Jan warned of looming civil war absent dialogue. Govt late Jan denied involvement in Maseko’s killing, said it launched investigation to find those responsible. Hundreds of pro-democracy activists 27 Jan reportedly marched to Manzini police headquarters demanding justice for Maseko; police reportedly opened fire and injured at least one demonstrator.

Guinea

Interim govt rejected calls to reopen inter-Guinean dialogue outside country amid ongoing stifling of dissent.

Conakry ruled out possibility of resuming dialogue abroad. Col. Doumbouya’s interim govt 12 Jan rejected efforts by West African regional bloc ECOWAS to relaunch dialogue between interim govt and political and civil society groups outside country to include main opposition actors (who boycotted so-called inclusive inter-Guinean dialogue held in late 2022), said “there is no reason to hold talks abroad” as dialogue “has been wrapped up”. Meanwhile, UN Deputy Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel Giovanie Biha 18-20 Jan visited country, met with PM Bernard Goumou and reaffirmed UN’s “commitment to support the ongoing transition… in accordance with the 10-point timetable for a rapid return to constitutional order”.

Harassment of opposition persisted. Authorities 17 Jan blocked Fodé Oussou Fofana, VP of opposition Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea, from travelling abroad; 21 Jan arrested Mamadou Billo Bah, prominent member of outlawed civil society platform National Front for the Defence of the Constitution, in capital Conakry, later accused him of taking part in “illegal gathering” and “destruction of property”.

Kenya

Govt and opposition traded accusations of misconduct during August elections, while Al-Shabaab and cattle rustlers carried out deadly attacks.

Govt and opposition argued over presidential election results. President Ruto 17 Jan made unsubstantiated allegation of plot to assassinate electoral commission’s former Chairman Wafula Chebukati for allegedly refusing to rig Aug 2022 presidential election in favour of opposition leader Raila Odinga. At opposition coalition Azimio la Umoja rally gathering thousands in capital Nairobi, Odinga 23 Jan urged supporters to “resist” Ruto’s govt, calling it “illegitimate” and demanding its resignation.

Al-Shabaab launched new attacks in east along border with Somalia. In Garissa county, explosive device likely planted by Al-Shabaab combatants 11 Jan killed four road workers between Garissa and Bura towns, while security forces 18 Jan killed ten suspected Al-Shabaab militants in Galmagalla village.

Deadly cattle raids continued in drought-affected north west. Unidentified gunmen 1 Jan killed two girls and stole 70 heads of cattle in Kotut village, Elgeyo-Marakwet county; another cattle raid 12 Jan reportedly left eight people dead in Laisamis town, Marsabit county.

Nairobi’s efforts at regional diplomacy continued. Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua and President Ruto 9, 10 Jan respectively met Vice-Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” in Nairobi, reportedly to discuss Sudan’s possible reintegration into African Union among other matters (see Sudan). Representatives of M23 rebel group 12 Jan met East African Community facilitator for peace process in eastern DR Congo (DRC), Uhuru Kenyatta, in Kenya’s Mombasa city, reiterated readiness to withdraw from captured territory in DRC’s North Kivu province and adhere to ceasefire (see DR Congo).

Mali

Jihadist militants launched spate of attacks in south, transitional govt encountered resistance to constitutional reform plans, and months-long tensions with Côte d’Ivoire abated.

Jihadist attacks continued including in southern region. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 2 Jan launched simultaneous attacks in southern Koulikoro region, killing two people in Kassela village (20km from Bamako) and another five in Markacoungo town (80km from Bamako). Also in Koulikoro, JNIM 15 Jan reportedly ambushed armed forces near Kolokani village, killing five soldiers while also losing 15 combatants. In centre, JNIM 10 Jan launched twin attacks on govt forces between Dia and Diafarabé towns (Mopti region), and Koumara and Macina towns (Koulikoro and Ségou regions, respectively); 14 soldiers and 31 jihadists reportedly killed. Meanwhile, in Ménaka region further north, Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) militants targeted civilians, notably killing eight people in Inagam and Assakereye villages 5 Jan.

Transitional authorities’ constitutional reform plan faced opposition. Several opposition groups, including supporters of influential Imam Mahmoud Dicko 9 Jan, announced boycott of meeting convened by govt to discuss draft constitution ahead of constitutional referendum scheduled for March. Meeting 12 Jan proceeded with only 50 of 281 invited participants present. Authorities 14 Jan used tear gas to disperse demonstration to welcome Dicko back from Saudi Arabia to capital Bamako.

Tensions with Côte d’Ivoire eased as Mali freed Ivorian soldiers detained since July. Interim President Col. Assimi Goïta 6 Jan pardoned 49 Ivorian soldiers detained in July 2022 on allegations of undermining state security; 46 soldiers next day returned to Côte d’Ivoire (three had been released in Sept 2022). In phone call, Ivorian President Ouattara 9 Jan invited Goïta to visit Côte d’Ivoire (see Côte d’Ivoire).

In other important developments. After signatory armed groups late Dec suspended participation in 2015 Algiers Accord, Malian FM Abdoulaye Diop 15-16 Jan travelled to Algeria, met counterpart Ramtane Lamamra and President Tebboune to discuss issues related to peace agreement. Bamako later in month reportedly declined Algerian proposal to host meeting between stakeholders of 2015 agreement, which would have conformed with signatory armed groups’ request for meeting “on neutral ground”.

Mozambique

Fighting continued in Cabo Delgado province as govt forces and allies redoubled efforts to tackle Islamist insurgency.

Govt launched new counter-insurgency operation in Cabo Delgado. Security forces 1 Jan undertook operation “Vulcão IV” reportedly with support of Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in bid to clear Messalo River basin in Muidumbe district and nearby forests of northern and western Macomia district. Operation coincided with uptick in insurgent attacks and clashes between security forces and insurgents in both districts. In Macomia, Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) 8 Jan ambushed joint Mozambican and SAMIM force near Litandacua village, claimed injuring several soldiers and stealing military equipment; ISMP 22 Jan again clashed with security forces in Litandacua. In Muidumbe, fighting 9 Jan reportedly erupted between security forces and ISMP in Mandava village, leaving unconfirmed number of casualties; ISMP next day attacked military post at Xitaxi village, killing at least three soldiers, and 15 Jan reportedly launched explosive device attack against govt forces along N380 road. Also in Muidumbe, local militia 19 Jan killed six alleged ISMP militants in Namacule village. Attacks on civilians also persisted in Cabo Delgado. Notably in Nangade district, alleged ISMP 4 Jan raided Chacamba village, less than 10km from district headquarters, beheading one man and kidnapping up to three women; attack coincided with Cabo Delgado governor’s visit to area. In Mocímboa da Praia district, alleged ISMP 25 Jan entered Calugo village, reportedly to resupply themselves.

Rwandan forces expanded area of operations to southern Cabo Delgado. Rwandan security forces 12 Jan confirmed that they had deployed to Ancuabe district in southern Cabo Delgado amid ongoing operations in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts in province’s north.

In other important developments. Video 9 Jan emerged online allegedly showing SAMIM troops burning corpses in Nkonga forest of Nangade district in Nov 2022; SAMIM 11 Jan said it “does not condone acts reflected in the video” and announced investigation. UN World Food Programme 27 Jan announced it would as from Feb suspend food aid to people displaced by conflict in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula provinces.

Niger

Jihadist violence continued to fuel insecurity in south west and south east; local peace agreement between communities of Banibangou municipality revived hope for resolution of longstanding conflict.

Islamic State continued driving insecurity in Tillabery region in south west. Govt forces 8 Jan reportedly killed four suspected Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) fighters and arrested another three near Taroum town (Ouallam department), also losing two soldiers; 18 Jan reportedly killed 11 suspected jihadists and detained another six near Doulgou village (Gotheye department), with local sources alleging unknown number of those killed were Fulani civilians. Suspected IS-Sahel elements 10 Jan killed two civilians near Téra town (Téra department); 12 Jan attacked Doukou Koira Tegui village (Tillabery department), killing two and wounding seven residents.

Boko Haram factions kidnapped civilians in Diffa region in south east. Suspected Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) faction of Boko Haram 7 Jan kidnapped two people in Gremari locality (Maine Soroa department); next day kidnapped five children in Maissirodi village (Diffa department). Suspected Boko Haram (JAS) militants 18 Jan kidnapped at least four women in Rimi village (N’Guigmi department).

In other important developments. Representatives of Zarma and Fulani communities in Banibangou municipality (Ouallam department, Tillabery region) around 23 Jan signed peace agreement to end longstanding conflict fuelled notably by competition for natural resources. Ruling party late Dec elected former President Issoufou’s ally Foumakoye Gado as party president, highlighting Issoufou’s continuing influence within party and in state matters.

Nigeria

Insecurity remained rampant ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections due in February.

Political violence persisted notably in south ahead of general elections. Electoral commission 9 Jan warned that insecurity could derail general elections due 25 Feb and 11 March. Assailants 14 Jan killed uncle of prominent politician in Akokwa town, Imo state. Gunmen next day set electoral commission office on fire in Enugu state, killing policeman, and 20 Jan stormed ruling All Progressives Congress meeting in Ebonyi state, killing two.

Jihadists remained active in North East. In Borno state, clashes between rival jihadist groups persisted, with Boko Haram (BH) 7 Jan reportedly killing 35 Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighters near Kukawa town. Jihadist groups also continued to target civilians and security forces in Borno. Notably, Boko Haram 17 Jan raided Makilwe village, killing one farmer and abducting eight others. Govt forces 23 Jan repelled ISWAP ambush near Komala village, killing at least 23 assailants.

Violence continued despite military operations in North West and North Central. Authorities 3 Jan announced arrest of ISWAP commander Abdulmumin Ibrahim Otaru (aka “Abu Mikdad”), said he “operated terrorist cells” in Kogi state. In Kaduna state, unidentified gunmen 9 Jan ambushed security patrol near mining site in Birnin Gwari area, killing 12 security personnel and local vigilantes. Meanwhile, in Benue state, suspected herdsmen 19 Jan killed nine people including displaced persons in Abagena town. Military suspected of mistakenly killing dozens in airstrikes 24 Jan: bomb blast struck group of herders near Rukubi village, Nasarawa state, reportedly leaving 54 dead, and drone strike killed unspecified number of vigilantes near Galadimakogo village, Niger state.

Biafra agitation and other violence persisted in South East. In Imo state, gunmen 2 Jan attacked former state governor’s convoy, killing four police officers near Ehime-Mbano town. In Anambra state, gunmen 9-12 Jan killed at least seven people and set buildings on fire in Ihiala town. Troops 10-13 Jan killed at least seven Indigenous People of Biafra separatists in operations in Imo, Anambra, Abia and Enugu states. Meanwhile in South South, gunmen 7 Jan kidnapped around 20 people at Igueben train station, Edo state; all abductees later rescued.

Togo

Jihadist militants launched further attacks in northern region.

Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants launched explosive device attacks in Kpendjal prefecture of Savanes region, reportedly killing at least three soldiers near Tiwoli village 2 Jan and injuring four others near Boatou village 18 Jan.

Asia

Bangladesh

Govt continued clampdown on opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) as it held anti-govt rallies, while deadly attacks continued in Rohingya refugee camps.

Govt continued crackdown on BNP amid nationwide protests. New opposition alliance comprising 15 parties 7 Jan joined BNP’s ten-point movement calling for govt resignation and new elections, bringing total parties in support to over 30. As BNP and its allies 11 Jan held mass anti-govt sit-ins in capital Dhaka and countrywide, ruling Awami League supporters reportedly attacked BNP leaders and activists in Faridpur district, injuring several; police next day filed cases against 114 BNP leaders and supporters, arresting 13. BNP leaders and activists 16 Jan clashed with police in Chittagong city; BNP claimed police fired on peaceful protesters, injuring 20, while police filed anti-terrorism charges against at least 500 for attacking police and using explosives. BNP sec gen 18 Jan claimed govt had filed 1,209 cases under controversial Digital Security Act in four years against dissidents, journalists and opposition leaders.

Violence in Rohingya camps persisted. In Cox’s Bazar’s Ukhiya camp, Rohingya leader was stabbed to death 8 Jan and another was shot dead next day; police attributed attacks to Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Human Rights Watch 17 Jan accused Armed Police Battalion, elite police unit overseeing security camps, of extortion, arbitrary arrests and harassment of refugees. UN refugee agency same day deplored “alarming rise” in numbers of Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar or Bangladesh in 2022, reporting 360% increase and “growing sense of desperation”. In first clash between two groups, Rohingya Solidarity Organisation militants 18 Jan attacked ARSA outpost in Bangladesh-Myanmar border area known as “no man’s land”, where around 4,000 people shelter, killing one RSO militant; Bangladeshi authorities began processing those sheltering there to enter country.

Authorities arrested suspected militants. Counter-terrorism police 1 Jan arrested six suspected al-Qaeda-inspired militants in Dhaka, Chittagong and Teknaf cities; counter-terrorism police 8 Jan arrested three suspected members of new militant outfit, Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, in Bandarband’s Naikhongchari sub-district; police 23 Jan arrested two suspected members of same group following reported gunfight in Cox’s Bazar Rohingya camp.

India

China’s activities along disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) continued to raise concerns in Delhi, while Maoist violence persisted in east.

Disputed border continued to fuel tensions with China. Indian army chief Gen. Manoj Pande 12 Jan said that situation along LAC is “stable yet unpredictable” and noted that China “slightly” increased its presence along border, but Indian troops are prepared to deal with any “contingency”. Chinese President Xi Jinping 18 Jan reportedly held rare video conversation with Chinese soldiers stationed along LAC in which he reportedly ordered them to “remain alert and be ready for combat”, which fuelled concerns in India. Satellite images posted 19 Jan showing China constructing dam on Mabja Zangbo/Brahmaputra River near LAC raised fears in India over China’s future control of water. Meanwhile, U.S. Assistant Sec State Donald Lu visiting India 14 Jan said China has not taken “good faith steps” to resolve LAC issue and “U.S. will continue to stand with India”; China next day criticised remarks.

Maoist violence continued in east. In Andhra Pradesh state (east), Maoists 4 Jan killed tribal man suspected of working with police in Alluri Sitarama Raju district. In Jharkhand state (east), security forces 23 Jan killed local commander of Maoists’ splinter group People’s Liberation Front of India during clashes in Ranchi district; improvised explosive device 24 Jan injured boy in West Singbhum district; security forces 28 Jan killed one Maoist during clashes in Chatra district.

In other important developments. News channel BBC 17 Jan broadcast documentary in UK examining role of PM Modi, then-Gujarat’s chief minister, during 2002 Gujarat anti-Muslim riots; govt 19 Jan slammed documentary as “propaganda” betraying “colonial mindset” and banned YouTube and Twitter from airing documentary’s clips in India.

India-Pakistan (Kashmir)

Militants launched first deadly attack on Hindus in years in Jammu region, while acrimony continued between India and Pakistan.

Militants targeted Hindus in brazen attack despite low ebb in violence across Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). In first attack on minority Hindu community members in Jammu region’s Rajouri district in over a decade, militants 1 Jan came down from forested higher reaches to village and fired indiscriminately on three houses, killing four people and injuring seven; explosive left behind by militants next day killed two children in same village. Security forces did not accuse any group of responsibility. Meanwhile, militant attacks across J&K remained at low ebb owing to harsh winter. Notably, militants 1 Jan lobbed grenade at security forces personnel in regional capital Srinagar, injuring one. Two alleged Lashkar-e-Tayyaba militants 15 Jan escaped during security operation in Budgam district but were killed two days later. Militants 22 Jan lobbed grenade in Srinagar, injuring one civilian. Home ministry declared The Resistance Front and People’s Anti-Fascist Front as “[militant] organisations” 5 and 7 Jan, respectively.

Locals protested against govt’s land laws in J&K. Hundreds of political activists 16 Jan protested in Jammu against J&K administration’s ongoing eviction of locals from what has been declared “state land”; protest leader same day said govt had “fiddled” with laws of “erstwhile State of [Jammu and Kashmir]” to “allow people from outside J&K and deprive the residents of their due right to use the land”.

India and Pakistan continued hostile rhetoric. Pakistan’s foreign ministry 4 Jan called on India to end “vile anti-Pakistan propaganda”, accusing Delhi of “brazen involvement in fomenting terrorism on Pakistan’s soil”. Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif 16 Jan called for talks “to resolve our burning points like Kashmir”. India 19 Jan said “we always desire normal neighbourly relations with Pakistan” but there should be no “terror, hostility or violence”. Indian Army Chief Manoj Pande 12 Jan said Feb 2021 ceasefire with Pakistan “is holding well but cross-border support to [militancy] and [militant] infrastructure however remains”; security forces 3 Jan claimed to have killed Pakistani trying to intrude in Punjab state’s Gurdaspur district.

Myanmar

Regime prepared for election and pursued dialogue with ethnic armed groups, while ongoing heavy clashes between military and resistance groups displaced thousands.

Regime continued election preparations and peace talks with ethnic armed groups. Leader Min Aung Hlaing 5 Jan called for update of voter list as part of preparation for election likely held mid-year. Regime 26 Jan issued new highly restrictive political party registration law, which will likely result in most parties being dissolved within 60 days. Election faced opposition: National Unity Govt (NUG) urged public not to cooperate with process, and resistance groups during month staged more than dozen attacks on teams updating voter lists across country, including assault which killed one in Tanintharyi region 9 Jan. Meanwhile, discussions with ethnic armed groups under regime peace initiative continued; nine of ten groups participated in three rounds of meetings as of 25 Jan. Officials 5-7 Jan met United Wa State Party, National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP); SSPP 7 Jan said groups would not oppose election process. Marking Independence Day, Tatmadaw 4 Jan released 7,012 prisoners, including some 300 political prisoners.

Military launched airstrikes against ethnic armed groups in north. In Kachin State, military 9 Jan conducted air attacks on Kachin Independence Army base in Tanai township and outposts in Hpakant and Hkamti townships. In Chin State, regime 10 Jan launched airstrikes against Chin National Front (CNF) headquarters at Camp Victoria, Thantlang township, killing five CNF soldiers and injuring ten; additional airstrike next day damaged medical facility and destroyed three homes.

Military and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) clashes displaced thousands. In Kayin State, military 1 Jan launched around 20 airstrikes against KNLA Brigade 6 and Kawthoolei Army’s Lion Battalion in Kyainseikgyi township following groups’ late Dec seizure of two bases near Payathonesu, killing seven Lion Battalion soldiers. Brigade 6 and allied People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) 4 Jan launched attacks on three infantry battalions around Kyainseikgyi; military responded with helicopter gunships. Military next day bombed Brigade 6-aligned Karen National Union administrative office in Dooplaya district. Clashes displaced some 10,000 people, and KNLA claimed it killed 70 soldiers.

Nepal

New PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal received near-unanimous support in vote of confidence, while tensions emerged within ruling coalition ahead of presidential election.

New govt secured overwhelming support. In vote of confidence 10 Jan, Maoist Chairman and PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” received 268 votes in favour in 275-member House of Representatives after Nepali Congress in surprise move backed Dahal despite his withdrawal from Nepali Congress-Maoist electoral alliance in Dec; Nepali Congress decision led to speculation that Maoists would in return support Nepali Congress candidate in upcoming March election for presidency.

Discord surfaced between ruling coalition parties. Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) Chairman KP Oli 17 Jan walked out of all-party meeting after rejecting suggestions that constitutional posts like presidency be shared with Nepali Congress; Oli accused Nepali Congress of “plotting” against Maoist-UML alliance, which is underpinned by 25 Dec deal whereby presidency and house speaker posts go to UML. UML leader Dev Raj Ghimire elected speaker of House 18 Jan. Meanwhile, Deputy PM and Rastriya Swatantra Party chief Rabi Lamichhane 27 Jan resigned after Supreme Court annulled his election to parliament due to invalid citizenship; Lamichhane’s citizenship was restored 29 Jan.

Pakistan

Pakistani Taliban killed scores in suicide attack in Peshawar; tensions remained high as former PM Imran Khan campaigned for early polls and electoral dispute erupted in Sindh province.

Deadly bombing rocked Peshawar city amid spate of Pakistani Taliban attacks. Suicide attack – claimed and then denied by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – at mosque in Peshawar’s Police Lines district 30 Jan killed more than 100 and injured over 200. Earlier, TTP maintained high-frequency attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, killing over dozen security forces. Notably: 6 Jan killed two police officers in Lakki Marwat district; 14 Jan killed three police officers in Peshawar; suicide attack 18 Jan killed three police officers in Khyber district. Attack from Iran in Panjgur district 18 Jan killed four soldiers. Security operation in South Waziristan district 5 Jan killed 11 militants, including top TTP commander. Meanwhile, interior minister 2 Jan said “Islamabad may target the TTP in Afghanistan if Kabul does not take action to dismantle them”.

Khan and allies maintained pressure on govt, dissolving two provincial assemblies. Khan ally and Punjab Chief Minister Pervaiz Elahi 11 Jan won confidence vote in Punjab assembly, which was dissolved 14 Jan. In KP, chief minister – and member of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) – 18 Jan dissolved assembly; elections now due in both provinces in April. Election commission 22 Jan appointed opposition nominee as Punjab’s caretaker chief minister; PTI 27 Jan challenged nomination at Supreme Court. Meanwhile, PTI embarked on new bid to push for early general elections by seeking to withdraw April 2022 resignations of 131 lawmakers in order to defeat PM Sharif in potential confidence vote; 45 PTI members 23 Jan withdrew resignations but failed to prevent speaker from 17, 20, 22 Jan accepting resignations of all PTI lawmakers; election commission 29 Jan announced by-elections for 86 national assembly seats in March.

Political tensions rose in Sindh province. During second phase of local polls 15 Jan, clashes and electoral disputes erupted between rival party activists; if Sindh’s ruling Pakistan Peoples Party and closest contender Jamaat-e-Islami fail to reach agreement on key positions, particularly Karachi’s mayor, instability in financial hub could further undermine fragile economy.

Sri Lanka

Govt slashed spending amid economic strains and efforts to secure international bailout loan, while continuing initiative to address decades-old ethnic conflict.

Govt cut back spending amid deep recession. Amid falling govt revenues, President Wickremesinghe 10 Jan instructed all ministries to cut 5% of their allocated budgets for 2023, with priority given to salary and pension payments to public sector employees. State Minister of Defence Premitha Bandara Tennakoon 13 Jan made surprise announcement that army personnel would be reduced by one third over 2023, falling to 135,000 from 200,000. In positive step, India 16 Jan informed International Monetary Fund (IMF) that it will support debt restructuring process, marking progress toward finalising bailout loan. Chinese Vice Minister Chen Zhou 16 Jan indicated “some good news soon” regarding debt restructuring. Wickremesinghe 27 Jan prorogued parliament until 8 Feb, when new policy program is due to be announced.

Govt continued discussion of initiative to address ethnic conflict. Wickremesinghe 15 Jan reiterated govt’s “hope to fully implement the 13th Amendment of the constitution”; successive governments have failed to implement key provisions since amendment was made law in 1987. Tamil National Alliance (TNA) parliamentarian M.A. Sumanthiran 16 Jan said, “Nobody takes it with any seriousness because it has been constantly promised.” Wickremesinghe also said govt was “discussing appointing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)”. Talks between govt and TNA, however, appeared stalled following former’s failure to meet deadlines for releasing Tamil prisoners held under Prevention of Terrorism Act and releasing private land held by military.

Local elections preparations resumed, Supreme Court ruled on 2019 bombings. Following govt attempts to delay local govt elections, Election Commission 21 Jan announced polls will be held on 9 March. In landmark ruling, Supreme Court 12 Jan ruled that former President Maithripala Sirisena and four other senior officials had violated fundamental rights of petitioners by failing to act on warnings received in advance of 2019 Easter bombings. In first by foreign govt, Canada 10 Jan imposed sanctions on former Presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa for “gross and systematic violations of human rights during armed conflict in Sri Lanka”.

Europe & Central Asia

Belarus

Military cooperation with Russia continued, authorities began trial in absentia of opposition figures, and govt sought ways to strengthen cooperation with Tajikistan.

Military activities with Russia continued amid fears of more Belarusian support in Ukraine. President Lukashenko 6 Jan visited training ground in south-western Brest region bordering Ukraine where Russian troops are stationed. Defence ministry same day announced arrival of more Russian military equipment and aircrafts. Authorities 16 Jan-1 Feb held joint tactical flight exercises with Russia; govt 15 Jan said drills were “purely defensive” amid growing fears Belarus plans to deepen involvement in Ukraine. Former security official 29 Jan warned army could face mass desertion if Belarus invades Ukraine. Meanwhile, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 10 Jan announced new sanctions against Belarus for “role in this Russian war”.

Authorities proceeded with trial in absentia of leading opposition figures. Amid govt’s continued crackdown on dissent, trial in absentia of opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and four associates, indicted among other charges for treason and conspiring to seize power, 17 Jan began in capital Minsk. European Union High Representative Josep Borell same day condemned “fabricated charges” and Belarus’s “brutal persecution” of opposition leaders, while U.S. imposed visa restrictions on 25 officials for continued repression and “politically motivated trials”.

In other important developments. News agency Belta 4 Jan reported that Defence Minister Viktor Khrenin met with Tajik counterpart Sherali Mirzo in Belarus; two reportedly discussed “security matters in the responsibility area of the Collective Security Treaty Organization” and ways to advance bilateral cooperation.

Kyrgyzstan

President finalised border delimitation agreement with Uzbek counterpart, and police arrested relatives of detained activists and politicians protesting in capital Bishkek.

Kyrgyz and Uzbek leaders completed border delimitation process. President Japarov and Uzbek President Mirziyoev 27 Jan signed over 20 documents aimed at strengthening bilateral relations during Mirziyoev’s state visit to Bishkek. Most notably, leaders finalised border delimitation agreement, which Japarov hailed as “truly historic event”.

Authorities detained dozens of demonstrators in Bishkek. Police 10 Jan arrested dozens of relatives of 26 politicians and activists detained late Oct for protesting border delimitation agreement with Uzbekistan; relatives demanded release of jailed politicians and activists during rally in Bishkek. Police same day released demonstrators.

Tajikistan

Tajik and Belarusian defence ministers met in Minsk.

Belarusian news agency Belta 4 Jan reported that Defence Minister Sherali Mirzo met with Belarusian counterpart Viktor Khrenin in Belarus; two reportedly discussed “security matters in the responsibility area of the Collective Security Treaty Organization” and ways to advance bilateral cooperation.

Ukraine

Heavy fighting persisted in Donetsk as Russian forces captured Soledar, Western allies ramped up military support, and Zelenskyy dismissed senior officials in anti-corruption sweep. 

Fighting continued in eastern Donetsk region as Ukraine withdrew from Soledar. Ukrainian artillery 1 Jan attacked Russian military base in occupied Makiyivka city. Russian defence ministry 4 Jan admitted that 89 soldiers had been killed, highest number of deaths it has acknowledged since full-scale invasion; Russian military bloggers criticised Russian planning and logistics. Russian paramilitary Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin 11 Jan claimed his troops had fully captured Soledar town just north of embattled Bakhmut town. Claim appeared premature and fighting continued, but Kyiv 25 Jan admitted its troops had pulled out, marking Russia’s first major battlefield advance since July 2022; loss of Soledar further complicates Ukraine’s defence of Bakhmut. Heavy fighting continued elsewhere in Donetsk, with British intelligence 31 Jan warning of “concerted” Russian assault on Vuhledar coal-mining town. Meanwhile, Russia continued targeting critical infrastructure, notably killing 11 people on 26 Jan.

Ukraine secured major breakthroughs in Western military support. France 4 Jan announced plans to equip Ukraine with armoured AMX-10 RC combat vehicles. Germany next day said it would provide around 40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles while U.S. said it would deliver 50 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. UK became first western nation to pledge supply of main battle tanks, 19 Jan announcing “Tallinn Pledge”, military aid package coordinated with Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic. Germany 25 Jan announced it would send Leopard 2 tanks amid mounting international pressure; hours later, U.S. declared it would send 31 M1 Abrams tanks. Russia same day said decision takes conflict “to a new level of confrontation”.

Zelenskyy cracked down on corruption. President Zelenskyy 22 Jan dismissed senior official Vasyl Lozynskiy following his arrest on embezzlement charges. Days later, Zelenskyy 24 Jan dismissed over a dozen senior officials, saying state “will be cleaned up”. Meanwhile, presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych 17 Jan resigned after wrongly claiming Ukrainian air defence had shot down Russian missile that killed 45 civilians in Dnipro city on 14 Jan.

Uzbekistan

President finalised border delimitation agreement with Kyrgyz counterpart; prosecutors handed down lengthy prison term for Karakalpak activist.

Uzbek and Kyrgyz leaders completed border delimitation process. During two-day trip to Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, President Mirziyoev and Kyrgyz counterpart Sadyr Japarov 27 Jan signed over 20 documents aimed at strengthening bilateral relations. Most notably, leaders finalised border delimitation agreement, which Japarov hailed as “truly historic event”.

Court sentenced Karakalpak activists to between three and 16 years in prison. During trial of 22 people charged with instigating deadly violence in autonomous Karakalpakstan region in July 2022, prosecutors 11 Jan called for 20 defendants to receive sentences of between five and 18 years. Bukhara city regional court 31 Jan sentenced lawyer and journalist Dauletmurat Tajimuratov to 16 years in prison. Court sentenced 15 others to prison terms of between three and eight and a half years, released five and handed one a suspended prison sentence.

Latin America & Caribbean

El Salvador

Authorities renewed state of exception for tenth time as President Bukele lauded improved security situation; Salvadoran debt remained high.

Authorities once again renewed state of exception. Legislative Assembly 11 Jan extended state of exception, cornerstone of Bukele’s administration, for tenth time. News outlet La Prensa Gráfica 17 Jan reported that more than 97,000 people, or 2% of country’s adult population, is now behind bars, making it highest imprisonment rate worldwide; Legislative Assembly 12 Jan reported over 61,000 people have been arrested since state of exception began in March 2022. Bukele 17 Jan declared that El Salvador had become “safest country in Latin America” and that state of exception would last “as long as necessary”.

NGOs raised concerns over arbitrary arrests and deaths in custody in past year. NGO Cristosal 5 Jan said it had received 3,086 complaints of human rights violations between March 2022 and 31 Dec, 97% of which were for arbitrary arrests. In its World Report 2023, NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) 12 Jan expressed concern for high number of arbitrary arrests and deaths of 90 people while in custody. In joint statement, HRW and Cristosal 27 Jan said leaked database belonging to Ministry of Public Safety “supports findings of mass due process violations, severe prison overcrowding, and deaths in custody”.

In other important developments. News outlet Elsalvador.com 18 Jan reported that Bukele had increased Salvadoran debt by $5 billion in his three years in office. Legislative Assembly 11 Jan approved controversial Digital Securities Law, allowing El Salvador to issue Bitcoin-backed bonds. VP Ulloa 3 Jan asked Brazil to rejoin Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, signalling willingness to engage with other countries in region.

Honduras

Govt extended state of emergency amid efforts to tackle extortion, and congress failed to elect new Supreme Court members.

Govt extended and expanded state of emergency. After govt imposed state of emergency in Dec 2022 to tackle apparent rise in extortion, Honduran Press Secretariat 7 Jan announced extension by 45 days and expansion to 73 other municipalities across country. Head of Police Gustavo Sánchez 3 Jan said police had dismantled 38 criminal gangs, apprehended 652 gang members and served 717 arrest warrants and that this had been done with “no complaints of human rights violations”. Meanwhile, shoot-out between security forces and gang members 30 Jan left one police officer dead in capital Tegucigalpa.

First attempt to elect Supreme Court members failed. Nominating Board 23 Jan published list of 45 candidates for election of new Supreme Court members, from which Congress elects 15 members. Political tensions simmered ahead of 25 Jan vote since court members are often elected along party lines. Notably, both ruling Libre party and opposition National Party throughout Jan accused each other of planning violent mobilisations on day of election. Congress 25 Jan failed to elect new Supreme Court members; unclear when Congress will convene for new vote, which must occur before 11 Feb deadline.

Mexico

Criminal violence remained high, govt appointed military officer for key role in public security apparatus, and U.S. and Mexico struck migration agreement.

Scores of security personnel killed amid high levels of violence. In north-western Sinaloa state, federal forces 5 Jan captured Ovidio Guzmán, leader of a Sinaloa Cartel faction and son of infamous drug trafficker “El Chapo” Guzmán, in Jesús Maria village; operation left at least 29 people dead, including ten military officers. In apparent bid to secure Guzmán’s release, cartel members same day set fire to shops and vehicles in area and shot at passenger plane in Culiacán airport. In northern Chihuahua state, leader of Los Mexicles criminal group, Ernesto Alberto Piñón de la Cruz, 1 Jan set off mutiny in Ciudad Juárez prison that left 17 people dead, including ten prison officers; he and 29 others escaped. Police 5 Jan killed Piñón in shootout in Ciudad Juárez. In central Mexico State, unknown gunmen 24 Jan killed seven people at gathering in Chimalhuacán municipality. In central Zacatecas state, unknown gunmen 28 Jan killed seven in bar in Jerez municipality. Violence targeting journalists also persisted. Notably, in north-western Sonora state, unknown gunmen 1 Jan shot at reporter Omar Castro.

Authorities drew criticism for further militarisation of public security. President López Obrador 16 Jan appointed former army general and commander of National Guard, Luis Rodríguez Bucio, as new sub-secretary of public security, renewing criticism against govt for entrusting military officers with civilian tasks. Supreme Court 24 Jan upheld controversial article of National Law on Registration of Detentions, which allows armed forces to make civilian arrests without informing police or public.

In other important developments. Mexico and U.S. 5 Jan announced agreement under which U.S. will accept 30,000 migrants from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela; Mexico will accept 30,000 people from same nations having crossed, or tried to cross, U.S. border illegally each month. Trial of Genaro García Luna 16 Jan commenced in New York, U.S.; García Luna, public security secretary and chief war-on-drugs architect under former President Felipe Calderón, is accused of facilitating Sinaloa Cartel’s drug shipments into U.S. and helping group evade capture.

Nicaragua

Crackdown on Catholic Church continued, Indigenous groups condemned govt inaction on illegal settlers, and international actors urged release of political prisoners.

Ortega’s repression of Catholic Church continued. Authorities throughout month banned at least seven religious processions from taking place and attempted to stop at least three more across country as govt clamped down on religious gatherings. Public prosecutors 10 Jan started trial of Matagalpa Bishop Rolando Álvarez, accused of “conspiracy” and “spreading false news”; judge 16 Jan found priest Óscar Benavides guilty of “conspiracy to undermine national integrity and propagation of false news” and sentenced him to eight years in prison. In closed-door trial 23-26 Jan, authorities found six priests and one layman guilty of crimes of conspiracy and spreading fake news.

Indigenous communities spoke out against govt. Representatives of Miskitus and Mayangnas indigenous communities 5 Jan published open letter to President Ortega condemning state’s inaction regarding so-called colonos, or “settlers”, whom they accuse of invading indigenous lands, murdering members of local communities, causing environmental destruction and obstructing their communities’ access to food and shelter. Police 26 Jan arrested 24 settlers after they reportedly attacked Indigenous community as part of land dispute in Bonanza municipality, North Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region.

International pressure to release political prisoners persisted. U.S. Assistant Sec State Brian Nichols 6 Jan said “there has been no communication” with Ortega’s govt but that U.S. was willing to engage if Nicaragua took “positive steps”, such as releasing political prisoners and restoring “minimum rights” for all citizens. Chilean President Gabriel Boric 24 Jan called for immediate release of prisoners during summit of Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Meanwhile, Ortega 11 Jan withdrew ambassadors from Chile, European Union, Ethiopia and Belgium.

Peru

Protests rejecting Boluarte’s take-over intensified across country, killing scores and prompting widespread concern nationally and internationally; new president resisted calls to resign.

Renewed protests left dozens dead as security forces clashed with protesters. Protests, which first erupted in Dec 2022 after former President Castillo’s impeachment, 4 Jan resumed after two-week pause in southern Puno, Cusco, Apurimac and Arequipa regions, and central Junin department. Protesters continued to demand immediate elections, closure of Congress, new Constitution and removal of President Dina Boluarte, who was sworn in 7 Dec following Castillo’s removal. Violence 9 Jan escalated in Puno’s Juliaca city, where clashes between protesters and police left 19 dead. Massive protests in capital Lima 19-20 Jan once more descended into violence, leaving one dead and dozens more injured as police used tear gas to push back protesters. Police 21 Jan arrested well over 200 demonstrators who had stormed university in Lima day before. As of 30 Jan, 58 people have died during protests.

Boluarte refused to resign amid concerns over mounting violence. Prosecutor’s office 10 Jan opened investigation against Boluarte and members of her cabinet for alleged crimes of “genocide, aggravated homicide and serious injuries”. UN same day released statement voicing concern for “rising violence”, while EU 21 Jan condemned security forces’ “disproportionate use of force”. Boluarte 13 Jan apologised for violence but insisted she would not resign nor call constitutional assembly. Govt next day extended 30-day state of emergency in Lima and several other regions for another month. Boluarte 24 Jan called for “truce” and blamed “radicals” for violence, 27 Jan urged Congress to bring tentative April 2024 elections forward to Oct 2023; Congress next day rejected proposal but is set to vote again.

Relations with Honduras and Bolivia grew increasingly strained. Lima 9 Jan banned former Bolivian President Evo Morales and eight Bolivian citizens from entering Peru, accusing them of interfering in Peru’s internal affairs. Morales, who has denounced Castillo’s arrest as illegal, same day said ban aimed to “distract from “human rights abuses”. Foreign ministry 26 Jan recalled its ambassador to Honduras after Honduran President Xiomara Castro 24 Jan condemned Boluarte’s “coup d'état”.

Venezuela

Opposition selected new parliamentary leadership, Mexico talks between govt and opposition stalled, and protests over low wages erupted across country.

Opposition elected new parliamentary leadership, exposing deep internal cleavages. After mainstream opposition late Dec dissolved so-called “interim presidency” of Juan Guaidó, opposition-led National Assembly 5 Jan voted for new leadership, comprising three women, including incoming head Dinorah Figuera from Justice First (PJ) party. All three are in exile and represent so-called “G3” – three largest parties in opposition alliance Unitary Platform – which are increasingly at odds with Popular Will (VP), Guaidó’s party. Exiled VP leader Leopoldo López 12 Jan accused several leading G3 politicians in Unitary Platform delegation to Nov Mexico City dialogue of allying with President Maduro, claiming delegation was “infiltrated”. In same briefing, López blamed PJ’s Julio Borges for failure of 2019 coup attempt, triggering prosecutors 16 Jan to issue arrest warrant for Borges. Meanwhile, opposition-led National Assembly 19 Jan named five-person executive committee to manage Venezuelan assets held abroad.

Efforts to schedule next round of Mexico talks stalled over frozen assets. Maduro govt refused to agree to schedule second meeting of renewed Mexico City talks with Unitary Platform until U.S. unfreezes funds promised under Nov agreement. Unitary Platform delegation 13 Jan met U.S. Assistant Sec State Brian Nichols in U.S. capital Washington DC to resolve issue, but returned without apparent progress. Maduro’s chief negotiator and National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez 17 Jan said there was “no reason to continue a dialogue with people who don’t keep their word”.

Fresh wave of labour unrest erupted. Demonstrations occurred throughout month as public sector wages sank further in real terms, fuelled by substantial devaluation of bolívar currency. Teachers 9 Jan began nationwide protests over wages and conditions, prompting govt-backed armed civilian groups known as colectivos in Aragua state 14 Jan to threaten consequences; National Guard 19 Jan reportedly warned protesting teachers they could face reprisals by colectivos. Union representatives at state-owned Sidor steel plant in Bolívar state said authorities 9-12 Jan arrested at least 12 workers amid labour unrest. Public sector workers 23 Jan marched in cities across country, including Maracaibo (Zulia state) and Valencia (Carabobo state).

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